CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A003300010001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 17, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 2, 1957
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A003300010001-3.pdf233.85 KB
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Z~ 2 0 Of) W1 05.&(W* U 7 9 ZI+A 01 =sx j 2 September 1957 / 25X1 IOU or" DOCUMENT NO. AI T C I t'- L' I"~ a Nu (,FIAN~.,_ IN CLASS. ~V / BULLETIN K R0:aT~. PITH H HR 7 7 G2 25X1 ~ , v2t p DATE, REVIEWER OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET e 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP7 CURRENT 'S CLASS. CHANG II: T - 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03300010001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03300010001-3 25X1A Approved For 25X1A CONTENTS LAOS PRESSED FOR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WI USSR AND POLAND 2bAlA TO INDONESIA k- 2. HATTA'S VIEWS ON COMMUNIST THREAT 25X1A 25X1 REPORTEDLY, PLANNED IN ECUADOR (page 5). C iZ_ 3. COMMUNIST-INSPIRED GENERAL STRIKE 25X1A 4. AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR CAUTIOUS ON PROP Wr% TRIP TO MOSCOW 25X1A 2 Sept 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 25X1A Approved Fora Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0p3300010001-3 Approved Fbr Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T009754003300010001-3 25X1A 1. LAOS PRESSED FOR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH USSR AND POLAND 25X1A The USSR and Poland are now pressing the Laotian government to exchange dip- lomatic representatives on the basis of negotiations undertaken by Premier Souvanna Phouma during his earlier tenure, according to Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone. Souvanna has been negotiating with both countries for "some months, " according to Phoui, and the Laotian government has recently received Soviet agrement for the appointment of its ambassador in France to be con- currently ambassador to the Soviet Union, as requested by Souvanna over a year ago. In addition,, the Polish truce com- missionpr has presented a letter from his government, os- tensibly in line with an earlier request by Souvanna, granting de facto recognition to Laos and has suggested the way is now clear for an exchange of envoys. Phoui states he had been completely unin- formed on both these moves of Souvanna, and now is in a quandary over the situation. Comment Last November, as a result of Soviet ac- tion in Hungary, the Laotian cabinet.re- versed a decision to exchange representatives with the USSR. Souvanna may have sought an exchange of representatives with bloc countries in the hope of improving the climate of negotiations. with the Pathet Lao, who have in- sisted on a neutral foreign policy. In his earlier tenure, how- ever, Souvanna had a freer hand in determining Laotian policy; Phoui and Interior Minister Katay, leading anti-Communists of the two-party alliance which formed the present government, are now consolidating their power in the national assembly. 25X1A 2 Sept 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 25X1A Approved For Release - 3300010001-3 Approved Fo ;05P lease 9003.103.110 - 03300010001-3 25X1A 2. HATTA'S VIEWS ON COMMUNIST THREAT TO INDONESIA 25X1A Former vice president Hatta told Am- bassador Allison on 31 August that he saw no danger of a Communist take- over in Indonesia in the immediate fu- ture. In support of this view, he' pointed to the Communists' present minority in parliament, the generally anti-Commu- nist attitude of the a11ny, and the lack of vigorous Communist leaders. Hatta felt, however, that in the long run the Communist threat could become critical unless there was improvement in the economic situation in central and east Java, and unless leaders of the National party became convinced of the danger of cooperation with the Communists. Hatta apparently believes that the best that can be expected of the national round'-table conference starting on 10 September in Djakarta is an improvement in relations between dissident leaders and the government to the point that additional time will be permitted to work out their disagreements. Comment Recent Communist party gains in local Java elections indicate that it enjoys effective direction even though none of its leaders is a dy- namic public figure. Some National party. leaders reportedly favor ending the party's cooperation with the Communists, but a split apparently is continuing between, the older, leaders, who developed the Communist association, and younger lead- eSrs,-The economic situation in Java is rapidly deteriorat- ing without much hope that this trend will be reversed. 2 Sept 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 25X1A Approved For P,,elease 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A093300010001-3 Approved Fo - 010001-3 25X1A 25X1A 3. COMMUNIST-INSPIRED GENERAL STRIKE REPORTEDLY PLANNED IN ECUADOR A Communist- inspired general strike in Ecuador, reportedly planned for early September, could paralyze the Ecuadoran economy and challenge the stability of President Ponce's Conservative regimen F_ 25X1 25X1 The Communist-oriented oil workers.' federation is affiliated with the Communist-oriented Con- federation of Ecuadoran Workers (CTE), Ecuador's leading labor federation, which in turn is an affiliate of the Commu- nist Confederation of Latin American Workers and World Federation of Trade Unions. Staunchly anti-Ponce, the CTE might endorse a general strike and its Communist- penetrated railway union affiliate would probably support it, because the government has recently discharged-%000 railway workers. The government, however, has been alerted to the potential danger of the strike and has prom- ised to apply force if necessary to back the American com- pany's dismissals. 2 Sept 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 25X1A Approved For 25X1A 4. AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR CAUTIOUS ON PROPOSED TRIP TO MOSCOW Austrian Chancellor Julius. Raab told the American embassy in Vienna on 29 August that for a variety of reasons J he now thinks he will postpone until early next year his prospective visit to Moscow to discuss a scaling down of Austrian reparations deliveries. He implied that Moscow's informal offer to engage in confiden- tial personal negotiations would not justify an official visit in Austrian eyes, and added that, in any case, internal po- litical problems would preclude his making the trip this fall. He expressed a belief that the present governmental situation in Moscow is not sufficiently stable. The chancellor remarked as an after- thought and with evident dissatisfaction that Soviet Ambas- sador Lapin had recently had his first visit with Socialist Vice Chancellor Pittermann. 25X1 In any case, he is apparently worried that acceptance of Moscow's offer to negotiate with him per- sonally on a 50-percent reduction in reparations might re- vive suspicions that he is incautious in dealing with the So- viet Union. His distress over the Soviet ambassador's ap- proach to Pitte.rmann again suggests that Raab's interest in the negotiations is motivated in part by a desire to claim par- tisan credit for any concessions gained. 2 Sept 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin 25X1Page''6i Approved For