REACTION IN CONGRESS: U.S. MUST NOT ACT ALONE
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060036-0
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
July 15, 2005
Sequence Number:
36
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 6, 1967
Content Type:
NSPR
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J C-~t i a, CX 0 '1
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060036-0
Reaction in Congress: U. S. Must Not Act Alone
By E. W. KENWORTHY
Special to The New York Times .
WASHINGTON, June 5-The
dominant Congressional reac-
tion today to the outbreak of
hostilities between Israel and
the Arab states was that the
United States Should take no
unilateral action.
In both the Senate and the
House of Representatives, the
hope was that somehow the
United Nations could get the
belligerents to agree to a cease-
fire.
Failing this, there was hope
that the Soviet Union would
agree to meet with the United
States, Britain and France to
work out a big power approach
to the crisis.
Although two or three House
members suggested that the
United States should act alone,
if necessary, in coming to the
aid of Israel, no leader in either
body supported such action.
The prevailing sentiment was
most forcibly expressed by Se _n-
or Richard P.-Russell Demo-
crat of Georgia, chairman of
the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the subcommit-
tee on armed service appropria-
tions.
Russell Opposes Lone Action
Mr. Russell, who has given
undeviating support to the war
in Vietnam even though he has
always questioned the wisdom
of the United States involve-
ment there, told reporterd that
he was "unalterably opposed to
any unilateral intervention" in
the Middle East.
Whatever action the United
States takes, he said, should be
multilateral. And, he added,
"the multilateral action should
be multi-multilateral."
At 9:30 A.M., after Secretary
of State Dean Rusk and Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. Mc-
Namara had briefed President
Johnson at the White House,
they went to Capitol Hill for a
meeting with Congressional
leaders and the chairman and
ranking members of Senate and
U.N. or Big-Power Attempt
to Attain a Cease-Fire Is
Generally Supported
House committees most immed-
iately affected.
They were joined there by
Richard Helms, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Th
meeting lasted just over one
hour.
Those who attended declined
comment, beyond saying that
the briefing had dealt solely
with the military situation and
not with policy decisions. They
added that the two secretaries
and Mr. Helms had, at that mo-
ment, no clear idea of whether
action had been initiated by Is-
raeli or Arab forces nor what
the situation was.
Just 'Fragmentary Reports'
Mike Mansfield, the Senate
Democrat is leader, said, "You
could have read the same things
in the press. All they did was
give us what fragmentary re-
ports they had."
The Administration, Mr.
Mansfield told reporters, was
taken by surprise. It had an-
ticipated, he said, that there
was still some room for diplo-
matic activity because the Unit-
ed States had asked Israel for
restraint and "the Soviet Un-
ion had supposedly asked Egypt
to restrain themselves."
There was no suggestion in
the meeting with Secretary
Rusk and Secretary McNamara,
Mr. Mansfield said, that the
United States take military ac-
tion.
"Now that the Flame had
been lit," he said, "I would an-
ticipate that the Security Coun-
cil would, of necessity, be forced
to face up to the situation.
But what it will do remains
to be seen."
Asked whether the Adminis-
tration was under much pres-
sure from the Senate for unilat-
eral action, Mr.. Mansfield said:
"Both the Administration and
the Senate have-to use a mod-
ern colloquialism-kept their!
cool about this."
But he also said that there,
might have been more pressure,
to help Israel if it had not been
for "the situation in Vietnam."
There were differences of
opinion over whether United
States involvement in Vietnam,
was directly related to Presi-
dent Gamal Abdel Nasser's de
cision to request the removal,
of United Nations forces from'
Egyptian soil and his subse-
quent announcement of a'
blockade of the Gulf of Aquaba.',
There were also differences of
opinion about how much en-
couragement President Nasser
had received from the So-
viet Union to take his actions.
Mr. Mansfield thought that
"this had happened apart from
the situation in Vietnam S' Sen-
ator Russell expressed doubt
that President Nasser meant to
go as far as he had, and thought',
he probably would not have done
so if Secretary General Thant:
of the United Nations had not
yielded precipitately to his re-
quest for the withdrawal of
United Nations forces.
In fact, Mr. Russell said,
"what U Thant needed was a
few good Southerners to fili-
buster the situation."
Senator J. W. Fulbri rht De
ocrat of Arkansas, said that the
Middle Eastern crisis was "an
outgrowth of our involvement
in Vietnam." Last week he had i
expressed the hope that the So-
viet Union would agree to use
its influence with President Nas
ser to ease the crisis in returnfor American agreement to de-
escalate the war in Vietnam. ~
Today, Mr. Fulbright saidi
that the Russians had "appar-1
ently missed a great opportun-1
ity to gain tremendous prestige"
by acting as peacemakers.
Regardless of these differ
ences of view on the relation-'
ship of the Vietnam 'War and
the Middle Eastern crisis, it
was apparent that the heavy in-
volvement in Vietnam was,
largely responsible for the sen-
timent against any further uni
lateral intervention.
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060036-0