CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A001800340001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 4, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 8, 1954
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A001800340001-4.pdf301.77 KB
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/VAe ~`"~~~''`_?? 25x ~ DOS REVIEW COMPLETED 8 December 1954 1 -4 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN QOCUMENT NO. Z5- Z NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Rr' C1 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ 2O / d AUTH: HR 7Q-2 DATE: _///&-d REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1A Approved For R se 2003/10/15 :CIA-RDP79T0097 AW800340001-4 SUMMARY FAR EAST 1. Hatoyama seen most likely choice for next prime minister of Japan (page 3). SOUTHEAST ASIA 25X1 2e General Collins summarizes situation in Vietnam (page 3). NEAR EAST -- AFRICA 4. Comment on execution of Moslem Brotherhood members (page 5). 5, Compromise solution in Tunisia seems probable (page 6). LATE ITEM 6. French officials deny Moscow demarche deals with four-power talks (page 6). 25X1A 8 Dec 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Releas2 tA10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4 25X1A Approved For Rgas 2003/10/15 - - A400 800340001-4 FAR EAST 25X1A 1. Hatoyarna seen most likely choice for next prime minister of Japan: Most political observers in Tokyo feel that Ichiro Hatoyama will be the next Jap- anese prime minister. Hatoyama is already selecting his cabinet, according to the American embassy. The Right and Left Socialists, however, are reluctant to support Hatoyama in the elections for prime min- ister in the lower house of the Diet because of his stand in favor of rearmament. They will do so only if he promises to dissolve the lower house as soon as .the regular budget is passed next springs The embassy points out that if the Socialists withdraw their support from the Democrats and run their own candidate, Liberal Party leader Ogata or a compromise candidate could still become prime minister. No firm decisions have yet been made and all parties are revising their strategy in the light of Yoshida's resignation. Plans now call for selection of the new prime minis- ter on 9 December o Comment: The Socialists, despite their attempts to ba?gain, are ire y to support Hatoyama for prime min- ister unless they discover some sort of deal between the Liberals and Democrats o The Socialists may reason that their temporary support of a weak Hatoyama government will hasten a general elec- tion in which they are sure to pick up strength. Of the total of 467 seats in the lower house of the Diet, Ogata's Liberals hold 185, Hatoyama's Japan Demo- crats hold 120, and the Left and Right Socialists hold 1340 The other seats are either vacant or held by representatives of minor parties o 25X1A SOUTHEAST ASIA 2. General Collins summarizes situation in Vietnam: At the end of his first month in Vietnam, General Collins feels that prospects are only fair at best that Premier Diem will 8 Dee 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release J/40/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4 25X1A Approved For R as 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 1800340001-4 develop an effective government capable of resisting Viet Minh encroachments. Although the worst of the army-government feud is probably over, Diem continues to preoccupy himself with petty details of army administration and with the elimination of any latent pro-Hinh sentiment to the exclusion of more important mat- ters. His recent replacement of chief of staff Nguyen Van Vy-- who is competent but a French citizen--by the inexperienced but pro-Diem Le Van Ty reflects this suspicion. Collins' initial impression of Diem's weaknesses has grown stronger, and he says "time is running out and it will take a lot of doing to make him into an effective leader," Collins believes Bao Dai's continued tamp- ering with :Vietnamese institutions, especially the army, is injuri- ous, and notes Diem's readiness to assert increasing independence of Bao Dai. American relations with the French are satisfactory, Collins states, and General Ely has given assurances that the joint policy of supporting Diem will not be sabotaged by French subordinates, many of whom are still strongly anti-Diem. 25X1 3. 8 Dec 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For ReleascM3/1,0/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Rdea 25X1 NEAR EAST - AFRICA 4. Comment on execution of Moslem Brotherhood members: The execution of six members of the Moslem Brotherhood in Cairo on 7 December will further alienate the Egyptian masses from the Nasr regime. Despite its history of terroristic activity, the Brotherhood is largely regarded as a religious, organization and therefore the execution shocks the sensibilities of the devout. . The Brotherhoods violent opposi- tion left Premier Nasr no real choice; however, the executions can hardly be expected to stop terrorism. As a result, the regime will probably be forced to rely increasingly on police measures and has little prospect of returning to even a nomi- nal democratic basis. Brotherhood cells in various parts of the Moslem world have helped bring about an extensive adverse reaction to the executions. Mass demonstrations have occurred in several Arab states, and even in Pakistan- -normally removed from Arab politics-strong criticism has been voiced by re- ligious leaders. The Nasr regime has probably lost some of the prestige and influence it recently gained in the Moslem world and has lessened its chances of ultimately controlling the Sudan. 25X1A 8 Dec 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Releas25 40/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Ryas 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975 81800340001-4 5. Compromise solution in Tunisia seems probable: .It now seems probable that well over 75 percent of the outlaws will lay down their arms. The Neo-Destour nationalist party's delegates made a supreme effort to induce the fellagha to accept .the amnesty terms. The French authorities in Tunisia are elated and considerably surprised by the number of fellagha surrenders, ac- cording to the American consul general. A high-ranking French official told the consul general on 5 December that steps will be taken at once to provide jobs for ex-fellagha members to prevent them from return- ing to banditry. He admitted, however, that he has no employment plan ready. Comment: Prospects for a short-term compromise in Tunisia appear to be the best since 1951. The long-term outlook is, however, less clear. A final settlement must overcome the objections of both the French settlers with their powerful political allies in. Paris and extremist Tunisian nationalists. 25X1A There are indications that Premier Mendes-France prefers to have a final Tunisian settlement de- layed until after the 10 December parliamentary debate on North African policy in order to avoid revealing the extent of his con- cessions to the Tunisians and thus avert attacks by his oppo- nents in the assembly. LATE ITEM 6. French officials deny Moscow demarche deals with four-power talks: High French officials have told Ambas- sador Dillon that the French demarche in Moscow is concerned solely with "the -Austrian affair,, and have denied as "utterly without foundation" press reports that the demarche 8 Dec 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For ReleaQbMA110/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4 25X1A Approved For Rajoas 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975 4p.1800340001-4 deals with the possibility of a four-power conference in May. -Both Alexandre Parodi, secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, and Jean Soutou, the premier's personal foreign affairs spokes- man, have given these assurances, Dillon and British ambassa- dor Jebb consider the French explanation "reasonable:' Parodi. has also strongly assured Dillon that, contrary to speculation following General de Gaulle's speech of 4 December, the French government has no intention of hold- ing up the implementation of the Paris accords pending the hold- ing of a four-power conference. Comment: The United States and Britain have objected to the French making a unilateral demarche in Moscow, fearing that such action would create the impression that the three allies were divided, and thus give the USSR a diplo- matic advantage. Washington and London have reluctantly agreed to a demarche, however, on condition that the French say, in making the demarche, that they are doing ,so following consulta- tions with the United States and Britain. Mendes-France is eager to press a de- marche on the Austrian question so that he can rebut charges in the assembly that his UN speech of 22 November was only "window dressing." He also hopes to expand his talks with Moscow ulti- mately into four-power discussions of all areas of East-West disagreement. 8 Dec 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For ReleasCOMP10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800340001-4