FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH OF 13 MARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 18, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH OF 13 MARCH
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
18 March 1966
OCI No. 1161/66
Copy No.
GROUP 1
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
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amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
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OCI No. 1161/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
18 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Fidel Castro Speech of 13 March
Summary
Fidel Castro's speech of 13 March at Havana Univer-
sity reflected deep concern over domestic and foreign
problems. The Cuban leader castigated the Chinese for
their cavalier disregard of trade commitments with Ha-
vana and implicitly accused the quarreling Russians and
Chinese of exposing lesser Communist regimes to "imperial-
ist" threats. Apparently less disposed than before to
follow a policy of moderation and coexistence in the
hemisphere, Castro attacked Chilean President Frei for
the first time. Finally, in what appears to be fresh
evidence of his regime's need for scapegoats for its
economic shortcomings, Castro vowed a purge of "dilet-
tantes and playboys."
1. In his speech of 13 March at Havana University,
Fidel Castro hurled new insults at Peking and charged
that the Chinese leaders, in their old age, have con-
fused Marxism-Leninism with fascism. The attack was es-
sentially a reiteration of Castro's earlier statements,
and came exactly one year after his first criticism of
China. He repeated most of his charges of 2 January
against the Chinese for reducing rice shipments to Cuba,
as well as his complaint of 6 February that Chinese
representatives had distributed propaganda materials
among high Cuban officials and had attempted to sub-
vert Cuban officers. In directly criticizing the Chi-
nese leadership, Castro was more contemptuous than
heretofore, but it is not likely that he will sever
relations with Peking at this time, or that the Chi-
nese will be provoked into a complete break. Castro
probably will confine himself to baiting the Chinese,
perhaps by demanding a reduction in the 50-man embassy
staff in Havana and by harassing other Chinese repre-
sentatives in Cuba.
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2. In calling for greater military aid to Viet-
nam, Castro was less impassioned and more explicit
than he has been in the past. He appeared to outline
the extent of Cuba's willingness to help and may have
intended to set the stage for delivery of token anti-
aircraft or other defensive equipment to North Vietnam.
He said: "It is not necessary to perform an offensive
act. It is enough to give Vietnam all the conventional
armament necessary for the antiaircraft struggle."
Castro again implicitly criticized the Sino-Soviet rift
for exposing "small and weak" countries, such as Cuba
and Vietnam, to the threat of "imperialism."
3. For the first time, Castro denounced Presi-
dent Eduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian Democratic
Party, and said that in Chile "the only way to win the
revolutionary struggle will be by the armed struggle."
He denounced Frei as a coward, a liar, and a reaction-
ary. In the past, Castro had hoped to break out of
his diplomatic isolation in the hemisphere by encourag-
ing better relations with Chile and hence excluded
Chile from his diatribes against the "reactionaries
and puppets" of Latin America. His belligerant criti-
cism of Frei on 13 March, however, suggests that Castro
is losing interest in coexistence and compromise in
the hemisphere. The attack reflects the same militancy
he displayed at the recent Tri-Continent Conference in
Havana.
4. Castro's concern with Cuba's various internal
problems was also a recurring theme. He discussed the
economic hardships which "Chinese treachery" had
brought upon Cuba's consumers and indicated that 1966
sugar production at best will barely exceed 5 million
tons--l.5 million tons short of the objective. But
Castro was most agitated and defensive about wide-
spread rumors of increased opposition within his re-
gime. He denied press reports that there had been
student demonstrations at Havana Univbrsity two weeks
ago in connection with the trial of Major Rolando
Cubela. Castro appeared confident of his grip on
power and said that Cubela would not be executed be-
cause of the benevolence and confidence of the revolu-
tion.
5. Castro announced that there will be a purge
of "not more than fifty" -dilettantes and playboys
in the Foreign and Foreign Trade ministries for their
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excesses and pursuit of what he described as the
"dolce vita." Since coming to power in 1959, Castro
has persistently and puritanically endeavored to
end the vice and corruption which were typical of
some segments of Cuban society. In addition, for at
least a year, Castro has sponsored young and pre-
sumably more efficient technicians in high govern-
ment posts and has removed many of his veteran col-
leagues of the revolution. His purge of dilettantes
appears to be an intensification of these policies
and a result of his continuing need to find scape-
goats for the regime's failures.
6. On 17 March, the Central Committee of the
Cuban Communist Party announced that Major Efigenio
Ameijeiras was the first to lose his party and mili-
tary posts. Although Ameijeiras was a friend of
Cubela, he did not figure in the trial proceedings,
and his complete loyalty to Castro has never been
questioned. He was one of the twelve who survived
Castro's invasion of Cuba in 1956 and fought along-
side him through the entire Sierra Maestra campaign.
Ameijeiras frequently has been described as a drunk-
ard, a marijuana user, and a reprobate. His dismissal
therefore, is not related to larger political is-
sues and is an outgrowth of Castro's clean-up cam-
paign.
7. It is likely that only a f
u
E res will I" ncluded in the purge,
ertain labor and military leaders will
be ous e , but there are no indications that the
regime will move concertedly against any one group.
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