INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600050015-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

lleo ftnq; ~JO(JR6/20 IA U KCB AIIQ 1 GA "T 1-6 00&&01, A y,
EXECUTIVE BRA1,4'fi -'6F THE GOVERNMENT
intelligence activities
A Report to the Congress
JUNE 1955
THIS VOLUME CONTAINS THE COMMISSION
AND TASK FORCE REPORTS
a~'
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Intelligence
Activities
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
by the
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
JUNE 1955
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government
HERBERT HOOVER, Chairman
HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr. ROBERT G. STOREY
JAMES A. FARLEY CLARENCE J. BROWN
ARTHUR S. FLEMMING CHET HOLIFIELD
STYLES BRIDGES JOSEPH P. KENNEDY
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN SIDNEY A. MITCHELL
SOLOMON C. HOLLISTER
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Letter of Transmittal
June 29, 1955.
DEAR SIRS:
In accordance with Public Law io8, Eighty-third Congress,
approved July 10, 1953, the Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government submits herewith
its report on Intelligence Activities.
The Commission has had the services of an able task force
presided over by General Mark W. Clark, President, The
Citadel.
Respectfully,
The Honorable
The President of the Senate
The Honorable
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Contents
Page
Letter of Transmittal ................................... iii
Acknowledgments .................................... Vii
Preface .............................................. ix
PART 1. COMMISSION REPORT ........................... 1
PART II. TASK FORCE REPORT .......................... 3
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Acknowledgments
The investigation into the Intelligence Activities of the Gov-
ernment was performed by a task force under the chairman-
ship of General Mark W. Clark, President, The Citadel, and
comprising the members listed below:
Mark Wayne Clark. General, U. S. Army (retired). United
States Military Academy. Now President, The Citadel, Charleston,
S. C. In World War II commanded Allied ground forces in Italy and
effected first large-scale surrender of a German field command in
Europe. June 1945, Commander-in-Chief of United States Occupation
Forces in Austria and U. S. High Commissioner for Austria. Deputy
to U. S. Secretary of State in London and Moscow with Council of
Foreign Ministers negotiating Austrian treaty. May 1952, Com-
mander-in-Chief, Far East Command, serving simultaneously as
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, Commanding Gen-
eral, United States Army Forces, Far East, and Governor of Ryukyu
Islands. July 1953, signed Korean armistice agreement for United
Nations.
Richard Lansing Conolly. Admiral, U. S. Navy (retired).
Brooklyn, N. Y. Served at sea throughout World War I and awarded
Navy Cross. In World War II commanded Destroyer Division Six;
served in Office of Chief of Naval Operations and on staff, Com-
mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Postwar duties included
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Advisor to
European Advisory Commission, President of Naval War College.
Now President, Long Island University.
Ernest Frederick Hollings. Lawyer. Charleston, S. C. The
Citadel and University of South Carolina. During World War II,
served in African and European Theaters with U. S. Army. Former
member South Carolina State Legislature. Now Lieutenant Gover-
nor, State of South Carolina.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Henry Kearns. Manufacturer, inventor, and executive. Orange
Oaks Ranch, La Verne, Calif. University of Utah. Past President,
U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce; Vice President, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States; a:-.id Director, Tournament of Roses
Association. Chosen as "California's Most Useful Citizen," 1944?
Fellow, American Institute of Management.
Edward Vernon; Rickenbacker. Aviator. New York, N. Y.
International Correspondence School. In World War I commanded
94th Aero Pursuit Squadron, personally credited with 26 air victories.
World War II activities included special missions for Secretary of War
to nine foreign countries and areas. United States and foreign govern-
ment awards include Congressional Medal of Honor. Formerly exec-
utive with American Airways, Aviation Corporation, and North Amer-
ican Aviation. Since 1933, with Eastern Air Lines, Inc. as general
manager and president; now Chairman of the Board.
Donald Stuart Russell. Lawyer. Spartanburg, S. C. University
of South Carolina and University of Michigan. Practiced law in Spar-
tanburg. Formerly member Price Adjustment Board, War Depart-
ment; Assistant to Director of Economic Stabilization; Assistant to
Director of War Mol idization; Deputy Director, Office of War Mobili-
zation Reconversion, Assistant Secretary of State. Now President,
University of South Carolina.
Staff Director
James George Christiansen. Major General, U. S. Army (re-
tired). University of California, United States Military Academy.
Former Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces; Commanding General,
2nd Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Tex.; Commanding General, 6th
Armored Division, Flt. Leonard Wood, Mo.; Chief Engineer, Far East
Command; Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rome, Italy.
The Commission wishes to express its appreciation of the
services and devotion of the members of the task force and to
record its appreciation for theinformation and assistance pro-
vided by the officials of the various Federal agencies.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Preface
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities, under the
chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark, found it necessary
for some of its members to visit foreign countries to study
these activities abroad as well as at home.
Their investigations inevitably involved matters of ex-
tremely classified character to which they were given full
access. The task force has, therefore, prepared two reports-
an unclassified one bearing on the administration and the
coordination of the intelligence services of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the services of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and State Department. The other report, bearing the
highest security classification was substantially related to the
national security. This report was sent directly to the Presi-
dent and was not considered by the Commission because of
its extremely sensitive content.
Therefore this report of the Commission deals only with
the unclassified task force report.
350487-55-2 ix
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Part I
Commission Report
The task force, in order to give assurance to the Nation
that all segments of the Intelligence Activities are efficiently
carried out and that the expenditures are properly admin-
istered, recommends that a permanent "watchdog" com-
mittee be created. They recommend that such a committee
be created from Members of the Senate and House, together
with eminent citizens serving part time as needed, to be
appointed by the President.
The Commission believes, however, that while mixed con-
gressional and citizens committees for temporary service are
useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to
investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if
permanent, present difficulties. We therefore make the
following recommendation.
Recommendation
(a) That the President appoint a committee of ex-
perienced private citizens, who shall have the responsi-
bility to examine and report to him periodically on the
work of Government foreign intelligence activities.
This committee should also give such information to the
public as the President may direct. The committee
should function on a part-time and per diem basis.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
(b) That the Congress consider creating a Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar
to the joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case,
the two committees, one presidential and the other con-
gressional, could collaborate on matters of special im-
portance to the national security.
Other measures requiring legislation or of an administra-
tive character are recommended by the task force and we
suggest these for the consideration of the Congress and the
Departments concerned.
The unclassified report of the task force requires no de-
tailed review, and we therefore include it in full as Part II
of this report.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Part II
Report on
Intelligence Activities
in the
Federal Government
Prepared for the
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
by the
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
MARK W. CLARK, Chairman
RICHARD L. CONOLLY HENRY KEARNS
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS EDWARD V. RICKENBACKER
DONALD S. RUSSELL
Task Force Staff
. G. CHRISTIANSEN, Director
JOHN J. DUBBELDE, jr., Deputy Director
DOROTHY H. DAVIS, Staff Assistant
CHARLES C. BLI KENEY
LEE E. COOPER
RICHARD A. ERICSON
ROBERT J. FOLEY
PAUL L. HIGH
MICHAEL M. K1,RLENE
HERMAN O. LANE
JOHN L. MCGRUDER
EUGENE L. MILLER
OLIVER LLOYD ONION
RICHARD P. OVENSIIINE
HENRY E. RICHTER
TERENCE J. TULLY
Secretarial Stag
GERTRUDE I. DIXON
MARIE K. SMITH
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Contents
Page
Task Force Personnel ................................... 4
Acknowledgments ...................................... 7
Letter of Submission .......................... . . . . . . . . . . 19
Preface ..............................................
Introduction .......................................... 13
Scope of the Studies .................................... 17
Organization of the Task Force ........................... 21
"Intelligence --A Definition ............................ 25
I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY-NATIONAL LEVEL.. 27
The National Security Council .................. 27
The Central Intelligence Agency ................ 29
II. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY-DEPARTMENTAL
LEVEL ...................................... 33
Department of Defense ......................... 33
Office of Special Operations (OSO) ............. 33
Joint Chiefs of Staff .......................... 34
Department of the Army ..................... 34
Department of the Navy ..................... 37
Department of the Air Force .................. 40
Department of State ........................... 42
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ........... 44
III. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ........................... 47
Evolution of Our Plans ........................ 47
Postwar Organization .......................... 48
Functions Divided ............................. 49
IV. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND SECURITY ............ 51
Character of the Present Working Force ......... 51
G-2 Personnel and Security ..................... 52
ONI Personnel ................................ ' 53
Air Force Intelligence Personnel ................ 54
Industrial Security ............................. 55
Individual Security Cases ....................... 57
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Page
V. "WATCHDOG" COMMISSION . ... .................... 59
Agency Gets Wide Exemptions ................. 60
Would Study Complaints ....................... 62
VI. FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ........................ 65
Map Procurement ............................. 65
Intelligence Libraries .......................... 65
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMIINDATIONS .............. 67
Administrative Flaws Noted ....................
68
Data on Soviet Bloc Inadequate .................
69
Recommendations With Respect to Personnel....
70
Recommendation No. 1 ......................
70
Recommtndation No..2 ......................
71
Recommendation No..3 ......................
72
Recommendation No. 4 ......................
73
Recommendation No. :5 ......................
74
Recommendation No. 6 ......................
74
Recommendation No. 7 ......................
75
Recommendation No. 8 ...................... .
75
Recommendation No. 9 ......................
76
Approved For Release 20,05/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Acknowledgments
The Intelligence Task Force wishes to acknowledge the
complete cooperation it received from all the officials and
members of their staffs throughout the departments and
agencies surveyed, and believes that it was accorded free
access to the "raw" Intelligence material necessary to carry
out its investigative duties.
The enthusiasm and interest which the personnel engaged
in Intelligence Activities displayed in their work was gratify-
ing to the members of this task force and its staff. Their
full cooperation enabled us to complete our assignments
within the allotted time.
The chairman and the staff director are most appreciative
of the support rendered by the executive staff of the President
and other Government officials who appeared and were
interviewed and gave us their time and the benefit of their
knowledge; and of the help of the executive staff of the Com-
mission, particularly John B. Hollister, W. Hallam Tuck,
Francis P. Brassor, and Clara Demuling. Without Miss
Demuling's able assistance, the job of obtaining security
clearances for the task force and staff would not have been
accomplished in time to permit completion of our survey.
The chairman also is deeply obligated to and most appre-
ciative of the valued support and contributions of his col-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
leagues on the task force, the members of the staff, and the
able consultants.
The task force further wishes to express its deep gratitude
for the valuable aid of those public-spirited individuals who
gave freely of their time, and who by their objective approach
to the problem and their Government experience materially
enlightened our members. We are especially grateful for the
advice and the benefit of the wide experience of Major Gen-
eral William J. Donovan, former Chief of the Office of
Strategic Services; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; William H. Jackson, former Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; General W.
Bedell Smith, former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency; Major General Charles A. Willoughby, former
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command; and others.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Letter of Submission
May 25, 1955.
The Honorable HERBERT HOOVER,
Chairman, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government,
Washington 25, D. C.
My DEAR MR. HOOVER: We have the honor to present to
you the reports of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities
of our Government. In these reports, the task force
analyzes the national Intelligence effort and makes recom-
mendations with a view to correcting the weaknesses, im-
proving the quality, and increasing the efficiency of this
vital operation.
The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc, their methods of
infiltration, subversive activities, and propaganda employed
in the cold war now in progress, as well as the difficulty of
penetration of their security barriers, point up the fact that
our Intelligence effort must be the best in our history. This,
added to the advent of nuclear weapons, together with their
advanced delivery systems, has made adequate and timely
Intelligence imperative to our national security. The task
force is fully aware of the grave responsibility implicit in its
assigned mission.
Security requirements have made it necessary that the
task force depart in some degree from the form of the report
prescribed by the Commission. Two reports are submitted:
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
one, unclassified; the other, classified TOP SECRET, with
certain separate appendices which require additional
clearance.
In submitting &h ese reports, we wish to express our per-
sonal appreciation for the wholehearted and enthusiastic
cooperation given us by the departments and agencies
surveyed.
Respectfully submitted,
A"'~ c) 66-~
MARK NV. CLARK, Chairman.
RICHARD L. CONOLLY.
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS.
EDwARD V. RICKENBACKER.
DONALD S. RUSSELL.
10
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Preface
For self-preservation, the defenders of a free world need
complete, prompt, and continuing information on the plans
and potentialities of those who would enslave it. Nations
and people who value liberty and a sovereign national exist-
ence in a free world now look to the United States for leader-
ship and inspiration in their struggle to safeguard these
inherent rights.
In the historic family of nations, this country ranks as a
comparative newcomer. In the early days of the Republic-
not so long ago as the world measures time-our people felt
comfortably distant from the hotbeds of foreign intrigue and
conflict.
Transportation and communication facilities in the days
of clipper ships and the pony express were so limited and so
slow that they fostered a serene assurance of isolation and
geographical protection against possible aggressors.
Technological developments and political realignments in
modern times inspire no such sentiment as that which once
led a famous Denver editor to evaluate news on the premise
that "a dogfight in Champa Street" was worth more space
in his paper than war in some minor country abroad.
Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within our
generation and for our own protection, organized Intelligence
has been forced upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of
electronics, nuclear weapons and planes which travel at
supersonic speed.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
The United Stites emerged from World War II as the
political leader in free-world affairs and the outstanding mili-
tary power. The advent of atomic bombs, together with the
development of advanced methods for their delivery, intensi-
fied the need for adequate and timely Intelligence so that
we might fulfill our responsibilities in international affairs
and insure our own survival.
Effective Intelligence has become increasingly necessary
for our protection against the propaganda, infiltration, and
aggressions of the Communist .leaders.
By trial and error, study, and skill, we have made progress;
but we must not labor under any complacent delusions.
There is still much to be done by our Intelligence community
to bring its achievements up tc an acceptable level.
The task force i3 cognizant of the grave responsibility as-
signed to it. It recognizes the fact that it would be false
economy to stint on some phase of the Intelligence operation
and thereby run the risk of another costly and tragic surprise
like Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, it is desirable and
proper for us to insist that the substantial expenditures our
country makes in this field are worth while and that the
whole Intelligence output is efficiently handled and gets
adequate results.
The recommendations of the task force are presented from
the viewpoint that in time of peace we must not only be
prepared for war, but also must do our utmost to prevent war.
Adequate and timely Intelligence is the most effective and
economical means Of attaining these objectives.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Introduction
The machinery for accomplishing our Intelligence objec-
tives hereafter called the Intelligence community when re-
ferred to as a whole, includes the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelli-
gence sections of the Department of State, of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. Some of these agencies approach or exceed the opera-
tions of the CIA in functions and in expenditures. However,
since CIA is charged with the overall responsibility for coor-
dinating the output of all Intelligence forces, the task force
gave special attention to the work of that agency.
Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital work
of the Intelligence community is being led by a group which
is sincere and dedicated to the service of the Nation. We dis-
covered no valid ground for the suspicion that the CIA or any
other element of the Intelligence family was being effectively
contaminated by any organized subversive or communistic
clique. Charges were made by some individuals alleging a
few members of the Intelligence community were poor secu-
rity risks. All such cases, except those obviously without
merit, were investigated by proper authority, or investigations
are in the process of being made.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
On the basis of it, comprehensive studies, the task force feels
that the American people can and should give their full con-
fidence and suppoi-t to the Intelligence program, and con-
tribute in every possible way to the vital work in which these
agencies are engaged. We found the Director of Central
Intelligence to be industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic,
and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in his
enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome
duties and respons=bilities on the operational side of CIA's
activities. The task force feels that certain administrative
flaws have developed in the CIA, which must be corrected to
give proper emphasis and direction to its basic responsibilities.
The major aim would be greater concentration on the col-
lection of Intelligence information from our primary target-
Russia and her satellites, and Communist China.
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate
Intelligence data frDm behind the Iron Curtain. Proper di-
rectional emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness, and per-
sistence are essential to achieve the desired results.
The glamor and excitement of some angles of our Intelli-
gence effort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital
phases of the work or to cause neglect of primary functions.
A majority of the task force is convinced that an internal re-
organization of the CIA is necessary to give assurance that
each of these functions gets adequate attention without diver-
sionary interest.
The task force further is concerned over the absence of
satisfactory machin:ry for surveillance of the stewardship of
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
the Central Intelligence Agency. It is making recommenda-
tions which it believes will provide the proper type of "watch-
dog" commission as a means of reestablishing that relation-
ship between the CIA and the Congress so essential to and
characteristic of our democratic form of government, but
which was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law iio and
other statutes relating to the Agency. It would include repre-
sentatives of both Houses of Congress and of the Chief Execu-
tive. Its duties would embrace a review of the operations and
effectiveness not only of the CIA, but also of all other Intelli-
gence agencies.
One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission of
this type would be to keep the public assured of the essential
and trustworthy accomplishments of our Intelligence forces,
and to enlist public support and participation in the Intelli-
gence effort.
Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness
and appreciation among the people of the significance and
objectives of the Intelligence program. There is a corollary
demand for clarification of misunderstandings which have
arisen in the public mind, largely as a result of the misapplica-
tion of secrecy. However, it must be recognized that Intelli-
gence operations require a large element of secrecy as an
essential to success.
The Intelligence community should draw more widely on
the available pool of retired citizens with wide previous busi-
ness experience in the foreign field, and among retired mili-
tary personnel who have specialized over a long period in
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
the Intelligence field. It should develop a more attractive
program of career incentives for its officials, and of benefits for
its overseas employees.
Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are
being offered by the task force.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Scope of the Studies
Early Instructions
Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission
on organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(hereafter referred to as the Hoover Commission or the Com-
mission) to study and make recommendations as to the struc-
ture and administration of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission
to embrace studies of all Intelligence operations of the Fed-
eral Government and recommendations for changes neces-
sary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service
in this field.
The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision
of the Commission to broaden the scope of the studies. It
found at least 12 major departments and agencies engaged
in Intelligence in one form or another. In addition, io or
more minor agencies or activities expend public funds di-
rectly or indirectly in behalf of the Intelligence effort of the
Government.
Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference,
the task force was confronted with the Herculean job of
studying and reporting on more than a score of major and
minor departments and agencies. It quickly became evident
that any attempt to spread its investigations over such a large
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
area would mean that only sketchy results could be achieved
within the allotted time.
Task Force Procedure Revised
The most pressing need under present cdnditions is for
officials in important positions in Government, particularly
those responsible for foreign policy, to have readily available
full and factual foreign Intelligence. (The word "foreign"
as used here denotes the target of information as distinct from
the geographical source.)
Accordingly, the task force suggested to the Commission
that the best results could be obtained if the dimensions of
the inquiry were limited to certain key departments and
agencies.
This proposal was approved by the Commission with the
understanding that the task force would determine which of
the Intelligence services, activities, and functions of the agen-
cies surveyed it considered essential; those not necessary, or
of similar nature and requiring consolidation in the public
interest; those nonessential and competitive with private en-
terprise; and those representing duplication or overlapping
of work between agencies. Under this revised program, the
task force would coNer, among other matters:
(i) The Intelligence functions of the National Security
Council.
(2) The value and effectiveness of the information sup-
plied by the operating agencies.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
(3) The effectiveness of the coordination of Intelligence
activities.
(4) The organization, procedures, methods, and per-
formance of the Government agencies in the field of
Intelligence.
(5) An examination of the operation and physical plant
of the agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on
efficiency, and utilization.
(6) The various programs of the agencies in such fields
as training, research and development, stockpiling,
reference material, and security.
(7) Personnel policies and manpower utilization.
(8) All programs and procedures for the collection, de-
velopment, and dissemination of Intelligence infor-
mation within the Government, including collection
apparatus and dissemination media.
(g) Effectiveness of the coverage by the various agencies
of their specific areas of assignment, and extent of
teamwork between these agencies.
Two Reports Prepared
In the preparation of this report, the task force was moti-
vated by a sincere desire to present as complete an account
of its findings as considered judgment indicated would best
serve the public interest. Certain other facts and recom-
mendations prepared by the task force have been omitted
from this report on the ground that their disclosure publicly
might give aid and comfort to our potential enemies or might
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
jeopardize our national defense and security. These findings
have been incorporated in a separate, highly classified, com-
prehensive report which has been placed in the hands of the
Chairman of the Commission.
Teams Make Firsthand Studies.Abroad
In order to obtain a clearer picture of Intelligence opera-
tions, two teams were sent abroad for on-the-spot investiga-
tions. Each team was composed of a member or members
of the task force and members of the staff. One group
visited the European sector and the other went to the Far
East.
These. staff groups held conferences with the senior United
States representatives and senior military commanders. in the
countries visited. The visits and discussions provided the
task force wth firsthand information which could have been
obtained in no other fashion.
The conclusions reached and the recommendations con-
tained in this report, and in the more comprehensive report
to the Chairman of the Commission, reflect the benefit of
those personal tours cf inspection.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Organization of the Task Force
Security Impact on the Selection of Personnel
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last
investigative group authorized by the Hoover Commission.
The director and deputy of the staff assumed their duties on
October 1, 1954. The limited pool of available personnel in
this country with prior experience in the Intelligence field
influenced to some extent the structure of the staff and its
methods of operation.
The task force personnel and staff had to be screened care-
fully for background security and possible prejudicial in-
terest arising from prior association with departments and
agencies embraced in the survey.
Before a member of the task force or staff could have access
to any material, a security background investigation was con-
ducted and the individual declared by proper authority to be
eligible for access to "Top Secret" information. In each case
where the inquiry involved access to atomic energy data, a
time-consuming special clearance was obtained.
It was found that each department and agency had de-
veloped its own criteria, practices, and standards for clearance.
The task force adopted a policy in conformity with the poli-
cies and requirements of the department or agency involved
in each specific inquiry.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
In the interest of security and economy, the task forcealso
decided to keep i-s staff as compact as possible. Sensitive
material generally was studied on the premises of the agencies.
Staff Organizatioia
After careful consideration by the task force of various
possible methods of organizing the staff and its work, it was
decided that the roost practical course would be to assign
teams composed o i or 2 staff members to study specific
agencies, and to delegate to other teams specific across-the-
board survey functions. Individual task force members were
assigned across-the-board responsibilities paralleling the work
of designated staff teams.
Thus, all task force members were in a position to interject
their influence and guidance in the staff activities and at the
same time obtain valuable firsthand knowledge of the overall
problem.
Procedures for Gathering Data
The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings
by top officials and employees of each agency studied. These
briefings were characterized by informality. Oral questions
and answers usually were employed. In some instances,
however, copies of prepared briefings were furnished to the
staff for ready reference.
Discussions were had with many echelons of personnel in
each department and agency, from the clerks up to and
including the heads of the executive departments.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
In the execution of its extensive undertaking, the task force
in certain areas found it necessary to employ the "sampling"
method, particularly in the case of the study of activities
overseas.
The task force also received expert advice from many in-
dividuals no longer in Government employ, but who pre-
viously occupied positions of prime responsibility in the de-
velopment of our present Intelligence operations and
organization. Some of these witnesses appeared before the
task force at no expense to the Government and at consider-
able personal sacrifice. Their help and suggestions were of
inestimable value.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
"Intelligence"--A Definition
The fate of the Nation well may rest on accurate and com-
plete Intelligence data which may serve as a trustworthy
guide for top-level governmental decisions on policy and
action in a troubled world, where so many forces and ideol-
ogies work at cross purposes.
The Congress had clearly recognized the importance of
the role of Intelligence in our national security. It has au-
thorized expenditures by appropriate departments and
agencies to carry on this work comprehensively.
Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of
the Chief Executive of our Government, the Congress ap-
proved the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency to
coordinate the Intelligence activities of the various Govern-
ment departments and agencies in this field, in the interest
of national security.
In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of Intel-
ligence as carried out under present conditions and under
the present organization, the Task Force on Intelligence
Activities found itself confronted at the outset with the
problem of arriving at a common understanding and agree-
ment on the meaning of the word "Intelligence," as applied
to its own areas of work and investigation.
In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to
our special field of study, it was found that each department
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
or agency surveyed had its own "pet" definition. Many
of these definitions were lengthy and involved use of wqrds
requiring additional interpretation or delimitations to get
at their precise application.
The task force fought a definition as simple and clear as
possible and arrived at the following:
Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in
advance of initiating a course of action.
Useful for our purpose also, as a supplemental and ex-
tended definition, is that given in the Dictionary of United
States Military Terms for Joint Usage:
Intelligence.-The product resulting from the collection, evalua-
tion, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available informa-
tion which concerns )ne or more aspects of foreign nations or of
areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially significant
to planning.
26
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
I. The Intelligence Community
National Level
The National Security Council
The function of the National Security Council is to advise
the President with respect to the integration of domestic, for-
eign, and military policies relating to the national security so
as to enable the military services and the other departments
and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively
in matters involving national security.
The Council is composed of the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization, the Secretaries and Under Secre-
taries of other executive departments and military depart-
ments when appointed by the President, to serve at his
pleasure.
The Council, in addition to performing such other func-
tions as the President may direct, for the purpose of coordinat-
ing more effectively the policies and functions of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government relating to national
security, subject to the direction of the President, shall:
i. Assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and
risks of the United States in relation to our actual and poten-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
tial military power, in the interest of national security, for
the purpose of making recommendations to the President to
meet these probleirs.
2. Consider policies on matters of common interest to the
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with
the national security, and make recommendations to the Presi-
dent on these matters.
In order to accomplish its mission, the National Security
Council has at its disposal several groups which function in
varying degrees within the field of national Intelligence.
Duties of Special Assistant to the President
The Council is li aked closely to the President, not only
because the Chief Executive is Chairman and a member of it,
but also because of the designation by him of a Special Assist-
ant to the President `for National Security Affairs who, as a
member of the White House Staff, has constant and direct
access to the President and enjoys his complete confidence.
This Special Assistant to the President is, in fact if not in
name, the Executive Officer of the NSC and is chairman of
the highly important Planning Board of the NSC.
He personally briefs the President on national security
affairs, and with the President's approval prepares the agenda
for the NSC meetings. This Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent does not preside at any NSC meeting, but sits (just
beneath the Council itself) at the apex of the NSC administra-
tive machinery.
Approved For Release 20,05/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Progress in National Intelligence Policies
The National Security Council has issued several Intelli-
gence directives. They express the policy by which the In-
telligence effort is guided and coordinated; establish, within
the Intelligence community, committees for the fulfillment of
specific Intelligence functions; and pinpoint the responsibility
for specific duties in designated fields of Intelligence.
The national Intelligence policy, as expressed in these
directives, calls for integration of all departmental Intelli-
gence relating to national security through a process of coor-
dination of effort by the Director of Central Intelligence and
correlation of Intelligence by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Other groups have been established as appendages to the
Council, through some of which Intelligence, advice, and
recommendations have been received by the Council for its
use in advising and making recommendations to the
President.
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National
Security Act of 1947, is charged with the responsibility of
coordinating, evaluating, and distributing Intelligence data
affecting the national security. The Director of Central In-
telligence gives advice and recommendations to the National
Security Council on such matters.
The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor and to the postwar investigation into
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
the part Intelligence or lack of Intelligence played in the
failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt
warning of the impending Japanese attack.
That investigation of events leading up to the "day of
infamy" impressed upon Congress the fact that information
necessary to anticipate the attack actually was available to
the Government; but that there was no system in existence
to assure that the information, properly evaluated, would be
brought to the attention of the President and his chief
advisers so that appropriate decisions could be made and
timely instructions transmitted to the interested military
commanders.
It also demonstrated that in the prewar Government
organization no single official was responsible for whatever
failure of Intelligence was involved; and the blame for the
military surprise fell, justly or unjustly, on the military com-
manders present mnd immediately involved in the debacle.
Therefore, in I.)47, when legislation for a national In-
telligence organization was being considered, there was a
widespread feeling among members of the Congress that
responsibility for the coordination of the production of
national Intelligence, as distinguished from departmental
Intelligence, and for its dissemination, must be centered at
one point.
Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its
Director charged with the coordination of the Intelligence
effort, was authorized to fill this need. The Director of
Central Intelligence, in the performance of this responsi-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
bility, receives pertinent information from all branches of
the Government engaging in collection of Intelligence, in-
cluding the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides for
the administration of the Agency and grants the Director
wide autonomous authority.
366467--66----8 31
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
II. The Intelligence Community-
Departmental Level
Department of Defense
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS (OSO)
Authority, Responsibility, and Functions
The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for Intelli-
gence Activities in the military services is not specifically
defined in legislation or Executive order, but is implicit in
the following provision of the National Security Act of 1947:
The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.
Under direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of this
Act, he shall have direction, authority, and control over the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Opera-
tions) was designated to fulfill a requirement for staff partici-
pation and representation in matters affecting defense and
national Intelligence efforts. His authority and responsibil-
ities are set forth in various directives and memoranda of the
Secretary of Defense.
The organization is small and is neither intended nor pre-
pared to exercise administrative control over day-to-day Intel-
ligence activities of the armed services.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Joint Intelligence Unit
As an adjunct of the joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a joint
Intelligence Committee composed of the Intelligence chiefs
of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee
members are: the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the
Joint Staff, who acts as committee chairman; the G-2 of the
Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Director
of Intelligence, Air Force.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff
heads the Joint Intelligence Group, performing the Intelli-
gence functions arid duties assigned to him by the joint
Chiefs of Staff through the Director of the Joint Staff.
Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff
are within the Department of Defense, the Joint Intelligence
Group supports the Secretary of Defense in Intelligence
matters.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Responsibilities of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Intelligence (AC/S, G-2)
The AC/S, G--2, under supervision of the Deputy Chiefs
of Staff-and of the Comptroller of the Army, within his
scope of responsibility-plans, coordinates and supervises the
collection, evaluation and dissemination of Intelligence in-
formation pertaining; to the war potential, topography, mili-
tary forces and military activities of foreign nations, and the
34
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
strategic vulnerability of the United States and its posses-
sions.
The AC/S, G-2, also gives staff guidance and coordina-
tion to the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) and to the
Army Intelligence Center (AIC).
Attache System
Army efforts in the Intelligence collection field are carried
out largely through its Attache System which maintains
stations in many foreign countries.
Officers are assigned in the Attache System on a highly
selective basis in conformity with rigid requirements and
standards established for candidates for this type of duty.
After selection, officers are assigned to language and In-
telligence schools to prepare them for their assignments.
G-2 Training Interest
G-2's training interest lies principally in the areas of policy
guidance and planning. The training division establishes the
policies under which Intelligence and language schools
operate, and monitors their program.
Elements of the division also monitor training programs
in the Intelligence field, which are conducted by the various
field commands and agencies, to insure conformance with
G-2's guidance.
Counter-Intelligence Corps
This Corps operates under the command of a major gen-
eral, who is also, in effect, a deputy of AC/S, G-2, for CIC
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
matters. However, while the Corps commander is respon-
sible for certain administrative and security functions, he does
not exercise a true command control over the personnel of the
Corps. Based on 6ae principle that security is a function of
command, elements of the Corps generally are assigned to
field units and operate directly under command of the unit
to which they are assigned.
The mission of they CIC is to ferret out any treason, sedition,
subversive activity or disaffection, and to detect and prevent
enemy espionage or sabotage within the Army Establishment
and its area of jurisdiction.
In the pursuit of their primary functions, members of the
Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps acquire some intelligence
data, and these are fed into the Intelligence system.
Relationship to Other Agencies
Ga operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of coop-
eration and understanding in its relationship with other
segments of the Intelligence community. Committee, sub-
committee, and working groups provide for ready inter-
change of material, Practices, methods, and other pertinent
Intelligence information.
Much of the effectiveness of this system is achieved through
personal contacts. Material of an urgent nature can be dis-
seminated throughout the Intelligence community through
these contacts without being delayed to await scheduled com-
mittee meetings. There is positive evidence of an aggressive
willingness and desire among those engaged at the working
level to promote the overall Intelligence effort.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Language Training Program
Language training for the Attache System and for the
Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) is conducted at
the Army Language School in Monterey, Calif. Use also is
made of the Naval Language School in Washington, D. C.,
and civilian colleges. The Army conducts language courses
for CIC personnel at Fort Holabird, Md.
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
The Office of Naval Intelligence is part of the organization
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Director
of Naval Intelligence is designated as an Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations, and reports directly to the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations. He also has a direct responsibility to the
Secretary of the Navy.
Under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence is required to
administer, operate, and maintain an Intelligence service
fulfilling the Intelligence and counterintelligence require-
ments of the Department of the Navy for the purpose of:
i. Informing the Naval Establishment of the war-making
capabilities and intentions of foreign nations.
2. Providing the Naval Establishment with the Intelli-
gence needed for plans and operations.
3. Warning naval authority of threats to security of the
Naval Establishment.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
4. Providing the naval contributions to joint, national, and
international Imellig-.nce.
5. Promoting the maximum Intelligence readiness of the
operating forces and other components of the Naval Estab-
lishment.
6. Coordinating the Intelligence effort of the NavalEstab-
lishment.
7. Developing and promulgating, subject to approval of
the Secretary of the Navy, policies for the protection of
classified matter, including such policies applicable to indus-
trial security.
8. Advising the Chief of Naval Operations concerning all
matters relating to naval Intelligence and security policies
for the protection of classified matter.
Organization in the Field
In the field, three organizations assist in carrying out the
Intelligence mission of the Navy:
i. Naval District Intelligence Officers, who are under
ONI's management control and operate in the continental
United States and in certain outlying areas.
2. Intelligence organizations within the forces afloat,
which, although directly under their respective commanders,
are still under ONI's technical supervision.
3. The Naval Attache System, which also is under juris-
diction of the ONI.
The primary func
cers are the conduct
ions of the District Intelligence Offi-
of counterintelligence and the imple-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
mentation of security policies. The District Intelligence
Officer serves on the staff of his Naval District Commandant,
and in certain designated districts has additional duty on the
staff of the commander of the sea frontier in which his dis-
trict is located. The Naval District Intelligence Offices are
the major source of domestic counterintelligence of special
concern to the Navy.
In the forces afloat, each area, fleet, type, and task force
commander, and all flag officers exercising command have
a staff Intelligence section. This is headed by an Intelli-
gence officer who is responsible for the collection, processing,
and dissemination of Intelligence for the command. ONI
supports their Intelligence requirements and assigns them
collection missions within their capabilities to execute.
Naval Attache System
Naval attaches and their staffs are officially a part of ONI,
but they also have a responsibility to the Ambassador or Min-
ister who is the chief of the diplomatic mission to which they
are assigned. Normally, attaches are stationed only in those
countries which are of primary naval interest to ONI.
Each of the ambassadors to countries having ports of call
for our naval elements would like to have a naval attache to
take care of many problems arising from these visits and the
attendant shore leaves.
Administration
Administrative work in the Office of Naval Intelligence is
handled by the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Ad-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
ministration. Manpcwer and management surveys are con-
ducted continuously by this division to maintain efficiency
and economy throughout ONI.
"Special Duty Only"
Most of the military personnel assigned to Intelligence
duties are line officers, not specialists. The Military Person-
nel Act of 1947 made provision for Intelligence specialists in
the Regular Navy. However, si:ce by law none of these
"Special Duty Only" officers may succeed to command, and
since command is the usual stepping stone to flag rank, the
"Special Duty Only" class of service is unpopular among line
officers.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Organization for Intelligence Work
The civilian staff of the Secretary of the Air Force includes a
Special Assistant for Intelligence who is responsible for review
and evaluation of all matters pertaining to plans, policies, and
programs relative to tFe Air Force Intelligence program. He
is also charged with supervision and ultimate review of the
personnel security program, both military and civilian.
The Deputy Chief I Staff, Operations, is responsible for
the Air Force Intelligence activities, communications activi-
ties, and atomic energy matters.
The Department's Inspector General is responsible to the
Chief of Staff, USAF.: Among his other duties, he conducts
investigations of matt ?rs involving major crimes, violations
of public trust, subversive activities, sabotageand espionage;
40
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
and performs related counterintelligence functions for the
Department.
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, is di-
rectly responsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.
This organizational relationship places him in a position sub-
ordinate to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The interposing of an
echelon between the major Intelligence element of the Air
Force and the Department's Chief of Staff and certain other
functional Deputy Chiefs of Staff, such as the Comptroller,
affects adversely the efficiency of staff operation. Elevation
of the Director of Intelligence to the level of Deputy Chief of
Staff would greatly enhance the prestige of Intelligence in
the Air Force. This is a desirable and appropriate step in
view of the tremendous importance of Intelligence in the
overall mission of the Air Force.
Air Force Intelligence Training
Recognizing the need for continuing Intelligence train-
ing, the Air Force has established such a program for officers
and airmen, embracing courses ranging from those of an
introductory nature to those appropriate for staff officers.in
higher headquarters.
In addition to the service schools, college facilities are used
for language training and special studies. Training courses
also are available for Air Force reserve personnel.
The Air Force training program generally is adequate for
current requirements, even in technical areas where the per-
sonnel turnover is heavy. Periodic studies should be made,
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
however, to assure the adequacy of training facilities in rela-
tion to worldwide ;,staff requirements. The staffing of for-
eign posts with inadequately trained personnel may be not
only uneconomical, but might result also in the loss of
opportunities to collect Intelligence.
Department of State
Responsibility for Foreign policy
A primary function of the Secretary of State is to act as
principal adviser to the President in the determination of
American foreign pclicy and to implement and supervise its
execution by diplomatic means. By virtue of the authority
the Secretary exercises over all the activities of the Depart-
ment and the Foreign Service, he derives principal support
for the accomplishment of this task from the Under Secre-
taries, the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Con-
sular Affairs, the Special Assistant-Intelligence, and the
Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
The SpecialAssistant-Intelligence, with rank equivalent
to that of an Assistant Secretary, develops and implements a
coordinated program for foreign Intelligence for the Depart-
ment and for producing reports essential to determination
and execution of for rign policy.
Effect of Diplomacy on the Overall Collection of In-
telligence
The task force has recognized the incompatibility in
method between the practice of diplomacy and the more
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
direct and active operations incident to the collection of
Intelligence and the conduct of cold war.
While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between
them must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always
in the national interest. It must be realized that diplomacy
is not an end in itself; that, while political ends must be
served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of Intel-
ligence is a vital element in the fight to preserve our national
welfare and existence. Instances have come to the attention
of the task force where too conservative an attitude has pre-
vailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action
in the field.
Creation of the Intelligence Area
Prior to World War II, Intelligence for the support of
American foreign policy was produced by the inadequate re-
search staffs of departmental policy offices which had many
other duties to perform. Creation of the Intelligence Area
of that Department, by Executive Order 9621 of September
20, 1945, recognized the need for improving the quality of
Intelligence demanded by the tense international situation.
The Secretary of State is a member of the National Security
Council. The Intelligence Area provides staff assistance to
the Secretary and senior policy officers of the Department of
State, and maintains liaison with the other members of the
Intelligence community in the discharge of the Department's
responsibility in the total Intelligence program of the
Government.
43
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Better Quarters Needed
The Intelligence Area maintains its offices and records in
a converted apartment building, which does not constitute
satisfactory quarters for this special type of work. The cost
of adequate security measures consequently is high.
Existing plans for an addition to the New State Building,
if approved under the provisions of Public Law 519, would
improve working conditions and efficiency, produce savings
through the vacating of leased spaces, and reduce costs of
security, maintenance, and miscellaneous services for this
branch of the Intelligence effort.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
A Bureau of Investigation was created, under jurisdiction
of the Attorney General of the United States, by Executive
order of July 26, 14)o8. The policies now followed in the
administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were
established in 1924,, and in July 1935, this agency became
known as the Fedei?al Bureau of Investigation.
In view of the limited activities of the FBI in the positive
and foreign Intelligence fields, a detailed study of this agency
was not made. However, its functions in the counter-
intelligence effort were studied with deep interest by the task
force, in order to fill out the Intelligence picture.
We found the Dijector of the FBI, through his forceful-
ness, initiative, and managerial ability, to have developed his
agency into a model organization of its kind. We are con-
Approved For Release 20,05/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
fident that in the FBI we have a most effective counter-
intelligence service.
FBI Responsibilities in Counterintelligence
Among other assigned responsibilities, the FBI has juris-
diction over investigations relating to espionage, sabotage,
treason, and other matters pertaining to the internal security
of the United States. This jurisdiction places the FBI
directly in the field of counterintelligence.
Executive Order 10450 (May 27, 1953), which established
the security procedure covering "all persons seeking the
privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the
departments and agencies of the Government," provides that:
All investigations conducted by any other agencies, which develop
adverse information involving loyalty or information showing coercion
of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the national security,
shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a
full field investigation.
Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies
The Director of the FBI-along with the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Director of
Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Headquarters,
U. S. Air Force-is a member of the Interdepartmental In-
telligence Conference (IIC) which is responsible for the
coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related
Intelligence matters affecting internal security.
45
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
The IIC Charter does not disturb the responsibilities of the
member agencies, but makes mandatory such action of those
agencies as is necessary to insure complete investigative cover-
age of this field without duplication of effort, through appro-
priate exchange and --oordination of information and action
among the various pertinent agencies and departments of the
Government.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
III. Foreign Intelligence
Evolution of Our Plans
Traditionally, Americans are a peace-loving people. But,
a philosophy of peace is no guarantee of peace. In a tortured
world where greed, intrigue, and lust for power exist, pro-
tection of liberty and assurance of survival lie in alertness and
strength. Alertness involves adequate Intelligence data on
which to base adequate preparedness.
From the beginning, the United States has tried consist-
ently to maintain relationships with other countries openly
and to refrain from participation in secret treaties. This
principle likewise established the early pattern for the con-
duct of our Intelligence activities. The collection of infor-
mation concerning political and military policies and plans
of foreign governments was accomplished openly and with
the full knowledge of. the foreign powers. The work was
performed through the offices of our diplomatic representa-
tives abroad and accredited military attaches.
A substantial volume of material was collected, but there
was no machinery at home to pull this information together
into a cohesive mass and to draw from it logical conclusions
upon which to base national policy and future plans.
On July 11, 1941, the Chief Executive, in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, established an
Office of the Coordinator of Information to
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
collect and analyze information data, military or otherwise, which
may bear upon natioaal defense strategy; to interpret and correlate
such strategic information; to make it available to the President and
such other officials as the President may determine, and to carry out,
when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as
may facilitate the seciring of strategic information not available to
the Government.
This office came into being only 5 months before Pearl
Harbor.
Through a process of evolution, there finally emerged the
Office of Strategic Services as an operating agency of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This organization remained intact
until the end of Wosld War II.
Postwar Organization
In the fall of 1944, the Chief Executive wrote to the Direc-
tor of Strategic Services requesting recommendations as to
the organization of a postwar Intelligence organization. The
Director submitted a plan for the creation of a central Intelli-
gence service. The plan placed the proposed central Intel-
ligence service in the Executive Office of the President and
called for the appointment by the President of a Director of
Intelligence who would discharge and perform his functions
and duties under the direction and supervision of the
President.
It also provided for the establishment of an Intelligence
Advisory Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, War,
and Navy, and such others as the President deemed neces-
sary. The duties of the board would be to advise and assist
the Director of Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
The plan placed in the hands of the Director the work of
coordinating, collecting, evaluating, and disseminating In-
telligence for national purposes. It also recognized that
various departments of the Government should have their
own Intelligence bureaus for the collection and processing
of such information and material as might be needed in the
performance of their daily functions and duties. Each of
these bureaus would be under the sole control of its depart-
ment head and would not be encroached upon or impaired
by the functions granted to any other governmental Intel-
ligence agency.
The plan further contemplated that in time of war or
unlimited emergency, all programs of such an agency in areas
of actual or projected military operations would be coordi-
nated with military plans and be subject to the approval of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or in case of the consolidation of
the armed services, under the supreme commander.
Functions Divided
Under the pressure of prompt dissolution of wartime agen-
cies, the Chief Executive, on September 20, 1945, divided the
functions, personnel, and physical resources of the Office of
Strategic Services between the State Department and the War
Department. The research and presentation element was
transferred to the State Department, to be absorbed or liqui-
dated so that the element would cease to exist on December
31,1945-
On January 22, 1946, the Chief Executive created the Na-
tional Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of
49
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
State, War, and Navy, and the President's personal representa-
tive, to plan, develop, and coordinate Federal foreign Intelli-
gence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplish-
ment of the Intelligence mission for national security. This
presidential directive also created a Central Intelligence
Group (CIG) under the direction of a Director of Central
Intelligence (I)CI), designated by the President to assist the
National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and to be responsible
to it. The directive specified that the head of CIG would sit
as a member of the NIA.
It charged the Central Intelligence Group with the task
of correlating, ev luating, and disseminating Intelligence
relating to the national security; with coordinating such ac-
tivities of the Intelligence agencies of the State, War, and
Navy Department:; as related to the national security; and
with performing other services of common concern.
By the National Security Act of '947, as amended (Public
Law 253, Both Cong., July 26, i9~47), the Congress established
a National Security Council (NSC) which took the place of
the old National Intelligence Authority; and created under
the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) with a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as its
head. The National Intelligence Authority ceased to exist.
Under the provisions of this act, the National Security
Council established an Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC) made up of the various Intelligence chiefs, to advise
the Director of Central Intelligence in his efforts to coordinate
the Intelligence activities of the Nation.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
IV. Intelligence Personnel and
Security
Character of the Present Working Force
The methods used for selection of personnel were reassur-
ing in the light of suspicions which have been voiced that
subversive and communistic elements were readily infiltrating
into these sensitive jobs. Our investigations indicated that
the Intelligence leadership in all branches is alert to its re-
sponsibility and is functioning under strict rules designed to
prevent any such infiltration.
One flaw in the present system, however, seems to be the
absence of a general plan for a periodic review of the security
status of every person after employment in Intelligence
activities, to guard against the possibility that some employee
who was completely dependable and honorable when starting
work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or
succumbed to alien blandishments or some personal weakness
such as strong drink or sexual perversion. The task force
makes recommendations to minimize this hazard.
The continuing need for skilled civilians in certain cate-
gories of Intelligence work suggests further use of the
appointment method under Schedule A of the Civil Service
program by some Intelligence units.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 f
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Policies and procedures to give assurance of security of
personnel follow a standard pattern in all of the agencies con-
cerned (FBI, ONI, (3-2, AFOIN, CIA, and State) and are
generally adequate. The major obstacle in this area is the
load thrown upon investigative agencies in providing per-
sonnel clearances. Backlogs exist in all agencies, and the
time required for complete clearance checks and full back-
ground investigation runs as high as 15 months. Such long
delays hamper certain phases of the Intelligence program to
which these prospecr_ive employees are to be assigned, and
some potential Intelligence personnel are lost to the Intelli-
gence community. They grow tired and restive at the long
wait and accept other offers of employment.
G-2 Personnel and Security
All military assignments to G-2 are made by The Adjutant
General (TAG) in a. manner similar to other assignments.
Within G-2, however-, there are certain key billets in which
G-2 has a special interest. In such cases, selection of qualified
personnel to meet specific requirements is made from
nominations by TAG.
With only a few minor exceptions, the quality of personnel
in G-2 was found to be of an exceptionally high order.
Contact with officers in this field indicated that they were
alert to their obligations and duties. Personnel records of
those who may have had experience in Intelligence are
clearly marked so that such men are not lost to the system and
may be made available readily for future assignments in this
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
work. Most senior officers wish to retain attachment to their
basic branches of service, but feel that an Intelligence assign-
ment is beneficial to their career.
Regulations and necessary implementing procedures for
compliance with Executive Order 10501, titled "Safeguarding
Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the
United States" are in effect and are well observed. Personnel
attached to G-2 are security conscious to a high degree.
Poster and lecture programs help to keep them continually
alert and ever conscious of their responsibility.
ONI Personnel
Security policy in the Navy is vested in the Secretary of
the Navy. Preparation of security policies has been delegated,
through the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Director of
Naval Intelligence. Administrative work in the Office of
Naval Intelligence is in the hands of the Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence, Administration. Manpower and man-
agement surveys are continuously conducted by this division
to maintain both efficiency and economy throughout ONI.
In addition to ONI, three other offices have responsibilities
in certain phases of security. They are the Bureau of Person-
nel, in matters of military personnel security; the Office of
Industrial Relations, in matters concerning security among
civil service personnel within the Navy; and the Office of
Naval Material, in matters of industrial security. Each was
surveyed and appeared to be functioning adequately.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
The major portion of military personnel assigned to Intelli-
gence duties are not specialists; they are line officers. Pro-
vision was made in the Military Personnel Act of 1947 to
include Intellige::ice specialists in the Regular Navy. How-
ever, since by lave none of these "Special Duty Only" officers
may succeed to command, arid since command is the usual
stepping stone to flag rank, the "Special Duty Only" class of
service is unpopular.
The present tour of the naval attache is 2 years. Because
of personnel limitations, it has not been possible to send all
naval attaches to language schools. Many attaches are just
getting proficient in the language of the area to which they
have been assigned at the end of the tour. The other 2
services use the 3-year tour, and do does the ONI. It would
seem logical to bring the naval attache's tour in line by
making it 3 years also.
Air Force Intelligence Personnel
Air Force security operations are centered in the Office of
the Deputy Inspector General for Security. The Deputy
Inspector General has two directorates: that of the Office of
Special Investigations, and of the Air Provost Marshal, with
the functions of security divided between these directorates.
The Office of Special Investigations is responsible for con-
ducting all personnel background investigations within the
jurisdiction of the Air Force and for forwarding final reports
on completed investigations to interested commanders for
appropriate action. Close liaison is maintained with the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, Civil Service Commission, and
54
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
other investigative and law-enforcement agencies. Regula-
tions have been published for the purpose of establishing
uniform policies and procedures for the personnel security
investigation and clearance of Air Force military and civilian
personnel requiring access to classified information.
There is some reluctance now on the part of career service
personnel in the Air Force to take assignments or to specialize
in Intelligence work because of the limited opportunities to
reach the grade of general officer in this field. If the Director
of Intelligence had greater latitude in the selection of per-
sonnel, an improvement in this general attitude might be
achieved. The service would be more attractive if some of the
highly trained officers he would select could anticipate even-
tual elevation to the grade of general officer.
Because of Civil Service restrictions, the Air Force also has
experienced difficulty in obtaining civilian personnel suitable
for special intelligence duties. Certain specialists, such as
analysts, need great technical skill and long experience, are
generally in short supply and reluctant to be placed under
Civil Service. Civil Service exemptions for a limited number
of such experts would help the Air Force to overcome this
deficiency more readily.
Industrial Security
The Intelligence units of the armed services realize fully
that vital secrets placed in the hands of private industry
must be amply protected without sacrificing efficiency or
hampering production. "The Armed Forces Industrial Se-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
curity Regulation" (AFISR), dated January 15, 1953, and
issued by the Department of Defense, is the current directive
governing security in this area.. Instructions to contractors
regarding the handling of classified material are set forth in
a Department of Defense pub:ication bearing the title "In-
dustrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information" (ISMSCI).
AFISR effectively coordinates the industrial security activ-
ities of all military agencies engaged in procurement opera-
tions. Prior to its issuance, agencies operated individually
under their own departmental directives and supervision.
AFISR fixes responsibility for plant supervision, designates
procedures for clearance of both facilities and individuals,
and eliminates dulication of effort and uncertainty over
areas of security responsibility.
After a plant has received agency clearance, it is eligible
to accept classified material from any agency. The agency
which is having the work performed .in that plant and which
gave the clearance for that work, is responsible for the con-
tractor's obedience to the security instructions. A serious
weakness in the industrial personnel security program arises
from the fact that an individual who has been declared to
be a security risk, although removed from work of a classi-
fied nature, might still be retained in the same plant. Be-
cause he has daily personal contact with employees engaged
in sensitive production and enjoys freedom of movement
within the plant, such an employee still would have access
56
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
to material and information of great value to a potential
enemy of this country.
The military departments are aware of the situation and
have recommended legislation to correct this deficiency.
The task force commends such a proposal and feels that this
loophole in our security barriers should be closed promptly.
Individual Security Cases
In the conduct of this survey, the task force assiduously
endeavored to keep its effort focused and to expend its time
and resources in the accomplishment of the specific duties
assigned to it by the Hoover Commission-to study and
investigate the present organization and methods of oper-
ation of the members of the Intelligence community, and to
determine what changes, if any, would be necessary or
desirable.
Although detailed study of the policies, functions, and pro-
cedures of the departments and agencies collecting and han-
dling Intelligence data, as outlined to us by the Commission,
did not primarily entail the investigation of the security angle
of every individual engaged in Intelligence, we recognized
the fact that the character of personnel affects these Intelli-
gence functions, and we faced squarely the issue of indi-
vidual cases under suspicion or brought to our attention from
various sources. A number of names came to us with sup-
posedly derogatory information or merely with derogatory
implications.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
When any such information or any name was brought to
our attention from any source concerning individuals em-
ployed in the Intelligence field, or even if not so employed,
every case except those obviously without merit was referred
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or, where appro-
priate, to the responsible Intelligence agency, or to both, with
a request for a repcrt.
Up to the time this report was prepared, some replies to
our inquiry developed information to the effect that the
records contained no adequate basis for suspicion of the indi-
viduals as security risks. Some replies indicated that the
individuals were under investigation and that the investiga-
tions were continuing. One of the individuals is on leave
without pay, pending completion of an investigation now in
process and appropriate disposition.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
V. "Watchdog" Commission
The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence
Agency, as a major fountain of Intelligence for the Nation,
must of necessity operate in an atmosphere of secrecy and
with an unusual amount of freedom and independence. Ob-
viously, it cannot achieve its full purpose if subjected to open
scrutiny and the extensive checks and balances which apply
to the average governmental agency.
Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has. been freed
by the Congress from outside surveillance of its operations
and its fiscal accounts. There is always a danger that such
freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which
might prove costly to the American people.
Although the task force has discovered no indication of
abuse of powers by the CIA or other Intelligence agencies,
it nevertheless is firmly convinced, as a matter of future in-
surance, that some reliable, systematic review of all the
agencies and their operations should be provided by con-
gressional action as a checkrein to assure both the Congress
and the people that this hub of the Intelligence effort is
functioning in an efficient, effective, and reasonably econom-
ical manner.
Within the Armed Services Committee, there is a liaison
channel between the Congress and CIA which serves a
worthy purpose, but which cannot include private citizens
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
in its membership aad has not attempted to encompass the
wide scope of service and continuity which this task force
considers essential for "watchdog" purposes.
The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for
proper operation of our foreign Intelligence Activities but
is concerned over the possibility of the growth of license and
abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, per-
sonnel, and functions are precluded by law.
On the other hand, sporadic investigations in this field
might inadvertently result in unauthorized disclosure of
classified informatio a to the detriment of the Intelligence
effort. Periodic audits or studies by some qualified., impar-
tial agency would remove both of these dangers and would
also allay any suspicions and distrust which have developed
in the public mind by the complete secrecy of these opera-
tions. Such a procedure also might serve to shield our
Intelligence program from unjustifiable attacks upon the
agencies concerned, and enhance public confidence and sup-
port of this vital worn.
The Central Intel: igence Agency Act of 1949 legalized
the administrative procedures for she Agency. It was passed
by the Congress on the unanimous recommendation of the
Armed Services Committee.
Agency Gets Wide Exemptions
The Act exempts the Agency from compliance with any
provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any
requirements for publication or disclosure of the organiza-
60
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
tion, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency; and any regulations re-
lating to the expenditure of Government funds.
The widespread conviction among Members of Congress
that this situation should be corrected is indicated by the fact
that more than a score of resolutions have been introduced in
the current session calling for a review or watch over our
Intelligence activities, usually by a large joint committee of
the two Houses.
The task force, however, envisions as the proper agency for
this watchdog job a small, permanent commission modeled
after the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government-a bipartisan group including
members of both Houses of Congress and distinguished pri-
vate citizens appointed by the President.
Members chosen from private life to serve on this proposed
watchdog commission should come from a select group of
loyal, qualified, and public-spirited citizens who command
the respect and confidence of the American people.
Comprehensive periodic studies of the foreign Intelligence
Activities of the United States would be made by the commis-
sion, with special attention to the questions of whether the
assigned work of these Intelligence agencies is being carried
on efficiently and effectively; whether there is any unneces-
sary overlapping or duplication of effort between civilian and
military Intelligence agencies; whether the staffs are of a size
justified by their assigned functions and producing the Intelli-
gence required for the security of the Nation; whether ex-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
penditures are within budget authorizations and in keeping
with the expressed intent of the Congress; whether fiscal
policies and procedures are in conformity with sound account-
ing principles and practices to the maximum extent possible;
whether any of their activities or policies are in conflict with
the foreign policy aims and program of the United States; and
whether the effort of any of these Intelligence agencies is
being dissipated or adversely affected by assignment of added
functions alien to Intelligence. The commission would re-
quire a small permanent staff, with the usual provisions for
employing attorneys, experts, consultants, and auditors, for
expenses and for compensation of members and employees.
It would be empowered to hold hearings and to subpena
witnesses, under adequate safeguards to prevent the public
disclosure of classif_ed defense information which it might
receive; but would have the authority to demand and receive
from any source any information it might need for its own
use.
The overall aim would be the promotion of aggressive lead-
ership which would unify the Intelligence effort, make it
more productive, and inspire a higher spirit of teamwork
through elimination of petty competitive jealousies.
Would Study Complaints
The proposed commission should hold itself available to
receive and to study all complaints against any of our Intelli-
gence agencies; to maintain a familiarity with the activities
of these agencies a~ a safeguard against the abuse of their
62
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
proper functions; to consider requests of the agencies for
legislation, and, where advisable, to support the needs of the
Intelligence community before the Congress, and advise the
Congress on the effects of proposed legislation on our Intelli-
gence effort. An integral part of its duties would be reports
of its findings and its recommendations to the President and
to the Congress annually and at such other times as might
be appropriate or necessary.
One of the fundamental purposes of these reports would
be to keep the public informed, within the bounds of security,
of the value and the vital accomplishments of the Intelligence
community and provide an answer to unfounded complaints
and criticisms which have tended to arouse fears and distrust
of the Intelligence effort in the minds of the people.
Public support thus engendered certainly would improve
the effectiveness of the Intelligence operations, and foster
public participation in the collection of overt Intelligence data.
The people who support these operations are entitled to
assurance that the investment is paying dividends. With
such assurance, they would develop an enthusiasm and alert-
ness which could bring in valuable information at times to
supplement the work of the regular Intelligence forces.
63
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Approved For Release 20!05/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
VI. Functional Intelligence
Map Procurement
The task force found map requirements and production
for Intelligence purposes well coordinated. Through the
years, there has developed by mutual cooperation among the
departments and agencies, a committee whose primary
function is to prevent duplication in map procurement.
There is established within the Bureau of the Budget an
Examiner of Surveys and Maps, who coordinates all map-
making programs to avoid duplication and overlapping of
functions. The system seems to be efficient and effective.
Trustworthy and up-to-date Intelligence cartography is one
of the major elements utilized in Intelligence operations.
The cost of this phase of the work is substantial, but we found
this expense to be justified by the results achieved.
Intelligence Libraries
On the basis of visits made to the Intelligence libraries
maintained by the military services, the CIA, and the State
Department, the task force believes that these libraries in
general are efficiently operated. There is a workable system
in effect among the agencies for notification of availability
and exchange of information.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
There has been considerable discussion of the idea of
putting all the material in the possession of all Intelligence
agencies in one central library.
The value of a library depends on the ready accessibility of
its material to the users. Its use and effectiveness declines
when those who need it must become involved in complicated
procedures and delays in obtaining material.
The task force feels that a central library would foster the
development of private desk-side libraries and the retention
by individuals of material for protracted periods, with the
resultant denial or delay in access to others. Establishment
of a central library, therefore, seems impracticable.
However, for the purpose of providing ready reference and
more facile access to the various Intelligence data by any
department or agency, the task force suggests that all depart-
ments within the Defense Establishment and the Department
of State adopt the .,ingle-index system based on the Intelli-
gence subject code now in use by the CIA and the Air Force
libraries. The value of such a standardized procedure prob-
ably would be well worth the expense involved.
Various elements in the Intelligence family have come up
with divergent definitions and interpretations of certain
words and phrases in common use by the Intelligence com-
munity. The resultant confusion could be eliminated by
standardization. To that end, the task force proposes, that
the National Security Council produce an agreed glossary of
terms and definitions and provide for periodic review of this
glossary.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
VII. Conclusions and
Recommendations
In summarizing its findings and its recommendations, the
task force at the outset found, in general, that the Intelligence
effort is being pursued in a diligent and dedicated manner.
It noted throughout the Intelligence community an atmos-
phere of urgency and a desire to get on with the job of break-
ing through security barriers erected by our potential enemies.
However, instances of inefficient practices were disclosed,
and recommendations to correct them have been made.
The domestic counterintelligence effort was found to be
effectively coordinated among the departments and agencies
concerned. Positive direction and mutual support are pro-
vided through the operations of the Interdepartmental In-
telligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security. Specific responsibility in the domestic
area of each counterintelligence agency is established par-
tially by statute, and is further definitively specified by a
"Delimitations Agreement" to prevent overlapping and du-
plication of effort.
Recommendations covering overseas counterintelligence
operations, carried out by the military services and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, are contained in our classified
report.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
The domestic security and counterintelligence functions of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation were found to be con-
ducted efficiently and` effectively. This Bureau renders com-
petent and highly cooperative assistance to other Govern-
ment Intelligence agencies and performs an essential and
important function in the overall intelligence effort.
The National Intelligence Survey is an invaluable publica-
tion which provides the essential elements of basic Intelli-
gence on all areas of the world. While its production in-
volves an extensive a,,-.id expensive: effort, all members of the
Intelligence community derive an immediate benefit from
the contributions they make to it and profit from the final
product. There always will be a continuing requirement
for keeping this sur'ey up to date.
Administrative Flaws Noted
The task force concluded that the legislation and organi-
zational setup for Intelligence purposes are soundly con-
ceived, but that administrative flaws are in evidence. Ac-
cordingly, it has pointed most of its suggestions in that
direction.
Failure to produce certain elements of Intelligence has
been due in part to he restrictive effects of some of our na-
tional attitudes and policies toward the collection of Intel-
ligence so necessary for effective resistance to Soviet
aggression. Also, among some of those responsible for im-
plementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and nego-
tiation, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that
might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications.
68
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times
has stifled initiative and action in the collection of Intelli-
gence. Some of these efforts, if permitted to proceed prop
erly, might have brought direct and immediate results and
made positive contributions to the national welfare that would
have justified the attendant political risks and possible
inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.
Data on Soviet Bloc Inadequate
Security measures adopted by the Communists have been
provokingly conceived and boldly employed. They have
been quite effective in comparison with our security meas-
ures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in
this country with relative ease. The information we need,
particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available.
Through concentration on the prime target we must exert
every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success
in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level,
a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplo-
matic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.
The task force is of the opinion that the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence should employ an Executive Director, or
"chief of staff," of the Agency so that the DCI might be
relieved of the chore of many day-to-day administrative and
operational problems, and thus be able to give more time to
the broad, overall direction of the Agency and the coordina-
tion of the entire Intelligence effort.
69
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Recommendations With Respect to Personnel
The effectiveness of our national Intelligence effort is
measured to a large degree by the character and ability of
the personnel, both military and civilian, engaged in this
work. The diligent and dedicated effort of the Intelligence
community was evident to the task force.
Some problems, however, exist in the personnel manage-
ment field. These problems, taken collectively, seriously
affect the morale, the availability, and the quality of the
Intelligence personnel.
The task force presents detailed recommendations later in
this report, with a view to improving the prestige of the
civilian analyst; developing real career incentives in Intelli-
gence; relieving the critical shortage of qualified Intelligence
personnel by tappi:g the valuable pool of retired civilian
business men with experience abroad, and of especially
trained and qualified retired military personnel; broadening
the base of civilian employment to provide greater flexibility
of recruitment of Lie best qualified individuals; improving
the conditions of service of CIA personnel stationed abroad,
and increasing the salaries of certain key officials in CIA.
Recommendation No. 1
That the Central Intelligence Agency be reorganized
internally to produce greater emphasis on certain of its
basic statutory functions; ' and
'Details and supporting :factual matter relating to this recommendation are con-
tained in the separate classiied report of the task force. They cannot be incorpo-
rated in this public report for security reasons.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
That the Director of Central Intelligence employ an
executive officer or "Chief of Staff" of that Agency.
That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, com-
posed of members of both Houses of the Congress and
other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost
national respect and confidence, be established by act
of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organiza-
tion, functions, policies, and results of the Government
agencies handling foreign Intelligence operations; and
to report, under adequate security safeguards, its find-
ings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the
President, annually and at such other times as may be
necessary or advisable. The proposed "watchdog" com-
mission should be empowered by law to demand and
receive any information it needed for its own use. It
would be patterned after the Commission on Organiza-
tion of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover
Commission). Appointments by the President of per-
sons from private life to the proposed Commission should
be made from a select list of distinguished individuals
of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with
records of unselfish service to the Nation.
The tremendous importance to our country of the Intelli-
gence function, and the unpublicized and selfless duties per-
formed, demand that the prestige of this function, and of the
personnel involved, be recognized through the use of adequate
career incentives and benefits to encourage full development
of talent within the Intelligence community.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Recommendation No. 3
That the Executive Pay Bill of 1949 be amended to
increase the annual salary of the Director of Central
Intelligence to .he equivalent of the pay of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (now $20,000); to bring the com-
pensation of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
up to $17,500, the same as that of most Under Secre-
taries of the executive branch; and to provide operating
directors of areas of responsibility in Intelligence with
proportionate salaries; and
That the chiefs of the various Intelligence units of
the military services be elevated in the organizational
structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the
Army and the i it Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations in the Navy; and
That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be
amended to provide:
(a) Additional medical and hospital benefits and serv-
ices for dependents of CIA employees when stationed
overseas, similar to the benefits authorized for depend-
ents of members of the Foreign Service.
(b) Statutory leave benefits (and accumulation of
leave) for employees of CIA overseas, as now applied
to members of the Foreign Service.
Retired civilians with long b isiness experience in the for-
eign field constitute a possible source of important contri-
butions to the Intelligence effort., and this resource should be
exploited fully. Taere is also a valuable reservoir of retired
military personnel with foreign -.xperience which might well
be utilized. One major advantage in the exploitation of
wi;
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
these groups would be the speed with which they could be
fitted into the Intelligence picture because they would come
in with a large part of the necessary training already behind
them.
Recommendation No. 4
That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be
amended to authorize employment by the CIA of re-
tired military personnel of the armed services without
an arbitrary limitation on the number of such employees
(the limit now is 15) and without regard to the law limit-
ing their compensation; except that such personnel
should be authorized to accept either their military re-
tirement pay plus any difference between their retired
pay and the proper pay of the office they would hold in
CIA or the proper pay of the office, but not both; and
That the Department of Defense make extensive use
of Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-
competitive appointments) in the employment by the
military services of civilian Intelligence analysts and
other specialists in order to provide the necessary flexi-
bility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel
(to include retired citizens with wide previous business
experience in the foreign field) and to facilitate the in-
terchange of such personnel between zone of interior
competitive service and the overseas excepted service.
The task force is satisfied that the personnel security pro-
gram and procedures within the Intelligence community are
adequate to minimize the possibility of security risks and to
make extremely unlikely their employment in sensitive posi-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
tions in the Intelligence agencies, except in the procedure for
systematic rechecking of all personnel to make sure that the
passage of time has, not altered the trustworthiness of any
employee, and to make certain that none has succumbed to
some weakness of intoxicants or sexual perversion, or devel-
oped some other shortcoming that would disqualify him from
further sensitive work. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
has adequate safeguards against such a danger.
Recommendation No. 5
That measures be instituted in all agencies for re-
checking the security status of all personnel engaged in
Intelligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed
5 years in any individual case.
Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully
exploiting the possibilities of valuable military and techno-
logical data potentially available in scientific reports and
technical publications issued in foreign countries. The State
Department now is charged with this duty. Under this
arrangement, we lack adequate collection facilities and staff
experts to evaluate the material.
Recommendation No. 6
That the responsibility for procurement of foreign
publications and for collection. of scientific Intelligence
be removed from the State Department and placed in
the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such
scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this
work abroad.
74
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Efficient handling of Intelligence information demands
modern quarters for the personnel and the records. The
Central Intelligence Agency, after 8 years of operation, still
lacks such facilities.
Recommendation No. 7
That the Congress appropriate as soon as practicable
the funds necessary to construct adequate headquarters
facilities for CIA in or near Washington, D. C.
The task force believes not only that great care must be
taken in the selection of highly qualified persons, both tech-
nologically and Intelligence-wise, for the group supervising
atomic energy Intelligence data, but that changes in the group
should be made as infrequently as possible.
Recommendation No. 8
That steps be taken to introduce highly selective
methods of choosing members of the coordinating com-
mittee on atomic energy Intelligence, not only to get the
benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but
also to assure long tenure in this important assignment.
Lack of adequate linguistic preparation often has proved to
be a serious handicap to our representatives abroad. This
became painfully apparent during the Korean war. The
ability to write and speak the language fluently, and to
interpret foreign words and idioms accurately always helps
an American to get around in an alien land, to win the con-
fidence of its people, and to understand them.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1
Recommendation No. 9
That a comprehensive, coordinated program be de-
veloped to expand linguistic training among American
citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and
That the Department of Defense expand and promote
language training by offering credit toward reserve com-
missions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve
personnel for completion of selected language courses.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. . Price 35 cents
76
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600050015-1