CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 2, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A00080
2 September 1965
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT. Cuban Subversion in Latin America
1. The Castro government remains convinced
that a Cuban-style revolution is inevitable in
Latin America and the "export of revolution" con-
tinues to be a major tenet of its foreign policy.
Cuba is willing and able to provide training,
money, and propaganda support to subversive
groups in Latin America through its espionage
and subversion organization, the General Direc-
torate of Intelligence (DGI). It now concentrates
on those countries--especially Venezuela, Guate-
mala, Colombia and Peru--where active subversive
movements already exist in the field, but it can
be expected to capitalize on "targets of oppor-
tunity" elsewhere in the hemisphere. The recent
events in the Dominican Republic were read by
Havana as both a lesson and a warning--a lesson
on the importance of having a trained cadre of
professional revolutionaries in place, ready to
take advantage of a chaotic political situation,
and a warning that the US is determined to prevent
"another Cuba" in this hemisphere.
2. Although Castro never has wavered in his
belief that revolution will sweep Latin America,
his appraisal of the practical realities in various
countries has undergone a change. In the last two
years, Castro's policies have suffered reverses
in Venezuela, British Guiana, Chile, and Brazil,
as well as in the failure of any of the continents'
militant subversive groups to overturn Latin Ameri-
can governments. These have served to convince
Castro that his "inevitable" revolution is not
imminent.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
3. Cuba appears to have altered its indiscrimi-
nate revolutionary ties in Latin America. An indica-
tion of this is seen in the November 1964 conference
in Havana of representatives of the Latin American
Communist Parties. Cuba and the other Communist
Parties agreed to aid only those groups endorsed
by the regular Communist Parties--with the proviso
that such groups adopt a more militant approach to
the problem of revolution in their respective coun-
tries. It is too early to tell whether this agree-
ment is being carried out. In one country--Guatemala--
there are some indications that the official Communist
Party is taking a more militant line, probably in
the hope that increased Cuban support will follow.
In Haiti, Cuba is trying to unify the two Communist
Parties and rally public support for a program of
violent action against Duvalier. Cuba has also
tried to enlist international propaganda support
for the "constitutionalist" faction in the Dominican
Republic,
4, The main focus of Cuban interest, however,
lies in those countries where Havana feels a
genuine revolutionary potential exists. As speci-
fied in the communique of the Havana conference
and consistently reiterated by Cuban leaders, the
three most immediate targets are Venezuela, Guate-
mala, and Colombia. Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay
were also mentioned as was Panama. In his 26 July
speech, Fidel Castro added Peru to the "official"
list of countries where a viable and exploitable
revolutionary situation exists.
5. A large number of Venezuelans, Guatemalans,
and Colombians participate in Cuba's continuing pro-
gram of providing Latin American subversives with
ideological orientation and training in the specifics
of revolutionary warfare.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
25X1
7 In its propaganda, Cuba seems to have
turned from its earlier, blatant calls to revo-
lution, and now spends more time in laying the
groundwork for revolutionary activity. This in-
cludes ostensibly objective reporting of economic
and political conditions in Latin America, along
with greatly exaggerated reports of the successes
of militant subversive groups and calls for unity
among revolutionary groups in selected countries.
Havana radio broadcasts 143 hours a week to Latin
America-in Spanish, French, Creole (Haiti), Aymara
and Quechua (Andean countries) and Guarani (Para-
guay). Emphasis is on broadcasts to the "top three"
--Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--and there
is even a special weekly program, "Venezuelan .
Panorama," although a portion of the Cuban effort
is devoted to almost every country, in the hemi-
sphere.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
 Alk Aft
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
8. Recent broadcasts to Haiti provide a case
in point. Rene Depestre, a Haitian Communist long
resident in Cuba, broadcasts vitriolic commentary
on the economic and political deterioration of
Haiti and the need for unity among the revolutionary
forces. Depressed by the lack of concrete action
by Haiti's two Communist Parties, Depestre stated,
"It is of the utmost necessity that all honest
Haitians gather under the banner of the Unified
Democratic Front...to make Duvalier pay for his
treason and all of his crimes." On the practical
side of revolution, Havana radio has also been
serializing "beautiful and inspiring" sections
from Che Guevara's manual on guerrilla warfare and
translated some speeches that were given in Cuba
by the representative of the Venezuelan Armed
Forces of National Liberation (FALN).
9. Cuba's role in the current Dominican situa-
tion points up several aspects of its subversive
activities. Cuba provided training to more than
50 of the rebels in Santo Domingo. The majority
of these were members of the pro-Castro 14th of
June Group (APCJ). In December 1963, Cuba was
involved in an abortive attempt to land weapons
in the Dominican Republic for the violence-oriented
Dominican Popular Movement (MPD),
100 When the revolt began in April, Havana
apparently decided that, tactically speaking, the
achievement of popular support for the Caamano
forces demanded that the Communist and Cuban-
trained participation in the revolt be overshadowed
by its proconstitution, pro-Bosch, anti-Imbert cast.
As a result, Havana at first did not refer to Com-
munist participation., did not extend diplomatic
recognition to Caamano, and used its propaganda
media to'concentrate on the "evils" of the Reid
government, the Imbert junta, and the OAS and US
presence. The APCJ, on the sixth anniversary of
its founding, was lauded as a popular, not specifi-
cally a Communist, group. Havana played as a
straight news item the decision of the orthodox
Communist group to change its name to the Dominican
Communist Party and did not take advantage of the
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8
opportunity to show that Communists were leading
supporters of the Caamano forces. The degree to
which US and OAS countermeasures prompted these
tactics cannot be determined. However, they do
show Castro's realization that tagging a "Communist"
or "pro-Castro" label on a movement is not always
useful to Cuban interests.
11. In sum, while Cuba may be in the process
of altering its tactics, it has changed neither
its desire nor its willingness to aid subversion
in Latin America. Havana will continue to offer
training and propaganda support--and probably
monetary assistance--to active revolutionary
groups throughout the hemisphere.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000800010020-8