THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040015-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 9, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET POLICY
9 August 1963
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
SECRET
GROUPI
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MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
fHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
N THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
.8, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
)N OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
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OCI No. 2557/63
9 August 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM:
SUMMARY
Khrushchev's decision to sign a limited test ban involves
several considerations. He wants to create a relaxation of
tensions which would correspond to his projected reallocation
of resources toward the civilian sector of the economy. He
is able to use the agreement in the increasingly bitter maneu-
verings of the Sino-Soviet conflict. And he hopes it can be
developed to bring about a new atmosphere in East-West re-
lations which will provide fresh opportunities for forward
movement in Europe, particularly Germany.
In our view, important Soviet concessions to the West
are unlikely. But we believe that Khrushchev's economic
policies, and his decision to meet Peiping head-on, give him
a vested interest in perpetuating for some time the impres-
sion that a new era in East-West relations has begun. Thus,
we think that the USSR intends to sustain an atmosphere of
relaxed tensions for some time, even in the absence of tan-
gible agreements.
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THE NEW PHASE'OF SOVIET POLICY
1. After a long period of immobility and prob-
able internal contention following on the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, the Soviets have now embarked on a new
and active line of policy. As the Chinese Communists
have pointed out with great relish, Khrushchev has
executed a "180-degree about-face" in accepting a
partial ban on nuclear testing.
2. As with any major turn, the present switch
probably, involves a number of considerations, all
of which point in the Soviet mind to the desirability
of a period of reduced tensions in East-West rela-
tions. The main factors probably are Soviet inter-
nal economic problems, the sharpening conflict with
China, and the opportunities presented by current
divisions within the NATO alliance.
3. Present evidence suggests that an important
reason for Khrushchev's acceptance of a limited test
ban is the desire to ease the military burden on the
Soviet economy so that more resources can be devoted
to urgent civilian programs. He has made repeated
attempts to press this course upon his colleagues
for about four years. During this same period, the
economic case for some moderation of military and
space spending has steadily gained weight; the rate
of growth of GNP has slowed down, investment increases
have become smaller and smaller, agriculture has re-
mained virtually stagnant, and manifestations of con-
sumer discontent have increased. Military and space
programs, with their heavy demands on first-quality
resources and on the machinery and equipment industry,
have been the most important single cause of these
problems. Furthermore, Soviet increases in military
and space expenditures have thus far tended to spur
US military and space programs and thus to increase
the prospective future burden for the USSR.
4. Nevertheless, last winter it appeared that
the USSR might respond to the Cuban missile crisis
with a reaffirmation and perhaps even a strengthening
of the primacy of defense'over other economic sectors.
Khrushchev spoke of the need constantly to replace
advanced weapons systems and warned that increases in
consumption would have to be limited by 'defense needs.
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Beginning in the spring, however, Soviet officials
began to make statements which suggested that im-
portant new economic decisions were being taken. By
early June--before the President's American University
speech of the tenth and the receipt of the Chinese
letter of the fourteenth--Khrushchev laid down guide-
lines for revising the 1964-65 economic plan.
5. These instructions and his subsequent ela-
borations point to a major shift of resources into
the chemical industry, and specifically into those
components--fertilizer and synthetics--which work for
agriculture and the consumer. Present indications are
that the USSR intends to invest on the order of 15
billion rubles in this effort during the next five
to six years.
6. New investment in technically. advanced in-
dustries, particularly the chemical industry, will
require the same kinds of scarce resources as those
needed by advanced military programs. The `cf4o'rt now
projected is so large as to point strongly toward
a decision not to increase military and space spend-
ing at the high rate of recent years. We cannot
determine, however, how much the growth of military
and space expenditures will be checked, or whether
the Soviets contemplate actual reductions. Khrushchev
may have decided, for example, to resume the cutting
of conventional forces, to abstain from competing with
the US in a manned lunar landing race, or to set force
goals for advanced weapon programs lower than those
previously contemplated. Such decisions would pre-
sumably hinge on an easing of coidwar tensions which
would reduce risks to a minimum and hopefully result
also in a slowing down of Western military programs.?
And on the internal scene, Khrushchev wishes to be
able to point to an improved international atmosphere
in order to forestall objections that his shift of
resources endangers Soviet security.
The Conflict With Peiping
7. Whatever his internal concerns, Khrushchev
could not have decided for a test ban without assess-
ing the consequences for the dispute with China.
Since the Soviets knew that an all-out Chinese attack
on a test-ban pact was inevitable, the decision to
sign the agreement was at the same time a decision to
force the issue with China and'thereby to assert in
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the strongest terms their intention to determine
Communist policy. Furthermore, a nuclear test
ban,is excellently suited to the polemics over
nuclear war which the Soviets have chosen as their
strongest ground. Thus the. Soviets not only gain
something they can represent as a tangible suc-
cess for the general political line attacked by
China, but they force the Chinese to appear trucu-
lent and irresponsible in the sight of those
underdeveloped countries and foreign Communists
which are the objects of Sing-Soviet. rivalry.
8, Aside from these considerations, the So-
viet agreement to a partial test ban is one more
proof that Moscow assesses Sino-Soviet relations
as entirely beyond repair unless and until Peip-
ing makes a fundamental reversal of its course.
This does not mean, however, that Khrushchev will
acknowledge any common interest with the West
against China, lest this be taken as a sign of
weakness which would embolden the West to take a
firmer stand against his demands in other fields.
Policy Toward the West
9. Apart from these concerns of domestic de-
velopment and bloc. rivalry, the Soviets are also
moving to exploit the opportunities of the pre-
sent moment in the Western camps Divisions have
been widening between France and the Anglo-Saxon
powers, and Adenauer's imminent departure has
opened new prospects in Germany. The agreement
on nuclear testing is particularly appropriate
as the initial move in a more active European
diplomacy; not only does it engage.the sensitive
and unresolved issue of nuclear policy in the NATO
alliance, but it also opens all the Western dif-
ferences related to questions of European security.
10. This development in the Western alliance
comes at a time when the Soviets are keenly aware,
in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, that a
renewal of pressure tactics offers little promise
for immediate gains and probably higher risks than
ever before. On grounds of both prudence and op-
portunity, therefore, the tactics of detente, ne-
glected since the Camp David period, probably seem
indicated.
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11. The primary objective of present Soviet
tactics in Europe is, as always, Germany. Here the
USSR wishes not only to stabilize the position of
East Germany (and, by extension, of Eastern Europe)
but to destabilize the situation in West Germany
by persuading Bonn that its present allies have
forsaken their commitment to uphold the goal of re-
unification. Thus nearly all the Soviet proposals
for the "next" agreements after a test ban are de-
signed to extract Western acceptance of the GDR,
12. The non-aggression pact clearly pursues
this a?m,as does the proposal for limits on for-
eign forces in East and West Germany. The offer of
an exchange of military missions between Soviet and
NATO forces in the two Germanies works in the same
direction; these missions already exist, and the So-
viet proposal is merely designed to put them on a new
basis `Which.i*will extinguish their connection with
the postwar occupation agreements based on the con-
cept of eventual reunification. The Soviets have
not yet spelled out details of their suggestion for
control posts to inhibit surprise attack, but when
they do it is very likely that the two Germanies will
be included in the scheme as another means of freez-
ing the present division.
13. The more recognition the Soviets can obtain
for this division, the more success they would ex-
pect in their campaign to draw West Germany away from
its close connections to the West. The inducements
of trade are to be the main incentive in this effort,
and Soviet propagandists are now laboring to impart
a magic to the word "Rapallo." Khrushchev is prob-
ably encouraged by evidences of West German industry's
desire for Eastern markets, by Bonn's moves to estab-
lish trade missions in Eastern Europe, and by the com-
ing withdrawal of Adenauer. His constant complaints
against the restrictive US attitude toward trade with
the USSR reflect, we believe, not so much a desire
for greater exbhanges with the Americans but rather
an effort to break down the network of Western re-
straints which reinforce Bonn's hitherto negative
attitude.
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14, An additional factor in Soviet calculations
is nuclear proliferation, which to Moscow means pri-
marily the danger of a West German atomic capability.
It seems certain that the USSR does not expect the
partial test ban, or oven a comprehensive one, to
deter either France or Communist China from becoming
a nuclear power. But it probably does see the pre-
sent agreement, and the hopes for detente which it
is meant to generate, as raising further obstacles
against'..the various ways by which the Germans might
move toward a nuclear capability--an independent ef-
fort, cooperation with the French, or participation
in a multilateral force.
15. Khrushchev must calculate that, even if he
cannot make tangible advances toward these objectives,
he can in the very process lay substantial. strains
on relations within NATO, Broadly speaking, he can
continually pose to Germany's allies an 'apparent
choice between accommodating West Germany's concerns
at the expense of detente or sacrificing these con-
cerns to the prospect of a permanent stabilization
of Europe and a thawing of the cold war. In this way
he expects, at a minimum, to fray US and UK patience
,with Germany and to generate new doubts in the Federal
Republic.
Tactics in the Present Phase
16. For the present, then, Soviet policy seeks
to sustain an atmosphere of relaxed tensions in East-
West relations. In the process, the USSR will pro-
pose a variety of limited agreements, probably involv-
ing tactical, variations on previous Soviet positions.
But Khrushchev wishes to focus the negotiating process
primarily on Europe, and even here he probably does
not contemplate significant Soviet concessions to
Western views.
17. At Geneva, he will probably concentrate on
partial disarmament plans and declaratory agreements
of the type which he has recently set forth, but he
will also employ East-West forums to try to bring
such issues as the non-aggression pact to fruition.
We expect him at some point to make a direct over-
ture to Adenauer's successor. Throughout, he will
play upon the fears that Western refusal to grant
concessions will endanger the mood of detente. And
since his tactics depend greatly on precisely this
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mood, he.will probably find an early occasion to pro-
pose a summit meeting, calculating that he could put
the resulting Chinese outcry to use in his campaign
to isolate Peiping.
18, It is-too early, however, tp, predict with
confidence whether the Soviets would be willing at
some point to pay any important price to deepen and
prolong the new phase which they have set in motion.
The preceding analysis indicates no reduction of
their aspirations in regard to Germany, but rather
an intention to pursue them in a different way. They
have recently restated their aims to consolidate
the GDR's position in full equality with the Federal
Republic and to terminate the special, Western posi-
tion in Berlin in favor of a neutralized city. If
asked to make concessions, such as new guarantees
for Berlin, in order to sustain detente, we think
that they would probably refuse.
19. If the German question proves as intrac-
table as ever, the Soviets could terminate the present
phase; indeed, Ulbricht has recently taken pains to
remind the West of its vulnerability to harassments
in Berlin and on the access routes. We think it more
likely, however, that the Soviets will maneuver to
avoid a clear-cut early stalemate. Balked in one
field, they would probably seek some other area of
discussion to sustain the atmosphere of relaxation.
They might, for example, move to develop some new
perspective in the disarmament field, perhaps by
conveying a readiness to take up De Gaulle's pro-
posal to be host for a new conference. In this con-
nection, it is worth noting that China has reacted
to the nuclear test-ban agreement by taking over the
Soviet position as an exponent of radical disarma-
ment, a development which may help to keep Soviet
disarmament policy focused on limited measures.
20. Our view that the Soviets intend to sustain
a period of relaxed tensions even in the absence of
tangible agreements rests to a great extent upon
our belief that Khrushchev has been required by the
exigencies of his present situation to create a more
amiable relationship with the West. To this extent,
he is inhibited from reverting to high-risk policies
or even to more menacing atmospherics. We believe
that his economic policies and his decision to meet
Peiping head-on give him a vested interest in
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perpetuating for some time the impression that a new
era in East-West relations has begun. Some support
for this view an be derived from Soviet treatment
of the non-aggression pact; whereas Gromyko evidently
worked hard to secure a commitment on this from the
US and UK negotiators, subsequent Soviet propaganda
has listed it as the most desirable next step but
has not implied that detente would collapse without
it. It would be characteristic of Khrushchev to
enter upon a new phase of policy with great optimism
but without any clear idea of how much tangible suc-
cess was necessary to justify continuing the new line.
It would also be characteristic of him to scale down
his expectations only when repeatedly thwarted.
Some Contingencies
21. Western response to the ongoing detente
campaign will therefore have an important bearing
on how far Khrushchev is prepared to go. Though
he is advancing old proposals, there will be a
special incentive in the West to review them again
because of the prospects opened up by the Sino-
Soviet rift and the Soviet acceptance., without a
concurrent and tangible quid pro quo, of Western
terms for a partial test ban. On the other hand,
Franco-German suspicions of Soviet intentions are
already evident and are likely to be aggravated as
Khrushchev presses proposals related to the division
of Germany. If, at a later date, Khrushchev judges
that his detente tactics have brought about a sig-
nificant weakening of Western cohesion, but no
actual concessions, he might think that some re-
newal of Berlin pressures would help him to cash
22. Outside the framework of European relations,
there are two situations which could intrude on Khru-
shchev's calculations: Cuba and China. The,. more
conciliatory line toward the US brings general Soviet
policy into line with Khrushchev's efforts to damp
down the Cuban situation in order to consolidate
Castro's position. Agreement on this tactic was evi-
dently one result of the Castro-Khrushchev discussions.
But Castro is a third party to any East-West under-
standing, and he is capable of affecting it by his
own independent actions. His 26 July speech, for
example, constitutes a reservation of sorts on the
extension of any Soviet-US negotiations to Cuba
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and Latin America, and in general the intensity of
US-Cuban antagonisms makes unlikely any.substantial
and prolonged easing of tensions. Similarly, Khru-
shchev must fear that the US, even if It cooperates
in cultivating a general detente, will exclude Cuba
from this sphere and perhaps take some new vigorous
action against it, If Cuba and the-US become in-
volved in rising tensions and new clashes, Khrushchev
will be under great pressure to support Castro at the
expense of his detente tactics with the US.
23, The Chinese, of course, are violently op-
posed to the new turn in Soviet policy. In a number
of *hys=. aniaggressive move in Laos, for example,
or a new attack on India--the Chinese could demon-
strate the limits of any international understanding
reached without their participation. It is possible
that the Chinese could generate in the international
Communist movement enough disillusionment with Soviet
policy to force Khrushchev into demonstrations of
militancy and revolutionary zeal which would under-
cut his present line. We think this unlikely, how-
ever, because Khrushchev appears to have taken a
definite decision to contest these criticisms verb-
ally without altering his own policies.
24. A further contingency relates to internal
Soviet politics. In our view, Soviet domestic and
foreign policy have been more deeply intertwined in
the months since Cuba than in any other period since
Khrushchev attained powerI
25. Events of the past six months suggest the
existence of a conservative sentiment among some So-
viet leaders who would have opted for a different
line on economic questions and relations with the
West,or at least worked to oppose or dilute the line
which Khrushchev is now espousing. Not only the al-
location of resources, but questions of cultural
policy, the extent of de-Stalinization, economic
administration, and perhaps even relations with Yugo-
slavia appear to have been at issue in the presidium
last winter. Khrushchev has told several Westerners
that he had great difficulty in obtaining Kremlin
agreement on his December offer.of two or three on-
site inspections for a comprehensive test ban, and
implied that he had encountered reproaches when the
US insisted on more. Since the incapacitation in
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April of Kozlov, who we suspect was a key figure
among the conservatives, Soviet policy on all these
issues has increasingly reflected Khrushchev's pref-
erences. At any rate, in the aftermath of the Cu-
ban crisis Khrushchev's policies seem to have been
stymied, and this could have implications for the
durability of the present phase of Soviet policy.
26. By this we do not mean that Khrushchev can
be regarded as "soft" and his colleagues as "hard";
we continue to believe that Khrushchev probably was
the main proponent of the Cuban missile deployment.
What the evidence suggests is that Khrushchev has
a more flexible outlook and a greater concern to
keep Soviet policy in motion over a wide tactical
range, while some (not all) of his colleagues in-
cline more consistently toward internal discipline,.
heavy military spending, and a stance of greater
hostility toward the West. If this is so, it means
that some future development in the political leader-
ship could undermine the current line of Soviet for-
eign policy, especially if it fails to deliver the
benefits anticipated. In any case, following Khru-
shchev's departure there may be intense debate over
these matters.
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