CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006600490001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 October 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Khrushchev letters designed to stimulate
pressure for compromise settlement on Cuba.
(Page t)
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4. Cuba-UN: Raul Roa expected at UN today. (Page tit-a)
5. Cuba: Non-bloc developments. (Page ttt-a)
6. Cuba: Latin American developments. (Page it i-b)
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8. India - Communist China: Peiping mounts.diplo-
matic offensive designed to bring pressure for dis-
engagement along border. (Page t v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 October 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*USSR- Khrushchev's 27 October letter to Pres-
ident Kennedy, which was immediately published, con-
stitutes Moscow's first specific proposal for a negoti-
ated settlement of the Cuban crisis.
His call for reciprocal Soviet-US withdrawals of
offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey, under inter-
national supervision, and for mutual non-aggression
guarantees covering these countries was designed to
encourage U Thant to intensify his mediatory efforts
and to stimulate other UN members to increase pres-
sure on the US for a compromise formula. Khrushchev
expressed the belief that it is possible "to end the con-
flict quickly" and that his proposal provides the "basis
for a settlements'
Moscow probably will make further proposals cal-
culated to deter US military action against the missile
sites or, failing this, to make such action as costly as
possible in political terms. The 27 October bid for an
exchange of commitments regarding Turkey and Cuba
probably represents Moscow's maximum position.
inspections
The USSR's next step may be to reduce these de-
mands to a US guarantee not to attack Cuba and to re-
spect Cuban sovereignty in exchange for a Soviet com-
mitment to cease work on the missile sites and even-
tually to remove them under some form of international
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*Cuba--UN: In the UN on 27 October, there was
considerable fear that the US would invade Cuba, and
talks continued between U Thant and the chief dele-
gates of the US, USSR, and Cuba. Fidel Castro re-
plied .to U Thant's letter of 26 October, which pro-
posed the suspension of construction of MRBM and
IRBM bases during the period of negotiations. Castro.
said he. would accept. the. proposal provided that "the
US Government desists from threats and aggressive
actions, against Cuba, including the naval blockade of
our country:'
Castro also invited U Thant to come to Cuba to
discuss the crisis, "should you consider it useful to
the cause of peace." A UN spokesman said late on
the 27th that U Thant would decide soon whether to ac-
cept, "but not tonight.'
Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa was expected
to arrive in New York on 28 October to talk with Thant,
possibly to establish the terms of reference for a visit
to Cuba by the Acting Secretary General.
U Thant believes that the basic cause of the whole
situation is Cuba's fear of US invasion. His short-
circuit solution t 4-11- ---hlem is a US guarantee not
to invade Cuba.
*Cuba -Non-Bloc Developments: !Despite the cool
reception given by the United States, `Turkey, and Great
Britain to Khrushchev's 27 October proposal to neutral-
ize Turkish missile bases in exchange. for dismantling
Cuban ones, the idea of some such exchange seems
likely to linger in the minds of non-aligned Asian and
African nations as a reasonable solution to the Cuban
proble
(Khrushchev's proposal apparently took advantage
of t `oughts and suggestions made some time earlier by)
U
28 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF iii-a j
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such individuals as Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky
nd Ghana's Ambassador to the UN Quaison-Sackev.
Turkish Foreign Minister E rkin, echoing Presi-
dentXennedy, said on 27 October that "Turkey cannot
be the subject of bargaining on this matter'.' at this
time. In addition, British officials supported Presi-
dent Kennedy's stand
Nevertheless, the tendency of "neutral" nations to
seek a quid pro quo in reaching compromise solutions
is. likely to produce additional suggestions along these
lines. The first indirect Soviet bloc commentary from
Budapest indicating "bitter disappointment" over Presi-
dent Kennedy's "almost immediate" rejection of Khru-
shchev's proposal. and his apparent disinterest in nego-
tiating on "reaso able terms," may spur would-be medi-
ators into action.
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*Cuba--Latin American Developments: Venezuela
on 27 October became the first Lain American country
to order full-scale mobilization of its armed forces.
President Betancourt, long - a leading proponent of ac-
tion against Castro, wants "to put an end once and for
all" to the Cuban threat. Venezuela will probably con-
tribute forces to be used in the quarantine or other ac-
tions against Cuba but has urged that military measures
come under OAS command. 25X1
,
p
y
to President Kennedy's letter, adamantly reconfirms
28 Oct 62
DAILY BRIEF iii-b
Brazil's President Goulart
in a 25 October re
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his country's opposition to military measures
against Cuba other than the quarantine. On .27
October, Bolivia also officially declared its ad-
herence to the principles of "non-intervention and
self-determination" in the Cuban case, but did en-
dorse, the OAS,vote calling for the use of force if
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Areas in dispute
LOCATION OF
Tiy~ CURRENT FIGHTING
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28 Oct 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Man Pace
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*India - Communist China: Peiping is mounting
a diplomatic offensive designe to put pressure on
New Delhi to accept disengagement along the b rder
and a negotiated settlement on Chinese terms.)
(The Chinese apparently are trying to play down
thei -continued milita y advances by making a show
of peaceful intentions
~~(hou En-lai, in replying to a mediation offer by
Nasir, has urged the UAR to exert its influence on
behalf of the 24 October Chinese proposals for a 12-
mile mutual withdrawal and top-level talks. Chou
has dispatched similar notes to several Afro-Asian
neutralist leaders.
l In a 27 October editorial in People's Dai Pei-
pin "clearly indicated that in the northeastern sector
of the border it is willing to withdraw behind the
McMahon line. The Chinese, however, reject Nehru's
insistence on reverting to the situation that prevailed
in early September as a condition for negotiations)
The military situation is becoming less clear.
The 'Indians apparently are continuing to hold at
Chushul in Ladakh and Walong in the Northeast Fron-
tier Agency, but are falli g back in the central and
western sectors of NEFA
(Nehru is assuming closer personal control over
government actions. Some shift in authority and
functions in the defense field is likely, and may al-
ready be underway. Defense Minister Krishna
Menon's power and influence are almost certain to
be curtailed. However, Nehru probably will continue
to resist pressures to form a "national government"
or to dismiss Menon.l
1111 111
28 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF iv
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has greatly embarrassed the Indian Communist Party
(CPI). During the past year the CPI's Moscow-
oriented moderate leaders have moved the party to-
ward more nationalistic stance regarding the Chi-
nese.
CThe latest issue of the CPI's weekly New Age
25X1 supported the government's rejection of Peiping's
proposals and termed Chinese actions on the border
"an act of invasion:' Some leaders of the party's
vocal pro-Chinese faction fear that they will be im- 25X1
prisoned under New Delhi's newly assumed emergency
owers.
28 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF v
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
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The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
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The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
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The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved Fo
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