CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003000100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
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2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA
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3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
g {~ 4. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOPS
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1,, f) 5. BRITAIN WARNS OF INABILITY TO HOLD LINE ON CHINA
TRADE CONTROLS
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2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA
The revolt of East Indonesian commander
Lt. Col. Samual on 2 March against
Djakarta's authority follows essentially
the same pattern as that of dissatisfied
army leaders in Sumatra last December.
Like the Sumatrans, the East Indonesians
are demanding greater autonomy and bet-
ter economic treatment.
East Indonesia, the territorial command
centered on Celebes and including the Moluccas, Lesser
Sundas and Bali, had earlier given numerous indications of
rising discontent. Samual himself had given the impression
that he sympathized with these dissident attitudes.
The East Indonesian break over the issue
of autonomy comes at a time when Moslem and non-Javanese
opposition to President Sukarno's plan to include Communists
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in the government is on the upswing. It also coincides with
a recent report that Moslem leaders in East Indonesia, as
well as Sumatra, have been alerted to "take action" in early
March if Sukarno persists in his plans.
The process of fragmentation in Indonesia
may not end with Samual's action. The restiveness of neigh-
boring Borneo suggests that leaders on that island may be
considering similar action. If this should occur, the Djakarta
government will have lost control over virtually all of Indonesia
except the island of Java.
Meanwhile, former vice president Hatta
has publicly warned that Sukarno's plan is bound to fail. This
statement will probably have the effect of stiffening resistance
to Sukarno's concept, particularly by the Moslem parties.
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3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
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The state of emergency declared through-
out Thailand on 2 March was designed to
cope with apparently spontaneous demon-
strations of popular disgust over irregu-
larities in Bangkok during the 26 February
national elections. There is no evidence
that, as implied by the government, these
demonstrations have been inspired by the
Communists. Late reports indicate that
tension in the capital city has somewhat
abated, although the situation remains
potentially explosive.
The American embassy in Bangkok has been
informed that the government has appointed
a commission of nonpolitical career offi-
cers to investigate electoral irregularities.
In addition, Premier Phibun has reminded
the public of its legal recourse under the electoral law in'-any
cases of fraud.
The Thai army chief, General Sarit, who
during the emergency is in command of all armed forces.in-
cluding the police, may be tempted to take advantage of his
enhanced powers to undermine his rival, Police Director Gen-
eral Phao. As the official who would be held responsible for
electoral frauds, Phao is in a highly vulnerable position. While
the government radio denies reports that the police chief has
been taken into custody, he apparently has not been participat-
ing in the emergency meetings of high officials.
In commenting on the present crisis, Khuang
Aphaiwong, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, re-
portedly stated that everything depended on Sarit, with many
people expecting the latter to emerge as the people's hero by
stepping in to demand new Bangkok elections while at the same
time getting rid of Phao.
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4,. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOPS
REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH
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Recent statements by Hungarian Foreign
Ministry officials support a report passed
to American officials by the Austrian min-
ister in Budapest that Soviet-Hungarian
discussions on a "status-of-troops" agree-
ment are to begin in March, A Hungarian
:Foreign Ministry official told an AP corre-
spondent that such discussions would begin
in the "second half of March," and the Hungarian protocol
chief informed the British air attache that talks on the sub-
ject of Soviet troops in Hungary "are beginning."
The Austrian minister believes the re-
gime may hope to head off expected unrest on 15 March, the
anniversary of Hungarian independence, through a "broad
hint" that if all goes well some favorable result will be forth-
coming. The American legation in Budapest adds that it is
not impossible that the USSR has made the successful handling
of the situation in March by the Kadar regime a prerequisite
for negotiations on the reduction or redisposition of Soviet
forces in Hungary.
Comment The reduction or redisposition of Soviet
troops, while it would not reconcile the
population to the current regime, would reduce some of the
tension by making less obtrusive the principal symbol of sub-
jugation and defeat,
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5.. BRITAIN WARNS OF INABILITY TO HOLD LINE ON
CHINA TRADE CONTROLS
25X1A The British government doubts that it
will be able to "hold the line" much
longer in maintaining controls on trade
with China over and above those with
the rest the Soviet bloc, the Foreign Office informed the
American embassy in London on 1 March. The government
contends that in view of Britain's precarious balance of pay-
ments situation, the additional China controls are an un-
necessary burden on the economies of both Britain and its
dependent overseas territories. It also cites the severe
pressure at this time from political and business circles
for a relaxation of controls.
With regard to East-West trade in gen-
eral, the government considers that controls should be con-
fined to items of real strategic importance and not used as
a weapon of economic warfare. It believes present controls
are more extensive than strategic considerations require
and sees no justification in recent events for adding to them.
Comment This appears to represent a significant
shift in the government's position. On
4 February the American embassy reported that while the
government agreed with its critics on China controls, it
would not accede to their demdnds for relaxation' for reasons
of international policy.
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