VIETNAM--A MIDDLE WAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 19, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
fact that the news media obtained informa-
tion (which could just as probably come from
recipients of the subpoenas), no conclusion
can be drawn that the Committee released
the information. The complaint alleged no
specific fact showing that the release was by
a named Committee member or by an au-
thorized employee at a stated time and place
or by some stated means. Unsupported con-
clusory allegations are insufficient to estab-
lish something as a fact. Riley v. Titus, 89
U.S. App. D.C. 79, 190 P. 2d 653 (1951).
V. Plaintiffs' Conclusory Allegations Set
Forth In the Complaint and in Their
Affidavits Should Be Stricken as a Matter
of Law
From what we have shown supra, it is
clear that the House Un-American Activities
Committee hearings scheduled for August
16, 1966, which are challenged in this pro-
ceeding, serve a legitimate legislative pur-
pose. The conclusory allegations set forth
in plaintiffs' affidavits and in paragraphs 10,
12 and 13 of their complaint purport to
contravene the fact that the hearings serve
a valid purpose. However, even the most
cursory examination of the enumerated
paragraphs of the complaint and the affi-
davits will reflect the broad and all-encom-
passing sweep of plaintiffs contentions and
logically, will demonstrate, as well, that their
assertions can be predicated only upon con-
jecture and emotion and not upon personal
knowledge as they represent in their veri-
fication to the complaint and in their
affidavits.
Absent basic, factual allegations which
would of necessity be exposed to the fresh
air of examination by this Court, plaintiffs'
conclusory assertions are insufficient as a
matter of law to sustain their contentions
that purposes, other than legitimate legis-
lative inquiry, exist for the hearings now
being conducted.
The rule controlling here arose out of
Riley v. Titus, supra, where our` Court of
Appeals stated at pp. 654-55: "The appellant
plaint of allegations of "malice", "con-
spiracy", "unlawfulness" and the like. See
e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 565, 569 (mal-
ice); Norton v. McShane, supra, 332 F. 2d
at 357 (malicious arrest, abuse and mis-
treatment, and conspiracy);. Gager v. "Bob
Seidel", 112 U.S. App. D.C. 135, 140, 300 F.
2d 727, 732, cert. denied 370 U.S. 959 (1962)
(conspiracy) ; Ove Gustavsson Contracting
Co. v. Floete, 299 F. 2d 655, 657-859 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (wil-
fully, maliciously, with intent to harm and
injure); Bershad v. Wood, supra, 290 F. 2d
at 715-719 (malice); DeBusk v. Harvin, 212
F. 2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (malicious acts
and conspiracy) ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.
2d 579, 581 (1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949
(1950) (conspired and maliciously and wil-
fully entered into a scheme); Laughlin v.
Rosenman, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 164, 168, 163
F. 2d 838, 840 (1947) (knowingly, wilfully
and maliciously participated in an unlawful
conspiracy) ; Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 U.S.
App. D.C. 100, 102, 99 F. 2d 135, 137, cert.
denied 305 U.S. 643 (1938) (wanton, mali-
cious and unlawful acts).
For this reason plaintiff's unsupported
conclusory allegations both in the complaint
and In their affidavits should be stricken.
Wherefore, for the reasons stated herein
the Court is respectfully urged to strike
paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of the complaint
and paragraphs 4 and 5 of each of the plain-
tiffs' affidavits and to dismiss the complaint.
HARRY T. ALEXANDER,
Acting U.S. Attorney.
JOSEPH M. HANNON,
Assistant U.S. Attorney.
FRANK Q. NEBEKER,
Assistant U.S. Attorney.
OIL ZIMMERMAN,
Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Of Counsel: Kevin T. Maroney, Lee, B.
Anderson, Attorneys, Department of Justice.
bases her suit for recovery under the Fed- i; (Mr. RYAN asked and was given per-
eral Tort Claims Act upon alleged miscon- mission to extend his remarks at this
duct 'of her superior officers prior to her paint in the RECORD, and to include eX-
discharge. For the most part, however, her
complaint describes their action in only such
general and conclusionary terms as 'arbi-
trary' and 'unlawful.' No factual allegations
emerge from her voluminous pleadings and
affidavits with sufficient clarity to show a
basis for recovery on a theory of tort lia-
bility. At the most there are only remote
references to a 'conspiracy' and 'threats' b
traneous matter.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, like the
fluctuations of war itself, there is an
ebb and a flow to the words and terms
of the debates which accompany the
decisions surrounding a war. The mili-
tary, political, and rhetorical Involve-
two persons who were her superiors at dif- ment of the United States in the war
in Vietnam is less like an escalator
ferent times in different states. In a parallel
situation, this court has stated, 'Though it smoothly carrying us from one level to
[the complaint] characterizes appellees' al- another, than it is like a car caught in
leged conduct as wrongful, unlawful, and a traffic jam, sometimes at rest, some-
malicious, it does not sufficiently disclose times creeping along slowly, but always
the conduct to enable a court to judge trying to go as fast as it can without
whether or not it" was tortious' Burns v. crashing into the cars in front of it.
Spiller, 1947, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 91, 181 F. During the past weekend the debate
61 denied, 3e 8(a) (a), , suddenly put on a spurt of energy. There
68 8 S. . Ct. 10 101, , 92 92 L. Ed. 373. . See e Rule
Fed. It. CivP. In that case the complaint was fresh evidence that the United States
was dismissed for failure to state a claim is prepared to get far more involved in
upon which relief could be granted there the war than most Americans had
appearing no issue as to any material fact, dreamed possible. Former President Ei-
the granting of summary judgment was senhower announced to the 19() million
proper in regard to this aspect of appellant's Americans who have not read his mem-
Similarlycase for , the in same reason'' oires that the country was perfectly pre-
Chung Wing Ping v. Ken-
nedy, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 106, 294 F. 2d 735 pared to use nuclear weapons in Korea
(1961) the Court concluded that an unsup- when our adversaries decided to call it
ported and nebulous allegation of criminal quits. And the ranking Thai military
conspiracy was not a sufficient basis for officer announced that the United States
allowing discovery to contest a motion for is already at war in northeastern Thai-
summary judgment. Because of superven- land.
ing public policy need to free federal of- But those who urged restraint were no
hies facers from acting vexations accord
suits with the their r courts s have ive
e less vocal. Former White House Aid
u
made a like application of the rule to them Richard Goodwin suggested the forma-
and held that the "official immunity" doc- tion of a committee to oppose the escala-
trine is not affected by inclusion in the com- tion of the war in Vietnam.
In addition, the Sunday edition of the
New York Times magazine section car-
ried a devastating analysis of the war by
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., former assistant
to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who
concludes that-
Deescalation could work, if there were the
will to pursue it.
Perhaps Goodwin and Schlesinger will
only convert those of us who are already
convinced that the United States should
follow this course. But I cannot believe
that their comments would not influence
the thinking of the "hawks" as well, if
only they were willing to listen.
In the firm hope that Professor Schles-
inger's comments will not fall on deaf
ears, I am inserting his article, "A Middle
Way Out of Vietnam," in the RECORD at
this point. I hope that it will be widely
read.
The article follows:
SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR
COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF
VIETNAM
(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)
(NoTE.-Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is a for-
mer special assistant to Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson, author of "A Thousand Days,"
and Albert Schweitzer professor of the hu-
manities, City University of New York.)
Why we are in Vietnam is today a question
of only historical interest. We are there, for
better or for worse, and we must deal with
the situation that exists. Our national se-
curity may not have compelled us to draw a
line across Southeast Asia where we did, but,
having drawn it, we cannot lightly abandon
it. Our stake in South Vietnam may have
been self-created, but it has nonetheless be-
come real. Our precipitate withdrawal now
would have ominous reverberations through-
out Asia. Our commitment of over 300,000
American troops, young men of exceptional
skill and gallantry engaged in cruel and diffi-
cult warfare, measures the magnitude of our
national concern.
We have achieved this entanglement, not
after due and deliberate consideration, but
through a series of small decisions. It is not
only idle but unfair to seek out guilty men.
President Eisenhower, after rejecting Amer-
ican military intervention in 1954, set In
motion the policy of support for Saigon
which resulted, two Presidents later, in
American military intervention in 1965.
Each step in the deepening of the Amer-
ican commitment was reasonably regarded
at the time as the last that would be neces-
sary; yet, in retrospect, each step led only to
the next, until we find ourselves entrapped
today in that nightmare of American strate-
gists, a land war in Asia-a war which no
President, including President Johnson, de-
sired or intended. The Vietnam story is a
tragedy without villains. No thoughtful
American can withhold sympathy as Presi-
dent Johnson ponders the gloomy choices
which lie ahead.
Yet each President, as he makes his
choices, must expect to be accountable for
them. Everything in recent weeks-the ac-
tions of the Administration, the intima-
tions of actions to come, even a certain
harshness in the Presidential rhetoric-sug-
gests that President Johnson has made his
choice, and that his choice is the careful
enlargement of the war. New experiments
in escalation are first denied, then dis-
owned, then discounted and finally under-
taken. As past medicine fails, all we can
apparently think to do is to increase the
dose. In May the Secretary of the Air Force
explained why we were not going to bomb
Hanoi and Haiphong; at the end of June
we began the strikes against the oil depots.
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22054
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE September 19, 1966
The demilitarized zone between North and 38th Parallel despite warnings from Peking precisely the effect that the analyses of the
South Vietnam has been used by North that this would provoke a Chinese response. United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Vietnam units for years, but suddenly we In a few weeks, China was actively in the after the Second World War would have fore-
have begun to bomb it. war, and, while there was the greatest oast. Under Secretary of State George :Bali
When such steps work no miracles-and slaughter, it was not notably of the Chinese. was a director of that survey; this may well
it is safe to predict that escalation will be There seems little question that the Chi- be why he has been reported so unenthusias-
no more decisive in the future than it has nese have no great passion to enter the war tic about the air assault on the North.
been In the past-the demand will arise for in Vietnam. They do not want to put their And, far from stopping infiltration across
"just one more step." Plenty of room re- nuclear plants in hazard; and, in any case, the 17th Parallel, bombing, if ur own statis-
mains for widening the war: the harbors their foreign policy has typically been. a com- tics are to be believed, has stimulated it.
of North Vietnam, the irrigation dikes, the pound of polemical ferocity and practical "It is perfectly clear," Secretary McNamara
steel plants, the factories, the power grid, prudence. But the leaders in Peking are no has said, "that the North Vietnamese have
the crops, the civilian population, the Chi- doubt just as devoted students of Munich continued to increase their support of the
nese border. The fact that we excluded such as the American Secretary of State. They Vietcong despite the increase in our ef-
steps yesterday is, alas, no guarantee that are sure that we are out to bury them; they fort. . . . What has happened is that the
we will not pursue them tomorrow. And believe that appeasement invites further ag- North Vietnamese have continually increased
if bombing will not bring Ho Chi Minh to gression; and, however deep their reluctance, the amount of resources, men and material
his knees or stop his support of the Viet- at some point concern for national survival that they have been willing to devote to
cong in South Vietnam, there is always the will make them fight. their objective."
last resort of invasion. General Ky has When will-that point be reached? Probably Nor can we easily match this infiltration
already told us that we must invade North when they are confronted by a direct threat by enlarging our own forces-from 300,000,
Vietnam to win the war. In his recent press to their frontier, either through bombing or for example, to 500,000 or 750,000. The ratio
conference, the Secretary of State twice de- through an American decision to cross the of superiority preferred by the Pentagon in
clined to rule out this possibility. 17th Parallel and invade North Vietnam. If a guerrilla war is 10 to 1, which means that
The theory, of course, is that widening Communist regime barely established in Pe- every time we send in 100,000 more men. the
the war will shorten it. This theory ap- king could take a decision to intervene enemy has only to send in 10,000 or so, and
pears to be based on three convictions: first, against the only atomic power in the world we are all even again. Reinforcement has
that the war will be decided in North Viet- in 1950, why does anyone supopse that a not created a margin of American superior-
nam; second, that the risk of Chinese or that decision in 1966? Indeed, given the ity; all it has done is to lift the stalemate to
Soviet entry is negligible, and third, that much stronger regime should flinch from a higher and more explosive level. Indeed,
military "victory" in some sense is possible. present discord In Peking, war may seem the there is reason to suppose that, in its own
Perhaps these premises are correct, and in best way to renew revolutionary discipline, manner, the enemy can match our every step
another year or two we may all be saluting stop the brawling and unite the nation, of escalation up to the point of nuclear war.
the wisdom and statesmanship of the It is true that the Chinese entry into the U.S. News & World Report says in its Issue
American Government. In so inscrutable Korean War had at least the passise support of Aug. 22: "It's clear now to military men:
a situation, no one can be confident about of the Soviet Union; but it would be risky bombing will not win in Vietnam." This is a
his doubt and disagreement. Nonetheless, today to rely on the Sino-Soviet split to dispiriting item. Why had our military
to many Americans these propositions con- save us from everything, including Soviet leaders not long ago freed themselves from
stitute a terribly shaky basis for action which aid to China incase of war with the United the illusion of the omnipotence of air power,
has already carried the United States Into a States or even direct Soviet entry into the so cherished by civilians who think wars can
ground war in Asia and which may well war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is be won. on the cheap? The Korean war, as
carry the world to the brink of the third already extensively involved in Vietnam- Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, "taught
world war, more so in a sense than the Chinese-and it that it is impossible to interdict the supply
The illusion that the war in South Viet- would be foolish to suppose that, given Moo- route of an Asian army by airpower alone.
nam can be decided in North Vietnam is evi- cow's competition with Peking for the lead- We had complete air mastery over North
dently a result of listening too long to our ershlp of the Communist world, Russia could Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply
own propaganda. Our Government has in- afford to stand by and allow Communist columns unmercifully. . . .But we did not
sisted so often that the war in Vietnam Is North Vietnam or Communist China to be halt their offensive nor materially diminish
a clear-cut case of aggression across frontiers destroyed by the American imperialists. its strength." If air power was not decisive
that it has come to believe itself that the As for the third premise (that military in Korea, where the warfare was conven-
war was started in Hanoi and can be stopped "victory" is in some sense possible) : The tional and the terrain relatively open and
there. "The war," the Secretary of State has Joint Chiefs of Staff of course, by definition compact, how could anyone suppose that it
solemnly assurbd us, "is clearly an 'arnied argue for military solutions. They are the would be decisive against guerrillas thread-
attack,' cynically and systematically mount- most fervent apostles of "one moire step." Ing their way through the hills and jungles
ed by the Hanoi regime against the people of That is their business, and no one should be of Vietnam?
South Vietnam." surprised that generals behave like generals. The bombing illusion applies, of course, to
Tat the: best evidence is that the war be- The fault lies not with those who give this South as well as to North Vietnam. Tactical
gan as an insurrection within South Viet- advice but those who take it. Once, early bombing-bombing in direct support of
nam which, as it has gathered momentum, in the Kennedy Administration, the then ground operations-has its place; but the
has attracted increasing support and diree- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs outlined the notion that strategic bombing can stop guer-
tion from the north. Even today the North processes of escalation in Southeast Asia rillas runs contrary to experience. And we
Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam before the National Security Council, con- had it last winter, on the authority of the
amount to only a fraction of the total enemy eluding, "If we are given the right to use Secretary of State, that despite the entry of
force (and to an even smaller fraction of the nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory." North Vietnamese regulars the war in South
American army in South Vietnam). We President Kennedy sat glumly rubbing an Vietnam "continues to be basically a guer-
could follow the genial prescription of Gen- upper molar. After a moment someone said, rilla operation."
eral LeMay and bomb North Vietnam back' "Mr. President, perhaps you would have the Sir Robert Thompson, who planned the
to the Stone Age-and the war would still general explain to us what he means by vic- successful British effort against the Malayan
go on in South Vietnam. To reduce this war tory." Kennedy grunted and dismissed the guerrillas and later served as head of the
to the simplification of a wicked regime mo- meeting. Later he said, "Since he couldn't British advisory mission in Saigon, has em-
lesting its neighbors, and to suppose that it think of any further escalation, he would phasized that the defending force must oper-
can be ended by punishing the wicked re- have to promise us victory." ate "In the same element" as their adver-
glme, is purely to misconceive not only the What is the purpose of bombing the north? saries. Counterinsurgency, he writes, "is like
political but even the military character of It is hard to find out. According to Gen. trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It
the problem. Maxwell Taylor, "The objective of our air is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The
As for the assurances that China will not campaign is to change the will of the enemy dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, the
enter, these will be less than totally satisfy- leadership." Secretary McNamara, on the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog will
ing to those whose memory stretches back other hand, has said, "We never believed that then chase the female cats. The answer is
to the Korean War. General MacArthur, an- bombing would destroy North Vietnam's to put in a fiercer tomcat.
other one of those military experts on on., will." Whatever the theory, the results Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The
ental psychology, when asked by President would appear to support Secretary Mc- counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam has
Truman on Wake Island in October, 1950, Namara. The northern strategy, instead of languished, while our bombers roam over
what the chances were of Chinese interven- driving Hanoi to the conference table, seems that hapless country, dumping more tonnage
tion, replied, "Very little.... Now that we to have hardened the will of the regime, con- of explosives each month than we were drop-
have our bases for our Air Force in Korea, if vinced it that its life is at stake, brought it ping per month on all Europe and Africa
the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongang, closer to China and solidified the people of during the Second World War. Just the
there would be the greatest slaughter." North Vietnam in its support. other day our bombs killed or injured more
Such reasoning lay behind the decision (the 'There is no indioation," General West- than 100 civilians in a hamlet in the Mekong
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern moreland said the other day, "that the re- Delta-all on the suspicion that two Vietcong
Affairs at that time is Secretary of State to- solve of the leadership in Hanoi has been re- platoons numbering perhaps 60 men, were
day) to send American troops across the duced." In other words, bombing; has had there. Even if the Vietcong had still been
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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
around, which they weren't would the mili-
tary gain have outweighed the human and
political loss? Charles Mohr writes in The
Times: "Almost every provincial hospital in
Vietnam is crowded with civilian victims of
the war. Some American doctors and other
officials in the field say the majority are the
victims of American air power and South
Vietnamese artillery."
The trouble is that we are fighting one
war, with our B-52's and our naval guns and
our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting
another, with their machine guns and am-
bushes and forays in the dark. "If we can
get the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we
will blast him," General Westmoreland has
plaintively said; and when they occasionally
rise to the surface and try to fight our kind
of war, we do blast them. But the fact that
they then slide back into the shadows does
not mean that we are on the verge of some
final military triumph. It means simply
that we are driving them underground-
where they renew themselves and where our
large, fierce dog cannot follow.
Saigon officials have been reporting that
Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can
remember; these reports need not be taken
seriously now. I know of no convincing evi-
dence that the Vietcong lack the political
and emotional commitment to keep fighting
underground for another 20 years.
Our strategy in Vietnam Is rather like try-
ing to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We
occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig
up most of the turf, too. The effect of our
policy is to pulverize the political and insti-
tutional fabric which alone can give a South
Vietnamese state that hope of independent
survival which is our presumed war aim.
Our method, in other words, defeats our
goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of
the smashed social structure of South Viet-
nam will be Communism. "My feeling,"
Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the
Marine Corps, has wisely said, "is that you
could kill every Vietcong and North Viet-
namese in South Vietnam and still lose the
war. Unless we can make a success of the
civic-action program, we are not going to
obtain the objectives we have set."
Much devotion and intelligence are at
present going into the programs of recon-
struction, but prospects are precarious so
long as the enemy can slice through so much
of South Vietnam with such apparent im-
munity; and so long as genuine programs of
social reform threaten the vested interests
of the Saigon Government and of large land-
holders. In any case, as claimants on our
resources, these programs of pacification are
hopelessly outclassed by the programs of de-
struction. Surely, the United States, with
all its ingenuity, could have figured out a
better way to combat guerrilla warfare than
the physical obliteration of the nation in
which it is taking place. If this Is our best
idea of "protecting" a country against "wars
of national liberation," what other country,
seeing the devastation we have wrought in
Vietnam, will wish American protection?
At the same time, our concentration on
Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other
areas of national concern. In domestic pot-
icy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion
and a half dollars a month, everything is
grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was
on his way to a place in history as a great
President for his vision of a Great Society;
but the Great Society is now, except for
token gestures, dead. The fight for equal op-
portunity for the Negro, the war against
poverty, the struggle to save the cities, the
improvement of our schools-all must be
starved for the sake of Vietnam. And war
brings ugly side-effects: inflation; frustra-
tion; angry protest; attack on dissenters on
the ground that they cheer the enemy (an
attack often mounted by men who led the
dissent during the Korean war) ; premoni-
tions of McCarthyism.
We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies nat-
urally draw away as they see us heading
down the road toward war with China.
When we began to bomb the oil depots, James
Reston wrote: "There is now not a single
major nation in the world that supports
Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and
Haiphong." As nations seek to disengage
themselves from the impending conflict, the
quasi-neutralism of leaders like de Gaulle
gains new plausibility.
On any realistic assessment, Western
Europe and Latin America are far more
significant to American security than South
Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified
our policy and weakened our position in both
these vital areas. The war has clouded the
hope, once mildly promising, of progress
toward a detente with the Soviet Union. It
has helped block agreements to end under-
ground nuclear testing and to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons. It has precipitated the
decision of U Thant to resign as Secretary
General of the United Nations and condemns
the U.N. itself to a time of declining influence.
Our rejection of the views of our friends
and allies-our conviction, as Paul H. Smith
has put it, "that we alone are qualified to
be judge, jury and executioner"-ignores
Madison's solemn warning in the 63rd Fed-
eralist: "An attention to the judgment of
other nations is important to every govern-
ment for two reasons: the one is that in-
dependently of the merits of any particular
plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other
nations as the offspring of a wise and hon-
orable policy; the second is that in doubt-
ful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong pas-
sion or momentary interest, the presumed
or known opinion of the impartial world
may be the best guide that can be followed.
What has not America lost by her want of
character with foreign nations; and how
many errors and follies would she not have
avoided, if the justice and propriety of her
measures had, in every instance, been previ-
ously tried by the light in which they would
probably appear to the unbiased part of
mankind."
The Administration has called the critics
of its Vietnam policy "neoisolationists: "
But surely the real neoisolationists are those
who have isolated the United States from
its allies and raised the tattered standard,
last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas Mac-
Arthur, of "going it alone."
. How have we managed to imprison our-
selves in this series of dilemmas? One rea-
son surely is that we have somehow lost our
understanding of the uses of power. Under-
standing of power implies above all precision
in its application. We have moved away
from the subtle strategy of "flexible response"
under which the level of American force was
graduated to meet the level of enemy threat.
The triumph of this discriminate employ-
ment of power was, of course, the Cuban
missile crisis (where the Joint Chiefs, as
usual, urged an air assault on the missile
bases). But President Johnson, for all his
formidable abilities, has shown no knack for
discrimination in his use of power. His
technique is to try and overwhelm his ad-
versary-as in the Dominican Republic and
Vietnam-by piling on all forms of power
without regard to the nature of the threat.
Given this weakness for the indiscriminate
use of power, it is easy to see why the appli-
cation of force in Vietnam has been sur-
rendered to the workings of what an acute
observer of the Johnson foreign policy, Philip
Geyelin, calls "the escalation machine." This
machine is, in effect, the momentum in the
decision-making system which keeps en-
larging the war "for reasons only marginally
related to military need."
22055
The very size and weight of the American
military presence generate unceasing pres-
sures to satisfy military demands. These may
be demands to try out new weapons; the
London Sunday Telegraph recently ran an
informative article comparing the Vietnam
war to the Spanish Civil War as a military
testing ground and laboratory. Or they may
be cries for "one more step," springing in part
from suppressed rage over the fact that, with
military power sufficient to blow up the world,
we still cannot compel guerrilla bands in
black pajamas to submit to our will. What-
ever the reason, Sir Robert Thompson has
noted of the American theory of the war:
"There was a constant tendency in Vietnam
to mount large-scale operations, which had
little purpose or prospect of success, merely
to indicate that something aggressive was
being done."
The Administration has freely admitted
that such operations, like the bombing of the
North, are designed in part to prop up the
morale of the Saigon Government; And the
impression is growing now that they are also
in part undertaken in order to smother
doubts about the war in the United States
and to reverse anti-Administration ten-
dencies in the polls. Americans have become
curiously insensitive to the use of military
operations for domestic political purposes. A
quarter-century ago President Roosevelt
postponed the North African invasion so that
it would not take place before the midterm
elections of 1942; but today observers in
Washington, without evidence of shock, pre-
dict a new venture in escalation before the
midterm elections of 1966.
The triumph of the escalation machine has
been assisted by the faultiness of the infor-
mation on which our decisions are based.
Nothing is phonier than the spurious exacti-
tude of our statistics about the Vietnam war.
No doubt a computerized military establish-
ment demands numbers; but the "body
count" of dead Vietcong, for example, in-
cludes heaven knows how many innocent
bystanders and could hardly be more un-
reliable. The figures on enemy strength are
totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citi-
zen relying on the daily newspaper. The
Times on Aug. 10 described "the latest in-
telligence reports" in Saigon as saying that
the number of enemy troops in South Viet-
nam had increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a
total of 282,000. Yet, "according to official
figures," the enemy had suffered 31,571 killed
in action in this period, and the infiltration
estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to
54,000 as "possible."
The only way to reconcile these figures is
to conclude that the Vietcong have picked up
from 30,000 to 50,000 local recruits in this
period. Since tpis seems unlikely-especially
in view of our confidence in the decline of
Vietcong morale-a safer guess is to question
the wonderful precision of the statistics.
Even the rather vital problem of how many
North Vietnamese troops are in South Viet-
nam is swathed in mystery. The Times re-
ported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Viet-
namese troops are believed by allied intelli-
gence to be in the South." According to an
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon
printed in The Christian Science Monitor of
Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Govern-
ment says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat
troops and support battalions have infil-
trated into South Vietnam.
"These figures are far in excess of United
States intelligence estimates, which put the
maximum number of North Vietnamese in
the South at about 54,000."
But General Westmoreland told his Texas
press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy
force included "about 110,000 main-force
North Vietnamese regular army troops."
Perhaps these statements are all reconcil-
able, but an apparent discrepancy of this
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 22056
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 19, 1966
Magnitude on a question of such importance
raises a twinge of doubt.
. Nor is our ignorance confined to battle-
order statistics. We have always lacked gen-
uine knowledge of and insight into the po-
litical and cultural problems of Vietnam, and
the more we press all problems into a mili-
tary framework the worse off we are. The
Administration in Washington was syste-
matically misinformed by senior American
officials in Saigon in 1962--63 regarding the
progress of the war, the popularity of Diem,
the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet"
program and other vital matters. It was not
that these plHCials were deliberately deceiving
their President; it was that they had deceived
themselves first. Ordinary citizens restricted
to reading the American press were better in-
formed in 1963 than officials who took top-
secret cables seriously.
The fact is that our Government just
doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to
know. It is not discreditable that it should
not know them, for the facts are elusive and
the judgments incredibly difficult. But it is
surely inexcusable that It should pretend to
know things it does not-and that it should
pass its own ignorance on to the American
people as certitude. And it is even less ex-
cusable that it should commit the nation to
a policy involving the greatest dangers on a
foundation so vague and precarious.
So now we are set on the course of widen-
ing the war-even at the cost of multiply-
ing American casualties in Vietnam and.
deepening American troubles at home and
abroad; even at the risk of miring our nation
in a hopeless and endless conflict on the
mainland of Asia beyond the effective em-
ployment of our national power and beyond
the rapge of our primary interests; even at
the risk of nuclear war.
Why does the Administration feel that
these costs must be paid and these risks run?
Hovering behind our policy is a larger idea-
the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just
a local conflict between Vietnamese but a
fateful test of wills between China and the
United States.
Our political and rhetorical escalation of
the war has been almost as perilous as our
military escalation. President Kennedy's
effort was to pull Laos out of the context of
great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian
civil war to rational proportions. As he told
Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, Laos was just
not important enough to entangle two great
nations. President Johnson, on the other
hand, has systematically inflated the signifi-
cance of the war in Vietnam. "We have
tried to make it clear over and over again."
as the Secretary of State has put it, "that al-
though Hanoi is the prime actor in this
situation, that it is the policy of Peking that
has greatly stimulated Hanoi.... It is Ho
Chi Minh's war, Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's
war."
"In the forties and fifties," President
Johnson has said, "we took our stand in
Europe to protect the freedom of those
threatened by aggression. Now the center
of attention has shifted to another part of
the world where aggression is on the march.
Our stand must be as firm as ever" Given
this view, it is presumably necessary to pay
the greatest costs and run the greatest risks-
or else invite the greatest defeat.
Given this view, too, there is no reason
not to Americanize the war. President Ken-
nedy did not believe that the war in Vietnam,
could succeed as a war of white men against
Asians. It could not be won, he said a few
weeks before his death, "unless the people
[of South Vienami support the effort .
We can help them, we can give them equip-
ment, we can send our men out there as ad-
visers, but they have to win it, the people
of Vietnam." We have now junked this doc-
trine. Instead,, we have enlarged our mili-
tarypresence ntil it is the only thing that
Matters in South Vietnam, and we plan now
to make it still larger; We have summoned
the Saigon leaders, like tribal chieftains on
a retainer, to a conference in an American
state; we crowd the streets of Saigon with
American generals (58 at last count) and
visiting stateside dignitaries. In short, we
have seized every opportunity to make clear
to the world that this is an American war-
and, in doing this, we have surely gone far to
make the war unwinnable.
The proposition that our real enemy in
Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of
widening the war. It is the vital element
in the Administration case. Yet the proof
our leaders have adduced for this proposition
has been exceedingly sketchy and almost per-
functory. It has been proof by ideology and
proof by analogy. It has not been proof by
reasoned argument or by concrete illustra-
tion.
The proof by ideology has relied on the
syllogism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam
and China are all Communist states and
therefore must be part of the same con-
spiracy, and that, since the Vietcong are the
weakest of the three, they must therefore
be the spearhead of a coordinated Chinese
plan of expansion. The Department of
State, in spite of what has struck most peo-
ple as a rather evident fragmentation of the
Communist world, has hated to abandon the
cozy old cliches about a centralized Com-
munist conspiracy aimed at monolithic world
revolution.
As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen
years of public Russo-Chinese. quarreling,
Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the de-
partment, could talk about "instruments of
Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the
Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan.
28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still
run on about "their world revolution," and
again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists"
and their "larger design." While the depart-
ment may have accepted the reality of the
Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966,
the predominant tone is still to regard Asian
Communism as a homogenous system of ag-
gression. The premise of our policy has
been that the Vietcong equal Hanoi and
Hanoi equals Peking.
Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking
have interests in common and strong ideo-
logical affinities. Obviously, Peking would
rejoice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But
they also have divergent interests and pur-
poses-and the divergencies may prove in the
end to be stronger than the affinities. Re-
cent developments in North Korea are in-
structive. If any country was bound to Pe-
king by ties of gratitude, it was North Korea,
which was preserved as an independent state
by Chinese intervention 15 years ago. If any
country, today is at the mercy of Peking, it
is again North Korea. When North Korea
now declares in vigorous language its inde-
pendence of China, does anyone suppose that
North Vietnam, imbued with historic mis-
trust of China and led by that veteran Rus-
sian agent Ho Chi Minh, would have been
more slavish in its attitude toward Peking?
The other part of the Administration case
has been proof by analogy, especially the
good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the
village idiot, the Secretary of State recently
confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler
was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese. .
But what is common between the two sit-
uations is the phenomenon of aggression"
The Vietnam war, President Johnson recent-
ly told the American Legion, "is meant
to be the opening salvo in a series
of bombardments or, as they are called
in Peking, "wars of liberation."If
this technique works this week in Vietnam
the Administration suggests, it will be tried
next week in Uganda and Peru. But, if it
is defeated in Vietnam, the Chinese will know
that we will not let it succeed elsewhere.
"What happens in South Vietnam," the
President cried at Omaha. "will determine-
yes, it will determine-whether ambitious
and aggressive nations can use guerrilla war-
fare to conquer their weaker neighbors."
The Secretary of State even described an ex-
hortation made last year by the Chinese De-
fense Minister, Marshal Lien Piao, as a blue-
print for world conquest comparable to Hit-
ler's "Mein Kampf."
One thing is sure about the Vietnam rid-
dle: it will not be solved by bad historical
analogies. It seems a trifle forced, for ex-
ample, to equate a civil war in what was for
hundreds of years the entity of Vietnam
(Marshall Ky, after all, is a North Vietnamese
himself) with Hitler's invasion of Austria and
Czechoslovakia across old and well-estab-
lished lines of national division; even the
village idiot might grasp that difference.
When President Eisenhower invoked the
Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to in-
volve the British in Indochina, Prime Min-
ister Churchill, a pretty close student of
Munich in his day, was unmoved. The
Chinese have neither the overwhelmingly
military power nor the timetable of aggres-
sion nor, apparently, the pent-up mania
for instant expansion which would justify
the Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Piao
document, the Rand Corporation, which evi-
dently read it with more care than the
State Department bothered to do, concluded
that, far from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it
was a message to the Vietcong that they
could win "only if they rely primarily on
their own resources and their own revolu-
tionary spirit," and that it revealed "the
lack, rather than the extent, of Peking's past
and present control over Hanoi's actions."
In any case, guerrilla warfare is not a tac-
tic to be mechanically applied by central
headquarters to faraway countries. More
than any other form of warfare, it is depend-
ent on conditions and opportunities within
the countries themselves. Whether there are
wars of national liberation in Uganda and
Peru will depend, not on what happens in
Vietnam, but on what happens in Uganda
and Peru.
One can agree that the containment of
China will be a major problem for the next
generation. But this does not mean that we
must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the exact
drama of Europe in the forties and fifties.
The record thus far suggests that the force
most likely to contain Chinese expansionism
in Asia (and Africa, too) will be not Western
intervention but local nationalism. Some-
times local nationalism may call on Western
support-but not always. Countries like
Burma and Cambodia preserve their auton-
omy with American assistance. The Africans
have dealt with the Chinese on their own.
The two heaviest blows recently suffered by
Peking-the destruction of the Communist
party in Indonesia and the declaration of in-
dependence by North Korea--took place
without benefit of American patronage or
rhetoric.
In the unpredictable decades ahead, the
most effective bulwark against "interna-
tional" Communism in some circumstances
may well be national Communism. A ra-
tional policy of containing China could
have recognized that a Communist Vietnam
under Ho might be a better instrument of
containment than a shaky Saigon regime led
by right-wing mandarins or air force gen-
erals. Had Ho taken over all Vietnam in
1954, he might today be enlisting Soviet sup-
port to strengthen his resistance to Chinese
pressure-and this situation, however ap-
palling for the people of South Vietnam,
would obviously be better for the United
States than the one in which we are floun-
dering today. And now, alas, it may be al-
most too late: the whole thrust of United
States policy since 1954, and more than ever
since the bombing of the North began, has
been not to pry Peking and Hanoi apart but
to drive them together.
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September 19 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 22057
Is there no way out? Are the only alter- not likely to deter Hanoi any more in the irrevocably to him-and why should he not
natives widening the war or disorderly and future than it has in the past; and, given Its after the laying on of hands at Honolulu?-
humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our states- limited military effect, the Administration's and that, whatever he does, we cannot afford
manship is not yet this bankrupt. I think desire to gratify the Saigon Government and to abandon him_
a middle course is still possible if there were the American voter is surely not important Robert Shaplen, in the August 20 issue of
the will to pursue it. And this course must enough to justify the risks of Indefinite es- The New Yorker, reported from Saigon that
begin with a decision to stop widening and calatton. Moreover, so long as the bombing the atmosphere there "is being compared to
Americanizing the war-to limit our forces, continues there is no chance of serious nego- the miasma that surrounded Diem and his
actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of tiation. Nor does the failure of the 37-day tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu" and that
bombing more places, sending in more pause of last winter to produce a settlement "many Vietnamese believe that the Amer-
troops,. proclaiming ever more ardently that refute this. Thirty-seven days were hardly scans, having embraced Ky so whole-
the fate of civilization will be settled in enough to persuade our allies that we hon- heartedly and supported him so long, are
Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to estly wanted negotiation; so brief an inter- just as responsible as his Government for
see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war lude left no time for them to move on to the recent repressive acts."
in which Communist guerrillas, enthusias- the tricky job of persuading Hanoi. For I am sure that President Johnson did not
tically aided and now substantially directed Hanoi has substantial reasons for mistrust- intend to turn over American policy and
from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Com- ing negotiation-quite apart from Chinese honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's gimcrack.
munist despotism in South Vietnam, not pressure or its own hopes of victory. Ho has bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime. The time is
for the Chinese but for themselves. Let us entered into negotiation with the West twice bound to come when Ky must learn the facts
unnotderstan mild that the ultimate problem here in the past-in 1946-47 and again in 1954- of life, as General Phoumi eventually and
y but political. Let us adapt and each time, In his view, he lost at the painfully learned them.
the means we employ to the end we seek. conference table things he thought he had But why wait? In our whole time in Viet-
Obviously, military action plays an in- won on the battlefield. nam, there has never been a Government in
dispensable role in the search for a political For all our official talk about our readiness Saigon which had the active loyalty of the
solution. Hanoi and the Vietcong will not to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it can- countryside. It might be an agreeable ex-
negotiate so long as they think they can not be said that the Administration has pur- periment to encourage one to come. into ex-
win. Since stalemate is a self-evident pre- sued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, istence. Instead of Identifying American In-
condition to negotiation, we must have imagination and perseverance with which it terests with Ky and rebuffing the broader
enough American armed force in South Viet- has pursued war. Indeed, some American political impulses in South Vietnam, we
nam to leave no doubt in the minds of our scholars who have studied the matter believe should long since have welcomed a movement
adversaries that they cannot hope for vic- that on a number of occasions when pressure toward a civilian regime representing the sig-
tory. They must also have no illusion about for negotiation was mounting we have, for niflcant political forces of the country and
the prospect of an American withdrawal. whatever reason, stepped up the war., capable both of rallying the army and carry-
The object of the serious opposition to the Nor can it be said that the Administration ing forward programs of social reform. We
Johnson d fe at
but a negotiatabout not an ed settement has laid fairly before the American people a sistancevin rebuilds gvand modernizing the
' the occasional signals, however faint, which
Therefore, holding the line in South Viet- have come from Hanoi-as in the early win- South and institutional structures
favor oe
nam is essential. Surely, we already have ter of 1965, when U Thant's mediation neutralization ot Vietnam. And country, it should favor the
enough American troops, firepower and in- reached the point of selecting the hotel in nof its country, o it should
stallations. in South Vietnam to make it Rangoon where talks might take place, until it seek negotiation with the Vietcong, eenn to
clear that we cannot be beaten unless we we killed the idea by beginning the bombing stay In Vietnam, usersh our commitment at
choose to scuttle and run, which will not of the North. Nor, for all our declarations the o d is coming g should not think that
happen. The opponents of this strategy about "unconditional" negotiations, have we the world is coming to begin nd.
talk as if a holding action would put our refrained from setting conditions-such as, the It the not too late l tithe the aeon of our
forces
forces under siege and relinquish all initia- for example, that we won't talk to the Viet- military nor would the reduction of our
to the enemy. This need not, of course, cong unless they come to the conference fluence. effort damage our international fin
be so. It is possible to slow down a war table disguised as North Vietnamese. the the op onhofe this ore respect r to be e won in
and co Kennon
without standing still; and, if our present Though the Vietcong constitute the great has written, irittttenen of thworld,"
generals can't figure out how to do this, then bulk of the enemy force, they have been liquidation , of "by a
unsound resolute positions and than the
let us get generals who can. Generals Ridg- given little reason to think we will negotiate most otiate mos stubborn of extravagant or -
r
way and Gavin could doubtless suggest some about anything except their unconditional t pureof France stronger
names. Moreover, there is a South Vietnam- promising objectives." France was ese army of some 600,000 men which can surrender. than ever after de Gaulle left Algeria, the
take all the initiative it wants. And if we It is hard to see why we should not follow Soviet Union suffered no lasting damage from
are told that the South Vietnamese are un- the precedent of Laos, when we admitted the puling its nuclear missiles out of Cuba. And
willing or unable to fight the Vietcong, then Pathet Lao to the peace talks, and offer the the policy of de-escalation recommended here
we must wall the more about the pout- Vietcong the prospect of a say in the future is, of course, something a good deal less than
ical of e side wonder
the war, political life of South Vietnam-conditioned withdrawal.
w
The ab act of our military on their laying down their arms, opening De-escalation could work, if there were the
j policy, as ob- up their territories and abiding by the will to pursue it . . . This is the hard ques-
servers like Henry Kissinger and James Mac- ground rules of free elections. Nor is there tion. The Administration, disposed to the
Gregor Burns have proposed, should be the reason to see why we have been so reluctant indiscriminate use of power, enmeshed in the
creation and stabilization of secure areas again to follow the Laos model and declare grinding cogs of the escalation machine,
where the South Vietnamese might them- neutralization, under international guar- committed to the thesis that China is the
selves undertake social and institutional antee, our long-run objective for Vietnam. enemy in Vietnam, obviously could not turn
development. Our resources should go, in An Imaginative diplomacy would long since to de-escalation without considerable inner
the Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold have discussed the ways and means of such upheaval. The issue in the United States in
than to search-and-destroy (especially when neutralization with Russia, France, Britain the months to come will be whether Presi-
search-and-destroy more often means search- and other interested countries. Unsatisfac- dent Johnson's leadership is sufficiently re-
and-drive-underground). We should get toffy as the situation in Laos may be today, it silient and forbearing to permit a change in
rid of those "one-star generals who," in the is still incomparably better than the situa- the direction of policy and arrest what is
words of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their tion In South Vietnam. coming increasingly to seem an accelerating
tour in Vietnam as an opportunity to in- On the other hand, negotiation is not an drift toward a great and unnecessary
Bulge in. a year's big-game shooting from catastrophe.
their helicopter howdahs at Government exclusive, or even primary, American respon-
their expense." sibility. Along with a military stalemate,
At the same time we should induce the the other precondition of a diplomatic set- (Mrs. DWYER (at the request of Mr.
Saigon Government to institute generous tlement is surely a civilian government in WATKINS) was granted permission to
amnesty provisions of the kind which worked Saigon. Marshal Ky is one of those Frank- extend her remarks at this point in the
so well in the Philippines. And we should enstein's monsters we delight In creating in RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
further increase the incentive to come over our "client" countries, very much like the ter.)
by persuading the South Vietnamese to aban- egregious General Phoumi Nosavan, who sin-
don the torture of prisoners-a practice not gle-handedly blocked a settlement in Laos [Mrs. DWYER'S remarks will appear
only horrible in itself but superbly calculated for two years. Like Phoumi, Ky evidently hereafter in the Appendix.]
to make the enemy fight to the bitter end, feels that Washington has committed itself
In the meantime we must end our own
shameful collaboration with this barbarism 1 JUST NOT NEEDED
and stop turning Vietcong prisoners over to See "The Politics of Escalation in Viet- (Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of
the South Vietnamese when we know that and nam," Reginald Franz Zelnik lnik of f the the University Daleof Scott Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permis-
torture is probable.
California; to be published in October by Sion to extend his remarks at this point
As for bombing the North, let us taper Fawcett Books (paperback) and Beacon Press in the RECORD and to include extraneous
this off as prudently as we can. Bombing is (hardcover). matter.)
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22058 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE September 19, 1966
Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, once pie of a dam that is needed, is fully justified, East Tennessee Historical Society, McMinn
again I am compelled to rise to speak that is reasonable in concept and execution. Chapter.
It is to replace the present Hales Bar Dam, East Tennessee Duck Hunters Association.
8;gainst wasteful and unnecessary Fed- that has been undermined by water leaks Sweetwater Valley Feeder Pig Association.
eral spending. through porous limestone formations. Nick- Knox County Young Republican Club.
This time I am concerned over the ajack also will provide huge locks to allow Southern Field and Creel Club.
Tellico Dam project included under title better use of the Tennessee Riverby shipping West Knoxville Sertoma Club.
IV in the Public Works Appropriation than currentllyyns b rast DttleneekLd
the at Hale'srBar. KKnoxville noxville Men's Garden Club. with e Act of 1come 17787 -which i steed.. harp
Uled to come before the House this week.. need for Nickajack Dam is the proposal for Cherokee Rifle and Pistol Club, Inoorpo-
This project, which is mentioned building the Tellico Dam on the Little Ten- rated. Assaciation for Preservation of Tennessee
page 83 of the Public Works Committee ee nessee River. Perhaps you have heard most about the Antiquities.
report on the bill-House Report No. Tellico Dam as a result of the protests of Ossolt Circle-Knoxville.
2044-may seem innocuous. It calls for nature lovers, conservationists and fishermen Middle Tennessee Conservancy Council.
a $3.2 million appropriation for a dam who lament that the Tellico Dam would de- Scout Troop 3057. l rivers
in our
Y-In on the Little Tennessee River in south- river stcos one the additionlast natu as the stronger Appa diaachiann Anglers.
can Foresters, Kentucky-
rrn development." efor "multipurpose thnpoint that there is no real need for the Tel- TenSqclety of nessee Section.
like water resource Now that development, sounds flood lico Dam. AR, Kentucky-
like It is not justified by power production James White oChapter, D Athe s oxville. .
control, and maybe even power develop- needs. It is not justified by navigation de-Chamber ment-in short, all the good things for mands. It is not supported as a flood control Outdoorsmen, Inc.-Kingsport.
which TVA has become famous. measure. The only significant argument this broad opopposition,
Frankly, Mr. Speaker, that simply is that is made for the Tellico Dam is that it Knowing would a congressional of f this oad o have new
1) lthere are hims authorized this Tellico Dam scheme? I
sites. not the case with Tellico Dam. Tellico would a6gument whenindustria
Dam is purely and simply a "pork bar- Poor
eel" project that will have the taxpayers s many available industrial sites in the area doubt it-Certainly, not without a good
of the United States footing a $42 mil- that are not yet in use, and (2) it is not the deal more information.
business of the Federal Government to take Abuses such as this proposed dam indi-
lion bill for a risky 5,000-acre real estate the role of real estate developer. sate that new legislation may be neces-
speculation. It appears that the real reason behind the nary to bring agencies such as TVA back
The so-called "general economic de- Tellico Dam is that its proponents just have into the Federal Government and under
velopment" that TVA has in mind in run out of something else to do for the time normal authority of Congress.
the Tellico Dam project is really to lure being. Just yesterday, the House Appropria- the e n normal au I would not ngrend to be
region of the co in- tions m?riiooni dollars to startethe2projeeot-a an expert on the economics of this Tel-
industry from
t to this ab un it and the way TVA ate small forerunner of many millions of your liCO Dam project. I do not have to be
"profit" to pljprivateVate dollars that would follow. one to see the dangers and the holes left
tends to ga to condemn
land for resale e at a "profit" to Here is one excellent example of a wise by unanswered, and unasked, questions.
industry. place to cut expenditures in this time of gal- For example, TVA predicts that it will
I find it very hard to understand why loping inflation, wasteful Federal spending, generate $15 million in economic benefits
TVA should ever be involved in this type deficit financing and costly war. from the project. , Almost $11 million of
of "pork cbarrel proj ertainly, t" his Tel is at any time. Mr. Speaker, I have inquired and that total is to come from land sales? but
o But, mpleiely t of lin Dam scheme found that more than 50 national and what if those land sales do not materi-
r scompletely out of end e now when local organizations are strongly opposed alize? If those land sales do not materi-not MeltOLI
estraint on Federal spending is so ur- to Tellico Dam. I would like to present ali H- almost they pe cent of that economic
gently needed. a partial listing of these organizations not a On top of sound business business pp else,ropositionthis. is I am am for the RECORD: benefit goes down the drain.
rea-
t once that TVA tried a similar ven- oaonrrue TELLi oC DAM PROJECTD TO THE Mrthe. Speaker, Chattanooga I editor share the that the real suspicion of
informed very o
acquired this area with no suc- son for the Tellico Dam project is that
cess once before
cols. Hill They and, a acres on Mel- Nationial WildlifeoFederation. the TVA has just run out of other things
tan Hin reservoir s of now, they National Audubon Society. to do. We cannot afford this kind of
have only been able to sell one 25-acre National Parks Association. "busy work" in this time of mounting
parcel. Wildlife Management Institute. inflation.
'TVA says that the Tellico Dam situa- The Nature Conservancy. believe that we
. any
tion is different. They say that it has American Forestry Association. Futhermarecan or should, a I ff do ord not not busy work that Amer highwces rail, and water transportation America Pulpwood Assoc ationa d
and perhaps destroys valuable
. However, that ham lacking ng at Melton of Wildlife. natural resources.
Hill, However, I am sure that they were Defenders Trout Unlimited. I have never fished in the Little Ten-
just as confident at Melton Hill. Speak- Citizens Committee on Natural Resources. nessee River and i consider it my loss,
of
ing as a businessman I would want to Tennessee Society of the Daughters of the oof
know a great deal more about the market American Revolution. for the the great uns experts tell poiled me se that t this is river one n
before I would sink $42 million in a land Tennessee Game and Fish Commission. that part s the Gtunche f r They say
speculation to go this. into not think that TTennessee Conservation ennessee Outdoor Press eAssocia.tion. that this dam will wreck this, and I be-
TVA but if th they into this kind stockhold- Tennessee Farm Bureau Federation. sieve them.
tress, but if they do, then the - Tennessee Livestock Association. Along with the people of Tennessee,
ens-the U.S. taxpayers-must have bave bet- Tennessee Federation of Garden Clubs. the numerous conservation agencies
ter assurance of the soundness of the Southeastern Outdoor Writers Association. of Tennessee,
project than we have seen so far. Association for Preservation of the Little and I urge t t he my great colleagues newspapers so support an
I doubt very much whether this Tellico Tennessee River.
Dam project would have gotten this far The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. amendment to the public works appro-
if TVA were required to come to Congress Cherokee Nation, Tribe of Oklahoma. priations bill to delete the appropriation
Fort Loudon Association, for the Tellico Dam project.
for authorization. Clearly the project is Monroe County Farm Bureau.
widely opposed by local groups and by Monroe County Farmers Cooperative.
national conservation organizations. I Monroe County Livestock Association. INTERVIEW WITH GEN. WALLACE
have received many letters from people McMinn County Farm Bureau. M. GREENE, JR., U.S. MARINE
in Tennessee asking my help in stopping Blount County Livestock Association. CORPS
TVA. The Chattanooga News-Free Press Greenback Farmers Cooperative.
Vonore Lions Club. (Mr. KEOGH (at the request of Mr.
summarized ida aeptember in 16: an edi- Childhowee Rod and Gun Club, MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to
tonal last Fri day, September Chattanooga Trout Association. extend his. remarks at this point in the
JusT NOT NEEDED Atililand Sportsnman's Club. RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ing below Chattanooga, work is progress- Cheroked' Sportsman's Conservation Asso- ter.)
ing on the Nickajack Dam. This is an exam- cation.
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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 22059
Mr. KEOGH. Mr. Speaker, recently bility for less than 10 square miles of real of helicopters, and the ever-improving in-
the Commandant of the U.S. Marine estate, with a very small number of Vietna- telligence that we have, it would be much
M. Greene, Jr., re- mese living within the perimeters. better, instead of having a barrier type of
Corps, turned to Gen. the United Wallace States Greene, the war Today, Inside the Marine Corps' area of defense, to have a mobile, quick-reacting
responsibility, there are 1,620 square miles of defense to hit the enemy wherever they may
zone in Vietnam, where he made a com- ground and 900,000 Vietnamese civilians. I enter the country.
prehensive survey of our military posi- would call this progress. Furthermore, what do you really have when
tion.and our relations with the Vietna- More than that: The perimeters are grow- you have a barrier along the DMZ? The
mese people. General Greene, who is ing, they keep expanding, and I feel that enemy can always make an end run around
completing 3 productive years in the ex- within a reasonable time We're going. to be it. What are you going to do-extend a
acting role of Commandant, was inter- able to amalgamate these beachheads into a fence across the entire continent of Asia?
single beachhead, which will be proof not Q. Are the two Marine divisions in Viet-
viewed by members of the staff of U.S. only to our own people that our programs are nam actually enough to link up those beach-
News & World Report. succeeding out there, but also a clear signal heads, and do all the other things required
His penetrating comments, as pub- to He Chi Minh that he's losing. of them?
lished in the September 5, issue of that Q. When would you estimate the linkup A. If we were to put additional troops in
magazine, should be read by every in- will come? - there, we could hasten the effort.
terested American: A. I'd say that part of the program should Q. Do you have those in reserve, available
GENERAL GREENE TELLS THE STORY OF VIET- come within the next few months. Now, of somewhere in the world?
NAM WAR-INTERVIEW WrTH THE COMMAN- course, this doesn't mean that the military A. We have the newly organized Fifth
DANT OF THE MARINE CORPS campaign is going to be over, because, al- Division on the West Coast. We've already
though we will have torn out the guerrilla started the deployment of one of its regi-
(NOTE.-After a year of sustained U.S. ef- infrastructure from the villages and hamlets ments, the 26th Regiment, to the Western
fort in Vietnam, at a steadily rising cost, the and forced the enemy out where we can get Pacific.
returns are starting to come in-and they're at him in the jungles and mountains to the Two battalion landing teams are already
mixed. west, it simply will mean that we've done the either in place or en route, along with the
(The military picture is improving, but preliminary surgery. regimental headquarters. They'll come un-
how rapidly? Will the Marines be able to Next, we have to get on with the pacifica- der the command of the Ninth Amphibious
link up their coastal beachheads? How tion program, which is going to take a con- Marine Brigade on Okinawa. The other two
about the Delta-will U.S. have to go after siderable period of time and also is going to regiments of the division are being organized
Reds there, too? require U.S. military and civilian effort. on the West Coast, with one battalion in
(Mainly: Can U.S. ever win a military vic- Q. For a long time? Kaneohe on Oahu.
tory? A. For a long time. Look how long we Q. Those are regulars?
(Then there's the pacification side of it. have been in Europe-20 years. How long A. These are regulars, made up of volun-
It's agreed that job is just starting. How have we been in Korea? Fifteen years. The teers. Now, in addition to this, of course,
long will it take-a year, or five, or 20? point is this is a long-term job. It is not we have the Second Division and air wing
(For authoritative answers, "U.S. News & necessarily a long-term military job. We on the East Coast of the U.S.-in North
World Report" invited to its conference room may get over that part of it but the pacifica- Carolina, at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point.
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, just tion job is going to take a long time. These are in a ready status to meet contin-
back from the war zone. This is an exclu- Q. Do you have enough men to do the gencies in the Atlantic Ocean basin and also
sive Interview with members of the maga- military job? in the Mediterranean or Europe. We could,
zine's staff.) A. We have 56,000 Marines in South Viet- if necessary, draw down on this air-ground
Q. General Greene, did you bring back nam, enough men to slowly expand our per- team. We wouldn't like to do that. Then
any dominant impression from your latest imeters as we're doing now. However, of the third source would be our Fourth Marine
trip to Vietnam? course, if additional forces were to be in- Division and wing team, which is our Re-
A, The thing that impressed me most was troduced, the action could be expedited, serve outfit. I can say, based on my own
the tremendous progress that's been made accelerated. experience, that the Reserve is in the best
in the seven months since my last inspec- Q. How far from the sea do you intend to ready status that it's ever been in its history.
tion-progress which to me augurs of a deft. extend the beachheads? Q. How many men are there in the Marine
nite victory. A. From the sea westward to the moon- Reserve)
Q. What kind of progress? tains, back far enough to cover the great ma- A. We have about 48,000 in the Orga-
A. The magnitude of the entire effort-the jority of people living in our area of respon- nized Reserve and about 56,000 in our Class
combat elements, the installations, the sup- sibility. 3 Ready Reserve.
porting establishments, storerooms, work- Once you get to the mountains, you'll find Q. If you expand your forces in Vietnam,
shops, barracks for the men, recreation areas, very few people. There are 10,000 square will you have to call up any of your Re-
and so forth-it is all just tremendous. miles in the First Corps area, but the bulk of serve units?
That's No. 1. No. 2 is the progress made in the population-I'd say 90 per cent of the A. Since we've had a gradual intensifica-
the pacification of the countryside in the population-is actually centered in just one tion of effort in South Vietnam, we have
Northern Provinces where the Marines are fourth of the total territory-in the sliver of been able to avoid calling up the Fourth
located, and the success that we're having flatland adjacent to the sea. We're talking Marine Division-the Reserve outfit-and,
in the search-and-destroy operations. There about a region with a coastline 165 miles long instead, we were able to organize the Fifth
is a very definite and noticeable progress. and 8 to 14 miles in width. Division entirely out of volunteers. I
Q. But aren't the Marines really prisoners Q. How many people are concentrated in thought that this was the proper thing to
in those beachheads that they are in along this coastal area, altogether? do and so recommended, because I want to
the coast? A. Some 2.7 million, plus some 200,000 keep that Fourth Division as a "Sunday
A. No, they aren't-that's just the point, refugees. Very few are in the mountains. punch." They're able to get under way with-
The beachheads are operating bases; they're it is very, very rugged country up there. In in 60 days after they're called.
combat bases on the sea from which we've fact, they have what they call a "double If we had a real serious escalation or
not only been operating, but which we're canopy," with not only the ordinary tree- emergency, we could call them up and move
gradually expanding. As you know, we went top-level growth, but an extension of this them quickly.
in there in March of 1965 and established growth at a second level. This is no country Q. How long does it take to form a new
three beachheads, with limited perimeters. in which anyone wants to live. It's tremen- division like the Fifth and get it effective
We've been expanding the perimeters ever dously rough. for operation?
since. We know that many of the enemy suffer A. The total organization of the Fifth
Actually, as I tell a lot of our Marine from malaria and dysentery. It's hard to get Division Will take approximately 12 months.
officers, here you are seeing the influence of food. They've had to execute forays toward We started organizing in March of this year.
sea power on history, really. the coast in order to get rice to eat, in many As far as heavy equipment is concerned,
Q. What are the three beachheads, Gen- cases. I'd say it will take about 18 months to get
eras? Q. Would you be in favor of going north everything we need in the way of tanks and
A. The principal one is at Da Nang, the as well as west, and extending a barrier artillery and trucks.
first beachhead we established. The second parallel to the seventeenth parallel, south of But remember, we're organizing it by small
is about 45 miles to the north, at Phu Bat, the so-called DMZ---demilitarized zone-to combat units-our battalion landing teams-
which is near the ancient city of Hue. The stop infiltration? and, as I said, we've already deployed the
third is some 65 miles south of Da Nang at A. In theory, this present an inviting pie- first of these. But the total process will not
Chu Lai. tore, but it becomes very questionable when be completed, as far as people go, until
Q. How fast are you pushing out from you examine the logistics required, the engi- March of 1967,
these beachheads? Will you be able to link neers required, the time required and the Q. Is the size of the Marine Corps itself
up all three before long? troops who must keep it under surveillance. going to have to go up in order to meet the
A. This is the thing that really makes me There's a serious question as to whether this planning?
feel optimistic. Some 17 months ago, when would be the proper technique or not. A. We're authorized an end strength of
we first went ashore, we assumed responsi- With the mobility that we have in the way 278,000, which we'll reach by end of cal-
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22060 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE September 19, 1966
endar 1966. 'Unless there's an intensification A. It was a very clever procedure in which, in the vicinity of Hue. The city has quieted
Of effort in South Vietnam, this is the level just below the water level, they would dig down. Da Nang has returned to normal.
at which we expect to operate. into the side of,the well and then upward, But here is the vital thing: Even at the
Q. Do you expect to get another division and hollow out an enclosure big enough for height of the political emergency up in First
in Vietnam soon? two men. Then they would build an air Corps, the fabric which we'd built over the
A. We don't necessarily have to have an- conduit into the well itself just above the period of a year in the countryside, among
other Marine division In South Vietnam. We water level. the people, held firm,
might get help from Vietnamese Marine When we entered the village, they'd dive Q. The trouble was in the cities?
units. As you probably know, there is a very into the well, go up into the enclosure and A. Absolutely. Out in the hamlets and
fine Vietnamese Marine Corps, and also a hide. We attempted to get them out by put- villages, where we had our pacification pro-
Korean Maxine Corps. The Korean marines ting tear gas into the wells, gram under way with the Vietnamese, the
are now In $outh,Vietnam. Altogether, there Q. Do you occupy these hamlets? people continued to cooperate with us, and
are five battalions of Vietnamese marines. A. Yes, and that's an important thing. we had no difficulty at all. It was only in
Both of these units are outstanding, and When this screening operation is over, we the urban areas, where the agitation was un-
we'd be very happy to have them operating then leave one Marine squad, plus two squads der way, that there was some difficulty.
with us. of local militia. Q. Do these people in the countryside have
Q. What are they doing now? Q. That thins out your forces-- any feeling of allegiance to Saigon?
A. The Vietnamese marines are In strategic A. That's the point I was going; to bring A. Their allegiance is principally to their
reserve in the country. Actually, during our out. In theory, this particular operation as own family, to their village or their hamlet.
last two combat operations, "Hastings" and soon as it's completed, should be taken over to their religion, or to small groups. This is
Colorado," we've had at least two of their by the Vietnamese themselves, either by the a major problem, because the idea of volun-
battalions operating with us. Many of their local police and militia, or by South Viet- tary allegiance to a government is new to
officers and men have been trained in our namese Army troops. them. In the past, governments have al-
schools here in the States. But the fact is there are not enough- ways been forced on them.
There are many, many Koreans and a great and not enough trained-individuals to do This is the problem that's going to take
many Vietnamese officers and noncommis- this, so, for the past 18 months, we've had to years. General Walt (Lieut. Gen. - Lewis
stoned officers whom we personally know. divert marines from their normal search-
young Vietnamese people. That's why he's
Q. General, are the Marines spending as thQ.~ Is anything being done in Saigon aigon about spending so much effort on helping to get
much time actually in combat in this war as the schools re-established.
they have in past wars? A. Everything possible is being done to Q. Did you say the Marines are building
A. This is not like many past wars. Actu- expedite the training of Vietnamese civilians schools?
ally, we have two programs under way, and and military for the pacification program. A. Of course, and we're not only getting
we try to keep them in balance. As I men- Actually, while I was in Saigon I went on assistance from our Government through the
tioned, one is our search-and-destroy opera- down to Vung Tau, which is the revolu- AID program, but many thousands of people
tion; the other is pacification.. These pro- tionary-development, cadre-training: center- in the United States have made contra u-
grams, incidentally, apply throughout the a most interesting place where they had some tions to the Marine Corps Reserve civic-ac-
Country and are used by the Army as well as 5,000 civilian Vietnamese under training, to tion program. General Walt has had over
the Marine Corps, be organized into 59-man teams to be in- $350,000 made available to him, and most of
Q. Exactly what do' you mean by "search serted into these village and hamlet areas this he's spending in the re-establishment
and destroy"? to takover after the "County Fair" screen- of the schools. You can't go out there and
A, The phrase really describes it very well. g operation has been completed. They are see these children without realizin
We search for organized units of the enemy making progress. a how portant this really
until we locate them. Once they are located, Q. How do the Marines work alongside fine-looking boys project Is. are ere immediately get out there, usually by these South Vietnamese militia in the vii- and girls. They're smart.
mhelicopter, and strike and try to destroy or lages? I've talked with a lot of them. They're anx-
helicopter, them. That's the first program: A.. Very closely. We have what we call ions to go to school. And here is the basis,
Find the enemy, fix him and kill him. combined-action companies, which are rapid- I feel, of hope for the country.
The second program-and in the long run ly growing in number in the First Corps Q But that's along-time proposition-
is,
the more important of the two-ia our pact- area, consisting usually of a squad or a A. Ito r but we should ask: Is it worth-
n, ro am, which is also known under platoon of U.S. Marines, and then several Intertwined while or not?
hich and rso ally
p squads or two or three - hismall with our pledge
the terms of "civic action," "revolutionary platoons of Viet-
or "rehabilitation," This pro- namese militia. We work with them, train don't feel
should dw w to this small cou welsh hicon, h I we have! alp
gram consists of pulling out of the village them, develop their leadership, actually op- own n al sts ave our
and hamlet structure the Viet Cong who crate with them against the Viet Cong. must ere ber. We didn't i didn't t, too, this t-
have been living in these areas for years- Eventually we'll be able to pull our units out, field remember. Vietnam; select ele bats
identifying them, encouraging them to re- and they will operate by themselves. These tn which South can and
turn to the Government side through the people are good fighters. They're loyal, and one an which we can adequately meet and
"Open arms" defector program, capturing, they work with us in ambushes and opera- cope with the enemy.
killing them, or forcing them into the jungle tions at night. In fact, one company I saw nomIf we were to withdraw from ous pres sttigge
and mountains to the west-and then start- was on such close terms with our marines , we'd not only lose tremendous pe
ing on community programs to get people that they were wearing U.S. Marine Corps throughout the world, but it would only be
back on their feet. Insignia on one of the lapels of their pa- and
matter of me before we'd have meet the threat somewhere else either
Q. How in the world do you identify the jamas as an indication of how they felt. on the Subcontinent, in the Middle East,
enemy in any particular village? Another most interesting thing is the atti-
Amaybe in Australia and New Zealand, per-
tude of the young marines in these com-
. Back in the 1940s the Marine Corps, bined-action companies. hags Thailand, which is already threatened
which has had a great deal of experience in in the northeast corner, and, finally, perhaps
small wars, developed a "cordon system" for I talked with a tall, lean, lanky, Texan. even on our own doorstep, in Latin America.
the l wars, d v of dma, areas. We're for I'd say the boy, a corporal, is about 20 years
old. He hardly let me go, he was so enthu- We either have to choose meet the enc-
tually using this method-we call it the siastic about what he was accomplishing. my here, or face the almost certainty of hav-
County Fair" operation. I saw one of these He showed me his unit. He showed e ing to meet him somewhere else, on another
operations actually being conducted during where they were billeted. He introduced me battlefield, where the price of admission will
my recent visit, and it was most interesting. to the village officials. He told me about be many times what it's been so far.
What we do: We select a hamlet, say of their operations at night against the Viet WE CONTROL SEA AND AIR
500 or 600 people. We put a cordon around Cong. He took me down and showed me the Q. Isn't true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that hamlet, usually before daylight. Then, school they just got back into Operation. at one time opposed the idea of fighting an-
with South Vietnamese troops, we enter the They had six classrooms and about 200 kids. other land war in Asia?
hamlet, assemble all the people, screen each He took me in and introduced me to the A. This problem came up, as you know, in
individual, move the people out of the ham- teachers.
let into an enclosure where we can start 1eco, when It looked as if we were to
giv- Then this hapened: The going,
ing them medical treatment, feeding them in-command said he was going to xtend his become
c ursel that would have been a most
and issuing identity cards. This takes about tour in Vietnam for six months, because he difficult problem, because you have in Laos
three days. had been told he could have a unit of his a landlocked area, extremely rough country,
Now, if any of the Viet Cong in the village own like this In the next village. You see, very limited roads, practically no railroads,
attempt to escape, the cordon snares them. these men really believe in what they're far from the sea. This would have been a
If they attempt to hide, we find out where accomplishing. most difficult operation to mount and to
they are and dig them out. In this particular Q. Have you political stability in your area sustain.
village, we killed 10 Viet Cong and found a now? But we can't always select the area in
.number of them hiding in the wells. A. Vwa ,era An 1fl.1e ......
w. an tine weitez had turbulence c up tb~ere in April and May, we eventually didn't go into Laos, we found
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 September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 22061
ourselves slowly slipping into the situation for example, they have taken over the village Delta and d probably is accurate forecast finih there. that in which we find ourselves now in South and they control the people. er apIs a pacification noa program under way in
Vietnam. Fortunately, we're fighting in a Q. What's their motivation?
country where we have ready access from A. They have been sold the Communist the Delta? is a program under way, but
the sea, and we control the sea and control idea-that's one motivation. A. There the air. Q. Can the regular Northern troops be in- much remains to be done. The program be-
Q. Would it help the war much in the filtrated into the Southern villages, into the ing conducted now is under the auspices of
South if the port of Haiphong in the North infrastructure? Will they be accepted there? South Vietnamese military units. that
are Delta
's just
were be shut down tight, by mining the a number of Northern born prisoners who, In Alswhicho, of underethe controlfofhcerrtain
harbor r or by other means? group d to
A. You've e raised a question that's not only the first place, don't know the countryside th eViet Congs Bwho utatheret~aytremendous
military but also political. The political and, secondly, are not accepted by the peo-
factor has to be measured, and this has been ple. In fact, the Viet Cong themselves are job to be done in the Delta area, because
so m
along-and are -with- ple axe convinced that the Ameri cans and manyspeop e a dl hamlets be villages to be
one of
uch problem. the We determinants
out this action being taken. the Vietnamese that come in-in the mili- pacified. start
Q. Is
that Q. Is the flow of supplies slowing from the gtary units-are etting information f om them has to wewhere the one in the northern areas?y problem from
North?
A. Somewhat. I think where you notice the Communist fighters are, who they are A. Yes. In the north, although we have
it is In a drop-off of motorized vehicles, such where they're hiding, where their caches are. rivers running down to the sea, we don't
as trucks, and also in boats that are pro- This is, again, a most encouraging part of have the tremendous marshes and rice pad-' dies yo-d find In Delta.
pelled by motors. This is a result, of course, this whole operation. ta, you have a multitude of
of our attacks on their oil-storage facilities MAJOR ELEMENTS FROM NORTH In rivers the and Delettaams throughout. Then, of
in the North. However, infiltration of men Q. Would this suggest that the usefulness course, you're on the ocean, with a very long
still continues at about 4,500 to 5,000 men a of the North Vietnamese forces is largely con- coastline. In addition to that, you're next
month. fined to uninhabited areas? to the Cambodian border, which also poses a
Q. General, what do you think of Prime A. Northerners are alien in the South, but problem.
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's idea that we have the Communist side-our enemy-would in- Q. How do you deal with this problem?
to invade North Vietnam in order to end this troduce them into any area where they felt A. The job certainly can be done. There's
war? that they could gain a military advantage. nothing insurmountable about it. It's going
A. Well, several times the Prime Minister For example, in the Second Corps area, which to take people, it's going to take equipment,
has made various statements which are his is in the central part of South Vietnam, and it's going to take time.
own personal opinions. I feel that the real the plateau area around Pleiku and Kontum, Q. Do the Communists have organized
key in this war is whether we have success they've been introducing major elements in units in the Delta, or do they operate as in-
frastructure failure ripping out the guerrilla in- order to meet the U.S. Army's airmobile diva- dividuals pretty much?
frastructura from these villages and hamlets. sign in battle. A. They operate just as they do in the rest
I think the North Vietnamese are watching Q. Where do they come from? How do of the country-as individuals and as small
this, because they know that, if they lose the they get there? guerrilla bands.
people in the South, they lose the war. A. They come down through Laos, along Q. How do they supply themselves?
Q. Just who is it that you're fighting- the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and infiltrate across A. Principally from the countryside, so fax
mostly Southern Viet Cong, or regular-army the border through innumerable ingresses. as food is concerned. Their ammunition
troops from North Vietnam? I've seen some of these. For instance, one has been brought in across the border or
A. When we went initially into South Viet- is the Ba Long Valley up in the First Corps across the coast.
nam, into First Corps area, our principal area. This is a deep valley that comes right Q. Are we getting geared up for this kind
enemy was the "black pajama" guerrilla, across from Laos, right through the moun- of war in the Delta?
Now, the interesting thing: During my last tains into the area in the vicinity of Hue. A. We're always planning ahead for possi-
visit, Operation Colorado was in progress. This is a natural path-in a natural ingress. ble operations, not only In the Delta, but
We had just thwarted an ambush. There Q. They come on foot? throughout the country.
were some 200 bodies of the enemy scattered A. They come on foot a good deal of the Q. Will it take the same sort of effort in
around this village in which the ambush had way. However, in their initial movement out the Delta as in the First Corps area-the
been set up. In looking over the dead, and of North Vietnam, they ride trucks. They occupation of villages?
also looking over a group of prisoners which ride until they get down to the place where A. Yes, the same two programs-search-
our marines had taken, we found the bulk there are only trails, and then they infiltrate and-destroy and pacification-apply here
of these people were North Vietnamese, with by foot along the trails. just de much as they do up in the mountain-
sig nnificant of indication- guerrillas. that To m they e, this have Q. How are they supplied? ous northern portion of the country.
only Is a a sprinkling
is a ifica A. They're supplied by truck and also-as Q. Aren't those villages different in the
found it necessary to introduce North Viet- they have been in many other previous Delta-very difficult to guard because they
namese into the country in order to get on wars-by pack, -by coolie, by bicycle. stretch for miles along canals?
with the campaign that the guerrillas are Q. Do you agree with the theory that this A. Here; again, the problem essentially is
actually Q Do the m losing. war might just fade away if the enemy gets the same as we havq farther north. What
A. W 't taki take many prisoners? the idea that he is losing? was tried before, unsuccessfully, was to set
during is A. I certainly think it's a possibility. I up the so-called strategic-hamlet program in
Awe'd We . Bu taking as many prisoners
Ope like. But I saw about 2h durithis think Ho Chi Minh, as he watches the situa- which the hamlets were fortified, but their
Operation Colorado. There had been 20 tion in the South and sees that he's losing defense was left to the people, or to very
prisoners captured. control, may then decide that the easiest way poorly trained militia.
Q. Do they tend to fight until they're is temporarily to fade out of the picture in Under the system we're using now, well-
killed? hthat we'll leave the country-or that trained units are left in these areas to hold
A. No, you find a varie. uome of them hopes
fight until they're s so badly yy wounded that we at a later opportunity he'll be able to m- them. These- units are not only our own
can take them prisoner. Others surrender, filtrate with political teams and take over. military and the South Vietnamese military,
Others, even at the early part of the fight, This would be one prospect. It's happened but also the "revolutionary-development
just desert and come over to our side. before, and it's an easy way to do it without cadre" teams-the development teams that
are being trained.
Q. Don't the Communists have an endless any loss of prestige. Q. As this develops, it's going to take tre-
en? supply of m WHY THE DELTA IS VITAL mendous manpower, isn't it?
A. Theyhave a tremendous manpower Q. You are optimistic about the situation A. It already is taking tremendous man-
pool in the North, of course, and they can in the Northern Provinces, where the Marines power. You have about 700,000 men under
decide, if obey want go, period ntinue a war But have been located-but are things as bright arms from South Vietnam itself, of course,
attrition s: a What r they going time. But in the Southern Provinces, in the Mekong and we've got about 290,000 of our own
the point If: What are f they see, t gain at Delta? What is the situation there? troops there. The Koreans have over 20,000.
this sort of operation if thsee, first, that The Delta, as all of us well know, is a The Australians are represented, and so are
they've lost the people and, two, that we're tremendous area with a long seacoast, a net- the New Zealanders. A contingent from the effort - Q. Who d h are to see those the "black lack pajama" "guar' work of waterways-the rice bowl certainly Philippines is expected.
Q. o of South Vietnam and possibly of Southeast The one thing that comes out of any dis-
rillas? . Asia-5 million people who offer not only a cussion of this situation is the magnitude
A. Most are local people, and d people hamlets who of tax base for the guerrillas but also a recruit- of the task to be done.
wore born the equent and base. It is an area of the utmost im- Q. Is it going to take as many more people
South Vietnam, frequently led ra d into cadres as we have over there now?
trained in the North and rei they
the South. By virtue of the fact that that thI heard one of the leading officials of South A. I wouldn't want to speculate on how
are the only ones in a village that have arms, Vietnam say that the war started in the long it would take or how many troops it
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1&wnz CONGRESSIONAL RECORD . HOUSE September 19, 1966
would take. But let me say this: It will take They know that they can whip this enemy point of view, but I'm also keeping firmly in
a long time, and it will take a large number that they face. They've done it every time mind the problem of economics the the flow of
or troops. that they've met them in any major opera- gold, the cost, the casualties, th
Q. Are the South Vietnamese proving good tion of any sort. They know that the tre- meaning
o soldiers? mendous of these things tt our and our and aln fps
A. Yes, they are. When you remember that hind them as evident d bUnitedy the arnrnunitionbe- p
, with other of r nations and e ne interest st or
these people have been fighting and dying for food and installations that are going into the whe who have an nterest or
20 years, to think that they're still in the 'country. They feel in their own minds that are involved in this, too.
you mean by a "satisfactory
fighting business is a remarkable thing. this campaign Is going to be a success. Q. to the war?
We find that these people, if they're well Q. General, are you confident-- closeI to ea war?
led, will fight well. We've had scores of ma- A. Just two more points about morale that A. I mean providing firm security to the
Tines Operating as advisers with their units, struck me: people i ca io Vietnam and getting on with
and they speak most highly of them. If they I got to Okinawa, and I was really aston- Q. p Once hat' prone, d
ne, do you think that it
are led properly, they are good fighters. ished to find out that they had a blood-donor is finished ished that's
for all dotime?
Q. Are the Viet Cong good fighters, too? campaign, and the marines who were Well, I wouldn't say A. Very good fighters--dangerous fighters. through Okinawa on their way down to South foralltime. I'm juste saying that itficanhbe
During Operation Colorado, the Viet Cong Vietnam were contributing blood. brought to the status to which we want it
who were there fought until they were killed The other thing that struck me was the brought and to which the Vietnamese them-
right In their positions. They didn't run fact we had lots of units in South. Vietnam selves want it.
away. They fought. They're good fighters, them were over 50 per cent-and some of
They are well-equipped. They have good them almost 100 per cent-in U.S.. savings- WHEN T LEAVE CAN
weapons. bond purchases. In fact, in one place in Chu Q. And our troops s could d then come home?
WEAPONS USED BY REDS Lai I ran into a supply-support unit which A. Then our troops could start to come
Q. What athe weapons--Chinese? had a sign listing its savings-bond activity- home. As soon as the South Vietnamese
Q. Most are the t weapons shat I've seen are 90 per cent-and down at the bottom it said: people have started on the rehabilitation
of Soot design, manufactured In China. "We believe in the U.S.A." I thought that program-so that their own military forces,
Q. These are n, ml arms? was something that. people back here in the their local police and militia are able to pro-
Q. Small arms asome antiaircraft weep- United States might think about. tact them from any guerrillas that would be
ons.
ors. Of course, and n know ant surface-to-air raf t weapQ. Are you satisfied that your men are out in the countryside-then I would say
m
in North the Vietnam is pro- getting the righkind of training before they that we could start withdrawing our troops.
vIded
issile by the entet Union. are sent out to fight? I think it will be some time, however, be-
Q. What about et Uri reuse In casualties, A. You bet I am. The marines who are fore we will be able to do this.
General? going out to South Vietnam are going out
A. I don't. think our casualties have been there prepared to fight. They aren't going
ex A. Irdint think
oe had abtes have men out there to learn on the job. They know (Mr. RODINO (at the request of Mr. We' extra d
to 000 date, and 8, h aboutd. That is their jobs before they go. We have a tremen- MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to
just in the Marine Corps. The bulk of those
dous training system under way now, and extend his remarks at this point in. the
wounded returned to duty. we are introducing every scrap of informa- RECORD and to include extraneous rnat-
The medical ereatment our men are re- our tion that we training system, in South Vietnam Into
ter.)
, so that the marines
ceiving, now is really outstanding. We're that leave the United States, both the pro- [Mr. RODINO'S remarks will appear
losing less than 2 per cent of our wounded fessionals and also the short-timers, are be- hereafter in the Appendix.]
in this campaign out there, and it's due to ing given very detailed, thorough instruc-
the advances that have been made in mili-
tary medical treatment. For example, we tion in booby traps, mines, enemy tech-
are gedic people that aak example, the niqu.es, methods of ambushes, and all the (Mr. RODINO (at the request of Mr.
front line back in the States, undergoing counters that are used by our own troops. MATSUNACA) was granted permission to
Q. treatment, in five days' time. . How long is a Marine tour? A. extend his remarks at this point in the
One incident that struck me while I was A Marine tour is 13 months, portal to
at Chu Lai: We had a boy that had just portal--U.S. to U.S. It means 12 months RECORD and to include extraneous nlat-
come in from the front lines, badly woundeed. out there and about two weeks out, two ter.)
I me in f talking wfr him and adly woo ds weeks back, including the processing. [Mr. RODINO'S remarks will appear General with a Purple Heart. Two days later, when Q. iven a r Greene, are the military
pe sere- hereafter in the Appendix.]
I was at Clark Field at the Philippines, I went of t i gthis iven a r OrIs free a hand ui a ob operation
into an evacuation plane that was about to ?f war? Or is there quite a bi t of politi-
take o$ for Andrews Air Force Base near cal direction?
Washington, D.C., and the first man I saw A. This war, like all modern wars,, is ter- INCOME TAX DEDUCTION FOR
wthis boy whom I had seen in the hospital tainly a mixture of both military and politi- TEACHERS
was Chu Lai, cal factors-and, as time goes on, the years
pass by, this becomes even more evident and ( CRALEY the request :M
MORALE: HOW GI's FEEL, even more important. You can't look at any 1VIATSU SUNAGA) was g gr ranted permission to
o
Q. How is morale? - of these problems in Southeast Asia purely extend his remarks at this point in the
A, Again, on this trip, like on other trips, from the military point of view. RECORD and to include extraneous
I never founFi a single wounded man-and I Q. When you analyze a problem, do you matter.)
include many Army and Air Force and have a free hand or do civilians tend to Mr. CRALEY. Mr. Speaker, of the
Navy-who ever complained to me over the override you?
fact that he was wounded.. A. We have a very free hand in anal zf many grave problems confronting us to-
When I got to Japan, I went down to a problem, and we try to do it not only frcm day, I know of none more immediate,
Yokosuka to the naval hospital to see the the military point of view, but also from the serious, and of lasting significance than
wounded. As I was going along the wards, economic and political viewpoints, too, the critical shortage of teachers. The
one of the nurses came to me and said: We make recommendations to the officials Elementary and Secondary Education
"There's a wounded man, a corporal over in the Administration as to what our views Act and Higher Education Act will, like
there, and he requests mast with you." are. Now, they aren't necessarily always fol- medicare, have the immediate effect of
Well, you know what mast is: It's a session a lowed, but we have freedom to make known pointing up an already existing shortage;
commander gives on request to any one of our views-which we do.
fors teachers.
his men who wants to present a problem or Q. From the very beginning in this war, Thenamely, rationale for manpower
complaint or ask for help. there have been so many optimistic state-
So r supporting those bills
I went over to this boy. He was badly ments that a good many people are saying and others improving educational oppor-
wounded in the stomach and in one leg. He they just don't believe them any more. Does tunity in the United States, is also behind
was so badly hurt that he couldn't sit up in that critidsm bother you? my present support of legislation to
bed. He could just lie there. He couldn't A. Not particularly. Any estimate that one amend the Internal Revenue Code of
speak very loudly, so I bent over. And he makes hinges on the background and expe- 1954. The purpose of this amending
said to me: "General, I know I'm going to be rience of the individual who makes it, plus legislation I support is to allow teachers
all right. It's going to take a few weeks, and his interpretation of what he sees if he to deduct from gross income the expense
I have just one thing I want to ask you, actually goes into the country.
and that is that, when I'm able to walk, I I know I sound optimistic to you, and I'm incurred in pursuing courses for academic
want to return to my unit." enthusiastic about what I see, because I'm credit and degrees at institutions of
Now, here was a boy 19 years old, making convinced, if we keep on with what we're higher education and certain educational
that kind of a request. You find this atti- doing, that we can bring a satisfactory close travel expenses.
tude everywhere in South Vietnam-a feeling to this conflict in South Vietnam. of July 7,1966, the Inrn Revenue
that they've finally got the thing under way. I'm looking at It primarily from a military Service indicated an iri ention to change
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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 22125
recorded in volume 65-D, of Births, at page
110.
Given under by Hand and Official Seal of
Office at Lancaster, South Carolina, this 23rd
day of May, A.D. 1962.
LEE O. MONTGOMERY,
Clerk of Court for Lancaster County, S.C.
By
Deputy Clerk.
PENN-CENTRAL MERGER
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, I was pleased at today's action
by the interstate Commerce Commission
in reaffirming its April 27 decision re-
garding the Penn-Central merger. The
Commission's maintenance of Septem-
ber 30, 1966, as the effective date of the
merger is particularly important to the
future of the New Haven Railroad.
Early consummation of the merger will
insure that continuance of the New
Haven's vital passenger and commuter
services is not Jeopardized by delays in
the Penn-Central proceeding. Other
problems may well lie ahead for the New
Haven, but the ICC's action today as-
sures that it will not be the stumbling
block to a longrun solution of the New
Haven's situation.
Today's decision is also commendable
for its assurance that the ICC will con-
sider further the question of indemnifi-
cation of the Erie-Lackawanna, Dela-
ware & Hudson, and Boston & Maine
Railroads by the merging railroads, and
that these three carriers will have an op-
portunity to seek ultimate inclusion with-
in the Penn-Central system. As the
Commission itself points out, further pro-
ceedings regarding these three carriers
will be governed by the "fair and equi-
table" language of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. These three railroads pro-
vide important transportation services
that must not be neglected, and the Com-
mission's assurances regarding their
future are a step forward in develop-
ing an approach to keeping these services
in operation.
I have supported the concept of a
merger between the Pennsylvania and
New York Central Railroads since the
time that I was Attorney General. It has
been and is my belief that such a merger
is the first step forward in the develop-
ment of a modern and integrated trans-
portation system in the eastern part of
the United States. Such a system must
exist if we are to satisfy the growing
needs of this region's citizens for swift
and efficient service from city to city and
from city to suburb. That is why early
consummation of the merger, with ade-
quate provision for inclusion of vital
STHERS ARE NOW ALSO REVEALING
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNDE-
CLARED WAR IN VIETNAM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, lit-
tle by little-trickle by trickle-the truth
about the U.S. tragic and needless in-
volvement in a large=scale land war in
southeast Asia is coming to light.
Over this last weekend, four important
statements appeared in the public press
showing the growing fears of an ever-
widening group of people concerning the
quagmire in which the United States
finds itself enmeshed in Vietnam because
of its rigidity of position, its failure to
face facts, and its consistent adherence
to preconceived misconceptions.
Writing in the New York Times maga-
from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Com-
munist despotism in South Vietnam, not for
the Chinese but for themselves. Let us
understand that the ultimate problem here
is not military but political. Let us adapt
the means we employ to the end we seek.
In the same vein, speaking out against
what he said was an idea fostered out-
side of Vietnam that the conflict there
was a "kind of holy war between two
powerful political ideologies," U Thant,
Secrtary General of the United Nations
stated, as part of his annual report to
the United Nations :
The Vietnamese people, in particular, have
known no peace for a quarter of a century.
Their present plight should be the first, and
not the last, consideration of all concerned.
Indeed, I remain convinced that the basic
problem in Vietnam is not one of ideology
but one of national identity and survival. I
see nothing but danger in the idea, so as-
siduously fostered outside Vietnam, that the
conflict is a kind of holy war between two
powerful political ideologies.
Also, over the weekend, the Vatican an-
nounced that Pope Paul VI would urge
prayers on a worldwide basis. during the
month of October as part of a peace cam-
paign to end the war in Vietnam. It is
to be hoped that the prayers of the mul-
titudes will include one for those in posi-
tions of leadership in the administration
to face up to the facts not only as they
are but as they were so that our future
course of action can be determined in the
light of reality rather than fantasy.
Last Saturday, September 17, 1966, an-
other former adviser to both President
Kennedy and President Johnson, Rich-
ard Goodwin, speaking before the na-
tional board of the Americans for Demo-
cratic Action here in Washington, also
asked that the American people face up
to realities with respect to U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam. With his knowledge
of the inner workings of the White
House, Mr. Goodwin called attention to
the growing credibility gap between the
administration and the American peo-
ple. Speaking to this point he said :
zine for September 18, 1966, under the
title "A Middle Way Out of Vietnam,"
the noted historian and former special
assistant to both President Kennedy and
President Johnson, Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., gave a striking analysis of the course
open to the United States to extricate
itself from its difficult position in Viet-
nam. Professor Schlesinger points out:
The Illusion that the war in South Viet-
nam can be decided in North Vietnam is
evidently a result of listening too long to
our own propaganda. Our Government has
insisted so often that the war in Vietnam
is a clear-cut case of aggression across fron-
tiers that it has come to believe itself that
the war was started in Hanoi and can be
stopped there . . . Yet the best evidence Is
that the war began as an insurrection within
South Vietnam which, as it has gathered
momentum, has attracted Increasing support
and direction from the north. Even today
the North Vietnamese regulars in South
Vietnam amount to only a fraction of the
total enemy force (and to an even smaller
fraction of the American army in South Viet-
nam).
About U.S. attempts at reconstruction,
Professor Schlesinger writes:
Much devotion and intelilgence are at pres-
ent going into the programs of reconstruc-
tion, but prospects are precarious so long as
the enemy can slice through so much of
South Vietnam with such apparent immu-
nity; and so long as genuine programs of
social reform threaten the vested interests
of the Saigon Government and of large
landholders.
Professor Schlesinger's assessment of
the reconstruction program is under-
scored by a report appearing in the New
York Times this morning from Saigon
by Charles Mohr stating:
Top South Vietnamese officials have made
varying assessments of the pacification or
"revolutionary development" work done so
far in 1966. The most optimistic was that
performance was "not quite satisfactory," the
bluntest that progress was "quite limited"
and that "not much was achieved."
Commenting on administration state-
ments that the real enemy in Vietnam
is Red China, Professor Schlesinger
warns:
The air is charged with rhetoric. We are
buried in statements and speeches about
negotiation and peace, the defense of free-
dom and the dangers of communism, the de-
sire to protect the helpless and compassion
for the dying. Much of it is important and
sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended
to deceive. Some Is deliberate lie and dis-
tortion. But the important thing is not what
we are saying, but what we are doing; not
Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of what is being discussed, but what is happen-
widening the war. It is the vital element in ing.... In this, as in so many aspects of the
the Administration case. Yet the proof Our war, much of the information which feeds
leaders have adduced for this proposition has judgment is deeply obscured. Of course, in
been exceedingly sketchy and almost per- times of armed conflict facts are often elu-
functory. It has been proof by ideology and sive and much information, of necessity, can-
proof by analogy. It has not been proof by not be revealed. By its nature war is hostile
reasoned argument or by concrete illustra- to truth. Yet with full allowance for neces-
tion. sary uncertainties I believe there has never
As for the middle course for the future, been such intense and widespread deception
and confusion as that which surrounds this
Professor Schlesinger advises: war. The continual downpour of contradic-
I think a middle course is still possible tion, mis-statements, and kaleidoscopically
if there were the will to pursue it. And this shifting attitudes has been so torrential that
course must begin with a decision to stop it has almost numbed the capacity to sepa-
widening and Americanizing the war-to rate truth from conjecture or falsehood.
limit our forces, actions, goals and rhetoric.
Instead of bombing more places, sending in Calling for a return to the platform of
more troops, proclaiming ever more ardently the Democratic Party in 1964, "No wider
that the fate of civilization will be settled in war," Mr. Goodwin called for the forma-
Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to Lion of a "national committee against
see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war
in which Communist guerrillas, enthusiasti- widening of the war." He said :
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22126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 19, 1966
I suggest this organization Work with other in motion the policy of support for Saigon from the Even today the North Viet-
groups and individuals to form a national which resulted, two Presidents later, in namese regulars in South Vietnam amount
,committee against widening of the war. It American military intervention in 1985. to only a fraction of the total enemy force
will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a Each step in the deepening of the American (and to an even smaller fraction of the
lessening of the war in the South, although commitment was reasonably regarded at the American army in South Vietnam). We
individuals who oppose escalation may also time as the last that would be necessary; could follow the genial prescription of Gen-
hold those views. Thus it will be-open to yet, in retrospect, each step led only to the eral LeMay and bomb North Vietnam back to
all groups who oppose escalation In the North next, until we find ourselves entrapped to- the Stone Age-and the war would still go
regardless of their position on Other issues, day in that nightmare of American strate- on in South Vietnam. To reduce this war to
and will be open to the millions of Americans gists, a land war in Asia-a war which no the simplification of a wicked regime molest-
who belong to no group but who share this President, including President Johnson, ing its neighbors, and to su
basic belief and apprehension. Such a com? desired or intended. The Vietnam story is a be ended by punishing the wick wickeedr ret it can
riil
titee can provide a constant flow of objec- egime, is
tive Information about Vietnam. It can keep tragedy without villains. No thoughtful surely misconceive not only the political b-
vigil over official statements and ask the hard dent oh can withhold sympathy rests but even n the he military itary character of the e pro
questions which might help separate wish- Whc Johnsen ponders the gloomy choices lam.
ful think which lie ahead. As for the assurances that China will not
ing from facts. It will neither be Yet each President, as he makes his choices, enter, these will be less than totally satisfy-
against the Administration nor for it, neither, must expect to be accountable for them. Ing to those whose memory stretches back to
with any political party or opposed to It, Everything in recent weeks-the actions of the Korean War. General MacArthur, an
neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim the Administration, the intimations of ac- other one of those military experts on Orien-
will be to mobilize and inform the American tions to come, even a certain harshness in the tal psychology, when asked by President Tru-
people in order to Increase the invisible Presidential rhetoric--suggests that Presi- man on Wake Island in October, 1950, what
weight of what I believe to be the American dent Johnson has made his choice, and that the chances were of Chinese intervention, re-
majority in the deliberations and inner coon- his choice is the careful enlargement of the plied, "Very little.... Now that we have
cils of government. - Its purpose is to help war. New experiments in escalation are first bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chi-
the President and others in government by denied, then disowned, then discounted nese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there
proving a counter pressure against those who and finall undertaken. As
urge a more militant course; a pressure for y past medicine would bathe igrea ndthe slaughter." Such rest
which those in government should be grate- increase we to do to cdo e. In May think ary is of Secret axy lay of Siat the de arsEthe A (fair at
ful since it will help them pursue the course the Air he Air the force dose. In explained May why the Secret re of that time is Scret for Far Eastern ada ) to s send
of wise restraint. were were not that time is Secretary of State today) to send
going to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong; at the American troops across the 38th Parallel de-
As more and more of the truth is re- end of June we began the strikes against the spite warnings from Pelting that this would
vealed about, the reasons for the United oil depots. The demilitarized zone between provoke a Chinese response. In a few vveeks,
States becoming mired in the morass in North and South Vietnam has been used by China was actively in the war, and, while
Vietnam, many more people will join North Vietnam 'units nits for years, but sud- there was the greatest slaughter, it was not
their voices with those who have been dently we have begun to bomb it. notably of the Chinese.
When such steps work no miracle--and it is There seems little question that the Chi-
speaking out for years against the steady safe to predict that escalation will be no nese have no great passion to enter the war
escalation of the U.S. commitment in more decisive in the future than it has been in Vietnam. They do not want to put their
Vietnam and demand a halt to this sense- In the past-the demand will arise for "just nuclear plants. in hazard; and, in any case,
less escalation of a war we should not be one more step." Plenty of room remains for their foreign policy has typically been a com-
In. widening the war: the harbors of North Viet- pound of polemical ferocity and practical
I ask unanimous consent that there be nam, the irrigation dikes, the steel plants, prudence. But the leaders in Peking are no
pr ask at the conclusion consent the factories, the power grid, the crops, the doubt just as devoted students of Munich as
my remarks civilian population, the Chinese border. The the American Secretary of State. They are
the article by Mr. Schlesinger referred to fact that we excluded such steps yesterday is, sure that we are out to bury them; they be-
from New York Times magazine for alas, no guarantee that we will not pursue lieve that appeasement Invites further ag-
September 18, 1966, the article by Mr. them tomorrow. And if bombing will not gression; and, however deep their reluctance,
Mohr from the New York Times for Sep- bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees or stop his at some point concern for national survival
tember 19, 1966, excerpts from the report support of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, will make them fight.
by Secretary General U. Thant, the ar- there is always the last restart of Invasion. When will that point be reached? Prob-
bylSfrom the York World Journal ar General Ky has already told us that we must ably when they are confronted by a direct
Trieu o fat, September 18, o66, Jdescrib- invade North Vietnam to win the 'war. In threat to their frontier, either through bomb-
his recent press conference, the Secretary of Ing or through an American decision to cross
ing the Pope's proposed action, and ex- State twice declined to rule out this the 17th Parallel and invade North Vietnam.
cerpts from the speech by Richard Good- possibility. If a Communist regime barely established in
win on September 17, 1966, before the The theory, of course, is that widening the Peking could take a decision to intervene
Americans for Democratic Action. war will shorten it. This theory appears to against the only atomic power in the world
There being no objection, the material be based on three convictions: first, that the in 1950, why does anyone suppose that a
r5-- 6110
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine, tor y" and third, that military vic- Present discord in Peking, war may seem the
y" in some sense Is possible. Perhaps best way to renew revolutionary discipline,
Sept. 18, 1966] these premises are correct, and in another stop the brawling and unite the nation.
SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR year or two we may all be saluting the wis- It is true that the Chinese entry into the
COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF dom and statesmanship of the American Korean War had at least the passive support
VIETNAM Government. In so inscrutable a situation, of the Soviet Union; but it would be risky to-
(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) no one can be confident about his doubt and day to rely on the Sino-Soviet split to save
Why we are in Vietnam is gar, a disagreement. Nonetheless, to many' Amer- 'us from everything, including Soviet aid to
today question icans these propositions constitute a terribly China in case of war with the United States
of only historical interest, We are there, for shaky basis for action which has already car- or even direct Soviet entry into the war In
better or for worse, and we must deal with ried the United States into a ground war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is already
the situation that exists. Our national Asia and which may well carry the world to extensively involved in Vietnam-more so in
securtly may not have compelled us to draw the brink of the third world war. a sense than the Chinese-and it would be
a line across Southeast Asia where we did, The illusion that the war in South Viet- foolish to suppose that, given Moscow's com-
but, having drawn It, we cannot lightly nam can be decided in North Vietnam Is petition with Peking for the leadership of the
abandon it. Our stake in South Vietnam evidently a result of listening too long to our Communist world, Russia could afford to
may have been self-created, but it has none- own propaganda. Our Government has In- stand by and allow Communist North Viet-
theless become real. Our precipitate with.. sisted so often that the war in Vietnam is nam or Communist China to be destroyed by
drawal now would have ominous reverbera- a clear-cut case of aggression across fron- the American imperialists.
tions throughout Asia. Our commitment tiers that it has come to believe itself that As for the third premise (that military
of ov except 300 al0skm ric ntrroops, young men the war was started in Hanoi and can be "victory" is In some sense possible) : The
cruel gallantry engaged in stopped there. "The war," the Secretary of Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, by definition
and difficult warfare, measures the State has solemnly assured us, "is clearly argue for military solutions. They are the
magnitude of our national concern. an `armed attack,' cynically and systemati-of step.
We have achieved this entanglement, not tally mounted by the Hanoi regime against Tha moatt is their fetebueapostles and "one one more
should be
be
after due and, deliberate. consideration, but the people of South Vietnam." that generals behave like generals.
through a series of small decisions. It is Yet the best evidence is that the war be- The fault lies not with those who gi ethis
not only Idle but unfair to seek out guilty gan as an insurrection within South Vietnam advice but those who take it. Once, early in
men. President Eisenhower, after rejecting which, as it has gathered momentum, has the Kennedy Administration, the then
American military intervention In 1954, set attracted increasing support and direction Chairman of the Joint Chiefs outlined the
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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
processes of escalation in Southeast Asia be- ground operations-has its place; but the munity; and so long as genuine programs
fore the National Security council, conclud- notion that strategic bombing can stop guer- of social reform threaten the vested interests experience.
of the
And
nt and ing, on , are given the right use nuclear hrillas runs ad it last winter,yono the authority of the holders. In anyucaseeas claimantsgonaour
weapons, can guarantee victory."
Sdent Kennedy sat glumly lumly rubbing an upper Secretary of State, that despite the entry of resources, these programs of pacification aof
molar. After a moment someone said, "Mr. North Vietnamese regulars the war in South hopelessly outclassed by the programs
President, perhaps you would have the gent Vietnam "continues to be basically a guer- dies ruction. Surely, de Unihaveted States, with
eral explain to us what he means by victory." rilla operation"
Kennedy grunted and dismissed the meeting. Sir Robert Thompson, who plafined the better way to combat guerrilla warfare than the
the
literation
phy
the
Mal
the which itsicIsatakl place. If this is our b st
as head ofayan
nation Later said, "Since o he couldn't think of any successful ands later see against
further r escalation, he would have e to to promise guerrillas
us victory." British advisory mission in Saigon, has em- idea of "protecting" a country against "wars
What is the purpose of bombing the north? phsized that the defending force must of national liberation," what other country,
the same element" as their ad- seeing the devastation we have wrought in
It is hard to find out. According to Gen. operate ,that
Maxwell Taylor, "The objective of our air versaries. Counterinsurgency, he writes, "is Vietnam, will wish American protection?
campaign is to change the will of the ene- like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. At the same time, our concentration on
my leadership." Secretary McNamara, on It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other
the other hand, has said, "We never believed The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, areas of national concern. In domestic pol-
that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog icy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion
will." Whatever the theory, the results would will then chase the female cats. The answer and a half dollars a month, everything is
is to put in a fiercer tomcat." grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on
northern support Secretary McNamara. Hanoi a. The Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The his way to a place in history as a great Pres-
to have have har- counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam has ident for his vision of a Great Society; but
to table, seems see ems driving
d a the conference table, uished, while our bombers roam over the Great Society is now, except for token
to that hapless country, dumping more tonnage gestures, dead. The fight for equal oppor-
it closer convincer It
that its life the will at the regime, convinced
th brought explosives each month than we were drop- tunity for the Negro, the war against poverty,
China and solidified stake,
China solidified the people of North Vi-
etnam in its support. ping per month on all Europe and Africa the struggle to save the cities, the improve-
"There is no indication," General West- during the Second World War. Just the ment of our schools-all must be starved for
moreland said the other day, "that the re- other day our bombs killed or injured more the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly
solve of the leadership in Hanoi has been re- than 100 civilians in a hamlet in the Mekong side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry
duced." In other words, bombing has had Delta-all on the suspicion that two Viet- protest; attack on dissenters on the ground
precisely the effect that the analyses of the cong platoons numbering perhaps 60 men, that they cheer the enemy (an attack often
United States Strategic Bombing Survey aft- were there. Even If the Vietcong had still mounted by men who led the dissent dur-
er the Second World War would have fore- been around, which they weren't, would the Ing the Korean war) ; premonitions of Mc-
cast. Under Secretary of State George Ball military gain have outweighed the human Carthyism.
was a director of that survey; this may well and political loss? Charles Mohr writes in We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies nat-
be why he has been reported so unenthusi- The Times: "Almost every provincial hos- orally draw away as they see us heading
antic about the air assault on the North. pital in Vietnam is crowded with civilian down the road toward war with China. When
IAnd, far from stopping infiltration across victims of the war. Some American doctors we began to bomb the oil depots, James
the 17th Parallel, bombing, if our own statis- and other officials in the field say the ma- Reston wrote: "There is now not a single
tics are to be believed, has stimulated it. "It jority are the victims of American air power major nation in the world that supports Mr.
and South Vietnamese artillery." Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and
said, "that he No Sec n ese have on- The trouble is that we are fighting one Haiphong." As nations seek to disengage
said, "that the North Vietetnamese have con- war, with our Br-52's and our naval guns and themselves from the impending conflict, the
cong despite the increase theca our effort. of the Viet- our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting quasi-neutralism of leaders like de Gaulle
What hdeal happened is that . . another, with their machine guns and am- gains new plausibility.
has have con is that the North Viet- bushes and forays in the dark. "If we can get On any realistic assessment, Western Eu-
me lly increased the the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we will rope and Latin America are far more sig-
amount of have continually
they have resources, men and devote that him," General Westmoreland has plain- nificant to American security than South
they have been willing to devote to the it r tively said; and when they occasionally rise Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stul-
obje r ca:' to the surface and try to fight our kind of tified our policy and weakened our position
Ne arg we easily majoc this infiltration war, we do blast them. But the fact that in both these vital areas. The war has
fo enlarging our own or 750,000. 3e ratio they then slide back into the shadows does clouded the hope, once mildly promising, of
Pentagon In not mean that we are on the verge of some progress toward a detente with the Soviet
for example, yo preferred by th or by the . The
of superiority war is iority Is 10 0 to 1 means that final military triumph. It means simply Union. It has helped block agreements to
eeryitie we in , which more men the e that we are driving them underground- end underground nuclear testing and to stop
every time n send a 10 in 10,000 Orhd where they renew themselves and where our the spread of nuclear weapons. It has pre-
enemy has only to send in Reinforcement or so, and large, fierce dog cannot follow. cipitated the decision of U Thant to resign
no are all even again. American Supt hr- Saigon officials have been reporting that as Secretary General of the United Nations
not all it h a done is to lift the stalemate superior- t- Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can and condemns the U.N. Itself to a time of
ity; a higher had mot is p el. Indeed, remember; these reports need not be taken declining influence.
there higher and mare exlosivt level. Indeed, Our rejectelon of the views of our friends
mis reason the to suppose that, in its own seriously now. I know of lack the p convincing ecilolitical and allies--our conviction, as Paul H. Smith
of manner, the escalation up to enemy ca the n m point atch of our nuclear war war.r. and and a emotional the commitmVietcongent t commitment to o the keep p fighting has put it, "that we alone are qualified to
judge, jury and executioner"-ignores
U.S. News & World Report says in its issue underground for another 20 years. be Madison solemn warning in the 63rd Fed-
bombing 22: "It's clear now to military men: Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like try- adiso 's solemn to the judgment "-
bombing will not win in Vietnam." This is ing to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We er: a dispiriting item. Why had our military occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig other nations is important to every govern-
leaders not long ago freed themselves from up most of the turf, too. The effect of our ment for two reasons: the one is that inde-
the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, policy is to pulverize the political and instil pendently of the merits of any particular
so cherished by civilians who think wars can tutional fabric which alone can give a South plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
be won on the cheap? The Korean war, as Vietnamese state that hope of independent accounts, that it should appear to other
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, "taught survival which is our presumed war aim. nations as the offspring of a wise and honor-
that it is impossible to interdict the supply Our method, in other words, defeats our able policy; the second is that in doubtful
route of an Asian army by airpower alone, goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of cases, particularly where the national coun-
We had complete air mastery over North the smashed social structure of South Viet- oils may be warped by some strong passion
Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply nam will be Communism. "My feeling," or momentary interest, the presumed or
columns unmercifully.... But we did not Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the known opinion of the impartial world may
halt their offensive nor materially diminish Marine Corps, has wisely said, "is that you be the best guide that can be followed.
its strength." If air power was not decisive could kill every Vietcong and North Viet- What has not America lost by her want of
in Korea, where the warfare was conven- namese in South Vietnam and still lose the character with foreign nations; and how
tional and the terrain relatively open and war. Unless we can make a success of the many errors and follies would she not have
compact, how could anyone suppose that it civic-action program, we are not going to avoided, if the justice and propriety of her
measures had, in every instance, been pre-
would be decisive against guerrillas thread- obtain the objectives we have set." vo l tried the light in which they pree are
would ing their way through the hills and jungles presenuch t devotion and
into the progragmscof recon- probably appear to the unbiased part of man-
of Vietnam? kind."
The bombing .Illusion applies, of course, to atruction, but prospects are precarious so the South g well g In Vietnam. Tactical ofnSouas the enemy th Vietnam ewithslice
apparent Im- ofT its AV ettnamatpoo li has called olat onists " s
suchthrough
bombing=bombing In direct support
No. 158-23
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 22128
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,-SENATE September 19. 19et
nuo ~ureiy the real neoisolationists are those
who have isolated the United States from its
allies and raised the tattered standard, last
flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur,
of "going it alone."
How have we managed to imprison our-
selves in this series of dilemmas? One
reason surely is that we have somehow lost
our understanding of the uses of power.
Understanding of power implies above all
precision in its application. We have moved
away from the subtle strategy of "flexible
response" under which the level of American
force was graduated to meet the level of
enemy threat. The triumph of this dis-
criminate employment of power was, of
course, the Cuban missile crisis (where the
Joint Chiefs, as usual, urged an air assault
on the missile bases). But President John-
son, for all his formidable abilities, has shown
no knack for discrimination in his use of
power. His technique is to try and over-
whelm his adversary-as in the Dominican.
Republic and Vietnam-by piling on all
forms of power without regard to the nature
of the threat.
Given this weakness for the indiscriminate
use of power, it is easy to see why the appli-
cation of force In Vietnam has been sur-
rendered to the workings of what an acute
observer of the Johnson foreign policy, Philip
Geyelin, calls "the escalation machine."
This machine is, in effect, the momentum
in the decision-making system which keeps
enlarging the war "for reasons only mar-
ginally related to military need."
The very size and weight of the American
military presence generate unceasing pres-
sures to satisfy military demands. These
may be demands to try out new weapons;
the London Sunday Telegraph recently ran
an informative article comparing the Viet-
nam war to the Spanish Civil War as a mili-
tary testing ground and laboratory. Or they
may be cries for "one more step," springing
in part from suppressed rage over the fact
that, with military power sufficient to blow
up the word, we still cannot compel guerrilla
bands in black pajamas to submit to our will.
Whatever the reason, Sir Robert Thompson
has noted of the American theory of the war:
"There was a constant tendency in Vietnam
to mount large-scale operations, which had
little purpose or prospect of success, merely
to indicate that' something aggressive was
being done."
The administration has freely admitted
that such operations, like the bombing of the
North, are designed in part to prop up the
morale of the Saigon Government. And the
Impression is growing now that they are also
in part undertaken in order to smother
doubts about the war In the United States
and to reverse anti-Administration tenden-
cies in the polls. Americans have become
curiously insensitive to the use of military
operations for domestic political purposes.
A quarter-century ago President Roosevelt
postponed the North African invasion so that
it would not take place before the midterm.
elections of 1942; but today observers in
nam had increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, Laos was just
total of-282,000. Yet, "according to official not important enough to entangle two great
figures," the enemy had suffered 31,571 killed nations. President Johnson, on the other
in action In this period, and the infiltration hand, has systematically inflated the signifi-
estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to cance of the war in Vietnam. "We have
54,000 as "possible." tried to make It clear over and over again,"
The only way to reconcile these figures Is as the Secretary of State has put it, "that
to conclude that the Vietcong have picked although Hanoi is the prime actor in this
up from 30,000 to 50,000 local recruits In this situation, that it is the policy of Peking that
period. Since this seems unlikely-especially has greatly stimulated Hanoi. . It is Ho
in view of our confidence in the decline of Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's
Vietcong morale-a safer guess is to question war."
the wonderful precision of the statistics. "In the forties and fifties," President John-
Even the rather vital problem of how many son has said, "we took our stand in Europe to
North Vietnamese troops are in South Viet- protect the freedom of those threatened by
na.m is swathed in mystery. The Times re- aggression. Now the center of attention has
ported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Viet- shifted to another part of the world where
namese troops are believed by allied intelli- aggression is on the march. Our stand must
gence to be in the South." According to an be as firm as ever." Given this view, it is
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon presumably necessary to pay the greatest
printed In The Christian Science Monitor costs and run the greatest risks-or else in-
of Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Govern- vite the greatest defeat.
ment says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat Given this view, too, there is no reason
troops and support battalions have infiltrated not to Americanize the war. President Ken-
into South Vietnam. nedy did not believe that the war in Viet-
"These figures are far in excess of United nam could succeed as a war of white men
States intelligence estimates, which put the against Asians. It could not be won, he
maximum number of North Vietnamese in said a few weeks before his death, "unless
the South at about 54,000." the people [of South Vietnam I support the
But General Westmoreland told his Texas effort.... We can help them, we can give
press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy them equipment, we can send our men out
force included "about 110,000 main-force there as advisers, but they have to win it,
North Vietnamese regular army troops." Per- the people of Vietnam." We have now
haps these statements are all reconcilable, junked this doctrine. Instead, we have en-
but an apparent discrepancy of this magni- larged our military presence until it is the
tude on a question of such importance raise only thing that matters in South Vietnam,
a twinge of doubt. and we plan now to k
ma
it
Nor is our ignorance confined to battle-
order statistics. We have always lacked
genuine knowledge of and insight into the
political and cultural problems of Vietnam,
and the more we press all problems Into a
military framework the worse off we are. The
Administration in Washington was sys-
tematically misinformed by senior American
officials in Saigon in 1962-63 regarding the
progress of the war, the popularity of Diem,
the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet"
program and other vital matters. It was not
that these officials were deliberately deceiv-
ing their President; it was that they had de-
ceived themselves first. Ordinary citizens re-
stricted to reading the American press were
better informed in 1963 than officials who
took top-secret cables seriously.
The fact is that our Government just
doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to
know. It is not discreditable that it should
not know them, for the facts are elusive and
the judgments incredibly difficult.. But it is
surely inexcusable that it should pretend to
know things it does not-and that it should or the three, they must therefore be the
pass its own ignorance on to the American spearhead of a coordinated Chinese plan of
people as certitude. And it is even less ex- expansion. The Department of State, in
cusable that it should commit the nation to spite of what has struck most people as
a policy involving the greatest dangers on a rather evident fragmentation of the Cc mmi
foundation so vague and precarious. nist world, has hated to abandon tlj~js cozy
So now we are set on the course of widen- old cliches about a centralized Con*nuriist
ing the war-even at the cost of multiplying conspiracy aimed at monolithic world revo-
American casualties in Vietnam and deepen- lution.
ing American troubles at home and abroad; As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen
even at the risk of mirin
g our nation in a years of pbli R
ucusso-Chinese quarreling,
diet a new venture in escalation before the hopeless and endless conflict on the main- Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the de-
midterm elections of 1966. land of Asia beyond the effective employ- partment, could talk about "instruments of
The triumph of the escalation machine ment of our national power and beyond the Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the
has been assisted by the faultiness of the in- range of our primary interests; even at the Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan.
formation on which our decisions are based. risk of nuclear war. 28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still
Nothing is phonier than the spurious exacti- Why does the Administration feel that run on about "their world revolution," and
tude of our statistics about the Vietnam war, these costs must be paid and these risks run? again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists"
No doubt a computerized military establish- Hovering behind our policy is a larger idea- and their "larger design." While the depart-
ment demands numbers; but the "body the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just ment may have accepted the reality of the
count" of dead Vietcong, for example, in- a local conflict between Vietnamese but a Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966,
eludes heaven knows how many innocent by- fateful test of wills between China and the the predominant tone is still to regard Asian
standers and could hardly be more unreli- United States. Communism as a homogeneous system of
able. The figures on enemy strength are Our political and rhetorical escalation of aggression. The premise of our policy has
totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citi- the war has been almost as perilous as our been that the Vietcong equal Hanoi. and
zen relying on the daily newspaper. The military escalation. President Kennedy's ef- Hanoi equals Peking.
Times on Aug. 10 described "the latest in- fort was to pull Laos out of the context of Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking
teuigence reports" in Saigon as saying that great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian have interests in common and strong idea-
the number of enemy troops In South Viet- civil war to rational proportions. As he told logical affinities. Obviously, Peking would
a
still larger; we
have summoned the Saigon leaders, like trib-
al chieftians on a retainer, to a conference
in an American state; we crowd the streets
of Saigon with American generals (58 at last
count) and visiting stateside dignitaries. In
short, we have seized every opportunity to
make clear to the world that this is an
American war-and, in doing this, we have
'surely gone far to make the war unwinnable.
The proposition that our real enemy in
Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of
widening the war. It is the vital element in
the Administration case. Yet the proof our
leaders have adduced for this proposition has
been exceedingly sketchy and almost per-
functory. It has been proof by ideology and
proof by analogy. It has not been proof by
reasoned argument or by concrete illustra-
tion.
The proof by ideology has relied on the syl-
logism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and
China are all Communist states and there-
fore must be part of the same conspiracy,
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September 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 22129
rejoice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But
they also have divergent interests and pur-
poses-and the divergencies may prove in
the end to be stronger than the affinities.
Recent developments in North Korea are in-
structive. If any country was bound to Pe-
king ties of gratitude, it was North Korea,
which was preserved as an independent state
by Chinese intervention 15 years ago. If
any country today is at the mercy of Peking,
it is again North Korea. When North Korea
now declares in vigorous language its inde-
pendence of China, does anyone suppose that
North Vietnam, imbued with historic mis-
trust of China and led by that veteran Rus-
sian agent He Chi Minh, would have been
more slavish in its attitude toward Peking?
The other part of the Administration case
has been proof by analogy, especially the
good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the
village idiot," the Secretary of State recently
confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler
was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese. .. .
But what is common between the two situa-
tions is the phenomenon of aggression." The
Vietnam war, President Johnson recently
told the American Legion, "is meant to be
the opening salvo in a series of bombard-
ments or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars
of liberation.' If this technique works this
week in Vietnam, the Administration sug-
gests, it will be tried next week in Uganda
and Peru. But, if it is defeated in Vietnam,
the Chinese will known that we will not let
it succeed elsewhere.
"What happens in South Vietnam," the
President cried at Omaha, "will determine-
yes, it will determine-whether ambitious
and aggressive nations can use guerrilla war-
fare to conquer their weaker neighbors."
The Secretary of State even discribed an ex-
hortation ? made last year by the Chinese
Defense Minister, Marshal Lin Piao, as a
blueprint for world conquest comparable to
Hitler's "Mein Kampf."
One thing is sure about the Vietnam
riddle: it will not be solved by bad historical
analogies. It seems a trifle forced, for ex-
ample, to equate a civil war in what was
for hundreds of years the entity of Vietnam
(Marshal Ky, after all, is a North Vietnamese
himself) with Hitler's Invasion of Austria
and Czechoslovakia across old and well-
established line of national division; even
the village idiot might grasp the difference.
When President Eisenhower invoked the
Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to in-
volve the British in Indochina, Prime Min-
ister Churchill, a pretty close student of
Munich in his day, was unmoved. The
Chinese have neither the overwhelmingly
military power nor the timetable of aggres-
sion nor, apparently, the pent-up mania for
instant expansion which would justify the
Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Piao docu-
ment, the Rand Corporation, which evidently
read it with more care than the State De-
partment bothered to do, concluded that,
far from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it was
a message to the Vietcong that they could
win "only if they rely primarily on their
own resources and their own revolutionary
spirit," and that it revealed "the lack,
rather than the extent, of Peking's past and
present control over Hanoi's actions."
In. any case, guerrilla warfare is not a tac-
tic to be mechanically applied by central
headquarters to faraway countries. More
than any other form of warfare, it is depend-
ent on conditions and opportunities within
the countries themselves. Whether there
are wars of national liberation in Uganda
and Peru will depend, not on what happens
in Vietnam, but on what happens in Uganda
and Peru.
One can agree that the containment of
China will be major problem for the next
generation. But this does not mean that we
must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the exact
drama of Europe in the forties and fifties.
The record thus far suggests that the force
most likely to contain Chinese expansionism
in Asia (and Africa, too) will be not Western
intervention but local nationalism. Some-
times local nationalism may call on Western
support-but not always. Countries like
Burma and Cambodia preserve their auton-
omy without American assistance. The
Africans have dealt with the Chinese on
their own. The two heaviest blows recently
suffered by Peking-the destruction of the
Communist party in Indonesia and the dec-
laration of independence by North Korea-
took place without benefit of American pa-
tronage or rhetoric.
In the unpredictable decades ahead, the
most effective bulwark against "interna-
tional" Communism in some circumstances
may well be national Communism. A ration-
al policy of containing China could have rec-
ognized that a Communist Vietnam under
He might be a better instrument of contain-
ment than a shaky Saigon regime led by
right-wing mandarins or air force generals.
Had Ho taken over all Vietnam in 1954, he
might today be enlisting Soviet support to
strengthen his resistance to Chinese pres-
sure-and this situation, however appalling
for the people of South Vietnam, would ob-
viously be better for the United States than
the one in which we are floundering today.
And now, alas, it may be almost too late: the
whole thrust of United States policy since
1954,'and more than ever since the bombing
of the North began, has been net to pry
Peking and Hanoi apart but to drive them
together.
Is there no way out? Are the only alter-
natives widening the war or disorderly and
humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our states-
manship is not yet this bankrupt. I think
a middle course is still possible if there were
the will to pursue it. And this course must
begin with a decision to stop widening and
Americanizing the war-to limit our forces,
actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of
bombing more places, sending in more
troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that
the fate of civilization will be settled in
Vietnam, let us recover our cool and
try to see the situation as it is: a horrid civil
war in which Communist guerrillas, enthu-
siastically aided and now substantially di-
rected from Hanoi, are trying to establish a
Communist despotism in South Vietnam,
not for the Chinese but for themselves. Let
us understand that the ultimate problem
here is not military but political. Let us
adapt the means we employ to the end we
seek.
Obviously, military action plays an indis-
pensable role in the search for a political
solution, Hanoi and the Vietcong will not
negotiate so long as they think they can win.
Since stalemate is a self-evident precondi-
tion to negotiation, we must have enough
American armed force in South Vietnam to
leave no doubt in the minds of our adversar-
ies that they cannot hope for victory. They
must also have no illusion about the pros-
pect of an American withdrawal. The ob-
ject of the serious opposition to the Johnson
policy is to bring about not an American de-
feat but a negotiated settlement.
Therefore, holding the line in South Viet-
nam is essential. Surely, we already have
enough American troops, firepower and in-
stallations in South Vietnam to make it
clear that we cannot be beaten unless we
choose to scuttle and run, which will not
happen. The opponents of this strategy talk
as if a holding action would put our forces
under siege and relinquish all initiative to
the enemy. This need not, of course, be so.
It is possible to slow down a war without
standing still; and, if our present generals
can't figure out how to do this, then let us
get generals who can. Generals Ridgway and
Gavin could doubtless suggest some names.
Moreover, there is a South Vietnamese army
of some 600,000 men which can take all the
initiative it wants. And if we are told that
the South Vietnamese are unwilling or un-
able to fight the Vietcong, then we must
wonder all the more about the political side
of the war.
The object of our military policy, as ob-
servers like Henry Kissinger and James Mac-
Gregor Burns have proposed, should be the
creation and stabilization of secure areas
where the South Vietnamese might them-
selves undertake social and institutional de-
velopment. Our resources should go, in the
Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold than
to search-and-destroy (especially when
search-and-destroy more often means search-
and-drive-underground). We should get rid
of those "one-star generals who," in the
words of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their
tour in Vietnam as an opportunity to in-
dulge in a year's big-game shooting from
their helicopter howdahs at Government ex-
pense."
At the same time we should induce the
Saigon Government to institute generous
amnesty provisions of the kind which worked
so well in the Philippines. And we should
further increase the incentive to come over
by persuading the South Vietnamese to
abandon the torture of prisoners-a practice
not only horrible in itself but superbly cal-
culated to make the enemy fight to the bit-
ter end. In the meantime we must end our
own shameful collaboration with this bar-
barism and stop turning Vietcong prisoners
over to the South Vietnamese when we know
that torture is probable.
As for bombing the North, let us taper this
off as prudently as we can. Bombing is not
likely to deter Hanoi any more in the future
than it has in the past; and, given its limited
military effect, the Administration's desire
to gratify the Saigon Government and the
American voter is surely not important
enough to justify the risks of indefinite es-
calation. Moreover, so long as the bombing
continues there is no chance of serious ne-
gotiation. Nor does the failure of the 37-day
pause of last winter to produce a settlement
refute this. Thirty-seven days were hardly
enough to persuade our allies that we hon-
estly wanted negotiation; so brief an inter-
lude left no time for them to move on to the
tricky job of persuading Hanoi. For Hanoi
has substantial reasons for mistrusting nego-
tiation-quito apart from Chinese pressure
or its own hopes of victory. He has entered
into negotiation with the West twice in the
past-in 1946-47 and again in 1954-and
each time, in his view, he lost at the confer-
ence table things he thought he had won on
the battlefield.
For all our official talk about our readiness
to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it cannot
be said that the Administration has pursued.
negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, imag-
ination and perseverance with which it has
pursued war. Indeed, some American schol-
ars who have studied the matter believe that
on a number of occasions when pressure for
negotiation was mounting we have, for what-
ever reason, stepped up the war.
Nor can it be said that the Administra-
tion has laid fairly before the American
people the occasional signals, however faint,
which have come from Hanoi,-as in the
early winter of 1965, when U Thant's medi-
ation reached the point of selecting the hotel
in Rangoon where the talks might take
place, until we killed the idea by beginning
the bombing of the North. Nor, for all our
declarations about "unconditional" negotia-
tions, have we refrained from setting con-
ditions-such as, for example, that we won't
talk to the Vietcong unless they come
to the conference table disguised as North
Vietnamese. Though the Vietcong con-
stitute the great bulk of the enemy force,
they have been given little reason to think
we will negotiate about anything except
their unconditional surrender.
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It is hard to see why we should not fol-
low the precedent of Laos, when we ad-
rotted the Pathet Lao to the peace talks,
and offer the Vietcong the prospect of a
say in the future political life of South
Vietnam-conditioned on their laying down
their arms, opening up their territories and
abiding by the ground rules of free elec-
tions. Nor is there reason to see why we have
been so reluctant again to follow the Laos
model and declare neutralization, under in-
ternational guarantee, our long-run objective
for Vietnam. An imaginative diplomacy
would long since have discussed the ways
and means of such neutralization with Rus-
sis, France, Britain and other interested
countries. Unsatisfactory as the situation
in Laos may be today, it is still incom-
parably better than the situation in South
Vietnam.
On the other hand, negotiation is not
an exclusive, or even primary, American re-
sponsibility. Along with a military stale-
mate, the other precondition of a diplo-
matic settlement is surely a civilian gov-
ernment in Saigon. Marshal Ky is one of
those Frankenstein's monsters we delight
in creating in our "client" countries, very
much like the egregious General Phoumi
Nosavan, who single-handedly blocked a
settlement in Laos for two years. Like
Phouml, Ky evidently feels t4at Washing-
ton has committed itself irrevocably to
him-and why should he not after the laying
on of hands at Honolulu?-and that, what-
ever he does, we cannot afford to abandon
him.
Robert Shaplen, in the August 20 issue
of The New Yorker, reported from Saigon
that the atmosphere there "is being com-
pared to the miasma that surrounded Diem
and his tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu"
and that "many Vietnamese believe that the
Americans, having embraced Ky so whole-
heartedly and supported him so long, are
just as responsible as his Government for
the recent repressive acts."
I am sure that President Johnson did
not intend to turn over American policy
and honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's
gimcrack, bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime.
The time is bound to come when Ky must
learn the facts of life, as General Phoumi
eventually and painfully learned them.
But why wait? In our whole time in Viet-
tam, there has never been a Government in
Saigon which had the active loyalty of the
countryside. It might be an agreeable ex-
periment to encourage one to come into ex-
istence. Instead of Identifying American
interests with Ky and rebuffing the broader
political impulses in South Vietnam, we
should long since have welcomed a move-
ment toward a civilian regime representing
the significant political forces of the coun-
try and capable both of rallying the army
and carrying forward programs of social re-
form. We should give such a Government
all possible assistance in rebuilding and
modernizing the political and institutional
structures of South Vietnam. And if it
should favor the neutralization of its coun-
try, if it should seek negotiation with the
Vietcong, even if it should release us from
our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we
should not think that the world is coming
to an end.
It is not too late to begin the de-escalation
of the war; nor would the reduction of our
military effort damage our international in-
fluence. "There is more respect to be won
in the opinion of this world," George Ken-
nan has written, "by a resolute and courage-
ous liquidation of unsound positions than by
the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or
unpromising objectives." France was
stronger than ever after de Gaulle left Al-
geria, the Soviet Union suffered no lasting
damage from pulling it nuclear missiles out
of Cuba. And the policy of de-escalation
recommended here it, of course, something
a good deal less than withdrawal.
De-escalation could work, if there were
the will to pursue it ... This is the hard
question. The Administration, disposed to
the indiscriminate use of power, enmeshed
in the grinding cogs of the escalation ma-
chine, committed to the thesis that China
is the enemy in Vietnam, obviously could not
turn to de-escalation without considerable
inner upheaval. The issue in the United
States in the months to come will be whether
President Johnson's leadership is sufficiently
resilient and forbearing to permit a change
in the direction of policy and arrest what
is coming increasingly to seem an accelerat-
ing drift toward a great and unnecessary
catastrophe.
]From the New York (N.Y) Times, Sept. 19,
1966]
SAIGON To REFORM RURAL EFFORTS; MARINES
BREAK TRAP AT DONGH-PACIFICATION As-
f>ESSED
(By Charles Mohr)
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 18.-
South Vietnamese officials have concluded
that there have been serious deficiencies in
the rural pacification program this year and
that reforms are needed in 196'7, highly reli-
able sources disclosed today.
Top South Vietnamese officials have made
varying assessments of the pacification or
"revolutionary development" work done so
far in 1966. The most optimistic was that
performance was "not quite satisfactory," the
bluntest that progress was "quite limited"
and that "not much was achieved."
In general, the South Vietnamese analyses
were more critical and pessimistic than those
by United States officials. The Vietnamese
studies were not meant for publication but
for policy planning.
Veteran observers in Vietnam found the
South Vietnamese official pessimism a cause
for optimism. Their reasoning was that
shortcomings can he overcome only when
they are honestly acknowledged,.
TEAMS IMPLEMENT PROGRAM
Under the rural pacification program,
trained teams of workers move into selected
rural areas and attempt to bring them firmly
under Government control by rooting out
the Vietcong apparatus and improving life
in the area, as well as through political
propaganda.
Although there is a temptation to try, it is
impossible to measure the program's progress
statistically. The evaluation by the Vietna-
mese officials shows why.
They concluded, the reliable sources said,
that more progress had been made this year
than ever before. But in many areas the
following faults were discovered:
Pacification planning at the start of the
year by provincial officials was "unrealistic."
Some teams were shifted from difficult and
hostile areas to easy ones to make "better
performance scores."
Statistics were unreliable because pacifica-
tion operations were in some cases "carried
out over again many times at the same
number of hamlets" that had once been
officially declared as pacified.
Physical security was not as good as
expected and Vietcong underground agents
continued in some cases to collect taxes and
carry out propaganda activities:
The quality of pacification workers or
"cadres," as they are called, was below ex-
pectations. Recruiting met requirements
"in quantity but not in quality.."
In some cases, team members were "not
very enthusiatic toward their work" or to-
ward the people's aspirations. The teams
generally stayed in their assigned areas for
too short a time and in some cases left and
declared them pacified before such judg-
ment was realistic.
NUMERICAL REPORT CITED
Those conclusions cast some doubt on
the assertion made in a Washington report
this week by Robert W. Komer, a special
Presidential assistant assigned to the paci-
fication program, that in the first six months
of the year 531 hamlets containing 680,000
people had been brought into the pacifica-
tion program.
The South Vietnamese Government, in
planning for 1967, is stressing genuine
pacification of hamlets now only "statisti-
cally" pacified.
This year each of the 59-nian rural paci-
fication teams was supposed to spend a
minimum of two to three months, in paci-
fying a hamlet. But in practice, that often
was the maximum.
Under a new "rhythm" of pacification
planned for 1967, each team is expected to
work on no more than two or three hamlets
in a year and may spend an entire year in
one difficult hamlet.
Each team will be required to leave be-
hind a small number of men to maintain
stability. Thus, by 1968 each team will
continue to support about two hamlets
while undertaking the pacification of two
more.
Emphasis will be on well-populated ham-
lets, on those especially susceptible to eco-
nomic and agricultural development and
those with strategic positions and reason-
ably good military security.
The new guidelines may lead to more solid
achievements but will undoubtedly slow
down-at least on paper-the already slow
process of pacifying all of South Vietnam's
15,000 hamlets.
Few tasks in public administration any-
where in the world are so complex and
difficult as those assigned to the 59-man
pacification teams in Vietnam. And, in
some cases, they have received poor sup-
port from other units and agencies.
The South Vietnamese army, is said to
resent the teams as "unmilitary" and has
sometimes withdrawn troops without warn-
ing, leaving teams exposed to attack by the
Vietcong. Teams were sometimes expro-
priated by provincial officials who used them
as regular troops or in guard assignments,
leaving their hamlets unshielded.
EXCERPTS FROM "INTRODUCTION TO THE AN-
NUAL REPORT"
(By Secretary General U Thant of the United
Nations, Sept. 15, 1966)
X. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This review of the most important devel-
opments within the United Nations during
the last twelve months has the usual con-
trasts of light and shadow. The continued
slow rate of progress in many of our fields of
endeavor, and the setbacks which have been
suffered in others, can only be a cause of
disappointment to the peoples of the world
in whose name the Charter of the United
Nations was written. For this, however, they
must not blame the Charter itself nor the
institutions which it created.
The weaknesses and shortcomings of the
United Nations lie not in its constitutional
purposes, objectives and procedures but in
world conditions at the present juncture of
history. The proceedings of the Organiza-
tion inevitably mirror the state of the rela-
tionships between different peoples and dif-
ferent nations and sometimes between the
rulers and the ruled; the economic circum-
stances under which they live; the social
conditions that surround them. It is in
these realms, and not in the structure(s)
of the United Nations, that the roots of
the troubles of the world lie.
The troubles arising from present condi-
tions are abundant. They are the preva-
lence of narrow nationalisms, the periodic
reliance on crude power-whether political,
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military . or economic--to serve or protect
supposed national interests, the appalling rise
in the quantity and destructive potential of
nuclear armaments, the ever more serious
gaps in economic development, the persist-
ence of colonial domination over several
million people, the continuing prevalence in
many parts of the world of racial discrimi-
nation and suppression of human rights, and,
among populations constantly increasing,
the widespread inadequacies of education,
food shortages verging on famine, and lack
of medical care. These excesses, inequities
and injustices-and the fears, tensions, frus-
trations, jealousies and aggressions which
they breed among peoples and among na-
tions-still too_ largely condition the state
of the world, still too strongly and adversely
influence the national policies which Member
States bring to bear on the work of the
United Nations, and still too seriously ob-
struct rather than challenge the capacity of
the Organization to fulfill its purposes.
in the present difficult state of interna-
tional affairs, I believe it to be the first duty
of the membership to face up to the fact
that the chances of fruitful international
co-operation on many crucial issues in which
the United Nations has a clear responsibil-
ity for decision and action-issues ranging
from disarmament to development-have
been steadily and seriously impaired over the
past two years by a situation over which,
for well-known reasons, the United Nations
has not been able to exercise any effective
deepening crisis over Viet-Nam, where the The situation in Latin America also gives
dangerous escalation of armed force has been cause for some concern. Notwithstanding
accompanied, in my view, by an increasing the several factors which should enable Latin
intransigence and distrust among Govern- America to move forward in its economic
ments and peoples. and social development, the area as a whole
For my own part, I have tried by best to is finding it very hard to consolidate satis-
help in the efforts which have been made to factory growth rates. Many of the difficulties
reduce the escalation of the conflict in Viet- encountered are home-made and must be
Nam and to move to the conference table the eliminated by the Latin American countries
quest for a solution of the problem. In themselves, while others stem from Latin
doing so, I have been increasingly distressed America's economic relations with the rest
to observe that discussions of the matter of the world and their solution must be
have by and large been dominated by con- sought in an effective and continuous policy
sideration and analysis of the power politics of international understanding and co-opera-
involved, and that there has been much less tion.
concern for the tremendous human suffering At the same time, I must make clear my
which the conflict has entailed for the peo- belief that, while we face up to the existence
ple of Viet-Nam and also for the people of of national and even international situations
other countries involved in the fighting. My which are beyond the control of the United
heart goes out to them. The Viet-Namese Nations and recognize the harmful effects
people, in particular, have known no peace which they may have on the progress of
for a quarter of a century. Their present international co-operation within its sphere
plight should be the first, and not the last, of activity, the United Nations should be
consideration of all concerned. Indeed, I enabled to act more effectively and decisively
remain convinced that the basic problem in than it has done so far on many of the
Viet-Nam is not one of ideology but one of matters before it. We cannot wait for the
national identity and survival. I see noth- world to right itself-for the great Powers,
lag but danger in the idea, so assidlously in particular, to adjust their differences-
fostered outside Viet-Nam, that the conflict before applying greater determination and,
is a kind of holy war between two powerful if necessary, a larger sacrifice of time-
political ideologies. honoured attitudes to the solution of urgent
The survival of the people of Viet-Nam problems.
must be seen as the real issue, and it can It has, of course, been partly because of
be resolved not by force but by patience the deterioration in the international situ-
and understanding, in the framework of a ation that it has not been possible to make
willingness to live and let live. If this ap- greater progress in regard to such 'basic is-
proach can be accepted on all sides-and sues as disarmament. The world disarama-
the moral influence of Governments and ment conference still remains a somewhat
peoples outside the immediate conflict can distant goal. The problem of non-prolifera-
help to bring this about-I believe it should tion of nuclear weapons has gained added
be possible to reach a settlement which urgency and there is a greatly increased need
would end the suffering in Viet-Nam, satisfy for early action on account of the terrible
the conscience of the world at large and re- prospect of more countries joining the "nu-
move a formidable barrier to international clear club". It is also, in my view, both
co-operation. necessary and feasible to agree upon a ban
Although Viet-Nam represents the most of all nuclear tests. I hope that the discus-
serious manifestation of the unsatisfactory sions at the forthcoming session of the Gen-
state of international affairs, it is not the eral Assembly will demonstrate, above all
only point of open danger. The situation to the nuclear Powers themselves, how essen-
in the Middle East has shown no improve- tial it is to make speedy progress in regard
meat, and dangerous tensions persist. I sin- to these matters.
cerely trust that the hopes newly raised for Moreover, the international situations to
a settlement in Yemen will be fulfilled. I which I have referred, the rise of tensions and
also hope that the involvement of the United the emergence of new dangers in so many
Nations in the difficult question of Aden
may help to bring about a peaceful solution
there. Beyond these questions lies the long-
standing conflict between Israel and the
Arab States and the continuing need for
passions to be restrained and the terms of
the armistice agreements to be observed by
all concerned.
I shall not conceal my distress at some of
the happenings in Africa during the last
twelve months-not only those which have
hardened the colonial and quasi-colonial at-
titudes still entrenched in large parts of the
continent, but also those involving sudden
and violent political changes in newly inde-
pendent States. They have created a sense
of instability whch can easily be misrep-
resented or exaggerated to the disadvantage
of Africa as a whole and, by causing an in-
crease in tensions among African countries,
they have produced a setback to African
unity. By no means all of the many prob-
lems that the African peoples are facing are
of their own making, but few, if any, of them
can be solved except by the African coun-
tries themselves showing the qualities of
maturity and restraint which they have often
displayed, and using these qualities to en-
danger the greater spirit of co-operation and
willingness to work together, which is essen-
tial to the fulfilment of Africa's destiny.
This task is so important that Governments
and peoples must put above everything else
a willingness to sink their differences in the
higher interests of Africa and of the world
22131
parts of the world, point to the need for a
stronger rather than a weaker United Na-
tions, and one which can be relied upon to
undertake peace-keeping operations wherever
such action could help in the restoration of
stable conditions. Unfortunately, although
there seems to be a measure of agreement
that these operations have been effective in
the past and could prove useful in the future,
we are still far from agreement on basic prin-
ciples. I very much hope that, in the months
to come, the general membership and in par-
ticular those Members who have a special
responsibility with regard to the maintenance
of international peace and security, may find
it possible, within the Charter, to agree upon
the procedures to be followed in launching
such operations, the responsibility of the
various organs in their actual conduct, and
the financial arrangements by which the ex-
penditures involved may be met. I must
draw attention, to the fact that the peace-
keeping activities of the United Nations, per-
haps more than any other part of its work,
have enabled the Organization to gain a
measure of public confidence which is in
danger of being lost if the Member States re-
main deadlocked on the constitutional and
financial questions involved.
I should like to add, in this connexion,
that I believe that regional organizations
will have an important role to play in future
in reducing tensions within their regions and
in promoting co-operative efforts to attain
common ends. The work of the United Na-
tions at the regional level in the economic
and social fields has won universal acclaim;
the original economic commissions have be-
come increasingly effective in helping the
developing countries not merely through re-
search and studies but also by direct opera-
tional activities including those which have
led to the establishment of economic and
social planning institutes and development
banks. The work of inter-governmental're-
gional bodies outside the United Nations can
also, I am sure, contribute to the solution of
problems between countries within a region.
However, there are certain questions of juris-
diction and competence which arise with re-
gard to the maintenance of international
peace and security, especially in the peace-
keeping field, and concerning which the role
of the regional organizations requires clearer
definition. Some time ago, I suggested that
a. study of the functioning of regional orga-
nizations in terms of their respective char-
ters might be useful, and I mention it again
in the belief that Governments should wish
to follow it up.
It is as important for a stronger United
Nations to continue the long-term task of
building the peace as it is to equip itself for
helping countries to keep the peace. It is
not enough, in my opinion, for the United
Nations to deal where it can, and as the case
arises, with each specific problem that
threatens world peace. The causes of ten-
sion in the world have to be attacked at all
of their many roots. We have the means of
doing so, and we have made a start. While
for example, the international activities in
the fields of economic and social develop-
ment and human rights do not figure in the
headlines, the fact is that the greater part
of the resources of the United Nations and
its family of agencies is devoted to these
tasks. The manner in which they are un-
dertaken has a direct relationship to the re-
duction of tensions. I have said many times
that it is essential that the gulf between the
rich and the poor countries should be nar-
rowed: I attach the greatest importance to
the Governments of Member States taking
seriously the goals of the United Nations De-
velopment Decade, and making deliberate
progress towards the achievement of these
goals.
There are other causes of tension which
cannot be left to resolve themselves. In par-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 19, 1966
ticular, I feel that the United Nations must
make a sustained attack on the problems
which we might, because of their origin or
their nature, describe as the problems of
Colonialism. While recognizing that sub-
stantial progress has been made, we cannot
afford to forget that the process of decoloni-
zation has not been completed.. A hard core
of actual colonialism still exists, particularly
in Africa. It is coupled with the kindred
problem of racial discrimination, and this
evil in turn subjects the majority of the
population of one of the largest independent
States in Africa to conditions akin to the
wdrst type of colonial subjection. I believe
that in these situations there lies a great
opportunity for statesmanship on the part of
the colonial Powers-an opportunity which
they must seize before it is too late.
It is impossible, moreover, to view some
of these outstanding problems -whether it
is the position of the United Nations in re-
gard to the crisis in South-East Asia or the
lack of progress in disarmament-without
relating them to the fact that the United
Nations has not yet attained the goal of uni-
versality of membership. In the long run the
Organization cannot be expected to function
to full effect if one fourth of the human race
is not allowed to participate in its delibera-
tions. I know that there are serious political
difficulties involved in correcting this situa-
tion; but I hope that the long-term advant-
ages may be more clearly seen and the neces-
sary adjustments made.
This process may take some further time.
Meanwhile, I feel that all countries should
be encouraged and enabled, if they wish to
do so, to follow the work of the Organization
more closely. It could only be of benefit to
them and to the United Nations as a whole
to enable them to maintain observers at
Headquarters, at the United Nations Office at
Geneva and in the regional economic com-
missions, and to expose them to the impact
of the work of the Organization and to the
currents and cross-currents of opinion that
prevail within it, as well as to give them some
opportunity to contribute to that exchange.
Such contacts and inter-communication
would surely lead to a better understanding
of;:the problems of the world and a more
realistic approach to their solution, In this
matter I have felt myself obliged to follow
the established tradition by which only cer-
tain governments have been enabled to main-
tain observers. I commend this question for
further examination by. the General Assembly
so that the Secretary-General may be given a
clear directive as to the policy to be followed
in the future in the light, I would hope, of
these observations.
The United Nations is an experiment in
multilateral international diplomacy. Gov-
ernments maintain here Permanent Repre-
sentatives who have to carry out instruc-
tions understandably designed to promote
the political and other interests of the Gov-
ernments concerned. At the same time,
however, these Governments have subscribed
to the principles and ideals of the Charter
and they have to recognize that one of its
basic purposes is to be "a centre for bar-
monizing the actions of nations" in the
attainment of the common ends for which
the United Nations was established. I am
glad that in most cases the representatives
of Member States do not, in their pursuit
of national interests, forget the larger in-
terests of humanity represented by this
Organization. I personally believe that it
should be possible for the Governments of
Member States in all 'cases to use the
United Nations as a centre for harmonizing
their actions so that the Interests of hu-
manity may not suffer but may be properly
served,
In these observations. I have stressed
some of the basic beliefs which I have held
in. the discharge of my functions as Secre-
tary-General over the last fifty-eight months.
I feel that this is an appropriate occasion
for me to urge that the problems to which
I have referred and the suggestions which
I have made deserve careful consideration
if the Organization is to be strengthened, if
peace is to be preserved and promoted, and
if we are to make real progress towards the
goal of the economic and social advancement
of all peoples. There are many ways of reach-
In.g these objectives of peace and well-being,
and I do not believe that anyone should adopt
a dogmatic approach to them. Conditions
differ widely from country to country and
each bats the right, within the broad frame-
work of the principles of the United Na-
tions, to pursue its goals in its own way
and by means which it judges most appro-
priate and fruitful. At the same time I
believe that the ideological differences that
have divided the world are beginning to
show signs of losing their sharp edge, and
I approach the end of my term of office with
some confidence that, over the years, the
United Nations will prove to be the means
by which mankind will be able not only to
survive, but also to achieve a great human
synthesis.
[From the New York (N.Y.) World Journal
Tribune, Sept. 18, 1966]
PAPAL PLEA FOR PEACE
VATICAN CITY.-Pope Paul VI will urge
worldwide prayers in October as part of a
new peace campaign to try to end the war
in Viet Nam, the Vatican announced yester-
day.
The Vatican said the Pope will issue an
ancyclical letter to the world's bishops Mon-
day urging special prayers next month-the
month of the Holy Rosary.
An authoritative source said world peace
would be foremost among the subjects rec-
ommended for prayer and that the pontiff
had given Viet Nam much serious thought
during the two months he spent at his sum-
mer residence in Castel Gandolfo. He re-
turned to the Vatican yesterday afternoon.
The source said the Pope felt this was the
time for a new peace campaign, but his ac-
tion is expected to be chiefly religious in na-
ture rather than a specific suggestion to
statesmen or a sensational gesture.
The Pope, who has been in Castel Gandolfo
since July 16, returned to the Vatican yes-
terday afternoon. Some sources speculated
he might start his push for peace in an in-
formal speech from his window overlooking
St. Peter's Square today.
"There has been a spate of rumors that
something big is coming up," the Source said,
"but it would appear that a mediation offer
or a peace-making trip to one of the coun-
tries concerned is out of the question for the
time being. A call for worldwide prayer
would seem more likely."
"If the Pope, has some specific suggestion
to make, beyond those he made in the past,
he might do so later in a public speech or
through diplomatic channels. But an ap-
peal for prayers seems certain to be the first
step."
APOSTOLIC LETTER
The call could take the form of an apostolic
letter to the world's bishops or a message
asking all Catholics to pray for world peace
during October, the "month of the Holy
Rosary."
The sources said the Viet Nam war and
other threatening developments such as the
great purge in Red China were one of the
Pope's main concerns during his two-month
stay in Castel Gandolfo.
Another was the question of possible
changes in the church's ban on artificial
birth control, on which a papal pronounce-
ment may be forthcoming before the end of
the year.
Pope Paul scored one victory by bringing
about a short-lived Christmas truce in Viet
Narn?last winter.
In ?recent months, the Pope put aside his
public pronouncements on Viet Nam to con-
centrate on such other problems as the
famine in India. But Vatican sources said-
he was still quietly exploring all chances to
end the southeast Asian war and was ready
to act "whenever it appears a gesture
part could prove helpful."
EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH BY RICHARD GOODWIN
BEFORE AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1966, WASHINGTON, D.C.
There is, however, another issue which has
reduced discussions about domestic America
to academic discourse, which has swallowed
up the New Frontier and Great Society, and
which is eroding our position throughout
the world. That issue if, of course, the war
in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the most
dangerous conflict since the end of World
War II: more dangerous than Berlin or even
Korea. In those confrontations the danger
was clear and sensibly appraised. The stakes
were fairly obvious to both sides. Objectives
were carefully limited; and power ultimately
became the handmaiden of reason and final
accomodation. In Vietnam, on the other
hand, the dangers are confused and unclear.
Objectives are expressed in vague generalities
which open to endless vistas. Moreover,
from other cold war confrontations there
evolved a set of tacit understandings de-
signed to limit conflict even while it was be-
ing waged. That, for example, is the real
meaning of the no-sanctuary policy carefully
observed, we should remember, by both sides.
Today those understandings are in grave
danger of being swept away, and with them
our most important protections against en-
larging conflict.
The air is charged with rhetoric. We are
buried in statements and speeches about
negotiation and peace, the defense of free-
dom and the dangers of communism, the
desire to protect the helpless and compassion
for the dying. Much of it is important and
sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended
to deceive. Some of is deliberate lie and
distortion. But the important thing is not
what we are saying, but what we are doing;
not what is being discussed, but what is
happening.
And what is happening is not confusing
or unclear or contradictory at all. It is not
masked in obscruity or buried in secret
archives. It stands in clear, vivid and tower-
ing relief against the landscape of conflict.
The war is getting larger. Every month
there are more men in combat, more bombs
falling, greater expenditures, deeper commit-
ments. It is the steady inexorable course of
this conflict since its beginning. We have
gone to the United Nations' and the war
has grown larger. We have offered funds
for development and talked of social reform;
and the war has grown larger. We have pre-
dicted victory and called for compromise;
and the war has grown larger.
There is therefore, little escape from the
conclusion that it will grow larger still.
Nor Is this steady pattern the consequence
of inexorable historical forces. It flows from
the decisions of particular men in particular
places-in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon
and in the jungle headquarters of the Viet-
cong. It is in part a product of communist
hope and drive for victory; but it is partly
our decision too. And we must suppose
those same decisions will continue to be
made.
Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, be-
cause there is no alternative. There are
dozens of alternatives. There are enclave
programs, and programs to hold the centers
of population. There are suggestions that
we rely on pacification of the countryside
rather than the destruction of the Vietcong.
There are proposals to limit the bombing or
to end it. There are proposals for negotia-
tions, complete with all the specifics of pos-
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sible agreement. The fact is the air is full
of alternatives. They have simply been re-
jected in favor of another course; the present
course. And we must also suppose they
will continue to be rejected.
All prohecy is an exercise in probability.
With that caution let us try to strip the
argument of its necessary passion and dis-
cuss the probabilities which are compelled
by the awesome logic of the course of events
in Vietnam. Passion is important; it lies at
the root of war and of hatred of war. Nor do
I lack personal feeling; for only the strong-
est of feelings could impel me to discuss a
subject with which I was so recently con-
nected in so intimate a way. Yet we can
perhaps now meet more productively on the
common ground of reason. Rarely has there
been greater need for such unity among men
of good will.
In other places I have set forth my per-
sonal views on the conduct of the war in
South Vietnam: The belief that we have an
important stake in Southeast Asia, and that
we must continue the battle in the South-
although differently than we are now doing-
until a political settlement is reached. And
I have, like many others, discussed alterna-
tive routes to these objectives. Today, how-
ever, I would like to talk about the lengthen-
ing shadow of the war in the North; for in
that war are the swiftly germinating seeds
of the most grave danger.
In this, as in so many aspects of the war,
much of the information which feeds judg-
ment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times
of armed conflict facts are often elusive and
much information, of necessity, cannot be
revealed. By its nature war is hostile to
truth. Yet with full allowance for neces-
sary uncertainties I believe there has never
been such intense and widespread deception
and confusion as that which surrounds this
war. The continual downpour of contradic-
tions, mistatements, and kaleidoscopically
shifting attitudes has been so torrential that
it has almost numbed the capacity to separ-
ate,truth from conjecture or falsehood.
At one time we are told there is no military
solution, and then that victory can be ours.
There are months when we talk about
negotiations and months when we forget
them.
There are times when dissenters give aid
and comfort to the enemy and times when
they are acting in the greatest of our tradi-
tions.
We have been reassured about efforts to
reach a peaceful settlement when there is
no plan or program for settlement in exist-
ence. -
We are given endless statistics with a nu-
merical precision which only masks the fact
they are based on inadequate information, or
guesses, or even wishful thinking. For ex-
ample, if we take the numbers of enemy we
are supposed to be killing, add to that the
defectors, along with a number of wounded
much less than our own ratio of wounded
to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually
the entire North Vietnamese force every year.
This truly makes their continued resistance
one of the marvels of the world. Unless the
figures are wrong, which of course they are.
We are told the bombing is terribly costly
to North Vietnam. Yet the increase in So-
viet" and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is
far greater, in economic terms, than the loss
through bombing. Except in human life,
the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.
At the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bomb-
ings last June we were told that in the first
six months of 1966 enemy truck movement
had doubled, the infiltration of supplies was
up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased
120%. However, the fact is we do not know,
except inthe most vague and general way,
how much supplies are being brought in or
how many men. They move at night, some-
times on trails we have not yet discovered,
and the best intelligence gives only the most
vague picture. We could not only be wrong,
but enormously wrong. The swiftness with
which we change our estimates helps show
that seeming exactness conceals large uncer-
tainties.
The statements which followed the Hanoi-
Haiphong bombings are an illuminating ex-
ample of this process in action.
It was said the raids would destroy a large
proportion of North Vietnam's fuel capacity
and this would help paralyze-or at least
slow down-the process of infiltration. Yet
these raids had been anticipated, alternative
techniques of providing fuel had been de-
veloped, and the raids were destind to have
little if any effect on the North Vietnamese
capacity to make war. And this was clear
at the time we bombed.
We were told, in an inside story in the
New York Times, that the bombings would
prove to Hanoi it could not count on its
allies. The fact is that aid was stepped up
as we anticipated it would be.
Within a few days a high official said fresh
intelligence showed that Hanoi was now
plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suf-
fused with a sense of hopelessness, presum-
ably at least in part as a result of the raids.
'Yet, there was no substantial intelligence of
this kind. We have heard little about it
since. And recent information indicates
that the opposite was the case-the enemy's
will was strengthened.
The truth is that this major and spectac-
ular escalation in the war had had little
measurable effect on the enemy's capacity or
morale, and most of those who looked at the
matter seriously in advance of the bombing
knew it would probably be ineffective.
Yet despite confusion and misstatement,
despite the enormous difficulty of grasping
the realities on which policy must be based,
I believe we can know that further escalation
of the war in the North will only bring us
farther from settlement and closer to serious
danger of a huge and devastating conflict.
We began the campaign of bombing in the
North as a result of the enormous and un-
resolved difficulties of winning the real war,
the war in the South.
As predicted by almost every disengaged
expert, from General Ridgway to George
Kennan; and as taught by the whole history
of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither
brought the enemy to his knees or to the
council table. It has not destroyed his ca-
pacity to make war, or seriously slowed down
either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At
each step it was claimed the bombing would
make a decisive difference. Yet it has made
hardly any difference at all. In fact, the
tempo of conflict has increased.
The official statements justifying the
Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness to
the futility of bombing. We were told the
raids were necessary because infiltration had
increased enormously; and official admission
of the failure of one of the most intensive
bombing campaigns in world history. De-
spite thousands upon thousands of raids
more men and supplies are flowing South
and the routes of infiltration have been wid-
ened and improved. Despite the bombing,
or perhaps because of it, all signs indicate
the North Vietnamese will to fight has stiff-
ened and the possibilities of negotiation have
dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because
of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly
dependent upon Russia and China. Despite
the bombing, or because of it there has been
a vastly increased supply of aid to North
Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepen-
ing world communist commitment to this
war.
In short the bombing has been a failure,
and may turn out to be a disaster.
Yet we once again hear voices calling for
further escalation; just as each previous
time that the bombing has failed we have
been told that more bombing 1s necessary
and new goals are articulated. First it was
said we wanted to stop infiltration. Next,
we would persuade the North Vietnamese to
come to the Council table. Then we would
punish them and force them to surrender.
Now men are talking of the need to destroy
their capacity to make war. And so we move
inexorably up the ladder of failure toward
widening devastation. And the latest goal,
the destruction of enemy capacity, if ever
adopted, will be the most vaguely ambitious
of all. For such capacity rests on the entire
society; and that whole society; factories,
dams, power plants, cities themselves must
be brought tumbling down.
All of this is possible despite the fact that
each future escalation will probably have
the effect of previous escalations. It will
increase the dangers of wider war, lessen
the chances of a negotiated settlement, drain
away effort which should be concentrated
in the South, and further alienate our allies,
and have little damaging effect on the ene-
my's ability or will to fight.
We are sometimes asked what else we can
do. I believe there are other things to do.
The war can be fought more effectively in
the South. The search for a settlement can
be given greater direction and brilliance.
We can prepare ourselves, if necessary, to
accept a long ground war of attrition lead-
ing ultimately to a political settlement. But
that is not the question. If the bombing
cannot win the war, if it does not work; and
above all if it carries tremendous political
and military risks, then it should not be
increased, either out of frustration with the
war or with the polls.
For the greatest danger of this course-
the course of escalation-is not only in the
extent of devastation and death, or the dam-
age it does to the hope of peaceful solution,
but the fact that each step of the way in-
creases in vast proportion the danger of a
huge and bloody conflict. If North Vietnam
is devastated then all reason for restraint
or compromise is gone. The fight is no long-
er a way for the South but a struggle for
survival calling their still largely uncom-
mitted armies and people into battle. Nor
can China stand by and see its ally destroyed.
I do not believe China wants to fight the
United States, at least not yet; but it cannot
stand by while we destroy North Vietnam.
To do so would forfeit all its claim to moral
and political leadership of militant commu-
nism. They would then be truly a paper
dragon, stoking the fires of revolution only
when Chinese blood and land was not at
stake.
Nor is China's entrance likely to be sig-
nalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of
armies across the frontier. It is far more
likely that increasing destruction in the
North will stimulate or compel the Chinese
to accelerate the nature and kind of their
assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will be-
gin to fly air defense over Hanoi. The num-
ber of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may
be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft
crews may be placed throughout the country.
Thus, step by step, China acting in response
to seeming necessities, may become involved
in a war it did not fully contemplate, much
as we have. And there are many signs that
this process has already begun. This is the
most ilkely and grave route to enlarging con-
flict. And if China does enter we must bomb
them, for certainly we will not permit them
sanctuaries or, if it comes to that, engage
their armies solely in the jungles of South-
east Asia. And lastly is the Soviet Union,
forced to choose between China and America.
None of this is certain. An entirely dif-
ferent course is possible. Yet the danger of
such a chain of events grows by immeasur-
able strides each time we enlarge the war in
the North: and if past is prologue we will
continue that enlargement. Yet the fan-
tastic fact, the truth that challenges belief,
is that this is being done although virtually
no one remains beside some of the engaged
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military and a few men in the State Depart-
ment-virtually no one in the Administra-
tion or out=who believes that increased
bombing will have a decisive effect on the
war in South Vietnam. We are taking likely
and mounting risks in pursuit of an elusive,
obscure, marginal, and chimercial hope; a
course which defies reason and experience
alike.
Yet I believe this is the way we are going;
that only beneficent and uncertain fortune
tail bar the way. This is not a belief born
of personal fear. After all, we, or most of
us,' will continue to work and prosper, hold
meetings and make speeches, unless all of
our civilization is swallowed up. Bven then
enough will survive for the race to evolve and
perhaps create something finer. It is rather
a belief born of a fallible reason and analysis,
always better able to describe our situation
than guide our action, which seeks in the
acts of our past and the attitudes of our
present a guide for our future.
I do not wish however, to come with a
counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of
misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we
must all make what effort we can. There
are enormous differences among the critics
of 'the war. There are those who believe we
have no interest in Vietnam or even in all of
Asia. There are those who wish us to with-
draw. There are fierce debates over the his-
tory of the war, the nature of its partici-
pants, the goals of our enemies. There are
those, like myself, who believe we should
carry on the war in the South while intensi-
fying, modifying and sharpening the search
for peaceful compromise tied to some
measures of de-escalation in the North. Yet
our danger is so grave that those who fear
the future even more than they distrust the
past-a group which encompasses, I believe,
the majority of the American people-must
seek some common ground rather than dis,-
sipating energies in exploring the varieties of
dissent. Without sacrificing individual views
we must also shape a unified stand, a focal
point of belief and action which can unite
all who apprehend coming dangers. Only in
this way can we create a voice strong enough
to be heard across the country, bringing to-
gether men of diverse beliefs, adding strength
to the views of those in government who
share this apprehension. It must also be a
clear and direct stand; one that fires re-
sponse in those millions of our fellow citizens
who glimpse through complexity, discord
and obscurity the vision of something dark
and dangerous.
I believe there is such a position. It is
simply the victorious slogan of the Demo-
cratic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war.
It is to oppose any expansion of the bomb-
ing. It is to speak and work against all
who would enlarge the war in the North.
Such a stand will not end the war in
South Vietnam. It may even prolong it.
It will not fully answer the deep objections,
feelings and fears of many in this room or
across the country. But it can crystallize
the inarticulate objections of many. It may
well increase the weight and impact of the
forces of restraint. Most importantly it
strikes at the most ominous menace to the
lives of millions and the peace of the world.
Such a rallying cry requires compromise, the
willingness to seek less than is desired; but
that is the basic necessity of those who
seek not self indulgence but to shape the
course of this nation.
To be most effective this position will re-
quire more than speeches and resolutions.
It will need structure and purpose. I sug-
gest this organization work with other
xoups and individuals to form a national
committee against widening of the war. It
will not be aimed at withdrawal or even
a lessening of the war in the South; although
individuals who oppose escalation may also
hold those views. Thus it will be open to
all groups who oppose escalation in the
North regardless of their position on other
issues, and will be open to the millions of
Americans who belong to no group but who
share this basic belief and apprehension.
Such a committee can provide a constant flow
of objective information about Vietnam. It
can keep vigil over official statements and
ask the hard questions which might help
separate wishful thinking from facts. It will
neither be against the Administration nor
for it, neither with any political party or
opposed to it, neither liberal nor conserva-
tive. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and
inform the American people in order to in-
crease the invisible weight of what I be-
lieve to be the American majority in the
deliberations and inner councils of govern-
ment. Its purpose is to help the President
and others in government by providing a
counter pressure against those who urge
a more militant course; a pressure for which
those in government should be grateful since
it will help them pursue the course of wise
restraint.
Although I believe deeply in this proposal
I do not wish to give the argument a cer-
tainty I do not have. The most important
fact of all, the unknown which transcends all
debate, are the thoughts and intentions of
our adversaries and their allies. 'Yet skepti-
cism born of imperfect knowledge cannot
be permitted to dull the passion with which
we pursue convictions or the fervor of our
dissent. For we must fight against fulfill-
m.ent of Yeats' prophecy which foresaw de-
struction if the time should come when "the
best lack all conviction, and the worst are
full of passionate intensity."
Some have called upon us to mute or
stifle dissent in the name of patriotism and
the national interest. It is an argument
which monstrously misconceives the nature
and pr cess and the greatest strength of
American democracy. It denies the germinal
assumption of our freedom: that each in-
dividual not only can but must judge the
wisdom of his leaders. (How marvelously
that principle has strengthened this coun-
try--never more drastically than in the post-
war period when others have buried con-
tending views under the ordained wisdom
of the state, thus allowing received error
to breed weakness and even defeat. The
examples are legion, The virgin lands set-
tlement and the Great Leap Forward failed
because experiment was made into unchal-
lengeable law; while we began to' catch up in
space, modernized and increased our de-
fenses, and started the Alliance for Progress
because what began as dissent became na-
tional purpose). Of course the enemy is
glad to see our divisions. But our concern
is with America not Hanoi. Our concern
is with those millions of our own people,
and with future generations, who will them-
selves be glad to see that there were men who
struggled to prevent needless devastation
and thus added to the strength and the
glory of the United States.
Among the greatest names in our history
were men who did not hesitate to assault the
acts and policies of government when they
felt the good of the nation was at stake:
Jefferson at a time when the integrity of the
new nation was still in doubt, Lincoln during
the Mexican war, Roosevelt in the midst of
national depression, John F. Kennedy among
cold war defeats and danger.
Only a dozen years ago, in 1954, another
American leader assaulted our policy in Viet-
nam, saying "The United States is in clear
danger of being left naked and alone in a
hostile world ... It is apparent only that
American foreign policy has never in all Its
history suffered such a stunning reversal.
What is American policy in Indochina? All
of us have listened to the dismal themes of
reversal and confusions' and alarms and ex-
cursions which have emerged from Wash-
ingtoin . . . We have been caught bluffing by
our enemies. Our friends and allies are
September 19, .1966
frightened and wondering, as we do, where
we are headed ... The picture of our coun-
try needlessly weakened in the world'. today
is so painful that we should turn our eyes
from abroad and look homewards."
It is in this same spirit of concern for our
country that we should conduct our dissent
as, on that day, did Lyndon B. Johnson then
leader of the minority party.
It is not our privilege, but our duty as
patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to
oppose any President and any party and any
policy at any time which we believe threatens
the grandeur of this nation and the well-
being of its people. This is such it time.
And in so doing we will fulfill the most
solemn duty of free men in a free country:
to fight to the limit of legal sanction and the
most spacious possibilities of our constitu-
tional freedoms for the safety and greatness
of their country as they believe it to be.
The arguments of this speech have been
practical ones founded, to the limits of my
capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete
and specific realities and dangers of our pres-
ent situation. But there is more than that
in the liberal faith. American liberalism has
many faces. It pursues divergent paths to
varied and sometimes conflicting goals. It
cannot be captured in an epigram or sum-
marized in a simple statement of belief. Part
of it, however, is simply and naively it belief
in belief. It is the idealistic, visionary and
Impractical faith that action and policy and
politics must rest on the ancient and rooted
values of the American people. It still be-
lieves that for a nation to be great, to serve
its own people and to command the respect
and trust of others, it must not only do
something but stand for something. It must
represent in speech and act in ideals of its
society and civilization.
Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may
have been unavoidable, some is the result of
well-intentioned error, but some must surely
flow from the fact we have bent belief to
the demands of those who call themselves
realists or tough minded.
It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve
problems and Invest money and use power
unguided by ultimate aims and values. It
is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the re-
alities of human faith and passion and de-
sire; forces ultimately more powerful than
all the calculations of economists and gen-
erals. Our strength is in our spirit and our
faith. If we neglect this we may empty our
treasuries, assemble our armies and pour
forth the wonders of our science, but we will
act in vain and we will build for others.
It is easy to be tough when toughness
means coercing the weak or rewarding the
strong; and when men of power and influence
stand ready to applaud. It is far harder to
hold to principle, speaking, if necessary,
alone against the multitude, allowing others
to make their own mistakes, enduring the
frustration of long and inconclusive strug-
gles, and standing firm for ideals even when
they bring danger. But it is the true path
of courage. It is the only path of wisdom.
And it is the sure path of effective service
to the United States of America.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there further morning busi-
ness? If not, morning business is con-
cluded.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE-EN-
ROLLED BILL SIGNED
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
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September 19, 1966 CON
"In short, most that was lovely has been
made hideous and riches have been squan-
dered. It is a late chapter in the sad his
tory of so many North Shore harbors."
There are still a piddling 40 acres of pro-
ductive wetlands left in Mt. Sinai Harbor.
Dr. Murphy and others trying to save the
last remains of a rich natural asset are
fighting now to save those last 40 acres
from the dredge.
Brookhaven Town wants to enlarge the
harbor, dredging the area for commercial
sand and gravel-with the spoil materials to
be dumped on Cedar Beach-and also to dig
a 200-foot wide channel to a boat yard on
the landward end of the harbor.
The U.S. Department of Interior's Fish
and Wildlife Service in recent years was
given authority to speak up on conserva-
tion questions like the dredging permit.
Summarized, their answer to the town
says:
The dredger mining gravel In the harbor
now has "operated outside the area covered
by the permit and excavated to a depth ex-
ceeding that authorized."
A February 1965 report, the federal service
pointed out, "stated that dredging and fill-
ing in Mount Sinai Harbor has already
caused Incalculable loss," that "this often-
extended permit (for gravel mining) was re-
sponsible for a large part of these losses."
And the report sums up, "sacrifice of an
additional 40 acres of salt marsh and salt
water wetlands does not seem warranted by
the need for additional anchorage for boats,
inasmuch as a very deep harbor has already
been created accompanied by the destruc-
tion of over 100 acres of irreplaceable estua-
rine habitat."
The report Is buttressed by facts garnered
in on-the-spot investigations which showed
that silt from dredging was causing damage
and that more wetland was sliding into deep
potholes gouged by the dredge.
The federal expert's findings urge that the
gravel dredging permit be denied. They also
urge that the boat channel dredging re-
quest be denied.
.Instead, the experts say, a 100-foot wide
channel to the boat yard, no more than six
feet deep, should be created largely by using
a longer path of existing natural channels.
Those findings will be part of the testi-
mony next Oct. 7 when the Army Corp of
Engineers holds a unique hearing-only the
second on Long Island in recent years-on
whether or not to grant permission for the
dredging.
The unusual 10 a.m. session at Port Jef-
ferson High School was set up because a
valiant handful of conservationists, like
Dr. Murphy, demanded a chance to be heard
publicly.
They are still working wetlands in Mt.
Sinai Harbor that produce food for fish,
fish for the water and shore birds that fre-
quent the harbor, fish for the bigger fish at
sea-fish for man.
There are blue crabs In the wetlands too,
and the other marine life sustained by the
miraculous wetlands cycle.
There is gravel there, too.
If the past repeats itself, some day there
will be no gravel left in once-beautiful Mt.
Sinai Harbor.
Long before that, if heedless man has his
way, there will be no trace of the wetlands
superfarm.
The waters will be as barren of life as a
desert.
Just remember this. Man can make a
desert bloom.
He can not bring wetlands back to life
once they have been destroyed.
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Victor and the Long
Island Press have exposed the problems.
It is our responsibility in the Congress to
find the solutions.
ESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX A4841
The Future Looks Bright in South
Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, one of the
most optimistic reports on the recent
election in Vietnam comes from William
S. White.
I commend to the attention of our col-
leagues Mr. White's column which ap-
peared in the September 16, 1966, edition
of the New York World Journal Tribu ie.
The column follows:
VIET FUTURE LOOKS BRIGHT
(By William S. White)
WASHINGTON.-The long nightmare of Viet
Nam is lifting at last, and though the way
to final victory over the Communist assail-
ants from without and within still stretches
out long and forbidding, a true pre-dawn
does now loom faintly ahead.
This is the real meaning of the spectacular
success for the people of South Viet Nam.
In the teeth of tireless terrorism from the
Communists, they have voted in better than
80 per cent of their total strength in a free
election.
They are going now to make a democratic
constitution by orderly and democratic
means. To all the world they have issued,
moreover, a thundering rebuke to all those-
the Communists, the fellow-travelers, the
merely deluded peaceniks and beatniks-who
for years have peddled the monstrous fiction
that the Communist Viet Cong were in truth
popular In South Viet Nam and were only
engaged in a "democratic revolution."
By immense majorities, the South Viet-
namese themselves have forever destroyed
this Big Lie version of current history. By
immense majorities, they have shown their
determination both to keep their country
from the reaching grasp of internal and ex-
ternal Communist trigger men and to make
of it a decent state in Asia.
This is a victory for American policy of
measureless importance-not for Democratic
policy and not for Republican policy but for
a partisan stance of strength in trevail and
of steadfast honor in piled-up adversity. To
this splendid end the Republicans, and no-
tably the party's leading figures in and out
of Congress, have contributed with mem-
orable generosity and magnificent concern
for the vital, non-political interests of this
nation and of all the free world.
In the narrower sense, of course, it is a
triumph for the Democratic President who
has risked most in Viet Nam and has borne
the heaviest of the burden from a constantly
biting Democratic New Left at home and the
incessantly destructive carping that has
come from some of our alleged friends, such
as Charles de Gaulle of France.
Will it all help Deinocratlc Congressional
candidates in November's elections? No
doubt it will assist most of them, since most
have stood all along with this nation's pledge
to stay the course in Viet Nam. No doubt,
too, it may improve the President's "image"
In the opinion polls.
But It will also help many a Republican
congressional candidate, as well it should,
for many of these, too, have supported with
unshaken courage the commitment of three
successive Presidents of the United States to
the people of South Viet Nam.
To look for two-bit domestic partisan
credit or gain in this transcendental victory
for a tortured people and for an old concept
called the right to freedom-to freedom even
in Asia-would be little-minded beyond be-
lief. For what has happened in Viet Nam
can scarcely be described without the use of
superlative heaped upon superlative.
Fbr the first time in the Cold War a na-
tion under Communist attack not only from
abroad but at home has been able to con-
duct a free election as free men. The so-
called war of liberation as a special instru-
ment of Communist China lies in ruins in
the now-deserted balloting places of South
Viet Nam for the cynical and evil fraud it
has always been.
The Red Chinese have been thrown back
as never before. The policy of a rationally
restrained but absolutely determined mili-
tary resistance to Chinese aggression-by-
proxy has, been proved beyond all doubt to
be not only one of honor but one of effec-
tiveness as well.
Over Asia the long darkness is lifting at
least, though not yet dispersed. The Chi-
nese wave of the future is not, after all, to
be the wave of the future for Asia, just as
Hitler's wave of the future broke at length
two decades ago upon the great rock of reso-
lute Allied resistance.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. RAY J. MADDEN
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, on last
Friday I spoke to the delegates from eight
States bordering on the Great Lakes and
also representatives from our neighbor
Canada.
I am hereby submitting excerpts from
remarks which I made to the assembled
delegates :
EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH OF CONGRESSMAN RAY
J. MADDEN BEFORE CONFERENCE OF GREAT
LAKES WATER POLLUTION AT THE PALMER
HOUSE, CHICAGO, ILL., SEPTEMBER 16, 1966
Mr. Chairman: Vice President HUMPHREY
and his cosponsors are to be commended for
calling this conference to further develop and
decide upon executive action to curtail and
eventually eliminate the pollution of Lake
Michigan and the other great bodies of wa-
ter commonly called the "Great Lakes" of our
Nation.
This conference representing officials from
the States of New York, Illinois, Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana,
Michigan and Canada are contributing a
great deal of their time and services in com-
ing to Chicago on this occasion to help solve
one of the Nation's greatest problems-Wa-
ter Pollution.
This conference will also consider the pol-
lution problems of the Great Lakes and also
the pollution problems pertaining to inland
lakes, rivers, and streams located within the
borders of the above-mentioned states.
In the last session of Congress I joined
with a great number of other House and
Senate Members in sponsoring resolutions to
establish the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration and to provide grants for re-
search and development, to increase grants
for the construction of municipal sewage
treatment plants, to authorize the establish-
ment of standards of water quality to aid in
preventing, controlling and abating pollution
of interstate waters, and for other purposes.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX September
I also participated in sponsoring legisla-
tion on clearing up water pollution along
the shores of the great water bodies referred
to as the "Great Lakes.",
The legislation sponsored by our col-
leagues, Congressman JOHN A. BLATNIK, Of
Minnesota, as Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Public Works, and Senator EDMUND
S. MUSE.IE of Maine, have made great prog-
ress in Congress,
The House legislation would provide $2.45
b2 on for. sewage treatment plants for the
nei t five years and establish a new concept
of, incentive grants amounting to 10 per-
cent for the development of basin plans for
wate, pollution control. It would also in-
crease the Federal grant by another 10 per-
cent or up to 50 percent under the basin
plan, if the States matched to the extent
of 25 percent of the total costs. It would
also provide $228 million for water pollu-
tion research through the next three years
as well as other progressive steps toward
curbing water pollution.
The work that has been done In this ses-
sion of Congress is merely a beginning of
future plans to make an all-out effort to
solve the water pollution problem. If not
curbed, polluted water will, in a few years,
jeopardize the health of millions of human
beings as well as animal and plant life
throughout our land. Economists estimate
that in this generation we have suffered
losses from water and air pollution that
run into billions of dollars each year. Un-
less this program is pursued to a successful
conclusion, the future cost to the American
people In health, epidemics, and destruc-
tion of animal and plant life will be in-
calculable.
If this curruption and poison of our lakes
and streams, our lands, our rivers and forests
and the atmosphere itself is not eliminated
the progress and future expansion of food
production, health and agriculture Itself
will be curtailed, Pollution of our water
resources affects every human being and
form of life throughout the land. It has
been reported by experts who have studied
pollution that every river, stream and lake
within our nation's borders has, in some
degree, suffered from pollution. Pollution
in our Great Lakes system and in our in-
land lakes and rivers has already destroyed
millions of, wild life,,fish and other game.
Our nation? states, and local communi-
ties much organize and develop committees
of experts to formulate long range plans to
achieve cooperation with our national gov-
erudient and work out a unified and nation-
wide solution to clear up the waters of our
country. Communities along with industry
and business must be willing and able to
contribute funds necessary for constructing
and installing modern' facilities to destroy
industrial waste and sewage before it is re-
leased to enter our streams and lakes. Sew-
age and Industrial waste, under modern
scientific inventions, can be satisfactorily
cured and eradicated before it enters the
.Streams and lakes. The installation of the
necessary machinery on the part of industry
and municipalities can curb' this nation-
wide poisonous health hazard and it must
be done regardless of the cost.
The, people of our nation are cognizant of
the fact that Federal financial assistance will
be necessary if this great program is to suc-
ceed. It is also necessary that every munici-
pality, business and industry cooperate in
this necesasry effort. President Johnson has
recommended, and I am satisfied the vast
majority of Members of Congress are in favor
of an all-out effort to master this problem
but we must have the complete cooperation
of local industry and municipalities to suc-
ceed in the effort. Federal grants for waste
treatment plants now total more than $725
million. Almost 7,000 projects are now under
construction or already completed. The
president also requests an additional $150
million to continue this important and nec-
essary effort.
The Federal Government already possesses
authority to immediately bring suit to stop
pollution when the pollution constitutes an
Imminent danger to public health or welfare.
Our Government has the right to subpoena
witnesses in administrative hearings and the
Secretary has the right to initiate enfoce-
ment proceedings when pollution occurs in
navigable waters, intrastate or interstate.
The Government also has authority to de-
mand registration of all existing or poten-
tial sources of major pollution and the
United States officials have the right to in-
spect such sources. Private citizens also are
allowed to bring suit In Federal Court to seek
relief from pollution. These may seem strict
and stringent measures nevertheless extra-
ordinary steps must be taken to preserve
health and human life as well as animal and
vegetable production in our Nation.
The Federal Government has already taken
effective steps requiring all new Federal in-
stallations to include adequate water pollu-
tion control systems. All Federal agencies
are required to submit long-range plans to
bring existing installations up to a high level
of pollution control required by the new
facilities.
If the destruction of our fresh water sup-
ply in certain sections of the United States
continues it will be but a short time until
the shortage of water will be the number one
problem facing approximately 200 million
people in our land. President Johnson is
doing everything in his power and the Con-
gress will cooperate in legislation. and par-
ticipating funds to expand methods to con-
serve, existing water supplies and prevent
complete destruction of our lakes, rivers and
streams.
Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, Director of
Air Force Legislative Liaison, To Be
Transferred
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES S. GUBSER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I have
heard it said that if you want to know a.
man do business with him. But if you
want to understand him take a trip
with him.
Mr. Speaker, some weeks ago it was
necessary for us to say goodby, with
reluctance, to a man, Maj. Gen.. Thomas
0. Corbin, Director of Air Force Legis-
lative Liaison, whom many of us are
privileged to know and understand.
Of course, we were pleased that he was
to be transferred to, a new and more
challenging position, but nevertheless
we shall miss a good friend.
All of us who did business with Gen-
eral Corbin learned to respect him for
the splendid service he rendered our
constituents through us. His office was
operated fairly and efficiently, with the
best interests of the Nation as well as
the Air Force in mind at all times. I
found my constituents' problems con-
sidered with compassion and with a
thoroughness that was all and more than.
any of us should expect. Doing business
with General Corbin was a great source
of satisfaction.
19, 1966
But I was to enjoy a special privilege-
that of taking a trip with General Corbin
and learning to know and understand
him as a friend. In the fall of 1965, the
Special Investigating Subcommittee of
Armed Services, on which I serve, visited
every major military supply center in
an extensive 5-week trip around the
world. Those of us who traveled with
General Corbin appreciated his diligence
in seeing to it that the information we
needed in our work was available to
us. Whether it was talking to a GI in
the combat zones of Vietnam, pursuing
a serious point in a top-secret hearing or
briefing, fulfilling the important social
requirements at official receptions and
dinners in foreign lands, or expertly
handling the controls of a fast jet while
landing on some Asian airfield, all of
us who had the privilege of traveling
with Gen. Thomas Corbin remember him
for what he is, truly a man's man, a great
friend, a fine officer, and a gentleman.
Dedication of the Chapel of Our Lady of
Siluva in Washington, D.C.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EDWARD A. GARMATZ
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Speaker, Sun-
day, September 4, marked a very im-
portant day in the lives of all Lithuan-
ians in this country, and those of Lithu-
anian descent. On that day, in the Na-
tional Shrine of the Immaculate Con-
ception here in Washington, was dedi-
cated the Chapel of Our Lady of Siluva.
This solemn occasion marked the cul-
mination of much time, effort and sacri-
fice on the part of Americans of Lithu-
anian descent and therefore was a time
of great rejoicing for all. They came
from many parts of the country to join
in the celebration.
-There are a number of Lithuanians
living in my district in Baltimore and
we were all highly honored to have one
of the most prominent of them, the
Right Reverend Louis J. Mendelis, pastor
of St. Alphonsus Church in downtown
Baltimore, chosen to deliver the address
on that happy occasion. Knowing that
it will be'of great interest to all of you,
I am inserting it in the Appendix of the
RECORD.
SILUVA CHAPEL DEDICATION SERMON, THE NA-
TIONAL SHRINE, WASHINGTON, D.C., SUNDAY,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1966
"This is the work of the Lord: It is marvel-
lous in our eyes! This is the day which the
Lord has made! Let us rejoice and beiglad
in it." Ps. 117: 23-24.
On this historic occasion, no words Can ex-
press more fittingly the sentiments of deep
gratitude that fills the hearts of ALL Lithu-
anians everywhere, then the words of the
psalmist just cited. The Siluva Chapel we
dedicate today is the work of the Lord and
it is marvelous in our eyes. For I recall
only too well with what fear and trepidation
this work. was undertaken by His Excellency
Bishop Vincent Brizgys and his Volunteer
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~ AP~~~` A4845
Vietnamese Election Victory May Be
Bigger Than We Think
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, while
every friend of freedom is pleased by the
results of the South Vietnamese election
there are many problems yet to be solved.
Some of the subsidiary benefits of the
recent election, however, will help in
solving these problems. In this connec-
tion I commend to the attention of our
colleagues the following column by.
Joseph Alsop which appeared in the Sep-
tember 16, 1966, edition of the New York
World Journal Tribune:
VIET ELECTION VICTORY MAY BE BIGGER THAN
WE THINK
(By Joseph Alsop)
NHATRANG, VIETNAM.-The chances are
that the success of the Vietnamese election
is being underrated at home. Any success
here falsifies the predictions and flouts the
present prejudice of too many people at
home, and in Vietnam, too. So any success,
however solid, tends to be denigrated by
those same people.
Hence the first thing to note is that last
Sunday's election was brilliantly, even
startling, successful. The turnout of voters,
so far surpassing the normal American per-
centage, was far greater than anyone could
have forecast.
Furthermore, all those who voted did so in
the face of the grimmest warnings by the
Viet Cong. Voting was made a heinous
crime by the communist pre-election propa-
ganda. This should be noted by the oppo-
nents of the President's policy at home, who
have a way of hinting that the majority of
Vietnamese secretly support the so-called
National Liberation Front. The election in-
stead proves that the Viet Cong are exactly
what they appear-a small armed minor-
ity, seeking to seize control by naked force
of a people who want no part of them.
Having said so much (and it is ludicrous
that such things should still need saying!)
the obvious question is "What next?"
Here in Nhatrang, the headquarters of the
Second Corps area, the question seems par-
ticularly pressing.
In this corps area, the war is a stage or
two ahead of the rest of Viet Nam. The
enemy's most important units have been
driven to base themselves across the border
in Cambodia, whence they merely raid Into
Vietnamese territory. Except for the four
regiments in Cambodia, all the Communist
outfits in the field here are suffering gravely
from short rations and even worse from
malaria. All are trying to avoid c_ om.bat
when possible, and more than one of the
larger formations seems to have broken down
into separate companies and even platoons.
What you can see ahead, in fact, is a new
military phase, in which the threat of the
V. C. main forces will be much diminished.
But in this next phase, it will still be
necessary to do the long and tedious job
of tracking down the remaining V. C., squad
by squad and platoon by platoon, and con-
currently, long before all fighting ends, South
Vietnam will have to develop politically.
That would be difficult In any case. In
the Vietnamese case, it will be extra difficult
for two main reasons that are little under-
stood at home. The first is the doubly
colonial character of Vietnamese history.
The Vietnamese emerge into history as an
occupied and subject people. It took them
close to a thousand years to throw off the
Chinese yoke. And even their culture was In the last two or three years, young
so colonial that they always carried on the women have accepted their own dual interest
whole business of their quite independent in families and careers, said C. Easton Roth-
government not In Vietnamese but in well, president of Mills College. They have
Chinese. also become more creative, intellectually
Such was the position when the French ar- richer, less interested in security and more
rived, to add a second layer of colonial ex- concerned with social ills
he said
,
.
perience. It can be seen, then, that the "This is an exciting time," he said.
to aid the Vietnamese in evolving modern
methods of stable self-government.
With the election of the Constituent As-
sembly, the Vietnamese have now begun this
great task. But already, their second han-
dicap stares them in the face. Any stable
governmental system always somehow re-
presents or takes account of the main forces
In the community. Yet the army Is by all
odds the biggest force in Viet Nam at the
moment; and there is a general desire to get
away from military government.
What will be developed in the end, none
can foresee. One may guess that several
attempts may have to be made, over a con-
siderable period, before the Vietnamese find
what really suits them at last. Before they
find this, moveover, Americans should brace
themselves for the kind of recurrent political
turmoils here that so greatly upset many
people at home.
It will hardly avert turmoil, but a great
plus in the political equation must also be
noted. In brief, besides great industry, cour-
age and intelligence, the South Vietnamese
also possess one of the very richest countries
in the whole of Asia. Strange as it may
seem, moreover, South Viet Nam has actually
been enriched by the war, both materially
by the construction of a powerful modern
infrastructure for the economy, and man-
agerially by the training of hundreds of
thousands of technical cadres.
Even in the next phase of "political war,"
as Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky calls it, there should
be at least enough peace to make Vietnamese
natural wealth and recent enforced progress
count for a very great deal. Economics may
therefore lubricate politics. But patience
will still be needed, not least by the Viet-
namese themselves, until the day finally
comes when they have found their own way,
as the Koreans have already done.
Today's Coed Is a Concerned Woman
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE P. MILLER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, August 26, 1966
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, a very in-
teresting article by Judith Martin,
Washington Post staff writer, appeared
in that newspaper on Saturday, Septem-
ber 17. Mrs. Martin reported on an in-
terview that she had with Dr. C. Easton
Rothwell, president of Mills College,
Oakland, Calif.
Dr. Rothwell is one of the foremost
members of the academic community.
He is a progressive educator in the sense
that he keeps abreast of today's develop-
ments but is in no way a "faddist." Dr.
Rothwell is extremely proud of Mills'
graduates and they in turn are extremely
proud of him.
The article follows:
TODAY'S COED IS A CONCERNED WOMAN
(By Judith Martin)
The college girl has stopped asking herself,
"Can I combine marriage and a career?"
Instead, what she will need to know is,
"Where can I find a good baby sitter?"
"There's a new liveliness-in classes, in sem-
inars, in bull sessions. You can see it in
book withdrawals from the library-books
which aren't required for courses-and in
the sale of good paperbacks.
"There's a sense of commitment. Security
now is considered akin to dullness. The kids
are concerned.
"There's a trend to creativity. Partitions
are coming down. Mills is one of the real
centers for new combinations of the arts,
but it's elsewhere, too."
Dr. Rothwell attributes part of the- change
to the fact that current undergraduates re-
cevied their early schooling in "the post-
Sputnik time and there has been a revolu-
tion in education in those years."
Partly, he said, it's a reaction from post-
war years, when GIs who were heads of fam-
ilies, conscious of having lost school years
and anxious to make them up, influenced
campus life.
But partly, he said, it's just because "it's
in the air."
The college girl is more likely now, than
a few years ago, to be interested in science
and do graduate work, he said. -
There is less pressure on her to get mar-
ried young but she's more likely to continue
her work after marriage.
Dr. Rothwell, who is on one of "three
teams going to 40 cities" to raise money for
Mills College, addressed the Mills College
alumnae dinner at Fort Myers Officers Club
last night.
Each team consists of an administrator,
a faculty member and a student. Accom-
panying him were Barbara Wells, who teaches
political science at Mills, and Elizabeth Rid-
dleberger, a student from Charlottesville.
The college is trying to raise money to
meet a Ford Foundation grant of $2,200,000
at a ratio of three to one. A three-year
goal of $10 million is apparently going to
be exceeded, and there is a ten-year goal of
$23,500,000.
"But you can't just talk about money,"
Dr. Rothwell said, so he has been discussing
college trends and Mills programs with the
alumnae.
The development of interdepartmental
courses, such as "Human Development"
taught by a biologist, a psychologist and a
American bought" taught by an art his-
torian, professor of literature and an his-
torian, have been a Mills trend. The jux-
taposition of different arts, such as acting
to the music of an orchestra, is also being
done.
Summer seminars for alumnae and thier
husbands, a program which has been done
before at Mills, will be rescheduled.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT L. F. SIKES
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 22, 1966
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I note in
the September 17 issue of the Journal of
the Armed Forces, a very fine editorial
from the pen of Louis Stockstill on the
presentation to the Honorable Carl Vin-
son of the Sylvanus Thayer Award.
This is one of the Nation's most coveted
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A4846 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX September 19, 1966
awards and it is highly appropriate that ancestry as they celebrated the anniver- Mrs. Irene Palmer Challenges Economic
t +'k l +hda of Freidrich von p
f 1 y
Opportunity rograms
it now be presented to one of the grea- sary o
est of all Congressmen. Steuben. I suppose all of us learned in
Steuben who
V
on
I am very pleased to join my colleagues school that it was
in extending warmest congratulations to drilled the American Army at Valley
Carl Vinson on being the recipient of Forge, but he was much more than that
this award and I am pleased to submit for he instilled into our ragtail Army a
Mr. Stockstill's commendable editorial sense of devotion, pride, and loyalty that
for reprinting in the RECORD: it cherishes to this day. It is hard to
THE NATION IS GRATEFUL say what would have emerged from
L i StockstiM Valley Forge after that brutal winter had
s
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, August 30, 1966
(By ou
Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
On Saturday, 10 September, at the United not Von Steuben provided the discipline
State Military Academy at West Point, a that eventually meant victory. It is the t News & World Report for Au-
man who is beloved by the Armed Forces re- hard, too, to imagine what would have gut 2S, cexcerpts from a ]oe-
ceived the Sylvanus Thayer Award. been the fate of the Revolution without guscarried
a MIrene Palmer of De
The medal, awarded by the Academy's As- the services of the many thousands of written ieyn, La., Mrs. the challenged Enter
soclation of GracL1ites, previously has been German volunteers. We think often of prise Quincy, La., she Beaumont the need
presented to only eight others, including the great migrations of the middle 19th
Generals la the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower thcentury and somehow equate all Ameri- for our present economic opportunity
acid Douglas Ivlchrthe This was gone to first cans of German ancestry with that time. programs, war on poverty, and so forth.
3egisloccalaeoron. on which the Award has gone to a , Nothing could be further from the facts. For those in this body who might have
In selecting former Representative Vinson In 1766 Benjamin Franklin estimated missed this article, I wish to include it of Georgia for this great honor, the Associa- that Pennsylvania was more than one- herewith: with:
ith: -EARTH Loox AT A GROWING
tion could have made no better choice. Carl third German. In 1776 a census revealed PROBLEM
growth contributions to his nation, and the that there were more than 150,000 Amer-
cause plain-spoken of national security, to the g icons of German origin or descent. Von (NOTE p' p
development of the in Armed Ftheir Steuben a letter to the editor that is attracting wide-
and and to the he men and women men who wear their was not the only German name spread attention.
country's uniform will never be surpassed. on the roles of valor in the Revolution. (In this letter Mrs. Irene Palmer of De
And they must never be forgotten. He shared those lists with others such as Quincy, La., challenges the theory--often
Yet to forget 1s all too easy. Even when Peter Muehlenberg and Nicholas Herki- stated by top officials-that hardships and
a man actively holds high office he frequent- mer just to mention two. German- poor living conditions explain riots, crime,
ly is surrounded by supplicants whose atti- Americans have been in the van of every and growing dependence on government
, but are ou concerted effort of this country be it doles. To Mrs. Palmer, this is nonsense.
tude is "We know what you did for us yester-
heys eps i tot etirementihe cans be cert in. pushing back the, western frontier or (Crippled, forced to leave school at 1'7, Mrs.
settling the bloody Civil War. Palmer has worked hard, without luxuries,
that many of these same people will scarcely but: "You will never see us in a marching
remember he ever existed. It is estimated today that one Ameri- demonstration line wanting something for
Fortunately, the Association of Graduates can in six can trace all or part of his an- nothing. We're too proud for that."
of the United States Military Academy, and cestry to Germany. The largest of the (Following are excerpts from a letter to
others have not permitted Carl Vinson to German migrations came immediately The Beaumont (Tex.) Enterprise from Mrs.
dwell in the obscurity of retirement. They after the Civil War and in the 20 years Irene Palmer of De Quincy, La., and pub-
constantly remind him that the nation is following that war more than 2 million lished in The Enterprise on Aug. 3, 1966:)
grateful for his long and distinguished sere- them Came to America. Their lot, like These marches, demonstrations, riotings,
As Ice and he proud of addressed his the Cadet achievements. achie Corps, in ac- that of all immigrants, was not an easy lootings, police slayings and the such makes
d
cepting the Thayer Award, Chairman Vinson one. In addition to the normal problems, me literally sick, especially the reasons our
down
causes are of trying these to o cram cram d dowg
observed that the true test of any man is to and suspicions they had to overcome, Governmeour throatst officials
be able to combine humility with pride, to be they had to learn a new language. But episodes.
wisely aggressive without being dogmatic, to learn it they did and in short order the Sir, I know what hard work, hardship,
pable be firm of making without being decisions stubborn, without being be ca, rash, German immigrant community became pain and suffering is. I had polio at age 5
a strong bulwark of America. Their in-? months which left my left leg one and one-
assi criticism out b bein g weak, g weak, resenting to inspire be fluence was tremendous-John. Roebling half inches shorter than my right and. about
co accept
and at onate the out with same time oe tbe inspired by built the Brooklyn Bridge and in doing so one-third the size.
others compassionate
My father er died at 6 p.m. Sunday In 1935,
he serves but to those who serve under him. Stories about that magnificent euuice day. My bother died at 6 a.m. Tuesday and
In his long years of service, the former were printed with type from machines was buried Wednesday, leaving me with two
Congressman met all of these tests. invented by Otto Mergenthaler. George small sisters and my mother to support.
There are numerous places where Chair- Westinghouse invented the airbrake and At 17 I was not a drop-out in school. With
man Vinson's accomplishments are memorl- made hundreds of contributions to the no education-not enough, anyway--no ex-
alized. He has been accorded many honors, field of electronics as did Charles P. perience and with only one good leg, I quit
including the coveted Presidential Freedom Steinmetz. Studebaker and Chrysler are school and went to work to support a family.
Medal. well-known names now but not too long I didn't have a teen-age life because my
But as he returned to his home after the working hours were always from 10 to 20
West Point ceremonies, the veteran legisla- ago they were just two more German im- hours a day. In 1948, I got my right hand-
tor, who will be 83 on 18 November, could migrants. . my working hand; I'm right-handed--in an
only have found new pride in the knowledge R. Ii. Macy, the famous department electric ice shaver and mangled it. It was
that his name Is now forever engraved in the store, was founded by a peddler named doubtful whether I'd ever be able to use it
halls of one of the nation's most historic Lazarus Straus who had joined the ranks again, but after much pain and suffering I
institutions, particularly an Institution so of his fellow peddlers-Guggenheim, learned to use what I had left of a hand.
close to the people to whom he dedicated a This left me with one good leg and one good
lifetime of labor and love. Bloomingdale, and Seligman. It is even hand, but I didn't give up.
th t C-1 Schurz a German-
t
d
Von Steuben Day, 1966
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JOHN J. ROONEY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966
Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr.
Speaker, last Saturday was a particularly
happy day for Americans of German
e
repor
& FOLLOW ME JUST ONE DAY
born Senator from Missouri, friend of would like for Earl Warren, President
President Lincoln, and stanch advocate I wJoh ou l H. HUMPHREY, Earl P Lutent
of Nero and Indian rights, was one of King, and all the hell-raising juveniles to
the founders of a political party-the come to my home and follow me just one
name of which escapes me right now. day. I can guarantee that they wouldn't
The contributions of Americans of have enough pep left to go on a demonstra-
German ancestry are too many to even tion, marching or rock-throwing party.
begin to list in these pages. And the list My day begins at 4 a.m. and ends about 8
grows as our country continues to or 9 p.m., when my health permits. I do my
own housework, cooking, washing, ironing,
prosper. Mr, Speaker, our country owes sewing, raising flowers and a garden. In fact,
much to its citizens of German descent for the past three weeks I have been standing
and lineage. It is fitting then that we in a hot kitchen, over a hot stove, canning my
salute them on the occasion of the re- vegetables. Have an air conditioner? Are
membrance of Freidrich von Steuben. you kidding? Neither do I run up town
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