DRAFT ITEM FOR NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200090026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 10, 1979
• Content Type: NOTES

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10 OCT 1979
DRAFT ITEM FOR NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR
QUESTIONS ABOUT SECURITY LEAKS
I continue to be asked questions about security leaks. This
indicates the concern all of us have over the damage being done to
the country's intelligence capabilities and security by the continuing
flow of leaks. Because this is a matter of concern for each of us,
I would like to address some of the recurring questions that I receive.
One of these is: "Who leaks? Is it us? The Defense Department?
The
State? Congress?" In my opinion, there is no evidence that any
particular organization leaks more than any other. I believe that
nearly all recipients of classified information leak to some degree.
Perhaps at one time or on one subject a particular department or agency
will be the guilty party, but over the long run evidence is lacking
to show that any particular organization is more guilty than any other.
Leaks, however, can be broken into two categories--those as a result of
carelessness and those which are deliberate.
Carelessness. One form of carelessness is failure to comply with
the prescribed rules for handling classified material. Shortcuts such
as "talking around a problem" or "doubletalking" on an unclassified
telephone, failure to keep classified material under required control,
or not ensuring that everyone privy to a conversation has the
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requisite clearances all can contribute to leaks. Each such
breach of procedure may have only a small probability of leading to
an actual leak, but cumulatively they are the source of a great deal
of our problems. Another form of carelessness that results in loss
of important information is vulnerability to entrapment. This is
particularly true in dealings with members of the media. The standard
ploy is for a member of the media to pretend that he knows the whole
of some story and then get you to flesh it out for him. Good
journalists try these ploys repeatedly until they have pieced together
what should be highly classified material. All too often we are
entrapped because we want to feel important.
Deliberateness. Espionage is, of course, the most pernicious type
of deliberate disclosure in an unauthorized way. Beyond that, there
are individuals who deliberately leak classified information in order
to influence events or policy formulation. Sometimes they are giving
official background briefings which transcend what they are authorized
to say. Sometimes they feel the only way to further some program or
policy is to bring the pressure of the media to bear through leaking
classified information to the public. With deliberate leaks it is
possible to deduce that there are more likely motives for a particular
agency or department or the Congress to leak than some other, depending
on what policy or program appears to be at stake. That does not mean,
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however, that any particular organization is more likely to be the
source of a leak than another or that we can place the blame for the
problem of leaks on someone else. It is my strong conviction that
the only way we will correct the problem in the long run is for each
of us to start with his own office and attempt to improve security
where we each work. Instead, if we each blame it on the Congress,
or the White House, or the Defense Department or anyone else and stop
looking for ways to make our own operations more secure, we will
never improve.
Another question that frequently crops up is: "Isn't it more
difficult today for CIA employees to adhere to the rules of security
since we have a policy of greater openness with the public?" Some
people feel that it was easier for us when we just didn't talk at all
about our work.
In my view, it is no more difficult today for each of us to observe
proper security than it ever was. In point of fact, there never was
a time when nothing was unclassified or when we did not talk about our
work at all. It has been many years, for instance, since the government
instituted the policy of deliberate periodic downgrading of classified
information to unclassified. All along we each have had to be acutely
aware of the distinction between what is classified and what is unclassified.
Today in public we still don't talk about classified material. This
applies whether it is classified "Confidential" or "Top Secret."
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Sometimes I am asked: "How can you distinguish between what is
'sensitive' and what is not?" In point of fact, the term "sensitive"
has no meaning in our security structure and we should never be fooled
into thinking that because someone judges a piece of classified
information as not being sensitive it can in fact be discussed in public.
What is different today than in the past is that the public and
the media. are much more interested in our activities and much more
persevering in looking into them than ever before. This is not
something which we can control; it is not something that is likely to
go away. The only thing that we can control is how we respond to these
probings. The rules which govern Agency employees in dealing with the
media have not changed one whit. CIA employees simply do not deal
with the media unless they are specifically authorized to do so by the
Office of Public Affairs. Of course, there is no way we can or would
want to rule out social contact between our employees and members of
the media. Here, however, is where entrapment is a particular problem.
What appears to be an innocent social conversation can quickly turn
into deft probing by a member of the media. Our rules, however, are
that CIA employees do not answer phone calls or have meetings with
members of the media on matters of intelligence unless they are
specifically authorized.
In sum, our openness has always been a controlled openness bounded
carefully by who is authorized to deal with the media; bounded by a firm
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dividing line between anything that is classified and what may be
discussed in an open forum; and bounded by careful adherence to all
of the established security procedures. Nothing has changed these
boundaries. Each one of us needs to observe them.
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