THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK QUESTIONS & ANSWERS TO WILLIAM E. COLBY BY HARRISON SALISBURY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500040001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

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The Economic Club of New York
Questions & Answers
to
William E. Colby
by
Harrison Salisbury
13 November 1974
HS: Mr. Colby, I think that probably in many American
minds is the feeling that the CIA is sort of an
invisible government.. .a sort of a phantom that looms
over the regular government. Perhaps you could explain
this a little bit--what is the actual relationship of
the CIA to the President and what is its function as
defined in the statutes?
WEC: With respect to the President, of course, there is
a piece of paper over my desk which says that I serve
at his pleasure and it is fairly simple. There are
institutional ways provided in the statute by which
he exerts that control over me. The statute says
that CIA will do certain things and it will do such
other functions and decisions related to the national
security asthe National Security Council may from time
to time direct. Now our activities are directed by the
National Security Council. Our responsibilities abroad
--our responsibilities for various kinds of collection
of foreign broadcasts and so forth--are all outlined
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(WEC) in a series of directives by the National Security
Council to me to carry out and I, of course, have
to report to the National Security Council through a
variety of committees, one of which you have heard
of particularly, called the Forty Committee, which is
a group of senior officials from the State, Defense
Departments, the National Security Council, before
whom I must justify and receive authority to do any
action in the so-called covert action field. Now
this does not mean that I set quietly until they
tell me what to do. I look around at a problem,
I come up with recommendations, but I get their approval
before I actually can go ahead and carry them out.
HS: In this conception of the CIA function, what are the
checks and balances? who really scrutinizes the
inscrutable there? Is it done within the Government
apparatus itself or does this only'occur in sub-
committees of Congress?
WEC: There are days in which I think I am very carefully
scrutinized, indeed, by the press, among others,
which I really don't have any objection to and which
I can't under our system. But, to start at the
top: the President obviously has to be satisfied
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(WEC) with what we are doing. He has appointed a Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board of twelve very distinguished
private citizens who meet every two months, hold
hearings, ask questions, do intelligence investigations.
A measure of their reputations can be gathered from
the fact that they include such gentlemen as Dr.
Teller, Dr. Edwin Land, Mr. Gordon Gray, Governor
Rockefeller, various other people and Mrs. Luce. These
are all members of this particular board and they look
into our affairs and they make recommendations to the
President about foreign intelligence and sometimes
they take issue and they say that we have not appreciated
a situation properly and we have had a few arguments,
which is fair enough. I then have to justify the position
we have taken.
With respect to our budgets, we are subject to the normal
Office of Management and Budget review of our budgets.
We have examiners who come in and examine our requests,
cut us, and the normal relationship of any department
conducted in a compartmented and secret way. But these
gentlemen work for the OMB and they have the problem
of squeezing our desires into their availabilities,
and so they consequently look around for what can be
cut satisfactorily.
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(WEC) With respect to the Congress, there are, by Congres-
sional establishment.. .a long time ago.. .two sub-
committees of the Armed Services. The reason it is
Armed Services is that CIA was set up in the National
Security Act and in the jurisdictional arrangements
in the Congress, this then carries on and gives them
authority for oversight and I appear before those.
We have a standing arrangement with both of these
committees. I call the Chairman of one every Monday
morning at 10:00 o'clock and tell him anything that
I think should be brought to his attention or arrange
a meeting during the week to discuss something. As
to the other, a formal hearing once every two weeks
and we then go up and tell them what we think is
going on in the world, and any problems that have
arisen in our operations. We also have the
Appropriations Committee where there are subcommittees
again and, of course, once a year we go to them and
describe our budget in great detail and depth and go
into any detail that they are interested in on that
subject. So in terms of the Congressional review, I
think it is very intense. It obviously has increased
in intensity in the past few years because, quite
frankly, in the early days of our Agency, the aura
of mystery and secrecy was around intelligence and
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(WEC) frequently the Congressmen themselves or the Senators
decided that they really didn't want to probe into
the secrets because they were afraid if they learned
them they might spill them. Actually, I have frequently
said that the record of the Congress at keeping our
secrets compares extremely favorably to that of the
Executive Branch. (Much laughter)
HS: Mr. Colby, there has been--I know you are aware--some
criticism of the actual work of these Congressional
committees, some allegations by some other members of
the Congress who are not on those committees and also
in the press, suggesting that you've tamed these
watchdogs so well that really they eat out of your
hands. I suppose you wouldn't agree with that evaluation.
WEC: Well, I have been subjected to some very sharp question-
ing by them and, believe me, some of those nice, soft,
Southern political leaders, they can be very good
county prosecutors, too. (Laughter)
.HS: I am wondering whether, in this system, what protections
are built into it against two phenomena: one is the
self-fulfilling prophecies which seems to me to be
a problem you must confront constantly; and then there is
the other thing where you have.an action program of
tilting the evidence in favor of something in which
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(Hs) the Agency has decided it wants to have approval
WEC:
on.
Those are very good questions. The first one is a
problem we frankly have to wrestle with because it is
true that people sit, look at the evidence, make
tentative estimates about what they mean and there is
a vit of a tendency to receive that additional item of
information and carefully fold it in to the pre-conceived
notion. There is no question about that: that that's
a danger and that quite frankly we have made intelli-
gence mistakes. As a result of that--I can think of a
rather prominent one. The fact is, however, that we
try to set ourselves up against that. We have a pro-
cedure by which the different agencies of the intelligence
community must consult on an estimate of some particular
situation and the man whois responsible for signals
intelligence will feel very strongly as to what his
particular evidence indicates, while the man who is
responsible for
say, "Oh, don't
have to consult
political intelligence, perhaps,
will
worry about it." The fact that you
on this, the fact that the final
estimate has to be mine, period, no others,-but that
I am obliged to present any substantially dissenting
opinions, does give the President, the National
Security Council, a different opinion and I have in
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(WEC) my bag one that we are working on tomorrow where
the number of different opinions in that particular
paper in question we are addressing, is such that
it is almost a little hard to follow the rationale of
the paper because the various departments and agencies
are differing.
On the second question about the question whether
engaged in an operation we then only see the things
that support it--this is a criticism that was made
with some justice on the Bay of Pigs: that the
operators who were in charge of the operation, to keep
t very carefully...very. secret.. .as they had to, and
the analysts didn't get a chance to be critival about
it. Our analysts did get a chance to be critical about
?the war in Vietnam and you have heard a little bit
about our position on that in which they were critical
of even steps taken at the highest level of our
Government. And that, I think, is a function of
intelligence: to take that intelligence assessment and
appraise it.
We do have it arranged that if we are engaged in some
covert action today, that this paper that goes up to
the National Security Council seeking approval to con-
duct the activity must he shown to the analytical side
of our Agency and I have had situations in which the
gentleman?one or two gentlemen?on that side of the
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(WEC) Agency have come up to me and said that they really
don't agree with this, that it didn't seem to make
sense, which then required me to review and think
about it.
HS: Several years ago I happened to be out in Honolulu and
'I was approached by the chief intelligence officer for
CINPAC out there who had a problem. He said that his
commander insisted that when he layed down his
intelligence analysis daily that he place beside that
a copy of the New York Times so that the commander
had the choice of the information that the intelligence
officer gave him and what was in the Times. (Laughter)
Now the problem which this officer had was that he
wanted to receive the New York Times by air mail. At
that time we had an edition...the only edition we
supplied air mail was the Paris edition...and he was
getting the Paris edition several days late and he
had to delay his intelligence estimates for that reason.
I arranged for him to get a New York copy flown out very
rapidly to help him with his problem. (Much laughter)
You don't have that problem. You have the Times
every day and the Washington Post also. (More laughter)
You think it a wise precaution for anyone before acting
on your analyses to take a check of these newspapers
as well? (Much laughter and applause)
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WEC: I would say that we not only use the New York Times
but we use a variety of other newspapers (laughter)
no, we have
of the press and
but particularly
the greatest respect for the function
what it does--sometimes against us--
in terms of trying to assess and
understand a foreign situation. We do
sources, some
sometimes the
difficult for
of.... (interrupted by
press
have additional
laughter) .however,
can get into things that are very
our people to get to and I think the whole
concept behind the establishment of CIA was not that
we would run a competing service, but that we would
profit by the contribution made by the press, add to it
the additional matters that cost us a lot of money to
get, subtract out of it what somebody has leaked to
the New York Times, and hopefully arrive at a better
total appraisal.
(Members of audience: "Very good!")
HS: I wonder if I could have one more question with Mr.
Colby? Most of your remarks and all my questions were
devoted to intelligence which is a field in which the
Agency has extraordinary high marks and those who had
(which)
a peak at the Pentagon Papers/shows that its record
in Vietnam was extremely good and, generally speaking,
it is very good. The criticism of the Agency is no secret
to you--it comes from the covert operations in many
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(HS) different countries and particularly in the outburst
. on Chile of late,(and)in very recent days we have had
Dr. Kissinger in India having to pledge, cross his
heart, to Madam Gandhi that you are not going to over-
turn her government or operate in India. We have had
a story in the Times...
WEC: (interrupted to say:) overturn her government. (Much
laughter
(Mr. Lichtblau: I missed that, what did he say?)
(HS: Overturn the government in India. Mr. L: Oh!)
HS ...had a story from Italy about the fears that the
CIA is going to do something dreadful and, and yet you
say that at the moment you practically phased out
clandestine activity. I think you were quoted...
WEC: Phased down
HS: ...phased it down and that you didn't think the heavens
would--didn't you say--tell Congress last spring that
the heavens wouldn't fall if you 'had to give it up
entirely...
.WEC: ...at this time...it wouldn't fall at this time.
(More laughter)
HS: You want to keep a hand in there? (Laughter)
WEC: I think it is important that we have the potential, yes.
HS: I have seen estimates that you have had sort of a
deluge of exposes of the CIA and some of your people
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(HS) are telling all and that sort of thing, suggesting
that actually in your budget the clandestine side is
taking the lion's share--four--fifths or something like
that--of your budget. Wouldn't that--if you were really
to phase it down--wouldn't that cut you back enormously?
WEC:. I think here you have to distinguish the differences
between what I call clandestine collection--which does
take a substantial amount--and the covert actions or
political operations that you're mentioning. It is the
latter that by reason of the change in the world today,
are at quite a low level. I don't say I was misquoted
at one time as saying that it had been stopped. That
is not so. There still are some, but at a very low
level in deference to the kind of world we live in
today, but again, I do say that this is an important
tool for our country to have available to it.
HS: May I squeeze in one question I have about the
Middle Eastern situation which I think most everyone
in this room is worried about? Is there anything
clandestine or unclandestine--you could tell us about
that?
WEC: Well obviously there are a lot of things you can talk..
would not refer to our operations. I cannot do that
in public, unfortunately, because they become known
to the various people who really don't think very well
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(WEC) ...but the fact is that the Middle East obviously
is a major problem to our country: it is a major
political problem; it is a major economic problem, it
is a major arena in which we have a problem to face
with the Soviet Union and consequently it is a very
?-important intelligence target for our assessments, for
our technical intelligence, for our overt collection
? through our Foreign Service Officers and through our
listening to radio broadcasts and through our clandestine
operations. No question about it. It is a very
important subject for our intelligence today.
HS: Would it be viblating your standards or principles
if I asked you whether or not you had accurately forecast
and predicted the Arab oil embargo?
WEC: The easiest thing...in the first place, in answer to
your basic question, and there are no indiscreet ques-
tions,. only indiscreet answers....(Much laughter)...
with respect to the Arab oil embargo, the easiest
thing for any intelligence officer to do after an
event is to reach down and find that one report
down here that said it was going to happen--that is
simple. The question really, however, is: were our
leaders alerted to this danger? I think I would give
us pretty good remarks on that but not perfect ones
by a long shot.
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HS: Do you have any predictions for the Middle East?
WEC: It is going to be a subject of great importance and
great difficulty to us...(Much laughter and applause).
End of Question and Answer Period.
Closing remarks and thanks by the Chairman.
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