CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 August 1961
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TELLIGE.,,'~sCE
Raq u - - 21MI
State Dept. review
completed
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21 August 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. Colombian foreign minister believes Castro may be
having "deep domestic difficulties" and may therefore
be. amenable to influence by other Latin American gov-
ernments. (Page tit)
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L;uba-(;oiombia: o om lan oreign inister Turbay, who
une Havana after the airliner in. which he was
riding was hijacked over Mexico on 9 August, concluded from
a long conversation with Fidel Castro that the Cuban leader may
be having "deep domestic troubles" and wants to find a way out.
Turbay implied that he now sees some hope that Cuba will be
amenable to the influence of other Latin American governments.
He feels that Castro is anxious to avoid giving the US any pre-
text for intervention, possibly because he is uncertain how much
Soviet aid he would receive in such eventuality. Turbay had been
touring various Latin American countries seeking support for a
US-supported Colombian plan to convoke an OAS meeting that
would define the conditions under which Cuba would continue or
cease being a member of the inter-American systelD
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Cuba=Colombia
astro told Turbay that US actions had forced his regime
"into the arms of the Soviets" and repeated Cuba's familiar
line that the regime is "socialist," not Communist, and is pre-
pared to resume relations with the US immediately if this can
be done on the basis of "mutual respect." Turbay said Castro
seemed unprepared to discuss possible OAS action on the
Cuban problem. The prime minister presented no proposals
or counterproposals to Turbay's detailed and emphatic presen-
tation of the view that Cuba must decide whether to place itself
within or outside the inter-American system and that its pres-
ent ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc are incompatible. with this
system
jrbay noted that Castro listened intently to his presenta-
tion, said he would give careful thought to it, and alleged that
no one had spoken to him of these considerations before. This
last statement is patently false-the former Brazilian and Ar-
gentine ambassadors in Havana had often sought to press these
points in long personal conversations with him considerably be-
fore the rupture of US-Cuban relations last January. Castro's
conversation with Turbay was consistent with recent Cuban ef-
forts, clearly evident during the conference at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, to convince other Latin Americans of Cuba's "reason-
ableness" and "conciliatory" stand with respect to the ff-j
Tie recent letup in Cuba's provocative and overt aggressive
actions in the hemisphere may well be due to pressure by the
Soviet Union, which probably estimates that it would have more
to gain from the Castro regime's acceptance in the hemisphere
on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" than if Castro's continued
provocations led to US or concerted inter-American action th t
would force the USSR's hand on its promises of military support.
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21 Aug 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
,Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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