THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700020004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 24, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

S EC R An roved For Rise 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00472A# 70002000 C
F-Ir
OCI No. 0608/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
24 February 1965
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECRET
25X1
GROUP 1
Excluded From automatic
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A00170002 1? and declassification
 Approved Faelease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00A001700020004-8
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700020004-8
 25X1
Approved For R ase 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00472 0.1 700020004-8
OCI No. 0608/65
Publihsed by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(18-24 February 1965)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, following page
1. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Page
Aim of coup attempt of 19 February, or-
ganized by Colonel Thao, was to replace
Khanh with Khiem (p. 1); all top officers
involved in coup have escaped apprehen-
sion (p. 1); ouster of Khanh by his own
rescuers raises possibility of a deal
(p. 2); appointment of "Little" Minh
points to future scramble for control of
armed forces (p. 2); Thi placing his sup-
porters in key positions (p. 3); Bud-
dhists may be apprehensive (p.3); Quat
government will try not to alienate Catholics
(p. 4); increased taxes on rice by VC, with-
holding of stocks, worsening of security
conditions, and influx of refugees in sev-
eral porovinces plague economic situation
(p. 4).
25X1
Approved For Relea4e 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO011700020004-8
 Approved For R
B. MILITARY SITUATION
Page
6
Viet Cong activity less spectacular but
number of incidents increased during
week (p. 6); security situation in north-
ern and central provinces is becoming
serious (p. 6); Phu Yen Province has ex-
perienced sharp deterioration of security
(p. 6) ; destruction of 120 foot North
Vietnamese vessel led to largest single
haul of Communist weapons to date (p. 7) ;
likely that similar large shipments may
increase (p. 8); casualty figures (p. 8).
Serious setbacks in Central Vietnam
(p."10); provincial pacification plans
for 1965 have not been approved (p. 10)
Hop Tae area makes limited progress
(P. 11).
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
The preliminary meetings of Indo-Chinese
People's Conference in Cambodia end with
call for neutralization of South Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia (p. 12); Philippine
leaders still considering Philippine task
force for South Vietnam (p. 12):
25X1
25X1
NOTE
Although this report draws on contributions from the
several intelligence agencies, it does not necessarily
represent a consensus of those agencies.
Approved
25X1
 pproved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
In what turned out to be an abortive coup attempt followed
by a successful countercoup on 19-20 February, General Nguyen
Khanh has been deposed as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, but the government of civilian Premier Phan Huy Quat
so far remains intact. The situation in the aftermath of the
latest political upheaval remains unstable, The appointment
of General Tran Van "Little" Minh as acting commander-in-
chief appears to be a stopgap arrangement while more volatile
generals among the so-called "Young Turks" maneuver for
real control of the military against more conservative officers.
Moreover, the abortive coup, which had anti-Buddhist; pro-
Catholic and even pro-Diem overtones, seems to have sharp-
ened internal divisions and religious animosity and may serve
toro.,pel the Buddhists toward increasingly open espousal of a
negotiated settlement of the war.
Possibly as a result of the threat of reprisals, there were
no spectacular Viet Cong attacks or butrages during the past
week. It is nevertheless clear that the Comrziunist insurgents
are continuing to make serious inroads into government con-
trolled areas, particularly in the northern and central provinces.
The deterioration of security in these areas as a result of grow-
ing Viet Cong strength and activity is becoming increasingly
serious. In many areas the government forces have gone over
almost completely to the defensive leaving the military initiative
with the Viet Cong. The recent large arms cache discovered
in Phu Yen Province emphasizes the role of sea infiltration to
the Viet Cong. Until the security of the coasts can be reasonably
assured, additional shipments of arms, agents and supplies via
this artery can be expected.
25X1
25X1
Approv$d For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
,~h
NORTH'
Dong Hoi
VIETNA
1
~3o Ho Su Qu g Tr
Tchepone: O
o ~1
nakhet- MUong Phine~ 1St Div[ n^-
r Hue
CORPS
y aN n,Fi OPhuoc Bir
-An'x
A Loc
Tay N nh 05 r Ph,
CAPITAL MILT R- DIST I T .+.
th Divis on
C2V,an 1V
CORPS
)Rung
$a
Za
spec
VNN
on
O~CCon Son (Poulo Condore)
COW SON
Phuoc Binh Thanh
Bo DUo
o~o Duo
Hpai Nhon
o r
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 17 December 1964
_ Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
Division boundary
Hop Tac area
46536
0 15 50 100 M,1-
0 25 50 75 100 Kilamelcrs
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
 Approved For I~
I. SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. The coup attempt of 19 February was pri-
marily organized by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, former
South Vietnamese press and information officer
in Washington who had returned to Saigon about
two months ago and had resumed his contacts
among field-grade commanders lined up in his pre-
vious intrigues. The key figures participating
in the coup attempt were, with few exceptions,
the same military officers cashiered in a simi-
lar abortive attempt against Khanh last September,
under the same nominal leader, General Lam Van
Phat. Most of the officers involved are Catholics,
and many of them have ties with the southern fac-
tion of the Dai Viet Party, which Khanh purged
from his own government. The coup group had
support from certain priests and laymen in mili-
tant Catholic refugee circles, and its state-
ments bore strong overtones of sympathy with
the former Diem regime. According to Colonel
Thao, the aim of the coup was to replace General
Khanh with the ambassador to the US, General
Tran Thien Khiem, who voiced his approval of
the move from Washington and may have been a
prime mover.
2. The Thao-Phat coup forces, although they
had secured control of key points in Saigon as
well as of the Saigon airport, collapsed when they
ran into opposition from Air Force Commander
General Ky, as well as all of the corps commanders
and commanders of most of the specialized services.
General Khanh, who escaped to Vung Tau, was able
to organize a countercoup force to converge on
Saigon, while General Ky, who escaped to Bien
Hoa airfield north of Saigon, threatened to
bomb units supporting the coup if they'did not
yield. Amid intensive US efforts to avoid com-
bat between the opposing sides, negotiations were
25X1
25X1
Approved For Relea0e 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472F4001700020004-8
 Approved For RJ
1700020004-8
begun which, mixed with threats, eventually led
to the coup's failure. All of the top 14 officers
involved in the coup, however, have so far escaped
apprehension. In view of the subsequent ouster
of Khanh by his own rescuers, this raises the
possibility of a deal among the officers on
both sides to settle for Khanh's removal.
3. A meeting of the Armed Forces Council on
20 February, together with Khanh and leading
members of the Quat government, resulted in a
vote of no-confidence in Khanh as armed forces
commander. Khanh's status remained in some
doubt for the next 24 hours while he remained
out of Saigon, inspecting the military situation
in II Corps. On 21 February, a decree issued
by Chief of State Suu announced that Khanh had
been removed and "Little" Minh appointed acting
commander in his stead. Khanh's final efforts
to rally support from military units in the
delta proved fruitless, and he finally agreed
in talks with emissaries of the Armed Forces
Council to step down and leave the country under
face-saving:terms. On 22 February, another de-
cree named Khanh "roving ambassador," and he
is now scheduled to leave the country, possibly
on 25 February, after a formal transfer of his
command to Minh. Khanh has publicly implied
that he retains substantial support and that he
expects to "return at some point."
4 Iit remains questionable that Khanh's
absence will result in early armed forces unity.
The appointment of Minh in an "acting" capacity
seems to point to a future scramble for control
of the armed forces. The leading contenders at
the present time appear to be I Corps Commander
General Thi, now in Saigon with the title of
"Commander of. the Liberation Forces" and acting
as spokesman of the Armed Forces Council, and
Air Force Chief Ky, who has in the past implied
that only Khanh and himself had real potential
for leadership. In rapid moves to replace Khanh
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472Ag01700020004-8
 Approved For FPM
supporters, Thi, so far unopposed by Ky, appears
to be successfully putting his own followers into
key positions--national police director, and
commands of divisions close to Saigon. These
moves are already arousing concern among other
officers, particularly in view of Thi's recent
inclinations to link his fortunes with the strongly
Buddhist element in the I Corps area. General
"Little" Minh has reportedly commented that he
believes only further instability will result
from the presence of Thi and Ky in positions of
power. At the same time, generals with potential
military support to block Thi and Ky face possible
drawbacks in trying to assert themselves. The
most prominent of these, General Nguyen Van Thieu,
is a Catholic with admitted Dai Viet Party ties.
A strong Buddhist reaction might result if he
assumed a key role.
., There are indications of Buddhist appre-
hension over recent events, based in part on a
belief that Khanht,s ouster represents in effect
a victory for the obviously anti-Buddhist ele-
ments in the Thao-Phat coup group. There have
been some further suspicions that the US may
have had a hand in bringing about Khanh's removal
after he had supported the Buddhists in overthrow-
ing the regime of Premier Huong. The Buddhists,
however, have expressed no open support for Khanh,
stating only that they oppose any coups and
will support the Quat government. Privately,
many of them state that Khanh's dismissal is an
internal armed forces matter, and some welcome
his departure. Although there now appears little
likelihood that the Buddhist will mount any
public campaign on Khanh's behalf, Buddhist
monks are making it increasingly evident that
they expect to have Buddhist strength felt on
the political scene. Recent speeches by Bud-
dhist monks have exhorted their followers to
develop a revolutionary political spirit, and
Tri Quang and Tam Chau, are both alleged by the
press recently to have urged an end to the war.
25X1
25X1
Approved For R41ease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T004724001700020004-8
 25X1
Approved For R
Actual Buddhist views on the war are still couched
in uncertainties. Buddhist leaders privately
have made increasing references to the need for a
negotiated settlement although still in terms of
a divided Communist and non-Communist Vietnam.
It is possible that they view the continuing in-
ternal struggles under the stress of war as
sharpening attitudes against them.
6. Although several moderate Catholics have
been reported as critical of the Thao-Phat coup,
the coup attempt apparently had collaboration
from more militant circles. While the ouster
of Khanh is undoubtedly welcome, the emergence
of General Thi on the national scene, and the
suspicions that he as well as the Quat govern-
ment are under intense Buddhist pressure, are
likely to reinforce Catholic desperation and may
encourage further plotting among them. The'Quat
government reportedly feels it must move cautiously
in punishing any of the coup conspirators to
avoid further alienation of the Catholics.
Economic Developments
7. There are continuing reports that the VC
have increased taxes on rice and in some areas
have prevented rice from being sent to market.
In addition, rice merchants are holding-back
stocks and speculating on a price rise. There
have also been difficulties in delivering com-
modities for US-supported programs. In at least
two provinces in Central Vietnam, USOM represen-
tatives are virtually unable to leave the province
capitals. In several provinces there has been
an unusual influx of refugees to provincial
and district capitals as a result of increased
VC pressure and activity. Much heavier VC taxes
on commodities transported by truck have increased
retail prices to nearly prohibitive levels and
orders from merchants in rural areas have slowed
considerably. The worsening of the security
25X1
Approved For R4lease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472Ag01700020004-8
 Approved For
situation and use of transportation facilities
to move flood relief and military supplies has
contributed to a growing conge .1-4-n of commercial
goods in the Saigon port area. 7 -1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T0047~A001700020004-8
 Approved For ease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T0T724 O1700020004-8
B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. Although Viet Cong activity during the
week was less spectacular in nature that in the
previous week, the number of incidents reported
increased. Enemy actions were most intense in
I Corps, except in Quang Ngai where the Viet Cong
may be quietly concentrating forces. Viet Cong
activity in II Corps was less intense and con-
trasted sharply with that of the previous week.
In III and IV Corps areas, Viet Cong actions
were unremarkable but began to pick up by the
end of'the week. Enemy reaction to the coup
attempt was negligible; possible reactions in-
cluded harassment of the 25th Division Headquarters
located in the Hau Nghia Province capital and
three district capitals. Enemy railroad sabotage
decreased, but.Viet Cong harassment forced rail-
road authorities to discontinue repair operations
in the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen,
and Quang Nam. Rail service has been restored
on some section but it will be some time before
full service can be restored over the central
portion of the route.
The security situation in the northern
and central provinces of South Vietnam is becom-
ing serious. The Viet Cong are making large
gains in the northern provinces and .are accelerat-
ing their encroachment into areas formerly con-
trolled by the government. The Viet Cong have
gained control over additional areas and popula-
tion in the past few months, Government pacifica-
tion operations have suffered serious setbacks
in the north recently, particularly in the
provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh. Govern-
ment control is now limited to the environs of
district towns in these two provinces. In the
four northernmost provinces, the security situa-
tion is also steadily deteriorating. Further to
the south, the Viet Cong appear to be building
up their forces in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces.
Phu Yen Province has recently experienced a sharp
25X1
Approved For F9elease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001 700020004-8
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T0047 P01700020004-8
deterioration of the security situation and ARVN
and regional forces have retired to the district
towns. This leaves the government on the de-
fensive with the Viet Cong retaining the initia-
tive and de facto control over most of the country-
side. The Viet Cong are able to strike objectives
and interdict lines of communications in almost
all areas of the coastal regions of the northern
and central provinces of South Vietnam. The Com-
munist main force units in the north comprise the
best trained and organized force in South Vietnam
today. They continue to steadily increase the
size and military capability of this force through
clandestine land and sea infiltration.
The destruction of a 120 foot North Vietnam-
ese vessel displacing 300 tons on 16 February in
Phu Yen Province led.to the largest single haul
of Communist weapons infiltrated into South
Vietnam to date. The massive cache of weapons
found ashore also provided incontrovertible
evidence of North Vietnam's involvement in the
South Vietnamese insurgency. The cache included
North Vietnamese documents, personal mail and
photographs, and between 80-100 tons of munitions,
including some 4,000 weapons. Large quantities
of ammunition and about 500'pounds of medical
supplies were also captured. Most of the weapons
were reconditioned Chinese Communist arms, but
packing lists indicate that the shipment originated
in North Vietnam. COMUSMACV believes that the
shipment was intended for the Viet Cong in Phu
Yen and Khanh Boa Provinces, where enemy strength
has markedly increased in recent weeks. The
large number of individual weapons in the cache
further suggests that they were for the use of
locally recruited Viet Cong provincial and main
force troops. While this discovery indicates
the likelihood that similar large shipments may
increase, it is believed that ,they have been
occurring all along. The South Vietnamese Navy
is ineffective as a blockade force and have allowed
wide gaps-in the coastline for the clandestine
infiltration of enemy agents, cadre, weapons, and
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0p1700020004-8
 25X1
Approved For a ease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T0047 ,x901700020004-8
supplies. It now seems probable that supplies
and a considerable portion of Communist manufactured
weapons are being introduced into South Vietnam
via the sea route.
2. Government initiated military operations
decreased this past week, including those in con-
tact with the enemy. Since the reporting period
ended on 20 February, it does not reflect coup
and anti-coup activity by the military. It seems
likely, however, that military operations will
decrease again next week. There were no govern-
ment operations last week of any special significance,
other than the Communist arms recovery operation
currently in progress in Phu Yen Province.
3. Casualties and weapon losses declined from
the all time highs of last week. Government
casualties dropped sharply to 893 (212 KIA) from
1,558 (290 KIA) last week. Viet Cong casualties
also declined to 481 (442 KIA from 628 (505 KIA).
Government losses of weapons totalled 348 com-
pared to 1,106 last week and Viet Cong weapon
losses declined to 172 from 198.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001700020004-8
 Approved For
Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00472 1700020004-8
Conclusions
There were no spectacular Viet Cong attacks
or outrages during the past week, however, it is
clear that the Communist insurgents are continu-
ing to make serious inroads into government con-
trolled areas, particularly in the northern and
central provinces. The deterioration of security
in these areas as a result of increased Viet Cong
strength and activity is becoming increasingly
serious. In many areas the government forces have
gone over almost completely to the defensive
leaving the military initiative with the Viet Cong.
The recent large arms cache discovered in Phu
Yen Province emphasizes the role of sea infiltra-
tion to the Viet Cong. Until the security of
the coasts can be reasonably assured, additional
shipments of arms, agents and supplies via this
artery can be expected.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO91700020004-8
 Approved For
Co PACIFICATION
1. In the face of increased Viet Cong activity
and the serious deterioration of security, especially
in Central Vietnam, the pacification effort has suf-
fered serious setbacks. Increased Communist mili-
tary pressure has forced a re-evaluation of,the
pacification plans in Central Vietnam. On the na-
tional level, 1965 provincial pacification plans
have not been approved and pacification funds have
not been released. Stop-gap funding measures have
been put into effect and should allow projects in
progress to continue and new ones to be started.
Deterioration of security has also caused a reassess-
ment of plans for the deployment of sub-sector ad-
visory teams throughout the country in order to
insure that minimum security conditions consistent
with the mission will. be met.
2. Declining security in I Corps and sabotage
activity has suspended all repair activity on the
railroad between the cities of Danang and Quang
Ngai. This vital stretch of track between these
two cities has been virtually abandoned. The high
level of Viet Cong sabotage on Route I which par-
allels its railroad suggests that the Viet Cong
are intent on closing these two transportation
routes. This would go a long way toward isolating
the five northernmost provinces from the rest of
the country.
3. In the I Corps zone, increased pressure
by reinforced company-size Viet Cong units has
forced the government to assign an increased number
of troops to static security missions.. This has
generally weakened GVN influence in cleared areas.
4. Increased Viet Cong activity, mainly
against hamlets in the II Corps zone, has forced
the corps, division and province chiefs to con-
centrate their attention on immediate tactical
problems rather than on the pacification effort.
In Phu Yen Province, the government's
inability to provide adequate security for pacifi-
cation cadres and local officials led to a flurry
of resignations; the loss of some fifty painfully-
recruited pacification cadres is a particularly
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AP01700020004-8
 Approved ForlRelease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T004701700020004-8
serious loss. The senior US adviser in the prov-
ince reports sharp deterioration that government
forces have retreated to the district towns, leav-
ing the Viet Cong in control of the rest of the
area. The security situation is comparable to
that of Binh Dinh Province which has been in
serious condition since September.
5. In the III Corps zone, with the exception
of the Hop Tac area, pacification progress has
been slower than normal. Defoliation operations
against Boi Loi forest were terminated on 18 Feb-
ruary. By 19 February, more than 1,800 refugees
from this area had been resettled in New Life
Hamlets in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong
Provinces.
6. In IV Corps, sector forces normally
engaged in the pacification effort were diverted
to conduct search-and-destroy operations. The
1965 pacification plan calls for major efforts
in the 7th and 9th division areas, in a coordinated
effort to establish a secure belt across the delta
to block Viet Cong infiltration to the south.
7. In the Hop Tac area, the pacification
effort has moved ahead at about the same pace as
in the past several weeks Ten additional hamlets
were added to the list of completed hamlets, bring-
ing the total to 309. Viet Cong harassment against
government efforts were at a low level. Hamlet
Survey Teams are reported to have sparked positive
actions on the part of hamlet chiefs to help the
people, a circumstance which has reportedly motivated
the people to supply its government with information
about the Viet Cong.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0017Q0020004-8
 Approved F4
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A CAMBODIA
1. The preparatory sessions of the Indo-
Chinese Peoples Conference, held in Phnom Penh
under the auspices of the Sangkum, Sihanouk's
mass political organization, were concluded on
17 February. The plenary session is to be held
on 25 February. Clear differences have emerged
in the course of the preliminary meetings between
Tran Van Huu's "Committee for Peace and Renovation
of Vietnam" from Paris, and the Communist representa-
tives on the other. The moderates or neutrals, call-
ed for elimination of all foreign forces while the
Communists aimed fire at the US only. According
to a member of Tran Van Huu's delegation and Sangkum
sources, the NFLSVN delegation insisted that it alone
had the authority to decide on policy regarding
South Vietnam. In any event, the preliminary meet-
ings ended with a call for neutralization of South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Cambodians expect
40 organizations--four from Cambodia, five from
Laos, eleven from North Vietnam, and 20 from South
Vietnam--to attend the plenary session.
B, PHILIPPINES
1. Ambassador Blair met with President Macapagal
and Defense Secretary Peralta 20 February for further
discussions concerning a Philippine task force for
South Vietnam. Although the results were incon-
clusive, Macapagal promised to discuss the US pro-
posals for troop allowances and increased MAP assist-
ance with other Philippine leaders. The Philippine
Government is clearly reluctant to move quickly on
this matter in view of instability in South Vietnam
and national elections at home; however, they have
not given any indication that they intend to with-
draw their offer of additional assistance.
25X1
Approved For (Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472A0g1700020004-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8
 25X1 Approved Fir Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00A001700020004-8
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01700020004-8