CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300040026-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 10, 1965
• Content Type: REGULATION

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$9TS CONi~REfi6
1 st Session
ExEOUTTVE RrrT.
No. 4, Part 2
CONSULAR. CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
~1UCtrsT 10, 1965.-Ordered to be printed
MINORITY. VIEWS
We do not concur. with the recommendation of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.. that the Senate give its advice and. consent to
ratification of the Consular Convention .With the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. We believe .that the disadvantages of the
convention for the United States are su:Ticiently grave to outweigh
the advantages which are claimed for it.
Our concern relates principally to the provisions in the convention
under which consular officers and employees of the sending state are
given immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.
This convention is the first to which the United States has been a
party which provides for unlimited exemption from criminal jurisdic-
tion for consular personnel Previous consular conventions- have
provided for; immunity from cri mal jurisdiction for consular per-
sonnel with respect; only to misdeanors but not to felonies. We
believe that if the provisions regarding immunity had not been
included in the convention, the Soviet- Union would not haws. agreed
to it and,that, in fact, these provisions were ~ principal Soviet objec-
tive.- The testimony of witnesses from the Department of State has
been contradictory on the question of whether t)ie Soviet Union or
the United States first proposed including theso immunity provisions
in the convention.
In any case; we believe that the extension of immunity to include
felonies would open the way to esppionage' and other forms of sub-
version on the part of Soviet consular personnel. If this convention
is ratified, and if the Soviet Union then establishes a consulate or
consulates in the United States, the officers and employees of these
consulates would be able to engage in espionage and subversion
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COIt6UIrhIt Ct?~vENTIO~ WITH THE S0~'IET ~~+I01
knowing that They will not be -liable to prosecution but only to e~-
pulsian.
It is true that the establishment of a Saviet consulate or consulates
would mean only a small increase in the number of Soy-iet affiicials
with immunity dram criminal jurisdiction (as of duly 1, 1965, there
were 249 Sa~rict officials and 150 dependents v~fho enjoyed diplomatic
immunity). ~e aro convinced, however, t17at there is a pre~3isposition
an the part of Soviet officials to engage sn espir~nage and subversive
acti~-ities, a predisposition ~?hich is an important consideration
regardle~ of the numbers involved. In this cannect~ion, it is impportant
to recall the testimony of d. Edgai? hoover, Dil~ectar of the Feder~~l
Bureau of Investigation, before a subeomsnittee of the {'onimittee
on :lppropriations of the I3ause of Representatives on 1~gar~:h 4, 196x.
In ~~ statement inserted in the retard justfyiti~ the appropriations.
being requested for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, ~[r. IIoa~7er
said:
In r~ard to the Communist-bloc espionage attach
against this country, .them has been na letup w~iatsaever.
I~'istorically, the Saviet intelligence services have appra-
priated the great bulk of official representation and diplo-
matic estabhshnlents in other countries as bases from which
to carry an their esp onage operations. Over the 3-ears, the
number of such official personnel assigned to the tinted
States has steadily increased.
In testimony= relating to this statcnient during flit ~llarcli 4 hearing
~1r. Heaver stated that "our Government is about to allow them
(the Soviet Union] to establish consulates in many parts of the country
which, of course, will make our work more difficult." fir. Hoover
then inserted in the record of the hearing several other brief statementst
The first read, in part, as fallotivs:
The methods used to collect the data sought by the
Communist bloc intelligence services aro almost as varied
as the tykes of data which they endeavor to collect, One of
their mainstays is the callectian of inforruatian--classified
and otherwise--through. espionage operations involving
personnel legally assigned to official Saviet and satellite
establishments in the United States. The focal paints of
these operations continua to be the United Nations and the
Communist embassies, legations, consulates, and news ar
commercial agencies iii our country. Such gathering of
information is conducted by the Communist representatives
using the legal cover of their diplomatic ar ether official
status to cloak their spying activities.
Historically, the Soviet intelligence services have ap-
propriated the ggrreat bulk. of official positions abroad,
primarily using their afFicial representatives and diplomatic
establishinent~ in other countries as bases from 4vhich to
carry on their espionage operations,
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CON~SIILf~~ ; CONVENTION wITH THE: S(~vIFT UNION
A second statement related specifically to the question of new
Soviet consulates: It read as follows:
Long seeking greater official representati~in in the United
States which would be more widely spread over the. country,
a cherished goal of the Soviet mtehigence services was
realized when the United States signed an agreement with
the Soviet Union on June 1,1964, providing for the reciprocal
establishment of consulates in our. respective countries.
One Soviet intelligence officer in commenting on the
agreement spoke of the wonderful opportunity this presented
his service and that it would enable the Soviets to enhance
their intelligence operations.
In involving the great bulk of their official personnel in
intelligence activity in one way or another, the Soviets
utilize to the fullest extent possible any and all official moans
such as the United Nations, trade delegations, and the like,
as transmission belts to carry additional intelligence personnel
into this country.
I1~Iore recently, on July 14, 1965, ~Ir. Hoover, reviewing the major
phases of the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the past fiscal year, stated:
The great majority of the 800 Communist-bloc official
personnel stationed in the. United States, X-rotected by the
priz-ilege of diplomatic immunity, have engaged in intelli-
gence assignments and are a dangerous threat to the security
of the United States.
We believe that these statements of the chief investigative officer
of the United States should be given serious consideration. It is also
worth looking at the record of the activities of ~7oviet officials in the
United States. According to information supplied by the Depart-
ment of State, since 1946, 27 Soviet Embassy and consular officers and
personnel in the United States have been arrestE;d or expelled for in-
telligence activity. Those 27 included personnel assigned to the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet consulate general in New
York (which was closed in 1948), the Soviet mission to the United
Nations, and the United Nations Secretariat. :[n the same period,
13 diplomatic, consular, and international organization officials from
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania were expelled from the
United States for intelligence activities.
There is another grave aspect to these immunity provisions and
that is the chain reaction that will be set off if this convention is
ratified. The provisions regarding immunity will then apply not only
to Soviet consular personnel but may also apply to consular personnel
of the 27 other countries with which the United. States has consular
conventions or agreements which contain amost-f avored-nation clause.
These 27 countries include 2 other Communist countries: Rumania
and Yugoslavia. As a practical matter, as there are no Rumanian
consulates in the United States at present, them would not be any
immediate increase in the number of Rumanian official personnel.
enjoying. _complete immunity from crim~,inal prosecution. If any
Rumanian consulates were established in the United. States in the
future, however, their consular personnel would enjoy such immunity.
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CO1ti BULAR C(}Ir'3~E~ITION ?~'ITH THE SO~IIET UNION
~F'~e are thus opposed to the convention because we con3ider the
provisions ;ranting unrestricted itnmunit~ from criminal jurisdiction
to Soviet consular personnel to be unw~c. ~e believe that these
immunity provisions will encourage Sc~vict subversion b3- placing
.Soviet consular ersonnel outside the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States. c also believe tha.i it is not in the intere.~ts of the
United States to extend this immunity to several hundred, p?rhaps as
~i~an~ as 440 persons which would be the case ,given. the f act that z~nost-
favored-nation clauses are found in consular conventions and as ce-
ments the United States has with 27 ether countries.
rR4~~ ~. LAUSCUE.
BovRg~ B. IIrc~NLO~r~R~
~oII~ J. WILLFA~iB-
I~ARL Fi. I~UNDT.
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD (DE11~S-
OCRAT, CONNECTICUT) ON THE PROPOSED _RATIFICA-
TiON OF THE CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH -THE
SOVIET UNION
I wish to express my opposition to the ratification of -the Consulaz~
Convention With the Soviet Union.
I am opposed to it not because this clauso or that clause has been
poorly drawn, but on grounds of basic principle,.
The signing of tho consular convention will in no way serve: to
improve communications between the Soviet Government and the
Government of the United States, because it i,7 not the function. of
consulates to communicate or to participate in diplomatic- conver-
sations.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the opening of several
American consulates in the Soviet Unian and several Soviet consulates
in the United- States will encourage. the development of friendlier
relations between tho Soviet and- American peoples, ar that it will
perstt~de the Soviet leaders to call off the cold war:
On the contrary, it is my conviction that .the establishment of
Soviet consulates in this country will only servo to provide the
Kremlin with an enhanced cold war capability and that it will, in the
lo~tg rung only fan popular hostility totivard the Soviet Union because
of -the incurable addiction for espionage of all Soviet diplomats:
The record of Soviet diplomatic espionage is so massive and con-
sistent that I think it can properly be taken far granted that every
Soviet diplomat anal diplomatic employee must be considered a
member of the Soviet espionage apparatus and arecruiter-for this
apparatus.
~Ir.` J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, has underscored the seriousness of this problem in repeated.
statements over the years.
In a speech which I made on the floor of the Senate in October of
1962, I listed 17 Soviet nationals who had-used their positions at the
United Nations for purposes of espionage and v~rho had been .obliged
to leave the United States when their activities had been. exposed:
Since that tinge the number of such cases has grown to 21. In
addition to these Soviet nationals who had used their diplomatic
status at tho Unified Nations a~s a cover-for espionage against -the
United States, a total` of 12 Soviet nationals attached to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington have- similarly been obliged to leave the
country when their espionage activities were exposed.
I ~m a.ppendin~^ to this statement a summary list of Soviet nationals
at the United Nations and Soviet nationals attached to -the U.S.S.R.
Embassy tivho have engaged in espionage against the United Stated.
It, has been argued that -the Consular Convention With the Soviet
Union is in no sense exceptional because it is similar in substance to
our consular conventions with other nations.
s.
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C0~''sULAR COv'~~EgTILt~' ~4'ITH THE SO'V'IET L`:~IO\
This statement is not entirely accurate because the provision in the
convention which gives consular officers and employees immunityy
from criminal jurisdiction makes this the first convention which
rants such unlinuted eren~ptions to all consular personnel. Senators
~ausche, Williams of Delaware, IIickenlooper, and ITundt in the
minori:t~ views which they jointly presented, have dealt with this
matter m considerable detail.
But even if it were true that the convention with the Soviet
Union is similar in substance to our consular conventions with other
nations, this argument would still ignore the fact that the other nations.
with wham we have consular conventions are not canunittc~d to our
destruction, ara not seeking to subvert friendly governments all over
the world, and are not wading cold war against us.
I~Iore than one administration s akesnian has made the point
that those tivha oppose our policy in Vietnam for soma strange reason.
fail to comprehend the fundamental nature of Communist tyranny
and the nature of Communist aggression..
I, too, feel that the anti-Vietnam demanstratians that have taken
place on our campuses reveal an app~rlling lack of comprehension of
the basic facts about communi5ni.
But the fault fur this dyes not lie entirely ?~ith our ed~ica.tional
system ar ~G-ith the indifference of our citizens to the facts of liistary.
To a very large degree, I bclie~Te that the lack of comprehension
displayed by the manyy honest critics of our ?Fietnam policy stems
from the persistent eff~-rts, under both Democratic and. Rc:pablican
administrations, to loss over the ty~?anny of communism, to ignore
the ~?emlin's persistent anti-American tirades, to niinin~ize ita
subversii~e acti~-ity iii other countries, to grant the Sa~-iet regime
respectability, and. to encourage the illusory belief that the Soviet
regime is just another ci~dlized government ti~~iase philosophy happens
~ be difTercnt franc. ours.
To a large de~reo, this lack of comprehension has been encouraged
by things like hhriishchev's invitation to visit this country, b our
willingness to sweep the issue of Ilungary under the rug at tl~e ~nited
IiTatians, by muting the criticism of cammEiniSm on Voice of America
pro rams..
he consular convention which we are now being called upon to
ratify is, in my opinion, an error of the same order-an error that
blurs the differences between freedom and communism and that
makes it easier far the Communist cadres an our campuses to incite
the academic community against our policy in Vietnam.
I believe that we have noting to gain from this consular convention,
that it will not, by any stretch of the imagination, serve to bring
about a true abatement of tansians between the Soviet L'nion ;and.
the [Tnited States, and that it will contribute significantly to the
spread of popular befuddlement an the issue of Vietnam and on the
cold war ~ eneral.
I am loath. to ap~iase the administration on an is.5ue suchh as this
at so critical a period. in history. But I would be untrue to my
conscience and undeserving of any popular confidence if I were to
mute my criticism an this issue in deference to the administration's
attitude,
I, therefore, wish to ga an record against the ratification of the
consular convention and I would urge my colleagues to examine the
record closely before they cast their final vote...
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~ONrUL'AIZ ~R~00v~0026-3
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CQN5IILAR COIdYEHTI4~ '4S'I3`H 3'~ SO'YIET pI~iIOIV'
area u} Ne~v York City at a designated time and to place a package
wrapped in red ppaper therein so that i.t could be seen tla?ou~h the
rear window in the event material was to be passed. An additional
signal by way of marking a telephone directory in a ~a'ew York
restaurant was perfected to indicate to the source that the material
deli.vercd to the dead drop teas picked up.
A trial run of this arrangement occiu?red in I1Tcw York City on
April 23, 1952, on ~rhich date ~ovalev was observed in the immediate
vicinity of source's car, which was parked in the designated area
anal in which was placed a package ~vrappcd in red paper. Thereafter,
the source deposited material in the dead drop and on April 24, 1952,
I~ovalev ~cas observed making thepredesignatedmark in the telephone
directory in the New York restaurant.
:alatcrial of IntelllgenCe sI ificancc was left by the controlled
source in the ;!~Tew Fork dead drop area on October 1 and December 3,
1952, which materi;~l ~~Tas retrieved by the Soviets, On June 7, 1952,
the source v-as given b}? his Soti?iet principal in ifiashington $500 to
purchase an electronic device for delivery to the Soviets and an
additional 5500 %n payment for deli~Tei?~? of a nucrofilnz reproduction
of portions of a manual dealing vl-ith au automatic steering device
for ships, The controlled. source last heard from his Soviet. principal
on April 1, 1953, on ~rhich date he vas told that a meeting scheduled
for April 3, 1953, would not be held.
I~ovalev was declared peI?sana non grata by the De lartruent of
State for his actions in this case on February 3, 1954, and he departed
the United States February I0, 1954.
Leonid Igororrich Pivrl~v
PisTnev entered tho United States ou March 17, 1950, as assistant
Soviet ai~? attache.
On i~ovember 2 and 3, 1953, while on a tow? ihroug~out the South-
west, Pivnev purchased aerial mftgp~~ of Tulsa., Okla., grid vicinit
and Dallas, Tex. and vicinity, Pivnev did not identify hin~se~
as a Soviet ofpicia~ when purch!!sing these maps,
In the spring of I953, through a Washitlgtan businESSman, he
endeavored to utrl>~e the businessman's address as a mail drop. Ile
explained to the businessman that he would have mail delivered to
him at the businessman's address, ~ehich mail vas to be addressed
to s fictitious person and. which, upon receipt, ~cas to b+~ delivered
by the businessman to him.
On :March ~, 1954, he inquired at a ~Iril?ginia aerial photographic
concern as to the possibility of purchasing aerial maps cif Chicago,
Ill, He instructed the firm to seek such maps and agz?t~ed to pay
approximately '55,()00 fur them. On that date he purchased 33
aerial pbotographs of Washington, D.C., and vicinity, Pivnev, in
contacting this firm, identified himself as ono ~`Gcorge." IIe did
not indicate his official connection kith the Soviet Embassy.
On dray 3, 1954, he contticted a Washington, D.C., photographer,
introducing himself as a :1Ir. ~Cc~rge Tinney, a representative of ~~
private firlu desirous of purchasing aerial phntugraplLS of ~Tew York
City at a scale of 1:20,000 to I ;44,000 f eet,; .Photographs of this type
were not commercially available, On ~1ay 13, 1954, he agreed to
pay the photoggrrapher 5700 to obtain the photographs. Iie advanced:
on that date the sum of $4Q0,as partial.. paytuent,
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CON'BTIL'~R CONVENTION WITH TAE SOVIET UNION
On May 20, 1954, when meeting with the photographer .for. the
purpose of obtammg the photographs,. he was. accosted by special
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which occasion he
identified himself. On May 29, 1954, the Dep~artmant of State. de-
Glared Pivnev persona non grata for his. action, and he departed
June 6, 1954.
Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov
Bubchikov entered the United States December 1, 1954, as an
assistant Soviet military attach.
From July 1955 through May 1956, Bubchikov maintained contact
with a naturalized American citizen of Russian origin who was em-
ployed as a sales engineer. In July 1955 he appeared at the sales
engineer's residence late in the evening and sou;;ht his cooperation in
securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical
developments. Bubchikov promised -the engineer large sums of
money; however, even though seemingly important information was
furnished to him, he did not fulfill his promise of large payments...
During the. course of this operation it was featured by clandestine
meetings, complex recognition signals,. and a variety of "drop areas"
m which the source deposited material f or the Soviet.
In view of his activities in connection with the engineer, the De=
pertinent of State, on June 14, 1956, declared Bubchikov persona
non grata f or engaging "in espionage activities incompatible with his
continued presence in this country." He departed the United. Stites
June 24, 1956.
Yuri Pavlovich Krylov
Krylov entered the United States May 4, 1955, as assistant Soviet
military attach, Washington, D.C.
Tn April 1956, Krylov was introduced. to the manager of a Nash-
mgton electronics supply house. Through the Washingtonian, who
cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Krylov pur-
chased hard-to-got electronic equipment.
Tn August of 1955, Krylov contacted- an employee of tho Atomic
Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from him information
concerning the technical aspects of nuclear power: _ In December
1955, he contacted a former commissioner of the Atomic. Energy
Commission in an effort to develop information concerning : atomic
energy for space heating. Tn February 1956, he .attempted to pur-
chase 26 unclassified films on peacetime atomic energy. .
In February 1956, he endeavored to join. the Society of American
Military Engineers and to subscribe to the publication "The Military
Engineer," which contained information concerning U.S, fortifications.
On .January 14, 1957, the Department of State declared Krylov
persona non grata as a result of his activities. He departed the
United States January 26, 1957.
Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev
Mashkantsev served as an empployee of the consulate division of
the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., handlang repatriation matters.
He arrived. in the United States October 25, 1956.
On March 12, 1957, he appeared at the home of Pear Pirogov,
Russian flyer who, with Anatoli Barsou, defected to the United
States in Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected to Russia in 1949 and,
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~,(j CO~SULAIt CO~S'E~fiIQ:~ wITIi TI3E S0~'IE`F L?:4'IO
according to Vladimir 1?'et~?o~, the farn~or So~ieG intelligent;e officer
who defected in Austrnlia, after lengthy interrggation was executed.
Upon visiting Pirogov, ~Iashkantsev delivered to him a lengthy
hancl~~~ritten lct.ter purportedly from Barsov. The letter petitioned
Pirogov to return to the U,S.S.R. Examination of the letter estab-
lished that it vas not in the handwriting of Ilarsov but sues a carefully
prepared simulation. As a result, on April 17, 195'7, ~Iashkantser
was declared persona non grata for "impraper activities directed
toward inducing return to the Soviet Union of persons who here
sought asylum in the United States." :tfashkantseF departed April
25, 1957.
Nikolui Ivanovi~ch Kurochkin
F~.tirochlcin entered the United States, April ~, 1956, as a third
secretary of the ~Sa~~et Embassy, ~t'ashingtan, D,C.
In the fall of 1956, Charles T. I3eaumet, a professional writer,
contacted the So~-iet Embassy seeping statistics as to hosiery pro-
duckion in the So~~ict Union. IIe met Ii;urochpin, who supplied the
desired statistical data and, after a series of ineetings, informed
Iiealimet that if lie ~s?auld hbtaiii military informat~ian Go be incorpo-
rated in articles Kt~rochpin ?'as writing for Russian. militaryy journals,
he ~F~ould share with him his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter,
Ileauniet, utilizing the entree he enjoyed as a reporter, obtained
training and field manuals of the L'.S. Army which he turned aver to
Kurochkin. For the various manuals delivered to Iiurochkin,
Ileaumct was paid approximately ~$45Q. Included anion the manuals
sought by ~urochpin were two which ~i*cre classi$ed. ~he classified
manuals were net delivered to the Soviet.
Ou June 6, 1955, I~urochpin was declared persona non ;rata. for
engaging in higghly improper activities incompatible w%th leis diplo-
matic status, IIe de.partcd Pram the United States on dune I1, 1958.
.f;'vgeni Alek.seeaich Z?astroatsev
Zaostrovtsev entered the UTnited Shat-es August ~, 1957, as a second
secrcta~r~~ of the Soviet Embassy, ti'4 ashington, D.C.
4n February? 23, 1958, Zaostrovtsev ntet a State Department
Foreign Service officer in training, at a social function, There fol-
lowed intensive efforts on the part of Zaostravtsev t.o cultivate the
State Department ei~iployec for intelligence purposes. Between
February, 1958, and February 6, 1959, he mat with t:he State De-
PPartiiient. employee on 15 occasions. IIe obtained. from the State
Dcpartmclit eniplo~~cc material concerning the training program of
Foreign Servuoe afFis~era and endeavored, without success, to obtain
classified documents [ram. State Department files concerning the
ppolitical and economic affnir5 in the area of the Gotiterniiient employee's
futcu?e foreign a5signnient. IIe paid the Garernnient employee X150
for information furnished to him.
As a result of his dealings with the State Department employee,
the I7~epartine~it of :Mate oil ~Ia~' 13, 1959, made an informal request
of the Soviet Embassy for ~aostrovtsev's recall. Zaostrovtse~~
departed tho United States an :~1ay 15, 1959,
Ge~cnadiy G. Setxt~~nriov
Gennadiy Sevast~%aiiav arrived in the United Scales in i1~Iareh 1959
to serve as an alt-aeh~ in the cultural division of the Soviet Embassy
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
11
uI VPashington. D.C. On April 6, 1963, an individual whom the
Russians identified as "Vladimir Gridnev" arrived- in the United
States as a temporary employee of the Soviet ){ mbassy. Actually,
"Gridnev" was not the man's true name. Hf~ had been brought
to the United States under this pseudonym to assist in the attempted
recruitment of his brother, a Soviet defector now .employed by the
Federal Government, as a Russian spy.
Under the eye of Sevastyanov, "Gridnev" approached his brother
outside his brother's home m a suburb of VPashln~ton on the night
of April 28, 1963. Sevastyanov also stood by while meetings were
held between the brothers on April 30 and .May 2, 1963; and he
attempted to obtain details of the work which "Gridnev's" brother
was performing for the Federal Government as well as to recruit
him as an espionage agent.
"Gridnev" lef t the United States early. in May 1963. His brother
held one other meeting with Sevastyanov-on the night of June 13,
1963. "Gridnev's" brother cooperated fully with the FBI following
his initial contact by the Soviets on Apri128, grid FBI agents made
motion pictures, as well as still photographs, of the meetings between
the three men on April 30 and May 2.
Sevastyanov was declared persona non grata by the U.S. State
Department on July 1, 1963.
.Boris V. Karpovich .
On January 7, 1965, Boris V. Karpovich was declared persona non
.grata by the U.S. Government for conduct incompatible with his
diplomatic duties and he departed-the United Si;ates on January 12,
1965. (See p. 72 of Mr. Hoover's testimony, March 4, 1965, copy
.attached.)
-Stefan M. Kirsanov
On June 2, 1965, Kirsanov was declared persona non grata by the
U.S. Department of State For "activities incompatible with his
diplomatic status." Kirsanov and his wife departed the United
States June 10, 1965, for Russia.
LIST OF SOVIET U.N. REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET U.N. EMPLOYEES
WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE AGATNST Z'HE UNITED STATES
Vassili Molex
~~Phile attached to the Soviet delegation to thci United Nations, in
1953- (handling maintenance, purchase of supplies and similar matters)
Vassili Molex met Boris Morros on a date and at a time and place
previously designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence superiors in
Austria. Molex accepted from Morros a report prepared in New
York by Jack Soble and given. by Soble to Morros In accordance. with
instructions from their Soviet superiors. Photographs, both still
shots and motion pictures, of this meeting were. taken by FBI per-
sonnel. Immediately following the arrest of Jacl~ Soble on espionage
charges on January 25, .1957, the U.S. Department of State declared
Molex persona non grata.- Molex at that time: was employed (in a
similar capacity) by the Soviet Embassy. He left the United States
on January 28, 1957, en route to Russia.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 :CIA-RDP70B00338R000300040026-3
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 :CIA-RDP70B00338R000300040026-3
1~ CONSULAR Ca~"~'E:~'TIO\ wITII TILE SD~?IET L`~I0:4'
~tfikhai~ Ni~:olaeUich S~~arin
:iTikliail l`~Tikolaevich Svirin, a Soviet assigned to the So~~iet C .~'.
delegation from August 195? to ~~.~~ril 1954, vas identified by Yuri ~~.
I~ast~=orov, a former Soviet ilitelhgenee ofIic,~r, as a memlaor of the
1~Iirristry of Internal ~fl'airs and a very experienced iL telligenca
officer. S~-irin ~~as also identified b~= I~eino Ha.yhauen a former
Soviet intelligence agent. (}ri two occasions u1 January and February
1953, 5virin eras observed in the area whore Boris liorros ?~as schec~-
tiled to meet with his Soviet superior. ~Iorr?os subsequently met
Vassili ~Iolev on ~1la.reh ~3, 1953, at the scheduled meetrng place.
~YIQksi~ Grigorietncl~ ~~~rt~rcaU
:141aksim Grigorio~-ich ~ft~rtynoy lase entered th~~ G~uited 5t,~tes on
`woyember 3, 194, as n member of the Soviet representation to the
L .~ .:~1ilita~?y StafT Qomn~ittee. In august 1954 a highly laced
.~rrn}- oh'rcer in Gertuany ti~-as introduced to a Soviet under clandestine
circumstances in tl-e Soviet sector of Berlin. The officer did Writ
discourage the Soviet's approach and meetings in ~cse Fork ~cere
~irran~ed. .~ code phrase eras establiwlsed for recognition purpnscs.
The ~,cw York contact turned out to be ltlartyuua-. Qn t~vo oeca~t,?n,
a speda.l agent of the FBI, made up ter resemble the ~?my officer,. filet
with tlartynov. ?n the second occasion Januar ? 15, 1.9x5, F13I
agents, tirit~i State Dept~~~tnlent permission, accoste~ 1lart4iioy, ?-ho
identified himself, but claimed diplomatic immunity. ^On I