RELATIONSHIP OF US STAND IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO STABILITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800010004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 25, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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1,N-., 1t;1, .I (;ENCE MEMORANDUM
25 May 1966
No. 0825/66
Copy No.
H.LLATTti7;~~TTTI) OF US STAND IN SOUTH VIETNAM
'' ;TA. J ? T .TTY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
A'I'F OF INTELLIGENCE
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
; GORE T
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No. 0825/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 May 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Relationship of US Stand in South Vietnam
to Stability of Southeast Asia
Throughout Southeast Asia, there is awareness
of Chinese power and apprehension concerning China's
drive to expand its influence through subversion or
through direct military or political pressures. The
relationship between stability in Southeast Asia
and the US stand in South Vietnam against Communism,
and indirectly against Communist China, varies con-
siderably. The US determination to remain in South
Vietnam in force is a major factor affecting sta-
bility in Laos and Thailand, but has little or no
direct effect in Burma and Indonesia. Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines fall in a
middle category.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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1. One of the major factors contributing to
the relative stability which has prevailed in Laos
since the 1962 Geneva Agreement has been US policy
in Vietnam. This stability seems the result chiefly
of the reduction in North Vietnamese pressure in
Laos which has occurred as Hanoi has become preoc-
cupied with the military situation in the south.
2. The North Vietnamese apparently believe
that provocation of a major military conflict in
Laos at this time would involve direct fighting be-
tween US and North Vietnamese troops which would
overstrain their already hard-pressed resources.
Moreover, Hanoi has what it wants in Laos at pres-
ent; that is, control over the vital infiltration
corridor to South Vietnam.
3. As a result of a four-year period of re-
duced pressure, the anti-Communist forces in Laos
have consolidated their military position. US
military observers believe that the Royal Laotian
Army is a somewhat better organized, more effective
fighting force than it was four years ago.
4. There is, of course, a constant danger
that political bickering and personal rivalries
within the ranks of the anti-Communists will re-
sult in the collapse of the Souvanna Phouma govern-
ment. There have been several close shaves on this
score during the past four years. As long as Hanoi
continues to fear provoking a major US military
response in Laos, however, Communist forces are un-
likely to seek to exploit political turmoil among
the anti-Communists by attempting to expand their
area of control significantly.
5. The growing involvement of the US in South
Vietnam has had a generally positive effect on the
Thai Government's domestic and international anti-
Communist policies. The evidence of US resolve in
Southeast Asia has reassured Bangkok of the wisdom
of its pro-US policy and has motivated the Thais to
assume a larger role in the prosecution of the war
in South Vietnam.
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6. As the firmest US ally in Southeast Asia
since the end of World War II, Thailand has based
its commitment to the objectives of US policy on
both ideological and practical grounds. Thai for-
eign policy, however, has always been sensitive to
political realities, and Bangkok has persistently
questioned its close association with the US in
terms of the value of this association in meeting
the Communist challenge. Prompted by what Thai
leaders have viewed as evidence of US vacillation
and irresolution, these lingering doubts have oc-
casionally grown to a point where a full-scale re-
assessment of Thai foreign policy has seemed im-
minent. Such a period would almost certainly have
followed evidence of a lack of US resolution in
South Vietnam,
7. In late 1964, the Communists stepped up
their terrorism and political subversion in north-
east Thailand, hoping in part to frighten Bangkok
into assuming a more neutral role with respect to
the war in South Vietnam. Although the Communists
have made some gains in their guerrilla campaign,
their action has served to alert Bangkok to the
dangers in the countryside and has prodded the Thais
into an even closer relationship with the US. In-
stead of fear and apprehension, the Thai leadership
has demonstrated confidence that, in conjunction with
the US, it can handle the long-term Communist ef-
fort to subvert Thailand.
8. Cambodia has been the most stable country
in Southeast Asia over the past ten years. This
stability has stemmed from a combination of circum-
stances including the energetic, if not always wise,
leadership of Prince Sihanouk. Under Sihanouk, the
small internal Communist movement has been driven
underground, and opposition elements of other politi-
cal persuasions have been equally reduced-to positions
of impotence.
9. Sihanouk has also managed to keep Cambodia
from being directly entangled in the South Vietnam
war. This has been a major factor in the maintenance
of his almost unquestioned position in Cambodia.
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For several years, he has skillfully played off one
side against the other in Vietnam while carefully
steering a middle course and preserving some room
for diplomatic maneuver. He has been able to play
this delicate game adroitly principally because the
US has forestalled a Communist victory in South
Vietnam.
10. Although no friend of the US, Sihanouk has
on several occasions stated his belief that without
the US presence, South Vietnam would soon fall into
Communist hands. Moreover, he has also said quite
explicitly that a united Vietnam under Communist
hegemony would pose the gravest threat to the con-
tinuing stability of his non-Communist government.
Malaysia
11. Malaysia strongly supports the American
position on Vietnam. This support is partly based
on apprehension that without the US presence,
Malaysia's internal stability would suffer. Al-
though the Malaysian Government strives to promote
itself as a neutral, nonaligned Afro-Asian state,
it is actually anti-Communist and pro-West. Think-
ing on the Vietnam question appears to be strongly
influenced by the domino theory and particularly
by the fear that if South Vietnam should fall or
even falter before Communism, Communist pressure
on Thailand--Malaysia's neighbor to the north--
would escalate.
12. Prime Minister Abdul Rahman and other
Malaysian officials have repeatedly and publicly
stated that they approve the American presence in
Vietnam, that Malaysia would assist if it did not
have problems of its own (Indonesia's confrontation
of Malaysia), and that it is essential that the US
remain there.
13. Thinking on Vietnam is closely tied to
the domestic problem posed by the presence of Ma-
laysia's large indigenous Chinese population. The
Malaysian Government is controlled by the majority
ethnic group, the Malays, who fear the possibility
of being economically and politically overwhelmed
by the more energetic resident Chinese. In mainland
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Malaysia, the Chinese account for 37 percent of the
population. Singapore--which Malaysia forced out
of the federation in mid-1965--is largely a Chinese
city with the Chinese population accounting for 75
percent of the total. The Malaysian states in
Borneo--Sarawak and Sabah--also have large Chinese
minorities, 31 percent and 23 percent respectively.
These Chinese pose not only ethnic and economic
problems to the Malay majority, but they also pre-
sent the prospect of potential political identifica-
tion with Communist China. The Malaysian Government
believes that the American effort in Vietnam helps
to hold the line against Communist China and hence
against its appeal to Malaysia's and Singapore's
Chinese.
Singapore
14. The Singapore Government, which administers
a population composed largely of Overseas Chinese,
strives to appear nonaligned, but it is aware of the
threat of Communist China in Southeast Asia, and
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has so stated both publicly
and privately. For reasons of domestic politics, Lee
does not publicly take a specifically positive line
on US presence in Vietnam, but he believes that it
is essential that the US remain there. Lee believes
in the domino theory, and feels that if the US with-
draws from Southeast Asia, the entire area will fall.
15. As much as a year ago, Lee Kuan Yew stated
at the Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay that
South Vietnam must not be forced into Communism by
armed might or organized terror, that it must have
the right of self-determination. He said that if
the Communists are able to envelop South Vietnam,
it would be only a matter of time before they would
take over neighboring countries.
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16. Lee's present position shows no change.
During a visit this month to Sweden, in both pub-
lic and private interviews, he again called atten-
tion to the danger to Southeast Asia implicit in
the Chinese power role. Lee's public relations
man told a US official that although Lee cannot
say so publicly, in private he emphasizes that the
United States must stay in Vietnam, At the same
time, however, Lee feels that the US should not
escalate the dispute and must find a way to the
negotiating table.
17. Domestically, Lee argues that it would be
a mistake to tie predominantly Chinese Singapore
to the fortunes of mainland China as his pro-Com-
munist opposition desires. He maintains that since
the US will continue to hold the balance of power
in Asia, the Overseas Chinese of Singapore and
Malaysia--as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia--
should develop an identity separate from the main-
land and stake out their own future. A US with-
drawal from Vietnam would no doubt weaken this
argument and strengthen Lee's pro-Peking, pro-
Communist opposition. Such an event could force
Lee to move toward a "pro-Peking neutralism" or
conceivably even toward alignment with Peking.
18. Had the United States not shown its de-
termination to continue its stand in South Vietnam,
the appeal of Lee's pro-Communist opposition for
the largely Chinese population might have increased
significantly. Despite the probability that Bri-
tain's presence at its Singapore base will continue,
Lee might have been pushed toward some accommoda-
tion with Peking.
Philippines
19. Philippine stability is directly affected
by general confidence in US strength and presence
in Southeast Asia, in particular Vietnam. Both the
Philippine leadership and the public think of their
country as basically protected by the US-Philippine
bilateral defense treaty of 1951.
20. The Philippine administration supports the
US stand in Vietnam and is aware of its implications
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for Philippine security. The Philippines plans to
expand its contribution to the anti-Communist ef-
fort in, South Vietnam by sending in an engineer
battalion with security elements within the next
three or four months. Hitherto it has maintained
only a civic action team there. In supporting this
expanded Philippine effort, President Marcos stated
publicly on 20 March that the Vietnam aid bill was
part of the greater defense plans of the Philippines,
"which must depend on collective security for its
survival."
21, Had the United States not shown its de-
termination to stay in Vietnam, neutralist elements
and inclinations in the Philippines might well have
been strengthened. The effect probably would have
expanded into the socioeconomic realm, where po-
tential unrest is of increasing concern to the gov-
ernment.
22. Burmese stability can be attributed largely
to the strong leadership of General Ne Win, who
exercises rigid internal controls and pursues a
nonaligned foreign policy. His pursuit of neutral-
ism, however, is possible mainly because the United
States serves as a counterpoise to Communist pres-
sures in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam.
23. Moreover, as long as the Communist effort
in Vietnam is blunted, Ne Win can devote more at-
tention and a greater portion of Burma's resources
to the fulfillment of pressing socioeconomic needs.
In the absence of the United States presence as a
countervailing force, Burma would be obliged to pay
far greater deference to Peking's desires, to sub-
ordinate Burma's national interests to those of its
more powerful neighbor, and to acknowledge Peking's
hegemony. Even under present circumstances, there
are times when Ne Win is compelled to assume a more
accommodating posture toward Communist China than
he would wish, because of that country's military
might and common border with Burma.
24. Recently, in one of his more candid mo-
ments, Ne Win indirectly expressed his appreciation
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for the American presence in Vietnam and an aware-
ness of the problems posed for the United States
by the confused political situation which prevails
there. After wondering how it would be possible to
hold meaningful elections in a country torn by war,
he warned that Buddhist leaders should be more
cautious since they would be no match for the Com-
munists.
25. There is no direct relationship between
the US stand in Vietnam and internal stability in
Indonesia. The changed political atmosphere in
Indonesia since 1 October evolved from a complex
and long=standing domestic political situation.
The present emphasis on reversing Indonesia's pro-
Communist, pro-Chinese orientation and returning
to a nonaligned foreign policy and an anti-Commu-
nist government is based on the long-held convic-
tions of majority political elements. Present
stability is based on the power of the politically
conscious Indonesian Army and on the consensus of
50 to 70 percent of the population and leadership
that Communism is alien to Indonesian life and po-
litical goals.
26. Present top leadership is in the process
of recasting Indonesian foreign policy. To this
end, both public and private comments on the Amer-
ican stand in Vietnam are beginning to reflect a
sympathetic approach compared with the absolutely
negative one which prevailed under Sukarno. Last
month, Foreign Minister Adam Malik was quoted as
telling a newsman that he was "grateful for the US
position and effort in Vietnam" and "hoped that the
US could bring the problem to a successful conclu-
sion," More recently he stated somewhat equivocally
that the "US presence is necessary in Vietnam's" but
that if South Vietnamese political factions should
"stick together, they would be strong enough to
resist Communists without the Americans."
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27. The anti-Peking posture of the army and
many civilian elements conceivably may have been
strengthened by the US stand in Vietnam. However,
there has long been antipathy to ethnic Chinese
and to Chinese economic influence in Indonesia,
and the motivations for recent anti-Chinese ac-
tions are deeply rooted in Indonesia's past.
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25 May 1966
dent
The White House
nt to the
SUBJECT ' : R eiatioasbip of US Stand
in South Vietnam to
Stability of southeast
Asia
hod sesorandum responds to a
in th Vietnam and the relative stability
I sign develo .+nts, but we do find
a direct relationship between US firmness
U or factors were predominant in the
question which the President addressed to
A401 ral .Paborn 10 fty apropos of Ambassador
Ledge "s remark that the AS stand in South
Vista had helped make possible the anti--
Sarno coup in Indonesia. We feel that
Asian entries
/s/ R. J. Smith
xi
H. J. SIXTH
Deputy Director for Intel
Attachment
No. 082 /6
OIDDI ; f br
Distribution:
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1 - DCI w/att
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Vi - ocIju o w/o att
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I w Policy Dissem File w/o att
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le Bill Boyers
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25 Say 1966
FOR: The Honorable John T. *cNaugbtou
Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs
D"mrtment of Defense
'f Relationship of Stand
in south Vietnam to
stability of Southeast
Asia
d memorandum was prepared
espouse to a request by
t, which stud from Ambassador
10 remark that the tS stand in
helped make possible the
South Vietnam and the relative stability
observable in some of the other Southeast
Asian countries.
rt relationship between US firmness in
Indonesian developments, but we do find a
anti-Sukarno coup in Indonesia. We feel
that other factors were predominant in the
/s/ R. 3./ Smith
It. J. $#F
Deputy Director for intelligence
0925/66
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(copy 5)
Identical Memos with att sent:.
The Honorable Dean Rusk - cy 2
The Honorable W. Rostow -- cy 3
U. Alexis Johnson - cy 4
I - Policy Dissem File w/o att
O/DDI ? fbr
Distrito ion :
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OCI/MC4 w/o att
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1 - Exec Chrono w/o att
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25 may 19e6
Relationship of US Stand
in south Vietnam to
stability of Southeast
Asia
id memorandum was prepared
ith Vietnam had helped make possible the
FOR: The Honorable John T. McNaughton
Resistant Secretary
International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
.dent, which steamed from Ambassador
>yere in response to a request by
dge's May 10 remark that the US stand in
in Indonesia.. We feel
were predominant in the
eats, but we do find a
tween US firmness in
nd the relative stability
rvable in some of the other southeast
(copy 5)
/a/.Rt.? J..:Sm;ith
I. N. WITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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Identical Memos with att sent:
O/DDI: br The Honorable Dean Rusk cy 2
Distribution: The Honorable W. Rostow cy 3
Original - Addressees w/att U. Alexis Johnson - cy 4
1 - DCI w/att
vi'-- D/OCI w/o at t
countries.
1 - O/DDI Chrono w/o att
I - Rxec Chrono w/o att
1 - Policy Dissem File w/o att
. - OCI/MCO w/o att
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25 May 1966
R O*AN FOR; The Honorable Bill Moyers
Special Assistant to the
President
The White House
Relationship of US Stand
in South Vietnam to
Stability of Southeast
Asia
ached memorandum responds to a
which the President addressed to
Raborn 10 May apropos of Ambassador
's remark that the US stand in South
had helped make possible the anti-
coup in Indonesia. We feel that
other factors were predominant in the
Indonesian developments, but we do find
a direct relationship between US firmness
in nth Vietnam and the relative stability
observable in some of the other Southeast
Asian countries.
/a/ R. J. Smith
R. J. SHI TH
Director for Intelligence
Attachment
Now NO, 0825/66
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1 - Policy Dissem File w/o att
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