DRUG PEDDLERS IGNORE NIXON THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000400030067-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: October 13, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

1'xkkC95
Approved For Release 2005/06/22: CIA-RDP7 O1WO030067-8 C Z-i
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE~~ GG'' PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
Drug Peddlers Ignore Nixon Threat
_A v"
at& Anderson Tncreclii a !,not in. i7.S. interests- to imnte.
ence, President Nixon de-
clared dramatically that keep-
ing narcotics out of the coun-
try is "just as important as
keeping armed enemy forces
from landing in the US." The
'President then announced
sternly that he would cut off
aid to countries Whose leaders
"protect the activities of those
who contribute to- our drug
problem."
Predictably, these bold
words drew election-year
headlines for the President
and warmapproval from a
public alarmed over the drug
danger. Yet elasci_ fled. d"
men s inour possession show
certain foreign is
#at Me Z_ g-
s.
The smuggling operations in
Laos, for example, illustrate.
the difference between what
Mr. Nixon says in public and
what his intelligence docu,
ments show in secret. To prop
up the 5ouvanna Phouma gov-
ernment, he has poured in
more than $200 million in mili-
tary aid annually. re-
norts the CIA and her
s ve him ever- rea-
1 a d.
ays one document: "A
ec runr olTLao soe e
IS inyolyj4LMM narc ^ es
usnrlnces Including generals,
gr, Tats
,
and nrovin ogernors.
ml r_rA snWf ,!a1 advised
TfiE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Oct. 18, 1972 1 .
punish Vietnam for.failure to
control drugs ... "
President Nixon's double
talk on drugs is nowhere more
apparent than in Thailand
which gets over $100 million
in U.S, aid a year.
"We believe that major pu-
nitive measures (such as) with.
drawal of aid, denial of Most
Favored Nation status, etc.
would probably under
mine our cooperative relations
with Thailand and jeopardize
ongoing security activities ..."
says a U.S. intelligence docu-
ment.
A h. ichMr. Nixon has sworn to
4ULoff.
The secret documents make
clear that the President is put-
ting his military policies in
Asia ahead of the drug inva-
sion. "The difficulties of . un-
dertaking s ich drastic action
(as aid cutoffs) cannot be over-
emphasized," declares another
document on Laos, "since .. .
the risk of jeopardizing some
part of the military effort is
high."
In Cambodia, President
Nixon also continues to bol-
ster an unstable dictatorship
with $240 million worth of
U.S. aid a year. Yet Cambodia
is an important transshipment
point for dopey,i elh e
di Itmenlalns .
Nixon. however, has no inten-
tion in (amhndia of ar ing
cutoff -nift biq. at to
$ Ij`11,S. aid were withdrawn,
eve ment'sa ability to
~' sI aghes
si,tJ}?would be weakene o e
Saigon Smugglers
In South Vietnam, as well,
the documents' attest to "the
corruption among government
civilian, military and police of-
ficials, some of whom have
been actively participating in
the narcotics traffic them-
selves ... " But again there is
no real thought of cutting off
aid.
The secret docui rents
bluntly give the reason "'It, is
he . President's threats
ro" . which the CIAfears may
ecome a major supplier
~TJ. . dr a affic e7c rs." ut
t1+a CTA reporte.
- Shah hac. mank ennut
n few occasions against
rumors persist
.m &T some members of the
rCOyal farm v and uarlinm nt
ara narcotics use Swiss au-
thorities recently charged an
Iranian Prince who. accompa-
nied the Shah ' to Switzerland
with having transferred pure
opium to Geneva."
Throughout Latin America,
the same look-the-other-way
policy prevails.
President Nixon, for in-
stance, praised 'Paraguay for.
extraditing a notorious French
narcotics smuggler, Auguste
Ricord, to face trial in the U.S.
What Mr. Nixon neglected to
mention was that Ricord was
Squished only after we
wrote a series of columns
about Paraguay's government-
backed drug smuggling and
after Democratic congressmen
began talking of cutting off
aid to Paraguay themselves.
e _, Presidentreally
Eby, 1ehas ~CIA re oi"l"s
two Para an a erali
and t e c e o 1 s sec Lt Pd-
trlffi,n plyever ins errs say
tkaC. is no realmove end
the $12-million a year aid' to
Par-- :My.
In Panama, which gets $18
million annually in aid, the
President has intelligence re-
ports saying: "One of the
more glaring examples of offi,:
.cial corruption in the country
of Panama ... General Omar
Torrijos and President Lakas
appear to be controlling faa
tors in the narcotics traffic."
?11 ., r.atin Am ri ar the
i ih ence documCnts say;
"the- -s st d trimen to
_.e top of some
erican vernmenls '
But in Latin Amer caf a, Coo,
President Nixon's vows to cut
off aid to offending lands have
been ignored. The documents
say explicitly: "Coercive meas.
ures, such as reduction or ter
mination of AID programs...
generally have proven to by
ineffective."
government col ucion o~ i~c-
tin,in Af hanistan, Pakistan,,
Inc n a eru,
livid Hong Kong ans.
?1972, United Feature Syndicate
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 September 26, rroved Fe()?MgSJa(/f/?&~9ftoDP~f4ROAgf~5R000400030067-8
and the new Labor-HEW appropriations,
the welfare reform proposal, the water
pollution act amendments, the housing
bill, and the new minimum wage legisla-
tion. But no mention was made of one
issue which has been pending in the
Senate far, far longer than any of these
issues, and which deserves consideration
as much as any of the pending bills.
Mr. President, I refer, of course, to the
Genocide Convention. The convention
was originally submitted to the Senate
by President Truman in 1950. It took 21
years for the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to report it to the floor. That has
now occurred, and the Senate has a
golden opportunity to act on the con-
vention now.
If we. fail to act on this convention
prior to adjournment sine die-which
now looks as if it will be in the next 3
weeks-we will lose this opportunity-
perhaps indefinitely. This worthwhile
convention deserves our consideration,
and I believe we owe it to its proponents
to act up or down on this convention
after 22 years of indecision,
Mr. President, let us act on this con-
vention without further delay.
SOUTHEAST ASIA HEROIN
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, the
Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mc-
GOVERN) has challenged President Nixon
to live up to his threat to cut off aid to
all governments that do not cooperate
with us in the war against the world
heroin traffic. He and Frank Mankiewicz,
his campaign manager, have demanded
that the President start by immediately
banning aid to Thailand, Laos, and South
Vietnam. Frank Mankiewicz said:
That is where the majority of the world's
heroin is coming from.
The Senator himself did not go beyond
charging that one-fourth to one-third of
U.S. heroin comes from Southeast Asia.
But he added:
The reason that Richard Nixon has been
unable to prevent this is that our allies in
Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam p,re in-
volved in the narcotics trade.
To bolster his case, the Senator from
South Dakota quoted the following para-
graph from what was supposed to be "a
cabinet level report," which was made
the theme of an article by Seymour
Hersh in the New York Times of July 24 :
the governments of the (Southeast
Asian) region are unable and in some cases
unwilling to do the things that have to be
done by them if a truly effective effort were
to be made.
east Asia, because I believe they con-
stitute a definitive reply to the allega-
tions made by the Senator from South
Dakota and his campaign manager.
Fact No. 1, as General Walt points out,
Is that Southeast heroin accounts for no
more than 10 to 15 percent of the total
traffic coming Into this country-not
one-quarter, one-third, or one-half, as
the Senator and Mr. Mankiewicz con-
tend.
Fact No. 2 is that it is Burma and not
Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand which is
the heartland of the Southeast Asian
drug situation.
Let me quote what General Walt had
to say on the subject in his testimony of
August 14:
The Southeast Asian drug situation must
be dealt with on a regional basis. As I see
it, there are five factors which contribute to
the making of this situation:
The principal factor in the entire situation
is the virtually total absence of any kind of
governmental authority or machinery of con-
trol and repression in northern Burma,
which is the heartland of the Southeast
Asian drug situation.
The second most important factor is the
criminal element in Southeast Asia, largely
dominated by ethnic Chinese, operating in a
Maflia-like manner through the old tongs,
or Triad societies.
The third factor is the serious lack of ex-
perienced personnel and technological
equipment, and of an established control ap-
paratus which still hampers the efforts of the
Southeast Asian governments.
The fourth factor, in my opinion, is the
element of Communist involvement-in Laos,
in Thailand, in Burma, and probably in
Vietnam.
The fifth factor is corruption.
Looking at it from this standpoint, it is
nonsense to suggest that the prime factor
contributing to the drug problem in South-
east Asia is the existence of widespread gov-
ernmental corruption.
Given the existence of the other four fac-
tors, there would still be a serious drug prob-
lem in Southeast Asia regardless of any cor-
ruption that might exist in any government.
There may be honest differences of opinion
over whether corruption should be ranked
ahead of the Communist factor or ahead of
the lack of personnel and equipment. But I
believe that no one can challenge the asser-
tion that the Burma factor ranks first and
the criminal factor ranks second in the
Southeast Asian drug equation. Anyone who
ignores these factors is simply not looking at
the situation objectively or as a whole.
Let me expand on the statement that Bur-
ma is the heartland of the Southeast Asia
drug problem.
Burma produces by far the bulk of the
opium exported from the so-called Golden
Triangle.
The great majority of the refineries in
Southeast Asia are located in Burma. This
was so even before the recent crackdown in
A few months ago the able and distin- Laos and Thailand which obliged many of the
guished chairman of the Subcommittee refineries to relocate in Burma.
on Internal Security (Mr. EASTLAND) Burma is the prime sanctuary and base of
operations for the major groups of trafiick-
commissioned Gen. Lewis W. Walt, U.S. ers. It is in Burma that the great opium
Marine Corps (retired), to conduct an caravans originate which are the ultimate
investigation of the world drug traffic. source of 60 to 70 percent of the traffic com-
General Walt, who retired in early 1971, ing out of Southeast Asia.
is one of our country's foremost soldiers These facts are common knowledge, and
Burma. He pointed out that the chief
reason why the Burmese Government
has not been able to assert its authority
in northern Burma is because of the
chronic state of insurgency there, involv-
ing Shan and Kachin tribesmen and
White Flag Communists. The White Flag
Communists' insurgency, he said, has
grown to the point where it absorbs
probably 80 percent of the total counter-
insurgency energies of the Rangoon
government in northern Burma. Fur-
thermore, it so happens that the area
between the Salween River and the Yun-
nan frontier, which is firmly controlled
by the White Flag Communists, is the
most fertile opium-producing territory
in the whole of Burma.
Said General Walt:
In view of the fact that Peking mothered
the White Flag Communist movement and
that it still controls them, it cannot escape
morale responsibility for their role as prime
producers in the Burma opium traffic. More-
over, the act of this insurgency places the
Burmese Government in the invidious posi-
tion of not being able to enforce its own laws
in the area, and of having to tolerate opium
trafficking by the regional military forces
which oppose the Communists.
This is a situation which calls for some
plain talk-all the more so because China
has now been brought into the world com-
munity of nations.
Using a map that showed the main
opium growing areas in Laos and Thai-
land, as well as the areas under Com-
munist occupation, General Walt fur-
ther demonstrated that in Laos the
Communists control fully 80 percent of
the territory where opium poppies are
grown, and that they also control a sig-
nificant stretch inside Thailand along
the Laotian frontier.
General Walt gave high marks to the
governments of Thailand, Laos, and Viet-
nam for the cooperation they are now
giving us in the regional war On opium
and heroin. In the case of Thailand, he
detailed some of the impressively large
seizures that had been made by the Thai
authorities since the beginning of the
year, and described the destruction of
26 tons of opium which were surrendered
to the Thai Government by the Chinese
irregular forces in northern Thailand,
pursuant to an agreement which gave
the CIF members status as Thai resi-
dents, land of their own, and resettle-
ment assistance.
In the case of Laos, General Walt quot-
ed a paragraph from the so-called ca-
binet-level report, a paragraph which
had been overlooked by Mr. Seymour
Hersh of the New York Times-and was
later overlooked by the Senator from
South Dakota and Mr. Mankiewicz.
Surprisingly enough, the most effective
antinarcotics program in the area seems to
be in Laos, ... Ambassador Godley first con-
vinced Premier Souvanna Phoama of the
great importance the United States Govern-
ment attached to the antinarcotics program
and made it clear that few things could hurt
the cause of Laos more with the American
Congress and people than anything less than
has produced a report of outstanding Southeastern Asia, damning Laos and Thai- a maximum effort against the illicit traffic.
significance which merits the attention land but ignoring Burma, is simply not pre- Souvanna was sufficiently impressed by the
of every Member of Congress. In my re- senting a balanced picture. importance of the effort that he placed his
pore
marks today I intend to quote specifi- In his testimony of September 14, sonal charge intelligence offet, the General program. the prior mam. Kha. Kham , ho u, on e
sonal from those portions of General General Walt added further important of the most powerful men in Laos, had a clear
Walt's report which dealt with South- information about the situation in charter from his chief and went to work
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 S 16006
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16, 1972
with a real sense of personal dedication. He
has been assisted by all appropriate parts of
the U.S. mission. The overall antinarcotics
effort in Laos appears to be making good
progress; it is an example for other countries
o follow.
I agree with General Walt's observa-
tion that, when they quote from con-
lidential documents, newspapermen fre-
quently have a penchant for quoting the
"bad" paragraphs and ignoring the
,`good" paragraphs.
Mr. President, at this point, I ask unan-
imous consent to have printed in the REC-
ORD some of the key passages from Gen-
eral Walt's report on the Southeast Asia
drug situation.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
TsxcERPTs FROM GENERAL WALT'S TESTIMONY
ON THE WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC BEFORE THE
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL
SECURITY, AUGUST 14, 1972
It is my understanding that you have
asked me to present our findings on South-
east Asia before today's session of the sub-
committee because there have been con-
flicting reports about the situation in' that
part of the world and because there. is an
intense congressional interest.
According to some accounts which have
appeared in the press and on TV documen-
taries, the large-scale opium traffic in South-
east Asia has been made possible only be-
cause governments which are supposed to be
friendly to us have failed to cooperate with
us in combating the traffic and because top
governmental officials in these countries have
themselves been involved in the traffic. These
were the allegations.
The administration has replied that these
reports are false and exaggerated, that we
are today receiving excellent cooperation
from the governments in Southeast Asia,
and that remarkable progress is being made.
Where does the truth lie?
It is obvious from a reading of the Con-
gressional Record that many Congressmen
have been disposed to believe the critics
because in certain cases the critics have
been able to allude to confidential official
documents that appear to be highly critical
of the Southeast Asian governments. I may
say that I myself had read so many critical
articles prior to my departure that I, too,
was disposed to be skeptical, if not critical.
before I embarked on this trip around the
world. However, I came away with a final.
impression that was sharply opposed to my
preconceptions.
First, Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply
specifically to a statement that appeared in
the New York Times of July 24, because it has
been widely quoted and reproduced and has
obviously had considerable impact. The
article quoted the following paragraph from
what it described as a "cabinet level report":
I. quote:
"There is no prospect of suppressing air
and sea traffic of narcotics in Southeast Asia
under current conditions or under any condi-
tions that can realistically be projected. This
is so because the governments in' the region
are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to
do those things that would have to be done
by them-and cannot be done by the United
States-if a truly effective effort were to be
made."
I have been given a copy of the so-called
cabinet level report and here are my com-
ments on it, sir.
First, let me say it is a great temptation
for any newspaperman to quote from any
classified document he happens to get access
to. This is supposed to give him a scoop; and
there are many people who believe that the
mere fact that a document is classified con'- Mr. SouawiNE. But in opium, what is the
stitutes proof that the statements made in it size of it?
are accurate. But from many, many years General WALT. About the size of a build-
of experience in the assessment of Intel- Ing brick. I hoped to hvae a morphine brick
ligence, I know how misleading a single here this morning but I don't have it; it
document or a single quotation from a has not been brought in yet. It may be
classified document can be. brought in later. It is just about the size of
building brick.
Those who have had the sane experience
I have had, would, I believe, agree with the
following general observations:
(1) Honest and conscientious men look-
Ing at the same situation can come up with
substantially different assessments.
(2) The classified files on any complex
situation, therefore, will inevitably contain
reports that differ significantly on details
and even on fundamentals.
(3) Intelligence flies will frequently also
contain what we call raw intelligence; that
is, reports that have come in from a variety
of sources which may or may not be true,
and which have to be substantiated before
they can be considered hard intelligence.
(4) Those who have the responsibility of
decision must weigh their intelligence files
or their report files in aggregate, assiduously
distinguishing between raw intelligence and
hard intelligence.
(5) Reports that are 6 months to a year old
must never by themselves be used as a guide
to the current situation, even though their
validity at the time may have been generally
accepted. Situations can change radically in
6 months or even less.
(6) Reports, Including task force reports,
will vary tremendously in quality. Some are
outstanding; some are mediocre; some sim-
ply crumble before the test of time; some
turn out to be odd mixtures of valid findings
and of findings that miss the mark com-
pletely. Each report and each section of each
report, therefore, requires careful evalua-
tion.
In reading the report in question, I found
several statements which are hardly in har-
mony with the paragraph quoted.
There was, for example, an entire para-
graph devoted to the remarkable progress in
Laos, while, on the subject of Thai trawlers,
the report said, "For a number of reasons
the suppression of illicit traffic by Thai traw-
lers appears both feasible and highly reward-
ing; it should clearly command higheat pri-
ority."
The report to which the New York Times
article referred was dated February; the team
was in Vietnam in January. Their findings
were based-on the situation that existed dur-
ing the previous 6 month's to 1 year's time.
So I am not challenging gospel when I tell
you that my own assessment of the situation
in Southeast Asia today differs radically from
the quotation reprinted in the New York
Times article.
Let me first give you a general statement
of my findings and then I shall proceed to
deal with the situation on a country-by-
country basis.
Mr. Chairman, I would welcome questions
at any time during my presentation, sir.
I will not tell you that all is well in South-
east Asia and that we have nothing more to
worry about as far as the opium traffic in the
area is concerned. The problem remains a
formidable one and there are still many
weaknesses to be overcome.
To the criminal element, the gigant, prof-
its to be had from the opium trade con.
stitute an almost irresistible enticement. For
example, sir, a kilo of opium grown in Tur-
key, if it is sold to the government, a farmer
gets $15 for it. If it is sold illicitly he gets
probably $30 for it. Now, by the time that
kilo of opium is changed into heroin and sold
on the streets in New York, it is worth almost
140,000-so you see the people in between,
who are getting it here and selling it, are
making a lot of money.
Mr. SouRWINE. General, can you give us an
idea of the size of a kilo?
General WALT. A kilo is 2?to pounds.
organized and it is to be anticipated that
they will move to sophisticate their pro-
cedures in an effort to circumvent the
stepped-up security measures of the South-
east Asian governments.
The Governments of Thailand, Laos, and
Vietnam are relatively new to the business
of narcotics control and they suffer frorn. a
lack of specially trained customs and police
officials and of logistical communications,
and technological equipment. These weak-
nesses we are seeking to overcome through
special trainingprograms and advisory mis-
sions and through special equipment supply
programs.
Some allowance must also be made for
the political and social problems that have
delayed regional action on the drug prob-
lem, including the fact that the Govern-
ments of South Vietnam and Laos have been
fighting desperate and costly wars against
the North Vietnamese invaders while the
Government of Thailand has been having
increasing difficulty with the Communist
insurgency in its border areas.
Corruption throughout Asia is more wide-
spread possibly than It is here in our coun-
try and this is a problem, too, that will have
to be overcome or reduced to more accept-
able dimensions.
But, acknowledging the dangers and the
weaknesses, I still believe there is much
reason for hope in Southeast Asia. There is
movement there and momentum, and this
moemntum is In the right direction.
As the Senators know, our own Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs maintains
missions in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and
in many other countries. We tend to take
the existence of these missions for granted.
Actually, the mere fact of their existence
is of profound significance because it be-
speaks an extraordinary degree of coopera-
tion between their governments and ours.
There is no percedent inhistory for an ar-
rangement betewen two governments under
which government A gives government B
the right to station law enforcement repre-
sentatives on its territory, who operate their
own intelligence system and their own net-
work of informers, offering rewards for in-
formation in a more or less public manner.
Abuot the only power they lack is the power
to arrest-and here I would observe that our
own BNDD men are frequently invited to ac-
company law enforcement squads in other
countries, in an observer capacity, in raids
on traffickers and laboratories.
The implications of this arrangement go
far beyond permitting American BNDD offi-
cers to operate on their territory. Every
government that commits itself this far
automatically incurs an obligation to co-
operate with its in the fieldof narcotics in-
telligence and to take action on any hard
intelligence which we pass on to them.
At the very least, this degree of cooperation
must be considered pretty solid proof of good
faith. It would be impressive standing by
itself; but there are many other evidences
of good faith.
For example, both the Thai Government
and the Laotian Government have agreed in
principle to special aerial photographic recon-
naissance of their territory so that we will
know, and they will know, precisely where
the opium is being grown, and approximate-
ly how much is being grown. It Is my under-
standing that the first systematic reconnais-
sance flights will probably be made in De-
cember of this year and January of next year,
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September 26, .1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
when the next opium crop matures and when
the poppy field will have maximum visibility.
What the critics say is not completely un-
true but, by and large, their criticism and
the documents they quote in support of their
criticism have to do with a situation that
existed a year or so ago. Over the past year,
however, the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and
Thailand has changed radically. It would be
no exaggeration to say that all three govern-
ments in this period have made the quantum
jump from an indifferent or, at the best, an
unmotivated attitude toward the war on
drugs, to the status of allies with the United
States in this war.
These are my basic observations on the
situation in Southeast Asia.
The Southeast Asian drug situation must
be dealt with on a regional basis. As I see it,
there are five factors which contribute to the
making of this situation:
The principal factor in the entire situation
is the virtually total absence of any kind
of governmental authority or machinery of
control and repression in northern Burmpa,
which is the heartland of the Southeast Asian
drug situation.
The second most important factor is the
criminal element in Southeast Asia, largely
dominated by ethnic Chinese, operating in a
Mafia-like manner through the old tongs,
or Triad societies.
The third factor is the serious lack of ex-
perienced personnel and technological equip-
ment, and of an established control apparatus
which still hampers the efforts of the South-
east Asian governments,
The fourth factor, in my opinion, Is the ele-
ment of Communist Involvement-in Laos, in
Thailand, in Burma, and probably in Viet-
nam.
The fifth factor is corruption.
Looking at it from this standpoint, it is
nonsense to suggest that the prime . factor
contributing to the drug problem In South-
east Asia is the existence of widespread gov-
ernment corruption.
Given the existence of the other four fac-
tors, there would still be a serious drug prob-
lem in Southeast Asia regardless of any cor-
ruption that might exist in any government,
There. may be honest differences of opinion
over whether corruption should be ranked
ahead of the Communist factor or ahead of
the lack of personnel and equipment. But I
believe that no one cart challenge the asser-
tion that the Burma factor ranks first and
the criminal factor ranks second in the
Southeast Asian drug equation. Anyone who
ignores these factors is simply not looking
at the situation objectively or as a whole.
Now, sir, I would like to go to specifics on
Burma.
Let me expand on the statement that
Burma is the heartland of the Southeast
Asia drug problem.
Burma produces by far the bulk of the
opium exported from the so-called Golden
Triangle.
The great majority of the. refineries In
Southeast Asia are located in Burma. This
was so even before the recent crackdown
in Laos and Thailand which obligated many
of the refineries to relocate In Burma.
Burma is the prime sanctuary and base of
operations for the major groups of traffick-
ers. It is in Burma that the great opium
caravans originate which are the ultimate
source of 60 to 70 percent of the traffic com-
ing out of Southeast Asia.
These facts are common knowledge, and
anyone who talks about the situation in
Southeastern Asia, damning Laos and Thai-
land but ignoring Burma, is simply not pre-
senting a balanced picture ... Most of the
opium production in Burma, as you will see
from this map, is concentrated in 'the Shan
and Kachin States, along the Chinese fron-
tier. The northern part of the Shan State
above Lashio and east to the Chinese fron-
tier has been the locus of the White Flag
Communist insurgency which is a pro-
Peking and Peking-backed group.
In a period from March to June, after the
harvest but before the monsoons set in, the
opium is transported to the Thai and Laotion
frontiers either by trains or porters or by
caravans of horses and mules. The caravans
can be very elaborate undertakings.
That is a map of Burma. You can see the
general location in northeastern Burma and
this is the area where foreigners cannot get
into; it is an area controlled primarily by the
tribal and political insurgents and is defi-
nitely not under the control of the Burmese
Government and this is the center of the
opium growing and the heroin manufactur-
ing activity of Burma. `
When it reaches the frontier area, the
opium may be processed into morphine base
or heroin in the three large refinery com-
plexes in the Tachilek area, which is situ-
ated here, or at other refineries in the tri-
border area which I spoke of earlier .. .
As I said earlier, we saw from the aircraft
the complexes in the Tachilek area which
refine opium into morphine and heroin.
This manufacture of course, takes place be-
fore the heroin is moved on down toward
the Thai border and the Laotian border.
Alternatively, _the raw opium may be
moved into Thailand by a variety of devious
routes and then transhipped by trawler from
Bangkok to Hong Kong, Singapore, and
other points.
The KKY and the Chinese irregular forces,
who operate sometimes in competition, some-
times in collusion, are supposed to conduct
the major convoy operations, while the KKY
is reported to be in control of the three large
refinery complexes in the Tachilek area.
Burma Is a signatory of the 1961 U.N. Sin-
gle Convention on Narcotics. The government
appears to be unhappy about what the opium
trade in its northern provinces is doing to
its reputation, and it feels it is wrecking its
reputation as a nation incapable of control-
ling the opium growing. Every once in awhile
it will take a small affirmative action; it
will seize some opium or destroy a few poppy-
fields or put enough pressure on some of the
refinery operators to induce them to relo-
cate. But it fears to take more radical action
against the growers and the traffickers be-
cause it is. already having more trouble than
it can handle with the current crop of na-
tionalist and left-wing insurgencies. The re-
sult is that Burma remains an open conduit
through which a constant flow of opium and
morphine seeps through Thailand and Laos,
in large quantities, into western Asia, while
an already significant and growing flow of
heroin seeps through them to America.
Because it is fearful of compromising its
neutrality, the Burmese Government does
not want to enter into any bilateral arrange-
ment with the United States. This can be
understood. But it may be carrying things a
little bit too far when the Burmese Govern-
ment even turns down an offer from us of
logistical and communications equipment for
a beefed-up antiopium effort on their part.
These are facts which have to be kept in
mind assessing the situation in Thailand
and Labs.
Now, sir, I would like to go to the coun-
try of Laos. I want to deal next with this
country because there has been a lot in the
news about the opium traffic there.
Laos has accounted at the most for some
100 tons of the 700 tons or 12 to 15 percent,
of the opium produced annually in the
Golden Triangle and it probably accounts
for much less today. Most of this has been
consumed locally, but a limited amount has
gone into the export trade. Laos has had a
much greater importance as a transit area
for opium and morphine base coming from
Burma and as the locus, until recently, of a
number of heroin refineries.
In Laos? as in Thailand and Burma, the
opium is grown by primitive hill tribes-in
S 16007
Laos primarily by the Meos and Yaos who
have cultivated opium for generations. For
them it represents their only cash crop and
their only hedge against the possible failure
of their rice crop. Their income from their
plots of opium poppies may not run any more
than $60 to $100 a year, but to a Meo family
this is a very large amount which may
make the difference between survival and
starvation in a difficult year.
The opium is grown on mountain slopes
at an approximate altitude of 3,000 feet,
which seems best suited for its cultivation.
As in Thailand and Burma, the tribesmen
practice slash and burn agriculture, They
clear an area on a hillside, burn the trees
they have cut down, mulch the soil and then
cultivate it for a number of years until it
begins to show signs of exhaustion. Then
they move on to another hillside or another
area on that same hillside, and the process
begins all over again,
Flying over northern Laos, I saw literally
hundreds of clearings on the mountain
slopes which had been devastated and then
abandoned in this manner. In some parts of
Laos the clearings occurred at such fre-
quent intervals that It was as though an
army of giant locusts had moved through
the mountain jungles, pockmarking them
with areas of total destruction. Needless to
say, this is not good for the ecology of any
country.
Here is a map which shows the major
opium producing areas in Laos.
The area includes Phong SaIv Province in
the far north, Samneua Province in the
northeast, and the Plaines des Jarres in
Xiangkhoang Province. There was a time
when these producing areas, were divided
more or less evenly between Meos under
Pathet Lao, or Communist, influence, and
Meos loyal to the Government in Vietiane.
But as the Pathet Lao, with heavy North
Vietnamese support, have extended their
area of control, the anti-Communist Meos
have been forced out of their opium lands
and onto the plains, so that today the opium
growing areas of Laos are overwhelmingly
under Communist control. The opium agri-
culture in these areas, like all other agricul-
ture, is under the village management of
Hanoi-trained cadres.
In addition to the locally produced opium
which was picked up from the hill people
by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, horse and
mule caravans brought large quantities of
opinum into Laos from Burma. The opium
was moved to processing laboratories at Ban
Houei Sat and other centers; then the opium,
morphine, and heroin was moved out, gen-
erally by plane, to Thailand, Vietnam, and
Hong Kong.
Why did the Laotian Government not move
sooner to deal with the opium traffic in its
country? There are several reasons that help
to explain the lag, sir.'
The first reason is that until recently the
Laotian attitude toward opium was as
tolerant as were Western attitudes 100 years
ago. Opium was not a serious problem among
the Laotian people and the heroin problem
was nonexistent. There was no law against
growing opium or merchandising it and no
law against processing opium into morphine
or heroin, And so, without violating any law,
a handful of senior officers, including Gen.
Ouan Rathikone, former commander of the
Laotian Army, could line their own pockets
by engaging in the opium trade. General
Rathikone was retired from the Army last
July.
Second, there was the Government's al-
most total preoccupation with the war that
has ravaged their country for more than a
decade now. Beginning as a domestic Insur-
gency, this war has in recent years evolved
into an open invasion by North Vietnam, in-
volving as many as five divisions of the North
Vietnamese Army at times. For a small coun-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 26, f9;2
fry of 3 million people, the many scores of officials appointed to deal with the problem to be growing. Obviously, if they are grow-
thousands of military and civilian casualties of opium suppression. ing opium, they are not consuming all of it;
nave had a devastating impact. In Vientiane I was able to meet with a some of it must be sold somewhere.
On top of this, the Government must cope number of the Laotian officials now involved To sum up, I would like to quote a state-
uith some 235,000 refugees who have fled in their country's war against opium and the merit that was made to us by one officer in
from areas under Communist control. In the opium traffickers. Among them were His our Embassy:
light of these facts, perhaps some allowance Royal Highness Tiao Mankhara Manivong, "If you want to gage the progress that has
should be made for an attitude which ac- President of Narcotics Destruction; Mr. been made here, you have to be in a position
c_epted the war and the refugees as the Gov- Chanthaboun Luangraj, Director Gencral of to compare how easy it was for the traffickers
n'nment's first priorities. National Police and President of the Sub- previously with how difficult it has now be-
Third, there was the factor of corruption commission for Repression of the Narcotics come for them."
ind vested interest. There can be no ques- Traffic; and Mr. Nith Singharaj, President of I should also like to quote, in summing up,
:.ion that many well-placed people in Laos. the Interministerial Committee for Narcotics the paragraph on Laos from the so-called
froth Laotian and ethnic Chinese, were Control. I had a chat with each one of these "cabinet-level report," the same report from
;:.aLking a good deal of money out of the gentlemen and I may say that my conver- which the New York Times quoted a pars-
genum business and doing it without Vic- cations with them completely bore out what graph that appeared to be highly critical of
lating any law. a had heard from Ambassador Godiry and the Southeast Asian governments. While
With the major scandals that we have had his staff, and that is, that the Laotian Gov- there are some highly sensitive matters in
in some of our metropolitan cities, reaching ernment is now animated by a completely the document, dealing with informers and
r it the way up to police inspectors and judges, new spirit and that the officials assigned to technology, the paragraph on Laos contained
we are not exactly In the best position in deal with the problem have both a sophisti- nothing that in itself warranted classifca-
9ixe world to lecture other countries on cor- sated understanding of it and the determi- tion and I have, therefore, been given ex-
iuption. But it is a fact that corruption nation to really do something about i* press permission to read this paragraph to
tends to be far more widespread in low- Despite the fact that they have had to build the subcommittee. I quote:
income countries. When police inspectors an antiopium apparatus almost from scratch, "Surprisingly enough, the most effective
and judges who make $20,000 and $25,000 a and despite the demands of the war, the Lao- antinarcotics program in the area seems to
year succumb to temptation in our own tian Government's antinarcotics operation be in Laos. * * * Ambassador Godley first
country, we should not be surprised when has drawn blood since the first of the year convinced Premier Souvanna Phouma of the
their counterparts in other countries who in the form of repeated seizures of small and great importance the United States Govern-
work for bare subsistence salaries succumb large quantities of opium. ment attached to the antinarcotics program
substantially greater numbers to the -heir biggest haul to date was 89 kilos of and made it clear that few things could hurt
temptation of big money. opium-something over 200 pounds of opium. the cause of Laos more with the American
Fourth, there is the fact that Opium in On June 14, when I was having lunch with Congress and people than anything less than
Laos did not become a problem that vitally Ambassador Godley in Ban Houei Sai on the a maximum effort against the illicit traffic.
:affected American interests until the heroin Thai frontier, the report came in that the Souvanna was sufficiently impressed by the
epidemic hit the American forces in Viet- Lao police, acting on their own, had picked importance of the effort that he placed his
nom during the summer of 1970. It took sev- up another 12 kilos of opium in the nearby intelligence chief, General Khamhou, in per-
eral months before we realized what was village of Ban Dan. sonal charge of the program. Khamhou, one
happening and it was getting on to mid- A recent report by the Embassy team con- of the most powerful men in Laos, had a
1971 before our war against the heroin epi- tains language far more optimistic than any clear charter from his chief and went to work
demic In Vietnam went into high gear. It previous assessment of the situation in Laos. with a real sense of personal dedication. He
was a ,bout this time that we began to use According to this report, the security meas- has been assisted by all appropriate parts of
our influence to persuade the governments ures instituted by the Laotian Government the U.S. mission. The overall antinarcotics
of Southeast Asia to join us in more vigorous have surprised and discombobulated the traf- effort in Laos appears to be making good
measures against the opium traffickers. fickers so that there has been a dramatic re- progress; it is an example for other coun-
All governments tend to move with a cer- duction in the amount of traffic moving tries to follow."
tan time lag. On the whole, I believe that through Laos to other destinations. A direct This paragraph was never quoted by news-
the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and result of the Government's drive has been a men who had access to the document-the
Thailand must be given credit for moving serious depression in the price of opium, same as they had access to the paragraph that
quickly and dramatically since we first It is, of course. true that the Meo tribesmen was quoted. I do not know why this is so, but
raised the issue with them on a top priority whom we supported were opium cultivators, from a number of experiences, I have the im-
basis. as were the Meo tribesmen on the Commu- pression that when they quote from confx-
Looking at the situation which existed a nist side. Virtually all Meos in both Thailand dential documents, newspapermen have a
-ears ago in Laos, no one could be blamed and Laos grow opium-because they have penchant for quoting the bad paragraphs
for deciding that ingrained attitudes ran done so for generations, because they use it and ignoring the good paragraphs.
no deep to make any serious improvement as a medicine and as an euphoric drug, be- I would like now, sir, to go to the country
-ssible. But then things began to happen. cause it is their one cash crop and because of Thailand.
The strength of the American reaction to it can be stored against hard times. Thailand has come in fora tremendous
Apart from declaring war on the Meos or amount of criticism in a recent spate of fea-
.r,e news of the heroin epidemic among our lure articles and TV documentaries.
'ervicemen in Vietnam persuaded the Lao- forcibly uprooting them from their lands,
;.ian leaders that they could no longer afford there was no easy and immediate way of ter- My investigation has convinced me that
remain indifferent or unmotivated if they minating opium cultivation by the Meos An while some of the criticisms may have had
a
wished to retain American support. And so, enduring solution would require resettling been measa ure dramatic is durin
g solutin the sit
m November 15, 1971, the Laotian Legisla- the Meos on a permanent basis, teaching lion since that time, in particular over the
the
ure took the revolutionary step of passing a them how to cultivate substitute crops,
aw banning the production, sale or use of and providing transportation so that they will past help to update thee information that my toavail-
nium. All of the Meo deputies, following them sommove e kin d of crops to market and giving able to Congress so that Members of Con-
txe leadership of Gen. Vang Pao, voted af- support during the period in making their assessments, will riot
he at vely on this measure,
Even before the law was of transition. All of this is going to require gress, a good deal of time and a good deal of money, have to rely on the data of a year ago.
passed, the Lao- Opium cultivation was made 'illegal in
an Government had acted to curtail refin- While there was much criticism of the fact Thailand by a law passed on January 1,
'ry operations, destroying two refineries and that the Meos on our side were engaged in 1959; but, as we found out in our own coun-
eizing large quantities of drugs in the pros- opium agriculture, I have thus far come try during prohibition, it is one thing to
sal across no criticism of the Pathet Lao and the pass a law and another thing to be able to
North Vietnamese Communists for condor- enforce it.
Alarmed by the evidence of mounting gov- ing and even encouraging the cultivation of In Thailand the problem of enforcement re, '.;r emriestai pr duwn oeveral additional re- - opium by the Meo tribesmen under their con- was complicated by the fact that most of
opera- trol; or have I seen any mention of the Tact the opium is grown by primitive hill tribes-
tons to Burma. Today, according to respon- that General Vang Pao's Meos have largely men-Meos, Yaos, Lahus, and others-wino
'ble officials who follow the situation in discontinued the cultivation of opium. in live in isolated settlements and move from
aos, on a day-to-day basis, there is no evi- the first place because of Vang Pao's crop hillside to hillside and who, like their Cousins
,;ence to indicate that there is a single heroin substitution program going back a number in Laos, rely on opium as their only cash
b currently active in the country of Laos. of years; in the second place, because the crop and as their hedge against starvation in
while there are unquestionably some cor- Communist advance has forced them out of a bad year. The principal cultivators of the
,pt officials in the Laotian police force and their traditional lands, which were suitable opium poppy are the Meo tribesmen. I show
e Laotian Armed, Forces, everyone In the for poppy cultivation, onto- the plains, which you here a map of the distribution of the Meo
mbassy with whom I discussed the matter, are not suitable for poppy farming. Nor have tribes in northern Thailand .
---as completely convinced of the sincerity I seen the question raised as to the ultimate . The Thai Government has very little
id motivation of Prime Minister Souvanna purpose and destination of the opium which effective control over these people.
~'houma and Gen. Vang Pao and of the key the Meos under Pathet Lao control are known There is, of course, no firm figure an total
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September 26, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
production; the best estimates are, however,
that Thailand produces between 130 and 200
tons of opium a year.
The Thai Government has for a number of
years now been seeking to discourage opium
production by the hill tribes; but, as every-
one who has been out in the area realizes,
this is going to be a complex problem and it
is going to require time. The optimum solu-
tion would involve helping the opium-grow-
ing tribesmen to convert their temporary set-
tlements into permanent settlements by
building roads and schools and dispensaries,
teaching them to grow substitute crops which
can realistically be moved to market, and
assisting them during the period of transi-
tion.
In recent years the Thai Government has
been going about this problem with genuine
motivation. Its motivation springs in part
from a desire to cut down on opium produc-
tion and traffic in 'Thailand, in response to
international criticism; but there is another
important element, an element of self-inter-
est, to this motivation.
The slash-and-burn agriculture-as I
pointed out in my remarks earlier on what
is happening in Laos where they are destroy-
ing the wooded hillsides-does devastating
things to the ecology of a country. When the
tribesmen abandon their wornout poppy plots
to move on to a new hillside, the soil is left
pulverized so that with each heavy rain
some of it washes down into the valley. The
progressive stripping of the hillside jungles
is destroying the watershed, raising water
levels in the valleys beyond the point suit-
able for rice agriculture and silting up the
dams 15 years sooner than scheduled. That
agricultural experts are sold on the need for
dramatic action and the Government itself
is clearly very much concerned.
In December of last year the That Govern-
ment signed an agreement with the U.N.
Fund for Drug Abuse Control, a pioneering
agreement of its kind, calling for joint plan-
ning, with U.N. support, for a project design-
ed to eliminate opium production by the hill
tribesmen through a program of village de-
velopment and crop substitution. The gov-
ernment also set up a variety of special agen-
cies to deal with various aspects of the drug
problem in Thailand, including a special pro-
gram for hill tribesmen under the patronage
of the king and directed by the king's
nephew, Prince Phisidet, a young man of
dedication and vigor, with whom I had a long
conversation in Chiang Mai in northern
Thailand.
There are massive problems to be overcome
in weaning the hill tribes from opium agricul-
ture. First, there is the problem of land
ownership. Traditionally, the king owns all
the mountains and all the seashores of Thai-
land and, _therefore, all hillside agriculture is
technically illegal. But if the hill people are
to be persuaded to shift to other crops and
a more stable agriculture, they have to be
assured of the ownership of the land they till.
The Thai Government has been encouraging
the development of permanent settlements,
ignoring the technical illegality of their, own
position while they grapple with the legal
problem of land ownership.
The second problem involves finding suit-
able crop substitutes. Opium is very easily
moved to market and it does not take a lot of
transport and it brings a large and reasonably
stable cash return. Corn or fruit or market
vegetables would be much more difficult to
move to the distant urban markets and the
prices would fluctuate widely, according to
the whims of the 'Thai merchants. Beyond
this, there is the fact that with substitute
crops like tea, coffee, and fruit, it would take
5 years before the first crop came in.
Thira, there is the problem of teaching the
hill people entirely new agricultural tech-
niques, including terracing and windbreaks.
Fourth, there are no educated hill people
who are available for immediate recruitment
as administrators or technicians and bare
literacy probably does not exceed 5 or 10
percent among the hill people.
In Chiang Mai, I also had a long conversa-
tion with Mr. I. M. G. Williams, the U.N.
representative who is working with the Thai
Government on the hill tribe program. Mr.
Williams is a dynamic man with a tremen-
dous experience in the area. In World War II
he served as a colonel with the British army
in Burma and after the war he worked for
many years in different parts of the Far East
as an official of the British Colonial Office and
the British Foreign Office.
Mr. Williams had the highest praise for
the cooperation he was getting from the Thai
Government, especially from his Thai count-
erpart, Chit Posayananda, whom we also met
in Chiang Mai. Mr. Williams told me of their
plans for a pilot program involving the con-
struction of a model village with five satel-
lite villages. The village would contain a
headquarters and a dispensary and be staffed
by agricultural experts who would be volun-
teers on the Peace Corps style.
Mr. Williams felt that despite the many
difficulties there was reason for optimism.
He said that there was a new mood among
the hill people. They want to get away from
the itinerant slash-and-burn agriculture and
move into permanent settlements and get
some education for their children. But he
felt that the program was not moving as
rapidly as it might, in part because his head-
quarters in Geneva insisted on the most
painstaking studies before any action was
taken in each case.
The government has pushed its efforts to
the point where it has aroused open resent-
ment among the Moos, making it markedly
easier for the Communists to recruit Meo
tribesmen for the guerrilla insurgency which
has plagued northern Thailand for a number
of years now. The Communists come to the
Meos and say to them, in approximately
these terms: "The government is trying to
prevent you from growing opium poppies,
which you have always done and which is
your right. They are trying to take your only
cash crop away from you. Come with us and
we will let, you grow opium poppies."
On the basis of such agitation and with
cadres trained in Hanoi and Peking, the
Communists have been able to establish fair-
ly effective control over a strip of land per-
haps 150 miles long by 25 to 50 miles deep
along the northernmost portion of the Laoti-
an frontier.
The Communists have about 3,000 guer-
rillas in the area who are extremely well
equipped. We were told that they have AK47
rifles whit hare comparable to our M-16's,
60 and 81 millimeter mortars, B40 rockets,
57 millimeter recoilless rifles, and rubber
landmines and booby traps similar to those
used by the Vietcong. There is reason to
believe that the movement is directed from
China, among other things because the sup-
porting propaganda operation, the Voice of
Free Thailand, is located there. The Voice
of Free Thailand has transmitters capable
of reaching all the way to Bangkok and it
carries sophisticated programs of music,
news, and propaganda in both the Thai and
Meo languages.
I have heard the question asked repeatedly
how so much opium could be coming
through Thailand if the Thais were really
trying to stop it. While there is a lot of room
for improvement in Thailand, I think the
basic answer to this question is given by the
fact that the powerful United States of
America, with the largest, the best-trained
and the best-equipped customs agency and
drug repression agency in the world, is able
to intercept no more than 15 percent to 20
percent of the drugs coming into this coun-
try.
In Saigon, before I left for Thailand, an
earnest young newspaperman came to see and
said that he was convinced that so much
S 16009
opium could not be entering Thailand from
Burma without the complicity of the cus-
toms authorities at the border. There are
only four customs posts on the Burma bor-
der and there are literally hundreds, if not
thousands of jungle trails. The smugglers
don't have to pay bribes to get by customs;
there is a simpler, easier, and cheaper way
of getting their stuff into Thailand. Once
they -get into Thailand, to avoid ambushes
by the Royal Thai Army, they traverse a net-
work of trails along remote mountain ridges,
traveling mostly at night and rarely follow-
ing the same route on any two trips.
In Thailand, as in other countries, I asked
the BNDD representatives whether they were
able to share drug intelligence with their
counterparts and whether the Thai authori-
ties took action on the information they
were given. They told me that the Thai au-
thorities had never violated a confidence,
that BNDD did share their intelligence with
them, and that the Thais did follow through
vigorously whenever they were given a lead.
I also asked about the charges of corrup-
tion in high places. I was assured categori-
cally by the American drug control officials
that they have absolutely no information
pointing to the involvement of anybody in
the Thai Government at the policymaking
level.
Any government can be made to look bad
if one focuses only on the failures and weak-
nesses and on unfounded allegations against
that government; but I believe every govern-
ment is entitled to credit for its record of
positive accomplishments; and after my visit
to Thailand, I am convinced that some of
the accounts that have appeared in our media
have failed to give the Royal That Govern-
ment credit for all that it has done, especi-
ally over the last year, to help bring the flow
of drugs under control on a national and
international scale.
I have already mentioned Thailand's
agreement with the United Nations. Thailand
was also the first nation to enter into an
agreement with the U.N. Committee for Drug
Abuse Control, and together they are now
engaged in a pioneering international project
aimed at the suppression of opium cultiva-
tion through education and crpp substitu.
tion.
The memorandum of understanding of last
September between the Thai Government
and the United States Government was the
first document in which two countries jointly
committed themselves to an all-out battle
against the international drug traffic.
In April-May of this year, the Royal Thai
Government, with United States technical
and logistical assistance, created a special
mobile enforcement unit designed to inter-
dict narcotics in the north. This operation
now has five offices in northern Thailand.
During the first week of June, acting on its
own intelligence, it struck a major blow
against the drug traffickers with the seizure
of 1,600 kilos of opium concealed in the wells
of tank trucks, as well as a large amount of
chemicals used in the manufacture of heroin.
I have some pictures here showing trucks and
opium seized in Lampoon. It is a regular oil
tanker truck in which they found the stuff.
There is the material, 2 tons of it, that they
captured.
The Thai police officials took me to see the
tank trucks and the seized bales of opium.
It was an awesome thought to realize that
when this stuff is converted into heroin, the
amount seized would. be worth some $60
million here in the United States on the
streets of NevF York, and that literally thou-
sands of human lives could be destroyed or
wasted as a result of this drug.
Following up on the seizure in northern
Thailand, the largest opium seizure made
until that time in Thailand, Bangkok police
several days later seized the first No. 4 heroin
laboratory discovered in the city. There had
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE September 26, 19i 2
been many other seizures, large and small
of heroin and opium prior to my arrival in
Thailand.
two weeks ago the papers carried the news
that the Thai authorities had seized another
2.5 tons of opium and another No. 4 heroin
laboratory-
1'4r. SouxwINE. What does that mean: No.
4 heroin laboratory?
I'eneral WALT. That is the pure-that is the
wi' i to stuff and the most difficult to make.
one of the greatest problems the Royal
That Government had to contend with in-
voved the activities of the Chinese Irregular
Forces-CIF-along the northern Thai fron-
tier. It had been common knowledge for years
that these forces were heavily involved in
the flow of opium. The Royal Thai Govern-
ment in March of this year moved to resolve
this problem by granting resident status
and resettlement assistance to the several
thousand members of the CIF in Thailand in
return for their promise to get out of the
opium business completely and turn over
their stocks of opium.
,ow. these CIF forces-Chinese Irregular
Forces-sir, came out of Mainland China at
the time of the Communist takeover there,
and they have been without a home and
wilhout any place they could call a home.
And so the Thais took advantage of this and
they offered them a home and they gave
them land-if they, in turn, would turn over
to the Thai government the opium that they
had on hand, and would get out of the
opium growing business. This was a busi-
nesslike deal.
The resident status was a particularly
precious item of exchange for the CIF be-
cause they had up until then been sus-
pended in a condition of statelessness. The
resettlement assistance included the grant
of a tract of land away from the Burmese
border, an agreement to build essential
structures and roads, the provision of live-
stock and equipment, plus cash aid over a
period of several years until the settlement
became self-supporting. All told, the Thai
government committed itself to some $1
million in assistance.
"he CIF, on conclusion of this agreement,
turned over to the Thai government 26,245
kilograms, or 26 tons of opium, which was
publicly burned on March 7 of this year. For
some reason this event received virtually no
mention in the American press despite the
fascinating history of this political-
economic swap and despite the staggering
amount of opium involved. At the current
street price of $390,000 per kilo, this amount
of opium, converted into heroin, would be
worth approximately $3 billion. The amount
of heroin equivalent which the Thai gov-
ernment negotiated off the world market in
this transaction was far greater than the
total amount of heroin seized by all the free
.world's enforcement agencies over the pre-
vious 12 months.
"a"te news blackout of this incident is
something that defies comprehension. I have
had the Library of Congress research the
;a,l;t:er and they tell me that they have been
unable to find any article about the incident
in. f0 or 12 major newspapers which they
eh. eked.
r. Chairman, recently some question was
,ed about whether the 26 tons of opium
burned actually was 26 tons of opium. I have
!,ere a few photographs I would like to show
an of the preparation for the opium burn
and of the actual burning.
Ybis is the preparation for the burning.
You will note the opium is on top and under
the opium are piles of logs that are going to
be used as fuel for the burning process. This
shows the .entire lot piled out on the vacant
area where the burning is going to take
place. This is a picture of the actual burn-
ing. There is nothing left there but the
chs.rred logs.
Mr. Ingersoll is going to elaborate on this
In a few minutes.
I would like now to ask, Mr. Chairman,
that my testimony be interrupted so that
you can take the testimony of Mr. John
Ingersoll, the director of BNDD; Mr. William
Wanzeck, until recently director of the
BNDD bureau In Bangkok; and Mr. Joseph
Koles, forensic chemist for the BNDD, on the
steps they took to make certain that the 26
tons of opium that were burned was really
opium and that they were not burning hay
or something else. I respectfully suggest that
these three witnesses be called to the staid
in a group.
EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL WALT'S TESTIMONY
ON THE WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC BEFORE TI E
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECP-
RITY. SEPTEMBER 14, 1972
I have prepared this special map of South-
east Asia. including Burma, because I wish
to enlarge on my initial presentation.
Fact No. 1 that emerges from this map is
that in Laos the communists occupy some
80 to 90 percent of the opiumgrowing areas.
The diagonal lines indicate the areas under
communist occupation. and the heavy black
boot-shaped line indicates the major Opium
producing area. Obviously, the Meo tribesmen
who now produce their opium under com-
munist control aren't "eating" it all.
Fact No. 2 which emerges from the map,
is that the communist-led guerrillas in
Thailand are in effective control of an im-
portant stretch of opium producing land
along the Laotian frontier. The diagonal
shading on the Thai side of the frontier indi-
cates the area under communist control.
In both Thailand and Laos, the villages
where the opium is grown are controlled by
communist manager-cadres, trained in Pe-
king and Hanoi. Both movements are armed
to a large degree with Chinese weapons, and
both have their major radio propaganda op-
erations based on Chinese territory. The
money which they make from selling opium
is used to support their respective insur-
gencies.
A highly interesting feature of the cur-
rent political situation in southeast Asia is
this road, marked with a double line, which
25,000 Chinese communists have been build-
ing across northern Laos in the direction of
the Thai frontier. Eight meters wide and
hard-surfaced, the road is now only 50 miles
away from that portion of the Thai frontier
where pro-Peking guerrillas are already in
control. The road is reported to be very
heavily protected by radar and anti-aircraft
batteries.
The Communists component also plays a
vital role in the Burma drug situation.
Burma, as I pointed out in my previous tes-
timony, is the single most Important factor
in the southeast Asia drug situation. This is
where most of the opium is grown, it is where
most of the refineries and traffickers are con-
centrated, and it is the ultimate source of
most of the morphine base and heroin, as
well as raw opium, that comes out of south-
east Asia. The Burmese government is un-
happy about the situation, but there are
several major Insurgencies in the area which
prevent it from exercising any effective co:.-
trol.
Most of the Opium in Burma is grown in
the Shan state, which you see here. Some _s
also grown in the Kachin state to the north.
Both the Shan tribesmen and the Kacbiii
tribesmen have been in a state of insurgency
against the Rangoon government ever since
Burma became independent. But by far the
most serious Insurgency in the area is the
white flag communist insurgency, which s
under the immediate control of the Burmese
Communist Party and of Peking. Here again,
it is Peking which has armed the insurgents
and trained their leaders, and which supports
them with a China-based radio operation.
Over the past year, the white flag commu-
nist insurgency has grown to the point where
it absorbs probably 80 percent of the total
counter-insurgency energies of the Rangoon
government, in northern Burma.
The Shan and the White Flag Communist
insurgencies overlap each other. The heart-
land of the Shan insurgent movement is
shown on thismap in the area surrounded
by a wavy line. The White Flag Communists
are in pretty solid control of the area east
of the Salween River, marked in lighter
shading.
All of the armed groups in Burma, pro-
Communist and anti-Communist, have been
involved in the drug trade. This goes for the
Shan and the Kachin insurgents: for the
anti-Communist KKY or Burmese self-de-
fense force, and for the Chinese irregular
forces: and for both the White Flag Commu-
nists and the Red Flag Communists, a small-
er group which is supposed to be under
Trotskyist influence. Opium is the nearest
thing these groups possess to gold-and they
have all used It with abandon to purchase
arms and support their activities.
The situation has been marked by a
strange division of labor and by some highly
enterprising, if unprincipled, accommoda-
tions between the rival factions. The KKY
and the CIF are the dominant forces in the
Thai-Laotian border area. Both of these
forces have been heavily involved in the
transport and smuggling of opium, and the
KKY has also been heavily involved in the
refinery operation. On the other hand, most
of the opium in Burma, as I have pointed
out, is grown by Shan tribesmen, under the
control of the Shan states army or under
the control of the Communists.
The shaded area which the communists
control east of the Salween River is reputed
to be the most fertile opium producing terri-
tory in the whole of Burma and is credited
with some 25 percent of Burma's total pro-
duction. 'Burma's production is estimated at
some 400 tons a year, but the tribesmen use
most of it for themselves, exporting only
some 100 to 150 tons. Because it produces the
largest surplus of any area in Burma, the
territory under communist control may be
responsible for as much as 40 to 50percent of
Burma's entire opium-export.
How does the opium get from the areas
where it is grown to the Thailand-Laos
border? Obviously, it has to change hands in
order to do so: It has to get from the Shan
insurgents and from the white flag com-
inunist Shans into the hands of their hated
enemies, the KKY and the CIF. To permit
the consummation of these mutually profit-
able transactions, clearly, hostilities must be
temporarily suspended by both sides. The
town of Lashio-shown here on the map---is
the principal exchange point, where the pro-
ducers deliver their opium and where the
caravans form up to move the opium south
to the tri-border area.
In view of the fact that Peking mothered
the white flag communist movement and
that it still controls them, it cannot escape
moral responsibility for their role as prime
producers in the Burma opium traffic. More-
over, the act of this Insurgency places the
Burmese government in the invidious pcsi-
tion of not being able to enforce its own laws
in the area, and of having to tolerate opium
trafficking by the regional military forces
which oppose the communists.
This is a situation which calls for some
plain talk-all the more so because China has
now been b ought into the world community
of Nations.
WHAT SENSE TO THE VIETNAM
WAR?
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, an-
other monsoon season will soon be over
in Vietnam.
But the tragedy of the war goes on.
Indochina has been turned into a grim
and sordid theater of the absurd, where
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R J 74F &A80004000 994 ember 26, 1972
Instead of being used as whipping boys by
pacifists they should receive the thanks of a
grateful country not only for their qualities
of obedience and sacrifice but also for one
of the most amazing achievements in all
wartime. This achievement has been the
maintenance of generally good troop morale
in the kind of action they have had to fight
in Vietnam.
Not the least of Lavelle's aims is that his
conduct has given the antiwar careerists an-
other stick with which to beat the whole
concept of collective security in this world.
To be sure, it is not much of a stick. But,
then, they don't need much of a stick.
f POSITION PAPER OF SENATOR Mc-
GOVERN ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
NARCOTICS TRAFFIC
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, last week
at a State Department conference the
President reviewed the activities of his
administration in the fight against drug
addiction, and especially against the in-
ternational traffic in narcotics. He as-
serted once again that great progress had
been made, and he restated his deter-
mination to win the battle.
The Senator from South Dakota, as
the Democratic candidate for the Presi-
dency, has issued a detailed indictment
of the administration's effort to control
the international narcotics traffic. He
presented facts and figures in support
of his view that these efforts fall far
short of the full-scale attack proclaimed
b% the President. The position paper pre-
seated by the Senator from South Da-
kota reflects a great deal of careful re-
search. Administration sources have
characterized it as naive, but they have
not yet denied any of its substance. In
spite of any differences, however, he has
set forth certain truths which no one can
deny; namely, that American involve-
ment in the war in Southeast Asia is a
major factor in the problem of drug ad-
diction here at home; and that South-
east Asia will be the source of a larger
and larger share of the heroin traffic as
long as our involvement in that area
continues.
In his statement on Monday the Pres-
ident laid great emphasis on his progress
in inducing other governments to agree
to intensifying their efforts to stamp out
the traffic in heroin. Holding up the stick
as well as the carrot, he promised to use
his authority to cut off military and eco-
nomic aid to any country whose lead-
ers participate in or condone activities
that contribute to our drug problem.
Mr. President, these are persuasive
words. Unfortunately, they hide the grim
reality known to any one who has exam-
ined the situation in Southeast Asia.
With American prodding and the help
of American dollars the governments of
South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand have
enacted punitive legislation and added
narcotics personnel to their police forces.
They have made some arrests and de-
stroyed some opium. Yet, no one seri-
ous believes that these nations are fully
committed to the task.
These are societies that have tradi-
tionally tolerated both opium and official
corruption. The infusion of large quan-
tities of Amerlan dollars and men has
certainly not reduced that tolerance.
High officials in all three nations have
been accused of personal involvement or
complicity in the drug traffic, and wheth-
er or not the charges are justified in any
specific instance, it is obvious that indi-
vidual officials have been and are now
involved.
It is also obvious that these govern-
ments either cannot or will not control
the heavy flow of opium and heroin
right in their own capitals. Any Amer-
ican serviceman in Saigon knows where
he can buy drugs quickly and cheaply.
In Bangkok heroin abuse among the
1,500 military and civilian dependents
in the American secondary school has
reached epidemic levels. Officials now es-
timate that as many as 30 percent of
these American youngsters are involved
in heroin abuse. High grade heroin is
available on the streets of Bangkok at
50 cents a fix.
In spite of these grim facts, the Presi-
dent could not possibly cut off military
and economic aid to Thailand or South
Vietnam as long as he continues the
military action against North Vietnam in
defense of the Thieu regime in the South.
Even as American ground forces are
being withdrawn ' from South Vietnam,
economic and military aid to that nation
becomes all the more essential to the
President's policy. And as our ground
forces are reduced, Thailand become in-
creasingly vital as the launching pad for
our air attacks.
Thus, these nations can rest assured
that the threat issued by the President
on Monday could not have been meant
for them. They may go through the mo-
tions of enacting and enforcing laws
against the opium trade if the United
States insists. Indeed, there are undoubt-
edly some officials in these nations who
are sincerely convinced of the evil nature
of this trade. But in the final analysis
they know there will be no penalty for
negligence as long as the American mili-
tary effort continues.
Mr. President, when I consider how
many thousands of young Americans
have encountered the living death of
heroin addiction, and how many more
are threatened each day, and I know that
thousands could be saved if we were to
leave Southeast Asia, I can see no pos-
sible offsetting gain for this Nation in
pursuing the war further.
In the hope that they will contribute
to greater public understanding of the
cost of this war, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
position paper of the Senator from South
Dakota and the comments of Mr. John
Finlator, former Deputy Director of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STATEMENT OF JOHN FINLATOR, FORMER DEP-
UTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
I have read the position paper of Senator
McGovern concerning the Southeast Asia
narcotics traffic and I support the major
allegations that Senator McGovern has
made. Increasingly the American heroin
market is being supplied from the Golden
Triangle region of Laos, Burma, and Thai-
land. Southeast Asia clearly has the poten-
tial to replace Turkey as the major supplier
of heroin to the illicit market places of this
country. We are at present in the midst of
a dramatic changeover. Although the seizures
of heroin from Southeast Asia are smaller
than those from Europe, the incidence of
seizures are growing at an alarming rate.
The failure of the present administration
to stop the flow of heroin to this country as
well as to make inroads in the demand side
of our society, is clear evidence that we do
not have a total commitment to what the
President calls the number one domestic
priority of his administration.
President Nixon's programs have been
fragmented and ineffective with the only
visibility being a reorganization or shuffling
around of responsibilities from time to time:
a new prevention office in the White House,
a new, confusing enforcement in Justice to
chase the street addict-pushers, another new
office in Justice to gather drug intelligence,
all with high sounding titles and high sal-
aries which outstrip those of the Director of
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs and the Commissioner of Customs.
We are making only a small dent in the
amount of drugs coming into this country.
It will remain thus until we reach that
pleateau of total commitment. It is just not
there. We need stronger efforts than those we
presently espouse in the areas of treatment,
rehabilitation, education, prevention, re-
search, and enforcement. Senator McGovern
has spoken out on these subjects and I trust
he will speak of them again.
We are in worse shape in the war against
drug abuse today than on the day the pres-
ent Administration took office. This lack of
success may not be placed entirely on the
desk of any one group or administration but
Senator McGovernor offers a hope of a
stronger commitment than any we have seen
thus far.
If, indeed, the problems of narcotics
trafficking and addiction is our number one
priority, its solution will require the bring-
ing together of a massive amount of the
brainpower, manpower, and resources of this
country. In this we have failed and instead
have putted around the problem in frag-
mented, piecemeal manner. If the problem is
not one of a high priority, then we have not
done so badly.
Hopefully, Senator McGovern is going to
give us more insight into an outstanding
beginning.
John Finlator was with BNDD from its
inception in April, 1968. He became deputy
director in 1969 and retired on January 1,
1972. He was the first director of the Bureau
of Drug Abuse Control when it was created
in February, 1966. He has been in govern-
ment since 1936.
He is presently writing a book on the do-
mestic and international narcotics traffic
which will be published by Simon and
Schuster.
CURBING THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC
The crime problem in our country has
never been as serious as it is today. We all
know this from our own experience, and we
can see it in the deserted streets and parks.
The FBI crime statistics comfirm what we
all know to be true. They show a 33% crime
increase since 1963.
The greatest single cause of our high
crime rates is the need of heroin addicts to
commit muggings and burglaries to finance
their habits.
The heroin refined from the seemingly
innocent opium poppy is responsible each
year for thousands of drug-related deaths
and millions of drug-related crimes. The
lives of more than half a million Americans
are stunted by dependence on this drug.
Heroin addiction alone is more than suf-
ficient to account for all of the 6.5 million
robberies, burglaries, and thefts reported to
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It is important for us to understand
that until this rule came along, Ameri-
can fighting men were able to attack
enemy aircraft and attempt to destroy
them wherever they happened to be,
whether in the air or on a runway.
Another rule in effect said that in
North Vietnam, trucks driving on. a
highway could not be fired upon unless
they show hostile intentions toward our
fighting men. I suggest that my col-
leagues think about that one and try and
figure out what it means.
Perhaps the rule which has received
the most attention and which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff felt had been violated
involved an enemy radar site high on
a mountain range overlooking Laos. The
radar site in question provided group
control intercept to the Mig fighter
planes which could come over low. at-
tack our helicopters as they were doing
rescue work, and attack our tactical air-
craft. Because it is impossible for a ra-
dar to show hostile intentions, as such,
it was very difficult for our men to make
a decision whether the target should be
destroyed. It is my personal belief that
a radar site shows hostile intentions
merely by existing in a location of stra-
tegic importance to the enemy. It exists
only for purposes which mean the loss
of aircraft and men to us.
This of course was the target which
General Lavelle and General Abrams
finally agreed should come under the
rules and be attacked. As we all know,
they were later rapidly corrected by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for their decision.
Mr. President, I mention these rules
as background for our understanding of
the case involving General Lavelle.
What he did was make a decision-and
he made it alone-that any of our air-
craft flying over Northern Laos would
be constantly engaged by grour_dfire,
whether the fire was observed or not.
And under this interpretation of the
rule, he issued verbal orders that all
weapons and ammunition would be ex-
pended during each reconnaissance
flight and that a returning pilot, when
being debriefed by the intelligence
group, would report that enemy action
had been taken and that he had retal-
iated.
Now that is the case involving Gen-
eral Lavelle. Let us take a look at the
size of it. During the period of time in
question, roughly from November 1971
to March 1972, as many as 40,000 sor-
ties may have been flown. We are not
able to get the exact number but esti-
mates place it between 25,000 and
40,000 sorties. But the number of cases
involving falsified reports is something
like 20 or 30. Thus, despite what some
members of the communications media
have tried to make out of this violation,
I believe any fair observer would have
to admit that, even though General La-
velle was wrong, we are not talking
about a massive number of illegal
strikes. I do not give this as an excuse
for General Lavelle, because it is my
feeling that if only one out of 40,000
had been performed illegally and fol-
lowed by a falsified report it would be
sufficient to condemn the general's ac-
tion. What I am saying is that the inci-
dent does noti add up to an enormous
and continuoiis disregard for the gen-
eral rule in question.
I know that some Members of the
Senate might sk why have not other
officers involved been punished,` I would
remind them tl' t the first this g a man
learns in the military is the diq'iipline of
command and tie absolute necessity of
obeying command orders. Ifi suddenly,
in the military sftructure, offrers junior
to the men in co}lmand began to refuse
orders or to question orderss, the result
would be utter and complete chaos.- Now
I will admit that there are Ways a junior
officer can express, his disfatisfaction--
he can ask for written orders and he
can write a paper outlining his disagree-
ment with those orders which can be
placed in a proper file should anything
ever come of the incident. This was not
done in any of these cases. As General
Slay explained, when he was ordered as
operations officer of t$ie 7th Air Force,
to do the things thaw General Lavelle
wanted done he naturally assumed that
General Lavelle had permission from
people senior to him. Sc General Slay
obeyed the orders, ? as did the com-
manders under him, the pilots and ev-
eryone connected with the procedures.
Perhaps well over 290 people knew what
was going on but it was nd until Ser-
geant Franks, a very trustv'orthy and
valued member of the Air Fof a enlisted
personnel decided that he .could no
longer do these things, because he felt
it was against lriis Christian training.
As we all know, lie wrote a letter to Sen-
ator HUGHES explaining his feelings and
Senator HUGHES very correctly con-
tacted Chairmafi STENNIS of the Armed
Services Committee and the hearings in
the Lavelle case were set up.
Mr. President, although a full report
will be made available to the Senate at
some future date, I think it is safe for
me to report here that no one other thsn
General Lavelle is responsible for what
occurred. I say this knowing full well
that some segments of the communica-
tions media had intimated that other
officers of higher rank participated in
the decision,
The whole episode to me has been-
most unfortunate. It is unfortunate that
a fine career officer like General Lavelle
made the tnistake that he did,, even
though I can see how he might' feel in
his own mind that he was justified. And,
of course, the episode has not put the
Air Force in a good light because the
question repeatedly askedis why could
it not have been detected. Let me just
say that I.think that if my colleagues
could haven sat through all the hearings
they woul begin to realize the impossi-
bility of that; happening. The question
arises as to whether we can prevent
similar in idents from happening in the
future. Mt answer is that as long as hu-
man nature exists and men can do right
or wronw there is no way that we can
absolutely prevent future occurrences.
I would suggest, however, that in any
futur war in which we may become
engaged that we try not to write rules
of engagement that will hamper our
chances of victory. I think I can say
without any fear of contradiction that
had the rules of engagement not existed
this war could have been won a long
time ago and a great many American
men would not have died.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
article entitled "The Lavelle Episode,"
written by William S. White, and pub-
lished in the Washington Post of Sep-
tember 23, 1972.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE LAVELLE EPISODE
(By William S. White)
The case of one Air Force general who ex-
ceeded his bombing authority in Vietnam
has now turned out to be just that-the case
of one Air Force general who exceeded ... et
cetera, et cetera.
There is, in short, no evidence of some con-
spiracy within "the higher brass" to escalate
the war, or to challenge in any way the
constitutional supremacy of the civilian au-
thority. Particularly, there is no valid
showing that the military superiors of the
now disciplined and retired Gen. John La-
velle were slyly or otherwise egging him on
to hit unauthorized targets in Vietnam.
Professionally "antiwar" people inside and
outside the Senate for weeks have used the
Lavelle episode, which is deplorable enough
in its real nature but not one-tenth so de-
plorable as it has been made out by them to
he, for carom shots all over the place. They
have hit the war itself, the military in. gen=
eral, and, of course, that obviously evil thing
called the Pentagon.
Their intermediate target has, been Gen.
Creighton Abrams, who sucogeded as top
commander in Vietnam upon-the retirement
of Gen. William Westmor and. Abrams is
now under nomination by/ the President to
be Army Chief of Staff.
It appears plain that,, Waving been well and
truly cut up symbolic?glly by the new isola-
tionists and new paci$sts he will at length be
confirmed by the S hate. From the outset of
the Lavelle affair the "antiwar" zealots had
characteristically followed the Gilbert and
Sullivan ilictuin of verdict first-evidence
later. But even they are at last reluctantly
acknowledging that Gen Abrams (as also
the chairhlan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Adm. Thomas Moorer) was innocent of La-
vella's transgressions.
If it seems a pity nevertheless that Abrams
) ad to go through all this in order to be
allowed to begin to round out the last phase
of a distin*uished military career, then so
it'is. It is a?great pity, indeed. For the critics
of the VieUham command, first in Westmore-
land's and then in Abrams' charge, for years
have not been able to grasp one fairly obvi-
ous point. This is that the uniformed com-
mander of Vietnam never made the war and
never voted-as many of them in fact had
done-for the policies that created and
sustained it.
The cOmmander's job has been solely to
carry out the orders of three American Presi-
dents, orders always harsh with difficulty and
sometimes heartbreakingly so. Sometimes,
indeed, diplomatic concerns at the civilian
level have required the general on the spot to
see the enemy, run pretty well free while his
own troops and air power were fettered by
directions from, Washington. This restraint
has been right tlnd proper; but it has not
been easy.
That two suc:ssive representatives of
the dreadful "brass"-Westmoreland and
Abrams-have with massive fidelity and mili-
tary self-sacrifice been obedient at every
turn to civilian direction should speak more
than sufficently for their ingrained respect
for the constitutional supremacy of the civil
authority.
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A4ff September 26, p1972 CONGRESSI S15995
the FBI last year. American heroin addicts
each year spend. more than five billion dol-
lars on their drugs, making the illegal heroin
traffic one of America's largest industries.
Although not all crimes are reported to the
FBI, this five billion dollars is three times
the entire $1.5 billion price tag of the 5.6
million property crimes reported to the FBI
last year.
A recent survey of New York City jails
indicated that more than half of those
arrested use heroin. In large cities generally,
one third or more of muggings and bur-
glaries are committed by heroin addicts.
Some criminal court judges find that 75%
of their cases involve individuals with a
history of drug abuse. No wonder crime has
been called "the heroin tax." With addicts
spending at least five billion dollars a year
on their habits, the heroin tax has a price
tag of $100 a year for every family of four.
The addict is a victim, too. The addict's
life becomes a constant search for the drug.
Addiction consumes and destroys him. Seek-
ing to escape from pain, boredom, or misery,
the addict is caught in the narrowing trap of
an artificial euphoria. And heroin is a major
killer as well. Addiction is the greatest single
cause of death in New York City for people
between the ages of 15 and 35.
Furthermore, heroin addiction helps
finance the growth of organized crime. It is
estimated that organized crime gains profits
of nearly a billion dollars a year from nar-
cotics trafficking. These revenues can then
be invested in other criminal enterprises.
For the addict and for our whole society,
nothing could contribute more to improving
the quality of life than an end to heroin
addiction.
NIXON'S PROMISE-AND PERFORMANCE
Speaking in September, 1968 about the
rising heroin problem, candidate Richard
Nixon proclaimd: "We need action on the
part of the nation's - highest officials-that
is what this crisis calls for and that is what I
pledge the day after we take office in
January."
After thirty months of his "action" to deal
with the "crisis", Richard Nixon had to
acknowledge his dismal failure and admit
that the problem was still growing. "Heroin,"
he said on June 17, 1971, "is a fact of life
and a cause of death for an increasing-num-
ber of Americans." That same day, he sub-
mitted to Congress a drug bill which de-
clared: "Drug abuse is rapidly increasing In
the United States and now afflicts urban,
suburban, and rural areas of this nation."
As the last quote indicates, under the three
and a half years of the Nixon Administration,
heroin addiction has spread rapidly through-
out all segments of the population.
Suburban high schools have discovered
heroin problems where there were none be-
fore. A recent study found that one and a
half million Americans between the ages
of twelve and eighteen have used heroin.
This is one American youth in seventeen.
Until recently, heroin was an urban prob-
lem centered in New York City. But the At-
torney General of Iowa said last year: "It is
still inconceivable to most Iowans that heroin
addiction could be a serious problem here.
But the alarming fact is that heroin addic-
tion has made a formidable inroad in Iowa."
Pointing up the failures of the Nixon years,
John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, said in Feb-
ruary: "At the end of 1969, our statisticians,
employing proven statistical methods, esti-
mated the actual number (of heroin addicts)
to be 215,000 with a margin of error not
likely to exceed plus or minus 16%. At the
close of 1971, we believe the number to be
almost 560,000."
Ingersoll's estimate of a 77% increase in
two years is the most sophisticated estimate
that has been made. Other indicators tell a
similar story.
In 1908, 1,449 young men were rejected for
the draft because of heroin use, In 1970,
fewer young men were examined-but 50%
more were rejected.
In 1969, 1,013 drug related deaths were
reported in New York City. In 1971, over 1,300
were reported. Substantial increases were
reported in city after city. The increases were
from 72 to 139 in Baltimore; from 202 to
310 in Chicago; from 65 to 199 In Detroit;
from 135-to 180 in San Francisco; and from
24 to 83 in the District of Columbia.
These facts reflect the failure of the Nixon
Administration to stop the spread of heroin
addiction in the United States. They explain
why Richard Nixon had to admit in his drug
bill last year that "drug abuse is rapidly in-
creasing in the United States." One Ameri-
can in 400 is now a heroin addict.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Solving the heroin problem is an excep-
tionally complex matter. Crucial steps must
be taken in many areas. We must increase
efforts to cure .individual addicts, to resolve
underlying social problems, to break up the
organized syndicates that purchase, refine,
smuggle, distribute, and sell heroin, and to
prevent the illicit production of opium.
Each of these efforts is difficult. There is
no assurance that any of them will succeed.
But we owe it to ourselves and to the many
victims of heroin addiction to pursue every
possible approach to ending the scourge of
heroin addiction.
The Nixon record is vulnerable on every
front. What I wish to examine in this presen-
tation, however, is the record of the Ad-
ministration in one critical area-the inter-
national heroin trade. What has President
Nixon pledged; and what has he accom-
plished, in halting the flow of heroin from
remote corners of the world into our streets
and schools?
THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE
In September, 1968, candidate Richard
Nixon declared: "We must move against the
source of those drugs. In doing so we must
seek out the cooperation of friendly nations
which have been made conduits for these
drugs.... A new Administration will acceler-
ate the development of tools and weapons to
detect narcotics in transit."
On June 17, 1971, he reaffirmed that con-
viction. "Domestic enforcement alone," he
said, "cannot do the job. If we are to stop
the flow of narcotics into the lifeblood of this
country I believe we must stop it at the
source."
Nixon not only has made this commit-
ment; he has even claimed success. He
claimed on July 9, 1971 that "we are deal-
ing very effectively with the problem at its
source."
Despite Nixon's claim, an increasing
amount of heroin is being smuggled into
this country.
On June 27, 1972, BNDD Director John In-
gersoll estimated that heroin is being smug-
gled into the U.S. at the rate of 61/2 to 10
tons a year. A year ago his estimate was 5
to 6 tons.
In September, 1970, Ingersoll said: "Every
time one addict is cured, more take his place
because of the ever-increasing amounts of
heroin available."
A year ago Richard Nixon triumphantly
announced that-continuing a policy begun
under the previous Administration-opium
production was being phased out in Tur-
key. Be reminded us that Turkey has in the
past accounted for 80% of heroin smuggled
into the United States.
Yet recently the Administration has been
hinting that stopping opium production-
dealing with the problem at the source, in
Nixon's phrase-is not the answer at all.
There are some questions that Americans
should be asking.
If opium production in Turkey is being
phased out, how can heroin importation-
and addiction-' be increasing?
After years of emphasizing the impor-
tance of meeting the problem at the source-
and claiming success-why is the Adminis-
tration backing away from emphasis in this
approach?
And why is it that the drug problem is
worse than ever, four years after Richard
Nixon called it a crisis and demanded im-
mediate action?
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA HEROIN TRADE
The answer is that more and more of the
heroin entering the United States originates
in Southeast Asia. The Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs estimates that more
than half of the world's Illicit supply of
opium, the raw material for heroin, is grown
in the "Golden Triangle" region where the
-borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos con-
verge. One year's crop of 700 to 1000 tons
can be refined into enough heroin to supply
America's addicts for ten years. More and
more of this heroin is reaching the American
market.
Southeast Asia has been a major producer
of opium and has had opium addiction prob-
lems of its own for a long time. But only in
late 1969 did the white, pure No. 4 heroin that
is used by American addicts begin to be pro-
duced in Southeast Asia. When it appeared,
it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll says;
"Our first indications of the presence of
(No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in De-
cember of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned
into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned
into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the
Golden Triangle."
Since there was no indigenous demand for
No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its
appearance signified an intention to sup-
ply the U.S. market. The first victims were
our GIs in Vietnam. Possibly 100,000 GIs
became heroin addicts in Vietnam during
1970 and 1971. Now that many of our GIs
have come home and the market for No. 4
heroin has diminished in Southeast Asia,
Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in
our country.
Our inability to prevent this has been a
consequence of our priorities. The top and
really only priority of our government in
Southeast Asia has been to fight the war. The,
political and military priorities of the war
have relegated other problems to distant
back burners. The U.S. has always tolerated
corruption on, the part of our Southeast
Asian allies as long as they fight the war
and follow our policies. Black marketeering,
stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation, and
smuggling are tolerated, and all are rampant.
Narcotics . trafficking has not been treated
any differently.
Opium was being grown, smoked, and
smuggled in Southeast Asia when the U.S.
first became Involved in the region during
the 1950s and 1960s. But the opium traffic
was viewed as a minor local problem and
ignored. The U.S. built up a vast military
and political apparatus in Indochina to fight
the war. We ignored the fact that vitually
every link in that apparatus was simultane-
ously becoming part of a vast opium pro-
ducing, refining, and smuggling apparatus
which today is well on its way to replacing
Turkey as the major source of heroin enter-
ing the United States.
Here are some of the broad outlines of
the Southeast Asia opium and heroin trade
as it has developed:
In Laos, opium is grown by the Meo tribes-
men we organized into General Van Pao's
"secret army"; In fact, once the U.S. began
providing - them with liberal food supplies
to assure their allegiance, many of- hem
were able to switch to opium as virtually
their only crop.
In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan
rebels, the biggest opium growers in the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 26, 1972
world. They are armed with American weap-
rons and are able to thwart central govern-
ment ccontrol. Their weapons were provided
by the CIA or were acquired by trading
opium with government officials In Laos
and Thailand for guns supplied by (and
stolen from) the U.S. military aid program.
Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in
Thailand.
Opium from Burma is transported into
Thailand by remnants of Nationalist Chi-
nese (KMT) forces driven out of China in
1949. These forces are armed with U.S.
weapons and have been supported in the
past by the CIA. The Thai government now
uses them to patrol its rugged northern
frontier with Burma and to help suppress
the growing insurgency in northern
Thailand.
Opium is transported by the Royal Lao-
tian Air Force and the South Vietnamese Air
Force, which have been organized, financed,
and supplied by the United States, and on
local commercial flights as well.
Opium and morphine base (which is re-
fined from opium) are transported from
Thai ports in fishing trawlers to clandestine
laboratories in Hong Kong. This could not
happen without the complicity of the Thai
police and customs authorities.
Heroin is refined in laboratories in Thai-
land, Laos, Burma, and Hong Kong. In the
quantity and quality of its output, Hong
Kong now rivals the refining capacity of
Marseilles.
From Southeast Asia, heroin has been
smuggled to the United States via many
routes. There have been seizures of heroin
sent to the U.S. from Southeast Asia via the
military postal system. Southeast Asia
heroin has been seized In France on its way
to the United States, and Southeast Asian
heroin is reaching the United States by way
of Latin America. A courier ring was uncov-
ered smuggling Southeast Asian heroin to
the U.S. via the Philippines. Another
courier ring was uncovered this year operat-
ing through Bangkok. An increasing amount
of heroin refined from opium grown in
Southeast Asia is smuggled to the U.S. by
seamen from Hong Kong.
The Nixon Administration ignored the
drug problem in Southeast Asia- until 1971
when heroin use reached epidemic propor-
tions among our GI's in Southeast Asia. By
that time it was too late. The Administra-
tion's hands were-tied. Our allies in South-
east Asia had developed a vast opium pro-
ducing, refining, and distributing network
while the U.S., with its great power in South-
east Asia, patrolled the air, the land, and
the sea, organized armies, created and de-
stroyed governments, promoted intrigue, but
ignored the opium trade. Important mem-
bers of the armed forces and governments
of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are
raking in big profits from the drug trade.
't'hey are not about to forgo those profits.
The US Army Provost Marshal in South
Vietnam, in a 1971 report, stated that the
opium trade in South Vietnam is controlled
by a four tiered pyramid. At the top are
the powers behind the scenes who can
manipulate, foster, protect, and promote
the illicit traffic in drugs." "The people com-
prising this group," the report stated "may be
high level, influential political figures, gov-
ernment leaders, or moneyed Chinese mem-
bers of the criminal syndicates now flourish-
ing in the Cholon sector of the City of
Saigon."
't'he Provost Marshal identified Tran Thien
Khoi? chief of South Vietnam's customs
fraud repression division and brother of
Prime Minister Tran Thien Khlem, as "a
principal in the opium traffic."
General Ngo Dzu, II Corps commander in
South Vietnam and a staunch supporter of
President Thieu, was Identified last year as
a major narcotics trafficker. Thleu promoted
him after a whitewash Investigation.
General Ouane Rattikone controlled the
largest heroin laboratory in Southeast Asia
during his tenure as chief of staff of the
Royal Laotian Army (the only army other
than the U.S. Army that is completely fi-
nanced by the U.S. taxpayer). This labora-
tory was the major supplier of heroin for
U.S. forces in South Vietnam at the peak of
the heroin epidemic.
A high-level CIA intelligence report made
public by Jack Anderson states, "A broad
spectrum of Lao society is Involved in the
narcotics business, including Generals.
Princes, high-level bureaucrats and Pro-
vince Governors." Another intelligence re-
port states, "Most of the refineries In Laos
operate under the protection of the Royal
Laotian Armed Forces .
NBC News reported on July 15, 1971 that
both President Thieu and Vice-President
Ky were financing their election campaigns
from the narcotics traffic and labeled Presi-
dent Thieu's chief intelligence adviser, Gen-
eral Dang Van Quang, as "the biggest pusher
in South Vietnam." Quang's involvement In
the heroin trade has been confirmed by other
sources.
The Nixon Administration denied and cov-
ered up these facts and stood by helplessly
because it cannotcrack down on the corrupt
governments it is trying to prop up. Mean-
while, our allies in Southeast Asia mademil-
lions of dollars peddling heroin to GI's in
South Vietnam who were risking their lives
trying to defend them.
Today, they are making great profits sup-
plying heroin to addicts in America.
In 1970, the BNDD broke up a Filipino
courier ring which had smuggled apprgqxi-
mately 1,000 kilograms of Southeast Asian
heroin into the United States in the pre-
vious year.
That was enough to supply 15% to 20?>:
of the estimated U.S. consumption at the
time.
On April 5, 1971, 7.7 kilos of Double U-O
Globe brand Laotian heroin (the same brand
produced in General Ouane Rattikone's lab-
oratories) were seized in Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey.
On November 11, 1971, 15.5 kilos of the
same brand of Laotian heroin were seized in
New York City.
The new Laotian Ambassador to France was
caught in April, 1971 when he arrived in Paris
with 60 kilograms of heroin in his suitcase.
That is enough heroin to supply five thou-
sand addicts for a full year.
In January, 1972, U.S. customs inspectors
in Honolulu broke up a smuggling system
and arrested three couriers body-carrying
heroin from Bangkok to buyers In San Fran-
cisco and New York.
On April 5, 1972. a seaman was arrested in
Miami with 10 kilos of Double U-0 Globe
brand Laotian heroin and on April 11 another
seaman was arrested in New York with an-
other 5 kilos of Southeast Asian heroin.
And on August 23, 1972, the same day that
Richard Nixon delivered his acceptance
speech, the BNDD announced the seizure of
9 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin in New
York City and the uncovering of a smuggling
ring, The BNDD noted that there had been
another seizure of Southeast Asian heroin in
the same area the month before.
The seizures are only the tip of the iceberg.
John Ingersoll of BNDD told the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on June 27 that
"we have reason to believe that certain
ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America
have geared up an operation to take advan-
tage of the heroin availability in Southeast
Asia. . The evidence points to the estab-
lishment of a new pattern which affects
places never previously of any significance to
the drug traffic. Either as the result of actual
seizures or our intelligence, we believe these
shipments have come in through such diverse
seaports as Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New
Orleanp, Seattle, Vancouver, New York, and
the Great Lakes, port of Chicago."
As one Republican Congressman has said,
"Vietnam is truly coming home to haunt us.
No matter what they say.... the first wave
of this material is already on its way to our
children in high school."
It is impossible to be sure just how much
Southeast Asian heroin is now entering this
country. NBC's estimate in a recent special
broadcast was that one third of heroin enter-
ing this country now comes from Southeast
Asia. A recent report by the Strategic Intelli-
gence Office of BNDD stated, "More of the
heroin reaching the U.S. is from this area
than conventional knowledge has recognized.
A recent study by BNDD chemists, involving
109 traceable heroin samples, revealed 28 (or
25.7 percent) to be of southeast Asian
origin."
The percentage of heroin entering this
country that comes from Southeast Asia is
increasing; the Golden Triangle region of
Laos, Burma, and Thailand clearly has the
potential of replacing Turkey as this coun-
try's major heroin supplier. Whether that
potential is realized will depend on how the
United States responds to the problem. So
far, the U.S. has met this challenge with half-
measures and cover-ups.
Nixon Administration officials have her-
alded their achievements and claimed in-
cre''sing cooperation with the governments
of- Southeast Asia. However, independent in-
formation from Congress, the news media,
and concerned citizens has brought the Ad-
ministration's credibility into serious ques-
tion, and recent leaks of secret Administra-
tion documents directly contradict their pub-
lic statements.
Nelson Gross, the State Department's chief
narcotics spokesman, told a Congressional
inquiry on June 9 that "we feel that during
the past year some real progress has been
achieved" and that "the governments of
Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already
joined us in the fight."
This official optimism was flatly contra-
dicted by a Cabinet level report dated Febru-
ary 21, 1972, prepared by officials from the
CIA, the State Department, and the Depart
ment of Defense. According to The New York
Times of July 24, the report stated that
"there is no prospect . under any condi-
tions that can realistically be projected" for
stemming the smuggling of narcotics in
Southeast Asia.
"Our answer is categorical," Nelson Gross
told the Senate. "The governments of South-
east Asia are not engaged in drug trafficking."
Secretary of State Rogers claimed in May
that the governments in the area are actively
cooperating in efforts to curb the drug trade.
But the Cabinet level report stated, "The
governments in the region are unable and, in
some cases, unwilling, to do those things
that would haveto be done by them if a truly
effective effort were to be made.... The most
basic problem, and the one that unfortu-
nately appears least likely of any early
solution, is the corruption, collusion, and
indifference at some places in some govern-
ments, particularly Thailand and South
Vietnam, that precludes more effective sup-
pression of traffic by the governments on
whose territory it takes place."
Nelson Gross insisted that there were only
"unsubstantiated allegations" implicating
General Ouane Rattikone in the drug trade.
However, General Rattikone has acknowl-
edged his complicity, and John Warner, chief
of the Intelligence Office of BNDD, has since
confirmed Rattikone's complicity.
In July, 1971, a Congressional committee
was told that "U.S. military authorities have
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September 26, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
provided Ambassador Bunker with hard in-
telligence that one of the chief traffickers is
General Ngo Dzu, the commander of II
Corps." The U.S. Embassy permitted the late
John Paul Vann, the senior U.S. adviser for
II Corps, to respond: "There is no informa.
tion available to me that In any shape, man-
?ner or fashion would substantiate the
charges." He also indicated that General
Abrams had no such information. General
Dzu was then promoted. The Washington
Post later obtained the secret documents
whose existence had been denied and pub-
lished them in June, 1972.
Nelson Gross denied there was a serious
problem. In a letter to the Senate Committee
he said: "Southeast Asia is not a major
source of heroin an our market" and that
"only five percent" and "certainly no more
than 10 percent" of heroin used in the U.S.
comes from Southeast Asia. But it was
pointed out above that a survey of 109
seizures of heroin in this country by BNDD.
found that 26% came from Southeast Asia.
The Washington Evening Star-Daily News
on August 19, :1972 reported on secret intel-
ligence summaries compiled by CIA and
BNDD that contain some of the facts that
the Administration will not acknowledge in
public. The summaries state that "officials
of the Royal Thai Army and Customs at the
several checkpoints along the road to Bang-
kok are usually bribed and `protection' fees
prepaid by the smuggling syndicates or by
the driver at the checkpoints,"
The summaries also clearly explain why
the U.S. has been unable to deal effectively
with the Southeast Asia drug trade. They
state, "priorities related to requirements of
the Vietnam war may limit pressures that
can be applied". The "war on drugs" has
become a casualty of the war in Indochina.
Our political and military commitments
to the governments of Southeast Asia have
prevented any effective action to stop the
narcotics traffic: These commitments are the
result of, our determination to fight the war
in Indochina. We have allied ourselves with
corrupt governments that are 'complicit in
the drug trade and, this fact is coming home
to haunt us.
Ending the war in Vietnam will free us
to make the narcotics traffic our number one
priority in the region.
Heroin addiction in our country has
brought living death to hundreds of thou-
sands of Americans. It is a major force behind
our intolerable crime rates. It is fueling the
activities of organized crime.
We can no longer tolerate the narcotics
traffic and we can no longer support the cor-
rupt governments of Southeast Asia that
profit from it.
Our commitment; to the war In Indochina
is based on a :false notion of national se-
curity. Since Richard Nixon took office, the
United States has spent $60 billion to fight
the war compared to less than $1 billion to
combat the narcotics problem. Can anyone
say that the North Vietnamese are a greater
threat to our national security than the
crime, violence, and internal decay caused by
narcotics? -
It is time to stop fighting the war in Viet-
nam and see- how we can effectively fight the
war on drugs.
KEEPING THE BROKEN PROMISES
tration's top priority. In failing to crack
down on the Southeast Asia heroin trade, the
Administration has left plenty of room for
other nations to question our commitment.
There is no way to control the interna-
tional narcotics trade while winking at one
of the major areas of supply. We will simply
have to make a top priority effort to control
the Southeast Asia narcotics trade. Ending
the war will be the key.
In the following specific ways, Richard
Nixon's determination to continue the war
in Vietnam has prevented him from being
able to crack down on the Southeast Asia
heroin trade:
(1) He can't cope with the problem with-
out admitting the facts about his corrupt
allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam
who are supplying heroin to the U.S. market.
If he. admitted these facts, support for the
war would dry up overnight. Richard Nixon
has therefore chosen to ignore the problem.
(2) Richard Nixon is trying desperately
to prop up these weak, corrupt Southeast
Asian governments. He does not want to ex-
pose scandals which would threaten their
fragile existence and lessen their ability to
fight the war.
(3) We can never bring the necessary pres-
sures to bear on these governments as long
as we need Vietnamese soldiers, Lao mer-
cenaries, and That air bases to fight our
war.
The best case in point is Thailand. As a
major opium grower and the conduit through
which Burmese opium is smuggled, Thailand
is increasingly the key to controlling the
Southeast Asia drug trade. -
At the same time, as we increase our reli-
ance on air power, shift troops from South
Vietnam to Thailand, and reopen air bases
in Thailand, Thailand is becoming increas-
ingly crucial to our war effort.
The war effort is also dependent on That
mercenaries in Laos and South Vietnam.
As long as the U.S. is relying on mer-
cenaries and air bases that are available
only with the approval of the That govern-
ment, obviously there is a limit to how much
pressure we can bring to bear on them. The
war gives the corrupt Thai government a
veto power over American policy. As long
as the war continues, we will never be able
to pressure the Thai leaders to give up the
enormous profits that they are making from
the opium trade.
In the following ways; ending the war will
facilitate controlling the Southeast Asian
heroin trade:
(1) The end of the war will free us to make
a crackdown on narcotics the top priority
in our relations with the nations of this
area.
It will free the President to meet this issue
head-on instead. of covering it up for politi-
cal reasons.
(2) Political settlements at the end of the
war are likely to lead to the emergence in
Laos and South Vietnam of new governments
that would be less corrupt and more likely to
suppress the opium trade. The people and
governments of Laos and South Vietnam
are likely to realize that if they are serious
about rebuilding their countries, they will
have to root out corruption and curb the
growing drug problems that are ravaging
their societies.
(3) The end of the war would completely
What are the prospects for the future? turn the tables in Thailand. We would no
In order to halt the international narcot- longer be dependent on the That government
ics trade it will be necessary for the next for the war effort; instead, they would be de-
Administration to keep the promises that pendent on our economic aid to bolster their
Richard Nixon has broken. topheavy economy. A threat to cut off aid
He said on June 18, 1971 that controlling would give us tremendous leverage.
the heroin trade is his first priority in rela- The Thai government could seal off the
tions with the countries involved. Thai-Burmese border, if they were deter-
"I intend," he has said, "to leave no room mined to do so. Virtually all of the Burmese
for other countries to question our com- opium passes through Thailand. Most of it is
mitment to this matter." carried in large mule caravans by the KMT.
Those promises have been broken. Stopping Some is carried by Burmese Shan rebels, but
the heroin trade has not been the Adminis- the KMT units tightly control the border
S 15997
and tax -every pound of opium that crosses
into Thailand. This shows that the border
can be controlled. If the opium can be taxed,
it can be stopped. But it will require a vigor-
otus effort by the Thai government. The
United States must pressure the Thai gov-
ernment to make that effort.
The U.S. House of Representatives has
passed an amendment to the foreign aid bill
that cuts off aid to Thailand until the Pres-
ident determines that Thailand is cooperat-
ing to stop the narcotics traffic. It is a step
in the right direction, but it has the draw-
back of allowing a Presidential determina-
tion of cooperation. President Nixon will not
cut off aid because he needs these air bases.
The Secretary of State claims that Thailand
is already "cooperating," and the President
already has the power to out off aid to
Thailand but has not used it. The Senate
should also pass this amendment, with the
provision that restoring aid to Thailand is
dependent on significant achievements in
stopping the narcotics traffic as determined
by Congress or by an independent body.
(4), The reason that the government of
Burma is unable to stop the opium traffic is
that the opium growing areas are controlled
by rebel bands armed with American wea-
pons (they obtain those weapons by selling
opium to corrupt Thai and Laotian officials).
When the war ends and the United States
stops sending arms into - the area, the flow
of arms to the rebels will be disrupted. If
corruption in Laos and Thailand were con-
trolled and if the borders were sealed, the
Burmese rebels would find it difficult to mar-
ket their opium or to obtain weapons. With
a shortage of weapons and money, the rebels
would be weakened and it would be easier for
the Burmese government to regain control
of the opium growing areas. In the past, the
Burmese government has cracked down on
the opium traffic when it has been able to.
In addition, ending the Vietnam war and
reorienting our foreign policy may improve
our relations with Burma and make coopera-
tive efforts more likely. -
These points must be placed in the con-
text of a full program to stem the interna-
tional narcotics trade. Such an effort must
include four components. There is nothing
mysterious about these recommendations.
Some are official Administration policy and
all have been discussed and advocated for
a long time. But these recommendations are
meaningless as long as the war continues
and the Southeast Asia narcotics trade con-
tinues unchecked.
(1) Direct Diplomatic Pressure-The United
States should exert maximum pressure on
other governments to crack down on the il-
licit production and smuggling of opium.
This effort must be placed at the top of the
agenda of our foreign relations. Every pos-
sible diplomatic lever, including possible re-
duction or cessation of foreign aid, must be
brought to bear. If necessary, the President
should directly take charge of this effort and
should personally negotiate with the leaders
of other countries.
In this effort, the U.S. must use the carrot
as well as the stick. Other countries, too, have
an interest in halting the drug trade. They
have their own opium and heroin problems.
If given a realistic alternative to involve-
ment in the drug trade, foreign countries
may well find it in their interest to cooperate
in international control efforts.
Unfortunately, the opium trade is an im-
portant source of income to hundreds of
thousands of farmers around the world, and,
in some cases, to entire national economies.
Consequently, the United States must be
prepared to assist in making sure that realis-
tic alternative sources of income are avail-
able. This should include price support pay-
ments and, in the long term, investments in
the areas affected to help create alternative
sources of income.
(2) International Cooperation-U.S. action
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 26, 1972
is needed at once, but the proposed U.S.
actions would be more effective if taken by
an international organization. The U.S.
should attempt to organize the international
community to pressure offending nations to
clamp down on the narcotics trade. The In-
ternational Narcotics Control Board should
have authority to investigate alleged non-
compliance with international obligations in
any nation that is a party to the Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs. Economic sanc-
tions, including the withholding of inter-
national development funds, and possible
trade restrictions, should be available as a
tool of last resort in the event of persistent
failure by any nation to cooperate. An effec-
tive program of economic assistance to opium
producing areas converting to other crops
should be developed under international
auspices. So far only a tiny step has been
taken in this direction.
(3) U.S. Agencies-We should strengthen
the U.S. agencies that are responsible for con-
trolling the international narcotics trade. An
additional $40 million should be appropriated
for the Customs Bureau and the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for hiring
and training specialists in drug law enforce-
ment.
A conflict of jurisdictions between BN13D
and the Customs Bureau has undermined the
effectiveness of Federal control efforts. We
cannot expect other nationsto take us seri-
ously when we urge cooperation if we are un-
able to coordinate our own efforts. Yet Presi-
dent Nixon has been unable to gain control
over this conflict between two Federal agen-
cies. and the conflict has repeatedly jeopard-
ized important cases. BNDD should be as-
signed primary responsibility in controlling
the international trade, and the President
should be prepared to step in personally to
ensure that, this mandate is carried out.
(4) Finally, increased research efforts can
contribute to improving our ability to con-
trol the illicit narcotics traffic. The develop-
ment of cheap, non-addictive synthetic pain-
killers could make it possible to completely
outlaw opium production throughout the
world. If legal crops for medicinal purposes
can be marked with practical tracer elements,
this would make it much easier to detect
opium diverted into the illegal market. And
there are even indications that remote sensor
devices can be developed that would permit
direct detection of heroin shipments. All of
these possibilities should be vigorously-pur-
sued.
The international law enforcement strategy
is clearly not the total solution to the drug
addiction problem. A two-pronged approach
is needed-rehabilitation of those who are
now addicted and law enforcement and edu-
cation to prevent the spread of heroin addic-
tion. Here are some of the elements of a total
approach to drug addiction:
Rehabilitation of Addicts-Any serious as-
sault on the drug addiction problem must
include an extensive rehabilitation program.
A broad range of treatment facilities-
methadone maintenance, therapeutic com-
munities, detoxification, and abstinence-
must be available; we must seek to guaran-
tee that any addict seeking treatment can
gain access to a suitable modality of treat-
ment. Vocational training and counselling
and other supportive services must be avail-
able. and we must attempt to eliminate un-
fair job discrimination against ex-addicts.
Today there are waiting lists in our metha-
done programs; methadone is frequently the
only treatment available (<hough for many
addicts, such as young veterans who have
been addicted only a short time, methadone
may not be suitable) ; and supportive serv-
ices are frequently absent. Even if it were
possible to suddenly stop the flow of heroin
into this country and prevent more people
from becoming addicted, there are already
more than a half million heroin addicts in
our country who need treatment.
Domestic Law Enforcement-Domestic law
enforcement efforts must be pursued as an
adjunct to the international control effort,
to make it as difficult as possible for the
heroin traffickers to operate. Law enforce-
ment efforts should be directed not at the
street level pushers who are usually addicts
themselves but at those who organize, pro-
mote, and profiteer from the spread of heroin
addiction.
Even if the domestic and international
control efforts cannot eliminate the heroin
traffic, it is reasonable to hope that they can
reduce heroin availability on the street and
curtail experimentation and thus help stop
the spread of addiction (although confirmed
addicts will still do whatever is necessary to
obtain the drug).
Drug Education-Like the law enforce-
ment effort, drug education programs that
frankly and openly present the facts about
various drugs can help discourage experi-
mentation with heroin among youths.
Although President Nixon said in March,
1970 that drug education is the highest pri-
ority of his Administration, the drug educa-
tion budget for fiscal 1972 in the Office of
Education was 13 million-one fourth the
cost of one C-5A transport.
Other Drugs-International enforcement
efforts must not be limited to heroin. Other
drugs, including cocaine, methadone, and
barbiturates, must be included; they are
problems now and could become more serious
if heroin becomes scarce. Synthetic drugs
equivalent to heroin may also become avail-
able. Control efforts must be pursued now
before these problems grow.
Underlying Social Problems-Solving basic
problems of poverty, alienation, and lack of
opportunity will be the key to a long range
solution of our drug problems. Until the
underlying social causes of drug abuse can be
cured, drug abuse cannot be completely
eliminated. As long as the belief persists that
it is possible to solve problems by taking
drugs, it will always be possible that a new
drug problem could emerge.
These considerations, however, should not
discourage us from making an immediate
effort, pursuing every possible avenue, to cure
the heroin plague. Heroin overshadows all
other drugs in its disastrous impact on our
lives. Heroin is responsible for much of the
crime, violence, and insecurity that haunt
urban- life; heroin addiction has destroyed
the lives of hundreds of thousands of ad-
dicts: and heroin trafficking has fueled the
growth of organized crime. Heroin is our
worst drug problem and solving it would
immensely contribute to improving the qual-
ity of our lives.
The effort to solve the heroin problem must
cease to be fragmented and haphazard. We
must pursue it with the same determina-
tion and seriousness of purpose that we in-
vested in the Manhattan Project and the
space race.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties in attempting to control
the international narcotics trade are obvi-
ous. Opium is grown in many countries and
total U.S. consumption is small compared
to world-wide production. The intention in
this presentation is not to propose panaceas
or to paper over problems but rather to
clarify some of the reasons for past fail-
ures and to point the way toward a more
realistic effort. International enforcement
efforts are not the full answer to the drug
problem nor is Southeast Asia the only
opium-growing area that could replace Tur-
key in supplying the U.S. market. But our
failure to face up to the problem in South-
east Asia has been one major reason for the
failure of the "total war" that Richard Nixon
declared on heroin. The next Administra-
tion must face up squarely to the fact that
Southeast Asia is fast becoming this nation's
major heroin supplier.
It would be wrong to see only the problems
that beset the international control effort.
There are also some important facts which
indicate that an international control strat-
egy will have some reasonable prospect of
success. Thepoppy has a long growing period
and is easily detected from the air or by
satellite. Poppy cultivation is possible only
in certain fairly restricted climates. Culti-
vating the poppy is exceptionally demand-
ing; few who are not accustomed to that life
would be willing to adopt it. Consequently,
the international syndicates will not easily
be able to persuade farmers elsewhere to cul-
tivate the poppy, if they lose their source of
supply in the Golden Triangle.
In the 1950s Iran was able to gain control
over remote hill tribes and halt opium pro-
duction. India and China have had consid-
erable success in controlling the illicit pro-
duction of opium and preventing diversion
into illegal channels. Turkey's recent agree-
ment to terminate opium production-cul-
minating a decade of negotiation and pres-
sure-illustrates what can be achieved, when
narcotics control is made a top priority. It
is now time to place cracking down on the
heroin trade at the top of the agenda in our
relations with all of the nations involved.
No objective we are pursuing in Vietnam is
so important as to justify jeopardizing our
efforts to control the heroin trade.
The next President can act to end the war,
and crack down on the supply of heroin from
Southeast Asia. This is the fight that Amer-
ica should be pursuing.
This is th fight that, as President, I
intend to win.,
THE EAST LOS ANGELES DOCTORS
HOSPITAL
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, Octo-
ber 22, 1972, marks the 10th anniversary
of the founding of the East Los Angeles
Doctors Hospital. It gives me great pleas-
ure to congratulate this private institu-
tion on its 10th anniversary because of
the excellent health-care delivery serv-
ices it has provided to the community.
Working together, the hospital and the
community have relied upon each other
fo+r the advancement of medical services,
the development of health care career
opportunities for young people, the en-
couragement of neighborhood beautifi-
cation, the stimulation of art and design
as an adjunct to environmental improve-
ment, and the creation of a treatment
and convalescence that not only reduces
the apprehension of the patients but also
serves to hasten their recovery.
It has been a decade that the East Los
Angeles Doctors Hospital has grown from
39 beds to 150 beds. It has been a decade
of service to an area in which resides the
greatest concentration of Mexican
Americans. And, it has been a decade of
creative experimentation making a hos-
pital the focus of community service-of
integrating medical services with the
general elevation of people's expecta-
tions and, most important of all, a dec-
ade of providing access to health care
for thousands of people.
Here is a private institution-a tax-
paying institution-a nongovernment
funded institution, that has unilaterally
developed and implemented community
action programs without the need for
grants or Federal subsidies.
Here is an institution-East Los An-
geles Doctors Hospital-which has cre-
ated cash prizes, scholarships, and pur-
chase commissions for local Barrio
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE PAGE .~
NixonDel-ends His Record
In Combating Drug Trade
By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.
Special to Ths New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 -
President Nixon, in another
quick response to charges
raised by his Democratic oppo-
nent, defended today, his rec-
ord on narcotics control and
pledged to cut off aid to
any foreign government whose
leaders "protect" international
drug traffickers.
Appearing before an. Interna-
tional narcotics control confer.
ence at the State Department
this morning, Mr. Nixon told a
group of senior officers from
United States embassies in 55
countries that his year-old
war on drugs had shown
measurable progress but that
we must do more to win this
war and we must do it even
more quickly."
Senator George McGovern,
the Democratic Presidential
nominee, charged yesterday in
a statement issued in West Vir-
ginia that Mr. Nixon had failed
to "crack down on the nar-I
cotics trade in Laos, Thailand
and South Vietnam" because
the Administration needed "airy
bases in Thailand, Laos mer-
cenaries and Vietnamese sol-
member of the Administration,'
John Finlator, supporting Mr.
!McGovern's allegations.
Mr. Finlator, who retired las-
January as deputy director o
the Bureau of Narcotics anc
Dangerous Drugs, said that Mr
Nixon had allowed the "golder
triangle" of Laos, Burma anc
Thailand to be the major sup
plier of heroin to the ellici
market places of this country
and charged further that "wi
are in worse shape in the wai
against drug abuse today than
on the day the present Admin-i
istration took office."
Mr. McGovern, campaigning
in Cincinnati, said that Mr.
Nixon's remarks this morning
left "decisive questions un
answered."
Charging that the Saigon'
regime was riddled with drug
profiteers, Mr. McGovern chal-
lenged the President to invoke
the authority of the foreign aid
Mr. Nixon described interna-
tional drug ' traffickers as "a
menace not just to Americans
alone but to all mankind."
"These people are literally
the slave traders of our time.,
They are traffickers in living
death. They must be hunted to
the end of the earth. They must
be left no base in any nation
for their operation," he said.
The statutory basis for Mr.
Nixon to suspend aid to foreign
governments lies in Section 481
of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1971. Mr. Nixon has yet to
invoke the authority granted
him, and despite his threat this
morning, there are few officials
here who seriously believe that
he would order such strong
sanctions against the Thais and
the Laotians while the war in
Vietnam continues.
At the same time, however,
the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous. Drugs has helped or-
ganize and subsidize a task
force operating in northern
Thailand to intercept opium,
morphine base and heroin that
flows southward from Burma.
The bureau is now organizing
a Second such force in Bang-
NanieNot Used ; kok.
esident,s personal re-
P
h
r
e
. T
In his comments this morn- , sponse to Mr. McGovern's
ing, Mr. Nixon did not mention charge fit the pattern of Mr.
Mr. McGovern by name. This ' Nixon's campaign. Mr. Nixon
has become his custom. Mr and his subordinates have
Nixon also did not directly greeted nearly every McGovern
respond to the South Dakota charge, involving such varied
Democrat's allegations. matters as the role of 1 ht t
He listed five countries in government, the p g
Laos, Thailand, Turkey, France flood victims in Pennsylvania
and Paraguay-where United and the broader issues of wel-
States officials, working "in fare and taxes, with virtually
partnership" with local author- instantaneous rebuttal.
ities, had produced "important
of T Radio
breakthroughs," including large Remarks Underscoring Taped the for political
a
heroin seizures
decision to eradi- nature of ? the argument were
of Turkey,
r three other developments late
popp
a
ked
-
s
-
In addition, Mr. Nl? on
the embassy officials to convey Re-e eetion of the President 'for medical and scientific use
a "personal message" to the taped Mr. Nixon's remarks and and to refer evidence of illicit
foreign authorities when they radio stations. them available to and Lotion and drug trafficking
pro returned overseas. to other nations and to the
overnment, he said, Meanwhile, the McGovern United Nations General As-
h Tea PE in forces seized upon and distrib-
whose ders p' The pprotocol also provides for y
or protect the activities of those uted a statement by a former wore protoc exrprovid of
who contribute to the drug drug offenders.
problem should know that the
United States is required by
rican
statute to suspend all Ame
economic and mill ary assist-
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shall not hesitate to comply
with that law where there are
-1 violations."
act and impose sanctions on
the south Vietnamese Govern-
ment.
Administration officials do
not dispute the fact that the
"golden triangle" is now a ma-,
jor source of supply. But they
argue that Mr. McGovern's al-
legations of inaction are out of
date, that the Thailand task
force has made heavy inroads
traffic and that the
on drug
Central Intelligence Agency, re-
versing long-standing p Y.
now moving aggressively'
against traffickers in Indochina.
In support of his position,
Mr. Nixon also said this morn-
ing that Federal antidrug funds
had increased elevenfold since
1969, that arrests had doubled
in the same period and that a
recent sharp increase in heroin
prices on the East Coast sug-
gested that "the supply is dry-
ing up."
Treaty Change Voted
WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (AP)
-The Senate ratified today, 69
to 0, a revision of a 90-nation
treaty on narcotics. The change
is designed to strengthen inter-
national control of drugs.
Under the revision, the In-
ternational Narcotics Control
Board will be directed to lim}t
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 J.,1,~J
THE EVEI ING A4@ed For Release 2005/06/2~AQ
000400030067-f
PAGE
'lixon Warns of Aid Cu ro Drug-Dealer Nation
By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star-News Staff Writer
President Nixon today warned ,that he will
:it hesitate to cut off all American economic and
ilitary aid to any government whose leaders
articipate in or protect the drug traffic.
raised, the ~C
for its rote in~ag in Erna, cln ug
san~ agency has been -much
med."
orb y?
~3 htl tht=lntern.aQx]? dry ?a e. "Inge
_1mtell genre," .he -added,.."w W ys
? ig f dl r ;t Q tAre ublicize.ss
.s Ce$ses.by definition must always he 9- n
there are.many successes, _and particu-
nesof which this agency can be very proud."
s of the CI& j~.e...charged.tk the
:ency has a c ec1 "drug traffickers in Southeast
-.to- help maintain, alliam es.
He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immo-
_izing and destroying sources of drugs coming
:o the United States.
He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand
cl Turkey are just a few examples of the many
trntries where the work of American officials,
?m the ambassador down, in partnership with
-al officials, has produced important break-
roughs - huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or
in Turkey's case the courageous decision to
idicate the opium poppy itself."
The President said he considers keeping
igerous drugs out of the United States "just as
portant as keeping armed enemy forces from
-ding in the United. States". because the drugs
n endanger the lives of youg Americans just as
tch as would an invading army.
Speaking at an internatIQ . conference on
ig control at the State Del~ameat. he asked
terican officials from. around t1 e_world to con-
to foreign officials with,whoni they deal "this
snal message" from me:
See DRUGS, Page A-6
Coutinged From Page A-1 to get them to "quit fighting
"AMY government whose each other and start fighting
Ieaders participate in or pro- the problem."
tect the activities of those Citing some results, he said
who contribute to our drug the number of arrests of drug
program should know that the traffickers in the last fiscal
President of the United States year was double the number
is required by statute to sus- arrested in 1969, and the sei-
pend all American economic zures of heroin and other illicit
and military assistance to drugs are at. an all-time high.
such a regime. "Very sharp increases in the
"I shall not hesitate to com- prices of heroin throughout the
ply fully and promptly with eastern United States indicate
that statute." that the supply is drying up
Nixon said he has been and that the pressure is on the
"cracking the whip" over gov- criminal drug trade," he said.
ernment agencies involved in Nixon's statements appar-
dealing with dangerous drugs ently were in response to a
statement yesterday by Demo-
cratic presidential candidate
Sen. George S. McGovern.
McGovern said the number
of heroin addicts in the United
States had doubled since 1968
and charged that Southeast
Asia had became a major
source of heroin because the
administration w o u 1 d not
crack down on the narcotics
trade in Laos, Thailand and
South Vietnam.
Nixon made no direct refer-
;ence to McGovern's charges,
but his comments appeared to
be a sharp counterattack.
President's praise of the
Gfi4 r oo1l_aims -aild
official denials that` the.agen-
ey's Air America. has helped
"&ttrransport heroin in Southeast
Asia.
In a book called "The Poli-
tics of Heroin in Southeast
Asia," that was published re-
cently, Arthur W. McCoy
raised the question of whether
CIA operatives knowingly en-
(gaged in such traffic to help
mg taiu2lliancs.
More specifically, McCoy
accused officials in govern-
ments of VV.S.. alliis in South-
east Asia-particularly in Sai-
o goo-of profiting from the
traffic.
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
U.S. Is Backbone of Laos,
By Jack Anderson
The U.S. government has In-
sisted for years that its unof-
ficial CIA-run airline Air
America, has not been run-
ning opium in the mountain-
ofis Asian land gf,Laos.
But now, from the files of
the C14 pd o#xier U,S. inteali-
gence aencies, we have evi-
dence Qt_
iat U.S. ground and-air
equipment=- if npt lper
sonnel -bias formed the back-,
bone of the Laos opium trade.
"Selected Royal Lao Army
and RoyalLao Air Force
units, utilizing air and ground
equipment furnished by, the
United States, provide, the
means for ,lrotectipg, trans-
porting and processing of nar-
cot reports one.,- intelli-?
gence summary on Lao e.
"A broad? spectrum of Lao
society is lnvplved in the nar-
cotics business, including Gen-
erals, Princes, high-level bu-
reaucrats and Province Gover-
nors," says t ereport.
Another document: com-
plete with a secret CIA map,
reports unequivocally: "Most
of the refineries in Laos oper-
ate under the protection of
the Royal Laotian Armed
Forces . . . Some reports sug-
gest that a senior Royal Lao-
tian Armed Forces officer may
hold an owz ,ei:'ship interest in
a few of these facilities."
the highset echelons of Lao-
tian society, the documents
propose drastic action.
"An important target group
will be the Air Force generals
and other Royal Lao Air Force
personnel who command and
operate the transport aircraft
involved in. shipping narcotics.
TIM WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Sept. 9, I972 C 13
Trade
armored car and courier in- intimidated the regional Ted
dustry, a collection of small officials that two of them, who
companies all over the coun- had already given Interviews,
try' tried to withdraw them. Other
The banks would like to officials insisted their replies
swallow up the industry, and be totally anonymous.
the Fed has been deliberating
whether to grant permission. Although the survey was
Unwilling to play Jonah to dborted, the courier services
d did get some use out of it
the banks' whale, the armored Ba
th
i
-
se
e
ncomplete re-
"Officials high and low car and courier companies are on
who are found to be involved fighting back. As part of their
in a substantial way will have turns, it showed the Fed banks
counterattack one courier the p p weerivate generally courier satisfied with
services.
to be removed from positions firm hired Dun & Bradstreet
of influence," urges the memo. to survey how good a job the No Spanish Allowed
f courier companies do
It recommends curt
il
t
.
a
men
o
some-aid to Laos. They decided to survey the
"This is aimed specifically Fed's own outlying banks, fig-
at eliminating the use of all uring that if the Fed's own
U.S.-owned aircraft operated branches liked the courier
by the Royal Laotian Air service, this would be convinc-
Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, ing argument that the indus-
including U.S. support items, try deserved to survive.
in the transport of narcotics." Dun & Bradstreet gathered
In recent months, America's 20 interviews with Fed banks
spokesmen claim a new Lap. before their bosses in Wash-
tian anti-heroin law is having ington got wind of the survey,
some
wly , o effect. But, in fact, only Off went a peremptory tele-
pi'um hustlers are ar- gram. "It appears inappro-
rested; the generals and priate for officials of Federal
princes go untouched. Reserve banks and branches
to express any opinions about
Jonah and the Whale courier services," wired Board
The Federal Reserve Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting
is supposed to supervise that a Fed decision on the
banks, not do their dirty work- takeover was pending.
But recently the Fed aided the To make absolutely sure the
banks in an attempt t_9.-tali equrier survey was stymied,
over an enttiire. inducts , th added: "Please keep us
The victim of _thia -P __ omed if you are contacted
play was supposed to or sue, t e, f h.,information," This so
A top anti-poverty official
has scolded subordinates for
speaking Spanish at a recent
meeting that included Span-
ish-speaking officials.
"I was 'appalled," wrote op-
erations chief James Griffith,
"to hear a meeting of in-house
(anti-pvoerty) people clpsed
with a statement in Spanish
and answered in Spanish. This
was absolutely uncalled for
and taken as a direct insult by
the persons in attendance."
Griffith's rebuke was di-
rected at migrant staff official
Pete Merilez. Asked for an ex-
planation, Griffith told us:
"We poor gringos who don't
speak Spanish sometimes get
embarrassed when we hear
others speak it. We get the
feeling they're speaking be-
hind our backs."
01972 United Feature syn41estI
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 THE WA5i F), Vase 2005/06/22: C-ATE 7&
By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post St~4'[ wrltgr
T1
ever
American narcotics special-
au
ists are, privately, expressing
unle
concern at the prostrect of an.
ment
increase in the illegal
flow of
tern
one
heroin into the United States,
"I
from South and Wg}tsa ^ '!
Unit
the supply of drugs from. j
mod
other, foxeign sources -.dwin- prod
prod
dies.
From
myth
fidential studies, p r e .
r-r
e~ vKat
the a xnisiuix~ cul,
tinterr att n
Cb a fresh
, i
urces o narcotics in
ludil
n.
Pkey's legal opium pro-
duction is scheduled. to end,
this year as a result of U.S.
subsidies ;aimed at encourag-
ing Turkish farmers to grow
other crops. Most heroi
reaching the United States is
-
refined in France from. opium of Turkish origin.
mha r,TA sthd:__ -A
to Wa,
s+hing
umm ac , ArMr-
on estima e a a outlf
_ [-k`aR~opsum
1 of 2 0 on3' ts?m o-
d c ,ten __T?d,ay i, end
9U Put
r
,I1R'u, little of the
F. _ ,rovrf in South and
served as, the
r heroin smug-
United States.
But acgor to the jC]A "the thdr w%1- 11f Turkey from the illicit world market"
1
4c tei7S to attract narcotics
;fseeking new
ro S 0 supply.
_ The' U.S government studies
j
z calculate that India produces
about 200 tons of illegal opium
i Per Year. Most of this opium
- enters, a domestic black mar-
l ket serving. some 300,000 In-
e dian addicts. So far, th~~
a ies say, India has not b
3 significant. narcotics exporter.
1e studies --cau i n? how-
, that India could become
plier of the U.S. market
ss the New Delhi govern-
acts to suppress its in-
al narcotics trade. Or as
of the reports puts it:
ndia is frequently cited in
ed Nations bodies as a
el for controlled opium
uction and distribution.
the U.S, standpoint, this
has been detrimental
even though India is not a,
source of U.S. heroin supply.
"Because the myth absolves
New Delhi from dealing seri-
ously with its own addiction
fear "a hostile response from
the politically, sensitive fron-
tier tribal areas."
Recalling that "a number of!!
diplomatic representations"
made by the United States to
the Pakistan government have
had no "apparent effect," the
report recommends that the
Nixon administration apply
"pregsures and inducements"
including a halt in U.S. aid to C
persuade the Pakistanis to
deal with their drug output.
According to the .S. stud-
ies Afghani
t
s
an produces b
e-
teen 1100 and 125 tons of
The memorandum _stresses
that Iran could become a
transit area for illegal drugs
moving from South Asia to-
ward Western Europe and the
United States, Some 170 tons
of illicit Afghan and Pakistani
opium are currently smuggled
into Iran every year. Accord.
ing to the document, an Ira-
nian-prtnce who accompanied
Shah Muhammad Reza Pah
lavi was recently charged by
the Swiss authorities with
carrying opium to Geneva.
and traffie, it has been able to ~' mainly by Pushturl_ tribesirien opium output, the Shah legal
strike a 'pose of moral supers- N in the eastern parts of the
I ized the production of drug in
country M
mitt' inter
i
st -
f A
l
'
o
t
naona
o
..s
f
ly This glianistan
blocks U.S.-Indian cooperation narcotics output a study
on narcotics matters and di- states, is exported illegally.
verts India from a potentially , "Smuggling, is a Way of life in
useful rode in deveiopipg Afghanistan," it says.
- The study further warns
effective mul tilateral pro-
grams in the IJ ted 1Vat us,
which is a focal point of U.S.
policy strategy."
The U.S. report urges that
actions be undertaken by the
Nixon administration to "ex
pose the existence of India's
illicit markets," adding that
"the United States might lose
some good will in the process
of exposure but not on a scale
to offset the likely gains."
Turning to Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan, the CIA ' studies as-
sert that "laxities in law en-
forcement" in those countries
"appear to offer a trafficker
easier access to tribal prpdu-
eers" of opium than in other
parts of the world.
According to ' another classi-
fied U.S. government report,
Pakistan produces about 175
to 200 tons of illicit opium per
year, most of it cultivated in
the country's northwest tribal
regions.
The report blames the Paki-
stan government's failures to
suppress the drug trade on
inefficiency and "official cor-
veeFR'R~Iei 20 0(Mg
that the Pakistan authorities
are urlwil '' g to tackle the
drug problem because `
that drug networks operating
out of Afghanistan are ripe to
be taken over by international
traffickers because the Afghan
authorities take a benign atti-
tude toward narcotics traders.
The U.S. study attributes
the continuation of the Af-
ghan narcotics trade to "offi-
cial corruption" as well as to a
lack of interest on the part of
the country's authorities.
The- report warns against
vigorous U.S. agtions that
might increase Afghan de-
pendence on the Soviet Union.
It further concludes: "It is un-
realistic to expect Afghani-
stan, which suffers little from
the narcotics problem itself, to
give its solution the highest
priority in view of the ex-
tremely limited human and fi-
nancial resources of the coun-
try."
A CIA memorandum issued
on June 9, meanwhile, voices
alarm at the growth of opium
production and addiction in,
Iran.
1969, partly in order to stop a
drain on the country's foreigh
currency reserves through
smuggling. His decision was
denounced by the United Na
tions at the time as "tragic"
for both Iran and other na,
tions.
Since then, says the CIA
memorandum, Iran has regis-
tered about 90,000 narcotics
addicts. But this represents'
only one-fourth of the esti.
mated 400,000 drug users in-
the country.
This year, the memorandum
calculates, the demand for
opium in Iran will total about
350 tons-roughly two-thirds'
of which will come from do-
mestic production and the rest
from contraband' supplies.
The CIA document esti'
mates, however, that Iranian
opium production should soorl,
satisfy' and even exceed inter-,
nal needs. At that point, they
memorandum warns, the coun-
try could become a narcotics
exporter and also a drug
transit channel.
 THE WASFiIlvdgiv6NFrG~g~ease 2005/06/22: DATE 7
The Washington Merry-Go-Hound
131~S0400030067-8 ,CJ 1 `
PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Sept. 5, 1972 B 11
New Drug wave Points westward
By Jack Anderson
President Nixon's herculean
effort to stop drug smuggling
has at last slowed the flow of
heroin from Turkey and
Southeast As1a., yi]
tidalwav-i ricin2in ~
ven- our mideastern ally,
Iran, has started to'grow its
,,own opium under government
control, but the government
may not be able to stop illegal
.shipments from being. diverted
to America.
e'rhis . he warning of the
antra_ Inte i enc a ,?Tidy,
n cv: R>s ersit at
L> e Y Stern .i~xaffickeFS;'~~re. network in Afghanistan and
R .r .hg CIA.
"Tribal producers in Af-
~
ubtedlvwouTd be-willing-to
sutantial diver nof
im w twand g .. .
" xities in South Asia
lji o era distinct ad`v$31-
ta e o internationa ra ick-
er s i tTiey shouId decidl 1o
,_tTieut1an opium
Opium Gum
In Afghanistan production
is up. Starving peasants, "lack-
ing adequate food supplies be-
cause of recent droughts, have
resorted to chewing opium
gum to ease hunger pains."
n Po, production
a"r"Y s nce
1V,Q,"CIA. n `Goth
cg tries "penalties or a -
c viol ti ns are' miniml."
c'pThe intelligence documents
also suggest that the Mafia
would have no trouble cor-
rupting officials In both coun-
tries.
In Afghanistan, the docu-
ments report, "official corrup-
tion including high-level pro-
tection of narcotics dealers
is ... a problem" and "smug-
gling,is a way of life."
In Pakistan, "official corrup-
tion is reported to be a serious
problem" among the Land
Customs, Sea Customs, provin-
cial police and Para-mjlit? 'y
forces.
Worse, the existing hash
hearings on a bill to give State
Department workers an inde-
pendent grievance board.
Two present and one former
foreign service officers are
breaking the gentleman's code
of silence and spilling their
woes.
One witness is John Hemen-
way, a conservative diplomat
who claims he was fired be-
cause he argued with his
bosses over U.S. policies in
Berlin.
A present foreign service of-
fier, John Harter, who fought
and won an appeal against
shabby treatment from the de-
partment, has told his story in
a letter to Hays. Even State's
grievance board upheld
Harter, urging that he be pro-
moted, given a new job and
reimbursed for his lawyers'
fees.
The State Department, how
ever, has largely ignored the
recommendations which ara
now eight months old.
While the Hays hearings
have made the State Depart-
ment anxious over what fur-
ther horror stories may sur-
face, some of their fears are
unwarranted. Hays has co:i
fided that he does not expo a bill out of his committee
until the next session.
This means that the Senate
would have to go through the
entire process of passing their
version of the measure again
before any grievance board is
set up outside the depart.
ment's own jurisdiction.
? 1972, United Feature 8rndicpte i
cotics users. wins au on es
i f t1y '2?2iargcd an Iralrian
incelioacCilipf'nfed the
o with I wit `?tav-
Rz_
Seer ete he n he
Cl[~.other Intel i ence
aggnciet ailga ous
m, buildu sin ou 1i A!ia.
This couict e a s o in e
arm for the Mafia, whose sup-
plies in Turkey and the Thai-
land-Laos-Vietnam area are
slowly beginning to dry up.
The new smuggling menace
~El
1G.eml) t3atPr~..,~ui i?R and
.Tune 9.
' b.'ta tial
q ee ou Asian
o m are iverte to I"i'e'..
a r esi' e-
pe i t and=1s, on
Pakistan could be used to
send substantial quantities of
opium westward," warn the in-
telligence documents. Afghans
already have "professional
and sophisticated" means of
getting hashish by air to Teh-
ran, Beirut and Frankfurt and
by sea to Karachi. Some' has
reached the U.S.
As for India, the documents
say it now produces about
three-quarters of the world's
legal opium for medical pur-
poses. The widely held view
that India is effectively con-
trolling its opium production
is a "myth," the documents al-
lege.
Iran still doesn't produce
enough legal opium for the
country's registered addicts,
who receive the drug under a
national program. But the
opium harvest is increasing.
Meanwhile, allege the docu-
ments, "the estimated 100-300
tons currently being smuggled
into Iran, that could become
available, exceeds the total
opium equivalent needed to
supply the U.S. market."
Diplomatic Grievances
Diplomats at the State De-
partment have been complain-
ing about. undiplomatic treat-
ment from their bosses. This
week the squabble among the
striped pants set will boil over
into a House Foreign Affairs
subcommittee.
Chairman Wayne Hays (D-
b1o) is finally yielding to
Senate pressure and holding
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