SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600170054-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: May 1, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170054-5
10928 CONGRES,. _ C1. 1L RECORD - SENATE Ma,! 1966
laws which subject individual manu- The junior senator from New York of areas of North Vitenam and withdraw
facturers or distributors engaged in recently spoke in this Chamber on the to our strongholds, )end'uar the negotia-
fraudulent practices in the sale of their Alliance for Progress, and urged that tion of a cease-fire and an armistice.
goods to criminal prosecution and many the united States should take an active This should be followed by elections
States have laws giving the State gov- part in encouraging democratic forms under the supervision of the Interna-
ernment the right to seek injunctive re- and traditions in Latin America. I think tional Control Commissio or under the
lief to procure a remedy against fraudu- nearly everyone agrees with him. How auspices of the United Nations, and
lent practices. is such a desirable policy affected in its eventually by the orderly Withdrawal of
During the Commerce Committee's execution by the fact that we are in some our Armed Forces.
consideration of this bill, I supported the places using bribery to influence the out- Mr. President, in'nis use;a: concise and
proposal which requires manufacturers come of electrons? Will they not do as clear manner, Walter Lipprann, one of
or distributors of packaged goods to we do, not as we say? the free world's great, :urnalists and
print on the outside of such packages Answering such questions involves outstanding thinki rs, hi .s stated the
in clear, understandable, conspicuous weighing the intelligence advantages In problem extremely well i his column,
lettering the weight, measure, or numer- light of our long range foreign policy- entitled "Moment of Tru .i," which was
ical count of the pieces contained in the an exercise most appropriately per- published in the Washi ?gton Post on
package and if the content is not in formed by a committee Including mem- May 24, 1966. I commend this column
pieces but in weight, then the weight bers. of the Armed Forces, Appropria- to my colleagues and ai hopeful that
contents should not be identified in tions, and Foreign Relations Commit- administration leaders ;,R ponsible for
Vietnam policy will gh a serious and
pounds and ounces but in ounces alone
to simplify the housewives task in mak-
ing comparisons.
My interest in protecting the buyer is
just as deep as the interest of anyone
else, but I do not subscribe to the policy
of passing new laws on a given subject
when existing laws are adequate to reach
the desired objective.
Every time you pass a new law of this
type, you create new bureaus with their
plethora of public employees bringing
about a scandalous, Indefensible expan-
sion of public workers duplicating the
work that Is already authorized under
existing law.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTEL-
LIGENCE OPERATIONS
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish
to speak in support of the resolution of
the senior Senator from Minnesota to
establish a Select Committee on Intelli-
gence Operations, as that resolution was
ordered reported by the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. .
Recent stories in the. press indicate
that there Is a need for oversight over
some aspects of the activities of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency with particular
reference to the effects of this activity on
our general foreign policy. Participa-
tion of members of the Foreign Relations
Committee will permit and be particu-
larly appropriate to such scrutiny.
It appears, for example, that CIA
agents used Michigan State University
as a "cover" for intelligence activities, in
a technical assistance project undertaken
in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959.
What effect does such activity have on
our technical assistance projects else-
where in the world? Surely it gives op-
ponents of U.S. activity in such countries
a handle with which to beat our sup-
porters. If so, is the gain from this
particular activity worth such a cost?
These questions of foreign policy can
best be answered by a broadlybased Se-
lect committee.
It is reported in the series of New York
Times articles of April 25-29 on the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency that the Agency
sed money to influence the results
h
as u
additional be won by American tro,gpa fighting alone
of elections in foreign countries on occa- the present e s 100,000 or 200,000 approximating
sions where it appeared that Commu- 400,000 in South Vietnam, what :,her strategic op-
nists were doing so. Certainly such American GI's. bombing Hanoi and min- tion is there?
activity cannot be carried on without Ing the harbor of Haiphong, and carry- - The only other option ec-uld be to make
becoming known. If the report is correct, ing the war more directly to North Viet- no new decisions, pursue he present course,
which does this affect other foreign policies nam.
The second is to suspend all bombing seem, and that siornethir , rbetterawill turn
which we wi~rlpprovea For Release- 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170054-5
Another question which might well be
taken up by the Select Committee is the
degree to which our foreign intelligence
activities may properly extend into this
country. It has recently come to light
in the press that Mr. George A. Carver
wrote an article on the Vietcong in the
April issue of Foreign Affairs without
disclosure of the fact that he is a full-
time employee of the CIA. The New
York Times also reports in its series of
articles that the CIA has subsidized U.S.
book publishers under circumstances
that were not clear. What intelligence
goals are furthered by such activities?
To what extent do they conflict with
historic values and freedoms of our
citizens?
The same question may well arise from
the position of the Agency, asserted in
a slander suit in Baltimore, that its agent
when acting under orders, can with ab-
solute immunity slander a man in this
country by labeling him as a Soviet
agent.
Because these questions extend beyond
the intelligence field into areas of for-
eign policy, I support the motion which
would place them within the scope of a
select Committee on Intelligence Opera-
tions.
VIETNAM: MOMENT OF TRUTH
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio, Mr. President,
b tti lti xceed-
a
a es e
careful consideration to ,.he excellent
analysis set forth by Wsitur Lippmann.
I ask unanimous consent ;hat his column
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objectivr., the column
was ordered to be printer- in the RECORD,
as follows:
MOMENT-1 OF Ts -JT,i
(By Walter Lipp aan)
The hardest question facing us at the mo-
ment is whether or not tics disintegration
of the Saigon govcrrmcnt nit army can be
stopped and reversed. Tb, albclal position
1s,Bof course, that it can be.
But there is little eviden-, to support the
official will to believe, and -here is mounting
evidence that General Ky. or anyone like
him is in an Irreconcilable ccnf ict with the
war-weary people of VieW;tfr,. There is no
prospect now visible that the South Viet-
namese people and the South Vietnamese
army can be united and rained for the prose-
cution of the war.
Unless this condition changes radically, we
shall Increasingly be tightiri -,r alone In a coun-
try which has an army th:a is breaking up
and a government which h s little authority.
We can'already see on th, horizon the pos-
sibility of an American arr.y fighting on its
own in a hostile envirotm^nt. We must -
hope that the President .rid his strategic
planners are prepared for sich a develop-
ment. For If the South Vietnamese govern-
ment and army continue ,a disintegrate as
is now the case, our troop: iaay find them-
selves without serious o -,p :nized military
support, and forced to find their way In a
seething unrest where fncnd and foe are
indistinguishable.
su
with American a e c
those of the South Vietnamese, and If the Saigon forces dials ce crate, it will no
ing
longer be possible
with the South Vietnamese fighting one to cornices the war on
. ' of our troops is
theory that the
the
re of
another instead of the Vietcong, the
to smash the hard core of the enemy while
time has come for us to consider what the Saigon troops occup?,t and pacify the
possible justification there is for us to countryside. What then? We shall be hear-
continue fighting in Vietnam. ing from the Goldwater faction, whose first
Incidentally, when I visited Vietnam article 'of military faith is i:nlimited belief
and Thailand and other places in south- in airpower. They :ire arguing that the way
east, Asia from last September 28 until to repair the breakdown South Vietnam
October 19, my eyes were opened, and it is to bomb Haiphong and 1 oioi in the north.
The Administration, as w: Pre told by See-
did not take me very long to see for my- retary McNamara and Mr. Brown, the Sccre-
self that we were involved in a miserable tary of the Air Force, knows the folly and
civil war in an area that is of no stra- the futility of that tours- of action.
tegic or economic importance whatso- Is there any real alters .t:ve to a holding
ever to the defense of the United States. strategy, sometimes called i,e enclave strat-
Our President has two alternatives. egy, pending the negotiation of a truce and
One is to escalate the war by increasing agreement for our phss oythdrawal from
our armed forces in southeast Asia, from the Asian mainland? If ttie Vietnamese war
.. by the air "-- _ if it cannot