CONVERSATION WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI, 15 NOVEMBER 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002700120013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 16, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

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OLC
16 November 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
15 November 1978
I discussed the proposed sensitive intelligence collection operation
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delivered the letter requesting this to hii-11~ I suggested,
however, that we need at some time to take some of these sensitive
clandestine approvals to the SCC as a whole, rather than just clearing
them at his level or his level and the Secretary of State. I thought
this was a good one. It was timely but not urgent. He agreed and kept
the memo in order to remind him to schedule an SCC meeting on it.
STANSFI END TURNER
Director,
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The Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
The Honorable Les Aspin
The Honorable Bob Wilson
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Sirs:
The meeting we held on September 13, 1978, to discuss your letter of
July 28 to the President was extremely useful to me and my colleagues.
Such full and frank exchanges go a long way towards broadening the area
of agreement and mutual understanding between us.
As a result of our discussions I have had the entire process of
clearing covert actions restudied. I believe there is one small, but very
significant, change that we can make vuhich will help to clarify the
situation. Henceforth, we will categorize Findings as either "specific"
or "general." Looking at the Presidential Finding
items
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A, B, C, D, E and the paragraphs under F which pertain to a network of
agents and paramilitary operational capability would be considered "specific";
other subheadings would be considered "general." The purpose for making
this distinction is to clarify what procedures ensue to check on the proper
implementation of a Finding once approved by the President.
a. In the case of specific Findings,) hat is to be
accomplished, and where and when, itiewbiJ, clear in the
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language used by the President; further instruction or clearance
within the Executive Branch should not be required. Clearly,
under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. to the appropriate nGV4
ia
committees of Congress is required. Overall, this
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44 -varp I. y edwre: the President mak specific determination;
the CIA 4?d T' snthe Congress; and t n>arri out the Presidential
~~.. ~'~ ~Ql
Finding.
I_r$a alaw-at top& &,..4
b. In the instances of general Findings, S
L;3 f
nrinQOrI Fn tArliirh to;- JyNYMs i ~?
. r covert action ct b spelled outti
r
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se. details be devel ooed by the
CIA 42
clears P6 ss within the
Executive Branch ip in
I understand that some of your members have questioned whether in the
cases of general Findings it is adequate to rely on clearance within the
Executive Branch for approval of amplifying details rather than going back to
the President. One example cited was whether support against domestic
terrorism in a particular country should be approved by the State Department
or specifically by the President. It is my view that we need note that we
can neither overburden the President nor. become so bogged down in clearance
machinery that we cannot act in a responsive manner. You will recall that
in the instance of providing assistance
What we do in the case of each general Finding is to obtain clearance
from the State Department and upon occasion from other concerned departments
of the Executive Branch prior to translating the general Finding into
specific action.
responsiveYtt4
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check to ensure that
ILLEGIB
the p ij i 4 : a-W o;, -- - ; ; .be in conformance with the 4a.34 c foreign
President entrusts to the Department of State the responsibility for
ensuring that the way in which the covert action is carried out meets the
.,, policyAof our country. In brief, when signing a general Finding, the
n ?~.gau?~A
standards of foreign policy which he has established and within which the
State Department operates.
With respect to Congressional involvement in this process, there clearly
is no question with respect to the specific Findings. "Under the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment your committee and the appropriate additional committees
are notified in a timely manner. As far as the general Findings are
concerned, you are, of course, notified when they are approved. I recognize
this leaves you with some uncertainty with respect to the details of
execution. However, yours is certainly the right at any time to interrogate
our relationship. If we were to inform you on a daily basis of all sensitive
collection and covert action activities, it would greatly overburden both
of our organizations for little advantage. It seems to me. that I bear a
specific responsibility, however,-to-identify activities which I believe you
are interested in and provide you notification, and that the essence of your
supervisory and oversight function is to buttress your responsibility for
intelligence activities by selective and judicious questioning.
In the .future, when you are briefed on a covert action Finding that is
classified as "general," it will naturally and automatically raise the
question in your committee's mind as to whether you have special concerns
us through the oversight process and it seems to me that is the essence of
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in this area and therefore want to conduct a closer oversight than with
a specific Finding perhaps.
I think we have benefited greatly from our discussion with you in September
because it has clarified the way in which we should carry out our
responsibilities to the President "
d_4" in obtaining permission to execute
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general Findings, and it- has clarified, in our minds at'least, how your
oversight responsibilities can be fulfilled in these same circumstances.
Your position and that of the President's, it seems to me, are very analogous
in these circumstances: each of you bears. a responsibility; wants to be
involved only in that amount of detail necessary for adequate control; and wants
ensure that the system truly is responsible to the national needs within the
proper degree of control.
I am grateful for your stimulus to clarify this situation. I stand
ready to discuss this further with you at any time.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
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