SOVIET DOUBLETALK CONFUSED NASSER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060027-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 3, 1968
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060027-0
Pearson
and Jack Anderson
The most amazing story of
last June's Israeli-Arab war
has just been disclosed. It
comes from highly secret in-
telligence sources, and tells
how the Russians played a
double game with Egypt's dic-
tator Nasser. The reliability
of the story is beyond dis-
pute,
Throughout the crisis, U.S.
intelligence kept picking up
contradictory reports, some
saying the Russians were
secretly encouraging Nasser,
others claiming they were
trying to restrain him.
It has now been learned,
incredibly, that both reports
were true. Inside fact is that
Nasser had two pipelines into
the Kremlin and was get-
ting contradictory messages.
Through the diplomatic chan-
nel, he received urgent Rus-
sian appeals to avoid war with
Israel. The Soviet Ambassador
actually called upon Nasser
several times to hand him
these appeals in person.
But Cairo and Moscow were
also linked by the Russian
KGB intelligence channel,
which operates independently
of Moscow's Foreign Office
just as the CIA operates in-
dependent of the State Depart-
ment. .
Both the Russians and the
Egyptians, sharing a p.redelic
ViEsAi'INGTON POST
Wednesday, Jan. 3, I968 B 11
a-dLctalk Confused Nasser
i secret KGB channel than upon
normal diplomacy.
On May 13, Nasser informed
the Russians, via the KGB, of
his desire to concentrate his
forces in the Sinai, to demand
the removal of U.N. troops
along the border and to close
the Tiran Strait--moves clear-
ly calculated to bring Israel to
the brink of war.
Two days later, through the
same KGB channel, Nasser re-
ceived word that the Soviet
Union agreed to his moves.
Nasser Is Nervous
But Nasser was nervous
over a confrontation with Is-
rael. He wanted more specific
assurances, so fired two ques-
tions to the Kremlin through
the KGB:
1-How did the U.S.S.R. esti-
mate the consequences of an
Arab-Israeli war?
2-How far would the
U.S.S.R. support the Arabs in
the event of such a war?
The Soviet reply ? to these
questions arrived, again
through the KGB channel, on
May 21. Sallah Nasser. the
Egyptian intelligence chief,
personally delivered the mes-
sage to dictator Nasser. It
declared:
1. The U.S.S.R. estimate was
that the Arabs had the mili-
tary strength !:? ...uncluct a pro-
longed war which eventually
would f nrce Israel to make
prr' a1.. . c;3tjgns in the
resolve the question of navi-
gation through the Strait of
Tiran.
2. The U.S.S.R. would un-
dertake to prevent U.S. inter-
vention in Israel's behalf.
3. The U.S.S.R. did not
foresee any military require-
ment for its intervention on
the Arab side. Should unex-
pected circumstances arise,
however, Egypt could count
on immediate and massive So-
viet assistance.
Thus, encouraged, Nasser
went ahead with his plan to
close the Strait of Tiran,
which he fully expected to
lead to war.
He had moments of hesita-
tion, however, because of the
Soviet Ambassador's appeals
for restraint. The contradic-
tion in communications also
led to a backstage debate in-
side the Egyptian hierarchy
over which Soviet messages
to believe.
Wait for Israel Attack
Nasser finally concluded
that the KGB channel carried
the Kremlin's true, secret at-
titude and that the diplomat-
ic messages were merely in-
tended as camouflage "for
the sake of history." He also
figured that the intensity of
the Soviet Ambassador's ap-
peals must mean that the Rus.
sian.s didn't want the Arabs to
appear to be the aggressor.
Therefore, Nasser calculated
that. the for Israel to attack
first. .
On this point, he was vigor-
ously opposed by Field Mar-
shal Abdel Hakim Amer, who
was suspicious of the Soviet
doubletalk. In any event, he
believed the Arabs should at-
tack first.
Nasser's decision to wait
not only led to a military
debacle but brought a de-
mand from the Egyptian War
Minister, Shams Badran, for
a thorough investigation into
the political developments that
precipitated the war. Specifi-
cally, he called for an inquiry
into all the communications
received through the KGB
channel.
There followed a bitter
struggle over whose head
should roll-that of Field Mar-
shal Amer, who had mistrust-
ed the KGB message, or intel-
ligence chief Sallah Nasser's,
who had believed them. The
intelligence chief, t h o u g h
clearly wrong, was able to
muster the most political pow-
er. Amer and Badran were
dismissed.
All this so distressed Amer,
an Egyptian patriot, that he
suffered spells of suicidal de-
pression. It is known that
Egyptian intelligence smug-
gled poison into Amer's prison
cell. It's reported that Sallah
Nasser, aware of Amer's sui-
cidal tendencies and wishing
to silence him, arranged for
the poison to reach his hands.
Dictator Nasser, who had no
wish for his old friend Amer
to die, has now arrested Sal-
lah Nasser.
tion for secrecy, tend!"' . ,egev and erhaps give up
;place more reliance upon the I the port b( !lat. This would
1 0 1968, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060027-0