THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010061-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: September 26, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
26 September 1966
No. 1603/66
Copy No. r)
THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELL IGENCE
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I ddwngroding and
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WARNING
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
Page
1
The Formation of the Front 3
The Manifesto's Ten Points 4
Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts 5
The People's Revolutionary Party 7
PRP Organization and Activity 8
Hanoi and the Liberation Front 10
Strength of the Front 11
The Front's Grass-Roots Structure 12
NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations 15
Front Propaganda Machinery 17
NFLSV Program Abroad 18
Recent Activities Abroad 20
Recognition Strategy 20
Additional NFLSV Goals 21
Forming a Provisional Government 22
25X1 ANNEX I
NFLSV Organization
ANNEX II
NFLSV Five-Point Statement
NFLSV Ten-Point Program
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 September 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Organization, Activities, and Objectives
Of the Communist Front in South Vietnam
Summary
The National Front for the Liberation of South'
Vietnam (NFLSV) is ostensibly a,democratic and inde-
pendent organization. In reality, it was established
by and receives its over-all guidance from North Viet-
nam. The NFLSV provides the Communists with a banner
under which all facets of insurgent political and
military activity in the South are organized. The
Front is also designed to provide an alternative to
the Government of South Vietnam. The Communists have
set out in the Front's name a program of broad-polit-
ical and economic objectives which can be accepted by
the majority of people in the South. A phalanx: of
affiliated front organizations has also been created
to give the impression that the NFLSV embodies every
significant social, ethnic, religious, and profes-
sional group.
A number of the top public posts in the NFLSV are
held by "progressive" South Vietnamese, most of whom
are crypto-Communists. Behind these men are the hard-
core Communist leaders in the South who are members
of the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP)--the name
under which the Communist party in North Vietnam op-
erates in South Vietnam. The evidence indicates that
PRP committees exist down to the hamlet level in in-
surgent-controlled areas.
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NFLSV committees have also been established down
to the hamlet level throughout most of the insurgent-
held area. These committees, controlled by the local
Communists, often exercise a wide variety of govern-
mental-type functions, including the collection of taxes
and the organization of the local economy. Even in the
areas held firmly by the rebels, however, the NFLSV has
failed to pick up an independent following of any size,
and its authority is based mainly on insurgent coercion.
The Front has also been unable to attract any signifi-
cant support from any of the politically influential
groups, such as the Buddhists and the labor unions,
outside the Communist-held sectors.
On the international scene, aided and abetted
by the DRV, Liberation Front efforts to publicize the
activities and program of the insurgents have steadily
expanded since the first permanent NFLSV office was
opened abroad in 1962. There are now over one dozen
permanent Front missions abroad, several of them in Free
World countries. Since the early months of 1965 the
Vietnamese Communists have waged an increasingly vigorous
campaign to gain Free World acceptance of the NFLSV as
the "legitimate representative" of the South Vietnamese
people. This campaign has involved a broadening of Com-
munist claims on the extent of Front control in South
Vietnam, and a further open assumption of government
trappings by the NFLSV. So far, the Communists have
stopped short of declaring the formation of a provisional
Front government at the national level in South Vietnam.
A number of problems still stand in the way of such a
move, and it does not appear likely in the near future.
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The Formation of the Front
1, The Ho Chi Minh - led, Communists in Indo-
china have persistently operatbd under the cover of
a large "front" movement. While resisting the Jap-
anese during World War II, Ho and his comrades
functioned behind the facade of the old Viet Minh
league. In 1946, they formed the Lien Viet, or
Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direc-
tion of the war against France. When the struggle
shifted to South Vietnam following the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954, the North Vietnamese organized the
Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for "re-
unification" with the South.
2. This organization, headquartered in North
Vietnam, had little success in luring public backing
in the South. In late 1958, Hanoi apparently began
to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in South
Vietnam, Viet Cong documents captured in that period
disclosed the Communists' chagrin at their failure
to win a significant following in the South. These,
documents also indicated that the Viet Cong fully -
appreciated the importance ?of winning popular favor
if their rebellion was to have any chance of eventual
success.
3. The theory underlying the Communist front
movement in Vietnam has been to establish very broad,
general objectives which can be accepted by the ma-
jority of people, and then to enlist support from
every section of the population in an _allembtacing
political organization. If properly carried out,
"all the people" will unite in one organization
against the "enemy"--in this case the Saigon gov-
ernment. This theory is implicit in the treatise
on revolution in Vietnam, People's War, People's Army
written by the North Vietnamese minister of defense
in 1961.
4. By September 1960, Hanoi had apparently com-
pleted its general plans for a new and widely based
front organization, ostensibly indigenous to the South.
At a North Vietnamese party congress in September, Le
Duan, the party first secretary, called for the crea-
tion of a "broad united front" in the South which would
have the long-range goal of establishing a "national
democratic coalition government."
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5. The abortive coup against the Saigon regime
in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the
formation of the Front. The insurgents announced the
establishment of the "National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam" on 20 December of that year,
In order to sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was the
product of an indigenous band of patriots in the South,
Hanoi itself gave no publicity to the new organization
until January 1961.
6. The Front's manifesto was first aired in a
Hanoi radiobroadcast on 29 January 1961--a procedure
which itself testified to North Vietnam's guiding
role in the formation of the organization. When
broadcast again from Hanoi on 11 February, the mani-
festo contained several significant changes. These
changes eliminated material the DRV, on second
thought, apparently believed would tend to undercut
potential support for the Front in South Vietnam.
Some passages which suggested Communist origin or
ambitions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian
reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and bloody
excesses carried out under this slogan in North Viet-
nam had caused widespread revulsion in the South.
The Manifesto's Ten Points
7. In its final version (see Annex II), the
manifesto bore a remarkable similarity to Le Duan's
speech before the party congress in Hanoi, in the
spring of 1960, even using his words to describe
some of the Front's aims. Outlining a ten-point
program, the document declared that the Front's
most immediate task was to overthrow the Saigon gov-
ernment, implicitly through armed revolution. When
this was achieved, the Front would form a "broad
national democratic coalition administration" to "ne-
gotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification."
These and other goals of the Front, such as the adop-
tion of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality,"
and the redistribution of land in the South were iden-
tical with the actions long advocated for South Viet-
nam in Hanoi propaganda broadcasts. The goals were
phrased in such a manner, however, that the politically
inexperienced masses in the South would understand
them to mean little more than the replacement of the
current Saigon government by a more "representative,
humane" administration.
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8. The manifesto contained several highly gen-
eralized statements on the necessity for social and
economic reforms. These were designed to appeal to
many of the politically and socially dissatisfied
elements in the South. Such words as democracy, so-
cial justice, full employment, higher wages, and lower
rents, were liberally used. A general amnesty
covering political prisoners of the Saigon government
was promised. The document also played on Vietnamese
sentiments of nationalism, calling for the elimination
of foreign cultural influences and a return to Viet-
namese traditions.
9. Partly because the Front manifesto concen-
trated on the political aims of .the insurgency, and
also because early Front propaganda primarily stressed
the political activities of the NFLSV, the impression
was created that Hanoi intended the new organization
to serve mainly as the "political arm" of the Viet
Congo In fact, however, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV
provide a facade covering all facets of Viet Cong ac-
tivity in South Vietnam, military as well as politi-
cal. Shortly after the Front's formation, for example,
it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces
had been organized into the "Liberation Army of South
Vietnam" under the leadership .of the NFLSV. Today,. .
the Communists attempt to carry out as much insurgent
activity as possible in the name of the Front, whether
it is a military directive for an attack on a govern-
ment post, a propaganda harangue at gunpoint in a vil-
lage compound, .or- an official public statement on
policy.
Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts
10. In order to support the assertions in the
Front manifesto that the NFLSV was a broadly based
organization embracing many shades of popular opposi-
tion to the Saigon government, the Vietnamese Commu-
nists studded the announced leadership of the Front
with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who
could not be positively identified as card-carrying
Communists. These men were to run the day-to-day
activities of the Front's public administrative ap-
paratus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core
Communist direction in the background.
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11. The objective was to give the Front the ap-
pearance of broad representation among workers, reli-
gious orders, soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals
in South Vietnam. The Viet Congalso attempted to
select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV
and who would be capable of winning active public
support. Reports of the organization of bodies af-
filiated with the Front suggest that the Communists
always made sure that at least the secretary of the
committee was a Communist.
12. It appears that the Communists had a good
deal of difficulty in securing enough of the right
type of personnel for all of the top public posts
in the Front. Although the first NFLSV central com-
mittee announced in March 1962 reserved places for
52 members, it contained only 31 names, most of them
unknowns even in South Vietnam. NFLSV propaganda
claimed that the meeting at which the central com-
mittee was elected was "truly representative of the
people" and heavily attended. Actually, fewer than
200 people participated.
13. The second central committee, announced in
January 1964, had only 41 members. Of the 31 who had
served on the first committee, only about half
retained their posts, suggesting that a number of
the original appointees proved incapable of fulfill-
ing their duties. Despite Hanoi's wish to conceal
the real Communist domination of the Front, the
Communist associations of those chosen to fill the
top public posts in the NFLSV stand out clearly.
14. Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to
have long histories of cooperation with Ho Chi Minh's
old Viet Minh league. The chairman of the central
committee and the NFLSV's major public spokesman,
Nguyen Huu Tho, is a lawyer who has been involved in
pro-Communist political agitation in Vietnam since
1947. Although Tho claims in public to be a "social-
ist," and to represent an affiliated socialist party
in the Front, he is clearly a crypto-Communist.
15. Nguyen Van lieu, the first secretary general
of the central committee, was a leftist journalist
who had spent most of his career propagandizing in
favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In 1963,
lieu relinquished the post of secretary general and
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went to Prague from where he directed the Front's
foreign activities outside Asia until May of this
year when he was recalled home. Hieu's eventual
successor as, secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat,
has apparently been under North Vietnamese tutelage
since he took his "democratic" party into the Viet
Minh fold in the early 1950s. Phung Van Cung, who
heads both the Front Red Cross and the Front Peace
Committee, is also a former Viet Minh. Another top
public leader of the NFLSV is Tran Buu Khiem, who
heads the Front's Foreign Affairs Commission. He
is reported to have been one of the organizers of the
Viet Cong military effort and a former chief of
security for the Communist organization in South
Vietnam.
The People's Revolutionary Party
16. Behind the publicly acknowledged leaders of
the NFLSV, there is another, clandestine group of
professional revolutionaries, most of whom are
full-fledged members of the Lao Dong Party, the
name taken by the North Vietnamese Communists.
They provide the hard-core leadership in the so-
called "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), the
southern component of the Communist party in the
DRV. The PRP's founding was announced publicly by
a Liberation Front spokesman in January 1962, and
although the announcement admitted the PRP's lineal
descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party,
it was phrased to give the impression that the deci-
sion to organize the PRP was made by the Communists
in South Vietnam.
17. The fact that the PRP and the Lao Dong
Party are identical was revealed in a secret Lao
Dong central committee resolution of November 1961:
First of all, it must be clearly understood
that this is only a name change. Although
the overt name is different from what it is
in North Vietnam, neverthpless, sepretly...
the party segment ih South Vietnam is a
segment of the Lao Dong Party under the lead-
ership of the party central committee, headed
by Chairman Ho...except for the name, there
is no change whatever.
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18. Most of the hard-core Communist leaders in
the South are shadowy figures, but several of the
chief military personalities have become known
Additionally, Hanoi inadvertently revealed
in 1960 that some members of the North Vietnamese
party central committee were operating in South Vietnam.
19. Chief among those North Vietnamese officials
identified in the South is Nguyen Chi Thanh, a polit-
buro member of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.
Thanh, who is a general in the North Vietnamese
Army and was-also the army's political commissar
until 1961, left North Vietnam in early 1965 to take
over the running of the entire Communist war effort
in South Vietnam. His two principal deputies are
also generals in the North Vietnamese Army and
members of the ceutral committee of the North Viet-
namese Communist Party. One of them, the military
deputy, is Tran Van Tra, a tormer deputy chief of
staff of the North Vietnamese Army. Now, under the
alias of Tran Nam Trung, he is listed as chief of
the military affairs committee of the Front. The
deputy who runs the Communist political organization
in South Vietnam is General Tran Do,
20. It is not unusual to find the same man over-
seeing both the military and political program of the
Vietnamese Communists, particularly in a war situation.
For example, the military and political posts. in the 2
dortheft..half of'South _Vietnam?called Military Region
V by the Communists--are believed to be under the
command of Major General Nguyen Don, former commander
of the North Vietnamese 305th Division, who has been
operating in the South since 1962.
PRP Organization and Activity
21. The organization of the PRP furthered Hanoi's
efforts to depict the insurgency in the South as an
indigenous patriotic movement. It also permitted the
Communists to gain an open and readily explicable
voice in the NFLSV. Front conferences attended by
affiliated non-Communist organizations in the Front,
for example, could be more easily manipulated through
the use of the PRP operating openly at the meetings.
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22, The connection of the PRP with the Front was
explained in carefully phrased terms in the original
NFLSV announcement of the PRP's formation. The im-
pression was given that the PRP was to form only a
constituent element of the NFLSV with a voice equal,
but certainly not superior, to that of the non-
Communist groups active in the Front. In its own
initial statement, however, the PRP was more candid,
terming itself the "vanguard" of the insurgency. The
statement also placed the PRP first when calling on
members to "carry out the program of the party and
the program of action" of the NFLSV.
23. The PRP organizational structure is a
duplicate, insofar as possible, of the North Viet-
namese Party. A special department of the party
in Hanoi concerns itself with the problems of the
struggle in the South and with the southern party
segment. This department acts mainly through the
party's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
which functions as the headquarters for the PRP,
controlling through covert party channels the
NFLSV and acting through party channels as the high
command of the Viet Cong forces=-the Liberation Army.
24. COSVN sends directives down through a
traditional pyramidal party structure of which the
village party committees, and the village or hamlet
party chapters and cells they control, provide the
essential grass roots, The local party chapters
and their component three-man cells provide the
party members who lead the local guerrilla units,
control the local Liberation Front associations,
and recruit for the party, the Front or the guerrilla
unit.
25. Acting as much as possible through the Front,
party cadre disseminate propaganda, round up local
labor for Viet Cong military units operating in the
area, and collect taxes and information--or monitor
or control those who do. If the village or hamlet
is under firm Viet Cong control, this may be done more
or less overtly in the name of the party. If it is
not, there may be only a few party members who must
attempt all this on a covert basis.
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26. If the party has established a local village
or 4amlet government (a village "Liberation Committee"
or a hamlet "Administrative Committee" or "Board"),
the party ensures adherence to its directives by
planting its members in key positions or by having
the local party secretary monitor village activities.
In government-controlled areas and in the cities, it
is the party member operating covertly who recruits
and agitates and who enlists or buys agents or sym-
pathizers.
27. The Communists claim they are only one
element in the Front, albeit the "vanguard" element.
However, through the selection and manipulation of the
membership of the executive committees making up the
NFLSV and running its ancillary regional and function-
al "Liberation Front" associations, the party controls
the Front in classic, covert Communist fashion. The
headquarters of the central committee of the Front is
known to be colocated with COSVN.
Hanoi and the Liberation Front
28, The North Vietnamese Communist party and
government have carefully avoided establishing any
direct, public organizational ties with the Na-
tional Liberation Front. Close links clearly
exist, however, and DRV directives can be quickly
implemented. Hanoi's control over the Front is
organizationally maintained through the Communist
leaders in South Vietnam to whom the DRY issues over-
all guidance and instructions.
29. The Front does not, publicly at least, main-
tain an office or permanent representative in Hanoi
as it does in many other bloc capitals. When the
activities of Front delegations in the DRV are
publicized, the delegations are carefully linked offi-
cially with the DRV's own mass front ,)rgan, the
Fatherland Front, and not with the DRV Government or
party. This facade, of course, is designed to add
substance to Communist claims that the insurgents are
completely self-propelled revolutionaries.
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30. Unofficially, Hanoi has adequate opportunity
for closeliaison with the top public leaders in the
Front. Some of these individuals apparently visit
the DRV frequently, traveling via Cambodian or
Chinese transportation routes into North Vietnam.
Moreover, DRV and Front delegations frequently travel
together on tours abroad, with the NFLSV representatives
usually using DRV passports.
31. Occasionally, DRV and Liberation Front
propaganda differ somewhat in treating develop-
ments related to Vietnam. These differences do not
appear to indicate significant policy fissures be-
tween the DRV and the insurgents in the South. They
apparently stem mainly from the tactical consider-
ations facing the two groups, and do not relate to
their accord on over-all objectives.
Strength of the Front
32. The best evidence available on the numerical
strength of the Front is contained in a few captured
Communist documents that list the number of "members"
of various Front associations and organs in a few
scattered areas. The individuals listed probably
include both the full, card-carrying NFLSV members
and those whom the Communists consider enrolled in
the Front organs even though their participation
may be passive and they may not be fully committed
to NFLSV or insurgent objectives. Occasionally,
some of those in the latter category may participate
in Front-sponsored activities.
33. One fairly reliable document captured in
1963 places the Front strength at that time at 60,000.
By mid-1965 extrapolations from captured documents
listing Front membership indicate that the strength
of the NFLSV had grown substantially. By mid-1965,
the Communists could count around 500,000 South
Vietnamese (presumably 'over 16) as being enrolled
in one or another of the "liberation" associations,
34. Although hard evidence of the actual growth
of Front membership during the last 12 months is still
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lacking, it is doubtful that the Communists met
their high recruitment goals, particularly in areas
of considerable military activity. In these areas
there have been indications of growing reluctance on
the part of the local populace to provide labor and
other support for Viet Cong activity. Taking into
consideration the past growth rate of the NFLSV, it
is unlikely that its strength is higher than 700,000
to 750,000 at present.
The Front's Grass-Roots Structure
35. Efforts to develop the NFLSV at the local
level in South Vietnam began shortly after the Front
was established. A captured Communist document
issued in March 1961 urged the'immediate-orgaftization
of full NFLSV committees in villages and towns. It
was apparent that the Vietnamese Communists intended
to follow the pqttern already established in North
Vietnam, where general committees of Hanoi's
Fatherland Front exist alongside Communist Party
committees down to the local level. The available
evidence indicates that regular NFLSV committees
now have been formed at these levels throughout
most of the Viet Cong - controlled area where,
according to the most reliable statistics available,
approximately 20-25 percent of the rural population
resides.
36. To assure broad representation on these
committees, the number of card-carrying Communists,
is limited to two
fifths of the total membership. In one village,
which has been controlled by the insurgents for more
than two years, the NFLSV committee is composed of
representatives of all classes and organizations
existing in the village. There is a representative
for the landowners, one for the farmers, one for the
women, and representatives for other groups. In this
village, the secretary of the Front committee represents
the local PRP element, since he is also a member of
the Village-PRP committee. The PRP chapter receives
its orders from the higher district party committee.
These orders are passed to the village Front committee,
which is responsible for carrying out the orders.
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37. It appears that the regular Front committees
in Communist-controlled areas exercise a wide variety
of functions. They are the body used by the Communists
insofar as possible to collect taxes, conscript man-
power for military and economic services, organize the
local economy, and run rudimentary schools, hospitals,
and courts. The Front committees provide an organ-
ization with a potential for winning the voluntary
support of the population by various activities
of a welfare or civic-action nature, Working through
the Front, the Communists try to show that the in-
surgency is a more efficient, honest, and humane
administration than is the Saigon regime.
38. At the grass-roots level in the Communist-
controlled areas, the insurgents appear to be follow-
ing much the same strategy with the NFLSV as they did
with the local "administrative-resistance" councils
set up by the Viet Minh in rebel-held territory dur-
ing the war against the French. Captured Viet Minh
documents frequently dealt with programs carried
out under the authority of the councils to raise the
living standards. Such documents often contained
statistics on the establishment of schools, numbers
of children and adults in school, medical dispensaries,
sanitation efforts, and other civic responsibilities.
39. In the rebel-dominated areas, there appeared
to be an initial surge to participate in the NFLSV
as a reincarnation of the former Viet Minh. The
Front thus picked up former Viet Minh activists and
recipients of land redistributed by the Viet Minh.
This surge appears to have been short-lived, however.
For one thing,
early attempts to force "middle-class"
peasants to give land to the poor were too harsh
and resulted in a considerable loss of popularity
for the NFLSV. The subsequent growth in influence
of local Front organizations appears to have been
largely the result of rural passivity, combined
with the growing threat from the expanding insurgent
military arm.
40. It is doubtful that enrollment in one of the
Front organizations represents in many cases a willing
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individual commitment to the Viet Cong cause--except,
probably, for those recruited covertly in government-
held or nearby "disputed" areas. Nonetheless, once
enrollment is obtained, it is the Communist intention
to get such commitment. In "newly liberated" areas,
the Communists see the organization of Front associations
as a major step in the consolidation of their control,
a wedge further separating the people from the govern-
ment. This appears to be one of the primary tasks
for party cadres in organizing a village or a hamlet
after government officials or troops have left.
41. Because it lacked attractiveness, the
grass-roots structure of the NFLSV appears to have
required greater direct Communist control than
originally expected.
25X1 'ordered the use of the NFLSV during 1965
to "positively implement the party's policy" in the
countryside. In some villages in the insurgent-
controlled areas, the PRP unit has had to engage
openly in such activities as the collection of
taxes, and the organization of the local economy.
42. Outside the areas held firmly by the
rebels, NFLSV activity varies in intensity and
effectiveness. It is most intense in those rural
regions where irregular insurgent bands and sympa-
thizers are able to operate almost at will, and
where there is often little in the way of effec-
tive governmental machinery answerable to Saigon.
Organizing and proselytizing in the name of
the Front are carried on actively in these areas,
where about 25 percent of the rural population
resides. In the rural regions where the government
has begun planning or has begun to implement pac-
ification programs, there is less Front agitation.
Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the rural popula-
tion lives in such regions. NFLSV influence is
nearly negligible in the remaining sections of the
rural area where government military and civil
control is firm. Some 35 percent of the rural
population lives in these areas.
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43. Probably only a few NFLSV committees exist
at the local level in those rural areas not firmly
controlled by the Communists. In the contested
regions, the greater part of the influence exerted
by the insurgents appears to stem directly from
Communist Party action.
the PRP openly exercised
direct administration over village affairs.
44. Front influence among the nearly 3,000,000
residents in the major cities and towns of South
Vietnam is also minimal. One Communist Party member
reported that as of November 1964, Front organizations
in the Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone were nominal.
Communist organizers had been unable either to establish
a Front committee or to set up any of the Front's
mass organizations. In practice, the hard-core
Communist undergrund located in the area acted in
the Front's name.I
Lis no evidence that the ELSV has been successiul
in attracting significant support from any of the
politically influential groups in South Vietnam.
Both overt propaganda and extensive clandestine
penetration nevertheless continue to be directed
at the Buddhists, students, labor union members,
and armed forces personnel.
NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations
45. In addition to acquiring the proper person-
nel to fill the top offices in the Front, the Com,i-a
munists have expended considerable effort in flesh-
ing out the NFLSV with a phalanx of affiliated
"liberation" organizations. These groups have
been added to give the impression that the Front is
representative of every significant social, ethnic,
religious, and professional group in South Vietnam.
The complexity of this task was mitigated by the fact
that the Communists already had experience in conduct-
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ing a similar operation during the war against
the French.
46. In the first several months after the
formation of the NFLSV, associations specifically
for farmers, students, women, youth, and urban
workers were set up. Many others have been added
since that time. By early August 1964, the Front
had publicized the operation of some 20 affiliated
bodies. The top echelons of most of these groups
appear to be maintained with very small staffs,
if any at all. The Communists have put more ef-
fort into the organization of active farmer, women,
and youth groups of the Front at the local levels
in South Vietnam, where advantage could be more
effectively taken of the natural inclinations and
aspirations of these elements of society.
47. Where possible, the affiliated organiza-
tions of the NFLSV have been tied in with correspond-
ing international Communist-front organizations.
This gives them an international character, stimu-
lates publicity about them, and makes them appear
far more important than they actually are.
48. Two "political parties" in addition to
the PRP have also been attached to the Front as
constituent bodies. They are the so-called Radical
Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. It is
interesting to note that the only two political
parties permitted to exist in North Vietnam, aside
from the Communist Party, bear names almost identi-
cal to those in the South. In the North, they
supply a facade of democracy to the political proc-
ess in the country, and operate in such a manner
as to attract support from the intellectual and
"bourgeois" classes. They have the same function
in the South. Similar groups existed in the Com-
munist front during the war against the French,
and it is probable that some of their members
were ordered by Hanoi to remain in the South after
the 1954 war settlement.
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Front Propaganda Machinery
49, The NFLSV boasts an especially well-
organized propaganda arm, the Liberation NeAvsAgency
(LNA). The LNA was set up early in 1961, parallel
with the establishment of the Front itself. The
LNA provides an easily controlled mechanism for
the information dissemination which the Communists
have found so essential and effective in coordinat-
ing and backstopping their political agitation ac-
tivities. Several major LNA broadcast stations pro-
duce a steady diet of propaganda for public dis-
semination in the South.
50. Hanoi often rebroadcasts NFLSV statements
within an hour or two of the time they were first
issued by LNA. Under the banner of the Front, the
Communists also publish a number of "revolutionary"
newspapers; they claim 40 in the "liberated" areas--
as well as periodicals and pamphlets for special
audiences such as youth and women. Some are prepared
clandestinely and are disseminated covertly in govern-
ment-controlled areas. Much of the material produced
within South Vietnam is distributed in Communist
countries. NFLSV propaganda publications are printed
in several languages in Hanoi by the government's
official publishing houses, apparently to be dis-
tributed abroad under the aegis of the North Viet-
namese Government. English-language editions of
Front documents, for example, have been distributed
25X1
through official DRY channels. The several perma-
nent Front Offices abroad also distribute mountains
of NFLSV propaganda; several of them put out peri-
odic information sheets which are distributed to
local leftist press sources for inclusion in local
newspapers.
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NFLSV Program Abroad
52. One of the main aims of the Front since
its formation has been to publicize its activities
and programs abroad. By representing itself as an
organization struggling to free Vietnam from "colo-
nialist and imperialist aggression," the NFLSV has
made a special effort to enlist the sympathy and sup-
port of the newly emerging countries in Africa and
Asia. A steady flow of telegrams of greeting and
congratulations go out from the Front to foreign
governments and heads of state. Coprdination and
advice fot this kind of activity probably come
from the more experienced bureaucrats in Hanoi.
53. The Front has long been sending representa-
tives on overseas tours, at first mainly to the Com-
munist bloc, but with increasing frequency to Africa
and Asia. Front delegates have also been attending
meetings of leftist- and Communist-sponsored con-
ferences abroad since late 1962. The attendance of
Front representatives at foreign conferences and meet-
ings has been gradually accelerated. Under Hanoi's
sponsorship, these delegates now often appear at
Communist-sponsored world or regional conferences on
an equal footing with national delegations. It is
believed that a hard core of "delegates" for the
Front is stabled in North Vietnam,where entrance
and egress are easier than from South Vietnam.
54. The first permanent Front office abroad was
opened in Cuba in August 1962. By mid-1964, permanent
Front "missions" had also been established in Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the
UAR.
55. In view of the long history of Algerian op-
position to French "colonialism," the Vietnamese Com-
munists doubtless view Algeria as a fertile area in
which to enlist support for the insurgency in South
Vietnam. The organization and operation of the Front
office in Algters thus provide a good illustration.
of the NFLSV techniques and activities abroad. This
mission was established by Huynh Van Tam in February
1963, and headed by him until June of this year. For
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some time, there was no indication that the
Algerian Government had taken official notice of
the local NFLSV mission, other than to allow its es-
tablishment. During 1964, however, the Front repre-
sentatives apparently gained official standing in
the eyes of Algerian officials. On several occa-
sions, Tam conducted official conversations with
the Algerian foreign minister. Such activities tend
to bolster the Front's status in the eyes of the
local populace.
56. Tam also contributed articles to
French-language newspapers in Algeria and undertook
many other quasi-political activities, includ-
ing film showings and speeches to leftist youth
meetings. In May 1963, for example, he addressed
a Communist-sponsored conference of "Anti-Colonialist
Youth" in Algiers, and appealed for world-wide sup-
port of the Viet Cong. Tam also attended the Afro-
Asian Peoples' Solidarity meeting in Algiers in March
1964. His speech, predictably, dealt with the "cer-
tainty of final victory for the South Vietnamese
people" and appealed for moral and material support.
57. One of the most active of the NFLSV posts
abroad is the office in Peking, which was established
in September of 1964. Its representatives have been
invited to Chinese receptions for foreign dignitaries
and have been increasingly successful in arranging
private audiences with the stream of Afro-Asian per-
sonalities flowing through Peking. In April 1965,
the NFLSV opened an office in Moscow--its seventh full-
time post abroad. The Communists probably hoped
that Soviet propaganda support derived from this new
publicity outlet would significantly boost their cause
and that the office would also open new avenues for
NFLSV contact with the non-Communist world. Later
in 1965 the NFLSV secured agreements from Bulgaria,
Rumania, Poland, and Hungary for the establishment
of permanent offices in their capitals. Thus far,
however, only the post in Hungary has been filled.
An office in North Korea was opened and staffed in
early 1966.
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Recent Activities Abroad
58. During the past two years, the Vietnamese
Communists have concentrated mainly on pumping up
NFLSV relations with Cambodia. They have tried to
elicit statements and actions by the Sihanouk
regime supporting the Front's claim to be the
"legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese
people. With the active backing of the North
Vietnamese, Front representatives have had several
sessions with Cambodian officials to discuss a
formal treaty defining and guaranteeing the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border. Although the negotiations have
as yet failed to produce an ggreement, Sihanouk's
publicly demonstrated willingness to engage in treaty
discussions with the NFLSV is a decided plus for
the Communists. Sihanouk has also insisted that
the NFLSV should represent South Vietnam in any in-
ternational conference to guarantee Cambodian neutral-
ity.
Recognition Strategy
59. With the initiation of the US air strikes
in 1965, Hanoi and the NFLSV began to put greater
emphasis on their long-standing demand that any
settlement of the war in South Vietnam be "in
accordance" with the?Front program. In a major
policy statement of 22 March 1965, the Front as-
serted for the first time that it must have the
"decisive voice in any negotiations to end the
Vietnamese war."
60. In apparent support of such assertions, the
NFLSV and the DRV suddenly increased their propaganda
claims concerning the size of the "liberated areas"
under front control in South Vietnam. Throughout
1964, the Front's standard claim was that it con-
trolled about two thirds of the territory and about
half of the population in the South. Beginning in
1965, however, the claim was expanded to four fifths
of the territory and almost 75 percent of the popula-
tion.
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61. The long-standing allegation by the Front
that it is the "genuine" or "legitimate" representa-
tive of the South Vietnamese people was also given
greater emphasis in 1965. In the 22 March state-
ment, the Front proclaimed itself the "only"
legitimate representative. At about the same time,
propaganda from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow began to
give greater play to NFLSV claims of legitimacy,
identifying the Front in some cases ag the only
"legal" agent of ?the people in the South. This line,
intended as a counterpoint to the slipping prestige
of the Saigon regime, also appeared to reflect a
Vietnamese Communist estimate that Saigon and the
United States could eventually be brought around to
deal directly with the Front as an independent
political entity, thus strengthening the Communist
position in any war settlement,
62. The Vietnamese Communists appear to be-
lieve that it is no longer possible to force a bi-
lateral settlement of the war on a weakened Saigon
government. They have probably concluded that, be-
cause of the direct and growing US participation in
the conflict, an end to the fighting can be obtained
now only in a multilateral, internationalized ar-
rangement of the type that ended the Indochina Wan
in 1954. In the course of such a settlement, the
Communists realize that a strong image of NFLSV
prestige and physical control in South Vietnam will
be extremely important. It will not only help under-
mine the standing of the Saigon authorities, but
will also assist the Communists in gaining an effective
position in any postwar political establishment in
South Vietnam.
Additional NFLSV Goals
63. US and South Vietnamese agreement to deal
directly with the Front and to treat it as a "partner"
in settling the war would by no means guarantee that
the Communists would move quickly toward a political
settlement of the conflict. If the US and Saigon
recognized the independent status of the Front while
the Communists retained the military initiative in
South Vietnam, Hanoi and the Viet Cong would cer-
tainly take it as a sign of weakness and probably
would hold out for additional concessions before
acquiescing to any meaningful discussions on the con-
flict.
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64. Beyond broad statements of Front policy such
as the intent to form a "national, coalition govern-
ment" and to move toward "reunification" with North
Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists have been very
vague concerning specific NFLSV goals when the fight-
ing ends. An intent to leave considerable maneuver-
ing room seems to lie behind the basic Vietnamese
Communist line that any settlement of the war must be
in "accordance" with the NFLSV program.
65. It is probable, however, that at a minimum
the Communists would seek to gain the key defense,
foteign policy, information, and economic offices in
any coalition government so that they could make a
quick move toward implementing such policies as land
redistribution and socialization of industry. The
Front's secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly
25X1 toldl 'that a "socialist economy" would
be developed in the South after the war at the same
time as the war devastation was being repaired.
Possession of the key offices in a coalition govern-
ment would enable the Communists, operating through
the Front, to stifle quickly any opposition to a
full and open Communist take-over. The Communists
sought these offices during the political settlement
in Laos in 1962, under which a coalition government
was set up.
Forming a Provisional Government
66. The best evidence, perhaps, of the relative
weakness of the FrOnt asa political force in South Viet-
nam is its failure to'.establifgh a provisionaLmational
government. While both North Vietnamese and Front
officials have hinted on several occasions in the
past year that such a move was in process, such an
action would pose formidable problems for the Commu-
nists'And Actually further expose the lack of public
support for the Front. It would almost certainly
alienate politically active groups in the South, such
as the Buddhists, who do not entirely support the
Saigon government and have political ambitions them-
selves. The Front would also find it difficult to
establish a satisfactory seat of government in South
Vietnam. The leadership of such a provisional govern-
ment would have little attraction among politically
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conscious elements of the population not allied with
the Communists. In addition, any movement toward
the opening of negotiations on the war, should the
Vietnamese Communists decide to do so, might also be
complicated by the establishment of a Front govern-
ment.
67. Despite the weaknesses of the Front, however,
there are compelling reasons for the Vietnamese
Communists to continue to operate under its banner.
It provides, for example, a formal medium under
which all facets of the insurgent political and
military activity in South Vietnam can be organized.
Although it does not yet pretend to formal govern-
ment on a national scale, it does establish for the
Communists a needed organizational alternative to
the Saigon regime. It is also useful as a platform
for advertising the broad program of political and
economic objectives the Communists have set forth
as their alleged goals in South Vietnam.
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ANNEX I::
PREFACE
The following study of the NFLSV organization
attempts to identify as many of the leaders of the
front as possible. Most of the affiliated associations
have been identified by Radio Hanoi and the NFLSV
Liberation Broadcasting Station, and others have
appeared in Communist publications and documents.
Many of the groups exist only on paper, and it
has not been possible to identify the membership of
a number of the organizations. It should be noted
that some of the names may have been used without
permission and that some may be totally fictitious.
In many instances names are received orally and may
be spelled incorrectly or rendered phonetically.
I-1
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CENTRAL ORGANIZATION Page 1-4
Central Committee
Central Committee Departments
QUASI-DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION Page 1-7
ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS Page 1-8
Liberation Federation of Trade Unions
Liberation Peasants Association (Liberation
Agricultural Association)
Liberation Youth Association
Liberation Women's Association
Liberation Students and Pupils Association
.Liberation Writers and Artists Association
Association of Former Resistants
Patriotic and Democratic Journalists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers Association
Highland Peoples Autonomy Movement
Liberation Red Cross
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee for Solidarity with the Latin
American People
Committee for Protection of World Peace
Military and Civil Medical Council
Liberation Army and Popular Armed Forces
People's Revolutionary Party
Radical Socialist Party
Democratic Party
Liberation Press Agency
Liberation Broadcasting
Association of Writers and Artists of the
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*People's Liberation Youth Group
*Industrialists and Businessmen Against
the US-Diemists
*Democratic Lawyers ASsociation
*Membership not available
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ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS (cont.)
*Council of Heroic Disabled Servicemen
*South Vietnam Veterans Association
*Association of the Families of Patriotic
Soldiers
*Association for the Improvement of Morality
(of the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect)
*Patriotic and Peace-Loving Boys and Girls
Group
*Reformed Cao Dai Sect
*Group of Fighters for Peace, Reunification,
and Independence of the Vietnamese
Fatherland Patriotic Servicemen in
the Ranks of the US-Diem Army
*Committee for the Peace and Amelioration
of South Vietnam
*Association of Patriotic Teachers of the
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*Association of Patriotic Teachers of the
Western Region of South Vietnam
*Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin
*Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee
*Patriotic Khmer Monks Solidarity Association
*Khmer Buddhist Research Institute of South
Vietnam
*Group of Soldiers Who Have Returned to the
People
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
Page 1-16
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NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Presidium
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Members
Secretariat
Secretary General
*NGUYEN HUU THO
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*V0 CHI CONG
*Y BINH. ALE?
*DANG TRAN THI
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN THI DINH
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
*PHAM XUAN THAI
*THIEN HAO (Thich)
*TRAN BACH DANG
*THAN BUU KIEM
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
Deputy Secretaries ' *LE VAN HUAN
General *HO THU
Members *UNG NGOC KY
*HO XUAN SON
Members of the Central (elected January 1964)
Committee
DUONG TRUONG THANH
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HUNG TV, aka Hong Lien,
aka Nhan Tu
*HUY SON
*HUYNH BAI
*HUYNH CUONG
*HUYNH VAN TAM
,LAM TRI CHANH
*LE THANH NAM
*LE THI RIENG
1-4
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MeMbersof the Central (elected January 1964) (cont.)
Committee
*LE VAN THA
*MA THI CHU
-MAI VAN TI
*NGUYEN HOC
*NGUYEN HGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THI
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN TI
*NGUYEN VAN TIEN
*pHAM XUAN VY
1(110CHOM BRIU
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN VAN THANH
*VO DONG GIANG
*VO VAN MON
*VU TUNG
Members of the First (elected in 1962)
Central Committee
*DANG TRAN THI
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HO THU
*HUYNH CUONG
HUYNH DANG (1)
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
*HUYNH VAN IIAM
*LAM KIEN KHANH (1)
*LE NGOC QUANG (1)
*LE THANH NAM
LE THI DUONG (1)
*LE THI RIENG
LE VIET HUNG (1)
*MA THI CHU
NGOC TU (1)
NGUYEN CUU RICH (1)
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN HUU THO
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THACH (1)
*NGUYEN THI BINH
(1) Not currently a Central Committee Member.
1-5
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Members of the First (elected in 1962) cont.)
Central Committee
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
NGUYEN VIET MAU (1)
NHU SON (1)
*PHAM XUAN THAI
PHAN TUYEN (1)
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*ROCHOM BRIU
SON VONG (died March 1963) (1)
*THIEN HAO
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM
*TRAN HUU TRANQ
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*UNG NGOC KY
*VO CHI CONG
*Y BINH ALEO
Recently Identified Central Committee Members
*DANG QUANG MINH
TRAN HOAI NAM
VU NGOC HO
HUYNH THEN TU
Central Committee Departments
MILITARY COMMITTEE
Director
Members
*Tran Nam Trung
Le Van Tien
Bay Quan
INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Chairman *Tran Bach Dang
Deputy Chairman Muoi Tai
EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Chairman
*Tran Buu Kiem
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DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM COMMITTEE
Representative Thich Vinh
PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION
Commissioner *Phung Van Cung
INSPECTORS GROUP
Representative *Nguyen Van Hieu
Quasi-Diplomatic Representation
ALGERIA *Tran Hoai Nam
*Vo Cong Trung
Truong Van Loc
CHINA
CUBA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
*Tran Van Thanh
*Nguyen Minh Phuong
Nguyen Trong Kha
Hoang Bich Son
-*Ly Van Sau
Hoang Kinh
*Ha Tam Lam
*Dinh Ba Thi
*Ma Thi Chu
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
*Nguyen Van Hieu
*Duong Dinh Thao
Tran Huu Kha
HUNGARY *Le Phuong
INDONESIA *Le Quang Chanh
*Huynh Van Ba
USSR
*Dang Quang Minh
Nguyen Van Dong
*Nguyen Thanh Long
Luu Xuan Thanh
Ngo Ton Hoan
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Quasi-Diplomatic Representation (cont.)
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
*Huynh Van Nghia
*Nguyen Van Tien
HUNGARY Dinh Ba Thi
NORTH KOREA Vu Ngoc Ha
BULGARIA
POLAND
RUMANIA
ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS
LIBERATION FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Formerly
Liberation Labor Association (HOI LAO DONG GIAI
PHONG))
Chairman *Pham Xuan Thai, aka Xuan Thai
Vice Chairman *Dang Tran Thi
Standing Committee
Members *Dinh Ba Thi
*Huynh Van Tam
*Le Thanh Nam
*Nguyen Minh Phuong
*Tran Hoai Nam
*Tran Van Thanh
LIBERATION PEASANTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NONG DAN
GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Nguyen Huu The
Member Tu Lap
LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOT THANH NIEN
GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Tran Bach Dang
Vice Chairman Nguyen Van Chon
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LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN
GIAI PHONG) (cont.)
Secretary General
Deputy Secretary
General
Members
LIBERATION WOMEN'S
Nguyen Van Yen
Cao Van Tai
Anh Theo
Cao Van Sau
Cao Xuan Bo
Do Duy Lien
Ho Bao Hon
Ho Phong
Huynh Van Tuan
*Le Phuong
*Le Quang Chanh
Minh Tanh
Nguyen Dong Ha
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Nguyen Van Phuc
Nguyen Van Tai
Nguyen Van Tan
Nguyen Xuan Thuy
*Thanh Hai, aka Lun Thanh Hai
Trail. Tien Dui*,
Tran Tri'Dung
Tran Van An
Tran Van THUAn
Trich Van Thanh
ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)
Chairman, Standing Committee
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Vice Chairmen
*Mi Doan
*Le Thi Rieng
*Thanh -Loan
Standing Committee Members
*Nguyen Thi Thanh
*Nguyen Thi Tu
Phung Van Cung.(Mrs.)
Tran Thi Lieu
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LIBERATIONS WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU
NU GIAI PHONG) (cont.) ,
Members
*Bui Thi Me
Buu Hoa
Do Duy Lien ?
Hai Lua
Ho Thi Buu, aka Ho Thi Buoi
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngoc Dung (see *Nguyen Ngoc
Dung)
*Nguyen Thi Chon
Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
Nguyen Thi Ha
Nguyen Thi Hoa
Nguyen Thi Sang
Thua Hoa
Tran Thi Dan
Tran Thi Dau
Tran Thi Dinh
Tran Thi My
Tran Thi Tu
Tran Thi Trung
Truong Thi Hue
LIBERATION STUDENTS AND PUPILS ASSOCIATION
(HOI LIEN HIEP SINH VIEN HOC SINH GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Tran Buu Kiem
Members
*Ly Van Sau
*Nguyen Ngoc Dung
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Tran Van An
Tu Le
Viet Hung
LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI
VAN NGHE GIAI PHONG)
Chairman *Tran Huu Trang
Vice Chairmen Van Tung
Tran Hieu Minh
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LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HQI
VAN NGHE GIAO PHONG) (cont.)
Secretary General Ly Van Sam
Secretariat Members
Giang Nam
Pham Minh Hoa
Bui Kinh Lang
Members
Bui Xuan Lang
Ly Van Phung
Nguyen Hien
Nguyen Van Vinh
Pham Van Hoa
Phan The
*Thanh Hai
*Thanh Loan
Thanh Quy Minh
Trieu Van
Truong Binh Tong
Truong Thanh
Tung Long
Van Nam
ASSOCIATION OF FORMER RESISTANTS
Secretary General *Tran Bach Dang
PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION
(H?I NHA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU)
Chairman *Vu Tung
Vice Chairmen
*Tam Duc
*Nguyen Van Hieu
Nhi Muc
Secretary General Thanh Nho
Deputy Secretaries
General *Nguyen Thi Chon
*Thanh Huong
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JPATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION
(Hol NHA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU) (Cont,)
Members
*Duong Dinh Thao
Hieu Chan
Hoang Xuan Ba
*Nguyen Thi Binh
*Nguyen Van Tai
*Phan Lac Tuyen
*Rochom Thep
Thach Thien Chi
Tu Chung
SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION
(TRUNG UONG HOI LUC HOA)
Chairman *Thien Hao
Members
*Hung Tu
Giac Hao
SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
Chairman *Le Van Huan
Vice Chairmen
*Bui Thi Me
*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
*Nguyen Thanh Long
Secretary General Le Thuoc
HIGHLAND PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (UY BAN
DAN TOC TU TRI TAY NGUYEN)
Chairman *Y Binh Aleo
Vice Chairman
Members
*Mi Doan
*Rochom Briu
*Rochom Thep
*Xat
1-12
Ba Quan
Rochom Ban
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LIBERATION RED CROSS (HOI HONG THAP TI GIAI PHONG)
President *Phung Van Cung
Chairman, Execu-
tive Committee Vu Ngoc
COMMITTEE FOR AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY (UY BAN DOAN
KET A PHI)
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary
General
Members
*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
*Thien Hao
*Huynh Cuong
*Huynh Van Nghia
*Huynh Van Tam
*Le Thanh Nam
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngo Tan Dao
*Nguyen Van Tien
*Rochom Briu
*Tran Hoai Nam
COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN
PEOPLE .(UY BAN DOAN KET DAN TOC MY LA TIN)
Chairman *Le Van Huan
Member Chau Hoa,ng Nam
COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD PEACE (UY
BAN BAO VE HOA BINH THE GIOI)
Chairman *Phung Van Cung
Members *Ma Thi Chu
*Ho Hue Ba
MILITARY AND CIVIL MEDICAL COUNCIL
Director *Phung Van Cung
Member
*Ho Thu
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LIBERATION ARMY AND PO
PHONG QUAN VAN CAC LUC
Deputy Commander
Members
PULAR ARMED FORCES (GIAI'
LUONG VO TRANG NHAN DAN)
*Nguyen Thi Dinh
Sau Hoang, aka Cao Dan
Chiem,aka Dom, aka Sap
Cia, aka Sau Rau
*Tran Nam Trung
Nguyen Van Luong
Nguyen Van Huu
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (DANG NHAN DAN
CACH MANG VIET NAM)
Chairman
Secretary
General
Executive Com-
mittee Member
Member, Youth
Group
RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY
Secretary Gen-
eral
Deputy Secretary
General
Member, Standing
Committee
(DANG XA HOI CAP TIEN
*Nguyen Van lieu
*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
*Le Van Tha
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU)
Chairman
Secretary Gen-
eral
Ngo Ngoc Sang
*Huynh Tan Phat
Secretary *Nguyen Thanh Long
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DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU) (coni,)
Central Committee
Members *Duong Van Le
Ho Kim Son
Nguyen Van Ian
*Tran Bud Kiem
Tran Van Huong
*Ung Ngoc Ky
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY
Deputy Director
Lam Thinh
Director, ,East
German Bureau *Duong Oinh Thao
LIBERATION BROADCASTING
Director
Deputy Director
*Tam Due
Thanh Khenh
.ASSOCIATION,OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS OF THE SAIGON-
CHOLON-GIA pm AREA
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Members
Vo Hoai Linh, aka Hoai,Linh,
aka.Tru,ong,VInh Tong
Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh,
aka Phong Anh
*Thanh Loan
Ngoc Tung
Pham Huy
Tran Chinh True
*Tran Huu Trang
Tran Tarr Thanh
Tran Thanh Dat
Tran Van Choi, aka Chin Choi,
aka 'Tran-Vanchau
Vu Hien Thinh
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Regipnal Oganization
SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Secretary gen-
eral
Assistant Sec-
retary General
Members
EASTERN REQION ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
SecrQtary Gen-
eral
Secretaries
*Huynh Tan Phat
*Le Van Tha
Phan Trong Dan
Phuoc Thang
*Tran Huu Trang
*Nguyen Van Tai
Nguyen Dong Ha
Doan Cong Chanh
Hoang Hai
Hoang Minh Dao
Lu Sanh Loc
Ngoc Dinh
Nguyen Thi Phan
Nguyen Van Cung
Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka
Phong Anh
Thanh Tam
*Nguyen Thanh Long
*Hung Tu
Lien Van Chan, aka Le Van Chan
Nguyen Kien QUO?
Nguyen Van Chi
Tran Van Son
Nguyen Dinh Nho
*Huynh Thanh Mung
Le Sac Nghi
Vo Thanh Nguon
*Vo Van Mon
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EASTERN REGION ZONE
Members
CENTRAL REGION ZONE
Members
WESTERN REGION ZONE
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Secretary Gen-
eral
(cOnt.)
Ho Chi Tieng, aka Ho Chi Tong
Luu Kiet
Nguyen Bach Tuyet
Nguyen Duc Quang
Nguyen The Phuong, aka Nguyen
:Thi Phuong
Nguyen Van Hung, aka Nguyen Van
Trung
Nguyen Van Nong
Nguyen Van Xuan
Nguyen Viet Hong
Sorc Phrum
Thieu Nhu Thuy
Tran Van Binh
Truong Thang
Vo Van Voi, aka Vo Van Doi
Waifa Sam, aka Wai A Sam
BUi Duc Tam, aka BUi Duc Tan
Cao Van Sau
*Ho Hue Ba
Le Hong Thang
Luc Ta Soc
Ngoc Binh Thang
Nguyen Thai'Binh
Nguyen Thi Dinh
Nguyen Thien Tu, aka Huynh Thien
HTu
Nguyen Trong Xuat
Nguyen Van Chin
*Nguyen Van Ngoi
*Thien Hai)
*Duong Van Vinh
Tran Van Binh, aka Bay Thang
Tran Thanh Dai
Ngo Tan Dao, aka Ngo Dai Dao
Commissar (Cur-
rent Affairs) Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
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WESTERN REGION ZONE (cont.)
Commissar (Inter-
provincial Com-
mittee)
*Nguyen Van Nhon
Commissar (Cen-
tral Committee) *Huynh Cuong
Commis loner,
Standing Committee Ma Ha Thong, aka Muoi Thong
Adviser Le Van Phien
Members
*Bui Thi Me, aka Thi Me
Khiet
Le Minh Thanh, aka Minh Tan
Le Thi Toi
Nguyen Thi Sang
Pham Cong Chanh
Pham Minh Ly, aka Muoi Ly
Pham Van Be
Phan Huu Phuoc, aka Thanh Quyqh
Phan Van Nam, aka Thuc Nguyen,
aka Luc
Tran Van Phan
Tran Van Thuan
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ANNEX II
I. The so-called "peace terms" of the NFLSV :were set
forth on 22 March 1965, interspersed within a rambling
five-point statement. Essentially, the Front's five
points are as follows:
a. The condemnation of US policy in
Vietnam along with a catalogue of US war
"crimes" there since 1954,
b. An expression of the deterMination
of the Vietnamese "people" to "kick but" the US
"imperialists" from Vietnam and to "liberate"
South Vietnam. ACcording to the statement, the
"Vietnamese will never stop fighting ubtil:their
ultimate'objectives of "independence, democracy,
peace, and neutrality" have been obtained'. The
"Only way out" for the US is to "withdraw" from
South Vietnam. The statement declared that "at
present, all negotiations are useless" on the
war as7.1Ong as "the US imperialists" do not
withdraw all troops, weapons, and means of war
from Vietnam, and as long as the Liberation
Front does not have the "decisive voice." By
this the Front apparently meant that it should
have a dominant voice in any political settle-
ment of the conflict.
c. A pledge of determination to "advance
toward" the reunification of Vietnam.
d. A declaration that the Front has the
"full right" to receive international assistance.
While relying primarily on its own force, the
Front "will buy war materiel from any country,"
and will call "if necessary" for foreign volun-
teers.
e. A call on all South VietnaMese people
to join in the fight to "liberate" the South.
II. The Official Program of the National Liberation
Front, as announced by Hanoi VNA OD 11 February 1961
is as follows:
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1. To overthrow the disguised colonial
regime of the US imperialists and the dictatorial
Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United
States, and to form a national democratic coali-
tion administration.
The present regime in South Vietnam is, a .
disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists.
The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey
which has been carrying out the US imperialists'
political lines. This regime and administration
must be overthrown, and a broad national democrat-
ic coalition administration formed to include
representatives of all strata of the people,
nationalities, political parties, religious com-
munities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back
the people's economic, political, social, and
cultural interests; to realize independence and
democracy; to improve the people's living con-
ditions; and to carry out a policy of peace and
neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunifi-
cation of the fatherland.
2. To bring into being a broad and pro-
gressive democracy.
a. To abolish the current constitution
of Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration,
lackey of the United States, and to elect a
new National Assembly through universal
suffrage.
b. To promulgate all democratic free-
doms: freedom of expression,of the press,
of assembly, of association, of
movement. ..(ellipsis as received); to guar-
antee freedom of belief with no discrimina-
tion toward any religion on the part of the
state; and to grant freedom of action to the
patriotic political parties and mass organi-
zations, irrespective of political tendencies.
c. To grant general amnesty to all
political detainees, dissolve all concentra-
tion camps under any form whatsoever, abolish
the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic
laws; and to grant the right of repatriation
to all those who had to flee abroad due to
the US-Diem regime.
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d. To strictly ban all illegal arrests
and imprisonments and tortures, and to punish
Unrepenting cruel murderer's of the people.
3.. To build an independent and sovereign
economy', and improve the people's living conditions.
a. To abolish the economic monopoly of
the United States and its henchmen; to build
an independent and sovereign economy and
finance, beneficial to the nation and people;
and to confiscate and nationalize the property
of the US imperialists and the ruling clique,
their stooges.
b. To help the industrialists and trades
people rehabilitate and develop, industry both
large and small, and to encourage industrial
development; and to actively protect homemade
products by abolishing production taxes, re-
stricting or ending the import of those goods
which can be produced in the country, and
reducing taxes of import of raw materials and
machinery.
c. To rehabilitate agriculture, and to
modernize planting, fishing, and animal hus-
bandry; to help peasants reclaim waste land
And develop production; and to protect crops
and insure the consumption of agricultural
products.
d. To encourage and accelerate the
economic interflow between the town and the
countryside, between plains and mountainous
areas; and to develop trade with foreign
countries without distinction of political
regimes and on the principle of equality and
mutual benefits.
e. To apply an equitable and rational
system to abolish arbitrary fines.
f. To promulgate labor regulations,
that is to prohibit dismissals, wage cuts,
fines and ill-treatment of workers; to improve
the life of workers and office employees; and
to fix wages and guarantees forthe health of
teen-age apprentices.
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g. To organize social relief: jobs
for unemployed; protection of orphans, elders,
and the disabled; assistance to those who
have become disabled or lost their relatives
in the struggle against US imperialism and
its stooges; and relief to localities suffer-
ing crop failures, fire, and natural calami-
ties.
h. To help northern compatriots who
had been forced or enticed by the reaction-
aries to go South after the restoration of
peace to return to their native places if
they so desire, and to provide jobs to those
who decide to remain in the South.
i. To strictly prohibit forcible
house removals, arson, usurpation df land,
and the herding of the people into concen-
tration centers; and to insure the country
folk and urban working people of the oppor-
tunity to earn their living in security.
4. To carry out land rent reduction in prep-
aration for the settlement of the agrarian problem
so as to insure land to the tillers.
a. To carry out land rent reduction;
to guarantee the peasants' right to till their
present plots of land and insure the right
of ownership for those who have reclaimed
waste land; and to protect the legitimate
right of ownership by peasants of the plots
of land distributed to them during the re-
sistance war.
b. To abolish the "prosperity zones"
and the policy of herding the people into
"resettlement centers" and to grant the right
of those forcibly herded into "prosperity zones"
or "resettlement centers" (disguised concen-
tration camps) (parentheses as received) to
return home freely and earn their living on
their own plots of land.
c. To confiscate the land usurped by
the US imperialists and their agents and dis-
tribute it to landless and land-poor peasants;
and to redistribute communal land in an
equitable and rational way.
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d. Through negotiations, the state
will purchase from landowners at equitable
and rational prices all land held by them
in excess of a given area, fixed in accord-
ance with the concrete situation in each lo-
cality, and distribute it to landless and
land-poor peasants0. This land will be dis-
tributed free and will be free of any con-
ditions.
5. To build a national and democratic
education and culture.
a. To eliminate the enslaving and gang-
ster-style American culture and education;
and to build a rational, progressive culture
and education serving the fatherland and the
people.
b. To wipe out illiteracy; to build
sufficient general education schools for the
youth and children; to expand universities
and professional schools; to use the Viet-
namese language in teaching; to reduce school
fees or exempt fees for poor pupils and stu-
dents; and to reform the examination system.
c. To develop science and technology
and the national literature and art; and to
encourage and help intellectuals, cultural,
and art workers to develop their abilities
in service of national construction.
d. To develop medical service in order
to look after the people's health; and to
expand the gymnastic and sports movement.
6. To build an army to defend the motherland
and the people.
a. To build a national army defending
the fatherland and the people; and to cancel
the system of US military advisers.
,b. To abolish the pressganging regime;
to improve the material life of the army men
and insure their political rights; to prohibit
the ill-treatment of soldiers; and: to apply
a policy of assistance to families Of poor
army men.
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c. To remunerate and give worthy
jobs to those officers and soldiers who
have rendered meritorious services in
the struggle against the domination of
the US imperialists and their henchmen;
and to observe leniency toward those who
had before collaborated with the US.-Diem
clique and committed crimes against the
people, but have now repented and serve
the people.
d. To abolish all the military
bases of foreign countries in South
Vietnam.
7. To guarantee the right of equality
between nationalities and between men and women;
to protect the legitimate rights of foreign
residents and overseas Vietnamese.
a. To insure the right of autonomy
of the national minorities; to set up,
within the framework of the great family
of the Vietnamese people, autonomous
regions inhabited by minority
peoples; to insure equal rights among
different nationalities, allowing all
nationalities to have the right to use
and develop their own spoken and written
languages and to preserve or change their
customs and habits; to abolish the US-
Diem clique's present policy of ill-
treatment and forced assimilation of
the minority nationalities; and to help
the minority peoples to catch up with the
common level of the people by developing
the economy and culture in the areas
inhabited by them by training skilled
personnel from people of minority origin.
b. To insure the right of equality
between men and women, so women can enjoy
the same rights as men in all fields:.
political, economic, cultural, and social.
c. To protect the legitimate rights
of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to
defend and care for Vietnamese nationals
abroad.
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8. To carry out a foreign policy of peace
and neutrality.
a. To cancel all unequal treaties
.signed with foreign countries by the U.S.
henchmen which violate national sovereignty.
b. To establish diplomatic relations
with all countries irrespective of political
regime, in accordance with the principles
of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the
Bandung conference.
c. To unite closely with the peace-
loving and neutral countries; and to expand
friendly relations with Asian and African
countries, first of all, with neighboring
Cambodia and Laos.
d. To refrain from joining any bloc
or military alliance or forming a military
alliance with any country.
e. To receive economic aid from any
country ready to assist Vietnam without
conditions attached.
9. To establish normal relations between
North and South Vietnam as A'first step toward
peaceful reunification of the country.
The urgent demand of our people through-
out the country is to reunify the country by
peaceful means. The NFLSV undertakes the gradual
reunification of the country by peaceful means,
on the principle of negotiations and discussions
between the two zones of all forms and measures
beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending
the national reunification, the governments of
the two zones will negotiate and undertake not
to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or.
favor war, nor to use military forces against
each other; to carry out economic and cultural
exchanges between the two zones; and to insure
for people of both zones freedom of movement,
of livelihood, and the right of mutual visits
and correspondence.
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10. To oppose aggressive war and actively
defend world peace.
a. To oppose aggressive wars and all
forms of enslavement by the imperialists;
and to support the national liberation
struggles of peoples in various countries.
b. To oppose war propaganda; and
to demand general disarmament, prohibition
of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
c. To support the movements for
peace, democracy, and social progress in
the world; and to actively contribute to
the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia
and the world.
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