FINAL REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON TACTICAL WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74J00828R000100080012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
FINAL REPORT
of the
Defense Science, Board Task Force
on
TACTICAL WARNING
February 1972
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This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States with-
in the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. , Sections 793 and 794. The trans-
mission or the revelation of its contents in
any manner. to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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MEMBERSHIP
Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Warning
Mr. A. Carl Haussmann, Jr., Chairman
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
Dr. O. J. Villard, Jr., Vice Chairman
Stanford Research Institute
Dr. Thomas B. Cook, Jr.
Sandia Laboratories
Dr. Walter F. Leverton
Aerospace Corporation
Mr. Roy F. Donegan
Headquarters, NORAD
Mr. James R. Drake
R&D Associates
Mr. Jerome Freedman
Lincoln Laboratory, MIT
Lt. Col. J. J. Hannan, USAF
J3, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
National Security Agency
Dr. Charles M. Herzfeld
International Telephone. and
Telegraph Corporation
Dr. Albert L. Latter
R&D Associates
Mr. Jackson D. Maxey
Mechanics Research Inc.
Col. Frank G. Richie, USAF
J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dr. Harold P. Smith, Jr.
University of California, Davis
Brig. Gen. Lawrence Steinkrous, USAF,
Headquarters, SAC
Dr. Robert D. Turner
Institute for Defense Analyses
Dr. N.F. Wikner
Special Assistant (NTA), ODDR&E
Col. Wallace D. Henderson, USAF
Staff Liaison, ODDR&E
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 April 1972
TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THROUGH: THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
The final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical
Warning is hereby submitted. I would particularly call your attention
to the finding that, despite our large national effort to provide warning
of attack by ballistic missiles, we have essentially no capability "today
or in the foreseeable future," to detect incoming submarine-launched
cruise missiles (see pp. 2 and 15).
Gerald F. Tape
Chairman
Defense Science Board
iii
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
April 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Final Report on Tactical Warning
The attached report is submitted in response to the DDR&E's request
of 18 January 1971 to continue the review of the tactical warning
area with specific emphasis on the possibility of near term improve-
ments.
The report has been formally reviewed by the DSB and thoroughly
discussed with both the DDRF,E staff and appropriate service repre-
sentatives over the last several months. The present document
incorporates to a large extent the essence of suggestions made
during these reviews. It also incorporates the final thoughts of
the Task Force subsequent to the various review actions.
Growing recognition of the importance of tactical warning and needs
for attack assessment suggests that a continuing DSB review of this
area would be appropriate.
da #Uaj1'VA^4%
Carl Haussmann
Chairman, Tactical
Warning Task Force
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Page
Membership, Defense Science Board Task Force on
Tactical Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Memoranda of Transmittal . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. Requirements for Tactical Warning/ Attack Assessment 4
B. Survivability and Countermeasures Considerations . . 6
III. Discussion of Surveillance-System Capability. . . . . . 8
A. Comments on Ballistic-Missile Sensors . . . . . . 8
B. Tactical Warning/ Attack Assessment Systems . . . . 11
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix: Status of Prior DSB Task Force Recommendations. . 19
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REPORT OF THE TACTICAL WARNING TASK FORCE
OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (U)
1. INTRODUCTION (U)
(S) The Tactical Warning Task Force was reactivated by DDR&E
on January 18, 1971 to continue its monitoring of tactical warning and
associated issues. It was requested by DDR&E to apply itself initially
to improvement of tactical warning in the relatively near term; other
taskings of the panel -- e. g. , review of advanced technologies pertinent
to tactical warning -- would follow later. By request the Panel's efforts
were concentrated on the ballistic missile threat since it was understood
that the bomber delivery threat was being addressed elsewhere.
(S) The five meetings of the Task Force each emphasized a
particular subject area as follows:
(1) Surveillance Sensor System Capabilities --
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, 25-27
January 1971.
(2) NORAD Perspective on Warning Problems -- Hqs,
NORAD 30-31 March 1971.
(3) SAC Perspective on Warning Problems, Hqs. SAC
25 -26 May 1971.
(4) Intelligence System Contributions to Warning, NSA,
12-13 July 1971, and the National Military Command
System Interface with the Tactical Warning Function,
National Military Command Center, 14 July 1971.
(5) System 440L Improvement Potentials and Program
647 Capabilities, Hqs, Electronic Systems
Division, L. G. Hanscom Field, Bedford, Mass.,
16 September 1971.
(S) From the information presented at these meetings, our
general conclusion is that today's launch detection sensors -- when
presently programmed improvements are completed -- will provide
overlapping coverage at least of conventional ICBM launches. However,
the questionable survivability of these sensors and their associated com-
munications remains a significant cause for concern.
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(S) Submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are not
considered a part of the officially defined threat against CONUS. How-
ever, the potential should not be ignored since today we have virtually
no capability to provide warning of an SLCM attack.
(S) The impact of more, better, and more diverse Soviet missile
systems; the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and developments
in national policy requiring more flexible response warrant continuing
investigation of warning capabilities and potential improvements. It is
believed that the sensor options discussed later can, in combination,
offer significant improvement in early warning posture. A diversity of
sensors with better correlation of data also has the potential of providing
some pre-impact attack assessment capability. The requirement for
and utilization of such attack assessment information was not deeply
pursued by this Task Force.
(S) System capabilities and requirements are evolving from
Tactical Warning toward pre-impact attack assessment. We do not know
if this is in fact the route that should be followed. The need to evaluate
this trend and, if necessary, develop an alternative, requires a con-
tinuing investigation of the following subjects:
(1) National Command Authority (NCA), and individual
command requirements for tactical warning and
attack assessment information;
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(2) Utilization of attack assessment information by
ballistic missile defense systems, and the
associated nuclear release authority for these
systems;
(3) New systems to meet more extensive tactical
warning and/or attack assessment requirements;
(4) Closer coupling between undersea surveillance
systems and warning systems to provide both
earlier warning and better assessment of
SLBM attacks; and
(5) New technology to meet future requirements.
(U) In addition, it would seem advisable and useful if a con-
tinuing or follow-on committee monitored the fate of this report's
recommendations- -actions taken or the reasons for not taking action.
(U) A review of these recommendations made by the first
Task Force on Tactical Warning is included as an appendix to this
report.
(S) Items not considered by the task force or not considered in
sufficient depth to produce significant conclusions or recommendations
are:
(1) Third party problems, etc.
(2) MIRV and MR V
(3) Launch from under
(4) SALT implications
(5) Survivability requirements
Each of these areas will impact on tactical warning systems
requirements and could well be the subject of follow-on task force
efforts.
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II. DISCUSSION (U)
A. Requirements for Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment
(S) Tactical warning and attack assessment are defined in
JCS Publication 1 as follows:
(a) Tactical Warning - - Notification that hostilities
have been initiated including an identification
of specific threat events.
(b) Attack Assessment - Use of information from
sensors and any other available source to
determine the objectives of an attack and the
nature of the targets.
(S) The Task Force elected not to restrict its considerations
to tactical warning since the function of attack assessment is inevitably
associated with it in that some form of attack assessment will always be
required by the NCA before a response to a nuclear attack will be made.
Moreover, the same (or similar) surveillance systems provide - to some
extent - both types of information. Therefore, it became evident that
both functions needed to be considered in our review and evaluation of
surveillance-system capabilities and requirements.
(S) It seems worth pointing out that multiple warning and pre-
and post-attack assessment systems supported by survivable communica-
tions and associated hardware, and (hopefully) dependent upon different
phenomenology for warning indications are essential to the deterrent at
least in permitting the strategic bomber force to escape weapons aimed
at the bomber bases. Portions of our strategic forces can also benefit
from warning by being able to reposture themselves into a more survivable
mode. ALCC, LOOKING GLASS, NEACP, TACAMO are examples here.
The evident existence of a dependable warning system may also enhance
deterrence in a more general way. If our warning systems are weak,
any response we might make to an attack would either be delayed or be
based on limited information and therefore less effective; hence the
deterrent value of our "assured destruction" counter-forces is reduced.
(S) The chance of obtaining effective warning is enhanced by use
of divergent phenomenology for launch detection. Multiple independent
warning systems can make simultaneous attack on all elements of the
warning system more difficult.
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(S) A major and controversial question remains in the development
of capabilities for improved pre-impact attack assessment:
"Would the U. S. under any circumstance launch a retaliatory
strike prior to detonation of nuclear weapons on CONUS? "
The strategic value of a national policy which countenances such a course
of action can also be questioned. Therefore, this issue seems worthy
of future study from both a technical and political point of view.
(S) Tactical warning is needed for many NORAD, SAC and
NCA time-critical decisions. Some key decisions requiring this warning
data are:
(1) Bombers --scramble alert forces.
(2) National Command Authorities- -take steps
to improve survival potential and institute
other delegation arrangements.
(3) Defense-- scramble alert force and give
nuclear release authority.
(S) While these requirements for data can be met by current
or potential surveillance sensor systems, the only concrete guidance
for system designers is the JCS Validated Surveillance System
Objectives outlined in JSIPS 9-69 and reiterated in JSIPS 1-70.
These objectives were not constrained by either technological or
budgetary feasibility. We believe that more emphasis is required
on realistic goals of prompt and credible warning and assessment of
the character of the attack.
(S) In our view, the essential elements of credible warning and
attack assessment are: launches have occurred, number (is the attack
limited or massive), the country of origin and country being attacked.
In addition, it is essential to the NCA decision process to obtain details
on the character of the attack as soon as possible, although final
retaliatory decisions will probably not be made until nuclear detona-
tions have occurred on CONUS. In any event, whether functioning
in support of a retaliatory decision, or as a basis for force reconstitu-
tion, a capability for timely post impact nuclear detonation assessment
is essential.
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(S) Attack on satellite sensors and simultaneous ECM dis-
ruption of redundant surveillance systems would in itself constitute
warning. However, sensor vulnerability to countermeasures is also
a matter of real concern during an interval of gradually rising inter-
national tensions accompanied by successively more provocative acts.
The Task Force has been unable to discover what resources could be
brought to bear against a slow, insidious, gradually-increasing degrada-
tion of our warning sensors which might easily take place in an atmosphere
of threats and counter-threats. With current programs there would be
relatively few retaliatory measures open to us; perhaps the most logical
would be an equivalent attack on their sensors. In such a scenario, it
is essential that we be able to unequivocally detect such countermeasures,
and to take some protective steps which would at least increase the
difficulty of such action. At present, the U. S. has no such capability.
(S) As the number and diversity of warning systems is reduced,
the ease with which the enemy can attack and disrupt increases. In this
context we note that diversity of detection phenomenology does not
necessarily imply diversity of vulnerability to physical attack. Both
are needed. If the requirement expands from merely warning of mass
attack to warning and assessment of limited and repeated attacks,
functional survivability (survival of a warning and attack assessment
capability) becomes more critical. The difficulty of adequately
hardening any of the current or projected surveillance sensors for
tactical warning suggests that functional survivability is best and
most economically achieved through a diversity of sensor systems,
each survivable to the greatest practical extent. A survivable nation-
wide post-impact nuclear burst detection system (NUDETS), including
its communication, also seems to be a desirable part of this mix.
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III. DISCUSSION OF SURVEILLANCE-SYSTEM CAPABILITY (U)
(S) From the data presented in various briefings the Task Force
has prepared some comments on current and projected surveillance
sensor system capabilities in the light of the threats and the needs as
we understand them. These comments may provide some feel for the
relative cost and adequacy of performance of the various systems.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)
A. Conclusions (U)
(S) (1)
is at best marginal. Even then coverage of all poten-
tial SLBM launch locations will not be complete.
Present sensors are extremely vulnerable to elec-
tronic or physical attack. Our present ability to
warn against cruise missiles is non-existent.
SLBM warning coverage
for complacency. Until the IOC of the first
Although it can be said that when currently approved
programs are completed (474N modifications) or become
operational (647), we will have a modest capability in
terms of coverage and probability of detection for early
warning against the officially-defined ICBM and SLBM
threat projected through 1976, we do not find any basis
(S) (2) The strong push for dual deployment of in
the eastern hemisphere is premature. The case for addi-
tional satellites in the eastern hemisphere should be
based on operational experience and confidence in the
data processing software, coupled with the realization
of the postulated threat (SSNX-8), and has yet to be made.
(S) (3) In view of BMEWS capability for attack assessment as
well as tactical warning, it is desirable to retain this
system indefinitely or at least until the attack assessment
capability of the northern PARs is fully demonstrated.
While BMEWS provides a good impact point prediction
capability for attack assessment, it does have coverage
gaps against DICBMs, and FOBS. 440L provides only
gross attack assessment, but provides good FOBS and
DICBM coverage.
(S) (4) Responsibilities for management of the tactical warning
mission area are widely distributed and sometimes
conflicting. We have found no clear assignment of the
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mission, specific tasks, or responsibilities for pro-
viding tactical warning on a world-wide basis. CINC-
NORAD/CINCONAD has an assigned responsibility
for providing tactical warning of an attack against
North America and as a result of specific JCS re-
quests is providing data for attack assessment, but
does not have the mission of providing a comprehen-
sive national system for tactical warning and attack
assessment.
(S) (5) From the tone and content of briefings to the Task
Force, we perceive within the Services and the JCS
(NMCC) a growing interest in pre-impact attack assess-
ment to support both SIOP selection and even more de-
tailed control of strategic forces in a nuclear exchange.
It seems to be assumed that this information will be
forthcoming, but no one seems to know quite how nor
precisely what it will be use f r
he requiremerms
for such data seem not to be clearly established, and the
demarcation between attack assessment for NCA decisions
and data for battle control is by no means clear. The
problem of attack assessment for NCA decision support
has received relatively little attention while a large effort
has been undertaken to support a sometimes nebulous
function of "battle control. " The highest priority should
be placed on determination and support of NCA decision
requirements.
(S) (6) Post-impact NUDETS are integral and important parts
of the overall attack assessment problem. We believe
that more attention to this aspect of "attack assessment"
is absolutely essential.
(S) (7) The s stem specifications, and the demonstrated capability
I Iconsiderably exceed the "requirements" for a
launch warning system but fall short of providing an at-
tack assessment capability. A simpler (warning-only)
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system will, of course, support launching the bomber
force under positive control and a policy of retaliation.
It can be said that the trend of warning systems develop-
ment is toward systems to support at least a limited
attack assessment capability.
(S) (8) The survivability of tactical warning surveillance systems
and especially their associated command and control struc-
ture is a matter for real concern. Since any system can
in the end be put out of action by a sufficiently-deter-
mined attack, functional survivability is best assured
by redundant systems with different vulnerabilities. It
appears neither wise nor feasible to attempt to make
one system superhard and then to rely solely on it. The
need for improved survivability is, of course, based on
the assumption that warning systems may be required
to survive to warn of repeated attacks, or that an inde-
pendent attack on warning sensors might be made.
(S) (9) Today, and for the foreseeable future, we essentially
have no capability to detect incoming cruise missiles
flying at low altitude. This is disturbing from two
aspects. This has the effect of encouraging these
missiles to be stationed close to our shores. In the
absence of an adequate defense, this delivery technology
presents an all-too-attractive method of delivering pay-
loads. We have found no significant effort to address
this particular warning problem.
(S)(10) A potential way to improve our tactical warning/attack
assessment capability is to make operational use .in near
real time of intelligence data on missile launches. These
data could be used both to test the TW/AA surveillance
systems and to augment TW/AA in times of crisis.
However, there are currently both security and adminis-
trative problems in making these data routinely available
to personnel responsible for providing tactical warning on
a day-to-day basis.
(S)(11) If the system performance specifications are met (in par-
ticular an acceptable false alarm rate for SLBM detection)
I
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(S)(12) Lack of comprehensive programs to either detect
ECM efforts against warning systems or to counter
such efforts may well make such attacks attractive
to the Soviets in a period of increasing tension.
(S) (13) The performance of 440L as a contributor to the sub-
ject at hand, continues to be a matter of controversy.
Unless the system can be made to give adequate
around the clock performance its value remains
questionable.
Note: Another OTH system of :interest .is COBRA MIST. While
the Task Force did not fully investigate aircraft warning
intelligence systems, we were briefed on COBRA MIST
on two occasions. In these briefings and subsequent
discussions we could find no logical basis for establish-
ment or continuation of this system.
B. Recommendations (U)
(S) (1)* An organization should be established within the DOD
with the responsibility of staff supervision of the func-
tion of tactical warning and attack assessment. With
better management focus, technology can be much
more efficiently utilized. An integrated tactical warn-
ing and attack assessment management organization
should in the near term emphasize a clear definition
of NCA and CINC requirements, surveillance sensor
system data integration, and command and control.
New sensor technology can be explored later.
(S) (2)** The possibility of assigning the tactical warning/
attack assessment mission to an organization respon-
sible for satisfying all approved requirements should
be explored. The roles of NORAD, SAC, and the NMCS
and other key participants should be clearly defined
in this mission assignment.
* We hope that DOD Directive 5100. 30 will satisfy the intent of this
requirement.
The intent of this recommendation should also be implemented by
DOD Directive 5100. 30.
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(S) (3) Studies leading to a clear definition of attack assess-
ment requirements and current capabilities should
be made as soon as possible. A specific aim of
these studies would be to establish the difference
between attack assessments required for NCA de-
cision support (including the possibilities of second
strike retaliation, and those required for launch-
from-under attack) or for battle control.
(S) (4) In the design of tactical warning systems and their
associated communications, survivability and resis-
tance to countermeasures should be a more important
consideration than it is at present. While hardening
of radar systems does not appear economically justi-
fiable, greater satellite hardness against nuclear
attack should be achievable at moderate cost. The
criteria for survivability should be based on analysis
of the relationship between the cost of survivability
and effectiveness of the system on a case-by-case
basis.
(S) (5) The potential, and the need for survivable post-
impact NUDETS, and how it might be achieved,
should be restudied in the very near future.
(S)(6)
(S)(7)
(S) (8)
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(S) (9) The testing of sensor-system effectiveness needs addi-
tional emphasis. Every opportunity to make real-time,
in situ tests of the utmost possible realism should be
taken.
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(S) (11) Present R&D efforts to provide an SLCM warning capa-
bility should continue and more active consideration
should be given to deployment of an operational system.
(S) (12) A definitive operational evaluation of 440L should be
conducted as soon as ADC accepts full system respon-
sibility in order to judge the wisdom of continuing
investments in the system.
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Appendix
STATUS OF PRIOR DSB TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS (U)
(U) The first DSB Task Force on Advanced Tactical Warning
under the chairmanship of Dr. Albert D. Wheelon submitted their report
to OSD on 10 October 1969. It is interesting to note that many of their
recommendations for action to improve our tactical warning capability
continue to be pertinent and still require action. These prior conclusions
and/or recommendations are summarized below in the order of priority
which we believe to be currently appropriate.
(S) 1. System Engineering and Evaluation.
"We have observed that warning requirements are
ill-defined." This continues to be true and the need for
a full-time effort to quantify warning and attack assess-
ment requirements is still apparent. . . "We believe
that a useful and reliable early warning (and attack
assessment) system can be supported by today's tech-
nology, although no single sensor is itself highly reliable
under a wide enough range of conditions. Information
supplied by several diverse sensors, with their different
coverages and failure modes, will do the job if it is
properly correlated and distributed." . . .
(S) It is also true of this as well as the previous task force
that. . . "we did not dwell heavily on processing, display, and data utilization
problems." . . . We did investigate data utilization in somewhat more detail
than the previous group and still find that. . . "there is certainly more
important progress which can be made in these areas. "
(5) With the increasing SLBM threat and the growing National Military
Command Center (NMCC) interface with the National Command Authorities
(NCA) we find that responsibility for and approaches to use of tactical warning
and attack assessment information is becoming more diffuse rather than more
cohesive. While SAC and the NMCC may have requirements for information
which differ in detail from each other and from those of NORAD, we believe
that it is fundamental to a rapid and effective NCA decision process, particular-
ly in times of stress, that all elements have a common basis of information
presented in the same or a very similar manner. To achieve this necessary
cohesiveness in the NCA decision process, it is still recommended that -
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