WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 12, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
African Nationalism in Rhodesia
Secret
ARCHIVAL RECORD N2 45
PAS: RETURN TO
*%G CY cH g 12 May 1967
No. 0289/67A
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AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA
Rhodesian Africans today are apathetic, or with-
drawn, notwithstanding their many grievances against
the white-controlled government. The relative pros-
perity of many has made them hesitant to speak out
against the regime, and most appear resigned to some-
thing less than the militants among them demand.
White attitudes in Rhodesia have hardened and British
policy has only stiffened white resistance to any
liberalization. Indeed, the economic sanctions
against Rhodesia are hurting the Africans far more
than the whites, and it is apparent that Rhodesia's
economy can function for quite a while with little
damage to the white standard of living. The two ma-
jor African nationalist organizations continue to be
weak and ineffective. They are factionalized and
strife ridden, and efficient police operations have
made it virtually impossible for either group to
launch a large-scale operation against the government
forces any time soon.
The African Mood
Conditions in Rhodesia to-
day would appear conducive to
widespread discontent and dissen-
sion: 225,000 whites have com-
plete political and economic con-
trol over more than 4,000,000
blacks; Africans are permitted
only a token legal voice in the
government; African political or-
ganizations have been banned and
their leaders jailed or detained;
government security forces are
thorough and often brutal, and
security legislation is openly
directed at the suppression of
African political activity.
A great economic and social
gulf separates the affluent whites
from most urban Africans, who are
excluded from the skilled trades
and have little chance of obtain-
ing more education. The relatively
few educated Africans find that
there is really no place for them,
and among the whites they are often
even suspect because of their edu-
cation. The wage-earning African
receives only one tenth the pay a
white man gets for the same job.
The government has done little to
improve African education, and in
fact has recently initiated cut-
backs in African teacher training,
citing lack of funds. It is more
likely, however, that political
considerations are behind this
move, as Africans below a certain
level of education are prohibited
from voting.
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RHODESIA
BOTSWANA
Gatooma'
*Que Que
Gwelo :
Shabani* \
Prospects for Africans have
been made even bleaker by the
general increase in urban African
unemployment since the imposition
of the economic sanctions. More-
over, large areas of good white-
owned land lie unused, while the
rural Africans are restricted to
the areas of poorer land. At the
present rate of growth, the Af-
rican population will double
within 20 years, and the land
presently available to Africans
is already becoming overcrowded.
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REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
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Despite these frustrations,
the mood of Africans in Rhodesia
remains singularly calm, and
there are no outward signs of
widespread discontent. The urban
Africans, in spite of the inferior
economic and social status ac-
corded them, have benefited from
Rhodesia's over-all prosperity,
are still considerably better off
than Africans in most of the
neighboring countries, and are
well aware of this. Many live
quite comfortably and are able to
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help support less fortunate rela-
tives. They have shown themselves
generally unwilling to jeopardize
their jobs and security by in-
volving themselves in antigovern-
ment activity.
Many urban Africans undoubt-
edly believe that they have valid
grievances, and are probably in
sympathy with the nationalists'
goal of bringing about majority
rule in Rhodesia. Nonetheless,
they often deplore the violence
and irresponsibility of the na-
tionalists--frequently directed
more against Africans than
against whites--and are realistic
enough to realize that the end of
white rule is not yet in sight.
Rhodesia's rural Africans
have little contact with politics
and the central government; in-
deed, they probably have little
sense of national identification.
Historically unwarlike, they have
shown little interest in the mili-
tant nationalist cause, and the
nationalists have made few ef-
forts to establish themselves in
the rural areas.
The tribal chiefs are often
the only point of contact the
rural Africans have with the gov-
ernment, and as semiofficial gov-
ernment appointees, the chiefs
must promote government programs
and policy in order to protect
their own positions. The nation-
alists have attempted to under-
mine them by accusing them of
being stooges of the whites, but
in large parts of the country the
chiefs are still held in great
respect by many of their people.
As the rural Africans become more
"modernized," the influence of
the chiefs may wane, as it already
has in the urban areas, but this
modernization is still a long way
off.
Although the harsh security
legislation and police activity
may antagonize the Africans, it
has disrupted African organiza-
tional activities and has kept
would-be agitators out of circula-
tion. The leaders of the nation-
alist organizations are almost all
in jail, in detention, or in exile_ 25X1
White-Black Relations
The racial attitudes of Rho-
desian whites have been growing
more unyielding since the late
1950s. The emergence of the more
urbanized, politically aware Af-
rican in Rhodesia has combined
with the success of independence
movements in other African coun-
tries and the violence in the
Congo to make the Rhodesian whites
uneasy about their own future.
The successively more conservative
leaders elected by the whites
passed security legislation aimed
at curbing African political ac-
tivity, and between 1959 and 1964
one African political organization
after another was declared illegal.
The shift of white political
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sentiment to the right culminated
in the victory of Ian Smith's Rho-
desian Front party in the May 1965
parliamentary elections, and the
"Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence" (UDI) in November 1965.
African political leaders,
originally dedicated to obtaining
for their people a more effective
legal voice in the government,
became more militant after they
were forced out of the legal po-
litical arena. They began to ad-
vocate violence and the eventual
overthrow of the whites. As
their militancy increased, white
attitudes hardened further, and
communication between the races--
never good in Rhodesia-virtually
ceased. Thus, at a time when Af-
rican grievances were increasing,
the possibility of rational dis-
cussion became even more remote.
Racial animosities have been
exacerbated by the more recent
white immigrants, whose racially
privileged position gives them
a much higher standard of living
and social position than they en-
joyed in their home countries.
They are most outspoken in their
condemnation of Africans and of
African efforts toward self-de-
termination. Moreover, pressure
from Britain in the form of eco-
nomic sanctions and a distrust of
British Prime Minister Wilson
have only stiffened white opposi-
tion to any prospect of majority
rule, under which most Rhodesian
whites fear they.will lose every-
thing.
The Nationalists
The only significant African
nationalist organizations today
are the Zimbabwe African Peoples
Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe Af-
rican National Union (ZANU). ZANU
was formed in 1963 by ZAPU members
who were dissatisfied with the
leadership of ZAPU's president,
Joshua Nkomo. The split was fol-
lowed by a protracted period of
violence and infighting in which
each group tried to intimidate un-
involved Africans but which left
many Africans with a profound dis-
taste for the nationalists and
their methods. Both organizations
cite majority rule in Rhodesia as
their goal, and their differences
have been based more on personal-
ities and tribal factors than on
ideology. The principal leaders
of each group who are still at
liberty are in exile in neighbor-
ing Zambia.
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to the :Rhodesian security forces.
ZAPU, traditionally more in-
fluential and still the larger of
the two major nationalist organi-
zations, has been on the decline
for the past year. It receives
financial support from the Organ-
ization of African Unity, the
USSR, and several African coun-
tries. These sources have also
provided some equipment and train-
ing, but ZAPU has been unable to
infiltrate enough trained men
into Rhodesia from its base in
Zambia to pose any serious threat
ZAPU has. always refused to
consider any plan for unification
with ZANU, although ZANU has often
said that it would work with ZAPU
under certain conditions. Some
observers attribute this obstinacy
to the suspected "messiah complex"
of Joshua Nkomo. The ZAPU leader--
who has been in detention for
three years--is said to believe
that he is destined to be the
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Kenyatta of the Rhodesian peoples
and wants no competition for this
role.
ZANU, on the other hand, was
comparatively active throughout
much of 1966, after having been
virtually dormant since late 1964.
ZANU was responsible for several
terrorist incidents during 1966,
Although both organizations
have accepted funds from Commu-
nist countries--ZAPU chiefly from
the USSR and ZANU from Communist
China--there are no indications
that either has come under the
political influence of these
donors. Both ZAPU and ZANU
espouse the vaguely defined ideal
of "African Socialism" and ap-
pear ready to accept aid from
anyone willing to give it.
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A popular uprising by the
mass of Rhodesian Africans is
almost inconceivable at this
time. Increasing African unem-
ployment brought on by the eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia
may lead to greater unrest, but
many unemployed can still fall
back on the land if necessary,
and life for Africans in Rhodesia
is still much better than that
in many other African countries.
The pressure of the growing pop-
ulation on the subsistence agri-
culture and poor land will un-
doubtedly bring economic problems
in the rural,areas, but irriga-
tion schemes and the introduc-
tion of modern farming methods
into the African areas could
forestall trouble for many years.
The nationalists reportedly
are now taking the line that
Rhodesia's Africans must take a
harder stand against the whites,
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without relying on the outside
world, and are attempting to whip
up sentiment for the native use
of force to bring down the Smith
government. The fact remains,
however, that the nationalists
do not now have the organization,
leadership, or popular support
necessary to cause the government
any grave harm. As long as con-
ditions in Rhodesia remain within
limits of toleration for Afri-
cans, the Rhodesian African will
probably continue to accept what
life brings. 1 -1
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