TALKING POINTS FOR NFIB MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100060020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Talking Points for NFIB Meeting
19 January 1984
Report on DCI role in warning drew upon Community experience
with May 79 DCID, discussions in the Warning Working Group, and
interviews with several dozen senior people with warning responsi-
bilities or recent warning experience. The report reflects a wide
range of opinions and options for change.
The Warning Working Group believes the main issues are:
-- How broadly or narrowly one should define the mission of
a national warning system is discussed in paragraph 35.
The present, broad "no surprise on major security issues"
or a narrow, "warning of increasing readiness or intent
to attack US or US forces." Or something in between.
Majority of working group favored broad definition.
-- Administrative and substantive procedures and process
involved in integrating the disparate warning activities
throughout the Community and supplementing them. Essentially
a question of the present mandate, less than or greater
than as described in paragraph 36 of the report. None of
the Warning Working Group indicated fundamental problems
with any of these options.
-- Structure of the national warning system. This is discussed
in paragraph 37 and pertains to staff structures which are
largely a function of Community support and participation
in a national warning system. Majority view of working
group was in direction of expanded Community support and
participation.
Options for management discussed in paragraph 38-39 concern
oversight and direction of the national warning system effort
below the DCI. Working group opinion favored continuation
of traditional DDCI role, forming a new warning staff
successor to the SWS, and having the Chairman NIC or DDI
double-hatted as the DCI's senior warning officer.
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December 31, 1981
INR VIEWS ON THE NATIONAL WARNING QUESTION
The following comments reflect INR's views on the
national warning question, and suggest an appropriate approach
which takes into account existing institutions, structures and
procedures:
DEFINING THE WARNING MISSION
We envisage "warning" in the broadest sense as falling
into three slices: Big W; Little W; and No Surprise. "Big W"
relates to possible attack on the US, its forces overseas or
its allies; "Little W" refers to all other crises involving a
threat of initiation of hostilities. Both Big'and Little W
involve similar methodology of indications intelligence; taken
together they constitute a distinct professional discipline.
A "No Surprise" doctrine includes, in addition to Big and
Little W, a wide array of other events of substantial
importance to US policy and interests. It also involves a
broad range of disciplines, including political, military,
economic, sociological, and scientific and technical.
The "warning" writ should be as wide (including "no
surprise") as can be efficiently and effectively undertaken.
We think that current institutions and procedures, newly
sensitized, can adequately handle even the elements of a "no
surprise" requirement. On the other hand, those elements of
the system dedicated to handling problems arising from
possible attack on the US and other threats of initiation of
hostilities (Big and Little W) should not be burdened with the
tasks implied by a "no surprise" doctrine. That is the task
of the DCI and the Intelligence Community as a whole.
ORGANIZING FOR WARNING
A. THE ROLE OF THE DCI
As the President's Senior Intelligence Officer, the
DCI has responsibility for National Intelligence Warning, most
importantly strategic warning, but he must also oversee the
entire effort.
B. THE CHAIRMAN, NIC
The Chairman of the 'National Intelligence Council
should be the DCI's action officer for this effort, including
ensuring coordination of all the "no surprise" situations and
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Alert Memoranda through the regional and functional NIO
network.
Specifically, the Chairman, NIC, should be
responsible for ensuring that NIOs exert the necessary
estimative discipline so that all interagency products--
including Alert Memoranda--specify to the extent possible what
events are or are not likely, why such a judgment has been
reached, and what indications there might be to suggest that
such events were becoming more or less likely.
C. THE NIO/WARNING
Since Big and Little W?situations overlap regional
NIOs, and include either or both NIOs responsible for general
purpose and theater forces and stratecic programs, and because
I&W intelligence constitutes a discrete discipline, the NIO/W
should be a special assistant to the Chairman, NIC, with
specific responsibility for warning of possible hostilities or
other threatening military activities. The NIO/W, working
with the regional and functional NIOs, as agent for the
Chairman, NIC, would be charged with applying to all
interagency efforts related to Big and Little W the same
estimative discipline through the I&S?' prism as noted above for
the Chairman, NIC.
One task would be to assure that the monthly
meetings held by the various NIOs were more effectively used
in support of the warning mission. NIO/W or one of his staff
would review the agenda, attend the monthly meetings, and
ensure that there was a specific warning component in the
product. In particular, the NIO/W and his staff would
contribute indications lists on specific crises or problems.
The main responsibility of the NIO/W and his staff at NIO
monthly warning meetings should he to provide the analytical
basis in support of what indications to,,-look for next if a
situation deteriorates. This would sensitize the Community
and provide additionally needed focus and emphasis on warning.
NIO meetings and/or the warning products from them could be
issued once per month, or more frequently as required.
NIO/W should ensure that NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs and other
IC products are as supportive as possible of warning
requirements, and that issues and questions relevant to
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warning are appropriately covered in these papers, NIO/W
should participate in the production schedule, should propose
special studies as he deems required, and should work with the
other NIOs to see that warning is adequately addressed in any
study.
NIO/W and his staff would also work closely with
NFAC and the other producers of current intelligence and
longer range analysis and assessments to enhance general
sensitivity to warning and its requirements. Specifically,
the NIO/W and his staff could generate I&W studies of
strategic attack on the US, as well as additional potential
regional warning situations beyond Europe and Korea (e.g., the
Middle Easdt, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia).
Further, basic studies on I&W methodology should be
undertaken. Such work should aim to focus Community attention.
on developments which will change warning assessments, either
to deny indications or to create opportunities to develop or
exploit new ones. NIO/W could also usefully participate in
planning in the arms control field on. measures relating to
warning enhancement, e.g., confidence building measures in
CDE, and associated measures in MBFR.
Although requests for Alert Memoranda can come from
any quarter, the NIO/W has a special responsibility for those
involving potential military actions. Current procedures for
producing AMs seem adequate.
NIO/W should develop new training opportunities
specifically geared to I&W. He should assist in the
development of courses within the Intelligence Community.
With the Strategic Warning Staff already under the
NIO/W's aegis, it would make sense for-these resources to be
designated as the "Warning Staff" responsible for supporting
the NIO/W in the tasks outlined above.. A principal task for
these resources (as specified in DCID 1/5) should be the
strategic warning mission.
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The NIO/W and his staff should, have sufficient
resources to monitor, coordinate and enhance US intelligence
activities related to warning of military action, but all
within the general managerial structure and the substantive
programs that fall under the Chairman, NIC.
The Warning Working Group should be maintained as
the interagency managerial network to prepare and coordinate
responses and proposals to NFIB on warning matters.
SOME THOUGHTS ON ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS AND DEVIL'S ADVOCACY
There is a tendency to equate alternative analysis with
devil's advocacy. There is a difference, however, and
blurring the two leads to unfortunate confusion.
The Community has always valued alternative analysis.
The different agencies provide insurance against missed
alternative hypotheses because each agency--by role and
responsibility--is sensitive to one or more of the
repercussions of possible developments. DIA and the Services,
for example, are the eyes and ears of those responsible for
meeting and defeating a possible attack. Their role forces
them to examine worst case possibilities. INR, in the same
fashion, must be alert to situations requiring diplomtic
actions and has a stake in avoiding an overreaction to
ambiguous indications. Similarly, CIA and NSA have a stake in
adequate collection and analysis; Treasury and DOE each have
specific responsibilities and roles which sensitize them to
potential developments.
On the other hand, to provide for judgments that are
characterized only by institutionalized pessimism is to
develop an entity responsible not to be better or to be right
but only to be different. It would amount to transferring the
responsibility for reviewing all hypotheses from the line
intelligence services--where it is and should remain--to a
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special staff with a role
It is to suggest that the
of the various agencies.
Community will speak with
always be ambiguous.
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of
warning for
the sake of warning.
DCI
not demand
what he should demand
It
is also to
ensure that the
two
voices and
that warning, will
Considerable progress has been -nade over the. last several
years with our NATO allies, particularly the key ones, on
warning questions. Even so, the sharing of warning
information and the philosophy of warning probably deserve a
current look. However, it would be diverting to burden this
NFIB with discussion of the subject. It might first be
addressed by the WWG.
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