REMINDER MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200090023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 15, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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15 October 1979
REMINDER MEMO
SUBJECT: The First Seminar with the Economists
points at the Business Council:
a. A balanced budget.
b. Tight monetary policy reducing the supply of money.
c. Continued wage price constraints.
d. Reduction of cost-raising actions by the government,
e.g., regulatory burdens.
e. Stability of the dollar internationally--BOP.
f. Holding back energy costs.
g. Greater investment in creativity.
2. I Icomment--there is a risk on the agriculture side.
It is a bad crop year.
a. Common remedies won't do. Controlling demand is inadequate.
Need to control the supply production side.
b. Strategy for the 1980s.
(1) Balance the budget.
(2) Decrease government regulations.
(3) Encourage private investment through tax incentives.
(4) Encourage industrial innovation.
(5) Solve the energy problem.
(6) Improve human capacities through training.
(7) Reduce antitrust interference with a market structure.
that will make us-more competitive on the international scene.
(8) Expand trade.
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0 i
REMINDER MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Impressions from Discussion with
the Midcareer Course
1. There is a considerable mistrust of the supervisors and their
degree of control over careers.
2. There is a great fear of the new proposed program to. give
bonuses to GS-13s through GS-15s at the expense of half of the cost of
living increase for others. They feel it will make people behave in a
conservative way.
3. There is a great push for specialists, but DDO has recently
abolished the specialist category.
4. Why can't there be transfers into the DDO? Can't the DDO do
a survey of where they are short.of people today--presumably mainly in
Headquarters support?_ Would they not be better off with experienced
people from NFAC, DDS&T or DDA filling those positions than brand new
CTs? Are they up to their full quota of people?
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15 October 1979
REMINDER MEMORANDUM
Discuss with DDCI--let's take some dramatic action on Agency-wide
advertising for secretarial openings.
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15 October 1979
REMINDER MEMORANDUM
Discuss with DDCI--I'd like to approve the Annual Personnel Plan
numbers for recruiting and promotion -- soon.
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and count Soviet missile silos than it is for them to tell
the nationality of soldiers in a troop emplacement.
Verification of what the Soviets are doing in strategic
nuclear weaponry will be much easier with SALT than
without it, because each side will be governed by the
treaty's limits on numbers and sizes of missiles, and we
can look by satellite for violations. Without SALT there
will be no limits, and no rules against hiding, coding
signals, and other actions 'that will constitute
"cheating" if SALT is in force.
As to Soviet intentions in the Western Hemisphere,
there is no doubt that, given an opportunity, the
Soviets would expand their influence. But 2500 soldiers
armed with 40 tanks and some armored personnel
carriers and artillery pieces-but no airlift or sealift
capacity-scarcely represent. a threat to the United
States or any other country in the Western
Hemisphere. They are not even new. The Soviets had
20,000 troops in Cuba at the time of the 1962 missile
crisis. In February 1963, Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara said the Soviets still had 17,000 combat
troops. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean
Rusk pronounced them no threat to the US. Kennedy
made clear that the United States would not permit
.Soviet troops or Cuban troops to intervenein conflicts
elsewhere in the Hemisphere. To the best of anyone's
knowledge, they never have done so.
in spite of the evidence and the Kennedy-era
precedents, anti-SALT forces managed to whip
Washington into a frenzy over the Soviet brigade. The
Carter administration, having let matters get out of its
control, over-reacted. It tried to explain that there was
no threat here and that everyone should calm down.
But both President Carter and Secretary of State Vance
said this was a "serious" matter and that the "status
quo" was "unacceptable." Administration phrase-
makers seem to have thought"status quo ... unaccept-
able" was a clever device designed to produce success
whatever happened. But what Vance and Carter were
understood 'Co mean was that the US was insisting the
Soviet Union had to remove its troops ... or else. The
administration could not deliver upon this threat,
although it did secure Soviet "assurances" that the size
and nature of the force in Cuba would not be expanded.
In .the real world, this isn't a bad outcome for US-
Soviet negotiations. It will prevent the Soviets from
using our acceptance of 2500 combat forces as
permission to introduce 40,000. But because the
administration raised false expectations about its
intentions, the opponents of SALT, are only too glad to
make capital out of the fact that the 2500 soldiers still
are there. Even Senator Church is urging a treaty
reservation saying SALT can't go into effect unless the
president can certify the 2500 are gone.
With any luck, the Soviets may quietly disperse their
force in order to pacify the SALT opposition. But
suppose this happens. Will we have won a "victory"?
We certainly will not have de s ed-as seems to are and alwa e
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be desperately necessary for some Americans-that we
can face down the Soviets, 1962-style; and make them
crawl. If they withd.ra rany'forces;.i.t.w.ill be as part of a
coskfident'show of restraint on their part. It will be a
demons.tratid,n that they want SALT badly. It would be
good" f,,tkie:y:did,this; bit,it~wiil not satisfy any SALT
oppLinen.ts. they will sirriply'argue that SALT&ives the
Soviets such strategic advantages that the'USSR was
even willing to forgo its beachhead in the Western-
Hemisphere to get the treaty passed.
Of'President Carter's other responses to the Cuban
"crisis," some are ludicrous, such as the order to have
Marines storm the beaches at our Cuban naval base at
Guantanamo. Others are sensible, but irrelevant, such
as establishment of a joint task force headquarters in
Key West. Still others are meritorious-and relevant-
but these are the ones that probably will have least
priority for the administration, or will be stymied by
Congress: expanded foreign aid for troubled, subver-
sion-prone countries in Latin America; and establish-
ment of an effective quick-reaction military force to
intervene in real crisis areas in the world.
Soviet troops in Cuba are part of joint Soviet-Cuban
military and political activity all over the third world,
especially in Africa. This is a challenge to which the
United States so far has found no answer. Defeating
the SALT treaty is certainly no answer at all. Despite
the poses struck by American hawks, the US is unlikely
to go to war any time soon to prevent Cuba from
expanding its 50,000-man force in Africa. There are
cases-Yemen this year was a good example-when US
military power can be effectively employed to halt pro-
Soviet aggression. We need an effective quick-reaction
force and an expanded Indian Ocean fleet to deter-
and, if necessary, resist-military threats to our
Persian Gulf oil sources. And there are cases of civil
war, such as Angola, when giving overt or covert
military aid might make the difference between a
communist victory and the triumph of pro-Western
forces. But in most cases, Cubans are present in Africa
by invitation, and trying to expel them would be an act
of aggression on our part.
What are the answers to the Soviet-Cuban challenge?
Realistically, they lie in politics, attention, and spending
US resources to meet the development and security
needs of particular third world countries. If the United
States wants to block Soviet and Cuban expansion, it
will have to devise and execute carefully tailored
policies for individ.ual_third world countries, offering
them more political help, more economic assistance,
and (when. necessary) more arms than the Communists
do. We can tailor disincentives, too, for regimes that tilt
or fall to the Communists, but we should not declare
even these irrevocably lost. If we do not devote our
attention and resources to Africa and Latin America-
and to our own conventional and nuclear forces-we
will. suffer defeat after political defeat in the 1980s, and
2500 Soviet soldiers in Cuba will be irrelevant, as they