ISRAELI VIEW: RETALIATORY RAIDS MAY BE NEEDED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060024-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 12, 1968
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060024-3
;Israeli View: Retaliatory Raids May Be Needed
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times
LONDON, Jan. 11--Top Is-
raeli officials, anxious about the
continuing terrorist raids Into
their territory and indications
that such activity may increase,
say privately they may have to
launch retaliatory raids inside
Jordan and Syria.
"Since the June war we have
not staged any raids with
ground forces outside our bor-
ders," said one ranking official
ii} Tel Aviv. "If countries like
Syria and Jordan won't take
things in hand, they're asking
for trouble."
The threat of a strong,
though limited, military riposte
underscores the fact that de-
spite the much improved stra-
tegic position she achieved.dur-
ing the six-day Arab-Israeli
war, Israel is nervous about her
security. As long as there is no
political settlement of the Mid-
dle East crisis, the situation re-
mains volatile.
This is one of the principal
conclusions from several weeks
of talks with diplomatic and
military officials in Washing-
ton, Paris, London, Cairo and
Tel Aviv.
Strategic Position Better
From a strategic point of
view, Israel has never been in
a better position in the nearly
two decades of her existence.
Whereas before June, well
equipped Egyptian, Jordanian
and Syrian forces were close to
her borders; Israeli forces now
command comfortable buffers
in the Sinai Peninsula, on the
west bank of the Jordan River
and along the Golan heights in
Syria.
Yet with large Soviet ship-
ments of arms into the area,
with a population of about a
million Arabs within Israeli-oc-
cupied territory, and with in-
creased sabotage in her terri-
tory, seven months after the
war, Israel is still partially mo-
bilized.
No one expects a resumption
of large-scale hostilities in the
near future. For one thing, the
Arab military leadership is con-
sidered far from ready for
another round, even though the
Egyptian, Syian and Iraqi
forces are believed to have re-
ceived sufficient planes and
tanks from the Soviet Union to
restore their arsenals almost to
their prewar levels.
However, purges of key,of-
ficers in Egypt and the lack of
efficient small-unit leaders and
technical and maintenance per-
sonnel in the Arab armies are
believed to render them incapa-
ble of a sustained attack on
Israel for the time being. Esti-
mates on when they may be
able to contemplate renewed
fighting range from several
months to a couple of years.
Soviet Influence Increases
The Soviet Union, moreover,
now is thought to have achieved
a much stronger influence over
the Egyptian armed forces, both
through its supply of weapons
and vital spare parts and the
physical presence in the United
Arab Republic of thousands of
its advisers, instructors and
other technical personnel.
The prevailing opinion, both
among Israeli officials and
Western diplomats in Egypt and
in Western capitals, is that
while' Moscow can best contin-
ue its penetration of the Mid-
dle East in an atmosphere of
tension, it is anxious to avoid
another war that conceivably
could lead to a confrontation
between Soviet and United
States forces.
The thinking behind this
argument is approximately the
following:
Israeli forces are within easy
striking distance of Cairo, Da-
mascus and Amman. If war
broke out, could the Soviet
Union permit Israel, for in-
stance, to take Cairo without
direct intervention, and if it
intervened and so shifted the
balance of power that the sur-
vival of Israel was at stake,
could the United States stay
out?
No one is in a position to
say whether the Soviet Union
or the United States would in-
tervene directly.. But the pos-
sibility cannot be dismissed.
It is noted, for instance, that
Soviet pilots are thought to
have taken a direct hand re-
cently in the civil war in Ye-
men, flying some missions in
support of the republican
forces there.
More Infiltration Expected
The matter of guerrilla ac-
tivity in Israel is receiving
more attention partly because
of a recent shift by the Egyp-
tian Government to support
such a campaign. The Israelis
expect that this will result in
a greater effort to infiltrate
guerrillas and. saboteurs.
Since the Sinai war in 1956,
Egypt took the position that
guerrilla raids were counter-
productive in that they in-
creased world sympathy for
Israel, afforded Israel an excuse
for retaliatory raids and might
force the Arab world into a
war before it was ready.
In recent months, Western
diplomatic sources in Cairo re-
port-and Israeli intelligence
agrees - the Government of
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
has shifted its position.
Egyptian officials are said
to believe that nearly every
guerrilla raid is displayed prom-
inently in newspapers around
the world, undercutting Israeli
contention that everything is
under control. When Israeli se-
curity forces counter such ac-
tivity by blowing up Arab
homes and staging midnight
searches, it might tend to de-
pict the Israelis more as a ruth-
less occupying force than an
aggrieved victim of aggression.
Furthermore repressive meas-
ures might so arouse the Arab
population within Israel that an
internal guerrilla effort be-
comes more feasible?
Training Site Provided
As evidence of Egypt's new
view, Western intelligence
sources in Cairo say that Egypt
is now providing not only arms
and money but also a site for
the training of guerrillas.
According to this account,
last summer Algeria recruited
about 5,000 young people for
12 weeks of training at a secret
base about 100 miles south of
Algiers. They were then moved
to the Egyptian resort city of
Faiyum, about 60 miles south-
west of Cairo, for three weeks
of additional training.
In the past, most of the guer-
rilla training is believed to have
taken place in Syria at two
camps near Damascus and one
near the Syrian-Lebanese
border. This effort was directed
by Syrian military headquarters.
Egypt's decision to join in
the guerrilla campaign, Israeli
sources say, should mean a
larger, more intensive effort.
But since most of the agents
enter Israel and Israeli-occupied
territory through Jordan and to
some extent Syria, there is con-
siderable military planning in
Israel looking toward possible
counterraids.
Number Put at 10,000
Israeli officials say that un-
til now the Arab inhabitants in
Israel have been either un-
sympathetic or afraid to co-
operate with the terrorists and
that more than 600 guerrillas
have been killed or captured
since June. However, the num-
ber of guerrillas is believed by
some sources to exceed 10,000.
In the area of the Soviet re-
plenishment of aircraft to
Egypt. Israel sources say that
while about 220 jet fighters
have been supplied, compared
with a force of about 260 be-
fore the war, this includes
about 55 modern Sukhoi-7's
and 100 MIG-21's sent as re-
placements for less capable,
older MIG-15's and 17's.
The Sukhoi, they say, can
carry more than 2,000 pounds
of bombs at low altitude from
bases in Egypt to Tel Aviv.
The Israelis contend that a
stronger Israeli air force would
help deter war and thus would
be a stabilizing influence.
Whether it is persuasive or not,
this argument is being used by
Israel with France in hopes of
ending the embargo on an or.
der of 50 Mirage V jets, and
with the United States, in hopes
of getting about 50 F-4 Phan-
toms in addition to the 50 A-4
Skyhawks already purchased.
Israeli officials insist that if
Egypt, particularly, despairs of
achieving the capability for
military action against Israel,
she would eventually seek
peace.
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060024-3