ACTION ITEMS FROM DISCUSSIONS ON 10 JUNE 1977
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080021-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 3, 2005
Sequence Number:
21
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 10, 1977
Content Type:
MFR
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CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080021-9.pdf | 408.11 KB |
Body:
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10 JUAN i9?7
MEMORANDUM.FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Action Items from Discussions on 10 June 1977
3. Joe Kraft had an article in the June 9th Washington Post
about a "magneto-hydrodynamic" electrical power generating capability
that the Soviets have and in which we are also involved. I would
like to understand what this is, what its potential is, and what
our participation is?
4. Dr. Brzezinski would like to know if we see any connection
between the fact that we tested a nuclear power source for a satellite
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in 1965 and the Soviets first did it in 1971. Did they get the idea
from us?
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6. Covered all topics on the agenda.
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June 10, 1977
Somalia-Ethiopia: Troubles in Ogaden
I. The destruction on June 1 by Somali-supported insurgents
of ,three bridges on the railroad linking Addis Ababa to
Djibouti, the capital of the French Territory of the Afars
and Issas, probably marks the beginning of increased
Somali pressure on eastern Ethiopia.
II. Siad has probably concluded that the time is opportune for
regaining the Ogaden while Ethiopia's military capabilities
are at their nadir and before Soviet support and Ethiopia's
own mobilization efforts bring an improved military posture.
III. The attack has notably increased tension between the two
countries. The railroad is Ethiopia's principal rail link
to the sea, and Addis Ababa believes the attack on this
vital artery presages increased Somali activity in the
Ogaden. Somalia's propaganda attacks against Ethiopia
have become particularly virulent, and seem intended to
provide a justification for an attempt to regain the
Ogaden.
IV. Ethiopia, despite its concern, is unlikely for now to
attempt a military retaliation against Somalia.
A. This cautious policy could change if the substantial
amounts of military equipment from the Soviet Union,
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East Europe, and Libya, and more aid--including
modern Soviet tanks and MIG aircraft--has been
promised.
Addis Ababa is also proceeding with the rapid
expansion of its regular and irregular forces, and
has begun an offensive against insurgents in
northern Ethiopia that, if successful, would free
troops for use in the Ogaden.
V. Siad, on the other hand, sees political survival as
threatened if he failed to act and allowed Ethiopia to
regain the initiative against the insurgents before it
was too late.
VI. Siad and other members of the ruling hierarchy would
probably want to avoid the prospect of the insurgents'
suffering defeat and being forced back across the border.
The insurgents would probably turn a ainst_the,Mogadiscio
Government if they felt it had abandoned them.
VII. Increase in tensions have made more difficult Moscow's
attempt to maintain good relations with both Ethiopia and
Somalia.
VIII. They may come under increased pressure to speed up arms
deliveries to Ethiopia in response to the increased
threat from Somalia.
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IX. If there is a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, it
is likely to be short and limited to the Ogaden and
neighboring Somali territory. Neither side could be
expected to sustain concentrated military activity by a
large number of units for more than a few weeks; each
would quickly begin to encounter supply and maintenance
problems and shortages of petroleum products.
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621622 517 CIA
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- One hour "Open House" in your
office after each Morning Meeting.
- Presidential items.
- Use of office downtown.
- Administrative flexibility. Don't
hold up for observed compliance
with format.
014
1977
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DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ITEM ON IMPACT OF THE 200-MILE FISHING CLAIM ON
THE SOVIET, JAPANESE AND KOREAN FISHING INDUSTRY
1. We talked before about the problems for nations with large
fishing industries and/or heavy reliance on the protein from fish
for their national diet of the extension of maritime zones to 200
miles. Forty-four countries have claimed such zones, twenty of them
since the beginning of this year and more are expected to
declare them before the year is over. The attached chart brings
this out clearly and it also points out that since nearly all the
world's prime fishing grounds are within 200 miles of land that
only in the southern hemisphere, and particularly the south Pacific,
there is not much opportunity for expansion. When the Australian
Foreign Minister was here, I noticed that heJcommented on
expanding Soviet fishing activity in the south Pacific and the
graphic illustration certainly shows why.
2. The Soviets, the Japanese and the South Koreans have been
taking different methods to offset this impact on their fishing.
a. The Soviets first declared their own 200-mile
zone on the first of March of this year and will
conserve the catch in their own waters more for
themselves. They have, for instance, reduced the
Japanese catch by 50% and the South Korean catch by
100%.
b. They are also continuing a program they have
had in effect for many years of extending fisheries
aid to the lesser developed countries. Over the last
15 years they've given aid to 33 developing countries
totaling over $230 million dollars. The Asians have
countered to help the development of local fishing
industries but the repayment is generally in the form
of goods and services to the Soviets' own fishing
fleet operating in the area.
c. The next and most recent Soviet move starting
in about 1971 was the conclusion of joint venture
fishing agreements with 18 developing countries with
another nine currently in negotiations. In this case,
the Soviets take a 49% interest in the fishing venture
and thus have a voice in the local fishing operations
that guarantees them some measure of fishing rights
in the territorial waters of these countries. The
countries are shown on the next map of the world, the
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salmon-colored countries being those which have received
aid, the dotted countries those in which there are joint
ventures today, and the hatched ones in which there are
negotiations for joint ventures. Attached also is a
list of the specific countries who participated in the
aid and joint ventures programs. It is noteworthy that
almost half of the Soviet investment is in Africa, and
nearly 40% of that in Somalia. The other large
recipients of aid are Iraq, Egypt, South Yeman,
Bangladesh, and Chile.
(1) There are some of us who are suspicious
enough to believe that the Soviets have more than
protein in mind and are looking for a foot in the
door for further ventures by way of the use of
military base facilities, the military aid program,
and political penetration. This was certainly the
sequence that was followed in Somalia between the
early 1970's and today.
3. The Japanese are responding in a similar way. They
expect to declare their 200-mile fishing zone later this year.
They've also lost a $700 million seven-year program to increase
the yields of fishing in Japanese coastal waters.
a. They've established 200 joint fishing
companies in 51 countries, with the greatest number
in Asia and Oceana, and the bulk of the remainder
in Africa and Latin America.
b. Thirty of these companies are jointly owned
with United States interests.
4. South Korea has signed fishing agreements with 19 Asian
and Latin American lesser developed countries, one of which has
helped Koreans by paying licensing fees to fish in these countries'
waters.
a. South Koreans have also provided government
support for an agreement under' which 30 United States
fishing vessels will catch 130,000 tons of fish and
deliver them to the South Korean processing ship
stationed just outside our claimed 200-mile limit.
The intent is to avoid U.S. quotas. Whether this
unusual procedure will hold up or not remains to be
seen.
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