CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004800440001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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DAM REVIEWER3
22 December 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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India - COintiwnist China: Nehru's flat rejection on 21
k..?-\\ December of the claims Made in Chou En-laits letter of 17 De-
sk\ \\\\ cember leaves the border ,dispute deadlocked. Nehru advanced
.?SLN s
no new proposals, noting that Chou had found his "practical'
uggestions unacceptable and had nerely reiterated Peiping's
kl\\\T claims to extensive Indian territory. He maintained that Chi-
,\\ fiats claims were based on its recent intrnsions. Nehru turned
\..\ down Chou' s invitation to meet on 26 December as premature
as long as the Chinese and Indian vie-virpeints are still so far
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 Dece.71ber laU0
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMM mkusT B4oc
01\
Geneva Talks: The initial Soviet reaction to the failure
of the technical experts to reach agreement on the most im-
portant problems of detecting underground nuclear explosions
reflects Moscow's apparent concern that the 'United States
and Britain may use this impasse to press for a limited trea-
ty which would exclude underground tests from a permanent
ban. IM his final statement on 10 .December before the Christ-
mas recess, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin attempted to discount
the disagreements and called on his Western colleagues to 'put
aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work of the
political conference. Soviet spokesmen moved immediately
to try to shift blame for the impasse to the United States. They
challenged the correctness and objectivity of United States
seismic data and insisted that the talks proved the accuracy
of the 1958 report on a control system which the Western pow-
ers, in the light of new information, feel is no longer adequate.
Moscow's first public reporting of the latest A41:,' C underground
experiments using conventional high explosives was clearly
intended to leave the impression that the United States has re-
sumed nuclear testing.
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apart.. He stressed again, however, that his policy was t
'negotiate, negotiate negotiate to the bitter e.hd."j I. 25X25)(11
N 0
Morocco: Differences between Moroccan Premier Abdallah
Ibrahim and, the ,ing apparently have been patched up for the
time being. Friction had arisen over the arrest last week of
two leaders of the leftist, National Union of Popular Forces for
having implicitly criticized theKing. 'The American Ambas-
sador
?
sador in Rabat believes that a showdown now is desired neither
, .
by the palace nor by leftist sporters of Ibrahim and that ten-
sion once again' is rnodieratin
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in.E WE Srr
Latin America: Prazil has requested Argentina's support
for a meeting of Latin American chiefs of state at Brasilia
during the' city's dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital.
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tive was an "important declaration" on "Operation Pan America,
President Kubitschek's proposal for a joint attack on underde-
velopment in Latin America
C.ubitschelc's interest in such a meeting is probably three-
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fold,.-- to raise Brazil's -diplomatic prestige, to increase pres
sures on the United States for expanded technical and financial
25
assistance to Latin America,
and to help his party's chances in
the Qetober presidential
election_O
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Moves to Offset Impasse in Geneva Technical Talks
Soviet spokesmen at Geneva have moved promptly to play
down the importance of the areas of disagreement in the re-
port of the technical working group on the underground test
detection problem, At the same time, they are seeking to
place blame for the impasse on the United States. At the fi-
nal session of the political conference before the Christmas
recess, Chief Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin stressed that the
work of drafting a comprehensive test ban treaty should not
be "drowned in the doubts, speculations, and arguments"
raised by the experts. He called upon his Western colleagues
to put aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work
of concluding a treaty?
Tsarapkin claimed that a treaty could be signed in two or
three days "if those forces in the United States who want a
speedy conclusion of a treaty prevail." He charged that agree-
ment was blocked by the American experts at Geneva who "al-
leged that it is not possible to devise an effective control system"
--in contradiction to evidence furnished by, the Soviet experts.
The Soviet delegation apparently had hoped that some com-
promise formula could be worked out to avoid an impasse at
the technical level which might sidetrack Moscow's tactics of
clearing the way for focusing the negotiations on the Soviet pro-
posal for solving the underground detection problem--an agreed
number of annual on-site inspettions. In the final stage of the
technical talks, the chief Soviet expert sought to prevent the in-
clusion of disagreement in the final report to the political con-
ference. He continued to the end his efforts to refute Amer-
ican seismic data and to contend that the talks had proved the
complete accuracy of the report on a control system by the
1958 experts conference. In a bitter tirade at the 18 Decem-
ber session, he expressed doubt about the correctness and
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objectivity of the American data and charged that the "tendentious
use of unilaterally acquired materials" was aimed at "undermin-
ing confidence in the control system."
Moscow appears concerned that the United States and Britain
may use the failure to reach agreement on the most important
aspects of the underground test detection problem to renew pres-
sure for a limited treaty confined, at least at the outset, to ban-
ning atmospheric, high-altitude, and underwater tests. rrsarap-
kin has privately indicated that in the event of disagreemenl
the technical talks, the USSR might consider a phased treaty,
but stressed that the "crux of the matter" must be an obligation
to halt all tests at the outset? regardless of the temporary na-
ture of a ban on underground tests.
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Premier Khrushchev may believe the impasse at Geneva
calls for a fresh Soviet initiative designed to place the Western
powers on the defensive and focus the debate on terms favorable
to the USSR. He may take the opportunity of a recess in the talks
to address new letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Min-
ister Macmillan appealing for a compromise settlement based
on the concept of an annual quota of on-site inspections.
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III. THE WEST
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Brazil Suggests Meeting of American Presidents in Mill 1960
girazil has requested Argentina's support for a meeting
of Latin American chiefs of state in Brasilia to mark the city's
dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital and to issue an
"important declaration" on "Operation Pan America" (OPA).
President Kubitschek first proposed OPA in a letter to Presi-
dent Eisenhower in May 1958, calling for a reappraisal of
hemisphere relations and a joint attack on underdevelopment.
Possibly in order to promote interest in such a meeting,
the Brazilians are claiming that President Eisenhower will
attend. Furthermore, Brazil is backing Ecuador's suggestion
that the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled for Feb-
ruary 1960 at Quito be postponed, perhaps to improve chances
for a meeting at Brasilia.
A high Argentine Foreign Ministry official has said Ar-
gentina is reluctant to join in any Brazilian gambit to put the
United States "on the spot." He pointed out that when the
Brazilian foreign minister visited Buenos Aires in November
as part of Brazil's intensifying diplomatic campaign for OPA,
President Frondizi had qualified his endorsement by em-
phasizing self -help.
Kubitschek stated on 16 December that OPA provided
the opportunity of overcoming what he called US indifference
toward Latin America. Although he emphasized that OPA
was not intended as an effort to form a Latin American bloc
hostile to the US, Kubitschek apparently hopes to enhance
Brazil's leadership in the hemisphere and its importance in
world affairs. At the same time, he probably wants to use
OPA and a meeting at Brasilia to help his party's chances
in the October presidential elections3
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Acsistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secreft_ry for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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