NEXT MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200090003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 15, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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15 May 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: I&W Working Group
SUBJECT : Next Meeting
1. We will meet Tuesday, 16 May, at 1430 in 5G00 Headquarters.
2. Attached are a series of contributions as follows:
-- A new outline reflecting our last meeting
-- History of Warning in Community - IIA in
the new outline (0
-- Evolution of Community Watch Centers - IIB
(Heyman)
-- ents for Crisis Management - IIC I Past Arra 7
-- Arrangements for Warning - IIB2
et. al.)
0
-- Additional Arrangements for Strategic Warning -
IIIB3 et, al,)
-- Support to the DCI in Crisis Management - IIIB4
et. al)
3. The papers (IIIB2 & 3) overlap sub-
stantially and get to-the guts of one of our major problems. I
would like to devote tomo ing to them. If there is time,
we will also take up the pacer (IIIB4),
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25
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AD/NFAC/SS
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CONFIDENTIAL
-- Current Intelligence and Warning - IIDI
 CONFIDENTIAL
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9 May 1978
I. Introduction
A. Converging requirements
1. I&W Seminar
1 2.
0
exercise - Carlucci letter
3. WISP
4. HPSCI and OMB
B. Definitions and DCI responsibilities (conceptual framework)
.1. Current intelligence
2. Little-W
3. Big-h!
4. Crisis management (including relations to I&'W)
II. Background
A. History of Warning in Community
1. Watch Committee/NIC
2. Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. Change to Special Assistant/SWS
4. WISP
B. Evolution of community watch centers
1. Development in CIA
2. Elsewhere in Community (including WH)
3. Role in warning
C. Arrangements for crisis management (over time)
1. Task force & situation report
2. Role of NIO
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CONFIDENTIAL
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3. National Task Force experiment
4. Present confusion - need to reflect NITC
D. Major (and perennial) issues
1. Relationship of warning to current intelligence
2. Big-W vs. Little-W
3. DCI's responsibilities vs. those of Secretary of Defense
(in warning and intelligence crisis management only)
4. DCI's responsibilities to field commands
III. Discussion
A. Criteria for a National System
1. Clear lines of responsibility under the DCI
2. Smooth transition from normal operations to crisis
3. Line responsibility for warning, balanced by effective
second-look mechanisms
4. DCI control over mechanisms directly supporting him,
balanced by a recognition of Community equities
(especially in strategic warning)
5. Protection of national intelligence assets supporting
NSC from premature subordination to NCA and war-fighting
B. Necessary elements of such a system:
1.
Management
a.
b.
c.
Line of command under DCI
Community oversight and coordination
Internal staffing under DCI
2.
Arrangements for warning
a. First-look
b. Second-look
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c.
d.
Dissemination
Collection tasking
3.
Additional arrangements for strategic warning
a.
b.
c.
Second-look
Dissemination
Collection tasking
4.
Arrangements for crisis management
a. Policy support
b. Analysis
c. Diseemination
d. Collection tasking
IV. Recommendations (or Options?)
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15 May 1978
A. History of Warning in Community
1. The Watch Committee of the US Intelligence Board was formed in
January 1951 following the Chinese intervention in the Korean war. Its
mission was to provide USIB with the earliest possible warning of Soviet,
Warsaw Pact, or Chinese intentions to initiate military action or to
provide military support to any other nation to an extent that US security
interests were affected. The highest priority was assigned to warning of
Soviet nuclear attack on the US, US forces or bases overseas, or US allies.
The chairman of the Watch Committee throughout most of its existence was
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The committee was composed
of two members each from CIA, DIA, NSA and State, and one each from the
FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.
2. The Watch Committee was supported by an interagency staff called
the National Indications Center. The NIC, established in 1954 and located
in the Pentagon, had a staff of approximately 30, including 12 analysts
and ten people who manned a 24-hour Watch Center. The principal functions
of the NIC analysis staff were to review all-source indications intelli-
gence and to draft weekly Watch Reports. These reports were reviewed by
the Watch Committee and submitted to USIB for approval. Watch Reports
were disseminated throughout the Washington policy and intelligence com-
munities and cabled to some field stations by CIA and to various major
commands by DIA. Sanitized versions of the Watch Reports were passed to
Commonwealth liaison officers.
INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. From 1951 to 1974, the Office of Current Intelligence was .the
focal point for CIA's role in the Watch Committee. An OCI officer served
as director of the NIC, and the CIA contingent in the NIC included three
OCI Lnalysts. Within OCI, and Indications Control staff (INDICO) com-
posed of three officers managed the agency's participation in the Watch
Committee mechanism. INDICO coordinated draft Watch Reports with CIA
production offices, briefed the chairman of the Watch Committee on all
current items of I&W significance, and maintained liaison with the NIC
and with warning analysts in other USIB agencies.
Change to Special Assistant/SWS
4. In 1973-74, USIB authorized a study of the community's warning
mechanism and performance. This study concluded that the Watch Committee
process was outmoded and should be restructured to meet the needs of
policymakers in the 1970's, particularly in the light of improved col-
lection systems. By the late 1960's, the weekly Watch Reports had
gradually expanded to cover such areas as the Middle East, Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia. In treating this wide range of subjects, the Watch Com-
mittee became increasingly preoccupied with tactical details and its
ability to perform its original mission was impaired. Procedures had
grown increasingly ponderous and the coordination process was delayed
by lengthy debates over minor textual points and semantics. The value
of the Watch Reports to senior policymakers was diluted by the need to
negotiate bland compromise language which often blurred the clarity of
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judgments. Divergent agency evaluations were not adequately reflected,
and the provision for recording clearly defined dissenting views was
seldom used.
5. USIB decided in early 1975 to replace the Watch Committee and
the NIC with a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and a
Strategic Warning Staff. The DCI appointed the Special Assistant. in
consultation with the Director, DIA. The first Special Assistant was
Air Force MajGen Lincoln D. Faurer, DIA's Vice Director for Production.
The SWS was directed by a CIA officer appointed by the DCI. The SWS
director is responsible to the Special Assistant and serves as his deputy
for strategic warning. .
6. In contrast to the expanding scope of subjects and areas
covered by the Watch Committee, the mission of the Special Assistant and
the SWS was narrowed to providing the earliest possible warning that the
Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, China, or North Korea is considering mili-
tary action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its
military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten
military confrontations with the US. In contrast to the deliberations and
time-consuming negotiations on compromise language which impaired the
effectiveness of the Watch Committee, the SWS was to concentrate on.in-
depth analysis and the preparation of clearly-articulated warning judg-
ments. The SWS was intended to provide a devil's advocate and second-
look function, and to prod NFIB production offices into addressing specific
developments of potential warning significance. It was not to duplicate
the work of operations centers and current intelligence offices.
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7. DCID 1/5 authorized the Special Assistant and the SWS to take
the lead in initiating, and when appropriate drafting, strategic warn-
ing notices to the DCI who, at his discretion, would notify the Presi-
dent and the NSC. The Special Assistant and the SWS were also directed
to submit to the DCI and NFIB principals studies and recommendations for
improving the community's strategic warning capabilities.
WISP
8. WISP -- an acronym for Warning Improvement Study and Plan -- is
a DOD-sponsored project managed by DIA, with participation of CIA and
other NFIB agencies. Its purpose is to identify the major actions the
USSR and the other Warsaw Pact nations might take in preparation for
hostilities in Europe. The WISP concept is based on a constant sampling of
selected I&W targets with a view to identifying abnormalities related to
changes in readiness posture that may suggest preparations for attack.
The selection of military targets has been nearly completed, although more
work remains in defining the political and economic data base. From the
thousands of targets associated with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in
Europe, a relatively small set of targets will be selected as Necessary
Key Events. The WISP collection strategy is designed to enable analysts to
identify those key events that would have to occur in advance of an attack
were the Soviets to decide to mobilize for an attack against NATO forces-
25X
Director, Strategic Warning Staff
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B - Evolution of community watch centers
1. The historical evolution of the CIA Operations Center had
its roots in a number of diverse factors which in their own way brought
about its development from a simple, one Directorate support adjunct to
the CIA/DDI current intelligence effort to its present status as an all
Agency, all near real time source, community oriented, alert mechanism..
The first was the so-called "information explosion" brought about by the
improvement of technical collection systems and the concomitant Lgh
speed dissemination of this data to a wider audience of both analytical
senior policy players. A second phenomena, more psychological in nature,
was the reluctant realization, based mainly on. past errors and consequent
policy pressure, on the part of intelligence collectors and producers;
intelligence and operational playersy and the highest levels of the
government that we in the field of foreign affairs were living in an
increasingly interdependent world; a a world which opunwand causes
things to happen 24 hours a day, every day. Thus there began starting
in the mid-1960s,a growing realization in CIA that much needed to be done
to contend with these phenomena.
By the early 1970s this need had become so manifest that the DCI,
in the spring of 1973, commissioned an in-depth study of the need for
and scope of a full blown CIA Operations Center which hopefully would
evolve into a Community-wide National Intelligence Operations Center.
The result,;of this Working Group led by Mr. Richard Lehman, the then
D/OCI/DDl,were approved and the CIA Operations Center was born in June
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2. The experience of the other members of the intelligence community
was not dissimiliar. NSA, given the singular real time nature of its
Ff1D
environment the experience learned in the shoot down of the EC-121
off the coast of Korea in the spring of 1969, organized its NSOC
in February 1973. However, the NSOC is not only an alert mechanism
for SIGINT but one which also ` bps significant requirements and
analytical responsibilities around the clock. Today the NSOCythough
devoted solely to SIGINTis by a significant margin the largest and most
comprehensive, in scope and authority, of all the 24 hour Centers:in
the Community.
The experiences of State and its motives for establishing a 24-hour
Operations Center are not clear. But they too probably felt the same
kinds of pressure. However, unlike most of the intelligence community
Centers their development seems to have had an internal organizational
focus, i.e., the need taA ,, the immediate Office of the Secretary
with the Department's information system and the I&R intelligence
function. Since its development in late 1972 State's 24-hour center
has been subordinate to the Department's Executive Secretary and has
comprised two discrete 24-hour parts, the Operations Center and an INR
portion sQ;-4~/ removedy'substantively integrated.
The Pentagon experience was unique in that its J-2/J-3 separate
orientation continued to drive the way their 24-hour centers evolved.
Both developed separate Centers, one the NMCC under the J-3/JCS and
the Other the MIMIC under DIA. Until 1976 they were not.colocated, but
with the experiences of recent crises as the unifying element there
is today a significant improvement in cooperation in crisis times.
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Further the arrival of the NRT imagery era provided the impetus for
further improvement which was manifest, also in 1976, with the'estab-
lishment of the CCF to manage collection systems overall in behalf of
all DOD interests.
3. The role of these various Centers in warning varies from almost
total involvement.vis-a-vis SIGINT resources in the case-of NSOC to
practically no role in the case of the State Operations Center. This
of course follows the nature of the source each represents--SIGINT is
usually real time or close to real time; political reporting can be a
first indication but not nearly to a similar extent as to justify an
active State role in warning. Both the NMCC and the NMIC are deeply
involved in warning both within their 24-hour center and in conjunction,
through vast communication system, with DOD elements abroad throughout
the. world. To a significant degree this is all source though they rely
heavily on NSOC for the SIGINT contribution and through NMIC/CCF for
its NRT imagery element.
The role of the CL4 Operations Center in warning is at the
same time extant but unordained. It performs a first look warning
function by the very nature of its access, orientation, organization
and personnel. How this role relates to either the second look warning
function, either to current analysts or to SWS or later WISP is
unclear largely because the-issue has never seriously been examined
in CIA.
The establishment of the White House Situation Room as a 24-hour
consumer center occurred in the early 1960s as a need was manifested by
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to be kept
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immediately and consistently aware of world developments of all kinds.
The Situation Room was originally formed in close consultation with CIA,
in fact its first head was a DDI/CIA officer. Since then the leadership
has gone through several changes, CIA, NSA, and State, but always with a
civilian Director. Another constant is the fact that the Watch Officers
at the WHSR are members of the CIA Operations Center detailed there for
two years or more, a factor stemming in large measure from their all-
source experience and current intelligence support focus.
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15 May 1978
N 1ORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-SubstantAve Support
FROM
Chief,' Requirements E Evaluation Staff
SUBJE TT : Past Arrangements for Crisis Management
the improvements in the operations Center. Dedicated space, especially
because the DCI did not have the time or he was accompanied to
those meetings by someone who had other management responsibilities
that precluded briefing the analytical support chief.
3. The establishment of the NIO as the senior substantive
assistant to the DCI largely eliminated the lapses in relevance of
analytical support to the DCI. The NIO also provided a means of
drawing upon the capability of INR or DIA to produce a piece of
analysis for which they were uniquely qualified. This was seldom
arranged as an additional output by INR or DIA because they usually
functioned at full capacity during a crisis. Their contribution
became possible, however, when they realized that the DCI would
use their analysis in a policy forum and thus they would adjust
their schedule to accomodate the NIO request.
4. The effectiveness of CIA task forces has improved markedly
in recent years, both demonstrated and potential, as a result of
2. The CIA analytical task force has usually provided the DCI
with quality analysis, that was relevant to the issues under con-
sideration by the NSC, and in a timely fashion. Occasional lapses in
relevance have occurred when the DCI failed to feed back to his
analytical support the results of policy deliberations. This occurred.
lessons of the past five years.
1. These are some thoughts in response to para I C of your
4 May outline. This is nothing more than one man's view of the
xi SECRET
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arranged for task forces, have brought order, better morale, and
improved timeliness. Improved communications and dedicated
administrative support have improved timeliness and allowed us to have
analysts analyze rather than support other analysts.
5. The National Situation Report idea resulted from the
frustrations of the NSC Staff when they were beset with a con-
tinuous stream of situation reports from CIA, DIA, State, NSA
and spot reports from the DDO. The closing time of the intelligence
was usually different in each report, they were issued at different
times, and not infrequently the predictions and judgments were
different. Brent Scowcroft and Bill Hyland were the leaders of a
movement to establish a single national situation report and the.
responsibility fell to the DCI.
6. No one in the intelligence community failed to understand
the White House predicament but the obvious solutions all had draw-
backs. The DCI could not seriously contemplate issuing instructions to
Defense and State ordering them to deny the President the benefit of
their information and analysis. The NSC Staffers could have ordered
some staff procedures at the White House Situation Room to alleviate
the confusion. The decision, as a consensus of the Intelligence
Community, was for the DCI to issue a single National Situation
Report into which all intelligence organizations would put their
information and analysis.
7. An ad hoc DCI committee and some elements of the IC Staff
worked on the problem about a year and a consensus evolved that the
production of a National Situation Report required a National Task
Force. Consideration was given to having each organization provide
selected information and analysis to the CIA task force and making
them responsible for incorporating it into a National Situation Report.
That was ruled out on the basis that the Community's communications
capabilities were inadequate. The decision was to assemble analysts
from INR, DIA, and CIA into a single task force at the call of the
DCI. Before we ever tried this, DIA and CIA decided that neither could
afford the proper number of analysts in a NTF and still retain their home-
based capability. The only test of the NTF concept was on the occasion
of the Korean tree cutting incident. Most of us believed that the concept
failed the test.
8. A major improvement in communications has occurred since
we initially discussed issuing a National Situation Report from CIA
into which we would incorporate other contributions. We have an
improved grey phone trunk system which provides better and wider
services. We have grey phone conferencing service. All operations
centers now can transmit page size copy at five seconds per sheet
versus 45-60 seconds per sheet. We have the "Laserfax'" fascimile
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transmission system for photographs and map segments. We have
a first generation conferencing and text editing system in DIA,
CIA, and State. The inescapable conclusion is that it is time
to review the concept of CIA/NFAC issuing a National Situation
Report without having to move analysts all over town.
9. The communications improvements noted in para eight probably
i.ould resolve all but one deficiency we found with the concept of a
National Task Force. However we approached the task force problem,
either having the CIA task force issue the National Situation Report
or by having a National Task Force, we perceived the need for a
crisis collection coordinator. This deficiency has been remedied
by the concept of the NITO in the Collection Tasking Staff. It
would appear that the D/DCI/CT could. put a NITO in direct support of
the DCI's principal substantive assistant for the crisis (D/DCI/NI
or NIO) and that NITO could then provide the D/DCI/CT the information
he would need to coordinate the collection tasking.
cc: Vincent Heyman
F7 I
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CONFIDENTIAL 9 a
Relationship of Current Intelligence and Warning
The business of intelligence is a seamless web. Cuts in it must
always be to some extent arbitrary and must do some damage to the whole..
So it is in the business of current intelligence (the setting apart of
current intelligence is itself one such cut) which broadly stated is,
"Ensure that all evidence that is collected is brought together and the
results disseminated to those who need to know."
The goal of this sweeping charge is to prepare policymakers to act
promptly and wisely. Closer examination of the intelligence web to
identify those parts of it which contribute most directly to producing
prompt action identifies what can be called indications and warning
functions. Some of these are formal processes directed toward warning
of specific upcoming events. The formal processes range from highly
structured system~depending on automatic data processing and computer
facilities such as~t-he WISP committees are developing under DoD auspices
to warn of war in Europe, down through the regular meetings of groups of
knowledgeable analysts such as the interagency South African nuclear
watch team which periodically assesses the likelihood of a South African
nuclear explosive test. At their lower extremities these formal processes
.blend into a host of informal thought processes in thousands of analysts
who see their day to day responsibilities as including watch and ward
for the Nation's interests.
The issues of current intelligence versus warning that arise
perennially in the intelligence community nearly all reflect frustrations
and failures arising from the fundamental conflict between two facts.
On the one hand it is clear that there is no division, only a blending,
of what is called current intelligence and what is called indications
and warning. On the other hand it is also clear that the capacities and
stamina of no single mind is up to the task of covering the whole range
of these responsibilities continuously for any area of the world worth
worrying about. Cuts must be made in the web in order for men to manage
it.
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CONFIDENTIAL 1 10
The history of intelligence community efforts to cope with this
fundamental conflict shows an oscillation between (relatively heavy)
reliance on organs specifically assigned I&W responsibility and (relatively
heavy).reliance on generalists. After a period of reliance on specialists
arguments begin to mount to the effect that this reliance has placed
unrealistic and imprudent reliance on the prescience and ingenuity of
narrowly focused bodies and has blurred and diluted the warning responsi-
bilities of the wider community of knowledgeable analysts. After relying
for a time on generalists to warn of impending events in some region
arguments will begin to mount to the effect that nature, pressures and
conflicting demands of current intelligence are so great that it is
asking too much of one analytic corps to expect it to also meet the
rigorous and time-consuming requirements of systematic and effective
warning; only a group trained and experienced in the specialized tools
and techniques of I&W can do that. And so the pendulum has swung back
and forth.
Out of this history has emerged a fairly coherent set of issues
which must be faced again today.
--How do we invest in the warning function so as to concentrate
in those areas where likelihood and relevance combine?
--How do we capitalize on the capacity of mechanical processors
to handle vast quantities of data and the capacity of knowledge
able area specialists to capture ineffable signs of change?
--How do we prevent the indication and warning function from
becoming a rout exercise?
--How do we maintain the sensitivity of the whole body of
intelligence analysts to the warning function?
Warning and Strategic Warning
Another finer cut in the web has been made. Strategic Warning
(Big-W) has been set off by itself within the broader concept of warning
(little-w). There are no inherent differences between W and w in terms
of the techniques and methods required. Distinctions rest primarily on
judgments of priorities (the most serious potential and likely military
threats to US security and interests) and the capacities and limitations
of various national-level mechanisms. The significance of the distinction
is that, as a consequence of various policy and program decisions, the
formal national-level warning mechanisms of the Community are almost
exclusively devoted to W while current Community definitions in effect
limit W to warning of a military attack on the United Stated or its
allies.
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A central issue now is the nature and range of potential threats
-and crises that most likely will require national-level warning judg-
ments over the next five to ten years. Is the community consensus of
1974-75 still valid that the principal problem and focus should be W (as
now defined), or should priorities and primary missions be revised to
conform to a new and different perception of the most probable range of
threats and crises in the foreseeable future? In an era of detente
relationships between the US, on the one hand, and the USSR and China,
on the other, a plausible case could be made that although strategic
warning (as now defined) must remain the ultimate requirement, the
principal warning problems on the US agenda in the foreseeable future
probably will not focus on potential military confrontations between the
great powers, but rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises
elsewhere. Some of these "lesser".warning situations, of course, will
involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.
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Arrangements for Warning
1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrange-
ments for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the
necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not
been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible,
is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the
NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that
might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary lead-
ership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to
include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would
report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI
would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA
and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss
matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by
any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible
NIO.
3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies;
one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of
approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic
Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC.
This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment
of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately
adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension
of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements
by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately
10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations
Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of
any non-military developments throughout the world that have the
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potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The per-
sonnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would
be drawn.from the various components of the intelligence community.
(The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence
currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be
imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of
Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of
Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto
warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.
5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first
look now taken by the various operations centers around town as
well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The
staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge
thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original
reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for
warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would
function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insur-
ance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would
obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient
conferencing techniques at hand.
6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant
for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and
when feasible to the Warning Control Group.
7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special
Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation
of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible
NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation.
This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an-alert memorandum to
the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.
8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be
directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization re-
quired. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report,
collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures
the NITC would have in being by that time.
9. There, obviously, are several other options which could be
pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W
and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located
at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence
officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national
warning center either at CIA, DIA,'State or NSA; a fourth would be
the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible
for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of
the small w.
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10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to
the .intelligence community yet one involving all components in the
warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time
itestablishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level with-
in the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the
potential, for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the
cooperation of. analytical elements of the community.
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s
II-C-3 Additional arrangements for strategic warning - -
1. Arrangements for strategic warning, as well as for other categories
of warning, should be based on a clear understanding that this is a line
responsibility shared by all NFIB production offices. A small interagency
strategic warning staff should function as a backup and supplement to line
responsibility, not as the sole authority for strategic warning. Its mis-
sion should be focused on long-range research and analysis directed toward
providing a greater margin of insurance and safeguard against strategic
surprise.
2. This mechanism should have the right and responsibility to take
the lead in drawing community attention to developments of potential
strategic warning significance. Beyond this alerting function, the stra-
tegic warning mechanism should be authorized, in cooperation with the ap-
propriate NIO, to prepare warning assessments that would serve as catalysts
for broader community examination and judgment. This mechanism should not
be involved in day-to-day I&W activities, which should remain the responsi-
bility of such line elements as DIA's Alert Center, WISP, CIA's Operations
Center, and current intelligence offices. The strategic warning function
should not duplicate the daily, routine process of examining, evaluating,
and reporting force postures, military exercises, normal deployments, etc.
Warning personnel, moreover, should not be directly involved in crisis
management, although they would contribute warning assessments to crisis
task forces.
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3. The present definition of strategic warning under DCID 1/5 should
be broadened to include (a) political confrontations between the major Com-
munist powers (the USSR, Warsaw Pact, China, and North Korea), and the US
and its allies; and (b) small "W" situations involving a potential for es-
calation into strategic warning situations. The strategic warning group
would work closely with whatever mechanism is established to cover other
categories of small "W" -- a parallel warning staff, responsible NIOs, etc.
4. This distinction between major warning developments that involve
a potential for political or military confrontation between the major
Communist powers and the US, on the one hand, and other developments which
do not carry immediate dangers of such confrontation, on the other, would
meet the DoD's primary interest in warning activities related to Big "W."
The strategic warning group would function in close association with DIA's
Vice Director for Production.
5. The strategic warning group would report either to a Special
Assistant to the DCI, the Director of NFAC, or the DDCI. Community re-
sponsibility could be symbolized by and centered in a high-level interagency
warning committee which would oversee the group's operations and advise the
senior warning authority. This committee would not have regular weekly
meetings but would convene at the direction of the senior warning authority
to examine specific developments and oversee the community's response --__in
the form of an Alert Memorandum or a Strategic Warning Notice.
6. Other options for handling the strategic warning function might
include:
A. Dropping the distinction between Big W and Small W and vesting,
the entire warning mission in an expanded SWS, which could either operate
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as a single warning mechanism or be subdivided into two units -- one for
Big W and the second for all other categories.
B. Appointing a national intelligence officer for warning who
would supervise the separate warning mechanism, provide guidance and over-
sight for the I&W functions and responsibilities of line production offices,
and advise the DCI, DDCI, the Director of NFAC, and the NIOs on all matters
pertaining to warning.
C. Continuing the present arrangement under DCID 1/5, but with.
a broader Big W mission for the Special Assistant and SWS as described in
paragraph 3, and with the NIOs responsible for other small "W" coverage.
Dissemination
7. Alert Memoranda or Strategic Warning Notices would be issued to
the DCI and passed, at his discretion, to the President and the NSC. Other
reports and studies prepared by the warning staff would continue to be
disseminated to the Washington policy and intelligence communities and to
the major U & S Commands.
Collection Tasking
8. The strategic warning function should not have a separate tasking
system but should form an integral part of the total warning tasking system.
The warning group would maintain constant contact with the NITO for warning;
any collection requirements not satisfied through line production offices
and Alert Centers would be presented to the NITO for warning.
3
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15 May 1978
MFMJRANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support
FROM
ie , Requirements & Evaluation Staff
SUBJECT . Support to the DCI in Crisis Management
1. The following thoughts are offered in response to pars II C 4
of your 4 May outline.
2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from.
the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the
NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of
events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions
and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis,
and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of
alternative causes of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally
has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a,
shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI
and the NSC principals. in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.
3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that -
a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated,..
or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is
happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the
priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissem-
ination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what
is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or
no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but.
has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the
analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy
support is facts and analysis.
4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:
? increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the
needs of the policy makers,
5X1
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increase the responsiveness of collection resources to
meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts,
the policy maker, and the military commanders,
? reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
increase the availability of people and data the DCI
may want to consult,
increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation
and consultation on crisis matters.
5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by
concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated
by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR
and DIA in the unlikely event. that State and Defense needs for direct
intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the
analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing
upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many
times. in past crises.
6. The relevance of the CIA/NFAC analysis to policy interests will
be, to some measure, dependent upon our knowledge of what is under
discussion in the USG policy arena. There must be a bridge between the
policy arena and the intelligence support the DCI is expected to provide.
This comnnuiication bridge can be provided by providing a special substantive
assistant to the DCI for the duration of the crisis. This person must
possess detailed knowledge of the area. and events so that he can back up
the DCI in SCC or NSC meetings. This person must be attuned to policy
nuances and understand the analytical effort behind the DCI in order to
provide guidance to the CIA analytical task force and to INR and DIA as
appropriate. This role could be filled by the D/DCI/NI, by the appropriate
NIO, or by a combination of their efforts.
7. The responsiveness of collection resources will in large
measure improve by the reflexive actions of the collection program
managers in response to the crisis situation. Frequently, however, the
crisis will result in a conflict of priorities for the use of a single
collection system between analysts and policy makers involved in
the crisis and those whose responsibilities are untouched by the crisis.
In the case of such conflict, and also to maintain the level of
responsiveness, it would be helpful for the D/DCI/CT to place a NITO in
direct support of the DCI's special substantive assistant. This would
ensure that there will be someone who has direct knowledge of the
analytic support needed by the DCI who can keep the D/DCI/CT informed of
the priorities from that support.
8. The DDCI could assume a more direct management role and
reduce the demands upon the DCI in the crisis. In particular, the NFAC
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less the analytical task force could report to the DDCI and the Directorate
of Operations less the headquarters resources devoted to support of the
DCI and the task force could report to the DDCI.
9. The main point one ends up with is that the thrust of the DC P s
responsibilities are analytical in nature and that all procedures must be
designed to support him in that role. The major portion of the DCI's time
in a crisis will be spent absorbing the details of events, interacting with,
his analytical support, presenting his analysis in policy arenas, and
participating in policy debates. The next heaviest demand will stem from
covert action or-paramilitary planning and activities should they be
involved.. Other than having periodic briefings or reports on the overall
status of collection systems, one would not expect the DCI to spend much
time on collection matters.
cc: Vincent He an
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 Approved For ease 20041 21 2C. ?I*RDP83B01027(#0200090003-4
15 May 1978
ME'1ORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substant))ve Support
FROM
ie Requirements n Staff
SUBJECT . Support to the DCI in Crisis Management
25
1. The following thoughts are offered in response to para II C 4
of your 4 May outline.
2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from
the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the
NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of
events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions
and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis,
and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of
alternative causes.of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally
has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a
shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI
and the NSC principals in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.
3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that
a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated,
or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is
happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the
priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissem-
ination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what
is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or
no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but
has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the
analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy
support is facts and analysis.
4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:
? increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the
needs of the policy makers,
S E C R E T
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 S E C R E T
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0 increase the responsiveness of collection resources to
meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts,
the policy maker, and th&-military commanders,
0 reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
0 increase the availability of people and data the DCI
may want to consult,
0 increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation
and consultation on crisis matters.
5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by
concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated
by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR
and DIA in the unlikely event. that State and Defense needs for direct
intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the
analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing
upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many
times. in past crises.
6. The relevance of the CIA/NFAC analysis to policy interests will
be, to some measure, dependent upon our knowledge of what is under
discussion in the USG policy arena. There must be a bridge between the
policy arena and the intelligence support the DCI is expected to provide.
This communication bridge can be provided by providing a special substantive
assistant to the DCI for the duration of the crisis. This person must
possess detailed knowledge of the area and events so that he can back up
the DCI in SCC or NSC meetings. This person must be attuned to policy
nuances and understand the analytical effort behind the DCI in order to
provide guidance to the CIA analytical task force and to INR and DIA as
appropriate. This role could be filled by the D/DCI/NI, by the appropriate
NIO, or by a combination of their efforts.
7. The responsiveness of collection resources will in large
measure improve by the reflexive actions of the collection program
managers in response to the crisis situation. Frequently, however, the
crisis will result in a conflict of priorities for the use of a single
collection system between analysts and policy makers involved in
the crisis and those whose responsibilities are untouched by the crisis.
In the case of such conflict, and also to maintain the level of
responsiveness, it would be helpful for the D/DCI/CT to place a NITO in
direct support of the DCI's special substantive assistant. This would
ensure that there will be someone who has direct knowledge of the
analytic support needed by the DCI who can keep the D/DCI/CT informed of
the priorities from that support.
8. The DDCI could assume a more direct management role and
reduce the demands upon the DCI in the crisis. In particular, the NFAC
S E C R E T
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 S E C R E T
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less the analytical task force could report to the DDCI and the Directorate
of Operations less the headquarters resources devoted to support of the
DCI and the task force could report to the DDCI.
9. The main point one ends up with is that the thrust of the DCI's
responsibilities are analytical in nature and that all procedures must be
designed to support him in that role. The major portion of the DCI's time
in a crisis will be spent absorbing the details of events, interacting with
his analytical support, presenting his analysis in policy.arenas, and
participating in policy debates. The next heaviest demand will stem from
covert action or paramilitary planning and activities should they be
involved. Other than having periodic briefings or reports on the overall
status of collection systems, one would not expect the DCI to spend much
time on collection matters.
cc: Vincent Heyman
D
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