SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000300020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 February 1963
SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA
Personnel
I. From a few hundred technicians in the summer of 1962,
the Soviet military presence in Cuba has grown to in-
clude regular troops manning the tanks and other weap-
ons of mobile army groups, radar and missile special-
ists in charge of'an extensive air defense system,
and a large number of communications, air force, na-
val, and other personnel.
A. Although over 5,000 troops associated with the
offensive missile systems have left, we believe
about 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain.
1. These troops operate equipment which the Cu-
bans are not yet able to operate or which
the Soviets do not intend to give to Cuba.
2. They are a tangible expression of Soviet
concern for the preservation of a Communist
state in Cuba.
a. They help defend Castro regime against
internal attack.
b. They may also serve as brake on Castro
adventurism.
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3. There are no indications of major Soviet
troop withdrawals from Cuba, either planned
or in train.
4. DETAILS: Major components and estimated
strengths are:
a. Air and air defense: 7,500
SAM system--3,500
AAA and radars--3,100
MIG fighters--900
b. Army ground forces: 7,500
Armored groups--5,000
Headquarters, engineers, training--
2,500
C. Navy: 2,000
Cruise-missile units--1,000
KOMAR guided-missile boats--200
Headquarters, communications, secu-
rity--800
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Air Defense System
Ii. To defend their MRBMs and IRBMs, the Soviets planned
and largely achieved before the missile withdrawals an
integrated air defense system employing both surface-
to-air (SAM) missiles and jet fighters, backed by an
extensive radar and communications net.
A. Efforts to improve the SAM system continue.
1. Since the withdrawal of the MRBM and IRBM
units, three SAM sites have been involved
in major relocations. In each case, the
SAM site was moved away from the coast and
closer to an important military objective.
2. On 30 January, a new SAM site under construc-
tion was photographed southeast of Havana
near a military airfield. This may indi-
cate that an existing SAM site near the
coast in the same general area will shortly
be moved.
3. DETAILS:
a. 24 operational SAM sites, each with 6
launchers and approximately 20 missiles.
Total SAM missiles--approximately 500.
b. SA-2 missile (Guideline) has an esti-
mated range of 25-30 n.m. with a 500-
lb. HE warhead. The SA-2 is considered
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effective against aircraft operating be-
tween 3,000 and 80,000 feet, with limited
effectiveness down to 2,500 feet and up
to 100,000 feet.
c. The SAM sites appear to be manned entirely
by Soviet personnel. Although some train-
ing of Cubans in operation of SAM equip-
ment may be planned, there are no indica-
tions that this has begun.
B. To supplement surface-to-air missiles, the So-
viets have brought in 104 MIG fighters.
1. Of these, 42 are MIG-21 (Fishbed) aircraft,
manned entirely by Soviet personnel.
a. The MIG-21 is a highspeed (Mach 2) air-
craft which can be used both for ground
support and air defense. Its armament
includes infrared homing air-to-air mis-
siles. It has a combat radius of 350:n.m.
b. The MIG-21 aircraft probably is capable of
carrying nuclear weapons. However, this
fighter, which has been observed in flight
activity for several years, has never been
seen practicing as a nuclear weapons car-
rier either in Cuba or in Eastern Europe.
c. If a nuclear weapon was attached to this
aircraft, its radius of action would be
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seriously restricted, to about 200 nau-
tical miles and then only under visual
flight conditions.
d. There is no evidence, from our continuing
photo-reconnaissance of Cuban airfields
or other sources, of any special security
or other activity which would take place if
nuclear weapons for these aircraft were in
Cuba.
1. The Soviets run their own communications with
little or no help from the Cubans or Cuban facil-
ities.
2. Cubans appear to work conjointly with Soviets in
some reporting aspects of the air defense net-
work. They have no controlling function over
the missiles themselves.
DETAILS:
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Cruise Missiles
III. Although the Soviets brought in approximately 150
coastal defense missiles during the build-up, they
have thus far established only 4 operational sites.
A. The large number of cruise missiles which re-
main in crates suggests that the Cuban crisis
interrupted a Soviet program to deploy several
more sites.
B. DETAILS:
1. There are 4 operational units, with 8-10
missiles each, at Siguanea, Santa Cruz del
Norte, Banes, and Campo Florida (a standby
and training site). Total missiles: 32-40.
2. Cruise missiles are believed to be in crates
observed at:
Guerra (just west of Mariel) -- 46
Mayari Arriba (in eastern Cuba) -- 48
Santiago de Cuba (west of Guantanamo) -- 21
a. This makes a total of 115 cruise mis-
siles still in crates, enough to estab-
lish up to 15 more sites.
3. The coastal defense missile observed in Cuba
is a surface-launched version of the AS-i air-
to-surface, anti-shipping missile. In this
version, it has an estimated range of 30 to
40 nautical miles, with a 2,200-pound conven-
tional warhead.
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Soviet Armored Groups
IV. In late August and early September, the Soviets estab-
lished mobile armored groups at camps in the general
vicinity of the offensive missile sites. These units
were probably meant to provide local defense for these
sites in event of US invasion or guerrilla sabotage at-
tempts.
A. Each encampment--at Remedios, Santiago de las
Vegas, Artemisa, and Holguin--contains 1,000 to
1,500 officers and men and their organic equip-
ment.
1. The four groups have 140 medium tanks and
15 amphibious tanks, as well as assault guns,
mortars, and infantry rocket launchers.
2. There are about 24-32 FROG tactical rockets,
an anti-personnel weapon with a range of
about 50,000 yards.
3, The Soviet mobile armored groups are also
equipped with 28 armored scout cars carrying
SNAPPER wire-guided anti-tank rockets.
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Missile Patrol Boats
V. To complement the coastal defense capabilities of the
cruise missiles, the Soviets brought in 12 KOMAR guided-
missile patrol boats.
A. These units are being operated by mixed Soviet
and Cuban crews.
B. DETAILS:
1. The boat is a Soviet P-6 motor torpedo boat
hull modified to carry two missile launchers.
It has a top speed of 43 knots with maximum
range of 650 n.m. at 20 knots.
2. The missile has a range of 10-15 nautical
miles (limited by radar line-of-sight) and
carries a conventional warhead of about
2,000 pounds.
3. All 12 KOMAR's are now in Mariel-Havana area,
although 4 have operated out of Banes at
times in the past.
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6 February 1963
SUMMARY OF DCI'S STATEMENT TO MAHON COMMITTEE
ON SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA
I. On 1 July 1962, shortly before the Soviet buildup
began, we estimated roughly 500 bloc advisors and
technicans in Cuba.
A. This was based on the extent of training programs
underway and Soviet practice in other countries
like Egypt and Indonesia.
H. After the buildup began, we added to this figure on
the basis of arrivals of passenger ships known to
be carrying military personnel, assuming they were
normally loaded.
A. Our figures progressively rose to 2,000 on
1 August, 2,300 on 1 September, and 4,000 on
19 September.
B. We knew some additional Soviets had come on
cargo ships, but could not say how many.
C. These estimates were what the intelligence com-
munity could agree on. We now know they were
much too low,
III. Once we received the photography of 14 October, we
were able to shift our methodology. By 22 October we
had a rough estimate that a minimum of 8,000-10,000
Soviets would be needed to man the Soviet weapons
systems then known to be in Cuba.
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IV. At this time we were giving first priority to the
strategic weapons systems. The question of
personnel numbers was of lesser importance.
A. We were however, accumulating a mass of ad-
ditional information from many sources. As
time permitted detailed analysis, we progressively
raised our estimate until we now believe there
were about 22,000 Soviet military personnel in
Cuba at the height of the buildup. (Apparently
the passenger ships were troop loaded and sub-
stantial numbers came in on cargo ships.)
B. This figure included the four armored groups
which were only identified in November.
V. Over 5,000 Soviets departed in November and Decem-
ber, leaving our present figure of about 17,000
now there.
A. We think this figure is the best that can be
reached. We have covered Cuba exhaustively.
B. Some individual sources have reported figures
considerably higher than these. Recognizing
that neither we nor anyone else can make a
head count, we only report those figures which
can be verified by available intelligence re-
sources.
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ANNEX A
SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA
1962
1 Jul
1 November 1962
1 February 1963
y
0
42
0
MRBMS
Tanks
160
345
About 395
Field artillery and
770
1,320
1,320
AT guns
710
710
AAA guns
FROG rockets
0
24-32
24-32
Military vehicles
3,800
7,500-10,000
7,500-10,000
24
SAM sites
0
500
SAM missiles
0
4
Cruise-missile sites
0
Cruise missiles
0
About 150
About 150
Air defense radars
0
About 160
About 200
Jet fighters
35
101
104
Jet light bombers
0
42
0
Helicopters
24
About 70
About 85-100
12
KOMAR,cruise-missile
0
boats
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ANNEX B
ESTIMATE AS OF DATE LISTED OF
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN CUBA (EXCLUSIVE OF CIVILIANS)
1 July 1962
1 August 1962
1 September 1962
19 September 1962
22 October 1962
1 December 1962
15 December 1962
1 February 1963
17,000
* Agreed intelligence community estimates based on
known normal passenger capacity of ships.
* Retrospective analysis shows 22,000 present at
this time,
500
at least 2,000*
at least 2,300*
about 4,000*'
8,Q00-10,000#*
15,000-22,000
(present at height of
buildup)
17, 000
(present after departure
of missiles and bombers)
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2430 E STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
7 February 1963
TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
FROM: John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel
Telephone: C
In accordance with your request, I have
attached a copy of the unclassified statement
released by the Director and two other
papers which represent the prepared text
for the .Director's briefing of the Stennis
Subcommittee.
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