COMMENTS ON WARNING IN KOREA (WINK) STUDY FINAL REPORT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81M00980R001700070004-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 25, 2004
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 19, 1978
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
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19 September. 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for East
Asia and the Pacific
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Warning in Korea (WINK) Study
Final Report
REFERENCE: Your memo dtd 12 September 1978, same subject
(ER 78-9913/2)
1. I read your memorandum on the WINK study and proposed letter
to General Tighe. I am concerned in a number of respects:
a. To begin with, I don't see the virtue of post-
poning all effort on I&W in Korea while we try to sort
out the North Korean force level. I've had the distinct
i-opress;on there wasn't much effort. bei ng made in the
CIA in that regard, and therefore our analysts are not
tied up with that. Clearly, we have to sort that out
quickly and I would appreciate an early status report
on where we stand. I don't want to wait until it is
all finished and delivered before I get back into that
one again.
b. At the NFIB which approved the commencement of
the WINK study, I raised some serious questions, par-
ticularly as to whether the North Koreans were likely
to attempt a surprise attack. I don't know what they
did about those objections but assume they just forgot
them. I would appreciate knowing.
c. Having read just the short version provided here,
I am confused about the study itself and its measures of
effectiveness. The basic graphs that are shown indicate
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.'ate .? _ i y :~
'A i i as
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the probability of war starting at given times under
these scenarios.' I gather that these are simply the
objectives estimates of various analysts. What I am
interested in with regard to warning in Korea (and
Europe) is what indicators we should be watching to.
let us know if there is going to be a war. I am much
less- interested in subjective evaluations about how
'high that probability is at given days after tension
commences. I am interested in whether we are looking
at the right things. In short, we should have a matrix
of hundreds of indicators which we check every day, week,
month, etc., as appropriate. What I am looking for is
a Community discussion which would prioritize those
indicators so we are really looking at the right ones
I am not certain from this brief version that this study
is pointed in the right direction.
d. Your point that we need to crank in the political-
economic indicators is extremely valid, and we want to get
going in that direction quickly. Clearly, that cannot be
done in a study under DoD. General Tighe indicates that
he is proceeding with another study effort in this direction.
There is no reason necessarily to discourage that, but at
some point we have got to expand it to include the political-
military indicators. Among other things, we don't want to
get caught short again with a substantial increase in North
Korean armed forces without our having any indication of it
for maybe ten years. What are the indicators that would
let us know if they decide to make a substantially greater
commitment to their armed forces?
2: Overall I may be missing some point, but I don't really understand
why a revised estimate on the size of the North Korean forces is going to
be so critical to the way they might start a war. I seriously doubt that
it would be critical as to the warning indicators that I think are the
important thing for us to focus our attention on. I would like to see
you as the NIO begin to lead the Community in a direction that will help
us find long-term and short-term indicators.
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