NOTE FOR: NIO/GPF FROM A/NIO/W

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100030005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 31, 1982
• Content Type: NOTES

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TAB
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 Approv0or Release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP8318 027R000100030005-9
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
31 August 1982
NOTE FOR: NIO/GPF
FROM : A/NIO/W
The book reviewed in the attachment
may have relevance to you and the drafters of
NIE 11/12-82, Military Reliability of the
Warsaw Pact Allies.
Attachment:
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Flowerree, Charles C. and Victor L. Issraelyan, "Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and
US Perspective," Occasional Paper 29, Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation,
February 1982, 32 pp. Summarized by Sandra Daugherty, SAFAAR. (82-32)
(Note: Issraelyan is a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
USSR Representative to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Flowerree serves as a
senior advisor in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)
The 1979 Soviet-US draft treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling,
and use of radiological weapons defines such weapons as: any device or radioactive material,
including any weapons or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically
designed to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of disseminating the radiation
produced by the decay of such material.
Flowerree's paper chronicles radiological weapons control efforts by the UN since 1948.
According to Flowerree, early interest in the issue was "sporadic." The problem did not
assume any great significance until the early 1970s, when great quantities of radioactive
waste began to accumulate as a by-product of nuclear energy programs. Negotiations since
that time have dealt primarily with two aspects of the issue: "(1) the definition of
radiological weapons, and (2) the question of whether attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities,
such as nuclear power stations, constituted radiological warfare."
Issraelyan, a physician, focuses on the biological aspects of radiological warfare. He
discusses the physical properties of radioactive waste, stressing the fact that "the develop-
ment of radiological weapons would result from military or political (or both) considerations
and in no way depends on specific characteristics of a radioactive material."
Both authors address the skeptics who contend that radiological warfare is improbable.
According to Flowerree, while no operational capability for radiological weapons existed at
that time, their use against North Korea was proposed by Douglas MacArthur in 1951. Such
use was also briefly considered by the US against North Vietnam in the early 1960s.
Issraelyan suggests that arguments against the practicality of production and transport of
radiological weapons are "short-sighted."
Opposing ideologies aside, Issraelyan and Flowerree agree that the problem of radiolog-
ical weapons control warrants far more attention than has been evident to date. In their
view, the time to set controls in motion is now, before development and proliferation of such
weapons takes place. Firm commitments in this area could mark the beginning of a new and
successful era of arms control negotiations.
Johnson, A. Ross, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establish-
ments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc_., 1982, 182
pp., 19.50. Summarized by Laura Hutchinson, SAFAAR. (82-32)
(Note: This book is the product of research conducted under the National Security
rategies program of Project AIR FORCE at the g~n,~ ~r ion.)
The authors present an historical overview of the military establishments of Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, and Poland and trace the postwar development of military relations
between the USSR and the Northern Tier. By analyzing the different institutional histories of
these East European military establishments, they highlight Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities that
warrant closer Western attention. The authors are distressed that the study of the East
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 The FridPRTRYee Fo PPR Za'/e?a re IA-RDP83B01.0200100030005-9
August 20, 1982
European contribution to Soviet military power has been neglected: "Apart from a few West
German books on the East German military. . .there is not a single Western book devoted to an
East European military establishment." Therefore, they attempt to put into perspective the
unique role of each Northern Tier country within the Warsaw Pact by addressing such key
issues as the extent of Communist Party control over the military, the tensions that exist
between the national military elites and the USSR, and the loyalties and professional skills of
the officer corps. Also included are several appendices presenting an outline of the structure
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and selected data on the Northern Tier military
capabilities and expenditures.
The authors note that the formal Warsaw Treaty Organization, formed in 1955, was
primarily a political alliance. Even though the military functions of the Warsaw Pact were
strengthened during the 1960s, the alliance still lacked the functional military organs and
integrated command and control systems such as NATO had created. They point out that the
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a watershed event, marking the development of
multilateral military relationships in the Soviet bloc and demonstrating the Soviets' ability to
mobilize loyalist allies. However, the invasion was not cost-free for the USSR, as the morale
of the Czech officer corps was destroyed and "soul-searching" within the Polish and East
German military establishments began.
The Polish armed forces, the authors contend, have evolved into the most modern of the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military establishments. They call attention to the depth of national
tradition, anti-Sovietism, and pro-Western orientation that have existed within the Polish
military since its inception. Despite this strong nationalist sentiment, the authors make clear
that the Polish military is viewed by Moscow as capable of providing a significant increment
to Soviet military power in Europe.
In contrast to the Polish military, the East German military lacks a national tradition to
embrace. It is a young organization and has not experienced the internal conflicts prevalent
within the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces. Because the GDR's armed forces were
developed as a military instrument by the USSR, the relationship of the East German elites to
the Soviets has been one of direct subordination. According to the authors, the Soviets
probably have more confidence in the reliability of the East German military than in any
other Northern Tier armed forces.
The Czechoslovak military lost its autonomy during the 1950s when the Soviets began to
control policy and planning. Consequently, national sentiments started to emerge and were
vocalized by the officer corps. When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the officer
corps began to disintegrate and all reform movements within the military ceased. The
authors contend that Czechoslovakia has not yet recovered from this trauma. Its military has
not regained its pre-invasion size and suffers from a shortage of trained professionals.
Therefore, the Soviets must skeptically view the dependability of the Czechoslovak military
in a European contingency, they argue.
Because of the distinct institutional histories of each Northern Tier military establish-
ment, the authors reach several conclusions about the Soviets' ability to utilize these armed
forces in a European war. They contend that all three countries are prepared to participate
in a rapid, massive, offensive strike into NATO territory and can be relied upon by the
Soviets (although the Czech contribution is questionable). The authors reiterate that the
Warsaw Pact is an instrument of Soviet hegemony and the Soviets expect all Northern Tier
armed forces during wartime to combine with Soviet forces under the direction of the Soviet
High Command. However, tension between East European military elites and the Soviets is
likely to rise if the Soviets continue dominating all Warsaw Pact institutions, planning, and
doctrine. The authors believe that the Soviets are aware that nationalist sentiments can
quickly reemerge within the East European officer corps; this will influence Soviet percep-
tions of the reliability of the East European military elites under wartime conditions.
4
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The Friday Review of Defense Literature August 20, 1982
The authors do not fail to note the significance of the assumption of supreme political
power by the Polish military in 1981. The Polish crisis dramatized the inherent vulnerabilities
in the kinds and level of Soviet reliance on East European military forces. Because the Polish
officer corps was preoccupied with enforcing martial law at this time, they point out that it
was inconceivable that the Soviets could have counted on the Polish army in the event of a
European conflict. The Soviets still must solve the dilemma that was reemphasized by this
crisis: "Should the USSR rely on uncertain East European military capabilities or devote more
of its own military resources to the region?"
Foot, Peter, "Problems of Equity in Alliance Arrangements," Aberdeen, Scotland: Centre for
Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, No. 23, Summer 1982, 43 pp. Summarized by
Kathleen Anderson, SAFAAR. (82-32)
(Note: Foot is a Research Fellow with the Centre for Defence Studies.)
For more than three decades, the members of the Atlantic Alliance have grappled with
the issue of equity in burden-sharing. At the June summit meeting in Bonn, the leaders pledged
to "continue to give due attention to fair burden-sharing and to possibilities for developing
areas of practical cooperation." Foot finds this declaration of intent inconsistent; he reasons
that the concept of "fair burden-sharing" may be at odds with or even preclude the Allies from
"developing areas of practical cooperation" so long as "equity" implies the financial aspects of
membership without reference to achieving Alliance objectives.
Foot points out that using "equality of sacrifice" as the historical measure of burden-
sharing entraps the Allies in a "numbers" game. Statistical analysis leads to a preoccupation
with budgetary inputs. This focus, he asserts, distracts the NATO community from its real
objective--the output of defense capability. He also discounts the "benefits" received and
"ability to pay" approaches to equality of sacrifice as threatening the members' freedom of
action.
In the late 1970s, NATO decreed the "3 percent solution"--a general commitment to
increase military spending by three percent per year in real terms. Foot describes this
agreement On "equiproportionate" increases as "another turn on the burden-sharing carousel"
which has not been successful in reducing tensions because perceived inequalities were not
removed and no provision was made for non-quantifiable considerations.
The DoD studied the efficacy of "equiproportionate" increases near the end of the
Carter administration, though Secretary Weinberger presented the Report on Allied
Commitments to Defense Spending to Congress in March 1981. Foot characterizes the
Weinberger report as "the culmination... of three decades of intra-Alliance wrangling" and as
"the product of the ability-to-pay school of equity." He cautions that, while the report seems
to demonstrate that the European Allies measure up to the requirement of equity, the DoD
made no attempt to resolve the issue of non-financial contributions to the common defense. He
also stresses that a nation could increase defense spending by three percent without improving
its own security or its contribution to NATO's military effort.
In a positive vein, Foot notes that the Weinberger report reassured Americans that their
Allies are carrying their share of the load and, more importantly, it directed attention to the
fact that financial criteria should not be the sole determinant of equity.
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The Friday Review of Defense Literature August 20, 1982
Foot proposes a fresh approach--that burden sharing be measured by equality of effort,
a concept emphasizing "not what Allies are paying but what they are doing." He states that
equity in Alliance arrangements will have meaning only when expressed in terms of, the
organization's objective--security- -and suggests a reassessment of the Alliance itself would be
healthy. Four areas which should be studied as part of such a reassessment include: the
provision of territory; the amount of host nation support; manpower considerations; and
extension of military and economic aid to non-NATO countries.
In sum, Foot argues that "equality of effort" is a more constructive way to measure the
use of resources because it centers around collective endeavors. Dividing the labor, roles and
responsibilities among NATO members, he suggests, would afford the Alliance an opportunity to
eliminate duplication of effort and to exploit the special expertise of its members.
116
Pearce, Frank, Last Call for HMS Edinburg A Story of the Russian Convoys, NY:
Atheneum, 1982, 200 pp., $14.95.
(Note: Pearce is the author of six books, including The Ship That Torpedgd Herself.)
During World War II, along a two-thousand-mile convoy route through they Arctic Ocean
from Iceland to Murmansk, men of the British Royal Navy fought and died in a monumental
struggle to transport supplies to their beleaguered Russian allies. Pearce, himself a veteran
of the "Gateway to Hell," describes the horrors of a sea war pitting merchant ships and escort
vessels against two formidable aggressors--the Germans and the icy Arctic.
One such escort vessel was the British battle cruiser HMS Edinburgh. Pearce recounts
the last days of that gallant ship, from the first German torpedo attack on 30 April 1942 to
the final blow on 2 May which took her to the bottom--with a cargo of ten tons of gold
bullion. Pearce's gripping chronicle includes the recollections of both survivors of and
witnesses to the Edinburgh's death, men who endured that Arctic nightmare in defense of
their freedom.
(The story of the Russian convoys did not end with World War II. In September 1981,
after more than 39 years at the bottom of the sea, the treasure of the Edinburgh was
recovered by the salvage vessel Stephaniturm.)
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