AGENDA AND SPEECH FOR NAVAL WAR COLLEGE VISIT WEDNESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400390001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1970
• Content Type: SPEECH

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE VISIT
Wednesday, 4 November 1970
0800 Wheels up Washington National Airport, Fairways
Terminal
0915 Arrive Quonsett Point, NAS
0920 Ten minute helicopter ride to Naval War College. (In
bad weather there would be a 30 minute drive to the
College. )
0930 Arrive at Naval War College helicopter pad. Meet
senior officials. Coffee.
1000 Address by General Cushman on "The CIA"
(Pringle Auditorium)
40 minute talk
10 minute break
40 minute question period
1130- 1230 Post Lecture Conference
1230 Lunch in Admiral Colbert's quarters
1430 Depart NWC in helicopter for Quonsett Point, NAS
1440 Depart Quonsett Point, NAS for Washington National
Airport
1600 Arrive Washington National Airport, Fairways Terminal
1620 Arrive Headquarters
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KEY NWC PERSONNEL
President Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert
Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Frederick G. Bennett
Assistant COS Captain Charles Fonveille
Director, School of
Naval Warfare Captain Robert Williams
Senior USMC on Staff Colonel Robert Slay
Director, School of
Naval Command & Staff Captain "Bud" Woodson
Staff Naval Intelligence
Officer Captain Arthur Newell
AGENCY PERSONNEL AT NWC
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 Approved JRakaa.s.e ''Il'l"
finally
recovered from a bout
with pneumonia--and here
is the promised Lecture
Information Sheet.
Although this still
leaves a It of latitude,
I hope it will suffice
to get the speech writers
started in the right
direction.
If I can be of any
additional assistance,
please call: 401-841-
2528/2562.
R.E.Smith
CDR, USN
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Study: NATIONAL STRATEGY STUDY
Lecture Title: "THE CIA"
Scope: To examine the Central Intelligence
Agency's responsibilities for coordinating and pro-
ducing world-wide intelligence. A description of the
collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence,
with particular emphasis on the efforts required to
wupport the White House, DOD or State on specific
foreign policy issues. An assessment of the CIA's
contribution to the development of U.S. National
Strategy.
Relationship to curriculum: This lecture is one of
the series that supports the study of the USA. It is ~~
preceeded by a lecture "Establishment and Campus Views."
The lecture following is the "Role of Modern Jornalism",
an examination of the role of the media in the formulation
of U.S. policy.
Specific Area of Interest:
1. Does an overlapping of functions exist between
the various intelligence agencies?
2. Does the CIA's involvement in clandestine
operations present the danger of a conflict with its
responsibilities for objective intelligence?
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NAVAL AWADRECOLSS
4 NOVEMBER 1970
ADMIRAL COLBERT, GENTLEMEN:
A FORMER SENATOR WHO KNEW A GREAT DEAL ABOUT
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BUT NEVER DISCUSSED
THEM--ONCE EXPLAINED TO HIS CONSTITUENTS THAT IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY LIKE OURS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INFORM
THE PUBLIC WITHOUT INFORMING OUR ENEMIES, WHO MAKE
IT A PRACTICE TO READ OUR NEWSPAPERS VERY CAREFULLY.
THAT IS WHY I WELCOME OPPORTUNITIES LIKE THIS
INVITATION TODAY TO SPEAK TO YOU IN CLOSED FORUM,
PARTICULARLY ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY FORMULATION.
OUR CRITICS ARE NEITHER HAMPERED BY SECURITY
REGULATIONS, NOR RESTRAINED BY FEAR THAT WE MIGHT
REFUTE THEM WITH FACTS. IF WE WERE TO BEGIN TO REPLY
WITH SOME RELATIVELY HARMLESS ANSWERS, THE QUESTION
OF JUST WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE AND SHUT UP MIGHT BE
EVEN MORE DAMAGING THAN THE ORIGINAL CRITICISM, SO
WE JUST HAVE TO LIVE WITH SOME HIGHLY IMAGINATIVE
DESCRIPTIONS OF OUR WORK.
SECRET
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WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS VITAL
THAT WE ALL HAVE A CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE UNDER-
STANDING OF THE EXACT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT--
SPECIFICALLY, HOW INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS THE POLICY-
MAKER, AND HOW THE POLICY-MAKER CONTROLS INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES.
THE FACT THAT YOU GENTLEMEN HAVE BEEN CHOSEN
TO ATTEND THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IDENTIFIES YOU AS OF-
FICERS WHO ARE GOING TO BE DOING A CONSIDERABLE
AMOUNT OF JOINT STAFF AND JOINT COMMITTEE WORK IN
YOUR FUTURE CAREER ASSIGNMENTS. A SUBSTANTIAL POR-
TION OF YOUR DUTIES WILL INVOLVE SPECIAL TASK FORCES
AND INTER-AGENCY GROUPS WHERE YOU WILL BE WORKING
WITH--AND POSSIBLY EVEN FOR--THE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY.
ACCORDINGLY, I THINK IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU1
TO YOUR SERVICES, AND TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ITSELF, TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT, THE ORGANIZATION,
AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN OUR
GOVERNMENT WHICH WORK TOGETHER TO PRODUCE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
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FIRST. I AM GOING TO DISCUSS THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THEN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY-
MAKERS. AND FINALLY THE CONTROLS UNDER WHICH INTEL-
LIGENCE OPERATES.
THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION ABOUT
THE TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY," WHICH IS SIMPLY
A HANDY WAY OF REFERRING TO ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH COLLECTING.
ANALYZING. AND DISSEMINATING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
IT IS A FRAMEWORK--FORMALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD--WITHIN WHICH ALL OF THESE COM-
PONENTS CAN WORK TOGETHER.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 DID NOT
CREATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT. WE HAD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS--AND GOOD
ONES. TOO--IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. BEFORE THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED. OUR
GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING INTELLIGENCE FROM THE ARMY
AND THE NAVY, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. AND THE FBI,
AND THESE SAME ORGANIZATIONS ARE STILL PROVIDING IT.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE
INVESTIGATIONS OF THAT BLACK DAY SHOWED THAT THE
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NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE WAS THERE. IT HAD BEEN
GATHERED. BUT THE FAILURE WAS THAT ALL OF THE BITS
AND PIECES IN THE HANDS OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT WERE NOT PUT TOGETHER, AND EVALUATED,
AND COORDINATED, AND DISSEMINATED 11(,.TIME TO THE
PEOPLE WHO NEEDED THE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO TAKE
PROPER ACTION.
THE OBVIOUS REMEDY WAS TO ENSURE THAT OUR IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORK TOGETHER, EXCHANGE AND
COMPARE INFORMATION, AND PROVIDE THE MEN WHO HAVE
TO MAKE THE DECISIONS WITH THE BEST COMBINED, AGREED
INTELLIGENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE. IN A NUTSHELL, THIS
IS THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
CONCEPT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
WHEN THE ARMED SERVICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, AND CIA, AND THE FBI ARE ALL ENGAGED IN
COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE, ANY GOOD BUREAUCRAT CAN TELL
YOU THAT THERE ARE TWO GREAT DANGERS:
THE FIRST AND GREATEST IS THAT SOME VITAL AS-
SIGNMENT WILL FALL BETWEEN THE STOOLS--THAT EACH
AGENCY WILL THINK SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY.
THE OTHER DANGER IS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT--AND
THIS IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF EXTRAVAGANCE. IN
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THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, UNCOORDINATED EFFORTS
AGAINST THE SAME TARGET CAN LEAD TO DISASTERS.
To COPE WITH BOTH OF THESE PITFALLS--TO ENSURE
ENOUGH COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NEITHER
IMPORTANT GAPS NOR UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION--THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL
ORDERS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TWO
RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD OF THE CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH HAS THE STATUTORY
FUNCTION OF PRODUCING COORDINATED NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE. HE IS ALSO, BY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE, THE
PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT.
HE GUIDES AND COORDINATES ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES--
ANYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT--RELATING TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE
ACTS AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE PRES-
IDENT.
TURNING TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, THE FIRST ELEMENT MOST PEOPLE THINK OF
IN THIS CONTEXT IS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
SECOND, THERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WHICH REPORTS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND--
THROUGH THE JOINT CHIEFS--TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
SECRET
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THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR
FORCE CONTINUE TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
RESPECTIVE SERVICES. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, THE THREE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ARE
CLOSELY COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.
THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE--THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND
RESEARCH--WHICH SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
HIS POLICY PLANNERS. ALL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL
ARE INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS IN A SENSE, BUT THERE IS
ALSO A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY THEM-
SELVES PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT INFORMA-
TION, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS AN INTELLI-
GENCE COMPONENT WITH A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED
TO THE VITAL FIELD OF INFORMATION ABOUT NUCLEAR
ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS.
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IS CON-
CERNED PRIMARILY WITH INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT THE
CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE IS OBVIOUS1 SO THE FBI1 TOO, IS A MEM-
BER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI AND THE
CIA WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH
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COMBATTING AN OPPONENT WHOSE OPERATIONS AND WHOSE
AGENTS MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR BOUND-
ARIES OR NATIONALITIES.
THOSE, THEN, EXCEPT FOR THE NSA WHICH IS IN A
UNIQUE CATEGORY, ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, DIA AND THE SERVICE
COMPONENTS, STATE, AEC, AND FBI.
ROUNDING OUT THE PICTURE OF THE COMMUNITY,
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS--
ACTIVITIES WHICH SERVE THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT RATHER
THAN ANY PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. ONE AGENCY
MAY MANAGE THEM, AND EVEN PROVIDE MOST OF THE PERSONNEL
AND EQUIPMENT, BUT THEY ACTUALLY OPERATE DIRECTLY
FOR THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE OLDEST AND LARGEST OF THESE IS THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY, WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ITS COLLECTION COMPONENTS,
SCATTERED ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARE PROVIDED BY THE
ARMED SERVICES.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY PRESI-
DENTIAL DESIGNATION, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB--AND
THIS, BY THE WAY, IS ONE PLACE WHERE THE DIRECTOR'S
TWO JOBS--OR HIS "TWO HATS"--ARE VERY CAREFULLY DIF-
FERENTIATED. WHEN HE CHAIRS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
BOARD, HE IS THERE AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL IN-
TELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS THE HEAD OF CIA. USIB
ACTS ON AND APPROVES THE AGREED, COORDINATED JUDG-
MENTS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND IT
WOULD NOT BE PROPER OR EFFECTIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CHAIR THE MEETING AND TO PRESENT
THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. FOR
THIS REASON, CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE
BOARD IN THE PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE:
THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH;
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY;
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC; AND
THE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI,
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SINCE THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER
DIA IN THE PENTAGON, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE
ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE,
BUT AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF
USIB. THEY RETAIN THE RIGHT, AND IN FACT THE DUTY,
TO EXPRESS ANY DISSENT THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS
UNDER DISCUSSION. IF YOU HAVE SEEN THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WITH THEIR FOOTNOTES, YOU
KNOW THAT THIS IS A RIGHT THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO
EXERCISE.
USIB MEETS REGULARLY ONCE A WEEK--SOMETIMES
MORE OFTEN. IT IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY
OF MATTERS, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE
THAT USIB OPERATES AS AN ADVISORY BODY TO THE DIREC-
TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THERE ARE THREE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.
FIRST, THE USIB ESTABLISHES--AND PERIODICALLY
REVIEWS--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLI-
GENCE TARGETS, AND IN RECOMMENDING ASSIGNMENT OF
ASSETS TO COVER THOSE TARGETS.
SECOND, THE USIB CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWS OUR FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
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THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THOSE PRIORITIES, AND TO
MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
CLOSE IMPORTANT GAPS, AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY
DUPLICATION. PLEASE NOTE THAT I HAVE MODIFIED THE
WORD "DUPLICATION" EACH TIME I HAVE USED IT. WHEN
WE ARE TRYING TO GET HOLD OF THE OTHER FELLOW S
SECRETS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY,
A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION IS NOT ONLY DESIR-
ABLE, BUT EVEN MANDATORY FOR THE SAKE OF CONFIRMA-
TION.
THIRD, THE USIB REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN
GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS
TO THE PRESIDENT.
THE ACTUAL WORK OF DRAFTING AND RE-WORKING
THESE PAPERS IS GENERALLY DONE IN THE OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH IS A PART OF CIA, BUT
THE FINAL PRODUCT IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTI-
MATE, AND MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CONSIDERED
JUDGMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THIS IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL
APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH THE
CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE REVIS-
ING OF THE PAPERS IN DRAFT, AND BY THE USIB REVIEW
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OF THE FINAL PRODUCT. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTI-
MATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS
WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE
TO THE POLICY-MAKER.
I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE MEN ENGAGED IN
ARRIVING AT AN ESTIMATE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR UNA-
NIMITY PER SSE. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE
UNANIMITY BY OVERRIDING THE DISSENTING MINORITY,
OR BY WATERING DOWN THE ESTIMATE TO THE LEAST
COMMON DENOMINATOR--A NARROW AREA OF COMPLETE AGREE-
MENT BY THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SUCH
UNANIMITY, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO THE
POLICY-MAKER AND THE PLANNER.
WHAT US ASKED IS THAT THE DISSENTS SHALL BE
BASED ON HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER HOW THE
AVAILABLE FACTS ARE TO BE EVALUATED AND INTERPRETED--
NOT ON PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, HUNCHES, OR PAROCHIAL
INTERESTS. WITHIN THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE, WE EN-
COURAGE WELL-FOUNDED DISSENTS.
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I REFERRED
TO A BIT EARLIER, DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION. UNTIL THE
BRITISH RECENTLY MOVED TO SET UP A SIMILAR GROUP, THE
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WAS THE ONLY INSTITUTION
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OF ITS KIND IN ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WE KNOW OF.
AS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL BEDELL SMITH WHEN HE WAS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1950, IT IS A
BODY OF SENIOR, KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN OF VARIED EXPERI-
ENCE, WHO HAVE NO OTHER DUTY THAN TO STUDY AND SEEK
ANSWERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY. THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF ABOUT FIFTEEN
MEN WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDS IN THE MILITARY, DIP-
LOMATIC, LEGAL, ACADEMIC, AND INTELLIGENCE PROFES-
SIONS. THEIR SOLE FUNCTION IS TO HEAR AND CONSIDER
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT FROM THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE THEN PRESENTED TO
THE DIRECTOR AND TO USIB, AND NORMALLY HAVE GREAT
WEIGHT IN THE ESTIMATES THE DIRECTOR SUBMITS TO THE
PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL
IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY.
A WORD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES THEMSELVES.
SINCE NOVEMBER 3RD OF 1950, WHEN THE FIRST NIE WAS
ISSUED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN
THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER, SOME ELEVEN HUNDRED
ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PREPARED. THEIR SCOPE AND TIME-
FRAME HAVE BECOME STEADILY MORE EXTENSIVE OVER THE
YEARS, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THEIR SUBJECTS HAS GROWN.
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SOME ESTIMATES STILL DEAL WITH THE OUTLOOK FOR INDI-
VIDUAL COUNTRIES: THESE ARE USUALLY ABOUT COUNTRIES
WHICH HAVE ALREADY BECOME HOT SPOTS, OR ARE LIKELY
TO CAUSE SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE
YEARS. MANY NIEs, HOWEVER, NOW CONSIDER BROADER
PROBLEMS AND TRENDS WHICH CUT ACROSS NATIONAL BOUND-
ARIES--FOR EXAMPLE, SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM,
SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN, OR ItiE.
POTENTIAL FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA.
THE ESTIMATES ON SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE
MILITARY MATTERS ARE A CASE ALL TO THEMSELVES. THESE
HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF HARD EVIDENCE
AND HAVE LOOKED FURTHER AHEAD THAN MOST OTHER ESTIMATES--
USUALLY FIVE YEARS. BEGINNING THIS FALL, THEY WILL BE
MUCH MORE DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE THAN BEFORE--AND
COMPLETE WITH TECHNICAL APPENDICES AND ALTERNATE INTER-
PRETATIONS OF KEY DATA. THE TIMING OF THESE MILITARY
NIEs WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEYED TO THE PLANNING CYCLE
FOR OUR U.S. DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS.
YET ANOTHER TYPE, THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTIMATE, OR SNIE, INCLUDES A. HOC PAPERS ON
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EX-
PECTED REACTION TO SOME PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION BY
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THE U.S. THEREFORE, THE SNIEs MAY GET INTO SOME
PRETTY SENSITIVE AREAS.
OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD
ARE CARRIED ON BY COMMITTEES WITH SPECIALIZED FUNC-
TIONS. SOME OF THEM ARE REGULAR STANDING COMMITTEES,
SUCH AS THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMIT-
TEE, WHICH FOLLOWS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION, FRANCE, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES
WITH THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING NUCLEAR POWERS. A
SIMILAR COMMITTEE, THE GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRO-
NAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, CONCENTRATES ON
FOREIGN SPACE AND MISSILE ACTIVITY.
THEN THERE ARE A NUMBER OF &a UK COMMITTEES
TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC CRISES OR RECURRENT HEAD-
ACHES--A BERLIN COMMITTEE, AN ARAB-ISRAELI COMMIT-
TEE, TAIWAN STRAIT COMMITTEE, TO GIVE YOU SOME EX-
AMPLES OUT OF THE PAST.
THE WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES IN-
TELLIGENCE BOARD CONCENTRATES ON THE HIGHLY SPE-
CIALIZED FIELD THAT WE CALL INDICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE. THERE IS LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON A FULL-
TIME ACTIVITY KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS
CENTER, WHICH IS STAFFED JOINTLY BY THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. IT KEEPS TRACK OF POSSIBLE INDICATORS
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WHICH MIGHT GIVE US EARLY WARNING OF HOSTILE IN-
TENTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES.
THIS CENTER AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORT
TO THE WATCH COMMITTEE ON INDICATIONS WHICH MAY BE
SIGNIFICANT--OR ON THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT
INDICATORS. THE WATCH COMMITTEE HAS A REGULAR
WEEKLY MEETING, TIMED SO THAT THE CONCLUSIONS WILL
BE READY FOR THE WEEKLY USIB MEETING, BUT IN TIME
OF CRISIS THE WATCH COMMITTEE MAY MEET ONE OR MORE
TIMES A DAY.
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WOULD LIKE TO DE-
SCRIBE HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKES ITS CON-
TRIBUTION TO THE DECISION-MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT.
LET ME SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT WHEN IT COMES TO
DECISION-MAKING, IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE THAT
THE ONLY ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONE OF SUPPLYING
OBJECTIVE, SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. IT MAY BE HARD
FACT. IT MAY BE AN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION--THE BEST
JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION; OR IT MAY BE ESTIMATIVE--
AGAIN, A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF HOW THE SITUATION IS
LIKELY TO DEVELOP. THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS NEITHER
M&E. NOR ADVOCATE POLICY WHILE THEY ARE FUNCTIONING
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
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a
NOW. A MAN WHO SITS IN USIB AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN
AGENCY WHICH HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY FORMULA-
TION MAY WELL LEAVE THE USIB CONFERENCE ROOM OUT AT
CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY, GO BACK TO HIS OWN OFFICE.
AND ENGAGE IN A MEETING AT WHICH THE POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF HIS DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY ARE FORMULATED. As
LONG AS HE IS SITTING IN USIB, HOWEVER, HE IS NOT A
POLICY-MAKER.
THE ANCIENT GREEK POLICY MAKERS USED TO GET
THEIR ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DELPHIC
ORACLE. SOME OF THESE ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
FOR US BY THE HISTORIANS AND PLAYWRIGHTS OF THE
TIME, AND THEY OFFER A TEMPTING PATTERN. THEY WERE
SO WORDED THAT NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENED. THE ORACLE
COULD LATER CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN RIGHT. THE GIMMICK.
OF COURSE. WAS THAT EACH PREDICTION PERMITTED AT
LEAST TWO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE INTERPRETATIONS--
A SAFETY MECHANISM OUR MODERN CUSTOMERS WILL NOT
TOLERATE.
THE ORACLE HAD, HOWEVER. DISCOVERED THE BASIC
ESSENTIAL FOR AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: CREDIBILITY.
AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS NO VALUE, NO PURPOSE.
AND NO FUTURE, IF IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT
SERVES.
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THIS IS WHAT DICTATES THAT AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE SHALL ONLY SUPPORT--NOT PARTICIPATE IN--
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS,
SUPPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS
FACE A CHOICE BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B: INTEL-
LIGENCE WILL ONLY PROVIDE THE FACTS--AND THE WHOLE
RANGE OF KNOWN FACTS--RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE.
INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE
OTHER. THE MOMENT INTELLIGENCE ADVOCATES COURSE A,
THE PROPONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT--
IF NOT BELIEVE--THAT INTELLIGENCE HAS RIGGED ITS
REPORTING TO SUPPORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY
GOES OUT THE WINDOW.
THE ESTIMATIVE FUNCTION, OF COURSE, INCLUDES
CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS,
POSED BY THE POLICY-MAKERS, AS TO THE PROBABLE CON-
SEQUENCES OR REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES
OF ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES, THIS IS INDEED THIN
ICE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND I MUST AD-
MIT THAT THE RESPONSIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE SOMETIMES
SO CLEAR-CUT AND SO DEFINITIVE THAT THEY ARE TANTA-
MOUNT TO TACIT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. A WEATHER
FORECAST OF RAIN IS OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS ALSO IN
EFFECT A TACIT RECOMMENDATION TO TAKE A RAINCOAT.
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THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, AT THE SPECIFIC
REQUEST OF THE POLICY-MAKER. THE CONCLUSIONS ARE
BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ALL THE FACTS
AVAILABLE. RIVAL ADVOCATES AMONG THE POLICY-MAKERS
CAN ALWAYS CHECK WITH THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE REPRE-
SENTATIVES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE QUESTION HAS BEEN
GIVEN OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTI-
MATIVE PROCESS.
MY POINT IS THAT IF THERE IS CONTROVERSY OVER
WHAT THE U.S. POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE,
THE OPPOSING ADVOCATES MUST HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE
OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE
FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY
ONLY IF IT NEVER ENGAGES IN ADVOCACY.
SO FAR, I HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE CONTENTION
OF OUR CRITICS THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--AND
CIA IN PARTICULAR--SOMEHOW "MAKES" POLICY FOR THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THERE REMAINS THE ALLE-
GATION THAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATES WITHOUT ANY CON-
TROLS, THAT IT MAKES AND IMPLEMENTS ITS OWN POLICY,
SOMETIMES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROFESSED POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES.
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THIS IS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY: THE CONTROLS WHICH
THE POLICY-MAKERS--THE ELECTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT--HAVE AND EXERCISE OVER EVEN THE
MOST SECRET OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT FUNCTIONS
WHICH. WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, ARE PECU-
LIAR TO CIA. I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY WHERE WE
GET OUR CHARTER FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, AND HOW THEY
ARE GENERATED, PLANNED, ORGANIZED, AND CONTROLLED.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 GAVE CIA FIVE
FUNCTIONS:
ONE, TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--
AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT--ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY;
Two, To SUPPORT AND ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE COORDINATION OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT;
THREE, To PRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE FINISHED NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT:
FOUR, To PROVIDE THOSE SERVICES OF COMMON CON-
CERN FOR INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN BEST BE UNDERTAKEN
CENTRALLY; AND
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FIVE, To PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.
FIVE PRESIDENTS AND 23 YEARS LATER, THE LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES A COUPLE OF BRIEF FOOTNOTES.
FOR ONE THING, IT IS OFTEN STATED THAT THE CIA
WAS CREATED TO COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT. STRICTLY SPEAKING, THIS IS NOT
CORRECT, THE ACT OF 1947 DIRECTED THE CIA TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
COORDINATION; THE CIA RECOMMENDED, AND THE NSC ORDERED,
THAT THIS COORDINATION WOULD BE EFFECTED BY THE DI-
RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INDIVIDUALLY, AS THE
PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. THIS
THE DIRECTOR DOES, TO A LARGE EXTENT THROUGH THE
USIB MACHINERY. TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER ASPECT OF CO-
ORDINATION, IN 1968 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTABLISHED A THREE-MAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES BOARD, CHAIRED BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ITS OTHER MEMBERS ARE THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ADMINISTRATION
(WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING DOD INTELLIGENCE),
AND THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IN A PERIOD WHEN INTELLIGENCE
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REQUIREMENTS APPEAR TO BE GROWING AND THE RESOURCES
TO DEAL WITH THEM SHRINKING AT ABOUT THE SAME BREAK-
NECK PACE, THIS BOARD HAS THE UNENVIABLE TASK OF
MATCHING RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ASSETS. THEIR RECOM-
MENDATIONS HELP THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO DETERMINE, ALONG WITH THE PROPER AUTHORITIES AT
DEFENSE AND STATE, THE MOST DESIRABLE AND ECONOM-
ICAL METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.
FINALLY, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HAS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH A SMALL BUT
EXPERIENCED STAFF WITHIN CIA, ASSIGNED TO CONTINUING
REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE MAJOR NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE PROGRAMS. SO MUCH FOR THE MACHINERY OF COOR-
DINATION.
THE SECOND FOOTNOTE CONCERNS STATUTORY THEORY
AND PRACTICE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
PLACES THE CIA DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NATIONAL SECU-
RITY COUNCIL WAS CREATED BY STATUTE; IT IS LISTED
IN THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUALS; AND A SUC-
CESSION OF STATUTES HAS SPECIFIED ITS MEMBERSHIP.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ATTENDS AS AN
OBSERVER AND ADVISOR, NOT AS A MEMBER.
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THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT SUCCESSIVE PRES-
IDENTS HAVE DIFFERED IN THEIR USE OF THE NSC--DIF-
FERED FROM EACH OTHER, AND EVEN CHANGED CONCEPTS
WITHIN A PRESIDENTIAL TERM.
LEST ANYONE SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE CIA IS THERE-
FORE CONTROLLED ONLY BY A SOMETIMES INACTIVE OR DOR-
MANT BODY, LET ME STATE THAT WHETHER THE STATUTORY
NSC WAS MEETING DAILY, WEEKLY, OR INFREQUENTLY,
UNDER ANY GIVEN ADMINISTRATION, EACH PRESIDENT HAS
HAD CONTINUING MACHINERY WITHIN HIS CABINET OR HIS
WHITE HOUSE STAFF TO DEAL WITH NSC QUESTIONS, AND
THESE QUESTIONS HAVE INCLUDED CONTINUING CONTROL OVER
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
KITH THESE TWO FOOTNOTES ] LET US LOOK AT THE
ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF CIA ITSELF.
THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIA FALL INTO
THREE BROAD CATEGORIES:
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE:
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE; AND
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.
WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO DIVIDE CIA's INTELLI-
GENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES INTO THREE GROUPINGS THAT
REFLECT DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACQUISITION. THE FIRST
IS OVERT COLLECTION WHICH, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS,
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COVERS INFORMATION SECURED BY OPEN OR NONCLANDESTINE
MEANS. OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES THE MONITORING OF
FOREIGN RADIOS. SUCH AS RADIO MOSCOW. RADIO PEKING.
AND THE VOICE OF THE ARABS IN CAIRO. THIS IS DONE
BY THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE. WHICH
STILL ANOTHER TYPE OF OVERT COLLECTION CONSISTS
OF THE PROCUREMENT, THROUGH OPEN CHANNELS. OF FOREIGN
PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS. BOOKS, SCHOLARLY
JOURNALS. MAPS AND UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.
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SECURITY COMPARTMENTS. I AM SURE, THEREFORE, THAT
YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOT AN APPROPRIATE
SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION HERE.
THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS DISSEM-
INATION.
THIS INCLUDES BOTH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES PREPARED
SOLELY WITHIN CIA AND OTHERS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSIST-
ANCE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMU-
NITY.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE OF THE
LATTER TYPE. 0 ';OS C OF YO-~' --WHO__nn~. NOT NOT FAMILIAR -
T-~..
~C'~V/ ^c 7~ ~+
WITH THE Z'7`-FARE THE" BLUE C- VERE 7 PAPERSWHERE,
-1-N-E W TRY T9 1-nnv T NTTO__T [E_
AT- IS-GO-I-NG TO HAPPEN---1N E
flME PART I CULAR-T-OPI C ,
MA; I? ~- GOVER f~ I RL N~~ I-CS SUCH AS-,
"Tuc 913-TL$6K ?I 1_-COUNTRY A OR A_ B . "- - RE -' OO
--AND DEAL\WIT~I BROAD -TRENDS--AND -
EXPEGTE -LINES nF-P--O-L-4GY--IN.-TH-E_COIJ -AREA IN-
Q 'lSLOE C TT ON-,
..AN?TH?R GROUP ,G- -N S---AR?- MOR?
SOVIETMi-L- -AR-Y ESTABLI SHMENT_. _
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---KNOWLEDGE OF A SITUATION AND-_
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ARE BU I LT ON A SOLID -BASE-?_F--EV 1-D-ENtL-E ' TH-EY_:.. Go -"1` NT-O-
GREATER DETAIL AND G E N ER A l I- i -1O G-K A7 I -AD -TOW -PER-I-JD J-
USSR'T STRA1EGIC ATTACK FORGES, AIR DEFENSE CAPf BILL
T H R ANNUAL PAPERS ON THE E-TO P4 C-S -I-S-- I.i`I D-T OAS -
ASSESS T~-~REACTION IF T#E~, .
OF AG:FIQN BY THE ,--5- AS--"PURELY HYPOT-#ETI-CAL_
ON IMPr-ORTTANT QUESTQUEST-IONS-OF-THE -MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EX-
LP-ECT- D REAGTI$NTO -- ME PROPOSED--BUT AS YET---UfdA-PPf OVF_D--
C T MATE, OR SNIE, #H 6 GOMPOS?D OF An tnr PAPE- .5._
,ff-- SOME--FORE--JGN #Ob T-RY-.- .T-HE -S IE'- S
BY SOME POLICY-MAKER, As YOU.
S-.-GET-INTO SOME PRETTY SENSITIVE
LL OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE DRAFTED BY
THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WHICH IS PART OF
CIA. BUT THEY ARE TRULY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTI-
MATES. THEY MUST THEREFORE. REFLECT THE CONSIDERED
JUDGMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS
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IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL APPRO-
PRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH CONTRIBU-
TION OF FACTS AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE REVISING OF THE
PAPERS IN DRAFT, AND REVIEW BY THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
BOARD OF THE FINAL PRODUCT. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH
ESTIMATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS
WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO
THE POLICYMAKER AND PLANNER,(
THE NEXT CATEGORY OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE IS
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. MOST OF YOU ARE PROBABLY FA-
MILIAR WITH CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT IS DESIGNED
TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION MAKER IS WELL INFORMED
ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION
FROM ALL SOURCES, ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS
WHICH MAY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ALERT THE POLICY MAKER TO AN
INCIPIENT CRISIS. CIA MAINTAINS AN OPERATIONS CEN-
TER WHICH IS MANNED AROUND THE CLOCK SEVEN DAYS
A WEEK. THIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ALERT OUR PEOPLE
TO PRODUCE SPOT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OR TAKE AP-
PROPRIATE ACTION ON A 24-HOUR BASIS IN CRITICAL
SITUATIONS. THE OPERATIONS CENTER IS ALSO CONNECTED
BY RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL
MILITARY COMMAND CENTER AND THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS
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CENTER IN THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OPERA-
TIONS CENTER AND THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.
THE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IS
TO MAINTAIN AN AROUND THE CLOCK INTELLIGENCE COMMU-
NITY WATCH FOR INDICATIONS OF FOREIGN PREPARATIONS
TO ATTACK THE U.S., ITS FORCES OVERSEAS, OR ITS AL-
LIES.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN COMPARED
TO A NEWSPAPER. I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE. CIA's CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS PRODUCED
BY A GROUP OF ANALYSTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR
FIELDS AND WHO HAVE ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION OPEN
TO THEM, INCLUDING EXPERTS IN SPECIALIZED DISCIPLINES
SUCH AS ECONOMICS, FOREIGN TRADE, OR TECHNICAL WEAP-
ONS DEVELOPMENTS. CIA's CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS
DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPE-
CIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS
TOPICS.
ANOTHER TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION COMPRISES
THE RESEARCH STUDY. THESE STUDIES COVER A WIDE VA-
RIETY OF TOPICS--FOR EXAMPLE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THE OIL INDUS-
TRY IN IRAN,
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THE STUDIES ARE OFTEN PRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO SPE-
CIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARIES
OF STATE AND DEFENSE, OR THEIR SENIOR OFFICERS.
FINALLY, OUR PRODUCTION INCLUDES WHAT WE CALL
BASIC INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A DURABLE TYPE OF BREAD-
AND-BUTTER FACT YOU FIND IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY--THE RAILROAD SYSTEM, THE CAPACITY OF THE PORTS,
THE POLICE MACHINERY, THE MILITARY FORCES OF A PAR-
TICULAR COUNTRY. AS THE NAME IMPLIES, THE NIS IS
THE RESULT OF A WIDE COLLABORATION OF DIFFERENT
PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE FIFTH FUNCTION ASSIGNED
TO CIA WAS TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT. THIS IS OUR
CHARTER FOR COVERT ACTIONS, THE THIRD GENERAL CATEGORY
OF CIA ACTIVITIES. I PROPOSE TO TELL YOU WHY THEY ARE
NECESSARY, AND HOW THEY ARE CONTROLLED.( I WILL LEAVE
IT UP TO YOU, IF YOU WISH, TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE
IS. OR SHOULD BE. OR COULD BE, SOME OTHER AGENCY OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHERE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES MIGHT
BETTER BE ASSIGNED.
IN THE "COLD WAR," WHICH HAS EXISTED LONGER THAN
THERE HAS BEEN A CIA, WE FACE AN ENEMY ADEPT AT CON-
SPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, WITH WORLD-WIDE CLANDESTINE
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ASSETS, SKILLED AGENTS, AND NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT UN-
DERMINING OR OVERTHROWING ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH RESISTS
THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM.
THERE ARE APT TO BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IM-
PORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO COUNTER
THESE COMMUNIST EFFORTS, TO HAVE ITS OWN CAPABILITY
TO RESPOND BY COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.
THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE ASHAMED OF EITHER THE OBJECTIVES OR THE
METHODS, IT IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT SOMETIMES TAKES
CLANDESTINE METHODS TO BEAT CLANDESTINE METHODS--
JUST AS A KILLER SUBMARINE IS ONE OF THE BEST WEAP-
ONS TO USE AGAINST ANOTHER SUBMARINE.
THIS IS THE SHADOWY, TWILIGHT ZONE OF GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS THAT CONGRESS HAD IN MIND WHEN IT DIRECTED
CIA TO PERFORM "SUCH OTHER SERVICES" AS THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT DIRECT.
OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER
SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA HAS
DONE AS IT PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFICIAL POLI-
CIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLI-
CIES.
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WHENEVER THE CIA CARRIES OUT A COVERT OPERATION
OVERSEAS, IT IS WITH THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF A SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
EACH COVERT OPERATION WHICH THE AGENCY PROPOSES
THIS COMMITTEE. IT EITHER WINS THE APPROVAL OF THE
COMMITTEE, OR IT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE.
WHEN COVERT OPERATIONS ARE APPROVED IN ADVANCE
BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY
OF STATE, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IT IS OBVI-
OUS THAT THESE OPERATIONS ARE NOT GOING TO BE CON-
TRARY TO--OR OUTSIDE OF--THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED
BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY.
OUR UNDERTAKINGS MUST ALSO HAVE THE APPROVAL
OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. CERTAIN OF-
FICIALS OF THAT BUREAU HAVE BEEN GIVEN FULL CLEARANCE
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TO INQUIRE INTO ALL OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN DETAIL--AND BELIEVE ME, THEY
MAKE FULL USE OF THAT AUTHORITY. 0
w
IN ADDITION TO SUCH PRIOR APPROVALS, THERE ARE
OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH HAVE
THE SAME FULL CLEARANCE TO MONITOR OUR CONTINUING
OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT POST-MORTEMS ON THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
SOME OF THESE HAVE BEEN A. HOC GROUPS--SUCH
AS THE CLARK COMMITTEE, THE DOOLITTLE COMMITTEE, AND
THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCES.
ON A PERMANENT BASIS, ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE UNDER THE
CONTINUING SCRUTINY OF THE PRESIDENTS FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. THIS BOARD WAS FORMED
IN JANUARY 1956, UNDER DR. JAMES KILLIAN OF M.I.T.
IT IS NOW HEADED BY RETIRED ADMIRAL GEORGE W. ANDER-
SON. IT IS A VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ASSEMBLAGE OF DIS-
TINGUISHED PRIVATE CITIZENS, APPOINTED BY AND REPORT-
ING TO THE PRESIDENT. IT MEETS FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS
EVERY TWO MONTHS TO EXAMINE--IN DEPTH AND IN DETAIL--THE
WORK, THE PROGRESS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE ENTIRE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. BETWEEN REGULAR MEETINGS,
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SUBCOMMITTEES CARRY ON CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS
OF OUR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN INTELLIGENCE.
OVER THE YEARS, THE BOARD MEMBERSHIP HAS NOR-
MALLY BEEN A MIXTURE OF RETIRED SENIOR OFFICERS FROM
BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BRANCHES OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, FIGURES FROM THE ACADEMIC WORLD, AND PROMI-
NENT LEADERS IN BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY.
THE PRESENT BOARD INCLUDES GOVERNOR NELSON
ROCKEFELLER; AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, THE FORMER
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; MR. FRANK PACE, JR., FORMER
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET;
MR. GORDON GRAY, WHO WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPE-
CIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; DR.
WILLIAM O. BAKER OF BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES; DR.
EDWIN Lam, HEAD OF POLAROID; DR. FRANKLIN D. MURPHY,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE Los ANGELES TIMES-MIRROR;
AND MR. FRANKLIN B. LINCOLN, JR., OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S
LAW FIRM OF MUDGE, ROSE, GUTHRIE & ALEXANDER.
WE ARE NOT ONLY UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WE ARE ALSO UNDER THE CONTINUING
SCRUTINY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.
EVER SINCE CIA WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, THE Di-
RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
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BY THE PRESIDENT, AND IN FACT INSTRUCTED, TO MAKE
COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF CIA ACTIVITIES TO SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEES IN BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.
THE CONGRESS HAS CREATED SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND
SENATE TO HEAR THESE REPORTS.
ALSO, AS YOU MAY HAVE SURMISED FROM MY REFER-
ENCES TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OUR
OPERATIONS REQUIRE MONEY. OUR HEADQUARTERS ARE IN
LANGLEY, VIRGINIA, NOT AT FORT KNOX, AND OUR APPRO-
PRIATIONS REQUESTS ARE DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEES OF SENATE AND HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS.
SOME OF THE CONFUSION OVER CIA's RELATIONS WITH
CONGRESS ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THESE FOUR SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEES, AND ONLY THESE--ABOUT 30 LEGISLATORS
IN ALL--HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY THE PRESIDENT TO INQUIRE
IN DETAIL INTO OUR ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS.
WE WILL, OF COURSE, BRIEF ANY CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEE HAVING A JURISDICTIONAL INTEREST IN OUR SUB-
STANTIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. IN
THE COURSE OF A YEAR, THERE MAY BE 20 OR 30 SUCH
COMMITTEE HEARINGS--AND SOME OF THEM RUN AS LONG AS
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THREE FULL DAYS. WE ALSO BRIEF INDIVIDUAL CONGRESS-
MEN FREQUENTLY AT THEIR REQUEST.
BUT DISCUSSION OF CIA ACTIVITIES, METHODS, AND
SOURCES IS ANOTHER MATTER. IT INVOLVES THE LIVES OF
PEOPLE WHO WORK WITH US1 AND THE EFFICACY OF OUR
METHODS. THESE MATTERS ARE DISCUSSED ONLY WITH THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES DESIGNATED FOR THESE PURPOSES.
THIS IS NOT ARBITRARY OR BUREAUCRATIC; IT IS SIMPLY
RECOGNITION THAT THE RISK OF INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
RISES WITH THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO
SENSITIVE INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE.
WHERE DISCLOSURE IS AUTHORIZED, IT IS COMPLETE.
WITH THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES,WE DISCUSS COVERT OP-
ERATIONAL MATTERS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS
WHICH ARE SO SENSITIVE THAT EVEN WITHIN CIA ONLY A
SMALL PERCENTAGE OF OUR PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO
BE INFORMED.
I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THE MEMBERS OF THESE
SUBCOMMITTEES, OVER THE YEARS, HAVE ESTABLISHED AN
ENVIABLE SECURITY RECORD, AND HAVE REPAID OUR CANDOR
WITH CONSTRUCTIVE AND WELCOME SUPPORT. ACCORDINGLY,
I CAN PERCEIVE NO CAUSE FOR TERROR IN THE SUGGESTION
THAT WE SHOULD REPORT TO WHAT THE PRESS LIKES TO CALL
A "JOINT WATCHDOG COMMITTEE." WE ALREADY DO.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS RE-
QUIRED BY STATUTE TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF U.S.
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS, BUT THE LAWS AND
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED THAT THE
DIRECTOR SHALL REPORT TO AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE CONGRESS. THE QUESTION OF WHO SHALL HEAR
THAT REPORT IS A MATTER FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF CON-
GRESS TO DECIDE. OUR ONLY OBJECTION TO THE DEMANDS
FOR A WATCHDOG COMMITTEE IS THE COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS
IMPLICATION THAT THERE IS NO SUCH MACHINERY AT PRESENT.
SO MUCH, THEN, FOR THE CHARGE THAT CIA IS UNDER
NO CONTROLS, AND THAT NOBODY IN WASHINGTON IS TOLD
WHAT CIA IS DOING.
~
EN7-IML n~TEt41 rs tlfyC e-
AS Foil r~ tFC'r~n, QC A z r[a,y ~~= _111f
c- LNC7 CIA IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR PRINCIPAL GROUPINGS--
REFERRED TO AS DIRECTORATES--AND SEVERAL STAFF OR
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, THE HEADS OF WHICH REPORT DIRECTLY
TO THE DIRECTOR. AN EXAMPLE OF THE LATTER IS THE
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WHICH I REFERRED TO
EARLIER.
NOW FOR THE DIRECTORATES, THE DDI, OR INTELLI-
GENCE DIRECTORATE, IS THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCER OF
FINISHED SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. THE DIRECTOR-
ATE OF INTELLIGENCE ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERT
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.
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THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER,
WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER, IS ADMINISTERED BY THE
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH
THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND IS JOINTLY STAFFED
BY THE TWO AGENCIES. AS THE NAME SUGGESTS. THE NPIC
EXAMINES FILMS IN DETAIL AND ANALYZES AND INTERPRETS
THE PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER IMAGERY. THE WORK OF THE
NPIC FEEDS INTO AND SUPPORTS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY.
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THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS
THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES, INCLUDING R&D FOR TECHNICAL COLLECTION OPERA-
TIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLI-
GENCE ON THE S&T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS.
THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR CENTRAL ELECTRONIC
COMPUTER CENTER.
THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE,
WHICH EMBRACES THE SUPPORT SERVICES, SUCH AS SECURITY,
COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, PERSONNEL, FINANCE, LOGIS-
TICS, PRINTING AND THE HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS.
FINALLY, IF I MAY, I WANT TO DEVOTE A FEW MO-
MENTS TO THE TYPES OF PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR THE CIA.
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT JAMES BOND AND
HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE SPY MOVIES AND NOVELS NEVER
WORKED THERE.
A COMMENTARY IN THE LONDON ECONOMIST,. DISCUSS-
ING THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, MAKES MY
POINT PRETTY WELL WITH THIS SUMMARY: "MODERN IN-
TELLIGENCE HAS TO DO WITH THE PAINSTAKING COLLECTION
AND ANALYSIS OF FACT, THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT, AND
CLEAR AND QUICK PRESENTATION. IT IS NOT SIMPLY WHAT
SERIOUS JOURNALISTS WOULD ALWAYS PRODUCE IF THEY
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HAD TIME; IT IS SOMETHING MORE RIGOROUS, CONTINUOUS,
AND ABOVE ALL OPERATIONAL--THAT IS TO SAY, RELATED
TO SOMETHING THAT SOMEBODY WANTS TO DO OR MAY BE
FORCED TO DO,"
THE CIA EMPLOYEE IS A MUCH MORE ACADEMIC MAN
THAN THE PUBLIC REALIZES. WE MAY HAVE A FEW MEN
WITH THE DEBONAIR APLOMB OF NAPOLEON SOLO, BUT WE
SENIOR PROFESSIONALS WITH 20 YEARS
OR MORE OF INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND. MORE THAN HALF
OF OUR OFFICERS SPEAK AT LEAST ONE FOREIGN LANGUAGE.
SOME 17 PERCENT HAVE GRADUATE DEGREES. SIX OUT OF
EVERY 10 OF THE ANALYSTS WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY
AT HEADQUARTERS FOR ANALYSIS OF A FOREIGN AREA HAD
LIVED, WORKED, OR TRAVELED ABROAD IN THAT AREA EVEN
BEFORE THEY CAME TO CIA.
WHEN YOU COMBINE ALL OF THE YEARS REQUIRED FOR
GRADUATE STUDY, FOREIGN EXPERIENCE, AND THEN ADD
10 TO 15 YEARS OF INTELLIGENCE WORK, IT AMOUNTS TO
AN IMPRESSIVE DEPTH OF KNOWLEDGE, COMPETENCE, AND
EXPERTISE AT THE SERVICE OF OUR GOVERNMENT. WE
COULD EASILY AND ADEQUATELY STAFF THE FACULTY OF A
UNIVERSITY WITH OUR EXPERTS.
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ANNEX
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR U.S. POLICY
UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES STARTS WITH A NATIONAL
SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM, OR NSSM.
THE NSSM ORIGINATES IN THE NSC STAFF UNDER DR.
HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHO STATES THE PROBLEM
AND OUTLINES WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, AND WHEN.
THE BASIC DOCUMENT IS DRAFTED, USUALLY BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, IN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP.
ONE OF THESE, CALLED THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP,
DEALS WITH PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS. THERE ARE
FIVE OTHERS BROKEN DOWN BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, WHICH
ARE IDENTICAL WITH WHAT WERE CALLED INTERDEPARTMENTAL
REGIONAL GROUPS IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION. THEY
ARE CHAIRED BY THE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE IS USUALLY THE AP-
PROPRIATE DIVISION CHIEF FROM OUR OPERATING SIDE,
THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, BUT HIS FUNCTION IS LIM-
ITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT.
THE NSSM ITSELF STATES THE PROBLEM, LAYS OUT
THE FACTS, AND THEN LISTS A SERIES OF OPTIONS, WITH
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PROS, CONS, AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT WITHOUT
MAKING A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AMONG THE OPTIONS.
WHEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP IS SATISFIED
WITH THE NSSM, IT IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AT A HIGHER
LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE POLICY, IT GOES TO
THE DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW GROUP, CHAIRED BY DR.
KISSINGER AND COMPRISING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE UN-
DER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS.
NSSMS WHICH ARE NOT PRIMARILY MILITARY GO TO
THE NSC SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, ALSO CHAIRED BY DR.
KISSINGER. THE DIRECTOR AND I ARE THE CIA REPRESENT-
ATIVES, AND OTHER MEMBERS ARE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES
FROM STATE, DEFENSE, AND JOINT CHIEFS, AND THE OF-
FICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING. THE HEAD OF USIA usu-
ALLY ATTENDS.
THE PAPER MAY SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AND THE REVIEW GROUP
SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED READY FOR
PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION. ULTIMATELY, IT COMES
BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DOCUMENT
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STATING A PROBLEM AND EVALUATING ALL THE POSSIBLE
COURSES OF ACTION IT IS A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH
STOPS SHORT OF MAKING A RECOMMENDATION; THE DECISION
IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT.
WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AROUND
THE LONG OVAL TABLE IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS USUALLY SEATED ALL BY HIM-
SELF AT ONE END OF THE TABLE, MAY I REPEAT--AS AN &a-
VISER. HE GENERALLY OPENS THE MEETING WITH A SHORT,
CONCISE BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE
SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.
Now, THERE HAS BEEN, AS I SAID, AN INTELLIGENCE
INPUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NSSM
PROCESS. IT COMES NOT ONLY FROM THE CIA PEOPLE ON
THE VARIOUS PANELS, BUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL INTEL-
LIGENCE COMPONENTS SUPPORTING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE OPERATING DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS DEFENSE AND STATE.
IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND
TO THE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS.
THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT, HOWEVER, IS ORIENTED
TO POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION, AND IT IS SUB-
ORDINATED TO A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.
THE DIRECTORS BRIEFING TO THE NSC, ON THE OTHER
HAND, IS ORIENTED TO THE PROBLEM--NOT TO THE ANSWERS--
AND I THINK IT IS RELEVANT TO OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
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DETACHMENT FROM POLICY THAT, WHILE WE ARE REPRESENTED
IN THE NSSM PROCESS BY OUR OPERATING AND COLLECTION
PEOPLE, THE DIRECTOR NORMALLY CALLS ON THE INTELLI-
GENCE PRODUCTION SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE OFFICE
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, TO HELP IN THE PREPARATION
OF HIS BRIEFING FOR THE NSC.
IN THE BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS,
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PARTICIPATES
ONLY WHEN HE IS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OR FOR SOME
ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE DETAIL. THERE IS, OF COURSE,
NOTHING LIKE A FINAL VOTE, AND THE PRESIDENT'S DE-
CISION NORMALLY IS MADE KNOWN AT SOME LATER POINT
IN A NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM DIRECTING
THE HEADS OF APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES TO
TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS.
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HF.CR FT
To SUM UP, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMPRISES ALL OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE VARIOUS AGENCIES AND
DEPARTMENTS, OPERATING UNDER THE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE
OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD, AND THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE PRINCIPAL
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENT.
ITS PRINCIPAL FUNCTION IS TO PROVIDE THE IN-
TELLIGENCE APPRECIATIONS WHICH THE DECISION-MAKERS
NEED IN ORDER TO FORMULATE POLICY, AND TO GIVE THEM
TIMELY WARNING AND EXPERT ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS
BEARING ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS POLICY--IT DOES NOT
FORMULATE IT.
THE AUTHORITY FOR COVERT AND CLANDESTINE IN-
?TELIGENCE ACTIVITIES COMES FROM THE PRESIDENT AND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THESE ACTIVITIES
ARE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL AND REVIEW BY APPROPRIATE
BODIES OF BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES,
I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AFTER
THE BREAK.
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