COPING WITH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SUPRISE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100060010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 8, 1982
• Content Type: MF

Approver Release 2004th. CIA-RDP83B(*7R000100060010-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI #1099-82
8 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : Coping with Diplomatic and Military Surprise
1. The attached memorandum has some interesting perspectives
on coping with diplomatic surprises and sudden military initiatives.
Although most of the points are oriented toward a specific warning
function the paper is relevant to the duties of most analysts deal-
ing with political and military problems.
2. The author also does some contingent forecasting by
describing six situations where circumstances are converging in
a way that creates a potential for shock diplomacy or sudden military
initiatives.
-- Israel - Egypt
-- China - US - Taiwan
-- West Germany - NATO Missiles
-- South Africa - Namibia - Angola
-- Poland
-- Iran - Iraq
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Attachment
All Portions of this Memorandum
are Classified SECRET _2.5X1
pERIVATiVE CL BY --
SECRET C] DELL I REVW ON R Fah 2002
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DDI #1099-82
SUBJECT: Coping with Diplomatic and Military Surprise 8 February 1982
Distribution:
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Memorandum for: NIO for Warning
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February 4, 1982
Subject Preparing the Warning System to Cope with Surprise
1. The DCI's renewed mandate to define the warning mission broadly
in terms of avoiding surprise to US decision-makers requires new and
more imaginative analytical methods and processes. The fundamental
requirement for avoiding surprise is to strengthen the warning
community's ability to detect or sense when a target government's
policy is ripe for a significant break with, or departure from,
existing positions and lines of action.
2. Most foreign policies are based on a high degree of continuity,
inertia, routine, and incremental decision-making. Political leaders
everywhere usually prefer to cling to the "security" of familiar and
well-tested policies rather than gamble on leaps into the unknown.
As a result, most actions taken by governments fall within fairly
narrow limits and are thus reasonably predictable. Governments resort
to major departures or faits accomplis, which often produce surprise,
only infrequently, and usually under the pressures of a combination of
dometic and international forces and incentives. Surprise diplomacy
generally seeks to employ secrecy, surprise, and shock to achieve its
objectives.
3. The central task of warning is to monitor both the target
government's domestic and international situations and (even more
importantly) its perceptions of these situations in order to be in a
position to detect or sense when a breakpoint if imminent. Even if
this kind of detailed and exhaustive monitoring enables the warning
community to judge that circumstances exist that may trigger surprise
actions, most warning forecasts necessarily must be cast in contingent
terms or in a context of changes in a situation that have created a
potential for shock diplomacy or sudden military initiatives. The
intrinsic difficulties and ambiguities of warning intelligence will
always preclude clear and confident predictions. Contingent fore-
casting is the most that warning can strive for, and the demands of
this process are daunting enough.
4. Historically, two of the most common sources of policy break-
points and surprise have been (a) actual or impending failures of
a given line of policy, a bluff that has been called, or a power play
that has backfired; and (b) changes in the prevailing balance of
power--either domestic or international.
5. The current warning agenda offers four examples (actual or
potential) of the first category: the impending failure of Prime
Minister Begin's strategy since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem to trade an
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China - U.S. - Taiwan
1. The Chinese leaders are facing their most consequential
decisions in relations with the U.S. since President Nixon's visit in
1972. Their bold attempt to pressure the Reagan Administration into
terminating arms sales to Taiwan has failed, and they now find themselves
locked into a position in which they must either retreat or bring this
sensitive issue to a head. Both options carry high political risks for
Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, and the Taiwan dilemma probably has
intensified divisions in the leadership.
2. A retreat would seem to be excluded because this course would
require a politically costly admission that China had been caught in a
bluff. Although some Politburo members apparently have urged that
China demand an immediate and explicit suspension of the Administration's
decision to continue arms sales to Taiwan, Peking apparently has
decided to concentrate on extracting a deadline for ending U.S. arms
sales. China's official news agency contended on 31 January that a
time limit would "safeguard" China's sovereignty over the island while
giving "due consideration" to U.S. interests. The Chinese may be
willing to acquiesce in a continuation of limited U.S. arms sales for
a short period (perhaps one to three years), but only on condition that
the U.S. accepts the "principle" that the sales are incompatible with
China's sovereignty and with the December 1978 agreement to establish
full diplomatic relations.
3. While pondering their next steps. the Chinese are trying to
convey subtle signals to the U.S. that they retain the option of
improving relations with the Soviet Union if the Administration declines
to negotiate on Taiwan. The Chinese on January 25 confirmed that they
have held "unofficial" talks with Sergei Tikvinskiy, deputy chairman of
the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, about a resumption of the
stalled border negotiations, last held in Peking in June 1978. Tik-
vinskiy, formerly deputy chief of the Soviet delegation at the border
talks, is said to be seeking clarification of Peking's diplomatic note
of December 26 which agreed in "principle" to resume the border talks.
4. If further soundings convince the Chinese that the U.S. will
not agree to place limits on the duration and quantities of arms sales,
Peking will either have to make good on its threat to downgrade diplo-
matic relations from the ambassadorial to the charge'level, with the
knowledge that Washington promptly would match this move, or accept the
consequences of a serious loss of prestige and credibility. The Chinese
leaders pride themselves on making good on explicit warnings--the
intervention in the Korean War, the border war with India, and the
"lesson" administered to Vietnam in 1979. In view of this record and
the probable domestic political repercussions of a backdown, the Chinese
probably will act to reduce diplomatic relations with the U.S. in the
next three to six months.
5. A downgrading of diplomatic relations,, accompanied by a
cooling in Sino-U.S. economic ties, would represent a potentially
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South Africa - Namibia - Angola
1. South Africa's decision to play the "Cuban card" in the contest
over Namibia strongly suggests that Prime Minister Botha's government
has sharply downgraded its assessment of the chances for an acceptable
agreement on Namibia and that it may now move within the next six
months toward a unilateral declaration of Namibian independence under
the control of Pretoria's client Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. On
January 5, the acting commander of South African forces in Namibia
announced that his forces had clashed with Cuban troops for the first
time in nearly seven years. He claimed the Cubans had interfered with
South African and Namibian troops engaged in a "follow-up operation"
against SWAPO insurgents in the "operational area straddling the
(Namibia-Angola) border." The Angolan Defense Ministry promptly
challenged this claim and asserted that South African forces had
attacked Cuban and Angolan units 190 miles north of the border deep
in the interior of Angola.
2. The significance of South Africa's claim resides in the fact
that it is now contending that the clash with the Cubans confirms that
Soviet-directed Cuban forces are taking over the Namibian insurgency
from SWAPO guerrillas, thus "internationalizing" the conflict. South
African media have linked the incident to the negotiations on a Namibian
settlement and emphasized that the South African public will not support
a settlement unless Cuban troops are withdrawn from Angola. The South
African government has long made it clear that th?re can be no real
progress on Nam bia unless the U.S. delivers a satisfactory Cuban
withdrawal from Angola.
3. South Africa's decision to play the "Cuban" card at this time
almost certainly reflects an intention to stall the negotiations and
blame any breakdown on the Cubans and Soviets and on the U.S.' failure
to secure the departure of Cuban forces. The timing of Botha's decision
probably was influenced by his perception of the significance of the
Reagan Administration's decision to hold high level talks in the State
Department with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in late December, and the
Department's announcment that, "'This Administration has stated that the
U.S. considers UNITA to be a legitimate political force in Angola which
must be taken into account."
4. Botha appears to have interpreted this statement as meaning
that the Administration now endorses South Africa's view that the
Namibian problem cannot be settled in isolation from a broader
regional settlement, i.e., a Cuban withdrawal from Angola and an internal
political settlement in Angola itself. If South Africa now intends to
make a Namibian agreement conditional on an Angolan settlement) this
will obviously stalemate indefinitely the efforts of the five-power
Western "contact group" to implement the U','N. Security Council's
resolution calling for independence for Namibia in 1982. It will also
open the way to a South African unilateral declaration of independence
for Namibia, probably before the end of the year. This outcome would
precipitate an expansion of the conflict in southern Africa and confront
the U.S. with an array of problems that would far overshadow the stakes
in the immediate Namibian problem.
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Category B: Changes in the domestic balance of power
Poland
1. Developments in the past two weeks reinforce the impression
that sharp differences within the military and party leadership are
paralyzing the Military Council's ability to make major political and
economic decisions. The regime is also displaying great anxiety over
public reaction to the massive price increases that took effect on
February 1.
2. The most striking evidence of the regime's inability to make
tough decisions was General Jaruzelski's failure in his speech to
parliament on 25 January to lay out the kind of comprehensive program
that had been promised in late December. The speech itself was delayed
for three weeks, almost certainly because of irreconcilable differences
in the leadership. On the crucial issue of the future of Solidarity,
Jaruzelski acknowledged that proposals on trade unions remain to be
worked out. In contrast to his forthright statement in his Christmas Eve
address that "there is room for self-managing and really independent
trade unions" and for "workers' self-management," Jaruzelski on 25 January
could say only that he himself saw a need for a self-governing union as
a "counterweight to the bureaucracy" and that there was support for the
"idea" of unity among all trade unions. He said nothing about workers'
self-management. The hardline Army newspaper on 20 January had bluntly
ruled out workers' self-management and union participation in the
selection of enterprise managers.
3. Jaruzelski's vague formulations on the future of Solidarity
were dictated by disagreements between "moderates" who favor preservation
of a Solidarity purged of "antisocialists," restricted to non-political
issues such as wages and working conditions, and reduced to a constituent
member of a party-controlled national trade union federation, on the one
hand, and hardliners who demand the complete elimination of Solidarity,
on the other. Jaruzelski himself probably favors the moderates'
prescription, but he found it necessary in his 25 January speech to
avoid repeating his earlier assurances that he has no intention of
returning to the state of affairs before the Gdansk Accords of August 1980.
4. The sole issue on which Jaruzelski was able to express a
reasonably clear position--his pledge to ease some martial law restrictions
by the end of February "if no illegal actions develop"--was prompted by
two considerations: (a) the military regime's desire to give West
European governments a rationale for resisting U.S. pressure to impose
economic and political sanctions; and (b) concern that an indefinite
extension of full martial law would gravely compromise the Army's reputa-
tion in the public mind and jeopardize its reliability as the only
effective instrument for ensuring public order and guiding economic
recovery through the system of military commissars in industry, mines
commerce and transport.
5. The next four to eight weeks probably will bring decisive tests
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of Jaruzelski's ability to keep the lid on open resistance and lay the
foundations for gradual economic and political recovery. Public
reaction to the price increases will be the first significant test.
Jaruzelski is counting on his pledge to lift or reduce some martial law
restrictions by the end of February to buy him crucial time both at. home
and abroad in influencing decisions by the Western powers. He clearly
hopes to counter President Reagan's warning that "we're not going to
wait forever for improvement" by encouraging the kind of West European
interests and sentiments represented by Foreign Minister Genscher's
statement on 6 January that, "Together with our Western partners, we are
prepared to grant financial aid in large measure to a Poland that returns
to the path of reform and renewal."
6. If Jaruzelski is unable to make good on his martial law pledge,
if he fails to reduce leadership differences that are paralyzing major
decision-making, and if the kind of street violence that occurred in
Gdansk on 30 January spreads, Jaruzelski's position will become much
more precarious, the hardliners will strengthen their influence and
emerge more openly, and Jaruzelski's days in power probably will be
numbered.
Category B: Shifts in the International Power Balance
Iran - Iraq
1. A major breakpoint in the conflict is becoming increasingly
likely in the next three months. President Saddam Hussein's search for
a way to end his losing war reflects a growing fear of mutinies in
Iraq's demoralized army, especially if the Iranians carry the fighting
into Iraqi territory. Faced with the prospect of further military
setbacks and rising dangers of a threat to his leadership, Saddar- may
unleash his superior air force against Iran's remaining oil facilities.
Such attacks would draw Iranian counterstrikes against Iraq's three oil
pipelines to ports in Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. Mutual military
escalation might bring Gulf shipping to a halt and virtually remove
the oil production of Iraq, Iran and possibly some of the smaller Gulf
states from the world market.
2. If the Khomeini regime interprets Saddam Hussein's peace feelers
as a sign of growing weakness and vulnerability, it is likely to attempt
to intensify Iranian military operations in an attempt to bring him down.
Iran will therefore resist any outside diplomatic intervention to
arrange a ceasefire and Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territory.
3. King Hussein's theatrical announcement on 28 January that Jordan
will send volunteer troops to assist Iraq and that he will join this
force probably was prompted by his concern that the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein and a humiliating Iraqi defeat would greatly enhance Syria's
position in the Arab world and expose Jordan to harsher Syrian pressures.
King Hussein, moreover, probably hopes that his gesture will induce the
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Saudis to increase their financial support to Iraq and perhaps
prevail on the U.S. and Western Europe to intervene to arrange a
ceasefire as the only way to avert an Iraqi defeat and a dangerous
expansion of Iranian power in the Gulf.
4. The Administration may soon receive urgent appeals from
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and perhaps Egypt for prompt diplomatic inter-
vention to deny Iran and Syria what would be potentially highly
destabilizing changes in the Gulf and Arab balance of power.
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 ,MEMORANDUM FOR: Dick Kerr, D/C&
NI A
Doug MacEachin, DD/OCO
NIO/W
Date 8 Feb 82
FORM USE 5-75 101 ED TIONSVIOUS
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Strategic Warning Staff
5 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING
SUBJECT: Southeast Asian Potential for Crisis
Vietnam's offensive in western Kampuchea has again created conditions
for a potentially much more serious crisis involving Thailand and China,
and ultimately even the US. Indiscriminate Vietnamese violations of the
Thai border to strike at the support infrastructure of, or to envelop,
Kampuchean resistance forces could lead to clashes with Thai units
stationed in the border zone. Vietnamese battalion-level units have
already operated up to 5 km inside Thailand, but so far have avoided
engaging Thai units. On the other hand the danger of escalation is
increased by Thai apparent willingness to join the fray, evidently in
support of Kampuchean allies. Thai counterbattery artillery fire and
aerial reconnaissance have already occurred. One small Thai unit reportedly
made an incursion into Kampuchea. Should Thai troops get into serious
trouble, or just in the way, Bangkok is likely to appeal for support to
So far the Chinese have been conspicuous by their silence about Vietnam's
latest predations in Kampuchea. The, Chinese have yet to even mention the
Vietnamese offensive in propaganda. A slight increase in skirmishing and
shelling across the Sino-Vietnamese border has occurred, as part of the
annual rites inaugurating the lunar new year. -Chinese mention in press of
civilian casualties inflicted by the Vietnamese portends some iation,
but nothing relates this to the fighting in Kampuchea.
The Chinese usually do not retaliate immediately along the Sino-
Vietnamese border for Vietnamese operations in Kampuchea. It is likely
that they are watching the performance of the Kampuchean clients in the
face of the Vietnamese onslaught as well as judging the gravity of the
latest Vietnamese threat. The offensive has been underway since at least
late November, with its most intense phase beginning three weeks ago. But
so far it has not even been mentioned by the Chinese, in public or in private.
Chinese deliberations about a response are probably complicated by
internal conditions and the presence in Indochina of a Soviet military
delegation led by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov. Ogarkov's
visit raises a strong inference of complicity in the offensive beyond
the provision of required military support, and flaunts Soviet and Vietnamese
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solidarity. The danger to Chinese allies in Southeast Asia plus Vietnamese
and Soviet hauteur place heavy pressure on China to make some riposte to
signal its interests, if not protect its equities. One explanation for the
alleged presence of Deng Xiaoping in South China is to plan with local
commanders the nature and timing of a Chinese military response against
The linkages make the situation almost unpredictable with a large
potential for a chain reaction. A serious clash in Thailand could occur
at any time without warning. The amount and quality of warning available
in the event the Sino-Vietnamese border heats up hinges on the Chinese
response. Low level demonstrations of force could begin at any time
without warning. A buildup on the scale of the 1979 border war, which
does not yet seem likely, would be detected several weeks at a minimum
before major hostilities.
Acting Director, SWS
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