WARNING ASSESSMENT: EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 14, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
14 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
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FROM
National intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia
The following items were discussed by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the 18 June Warning Meeting.
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2. Analysts noted a steady move on General Chon Doo Huan's part
to build up his political power, closely following the process used by
Park Chong Hee. Nevertheless, there were limitations as to how fast Chon
could move -- the weakened condition of the existing political parties,
the difficulties (Con would face in creating a new party, and popular
reaction against him. Chon might need to rig elections, which could
greatly increase popular opposition. Promulgation of a new constitution
along the lines of the old Yushin constitution would also be likely to
generate widespread opposition.
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3. The security situation appeared to be relatively stable, with
the government closely watching possible trouble spots such as the
college campuses. Economic conditions were seen as less good but with
signs of an upturn becoming visible. US-ROK relations were satisfactory,
and the Combined Force Command was functioning normally. No indications
of unusual North Korean military movements had been observed. F I
China
4. Some further editorial criticisms of Hua Guofeng had occurred
but apparently not of a nature to suggest serious strains among the
senior leadership (criticisms of Hua were directed against his earlier
stand favoring a faster modernization than is now the case). It was
assumed that the top leaders were presently thrashing out issues which
would be addressed at major meetings to be held later this year.
There was a possibility that Deng Xiaoping would resign his governmental
position in August, which could cause other senior personalities
including Hua to follow suit. F-1
5. US-PRC relations were described as good, with the Geng Biao
visit to the US being taken by the Chinese as a sign of coincidence of
views on strategic matters. US arms sales to China were regarded by
the Chinese of lesser importance than the US-PRC strategic relationship.
However, continuing differences exist between the US and the PRC over
policy toward Kampuchea and Pol Pot. F 1
6. On Sino-Soviet relations, analysts surmised that the recent
Chinese rejection of Soviet feelers on improving these relations
signified a higher Chinese priority in maintaining good relations
with the US. No particular change in the Soviet OB along the Soviet-
Chinese border had been observed. I I
7. It was noted by one analyst that the PRC has begun to make
increased use of Hong Kong to train personnel in business and commercial
affairs, suggesting a long-term role for Hong Kong in China's economic
development. Q
Philippines
8. Reference was made to the reported manifesto of anti-Marcos
activities provided to the Department of State by Senator Aquino, which
called for a united front including the Communists against Marcos as
well as armed demonstrations. Analysts recalled that a similar manifesto
had occurred during elections some two years ago and this added nothing
new. It was agreed that the Philippine situation merited close watching,
however. El
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Indochina
9. Analysts called attention to upsurge in DK activity directed
against Vietnam communications in Kampuchea, which had created problems
for the Vietnamese. DK forces were well supplied. Analysts agreed
that failure of the DK to take vigorous action now would cause
problems for them when the next dry season arrived.
11. Analysts commented upon efforts by the Thai, so far unsuccessful,
to bring the Khmer Serai.and DK forces toeether.
Analysts believes
inese support for the DK would still be rendered through Thailand
despite some reports that Air Marshall Sitthi had cons king
the Chinese to find other means of resupplying the DK.
12. It was anticipated that Secretary State Muskie would be asked
by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur how the US would vote on
the Kampuchean issue in this year's UN General Assembly. 11
13. Signs of increased Chinese attention to Northern Laos were
noted, as evidenced by stepped up Chinese air flights between Hainan
and areas along the Sino-Laos border. Laotian refugees accepted by
China are in camps in Hainan.
14. Analysts commented upon a possible concentration of the
Soviet military presence in Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay.
Thailand
15. The performance of Prime Minister Prem since he assumed office
was summed up as not being too good. So far Prem had escaped serious
criticism, but a critical point could come in about three months more
unless he faced up to some of Thailand's pressing problems. This point
in time would coincide with the date of announcing new military promotions,
which could also cause additional trouble for Prem. I I
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