CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 April 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE gIJLLETII~f
11 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I4 THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In assessing. Soviet policy as the foreign min-"
isters con erence approaches Ambassador Thompson
concludes that Moscow~s principal objective is to gain We,3t-
ern acceptance of the Eastern European status quos to be
symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germanye
As for Adenauer?s decision to assume the presidency,
Thompson suggests that Soviet leaders will see this as pro-
viding opportunities for explaitation of those West German
political forces willing to "dicker" with Moscow and the lEsast
`German regime:
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Pakistan-India: The Pakistani Air Force on 10 April
shot down an In 'an Canberra jet bomber near Rawalpindi in
northern West Pakistan. Karachi states the aircraft wa.s inter-
cepted well inside Pakistani territory and ignored several
warnings to land. The two-man Indian crew .reportedly es-
caped" wit~~: injuries. The action is likely to produce sharp
political repercussions including mutual recrimination ,~,nd
heated press comment. The incident probably will retard cur-
rent efforts to ne otiate a settlement of the canal waters dis-
pute,
11 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Uru ayo The governing execu ve counci is con i -
ing breakplomatic relations with the USSR. Leaders
suppprting a break point to Argentina and Mexico's recent oust-
er off' Soviet diplomats accused of promoting- Communist agita-
tion~ and they cite similar activities in Uruguay. -The death
~~ on $ April of majority party chief Herrera who feared a break
would prejudice Uruguay?s increasingly important trade with the
Sino-Soviet bloc, will probably lessen apposition to such a move.
11 Apr 59
DAILY' BRIEF iii
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I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ambassador ompson's Views on Soviet Position in Negot.iation.~
Ambassador Thompson believes the U5SR's principal objet-
tive in forthcoming negotiations will be to achieve a result which
will amount to Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern
Europe to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East
Germanyo He suggests the USSR, in trying to accamplisli this,
will seek to inflict as much damage ~s possible on Western pres-
tige and unit
ri Thompson~s view, the USSR precipitated the Berlin crisis
I
~
in order to overcome Western resistance to top-level conferences
and to exert pressure on a very vulnerable Western positi~ono He
suggests that if the Soviet leaders succeed. in obtaining Western
acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and. East Germany,
they may agree to a new Berlin arrangement which will provide
the West with an "improved title" for remaining in West Berlin
and with better defined access rights4
e ambassador warns that failure to reach agreement on
Berlin will lead, at a minimum, to more active Soviet probing
and pressures on Allied and9 eventually, West German access to
Berlino While Thompson does not believe Khrushchev is sunder
any compelling domestic pressure to produce a victory} h.e em-
phasizes that the Soviet premier is in "deadly earnest" i,n "aim-
ing afatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging the exist-
ing boundaries of the Soviet empireb" At the same time, t:he
ambassador continues to believe there wil ,tee a strong S~~viet de-
sire to avoid, letting matters get out of hand,
~A's for Soviet tactics at the foreign ministers? conference,,
Thompson suggests that the Soviet representative, after stating
Moscow's established positions an a German peace treaty and
Berlin, may put forward "fall.-back" positions on individual ar-
ticles of the Soviet draft treaty, the specifics of the free-city
plans and the temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechoslo-
vakia and. Poland from the conferences Moscow's essentiia~
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"sticking pointx" howeverg will be over agreement to any 'West-
ern proposals which do not give substantial de facto recognition
to East Germany4
ompson feels the Soviet leaders believe Adenauer's
decision to seek the presidency has injected. new elements of
fluidity into the situation which will provide opportunities. for
Soviet exploitation of West German groups which may be will-
ing to abandon the West's long-standing policy on reunification
and "dicker" with the USSR and. East Germanyp
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Possible Repercussions of Indo-Pakistani Airplane Incident
The shooting down of an Indian Canberra jet bombex over
West Pakistan on 10 April will almost certainly renew the mu-
tual mistrust and suspicion which both Karachi and New Delhi
have shown a desire in recent months to diminish. The major
immediate result of the incident may be to make more diffi-
cult the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani canal waters dispute,
which is under negotiation with the assistance of the Wox~l.d
Bank.
The press in Pakistan seems likely to play up the "'gag-
gressive" attitude shown by Indian military forces in flying
over Fakistan, while the IiYdian press will note Pakistan?s
"aggressive" attitude in shooting down an unarmed plane. Po-
litical leaders may also try to capitalize on the issue to secure
tactical advantages or maintain a propaganda position?
If the Pakistani Air Force used American-supplied jet
fighters to sha~?t down the Canberrag New Delhi's long-standing
claim that American military aid. to Pakistan might well k~e
used against India will be strengthened. Similarly, Pakil~;tan
may also claim that the incident shows its continued need for
strong armed forces with up-to-date equipment. Both govern-
ments, however, may try to prevent the incident from inter-
faring seriously with over-all relations.
The incident is also likely te
Lion of the Indian public and govern
China?s suppression of the Tibetan
might have been maintained at a hi
mporarily to draw the atten-
ment away from Communist
revolt. Without it, feeling
gher pitch as the Dalai Lama
makes his wa toward. New .Delhi.
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Uruguay Considers freaking Relations With USSR
Uruguay's governing executive council is considering
breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR,
Some officials of the National party, which came to
power on 1 March, have expressed. concern over the extent
of Communist influence in Uruguay and over the large staffs
in the five bloc diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The Com-
munists thrived. under the lengthy incumbency of the last ruling
party.
The view previously voiced by some National party mem-
bers of the co~incil that Uruguay's serious financial problems
make bloc trade necessary for the short run may have lost
some support with the death on 8 April of the ruling party
chief, Dr. Herrera, who repartedly feared a break would
prejudice the increasingly important Sino-Soviet bloc trade.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
Tt-e Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under- Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Airector
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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