. . . IN A DANGEROUS WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 23, 1981
• Content Type: NSPR

AP PI R e lease 2001/0370TI6111A4REJF'91R0109011 R0005
(N3 'AG % 23 February 1981
angerous orld
?
United States intelligence started = world. In the SALT debate, for
as a spy service,shroudedinsecrecy. ??? example, Americans openly
left entirely to the president to run., discussed the details of Soviet mis-
Its legislativecharter, passed in 1947, sues which are held most secret in
was deliberately ambiguous about the Soviet Union, but revealed by
what it should do. This represented our intelligence systems. -
a total. American consensus at the , As our intelligence system grew,
time that the spy business was best it could no longer be contained with-
insulated from public debate and ex, in the old tradition of total secrecy.
posure. ? , But we still must protect its sources,
For 25 years'. -thereafter, intelli- ?-? the spies who are still needed within
gence officers made up- the rules as? the secret and authoritarian soci=
they went along. In the process, they ' ' eties threatening us. - ' ? ".`
made a few mistakes and did some so a new 'charter is being deVel?
-
wrong things: and I stress the oped.-It is essential for the morale
,
word ? few: -dr ? ff ? a n d effictiVeness of the' honorable,'
In the mid-1970s, the lid was lifted men and women who look ahead to
on intelligence in the most sensa-. the intelligence problems of the fu-
tional and sanctimonious of tones. - ture, rather than at the mistakes of
, The resulting outcry and` publicity the past ,'??;?1 -
frightened People all over the world. " ?
.4 !, ct
, The Pendulum is returning to a, .We Must Penetrate -
sensible middle. point America, . Intelligence must penetrate the
changed 'intelligence and made it ,, secrets of countries which can do
more than a simple spy service. It us harm. And we Must do it both
developed a great center of Scholar- with technology, and by dealing.
ship and research, with as many doc- - with brave men and women in those
tors and masters of every kind of countries who will risk their lives
art- and. science as any university. and livelihoods to help ns.
campus., 7-? ?Intelligence must offer a way of
It produced a triumph of technol- providing quiet assistance to friends
ogy, stretching from the depths of " of America in some countries, strug--.
the. oceans to the limits of outer gling against a brutal dictator , on -
space; using photography, electron- one side and ruthless terrorists on -
ics;" acoustics and other technologi- the other. This quiet action can offer -
cal marvels to learn things totally.,, an alternative to polarization and
hidden on -the] side of the turmoil, and be an effective and re-
... -1' 'strained use of -American influence
William E. Colby is former direc-`7::: more effective than diplomatic
total the Central intelligence Agen-' exchanges, but less violent than car-
,. .
cy;.!naw a lawyer in Washington. 1. ner task forces and Marines.
STATI NTL
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STATI NTL
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THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
22 February 1931
Ali.' ICU'
Victor Marchetti Richard Helms John Stockwell William Colby. Philip Agee
QUESTION: Which pictures don't fit in this group?
ANSWER: The two who aren't broke.
All are former CIA.-employes .who wrote-
books drawing on their years of.service-
with the Agency. Marchetti (along-with
coauthor John Marks) criticized the
agency's- methodaStockwell blasted.
the CIA's role in Angola. Agee attacked
the-- agency's secret operations and
named undercover agents. And Snepp
criticized America's hasty and ill-con-
ceived withdrawal from Vietnam. The
-
Frank Snepp
memoirs Written by the two men wh
aren't telling reporters they're in finan-
cial distress, ex-directors Colby_ and
Helms, were bland, flattering portray-
als of the CIA.
-
Have the er'S of Sam Giancana and efohnny Roselli--
' twegotthe mobsters involved with the CIA plot in the
'60s4o.-assassinate Fidel Castro?ever been found?
- - - .
Giaricana was Shot dead by gunmen in his Chicago home in
1975; Roselli was found dead in an oil drum floating in a
Miami waterway a year later. No suspects in either death
have been apprehended:
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080013-4
AppirtAkelease 20011103/07-1.1101FALRIOn1-00901R0005
22 February 1981
For:,the Recon
(--
From remarks by William Colby;
former director of the CIA, to The
Committee for National Security:
If we are going to ensure Our security,
in the future, we're going to have to start -
with an intelligent appraisAl of the real :
threats and the real problems that we
face in this world. Only on that basis can -
we design the proper strategy, design the::
tools and the weapons to the extent that-
we need them, to face those' different
threats.r Otherwise, we frequently runr
the risk of designing a magnificent de; z
fense against one threat, only, to.leave-
ourselves open against many others.
.think if we analyze our threat, we.,;;
have to start ivith.the only nation in the; -
? world that can destroy, us, the Soviet, :
Union. It has the weaponry,: it has the.:
` fora with which to do it But let's look
at what that threat really amounts to. IR'.
it a nuclear threat, which- can only be::
met by our nuclear weapons? : I think"
that we see that the Soviet Union spends'
enormous amounts of its groas national':
product to develop its military. systems:-;',
_This,reflects their internal political dy---'"
namics, their -paranoia about 'security'.
and Soviet pride in being another super-:
power. But I think we have to examine-
the most effective Soviet weapon used: ?
against us in recent years? which har.
been unarmed, transport aircraft, full of ?.
Cubans and East Germans sent to ex'
plait the turmoil in the Third World. We
must be secure against that kind of.
weapon as well as the nuclear. We must,
devote ourselves to developing the tools,:
the forces and the weapons to meet the
challenge of, the economic and sociologi-
cal differences and demagogy that we see,
in much of the world. We have to trans-,
form those differences into mutual'
growth, friend.ship and peade. The tools
to do this are diplomacy, trade and aid,t
not military force alone. '"
.tritt472, r4or,
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080013-4
Approved For Release 2001enRA-RDP91-00
Office of Current Operations
The Operations Center
News Service
Distribution 11
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STATI NTL
STATI NTL
or ReleavAAQIfflgtgarileiA-RDP91 -0
15 February 1981
. ? +1",
c.? ? ;?.> -11;4 4;r:
s-- M ePt
- r
4:211f./'
Inter;
..f ?
. _ ? ..
. ? ?
DAVtD. WIS5-fm?
1,?;?. tr. "iitt;
-:-PAS3artg.' GTON:r1Phe:-caPILF11-:catt-lae- cortiPared
lp-a.three:ring eirciif.agreat deal is going on
OnCii, it Li alioirnethaSoriietirnes; more
caniIedbywPiing the:sideshoWs-than'the-cen,t.
aet4iritiet
under PreSi den t Re-is:ail-167,d
a friendly". Setiate..,Seleet_.,COMMittee:-61;i':Intel:-.
lienced its er-jig- in Jarniary704;the:PreSident'S
Vioniiii4tion of his fox-frier cantpai.g.t -nianager;Williain.r
Casey to be. dir'. etcri-Of Central Intellikence;;;the-tele-VV:
iOnllightS.bathe-4-.thibinate.Seriate!calie;iiS rehrd in
glare :4d the'reiorters arid-photaaplaers alnio
*naucli.'nabre*ocleit:..,turnout greeted.- NaiY:Vice
--Adaii.-?Bobby1A:3Y1riman;'.thirect.or:of---the.--.SUper.see-ret
; Natianat..Secirritygency,:'ithenation's,:Ebde-brealcing'
-rna,:-.wh en he. appeared' quietly_before. the same corn
-Mittee on Fela:.,3.a.S.Regan's choice".fordeputy director':
:.fof:the GA.. Thinced hy,most obseryers,,Inman let an'.
:bitRi..e.s4ng'eatXU0f
DatiWau. -);Innaan-ei-plaiiied.:that,Casey:Opected h.ira
:depfity.tOiMproVe,the quality fat U.S ;;intelligence and-
the'ageneyeStiim-"a0rie D_Mc'ci on S4its ability..tdpredict:
futin-e everitalriniari addech,!?lIef..(CaSeY)i-fwill,!ccric.en?-?
On,t1*66:17.6:rt:CitieratithIST-
-. d.kidestine collection sides of thebusine-
ahe_
Pisek, learned-durings Warld?War
perieneewith.theOffiCeOf Stratec'SerilicieS;(0SS):As
chdef of .ser.ci.Otintelh'geia'oefor
by:PareClatint5.Nazi Cerrruriy
That Casey would wish t orcentr- te on the Ci .
...ccrgert:Ofietatiari*.and Oandistiilec011eetd6n-4thits:'not,
!;')anilY.s.7U7PrWEng--but Innian'scoranainfis nevertheles;Si
lt*ecatig -.'_the`-:Fiiiiaafe. is right Casey and:tinfInthave41
taken Oker. the helm of the.CLA uncl er a IFresidentwho
. _ftrraly'cOniicdttedtoa stronger inilitary and intelligence
,esiablisl*ient.... For theffisttinai itt the nation's histari;:l
.0..faiiner.CIA.,director, Giorgi:811;th:: fi:A7iCeliresident:'..1
Arid, sith the-,RepubliCans-in control erf:theSenate, the
;CIA.-rioVii Alas ,a; good friend conservative Sen Barr)
'Goldwater the. Sthate-
-.:naittee avers, eeing the a gencY,
an.impartant Otructuratchange as iiell..The7:
-;.C.14ahas.rsuceeeded, in- abOliShineAlae.f.1.3ughes-RStaiii
:7Amendment, which had required it to report on eaverf;:i
'perations to eight committees of Congress.. Under the
newlaw, only report .t4 tc,,,79 congressional-2,
- panelB,thc intelligence committees ?the Senate and-r
the Hour. ._During the nik.(17.-1970S; Congress investigated.
14)atefilbael.e0f6:200 i? 3107
and rev .ARP
-4,n4 other,l-intelligence .agencies,dru& "testing, jriV
-oRerung domestic-spying, Couatelpro i
larirtai,rs-f;
Pbug
that the CIA ha
sinate- Fidel.
world leaders.a
:.lengthy propos
were introduc
cTheintellige
..-which Would
their: powers,
r_PUblicity;Presi
;that was left Of
Oyersight Act:of. .
-the two-inteiligenee COrn:mitfeeS Prior, notice of `signi.f."
.:cant.7 covert operations?but allows him to explain later
:if he chooses not to comply The does require the
President'andthe CIA to furnish "any inforrnation!' on.
intelligence demanded by the committees, LIU t it is a far .
cry from the maisi-Ve,chartie,legislation once envi-
sioned.
;:
former director Of the CIA says
thatf-covertractiyities?both" Political_ and paramilitary .;
'action?now account for Only .3% or:4% of the CIA's
budget; compared with 50% in the 1950s and
hope it will increase;', he said,' because I.thirtit there are. j
:areas Of the world where a little Covert 'action can fore-:-
-.stall much more- serious problems later!' Covert action:
-Colby maintains; Can:"avoid a situation of seeing a place
descend into chaos or, alternatively, being tempted to
send in the -- ? : ;?.
L. Casey answered Cautiously when the senators as:lteff-,
about covert operations at his coal rmationhearin
Rigging elections, intervening in the internal affairs of.
another nation, he replied, "that kind Of thing you only
do in the highest interest of the country:Y- Just . -- I
how far will the CIA be unleashee."No one Cart!,
predict w'nether the new oversight System iSgoing?to,
wbrk,'!. said Jerry 3,..:Berinapi;. legislative counsel to t.e.';
American Civil Liberties :Uniori3One of the groups thati
fought and lost the battle for charter legislation. 'Tim!,
.-..have, Goldwater who .has said there are, secretilaqd
iather not knew Zessn.the.Housiji
::.gde, the IntelligenCe. Committee is more conservative
and lesS halal/
is also clear that one of GoIdWater'stop poritrns
will. be passage of a bill t-6 protect tlae identities of intel
ligente agents. Such legislation failed to pass last Year;-.:
butan identities billwas reintroduced on Feb. 3 by Sen.]
:John H:Chafee, a moderate Republican from Rhode Is-;
land,and four bills have been introduced in the Ilousei
Pressure for such legislation has mounted as a result:7
of several factors: the exposure of the names of dozens
of agents in the book by Philip Agee, a former CIA offi-
cer, and the assassination in 1975 of Richard Welch, the
agency station chief in`Athens, who had several months
? earlier been identified as a CIA man by the magazine ;
CounterSpYI:More recently,- in July,-1930, -gamut en atz:',
tacked the Jamaica home of N. Richard Kinsman Who
: CIAlika3tria-ftegPfkletneolobiddelbqii statim-
STATINTL
Ap roved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-R0P91-00901R000
OM=
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS STATINTL
(21 ?An
13 YEBRUARY 1981
- ? -
- By JOSEPH VOLZ
Washington INews -thirean)--The mySteriousdisappearance of: Nei,v4
York native "Michael Hand after his Australian bankcollapsed has sent::
shockwaves thrOugliT..the tanks of former :' CIA and military men who
served in Vietnam and reportedly poured millions, of, dollars in
obtained
The isode': whiciv is major newS
representative for Nugan Hand while George Far -
?- !ep ',
ris, a former Green Beret buddy of ,Hand, worked
Australia but until. now has gone unnoticed
, in the bank's Washington- office. Even former
in the united States, threatens to xpose Central Intelligence Director William Colby, now
seamy Side of CIA and military activities in . -a Washington. Lawyer, represented Nugan briefly -
Southeast 'Asia----.inclUding arms and: drug in the months before Nugan committed suicide.-
' traffickingdealing oif.the, black :market.. Colby said Nugan told him he wanted to expand in
; and theft oTJ S funds earmarked or _th'e. the United States. The former spy chief said he
war effort. J::: 7 - had "no idea"- how or why the Nugan Hand Bank
At the time of its collapie, the Nugan Handhad prospered so rapidly.
Bank had. off iceS. in 16 Countries, including the When Nugan died, on-Jan. 27, 1980, of what
United States. Hand, a decorated Green- Beret Australian police said was a "self-inflicted" bullet
veteran of Vietnam, signed pp, as bank representa-
wound, Hand told authorities that Nugan had
tives all over Asia, military and CIA friends he had misappropriated large sums from the bank. It was
met in Vietnam._ But the _bank, which expanded discovered that millions were missing.
, , - ?
almost overnight in 1973, folded year shortly And soon after so was Hand
after Hand's Australian partner,: Frank Nugani .". AUSTRALIAN POLICE have a fugitive- War-
committed suicide in Sydney, the banks headquar-rant out for Hand, who took key bank deposit
ters. Hand-disappeared from Sydney1 few weeks .4.-,,records with him. They, Want him on a conspiracy-
: later and has not been seen since.
-charg
? Hand was born in the Bronx in 1941 A graduate
of DeWitt-Clinton High Schoor,'- he enlisted in the In the United States' the Customs Service is
Army in May 1963 and volunteered. forthe Green -conducting an investigation into the Nugan-Hand
i?
Berets Three years later he -was --a .war hero .Bank's currency transactions. It is known that the -
. ,. - 'T,
having Won the Distinguished Serviee -Medal
FBI quietly began investigating the bank in Manila
for '
Fitt .1-lonnlulu, but officials, refuse- to ? discuss the
his courage- in .holding, of.Vcharging Communist
troops despite being twice WOUridedi ;
A CIA spokesman offered aterse"no comment".
- By .1973, through 'tome.'raysteriouS:waY," high
school graduate Hand?who-had once Passed the,..: when asked if the agency had any connection with
.
New York State forest ranger test?was into a new the bank Nugan and Hand got their start as a
line of work international banking business team. in 1969, forming Australasian and
; : 6f
ThoughiS belieVedhe had no sizable amount "Pacific?? Holding Ltd.; which was described as a
"tourism7 company, Among the shareholders of
of money, he and'Nugani7.who at the time was ,a
wholesale produce dealer opened their bank in.; the venture were four men who .gave their busi;,-.
1;'
Sydney, _capitalizing it for. $1 million Within -ness address as Air, America?for years: a CIA--4
. ?
months; the bank had offices company
,all over Asia.
_ _
- ?. ? ? . Colby says he believeS7Nugan-Hand had no
INEVITABLY,_ THE' OFFICES of rthe-Nugan- ?dealings with the CIA. But one former' intelligence
Hand Bank-seemed to be Icicated_ in cities where
the CIA had najor-stations: Hong Kong Manila
official Says the CIA-is particularly vulnerable to
i- , ,
fraud by its employes?though few have ever been
prosecuted?because of its lax accounting?prac-
.; Often outside groups have been called in to
? mask CIA interest in a transaction -and given-
Beret Benk!'- ha 'military circleS beCausei,sojinallY virtual carte blanche with the government's checkL,
ex-Green Berets?as well as former CIA:officers-- boolLOne example surfaced a few years ago when
v.,t1Npro.,740.0.4-FOr ReleaS0:2110:41/03/0%;aliglAzdarl/
. ? Army Gen EdwinBlack, brines' commander of -.. planes in r urop r es ikalgrtOgaVaill-
forOiAn -Thalland,_bec.ame.: the _Hawaiian
Taipei. And not only in Asia, but the Middle East
(Saudi .Arabia) -`and Europe. (Britain. :and _West,
Germany) as well
Nugan-Hand. became' :known as the "Greed:
APPrg
ON VAGIL
Release 2001/03/07. ? CIA,-,R9P9146?HRTJ00500080013-4
THE Wi.WINGTuili
10 February 1981
Americans, now agree on the need to renew and
revitalize our military, forces; Improvements are in,
process for our strategic nuclear forces, the land, sea
and air units prepared for conventional continental
conflict and. the, Rapid: Deployment Force being
built, for medium-scale intervention missions. But
examined on the scale of which Americans will see
live combat, those most likely to fight deserve first
priority ?
In the 'world President Reagan looks out on:
American diplomats are threatened, terrorists id all
descriptiona are at large, and the conviction persists
that America mai become more muscular but lacks
the wit or will to act 'effectively': Cuban, East Ger:
'man and other Soviet proxies proliferate in Africa,
the Middle East and central America,, and ideo-
logues such as Qaddafi; Khomeini and Castro plot to
isolate the United States by subverting its allies.'
The contrast between the disastrous Iranian mission
and successful comparable actions in recent years by
Israel, _Germany, Britain 'and France suggests that
other groups will believe they can challenge Amer-
ican "superpower" wit.h iinpunity,humble American
-
citizens and overthrow America's allies. : -
Small unit elite forces Enid personnel Wilt almost
certainly see live action against these attacks. Even
President Carter overcame his : reluctance to see
Americans in combat and dispatched the hostage
rescue 'mission to Iran and an advisory team to El.
Salvador's internal war. President Reagan- and Sec-
retary of State Alexander Haig have announced that
the United States will not react softly to terrorism:'-.
But these forces are poorly prepared to reetiond.
Our elite units, are scattered .through the military
services without central comniand-7Special Forces
in the Army, SEALS in the Navy, commando ,units
in the Air Force, recoil units in the Marines; area
specialists and linguists in intelligence, advisory and
training units. In the Iranian mission, the pentagon
produced -a force and command structure with bu-
reaucratic deference to all the different uniforms,
but at a cost to cohesion and decision.-Our
tradition of preparing for great wars causes disdain
for the extra costs in leadership and 'resources de;
mended by elite forces,, which must be subtracted
from the mass units.' Institutional distinctions be:
tween the military, and civilians deprive our advisory
teams of the more subtle political and psychological
capabilities of the Foreign Service and our
and intelligence services?
A simple alternative is available.' An 'elite. staff
must be formed, reporting to the chairman of the
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080013-4
Joint Chiefs of Staff,- but not to the coordinating
labyrinth of the component chiefs or the joint staff..
This . staff must organize, plan for and establish.
ready logistics and other support for a Unit of several.
hundreds--.-volunteers from the military services
and 'appropriate civilian agencies such as the For-
eign Service and the CIA. The unit should be put in
a'single training area to form teams and relentlessly
train and 'practice for hostage rescue, - ship and
air-
craft recapture, POW release and terrorist capture,
with ita own organic light aircraft, helicopter and
Maritime capabilities. ,? ;
The closest of links mint be maintained with in-
telligence agencies se that the unit is kept currently
informed of potential threats and can be dispatched
the afternoon the president orders. Unit personnel
should be formed into advisory teams for assign-
ment tc countries facing the challenges of terrorism..
subversion and turmoil, needing fully integrated'
political, psychological, paramilitary and police tac-
tics and techniques rather than conventional Mill=
tary advice alone. Rotation, out of the unit after It'
three-to-five year tour should be required to keep its
personnel fresh and be rewarded by choice assign
ments ahead of others who chose less challenging ca-P,
reer, tracks. , rid*
With the near-certainty that actions of this sort
are ahead, even if our improved regular milit,ary,
forces deter higher orders of violence, we 'should en-
sure that the courage of the' volunteers who will right'
these battles is matched by the forethought of their'
leaders in preparing and organizing them for coal-'
VAcif'^,A
The .uniter, who was &rector of the CIA from
1973 to 1978; twicitiarachuted behind German lines
int-World War II and directed multi-agency advi-
vsory teams in the Civil Operations and Rural Devel-
opment Support (CORDS) mission in Vietnam
front 1963 to 1971. ?
STATI NTL
elease 20011013fOrMUAIRDPVT=901R0
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1-1981
qatelligenee in the 1980s
William E. Colby
Reid & Priest
1111 19th Street, N.W:
Washington, D.C.-
Abstract - The 1980s will see revolutionary changes in intelli-
gence analysis and assessment, matching the changes in collection in
the past few decades. Information management will be improved by
technology, analysis techniques will be refined by new disciplines,
and intelligence warnings will be more pointed by improved commu-
nication modes and.by providing them to a wider public. Intelligence
in the information age will become a public function, not merely a
secret service.
The profession and discipline of "intelligence" faces a major turning
point in the 1980s. If successfully navigated, these years will mark the
culmination of the growth of a truly American intelligence system, as
different from traditional and foreign systems as American society,
culture, and government contrast with those abroad. The result can be a
remarkable improvement in our nation's .ability to analyze, judge, and
make decisions about international affairs.
For centuries, intelligence was the. small, private preserve of mon-
archs and generals. Governmental and military espionage ferreted out
the secrets of other powers in order to provide its sponsors with advan-
tage in their dealings. Secret agents intrigued and subverted in order to
discredit an opponent or support their adversaries within his own camp.
The spy was the prototype of this traditional "intelligence" discipline.
The first American- change in this traditional posture was latinched by
William J. Donovan in World War II 's Office of Strategic Services_ His
adventurous character certainly fitted the old tradition and he built
America's first worldwide service for espionage and for secret action
among guerrillas and liberation movements. But his adventurous spirit
was matched by an equally intense intellectual bent. Thus, in his new
intelligence orlranization he assembled a corps of academic experts to
"centralize" all the relevant information, that was overtly available as
well as that secretly obtained, to analyze it and to come to conclusions
about its significance. He gave this corps full status within the organiza-
tion and, indeet, praised it first in his final remarks to OSS in October
1945, ahead of his other personnel "in direct contact with the enemy."
This "central" contribution was so missed by President Truman
when he disbanded OSS that he reestablished the central staff a very few
months later in January 1946. While public opinion was transfixed?
and continues to this day to be so on the more.adventurous aspects of
intelligence, this central capability grew and became the key feature of
the_ modern American -approach to intelligence.
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ne seconct major change from traditional intelligence occurred with
the application of A merican technology to the collection of information.
Its most dramatic early example was the U-2 aircraft, bringing photo-
graphs from the center of the Soviet Union for several years before it was
shot down in 1960. This contribution has since increased geometrically
through satellite photography and through the many other avenues of
information collection now provided by electronics, acoustics, and a
variety of other sensing techniques. Computers and related devices have
provided an equal expansion of our ability to store, retrieve, and manage
the resulting masses of information.
In the short space of twenty years, this technology has revolutionized
the intelligence discipline. No longer does a spy have to work his way
secretly to a hostile border to determine the number of divisions placed
. there. Technology instead allows their strength, their equipment, and
their movements to be identified with precision and in detail. The spy's
sporadic and momentary glimpse of military forces has been replaced by
systematic and comprehensive coverage.
Outside government circles, of course, this same information explo-
i,;sion has taken place, through the technologies of modern communica-
!' tions, media dissemination, and information storage and retrieval. This
has produced the so-called information age which is already dominating
7'. our lives and our economies and will be a major feature of the 1980s.
A third major American change in intelligence has not been com-
pleted. Institutionalization of American intelligence within the Con-
stitutional framework is ending a status which was described by Presi-
dent Eisenhower as "divorced from the regular visible agencies of
government," the unfettered tool of the Executive. This change will
only be completed with the adoption by Congress of a new legislative
charter for American intelligence. This is currently stalled between
those who would restrict its functions to impotence in an excess of
post-Vietnam and Watergate revisionism and those who would like to
return to the good old days of independence and secrecy from all but the
sovereign Executive.
Eventually out of the debate will come a new American consensus as
to the proper role of American intelligence. It is clear that this-consensus
will include the requirement that American intelligence be Constitution-
ally accountable. It is also clear that this consensus will call for the
careful use of secret techniques and agents where necessary to obtain
essential information available by no other means. It will also permit
intelligence secretly to assist friendly elements in other nations when
their actions can make a substantial contribution. to the safety of the
United States, when direct U.S. military commitment is unwise, and
other overt American involvement is impossible. And the new consen-
sus must provide better protection for the secrets essential to American
intelligence through criminal sanctions against those irresponsibly ex-
posing them.
These three changes in intelligence are only dimly perceived by an
American public still titillated by the romantic figure of the spy.'
Thoughtful students and participants understand better the new nature of
intelligence, place the agent in his proper role of contributor, but not the
sole actor, in intelligence today, and seek a structure of direction and,
control appropriate to the new character of American intelligence. But
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intelligence is forming, which offers an even more important opportu-
nity for the future.
This fourth change would revolutionize intelligence thinking, to im-
prove the quality of intelligence estimates and warning, to match the
quantitative improvements already achieved in information collection
and management. Essential to this challenging task is a full understand-
ing of the real purpose of intelligence: accurate perception of the true
proportions of present events and warning of likely and potential future
ones. The forces and factors producing present developments must be
clearly identified so that they can be dealt with sensibly; and irrelevant
reactions can. be rejected, however emotionally satisfying they might
be. The future will never be shown precisely in an intelligence crystal
ball, as the function of intelligence is to warn so that action today can
ward off danger tomorrow, and make the prediction erroneous. But
potential future developments must be forecast so that the "unex-
pected" no longer surprises. In these two areas lie the unfinished tasks
of intelligence, which it must address in the 1980s.
The need for this change has been dramatized in the past two years in
Iran and in Cuba. The unexpected fall of the Shah was not a collection
failure. The facts leading to it were matters of common knowledge: die
Shah's forced-draft modernization program, his regime's dependence
on his army, police, and bureaucracy and the absence of an active
political base, the bitter but marginal leftist opposition, the inchoate
traditionalist opposition, and the rise in tensions over human rights and
corruption. Into this volatile mix the lighted match of the Ayatollah
Khomeini dropped, to produce the explosion which exiled the Shah and
caused President Carter to demand a review of our techniques of politi-
cal intelligence.
In Cuba, a detailed review of holdings on Cuba as a whole and the
Soviet presence there revealed old references to a Soviet "brigade,"
and a lucky break derived from increased surveillance confirmed its
existence. The positive indentification of this 2,600-man unit and its
forty tanks and 60 artillery pieces then produced rhetorical bombshells
from all sides about the danger this inconsequential force posed to the
safety of the American republic.
In both of these cases the failure lay less in the acquisition of
information than in the techniques of assessing its significance. And
these were not the first such shortcomings. The national estimate before
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was that the Soviets had never, and thus
0,1nuld never, emplace offensive nuclear missiles outside Soviet tern-
This comforting conclusion was fortunately contradicted by U-2
aithotographic evidence just before the missiles reached full operational
l'A'atatus, in Cuba.
The rational computation that Vietcong supplies could be amply
.1ransported over the Ho Chi Minh Trail and that there was no evidence
that they were being transported through Cambodia's Sihanoukville
4.(Kotnpong Som) in 1969 was contradicted after the fall of Sihanouk by
the emergence of bills of lading showing the established transport
routes. Projections of the future pace of Soviet strategic weapons de-
velopment through the 1960s were demonstrated in retrospect by critic
Albert Wohlstetter to have substantially underestimated the actual rate
rLO.f dev,Oppment, although the specific weapons available at any one time
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were faithfully reported. The intelligence community's Watch Commit-
tee opined in October 1973 that Egypt should not, and consequently
would not, launch major action over the Suez Canal, at almost the exact
moment it was doing so.
These erroneous projections of future developments highlight the
unfinished task of perfecting American intelligence. This litany of
errors is only partial, of course. A fair account would also note the wise
national estimates of the nature of the Vietnam conflict published in the
Pentagon Papers; the intelligence community's meticulous and detailed
reporting of Soviet strategic weaponry activity exceeding permissible
behavior under SALT I so that protests produced compliance; the useful
recent warnings that the Soviet Union will shift from seller to purchaser
of oil in 1982; and the close attention given the Soviet preparations and
preliminary movements into Afghanistan. These and many other exam-
ples can be used to show an impressive rate of success of intelligence
projections, but the real requirement in this vital field must be measured
by the fact that even the _occasional error could have fatal effects.
Ill
The first phase of this fourth change will seek to improve our manage-
ment of the mass of information now collected and available to Ameri-
can intelligence. New intellectual procedures, electronic hardware, and
a proliferation of software otter not only new ways to store and retrieve
information, but also new capacities to relate not only relevant but even
apparently unrelat,d facts.
No individual fact exists in isolation. It can only be properly inter-
preted in the context of many other facts relevant to it. A single soldier
out of step in a parading battalion will attract the TV camera, but a
judgment of the battalion's discipline and training must view the whole
unit and clarify whether his failure is typical or exceptional and whether
the battalion performs better on maneuver than parade. The effect of a
political speech must be judged not only by what it says, but in the
context of the economic, sociological, demographic, military, psy-
chological, and -cultural circumstances in which it is delivered.
The individual fact must also be judged in relation to its position in
time, considering what it represents in change from the past and what it
suggests about change in the future.
Clearly the information age and its technology have opened whole
new vistas for these techniques of information management. With
mechanized data banks and libraries, vast quantities of information can
be searched for material relevant to any inquiry. The evidence from the
satellite camera, the electronic intercept, and the attach?ighting can be
instantaneously centralized. The obscure reference in one report can be
clarified by the patterns revealed in analogous situations. We are
energetically seeking to achieve automatic translation to reduce the
language barriers established at the Tower of Babel, to select and
highlight relevant material for sophisticated human translation, al-
though not yet?perhaps never?reproducing poetry or eloquence trans-
lingually. The technique of "cratology"?identifying Soviet military
aircraft by the shape of their crates on the decks of ships delivering them,
dating from the early 1960s-r-can be supplemented by a number of other
equally useful techniques of pattern identification. With these mechani-
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cal aids, old and small details need not be forgotten or overlooked in the
course of a new review by a busy analyst.
Many of these techniques are, of course, mechanical and depend
upon the discipline under which the mechanical storage took place. Here
there can be human fallibility or mechanical shortcoming, producing the
familiar "garbage in, garbage out" criticism. Rather than impatient
rejection of the potential because of this inherent frailty, intelligence
must improve the discipline and the techniques so that they become
reliable and helpful.
Mechanical processes will never substitute for thought, nor will
machinery, no. matter how complex, replace the wise man, as his
judgment can handle more variables than any machine which has yet
been devised. The machines may not be able to answer question's, but.
they can present many of which the man was not aware, and force him to
carry his inquiry beyond where he might have rested. They can highlight
anomalies, contrasts, and exceptions, and compel attention to why they
occur. The wise intelligence officer will accept willingly the discipline
of such methodical procedures, just as the wise pilot methodically
proceeds through his pre-takeoff checklist despite his thousands of
hours of flying experience, against the remote, devastating possibility
that he omit an important step in his preparation for flight.
The second phase of the fourth change must occur in the analysis
process, building from the information base the constructs of meaning
and potential which they suggest. Intelligence analysis to date has
tended to stress the academic discipline of careful attention to evidence
and a conscientious search for a rational basis to account for, integrate,
and explain in a comprehensive way the vagaries of human action. To
draw a moral from past events and identify good and bad lessons for
future decision making, this process has certainly been valuable. But as
a basis for projection of future probabilities it has too many times been
found wanting.
A new discipline specifically designed for intelligence analysis must
be relined, and the process of research and development has already
begun. It willstep beyond academic analysis through new techniques to
project future probabilities rather than explain the past. Experiments in
this new discipline are by no means limited to the official intelligence
community, as they also take place in information science research
centers, among political risk analysts, and in the projections of the Club
of Rome, the Global 2000 study, and others. Some of these experi-
ments merely impose methodical disciplines on the careful enumeration
of alternatives and measure variations in the components of the forces
producing their models, from population growth to energy resources.
Some call for new forms of challenge and debate within the community,
from war or political-game scenarios and mock central committee
meetings to a proliferation. of B, C, and D panels of outside experts
representing different viewpoints. Some merely impose more precise'
numerical accountings of periodic assessments by individual analysts,
singling out those consistently better and penetrating generalities
obscured beneath rich English prose. Some involve whole theories,
such as Bayesian analysis, endeavoring to assess cumulative probability
from a:series of factors of varied weight, or gingerly experiment in the
,,diffieult, terrain of artificial 'intelligence. . , ?
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Many of these techniques are subject to legitimate criticism as overly
simplistic, mechanistic, and empirical, inadequately reflecting what are
still intangible values, influences, and judgments. But these are reasons
to refine and improve such techniques ,not to discard them, in the search
for more methodical and disciplined systems of analysis.
The new systems of analysis must recognize the importance of con-
sidering all capabilities and the desirability of economizing the response
to them. But they also must recognize that specific intentions are not
'only difficult to ascertain but arc inherently unreliable, as they can
change between the time they are learned and the time they are executed.
Thus analysis must seek to identify the forces and factors working to
influence an adversary's decision making, to judge what these will lead
him to do rather than what he would like to do or what he could do. This
will extend the analysis far beyond the numerical balance of forces or
economic power into the still rudimentary fields of psychological moti-
vation, cultural influence, and social behavior.
An example of the improved perception of reality which is possible
through such analytical techniques has been developed by the Overseas
Development Council (ODC)?the so-called Physical Quality Of Life
Index. The traditional comparison of the wealth and well-being of
different nations has relied upon their gross national product, and
refined this to a per capita gross national product figure. However, these
proved inadequate when it became clear that the per capita gross na-
tional product of a country such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia was skewed
by its oil wealth, a wealth in no way shared by the population as a whole.
The social and political tensions between rich and poor in many oligar-
chic states were concealed by such a measurement.
To meet the need for a better tool for development planning among
nations, the ODC combined three fundamental measurements of well-
being of a population, life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy,
into a composite rating. These three factors were chosen to represent
national and social well-being, rather than the national econoMic. bal-
ance 'alone. The precision of the component figures, such as literacy,
may be questioned in some underdeveloped nations, but even in their
approximate form they serve the development planner better than the
equally imprecise per capita GNP test.
More sophisticated intelligence analysis must also provide better
consideration of the secondary effects of various optional models of
change. Methodically approached, much clearer pictures of alternative
trends can be gained from a spreading decision tree showing the number
of choices a foreign leadership might have as the next step after an action
immediately before it. Clearly, the modern information technology
enables a far richer set of alternatives to be listed and considered than
that which has been available to date. Such projections could reduce
tendencies to focus on the most desirable probability, the immediate
difficulty. or the rational choice as distinct from the emotional. Obvi-
ously, this process cannot be carried forward too far, as the variables
rapidly become too numerous even for the technology, but it can be used
to focus attention on the likely subsequent stages of a critical situation
and whether they would be .better or worse than the existing. Concern
? over. the Shah's failings might have better weighed the possibilities of
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the problems produced by tne Ayatoi iah ictiomeini ? 1 e exercise could
also be valuable in selecting the best direction for American influence in
post-Park Chung Hee Korea, weighing the likely outcomes of the
alternatives of multiparty political contest or a priority for discipline,
against the background of North Korean policies and power.
Some changes in older analytical doctrines are already in process in
the intelligence community, such as closer integration of the analytical
function between the collectors and their policy-level customers. The
earlier belief was that these should be Separated, so that refined analyti-
cal judgment would be unsullied by collector enthusiasm or policy
preference. The ivory tower isolation which resulted from that theory
has been found wanting. The collectors collected what they thought was
important and passed the results directly to the policy level, especially
during crises when time was vital. The expert analyst was then left out of
the loop, unable to add his wisdom, and such analysis as took place was
done by the policy generalist. Policy officials expressed unhappiness
that the analytical products did not relate to their real concerns when
they did arrive from the tower. There will always be problems in the
relationships among these three levels, as the collector's raw report
inevitably will rocket to the policy level and the policy official fearful of
leaks will keep his most sensitive (and frequently most important)
information from the analyst. But the intelligence and policy com-
munities can communicate better than under the artificial doctrine that
they would contaminate each other by contact. The danger that analysts
will be drawn into policy debate and sacrifice their objectivity must be
faced and overcome, but not at the cost of removing them and their
expertise from the policy process entirely.
The traditional organization of the analytical community itself,
largely according to the disciplines of politics, economics, military
strategy, and science, has caused each discipline to view the world from
its special vantage point, but militated against the integration of analyti-
cal judgments according to the real?geographic?entities the policy
officials must deal with. As a result., political or military policy
generalists depend too much upon briefings by the respective discipli-
nary experts, which they then must integrate themselves. A beginning
has been made toward organizing intelligence analysis according to
geography, but a major restructuring of the analytical community into
geographic centers, each with all the disciplines represented, is a matter
of first priority as we enter the 1980s.
It is plain that this restructuring must also reflect the reality that
intelligence today must expand its responsibilities to reflect the real
challenges our nation faces in the world around us. No longer are these
merely from threatening military forces or hostile political movements.
Today they lie in such diverse fields as energy resources, trade and
financial balances, sociological stresses, and cultural antagonisms. For
these problems, intelligence must develop the same independent analyt-
ical center it has long provided for political and strategic matters,
including in its community the specialists of the Departments of Energy,
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture as it has those of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force. The national intelligence analysts must make
independent assessments of the fashion in which developments in these
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specialized disciplines can affect the nation as a whole, and how these
problems relate to the many other problems and dangers the nation
faces. Progress in this direction has been made in the CIA's reports on
economic, energy, and agricultural problems, but the function must be
fully understood and the appropriate relationships established with the
new departmental coworkers in this larger field of intelligence analysis.
The third phase of the 1980s change must take place in the communi-
cation of the products of intelligence to its users. The recent rhetorical
reaction to the identification of a Soviet brigade in Cuba bespeaks the
need for a considered technique of communicating individual facts in
their true proportions, lest overreaction be generated.
On the other hand, underreriction is as dangerous, and can be induced
by inadequate attention to unlikely eventualities. The fall of the Shahof
Iran is an example. On the basis of the relevant facts about his positiohin
1978 it was not unreasonable to conclude that he would probably
continue in power, an assessment which would have been shared by
almost any observer of the Iranian scene then. But a changed communi-
cation formula into the language of numerical probabilities could have
provided a better warning of the actual and unexpected reAilt. A 10
percent probability estimate that he would not continue would be only
slightly more thought-provoking than reassuring general prose. But the
communication process for the intelligence estimate might also have
included a factor for the importance of the improbable development;
multiplying the 10 percent to produce a warning signal forcing early
attention to ensuring that the slight probability not occur.
Intelligence failures in the past have produced a variety of techniques
to require adequate attention to intelligence warnings. Pearl Harbor
resulted in a structured machinery which operated for three decades and
concentrated on the possibility of a strategic attack upon the United
States or its allies, however improbable that attack may have seemed on
any one day. Reckless debate many times took place as to whether an
intelligence gap occurred when leaders were 'surprised but intelligence
officers pointed to reports that they should have read. This was replaced
by alert and warning notices through which the intelligence community
took responsibility for winnowing through the mass of information to
call attention to dangerous possibilities, but tried to avoid self-defeating
cries of "Wolf!" too frequently.
These warning procedures must be extended from the short-term alert
to the equally important call for attention today to the danger years
ahead, which can only be met by the early initiation of long-term
countermeasures. The predictable increase in tensions from over-
population and poverty in the Caribbean must generate the same warn-
ing as a report of an imminent terrorist plot, since the social and
economic programs necessary to counter these conditions can only be
effective if initiated in good time; otherwise, their damage to our society
might be greater than that which a terrorist bomb could produce.
IV
80013-4
The communication aspect of intelligence warnings and estimates raises
the special problem to whom they should be communicated. If intelli-
gence is thought of primarily in strategic and military terms, these
warnings obviously primarily concern our strategic and military leaders.
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It is on this basis that the National Security Council is identified as the
primary customer of the intelligence community, and that doubts,arise
whether it should be serving others at all. But as the dangers to our
country spread beyond the military and strategic into the political, the
economic, and the sociological arenas, it becomes clear that the respon-
sible Americans who must take the steps to avert those dangers also.
"need to know" the intelligence warnings and estimates of future
problems in those fields.
In the American Constitutional system, it is plain that this responsibil-
ity even extends beyond the national security executive departments.
It certainly involves executive departments such as the Department
of Energy with respect to foreign energy resources, the Department of
Agriculture with respect to the world grain trade, the Department of
Commerce concerned about our trade balances, and the Department of
Treasury concerned over the health of the dollar.
It is also clear that the Congress under the Constitution shares respon-
sibility for the security of the nation. Just as it has been provided with
information about hostile weapons systems in order- to determine the
appropriate defensive forces on our side, so it must share estimates of
foreign economic, social, and political developments in order to partici-
pate in the formulation of the necessary American policies to meet them.
And even Congress cannot operate without a base of public under-
standing and support. Thus the intelligence analysis and the factual
information upon which it rests must be shared with the public as well.
This of course is the current practice, as our media and political debaters
discuss detailed measurements of Soviet strategic weapons, conven-
tional armaments throughout the world, and the trends and estimates of
their future growth. This must also be the practice in the 1980s with
respect to the economic and social challenges that will dominate that
decade: energy, trade, inflation, poverty, underdevelopment, and social
turmoil. The intelligence analyses of these significant international
problems must be communicated in a sober and sensible fashion so that
the entire American people can understand and support the necessary
programs in order to manage and solve them.
This is, of course, a challenge to the traditional concept of intelli-
gence as a secret service which ferrets out an enemy's secret plan and
shares it with a monarch so that he can win a battle. It is a reflection of
the growth of American intelligence into the sophisticated '.center of
intelligence that it has become, truly a cornucopia of information born
out of the information age and its special collection devices. It now
possesses the responsibility, to assist the nation to survive in a world
-which can be as dangerous economically and socially as militarily. And
it is a recognition of the fact that government intelligence agencies are
supplemented by a host of other analysts in academia, business, and the
fourth estate as America wrestles with its problems, with none able to
assert exclusivity?or infallibility. Indeed, government might well
multiply the effectiveness of its own analytical agencies by contributing,
to the funding of such external and private analysis, to generate inde-.
pendent challenges to its own conclusions.
Communication techniques for this new responsibility of intelligence
must be the subject of further development and experiment. Protection
of secret sources is the least of the problems involved, as this can in most
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Journalists to disseminate their substantive in Dillation su/
protect their
sources. Rather than insisting on including (or leaking) the source to
demonstrate the credibility of the report, the intelligence agencies must
build their reputations for reliability so that attribution to them warrants
that their facts are based upon credible sources. This will require the
intelligence agencies to develop new formats for their reports, and
perhaps an agreed hierarchy of phrases to assign to sources of varying
reliability, but the key will be to develop the readers confidence that
their reports are worthy of careful attention.
Factors other than source protection must also be considered when
intelligence reports and assessments are made public. The reduction of
an administration's tactical flexibility may be an acceptable and even
desirable necessity in our Constitutional system, akin to other inhibi-
tions on executive power. But a negative and denigrating intelligence
assessment of a foreign leader or power, however true, can produce
resentment and reaction against the government. issuing it, as was the
case with some of the Congressionally mandated human rights assess-
ments. And some governments may accept that American intelligence is
privy to matters that are kept secret, but would move to retaliate if the
exposure was revealed to their own people. Some Third World nations
are already murmuring that they must share control of technology, even
in outer space, which could publicly reveal activities within their
sovereign territories, although they are well aware of the technological
capabilities of the United States today to learn of them.
These problems raised by public dissemination are not insoluble,
because the key element in most of them is the attribution of such
material to the American government. Similar assessments and similar
knowledge appearing without official attribution do not evoke the same
reaction nor subject the American government to the same formal
protests and reaction. Thus the difficulty can be minimized if the
governmentally acquired or produced information and assessments are
not officially released. A number of potential private intermediaries
exist to whom the material could be made available, who could repro-
duce it without official attribution. Many of these are at work today in
the media, of course, but the Congress and particularly the Library of
Congress are also increasingly providing this function. The academic
world and various public interest groups also offer vehicles for this 1
technique, to provide the substance of information to all those with the
need to know it but to minimize its international diplomatic effects.
The dangers could arise that intelligence would be used to support
policy rather than to assist in determining it, that intelligence would be
inhibited against release of material raising doubts about an administra-
tion's policies, and that the process of release would become an exercise
in manipulation. These difficulties can be minimized by a demon-
stration over time that intelligence information and assessments are
dispassionate and objective, providing the basis for policy debates
rather than resolving them, in the same fashion as periodic reports of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Reserve Board, and the many
other fonts of periodic information in Washington. The proof of this
pudding will be in the eating.
One of the largest hurdles to such communication lies in open attribu-
tion of such material to "intelligence," with its still exciting imaee. of
intrigue and mystery rather thanits reality as a center of information and.
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analysis. Hopefully, the growth of intelligence in the 1980s, and of
public perception of its real nature, will lessen this handicap. In the
interim, the information and assessments can be released, as many now
are, through the other departments in the form of posture statements,
information briefings for media, and reports to the Congress. raising no
eyebrows about such "intelligence" revelations. The key is to accept
that the reports must be made public and then determine the best way to
do so, rather than to continue the debate as to how to keep the material
secret and then to see it leak.
An additional benefit can come from this new open knowledge of
what was in the past classified intelligence. The information and the
assessments will be subjected to independent criticism and debate from
the many Other quarters which can bring relevant expertise to bear. The
academic experts, the political advocates, the media pundits, and even
the foreign subjects will be quick to point out aspects of the assessments
which appear faulty from their point of view. Such outside criticism can
only raise the standards the products of the intelligence community must
meet, and make them more reliable and useful.
V
The fourth great change in intelligence in the 1980s will prove to have
more extensive effects even than these substantial changes in the gov-
ernment's procedure for information management. It will constitute the
maturation of the intelligence function from its origins as a government
spy service to full growth as an intellectual discipline serving the private
and public sectors alike. The intelligence discipline will assume an
independent status serving all who need to collect, order and manage
information, draw from it the analytical conclusions upon which action
can be based, and produce comprehensive and measured assessments,
warnings, and estimates of the future, against which present decisions
and policies can be determined. The government's intelligence com-
munity should stimulate the development of these techniques, as intelli-
gence was an early sponsor and stimulus to the development of satellite
photography and computer hardware.
This process is already under way. Intelligence in its new dimension
has become too important to be left to government. Today's prolifera-
tion of information banks and analytical centers for investment counsel-
ing, political risk assessments, and "futures" estimates are witness to
the growth of the intelligence discipline outside traditional government
circles. In these centers, analytical rules and tools are being developed
to press beyond the services of credit centers, market research services,
and public opinion pollsters into projections of future opportunities and
dangers. The multiplicity of these centers will provide the incentives of
competition to research, develop, and produce more useful innovations
than an official bureaucracy would generate alone.
But an essential element of a successful revolution of this sort is
'lacking: a philosophy around which its elements can be formed and a
future objective clearly described. In the absence of such a philosophy,
threatening shadows of an inevitable "1984" totalitarianism will appear
; and the less developed nations will fear multinational domination by
electronic information tentacles violating their sovereignty. Even ad-
vanced nations are concerned over the centralization into American-
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based credit and similar data banks of the most intimate details about
their citizenries, resources, and cultures. These fears are producing
harnesses. on the new information industry, in the form of legislation
controlling the outward flow of data, personal and commercial, from
Many nations and also lead to demands by some for control of informa-
tion collected about them from any source. This race between tech-
nological capabilities and sporadic political and legal restraints will
produce conflict and frustration rather than confident growth unless an
adequate philosophy for the new age is developed.
In the information universe, a very few years have seen rapid move-
ment through several stages which required centuries in the world of
commodity trade. The era of acquisition or even conquest was the first,
reflected in the flow of commodities as tribute to imperial centers and
traditional espionage to gather information nuggets. This was followed
by a "mercantile" period, in which exchange was accepted provided a
net benefit accrued, in the intelligence world by doling out selected
items from a classified collection in return for another nation's equally
carefully released valuables. And as the volume of information ,availa-
ble explodes because of modem technology, we might say we are in an
era of "free trade" in information. This can be seen to provide mutual
rather than only one-sided benefits, as in the confidence gained by both
Israelis and Egyptians from Sinai Desert sensors ensuring against sur-
prise attack.
The need today is for a philosophy for the larger discipline of intelli-
gence, private as well as governmental. It must recognize the end of the
simple acquisitive stage of intelligence, and of the narrow mercantile
insistence on one-sided net benefit in exchanges. It must insist on the
recognition of mutual benefit from the free flow and exchange of
information, in the fashion that the SALT agreements recognize that
both sides can benefit from pledges against concealment and interfer-
ence with the other's national technical means of verification. It must
resist retrograde calls for a "balanced flow of information" as a camou-
flaged demand to control the information flow and manipulate appear-
ance rather than expand true knowledge and understanding.
This philosophy must also recognize the need for reasonable controls
over the information process, as the world has accepted similar ones
over the trading process. The free flow of information cannot be used to
justify potentially abusive collections of personal information any more
than free contract can be used to justify the employment of child labor.
Responsible authority must be given the task to protect against informa-
tion abuse as trade 'authorities protect against trade restraints.
The lesson of the commodity trade example is that each restraint must
have clear justification and that the guiding philosophy must be one of
freedom. Some philosophies and even nations have turned instead to
doctrinaire philosophies of control of their production of commodities.
But the success of the relatively free economies compared with the
failures of the controlled societies suggests that the path of freedom
offers greater successes as well as satisfactions. The same result can be
anticipated from a responsible philosophy of freedom as we face the
problems of the information age and the use of our "intelligence"?in
the best sense of the word?in the 1980s.
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