SR-71 RECONNAISSANCE OVERFLIGHT OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00285R000200230011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 16, 1978
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/02/15 : CIA-RDP82T00285R000200,
MEMORANDUM FOR: . Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to ta for Collection Tasking
SUBJECT: SR-71 Reconnaissance Overflight of Cuba
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1. This memorandum discusses factors affecting SR-71 reconnaissance
overflight of Cuba. It follows up a request by David Aaron at an SCC
working group meeting on 14 March that a study be prepared on the question
of what would be needed to resume aircraft reconnaissance flights over Cuba.
The question was brought up in the context of making it more "expensive"
for the Cubans to maintain their presence in Ethiopia.
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2. The last SR-71 mission over Cuba was flown on 11 January 1977.
The overflight program itself, was terminated at the direction
of the President following a 24 February 1977 Special Coordination Committee
review. A brief summary of the previous overflight program is attached
(Tab A). 25X1
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3. From an operational standpoint there are no major problems
with the resumption of either a special SR-71 flight or a series of flights.
The SR-71 can perform an overflight of Cuba from its home base, Beale AFB,
California. Tankers are needed to support such missions.
of such missions is offset because minimum flight activity an tanker
support must be maintained from Beale for training even in the absence of
operational missions. The DoD performs a current vulnerability analysis
in connection with all such missions to determine whether there have been
any changes in the Cuban Air Defense posture which could affect SR-71
operations. The designation of specific collection objectives for such
missions are developed through COMIREX.
DIA, JCS and USAF review(s) completed.
NGA Review Completed.
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4. SR-71 overflight of Cuba is not required at this time for
intelligence purposes. While periodic SR-71 flights would contribute
additional intelligence, the bulk of the intelligence requirements on Cuba
which depend on overhead imagery will continue to be satisfied by the
Tab B is a summary of
our current all-source collection capability relating to Cuban involvement
in Africa.
5. Overflight of Cuba by U-2 and SR-71 aircraft in the past was
a source of continuing political irritation to Cuba. The SR-71 missions
in 1974-1977 were flown primarily for political purposes and to maintain
a continuing reconnaissance presence over the island in case special needs
arose. Resumption of SR-71 flights at this time should be recognized as
possibly having a higher political reaction potential than the individual
flights previously, which were a direct continuation of past practices
8. Recommendation: It is recommended that if the SCC determines
that an SR-71 overflight be considered for political reasons:
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be tasked
to prepare a formal proposal for such missions through
normal procedures.
The State Department should be tasked to prepare a
special political evaluation which would include an
NFAC intelligence appraisal of estimated Cuban
reaction.
The JCS proposal and State evaluation should be processed to the SCC
for action and Presidential decision, if a positive recommendation is made
by the SCC.
Attachments:
Tab A - Brief Summary Overflight Program
Tab B - Summary of Cuban Activity in Africa
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DCI/IC/OPEI/CT 16 March 197
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Distribution:
Cy
#1
- Addressee w/atts
Cy
#2
- DDCI w/atts
Cy
#3
- ER w/atts
Cy
#4
- R:'CT Registry w/atts
Cy #5 - D/DCI/CT w/att
Cy #6 - AD/DCI/CT w/att
Cy #7 - C/ICRS w/att
Cy #8 - C/EXSUBCOM w/att
Cy #9 - C/SIGINT w/att
Cy #10- AC/OPEI/PAID
Cy #121 /att
Cy #13- Subject Fil"e w/att
Cy #14- ID Chrono
Cy #11- OC/RES/RG
w/att
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US Aircraft Reconnaissance Over Cuba
US overflight to Cuba was instituted in October 1960, with
CIA U-2 aircraft. The requirements related to Cuban military activity
on the Island and Soviet assistance. In October 1962, at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis U-2 overflight operations were transferred to the
Strategic Air Command. Following the crisis U-2 overflights
continued at varying levels of intensity from several missions daily
during the missile crisis to one mission during any three to four
days. A total of 16 SR-71 missions were flown between September
1974 and January 1977. (A typical track is attached.)
months period in mid-1974. In 1974 Dr. Kissinger approved use of the
SR-71 as the vehicle for reconnaissance over Cuba in place of the
U-2. The SR-71 missions were flown primarily for political purposes
and to maintain a continuing reconnaissance presence over the
Island in case secial needs arose. SR-71 flights were set initially
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During the period 1960-1974, overflights were justified primarily
on intelligence requirements for overhead imagery and, to a lesser
extent, the political requirement to maintain an ove-iflight "presence"
over Cuba. By the early 1970's 25X1
imagery satellite systems were beginning to satisfy the bulk of the
intelligence requirements. Also at this time, there was increasing
concern over the possibility of the loss of a U-2 over Cuba and a
Air Force desire to substitute the SR-71 for the U-2 on Cuban
overflight missions. All of these factors bore on the substitution
of the SR-71 for the U-2 in 1974. The continued success of the
to early consideration by the incoming. administration in January 1977
of the justification for continued US reconnaissance overflight of Cuba.
Assessments at that time concluded there was _no longer any
need for overflight of Cuba in response to national intelligence
requirements. This assessment pointed out that overflights did,
however, serve several purposes: a constant reminder of US concern
over Cuban activities; and, the maintenance of an overflight program
which could be increased when needed without introducing -an
entirely new irritant to the Cubans. The new administration, at
that point, terminated the program.
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TRACt~?' UMBER'-- SAMPLE #
".'~
'AIICA~ i .'.TYP1:'? -S.R-71
TAK . Utt, BASE p ALE AFB _ ..,?._
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IANDING~?tASE"'"?,?''BEALE AFB:.-'
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTION CAPABILITY: ACTIVITY
IN CUBA Related TO CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA
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Intentions of GOC to alter
posture/current policies
Transfer of military forces
to/from Africa
Impact of Cuba's African
involvement within Cuba
Soviet compensatory support
to Cuba
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Not Applicable
Discipline specific assessments obtained from
cognizant collection organizations. All-source
composite assessments obtained from cognizant
National Foreign Assessment Center analyst,
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T A n QLf+fl T
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NPIC/R-1129/63
March 1963
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN CUBA
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
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This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections
793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN CUBA
NP I C/R-1 129/63
March 1963
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Soviet troops in Cuba are stationed at var-
ious military installations, including military
camps, airfields, SA-2 SAM sites, and cruise-
missile sites. The purpose of this report is to
determine from aerial photography the peak
Soviet troop strength at four armored military
camps -- Artemisa, Holguin, Remedios, and
Santiago de las Vegas - - and five other con-
firmed or suspect Soviet military camps --
Camaguey, Mayari Arriba, Pinar del Rio, Playa
Baracoa, and Torrens (Figure 1).
As of I Ia total of 10,946
Soviet personnel were estimated to be present
at the above nine military camps. Of this total,
4,924 were found at the four armored camps,
with the remaining 6,022 personnel* at the other
five camps (Table 1). This estimate is based
on a detailed analysis of both high- and low-
level aerial photography.
*The majority of the estimated 3,238 personnel billeted
at Torrens are believed to be Soviet; however, the per-
centage of non-Soviet personnel cannot be determined.
* Armored military camps
? Military camps
Determination of troop strength was based
primarily on the extent of billeting facilities
observed. Soviet facilities can be identified by
(Figure 2). In several camps, permanent bar-
racks are being constructed to replace the tents,
indicating a degree of permanency at these in-
stallations. Estimated troop capacity of the tents
and barracks is based on an allocation of 40
square feet of floor space per man. Low-level
photography aided greatly in determining tents
and structures not used for billeting purposes.
A detailed study was also made of Soviet
equipment present at the camps to determine
if military units of specific size could be identi-
fied (Table 2). At each of the four armored
camps, a medium tank battalion and an assault
gun company were identified by the type and
number of tanks and self-propelled guns obser-
ved. Support and other equipment and weapons
identified at these camps do not correspond to
the established TO & E of known units, how-
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ever. Therefore, troop strength could not be
determined on this basis. No determination
of the size of military units could be established
at the other five camps.
Other methods of determining troop strength
from aerial photography were also explored, in-
No consistent correlation factors could be deter-
mined.
A detailed list of all wea ons and equipment
observed in at each of the
nine military camps follows. (Small quantities
of equipn- ent and some billeting facilities may
not have been observed because of dense foliage,
protective canvas coverings, or camouflage.)
Artemisa Military Camp is located 3.3
nautical miles (nm) northwest of Artemisa at
22-50-54N 82-48-30W (UTM 17QLR144278 on
AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3684 IV). The camp
consists of a billeting area,. a motor park, a
secured FROG (free-rocket-over-ground) park,
30 T-54 tanks
9 SU-100 self-propelled guns
8 SNAPPER antitank (at) rocket launchers
2 FROG rocket launchers
6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
9 14.5mm antiaircraft artillery guns
4 57mm antitank guns
3 120mm mortars
51 eight-wheeled APCs
2 BRDM APCs'
5 FROG missile transporters
8 motorcycles with sidecars
a 57 mm antiaircraft artillery battery, a 14.5
mm antiaircraft artillery battery, and a per-
manent barracks area under construction (Fig-
ure 3).
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
94 cargo trucks
10 utility trucks
1 van
5 truck-mounted treadway bridges
1 AT-T prime mover with dozer blade
1 T-54 tank chassis with mounted crane
1 motorized grader
1 rotary trench digger on AT-T
1 FIRE CAN radar
12 field kitchens
2 tank transporters
1 wheeled backhoe
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FIGURE 3. ARTEMISA MILITARY CAMP
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HOLGUIN MILITARY CAMP
llolguin Military Camp is located 1.6 nm
cast-northeast of llolguin at 20-53-48N 76-
14-OOW (UTM 18QUU718111 on AMS Series L
723, Sheet 4978 I). The camp consists of a
billeting area, a motor park, a secured storage
:11 T-54 tanks
3 PT-75 tanks
9 SII-100 self-propell(,d guns
1 13TR-50p APC
5 57mrn anl.iiank guns
7 120mm mortars
!) twin-30mm Czech antiaircraft artillery guns
(i 57mm anliaircraft artillee1 guns
I FIRE CAN radii
1 height rangefinder
5 generators
I AT-T tracked prime mover
2 A t-S tracked prime movers
area, a 57 mm antiaircraft artillery battery. a 30
mm antiaircraft artillery battery, and numerous
scattered personnel trenches (Figure 4).
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
H AT-I, tracked prime tamers
3 lank retrievers
269 cargo Irn1?lcs
1H it ii lv trucks
I v an,s
1(i POI, trucks
14 cargo trailers
ii Iruck-mounted t.readwn bridges
I AT-I, with dozer blade
1 rotary Irench digger on VI'-T
12 ('field kitchens
13 motorcycles with sidec;rrs
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REMEDIOS MILITARY CAMP
Remedios Military Camp is located 3.7 nm
southwest of Remedios at 22-27-12N 79-34-
57W (U"I'M 1_7QPQ459835 on AMS Series L 723,
Sheet 4283 II), the camp consists of a billeting
area, a motor park with a double-fenced parking
a`? T-54 tanks
9 tip-101) self-propelled guns
9 SNAPPER AT rocket launchers
0 FROG rocket launchers
8 field artillcry piece
ti I00mm mortars
Ei 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
S light antiaircraft artillery guns
2 FIRE CAN radars
I height rangefinder
I generator
'1 eight-wheeled All('.,
7 RRDM APIs
8 FROG missile Iransporters
I AT-S tracked prime mover
FIGURE 5. REMEDIOS MILITARY CAMP
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9 A'I'-L tracked prime movers
ti kink retrieI cr-
00? cargo trucks
utility (.rucks
7 POL trucks
0fi vans
17 cargo traitor=
5 truck-mounted treadway bridges
0 T-54 chussis wish mounted crane
1 motorized p1rarlcr
1 rotary Irench digger on A'I'-T
0 unidentified vehicles
10 field kitchens
17 motorcycle,, will sidecars
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area, a secured PILL, storage area, a secured
storage area, a 57 mm antiaircraft battery,
and 12 barracks under construction (Figure 5).
'the following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
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SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS MILITARY CAMP
Santiago do' las Vegas Military Gamp is
located 2.8 nm cast of Santiago do [as Vegas at
22-58-OON 82-20-25W (U'lM 17QL11626403 on
AMS Series L 723, Sheet 3784 IV). The camp,
located in a heavily wooded area, consists of
a billeting area, a motor park, a 57 mm anti-
aircraft artillery battery, and a 14.5 mm anti-
aircraft artillery battery. Infantry, armor, and
probable elite badges and other minor insignia
were observed at the camp (Figure 6).
'the following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
a? T-51 funks
9 till-IUU sell-propelled guns
a 57mnt antitank guns
9 7.1'I -4 antiaircraft artillen gtns
It ft7mnt antiaircraft artillery guns
I FIRE? CAN radar
I height rangefinder
5 IIRDM
I FROG mi."ile trnnsponcrs
t utissile iranxporter-
t .1'I'-i; tracked prime mm-,t,
l:. cargo trucks
I I utililV true ki
I unidentified \% heeled 111(1
:1 unidentified tracked y(hicles
I field kitchens
FIGURE 6. SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS MILITARY CAMP
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CAMAGUEY MILITARY CAMP
Camaguey Military Camp is located 4 nm
southeast of Camaguey at 21-21-11N 77-51-
24W (U FM 18Q'1U037637 on AMS Series L
723, Sheet 4680 111). the camp consists of a
24 cargo trucks
is utilitV? trucks
7 P0L trucks
:12 vans
14 electronics van.,
14 unidenlitiod vehicles,'pieces of equipment
billeting area, a motor park, and electronics
areas (Figure 7).
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
2 TOKEN-type radars
1 ROCK CAKE,'S'I'ONK CARE radar
I probable SPOON REST' radar
1 probable FLAT FACE radar
I microwave tower
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Mayari Arriba Military Camp is located 2.6
nm north-northeast of Mayari Arriba at 20-27-
14N 75-31-12W (U"1M 18QV'l457616 on AMS
Series Ili 723, Sheet 5077 II). The camp con-
sists of a billeting area, a motor park, an
a7inm antiaircrflft artillery ~un~
cnrt%o Iruek,~
uIilit' (nick,
van,
1i trnidentified \ehiclo- pi I. (e- of equipment
mi,~d transporter=
1 unidentified tranUporI'I-
7 \I:AZ-529 B prime uutver-
:1 S-h0-I vpe Trac?tor,
vsirc'line service trucks
MILITARY CAMP
open storage area, and an area containing prob-
able storage revetments (1 figure 8).
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
FIGURE 8. MAYARI ARRIBA MILITARY CAMP
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10 (approxint:uol.\) concrete rche.v
I:i (approxin:ately) concrew hth~
10 revetment,-, (prohaltle -a(rngo)
wheeled ha( klloe=
AT-"I' kith dozer blade
ii Wrack-mounted c?rane~-
1 rencrawr.-
1I crueU (cruiao-missile I
1 l'OI, tank= (horizontal)
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PINAR DEL RIO MILITARY CAMP
Pinar del Rio Military Camp is located 1.5
nm southwest of Pinar del Rio at 22-23-56N
83-42-48W (UTM 17QKQ206794 on !vMS Series
1; 723, Sheet 3483 II). 'the camp consists of
a billeting area located in and around an
orchard, and a motor park to the north (Figure 9).
the following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
S4 cargo truck;
: utility trucks
4 cans
:37 unidentified vehicles, j)iece:s of equipment.
I radio tower (R-4(IO)
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PLAYA BARACOA MILITARY CAMP
Playa Baracoa Military Camp is located 1.4 Playa Baracoa Airfield, is associated with the
nm south of Playa l3aracoa at 23-01-40N 82- assembly and maintenance (if HOUND (MI-4)
34-31W (DIM 17QLR386474 on AMS Series L and HARE (MI-1) helicopters at the airfield.
723, Sheet 3685 11). The camp, located at It consists of a billeting area, an assembly and
FIGURE 10. PLAYA BARACOA MILITARY CAMP
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maintenance area, a POL storage area, and
three 3-gun 37 mm antiaircraft artillery bat-
-cries. Seventeen tents differing in size and
shape from the typical Soviet tents (Figure 2)
are located in the assembly and maintenance
9 37mm antiaircraft artillery guns
16 cargo trucks
3 utility trucks
30 POL trucks
6 electronics vans (net-covered)
47 HOUND (MI-4) helicopters
area and probably billet Cuban personnel being
trained at the airfield (Figure 10).
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
9 HARE (MI-1) helicopters
108 helicopter shipping crates
60 unidentified vehicles.' pieces of equipment
1 motorized grader
36 POL tanks (horizonial)
numerous POL drums
TORRENS MILITARY CAMP
Torrens Military Camp is located 4.4 nm
west-northwest of Santiago de las Vegas at
22-59-36N 82-28-OOW (UTM 17QLR496434 on
AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3784 IV). The camp
consists of four billeting areas -- one of which
formerly was a reformatory -- three motor
parks, an electronics area, and a 57 mm anti-
6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
3 SPONGE CAKE radars
2 height-finding radars
10 generators
4 AT-1, tracked prime movers
16 AT-S tracked prime movers
15l cargo trucks
21 utility trucks
10 POL trucks
160 vans
aircraft artillery battery (Figure 11). The
majority of the estimated 3,238 personnel billet-
ed at Torrens are believed to be Soviet; how-
ever, the percentage of non-Soviet personnel
cannot be determined.
The following is a complete list of weapons
and equipment identified at the camp:
2 van work-shop trucks
33 cargo trailers (two axle)
7 van trailers (Iwo-axle)
17 trailers (two-axle)
8 trailers (single-axle)
1 ADA shower
1 motorized grader
17 field kitchens
181 unidentified vehicles,"pieces of equipment
numerous reels of wire
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REQUIREMENTS
CIA. OCI/R-14/62
OACSI. SRI 156R37/62
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