TRENDS IN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400190006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: MISC

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Tread* in Foreign Policy
1, .Although we believe foreign policy was not a principal cause
of Khrushchev's downfall, the end of his highly personal rule does
ant implications for the conduct of future Soviet foreign
relations .
A. A. collective leadership tench to be more conservative
and lose venturesome, though this does not mean
inactivity or an inability to make decisions.
1. During the coming months, and perhaps
for a few years, internal Soviet polities are likely
to influence foreign policy more than during T.hrushcheev's
last years.
nt collective leadership appears
o have no clearly dominant figure.
3. This process of group rule probably
ces the chances of aggressive Soviet action, but
sets a limit on movement in the opposite
direction - - movement toward concessions and
agreements on major East- JTest issues.
B. Thus, the short-term outlook is for a continuation
of the main lines of Soviet foreign policy since the Cuban
missile crisis.
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C. Soviet economic problems will also put some
check an an aggressive foreign policy, particularly in
Europe.
D. The on-going confict with Communist China will
continue to have contradictory consequences for Soviet
policy.
1. On the one hand, it is clear that the
Soviet$ are not going to compete with the Chinese
by adopting their extreme revolutionary militancy.
2. On the other hand, Chinese activity in
Africa and Asia calls forth competitive Soviet
efforts which clash with U. S. interests.
Soviets will stretch the concept of
coexistence so as to permit them to pursue
vehement anti-Western policies in the underdeveloped
areas without paying a price in their direct relations
with the West.
E. The competition with the Chinese continues to
influence the Soviet public posture on Cuha and
"revolutionary movements" in Latin America.
1. Although the new Soviet leaders have
r'ned zhrushchev's pledge to support Castro,
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Cuban-U. S. relations.
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The Chinese challenge is likely to spur the Soviets to
make more strenuous efforts to exploit anti-U. S. movements and
political developments in Latin America.
1. USSR apparently has endorsed decisions by a recent
conference of Latin American Communists in Havana
calling for more organized and coordinated propaganda
and tactics.
2. Main objective is to break Cuba's isolation within the
Western Hemisphere and to combat continuing Ti. . S.,
pressures against the Castro regir e.
3. The Communists promised pore active support for the
Venezuelan revolutionary movement.
4. They also singled out "freedom fighters" in Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti as
deserving Communist support.
However, this prospect of stronger Soviet verbal support
for anti-U. S. movements in Latin America probably does not
foreshadow important new Soviet political and economic commitments
or acceptance of new risks of a clash with U. S. power.
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