ART HOLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 250
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1964
• Content Type: SINT

PPLEASE ,2 TU15 SHEET (IN TOP OY ITUS 1`>i1TERIAL AT ALL TIHES
-fir eel - - ' CtA=RDP78TU3-194ADO02000~0001-1
JOB NO.2? BOX NO.- - 1'OI,I)I:IZ N0. __
The material hereunder has been treated as a single, unified, integrated
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procedures. The following review decision applies to the entire integrated
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o R E -y r a r e d 7 __41 _
n COMP TYpE _._-._----------
RIG CLANS y ` y b y C'_~CS _ ----
I! UST NEXT fl V A'JTU; HR 14.2
The file hereL nder his been en.tero(.1 into t.hc DAZI.: system as a si.ngl_e recut?d
under the title:
SI IOULD IT D1', NE . ES`~l'~I T TO IIE 4)VL AM i O}a' 1 ~.~N 01 till ; N>i"y 1'I L 1AL , th"o t nit cr
must he x'ev.tewecT in i`dtial.Ty fo class i.r.a.tt:on bra us :III results of t.li,;
revi cw clearly marked on e,.ich docwnent. according, to r.i1)p 1 .i.cabie procedure s.
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-Revised: June 1981
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{
STUDIES'
?
in
INTELLIGENCE
nJOB NO, 1. ,1. '
BOX No ------ sz?
FOLDER p,?O _ _ 02
TOTEL rocs HEtFEIN J_
CCC /_ REV DATE
CR,*G COMP Cat TYOE
05-G CUSS~ REV CLASS
JUST ____ NEXT M _ "-AUTt}t HR 10.2
VOL. 8 NO. 1 WINTER 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 ; IA-RDP78T03194A0002000 - SECRET
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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EDITORIAL. POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 27 Langley Q and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted through channels. They should be typed
in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the
Office of the Editor,
Page
The 1963 Studies in Intelligence Award ........... faces 1
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
The Recruitment of Soviet officials ... Andrew J. Twiddy 1
Takes fresh aim at the all-important target. SECRET
Work with Walk-Ins .................... Ivan A. Serov 17
View from the adversary's vantage point. SECRET
The Analyst in a War Theater Role .... Robert W. Smith 49
Political and economic intelligence on the Taiwan
J2 staff. SECRET
For an Eclectic Sovietology ........ Richard W. Shryock 57
The problem of the warring methodologies. CONFI-
DENTIAL
Better an Office of Sovietology ......... John Whitman 65
For unifying the study of Soviet politics. CONFI-
DENTIAL
Windfall from Hong Kong ........ Charles F. Turgeon 67
Selective questioning of the wave of immigrants from
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
On "The Craft of intelligence" ....... Frank G. Wisner Al
Re
l
ti
f
ec
ons of a veteran intelligence chief.
I
ntelligence in Recent Public Literature
Mnemosyne and the OSS ........ . A17
S
i
p
es and defectors .. , . .
A21
S
oviet intelligence . .
A28
Publi
c Texts in Intelligence Walter Pforzheimer A31
U
d
t
p
a
ed bibliography.
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Andrew J. Twiddy is an officer experienced in anti-Soviet
operations.
General Ivan A. Serov until recentl
-
I
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Robert W. Smith is a CIA economic intelligence officer.
Richard W. Shryock and John Whitman are members of the
national estimates staff.
Charles F. Turgeon is a junior officer trainee in CIA.
Frank G. Wisner, creator of CIA's original covert action or-
ganization, succeeded Allen Di}lles as head of the combined
CIA clandestine services in 1951. After illness forced him
to relinquish that post in 1959 he served in other respon-
sible capacities in Washington and abroad until his recent
retirement from government service.
Walter Pforzheimer is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence
Collection.
MORI/HRP THIS
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A new concept of soft sell and
painstaking development in
making an agent of the ad-
versary.
THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
Andrew J. Twiddy
THE 1963 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
The award of $500 offered annually for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence was divided in 1963
between two quite different types of articles.
articles appeared in the Fall 1963 issue.
There is no dispute, in principle, about how important it is
that we recruit Soviet officials as information agents. What
we urgently need to know about Soviet strategic intentions,
capabilities, and clandestine action to undermine other govern.
ments can in the last analysis be learned only from those who
have access to the secret files of the USSR. No spy-in-the-sky
can bring back this information. The highest aim of clandes-
tine agent operations is to recruit and direct people who can.
This is a clear principle, but in practice U.S. operations
against the all-important target tend to be neglected in favor
of more easily successful work in response to the demands of
the moment. The extreme difficulty of the task of inducing
members of the privileged class of an inherently patriotic na-
tion to betray their country, coupled with past failures at the
task, has engendered a widespread skepticism about the very
possibility of success-"Why go to all the trouble when we
know it won't work anyway; we've got too many other things
to do." Yet the job is anything but impossible, given the use
of suitable methods and the widespread disaffection existing
in the Soviet system.
The Vulnerable Target
The tensions ' and ills of that system bear down on most of
its subjects in one degree or another, and its very extremism
almost demands that disaffection be expressed in extreme
terms. The regime invites treason by demanding absolute, nar-
row, rigid, and humorless conformity as the price of a decent
existence. The road to the top in any profession, including
intelligence, is climbed by Party work, toadying, and a stance
of fanatic loyalty as much as by professional competence.
Fear and suspicion poison relations between Soviet citizens,
making genuine friendship impossible. The extreme, almost
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irrational care with whom tofe screens incubating
work abroad is a symptom
in officialdom.
etto-like communities, representatives of
Abroad, in their gh
what they are told is the strongest power on earth are warned
of the dangers of normal social contact with local citizens.
Their children must return to the USSR after the fourth and
last year at an embassy school because Soviet children are not
allowed to study in Western schools. Their owand inform-
movements are monitored by security personnel ants. Because they are human and the system is not, they
ants. and
clandestinely break rules all the time and suffer the conse-
quent tensions. They are bedeviled by denunciations, spying,
gossip, jealousies, and sexual and other frustrations. Their
zeal and originality are often rewarded with suspicion. Their
security dossiers are gradually filled with evidences of imper-
fection inevitable under the arbitrary and often vindictive
standards of discipline. An offense which in the West would
bring only a reprimand, if anything, may be enough to send
the Soviet back home in disgrace, to face punishment or even
dismissal from the service and Party. the foreign
Aggravating their discomfort are the appeals of and life they see around them. Although no people, by large,
is likely to prefer an alien to a familiar way and the Russians
are particularly proud of their country. and heritage, when
they see this foreign life against the background of the evils in
present-day Soviet reality they often find in it one or another
compelling attraction, depending on their individual personal-
ities-its easy personal freedom, the pleasure of relaxed trust
between people, a career without toadying, or merely the lure
of the exotic.
It is evident, to be sure, that many of our Soviet counter-
parts abroad are secure in their positions, happy in their work,
and enjoying the best of both worlds. But even for these the
possibilities of trouble and treason lurk not far beneath the
surface in the strains of such an environment. This, then, is
our target-a vulnerable thing festering with discontent and
resentment, rendered brittle by narrow conformism and dog-
matism, its vulnerability heightened by underlying cynicism
or despair about the system as a whole and made more acute
by exposure to another world and other ways of life.
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Restraints
If this is a fair picture, why don't more Soviets come over
to us? Those in trouble, reflecting on ways to get out of it, will
somewhere along the line think of recourse to the West;
"choosing freedom" is too common a phenomenon in the :East
ever to be entirely overlooked. Intelligence officers in particu-
lar are aware U.S. intelligence will help them financially if
that is what they need. But even if a Soviet is practically
in despair and has gone so far as to think about ways he could
contact the Americans or the local security authorities, these
plans will probably never take concrete shape but founder on
an assortment of inhibitions and fears. In the end, more of-
ten than not, he will stolidly return home, rationalizing des-
perately that perhaps everything will be all right after all.
The inhibitions that hold him there to face the music rather
than come to us are too many and too complicated for full
discussion here, but some of them must be noted because they
are pertinent to the argument to be developed in this paper:
Fear of the unknown, lack of understanding of the West.
Stories of discrimination, race riots, warmongering,
oppression of the proletariat, unemployment, etc.,
are believed in the East.
Distrust and fear of Western intelligence services. Many
Soviets view Western intelligence as viciously anti.-
Soviet, the toughest anti-Soviet influence in Western
life. Soviet intelligence officers, particularly of the
KGB, assume that we share their own unquestioning
aim of destroying or taking the enemy by whatever
force or stratagem is available. Thus they believe
Western intelligence is bent on destroying them, not
helping them. They do not know how they will be
received, and many even fear that they will be pun-
ished for their past work against the West.
Anxiety about making a place for themselves in Western
life. Especially they fear being unable to earn a
decent, honorable, and independent livelihood. Al-
though Soviets abroad usually know of successful de-
fections and rehabilitations in the West, they are
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troubled by reports of at least as many failures, of
former colleagues turning into friendless, drunken
wrecks, abandoned in an alien environment. Cer-
tainly they do not believe that they will be permitted
to work actively in their former profession, and many
are not willing to be transformed from senior officers
into mere information sources or "agents." Most
of them fear that they will be "squeezed dry like a
lemon" and then left to fend for themselves. All
these fears are purposely nourished by Soviet propa-
ganda.
Fear that Soviet penetration of Western intelligence serv-
ices and governments means for them not only detec-
tion if they work for us in place but retribution if
they defect. This fear is particularly acute on the
part of intelligence officers, many of whom have per-
sonally known of such penetrations.
Unwillingness to leave relatives behind, or to burden
relatives with the consequences of their treason.
The human tendency to follow the path of least resistance
rather than take a bold and lonely step fraught with
danger and the stigma of treason.
Ignorance of how to make contact safely with our people.
We often assume wrongly that any Soviet knows
enough to find an American or go to the embassy,
but in fact they are afraid of finding the wrong
American, or of being observed going into the embassy
and so having burned their bridges. Talks with
friends will not have suggested ways to get safely
to a Western service; this subject is taboo and can-
not be brought up even in jest.
In spite of all these restraining influences, many Soviets
have come over to us of their own accord. The number of such
volunteers contrasts so sharply with the failure of deliberate
efforts to recruit them that one suspects there must be some-
thing radically wrong with the American approach. Let's ex-
amine the standard approach, then, in an effort to find the
trouble.
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The Conventional Wisdom
The process of recruiting Soviet officials stationed abroad,
in the traditional and still prevailing conception, goes some-
thing like this.
A field station gets, from its own sources or from liaison
with the host country's service, the identifying data
on Soviets stationed in its area, including photos,
dates of arrival and departure, official functions or
title, sometimes their predecessors or successors, oc-
casionally some personality information. This is
supplemented by headquarters traces. The station
tries to determine which ones are members of the
Soviet intelligence services, the KGB and GRU, and
acquires more data on them through double agents
and various investigations. It identifies their local
contacts by means of phone taps, informants, obser-
vation and surveillance, liaison sources, etc., and it
establishes contact with these people in order to use
them as sources of information or means of access
to a target Soviet official.
The station collects and analyzes information on the tar-
get's points of possible vulnerability to recruitment or
defection, judging them against Soviet realities and
the experiences of the past, including the motiva-
tions of Soviet defectors. When it decides, with
headquarters, that the vulnerability is great enough
to give a reasonable chance of success, it plans a
recruitment or defection pitch. The plan is often
made and carried out quite hastily, for example when
a new source who judges the target defectable is ac-
quired and is available for use in the operation, when
an agent of the target has been arrested or he has
otherwise been compromised, or when he is about to
be transferred back to the Soviet Union.
Finally, using one of its own officers or, more commonly,
one brought in from the outside for better security
or for his special qualifications, the station makes the
"pitch." It must often be made in a public place,
there usually being no secure or comfortable access to
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the target. It is usually designed for maximum im-
pact, revealing to the Soviet all the compromising in-
formation we have; it usually offers the inducement
of a monetary reward; it carries explicit or implicit
threats of exposure or other trouble if the offer is re-
fused. It puts the Soviet officer in the position of
having to answer yes or no on the spot.
Many of us have seen this system applied and have tried it
out ourselves. The preparatory phases go nicely enough, but
at the culmination we have seen it fail repeatedly, some think
inevitably. Our offers evoke a violent reaction or a scornful or
indifferent refusal or a public flap. These failures have often
muddied local operational waters, have made other tasks more
difficult, and have given American inuelligkice a reputation
in Soviet eyes for clumsiness, naivete, and callousness that
certainly does not enhance our future prospects.
Why doesn't it work? A lot of professional thought has
gone into this, usually after each failure. Time after time
the reasons have been isolated and reviewed-in adequate as-
sessment of the target, overestimation of his vulnerability, bad
timing, or too cold an approach. But this analysis, made in
the hope of doing better next time, has merely scratched the
surface. Our work has not just suffered from flaws; it has been
based on fundamental misconceptions. That is why we haven't
done better next time, and won't do better as long as we con-
tinue in the same general framework.
Structural Weaknesses
The traditional method normally requires that the Soviet
make up his mind right away, that on the spur of the moment
he weigh our arguments against his own logic and inhibitions
and take here and now an irrevocable step, betraying his col-
leagues and annihilating his whole past and his planned fu-
ture. But no sensible person makes decisions this way, es-
pecially vital and unpleasant ones. The process of decision
on critical personal matters is usually long and turbulent, full
of starts and stops and reversals. While it can be influenced
by advice and outside intervention, such as repetitive sugges-
tion, it cannot be resolved sanely by a sudden forcing of the
issue. To impose an ultimatum is almost to guarantee a de-
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cision in favor of familiar fears and the normal course,
against the drastic step we propose. The latter requires :long
self-persuasion.
The very act of the pitch, the shocking bald invitation itself,
helps build barriers against success, almost regardless of the
objective circumstances. Even one who has long contemplated
defection is likely to be outraged and frightened when suddenly
a practical stranger, representing what he views with distrust
as a hostile force, asks him openly and callously to do here and
now the difficult and repugnant deed he has been hiding in
the recesses of his mind. This stranger has put him in an
embarrassing and difficult position; he must now report the
incident and suffer the consequences. His negative reaction
is especially strong when the approach not only endangers
him but includes a financial offer: however subtly presented,
this tends to make the whole thing sordid.
Proper timing in a recruitment approach is not merely some-
thing we have somehow failed to achieve; it is a mirage. In
every voluntary defection a complex array of personal and pro-
fessional circumstances and pressures have conjoined to make
the deed feasible at one precise point in time. We in the dis-
tance, with our inadequate sources and file data, would prob-
ably not even learn that a particular Soviet officer was dis-
turbed or in trouble, much less precisely when the pressure
became critical.
Successful recruitment requires that the target be not only
vulnerable but psychologically capable of such a step. But can
we ever know enough to pick the right candidate? Defectors
have tried to make us understand that no Soviet ever con-
fides to another, even his best friend, his true thoughts on
these matters. They are all caught up in the desperate game,
whose stakes are not only career but survival, of appearing
holier than the Pope. A Russian saying holds that "the soul
of another is darkness," and in Soviet Russia this is truer than
ever. We will probably never get enough psychological insight
into any Soviet to make a decent judgment about whether
he would ever, under any circumstances, be capable of treason..
As we do not know enough to distinguish potential targets
from the many who will never jump and the many others who
don't need to, so also we will probably never be able to judge
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just what sort of recruitment situation or recruiter would be
most likely to entice a given target to a favorable decision
rather than repel him: should it be a Slavic or American type,
for example; should he speak Russian or English? And even
if we could know all this in advance (and perhaps even the
target himself wouldn't), our operational resources are seldom
good enough to permit a careful and subtle development of the
target by the right people in the right way and at the right
time.
If we can agree that a person must have time to make an
irrevocable and heartbreaking decision when and as he can and
needs to, we arrive at the logical conclusion that the Soviet
must recruit himself. We cannot and need not supply the
essential pressures forcing him over to us; the Soviet system
will do that, and we can only help the process along. The de-
cision and the timing are the man's own. This important dis-
tinction was expressed not long ago by a Soviet intelligence
officer who had come to us. In describing some Soviet opera-
tions, he told about an attempt of his own to recruit a foreign
national, who had refused in spite of a real threat and intense
pressure, and he expressed his personal respect and admiration
for the man. Then, seeing the possible analogy with his own
case, he said, "You see, you could never have recruited me.
No offer or pressure could have brought me over." He was
dead serious, and convincing. The fact that he had made his
own decision and taken the step himself had put his act on
an entirely different plane.
This does not mean that we should abandon recruitment
operations, depending on walk-ins and devoting our case-officer
time to easier and more pressing tasks. On the contrary, we
should redouble our efforts. It is within our power to bring
over Soviets who without our intervention would never take
the step. But to do so we must revise our aims and methods.
We must recognize our limitations and our real opportunities.
New Construction
What is proposed is to change essentially our conception of
recruitment, to stop thinking of it as an event or incident, a
one-shot deal, an offer or question followed by a few hours'
decisive conversation. Instead, we should regard it as a series
of varied operational steps carried out over weeks, months,
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and years without a pre-set terminus. The process would be
designed to reduce our target's ignorance of the West and dis-
trust of us and make him know, by reminding him repeatedly,
that he can defect, if he eventually must, with prospects for an
honorable and active future, or he can safely cooperate with
us in place. While taking action, without his knowledge, to
increase wherever possible the pressures that might eventu-
ally force him to us, the program would show him how to come
over safely and provide him the channel to do so. It would
take for him the first difficult step towards eventual commit.
ment by establishing meaningful contacts, personal and im-
personal, and keeping these contacts alive as long as possible
and necessary.
Each step in the long-term operation against each Soviet
target personality should contribute in some way toward his
eventual recruitment, giving him information and encourage-
ment to help allay his fears and inhibitions, weakening his
position or otherwise increasing the pressure on him, or open-,
ing for him a safe way to come over. Each step has to be
tailored to the target and to local conditions and capabilities,
as well as to what has gone before and what is planned for the
future in each case. It is thus difficult to suggest concrete
actions for general use, but a few examples will be given later
for the sake of illustration. First it will be worth while to
examine some characteristics of all such actions.
Each step should be carried out under conditions of maxi-
mum security. A clumsy or crude approach in public will only
raise the target's ire and contempt and compel him to report
it. Similarly we should avoid, in general, use of the open mail
or telephone, and we should be careful how we use people who
are known to local or Soviet counterintelligence. Our action
should be designed to impress the Soviet with our competence,
security, and genuine concern for his safety and personal in-
terests, and at the same time to convince him that he might
get away with it if he fails to report to his authorities.
Each action should seek to minimize the chances that the
target will report it. By reporting it, he ratifies in his own
mind the "no" he gave us, which he might otherwise secretly
preserve as a "maybe" for the future. And his superiors -will
do what they can to guarantee his refusal. As a target of
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Western intelligence, whatever the circumstances, he has be-
come tainted, potentially dangerous. He will sooner or later be
recalled and any future assignment abroad prejudiced or de-
layed. On the other hand, any operational incident or contact
with us, however innocuous, which he fails to report brings
him closer to us. Not only does he compromise himself and
expose himself to pressure in our follow-up actions, but by that
simple omission he starts to cross an important first barrier
in his own mind; he comes a step closer to conspiring with us
against his own authorities.
We can encourage the omission by taking our steps securely,
by avoiding ultimatums, and by maintaining a sympathetic
and friendly or neutral and businesslike attitude, never a
threatening one. (Even if we confront him with compromising
information, we should try to convince him that we won't ex-
pose it but remind him that if his security people find out we
may be able to help.) Moreover, the action can be made so am-
biguous in content and purpose that he will not have anything
to reject and may be unsure whether he really needs to report
it or even what it was all about. We can make it progressively
clearer in follow-up steps, but by that time, hopefully, he will
have compromised himself by failures to report the early
phases.
Each action, as part of a long-range plan, must be followed
up by further steps, either direct contact or behind-the-scenes
activity, in a constant effort to add to the cumulative effect,
to keep up regular reminders, to provide deeper assessment of
the man, and to establish a firm channel between us and him.
Intervals between steps may vary from a few days to years,
but we use the arrows in our quiver one by one rather than
all in a single volley. We can hint in one meeting that we have
other information which we will impart later; this might help
keep his interest, increase the tension and fear, and encour-
age him not to report to his superiors right away.
Direct contacts with the target through our officers or agents
or through letters may be supplemented by indirect actions
designed to exacerbate his problems, weaken his position,
heighten the tensions around him, and help the Soviet system
vomit him out. We can use provocations, fabricated informa-
tion; public exposure, manipulation of double agents, or other
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actions to harm his position, with one proviso: we should not
tell him, or allow him to know, that it was we who did it. We
are trying to build up his. confidence in our good faith toward
him.
Some Don'ts
Under this concept we should drop some practices of the
past. We need not entirely abandon direct offers of aid or
suggestions of cooperation, even "cold" ones, but we should
stop confronting Soviets with ultimatums or threats, even
when the target takes violent offense at a friendly approach.
After all, our very approach has beset him with new problems
and dangers, and it may be normal to react with hatred or
fear. We should always keep our real goal in mind-not to
harm him, but eventually to recruit him. He may shy now,
but he will remember us if he needs us later. Best leave this
memory as palatable as possible.
Our work should be carried out less by American intelligence
personnel directly and more by local citizens on our behalf.
Soviets do not have their defenses up against the local com-
munity as much as they do against American officials; a pro-
posal, suggestion, or hint given by an apparently innocent
local citizen has a better chance to be entertained, and less
chance to be reported, than a similar one made by an Ameri-
can official. The latter would automatically be viewed as a
provocation, exciting fears and inhibitions the former would
not.
We must not try to get final results here and now. Our
first approach or contact should be regarded as only the be-
ginning of a long series. Each step we take should be shaped
according to this modest conception, and we should resign
ourselves to the possibility that we may not be able to judge our
progress or even the immediate effects of any given step. Al-
though with luck we might be able to accelerate a man's de-
cision, we must accept the fact that we may never get our
man at all, and if we do it may take the five, ten, or more years
that many past defectors had pondered their decision. We
must reject the idea that a Soviet's transfer back to the USSR
signals the end of the operation, demanding drastic action
to justify the effort already put into it. We must be patient,
reminding ourselves that he will probably come out again
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before long, and content to have made a long-term operational
investment.
When a Soviet begins to talk to us, when we begin to work
our way into a relationship that suggests recruitment, we
should not require black-and-white resolution of the situation
but be satisfied with half-success and compromise. Half-
recruitment or even less is better than nothing. Many who
want, some of them desperately, to get away from the Soviet
system or help destroy it are not ready to pay the price of
telling all, especially at the very beginning of a relationship
that requires trust on both sides. We should try to be more
flexible, realizing that if a Soviet withholds some information
and perhaps lies about other matters, this does not necessarily
mean he is actively trying to damage us, and it certainly does
not mean he was sent out against us, is in reality under So-
viet control. That a Soviet being recruited does not immedi-
ately tell all does not mean that he never will. Patience and
human understanding will take us a long way.
We should exercise discrimination in whether, when, and
how to offer money as an inducement. Even if the Soviet's
main motivation is materialistic, we must allow him to ration-
alize it on ideological or other grounds to maintain his own
self-respect. If money is not a real factor with him, the mere
mention of it may repel and alienate him. American intelli-
gence already has a reputation, officially promoted by the So-
viets, for buying people to do dirty deeds. It is usually quite
different appeals which will bring about the drastic decision
we want Soviet officials to make.
We should not entertain the idea that we can ever induce a
defection. All we can do is help the Soviet system do that for
us. That system, even without help, will create fears, doubts,
and disillusionment, and it will get many Soviets into trouble
sooner or later. Only let us try to insure that when the
trouble comes to a head (we won't get advance notice) we will
already have prepared and pointed out the way for the man
concerned.
We should not consider our dossiers mere collections of data
which, hopefully, might some day lead to a one-shot all-or-
nothing D-day. Our file on any Soviet abroad should be a case
file, a record of action taken and a source of inspiration for
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future action-all part of one continuing operation to nudge
him toward eventual cooperation.
Not knowing in advance who will come to us, or when, we
should prepare the way for as many Soviets as possible. The
limited actions proposed here should be incomparably more
numerous than the recruitment pitches of the past. This does
not mean that we should flail about hitting at every Soviet
in sight, nor should we repeat the same techniques so often. as
to dull.their point. But if we are to recruit Soviets, we have
to act. We must make our Soviet targets know that we are
here, active and competent, and what we want and what we
have to offer. If we have usable data and access to our targets
we should use them. And if we don't have them we should go
out and get them.
Case Sketches
Here are a few examples, hypothetical and real, of tactics
useful in such recruitment operations.
A young KGB officer under student cover, say, is approached
at the end of his short tour abroad. Our veteran operator
merely greets him in a fatherly way, exposes our knowledge of
certain sensitive aspects of his life, says we have been watching
him carefully, wishes him well in his KGB career, and promises
to get back in touch when he is sent abroad again. By this
step we put him in a ticklish position. Should he report our
approach? We have not provoked or tried to recruit him; and
we have shown him he is blown, a fact that could if reported
hamper his future career and interfere with assignment
abroad. At the same time we establish meaningful personal
contact, a direct channel to us which he can use now if he is
already looking for one but which in any case we can keep alive
against a future need. Presumably he goes back to the USSR,
on schedule, and we don't know whether he reports it. But
when he 'comes out again the same officer will appear in his
path from time to time. And we will work on him on the side,
trying to uncover his operational activity and find compromis-
ing data which can be used against him.
Or we discover a KGB officer, Z, who had been known to us in
the past and personally known to a defector, to be abroad again
under a new identity with diplomatic cover. We prepare an
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anonymous letter to him containing friendly greetings and
what looks like a status report on some private dealings-black
market implied but not specified. The letter also reveals the
writer's knowledge of personality information connected with
Z's earlier identity. This letter is slipped under his door when
he is known to be home. By this act we put him in a possibly
embarrassing situation with his own authorities. His explana-
tion, if he reports it, may be disbelieved, and he may be sent
home. The letter prepares the way for follow-up contacts
even less easy to explain to his superiors. And if he reports it
and is believed, we bring about a KGB investigation that may
cast suspicion on others. We may now take other steps, not
only against Z but related ones against other KGB officers
there and against Z's friends elsewhere.
Say we have long been troubled by a ubiquitous and effective
KGB operative, A, working directly against us in a certain
country, but we have been unable to identify his contacts.
We know only-from phone taps-that his closest friend is B,
a KGB officer under a different cover. Through audiosurveil-
lance we learn something slightly compromising about A that
B is likely to know. On the strength of this information we
make a direct recruitment approach to A, suggesting that he
had been singled out by an inside source and somewhere in the
course of the discussion mentioning B by name. A rejects the
appeal and reports it; he is recalled, and we have got rid of
him. Moreover, B may now be under suspicion. As a second
step an anonymous letter is sent to B, its contents implying
the existence of a clandestine relationship. Then we put an
indigenous agent of ours in touch with B to provide assessment
and a means of future access. Thus we also dangle before B
a potential agent, and if he recruits him we can manipulate
the case to affect his position.
In an actual and still active case, a Soviet intelligence officer
had shown that he liked Western life and social contact with
Westerners and was occasionally indiscreet. Our case officer
in contact with him under the same kind of cover one day
referred quite offhand to the man's true status and half-jest-
ingly suggested a clandestine relationship. The Soviet laugh-
ingly said no. Our man kept coming back and badgering the
Soviet good-humoredly, trying to get him to meet us in a se-
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cure place merely to discuss politics and otherwise talk shop.
Finally, when approached once in an inconvenient situation,
he agreed to meet securely. He has still not told us any
damaging secrets, indeed refuses to, but each time we meet he
tells more and the relationship comes closer to collaboration.
We have told him certain things pertinent to his own safety
and well-being. He has clearly not told his superiors; he could
not have been authorized to meet us as he does. We have no
intention of forcing him to a black-and-white decision but will
content ourselves with a slow and gradual establishment of
confidence, hoping for eventual cooperation. The information
he gives us may be fragmentary, but it, is becoming ever more
sensitive and valuable.
Harassment Potential
Our subject here is recruitment, but we should note the im-
portant side effects that can be achieved by a broad recruit-
ment campaign. Implicit in the actions described above is the
parallel aim of harassing and disrupting the Soviet intelli-
gence services, making their job more difficult. We cannot
expect mass recruitments to crown our efforts; if they pro-
duced one extra Soviet agent they would be worth while. But
many of our approaches and actions will be reported to the
Soviet authorities, and it behooves us, therefore, to build into
them provocative themes which when reported sow confusion;,
doubt, and suspicion, damage the position of other Soviet of l-
cers, and perhaps cause time-consuming investigations. By
the mere act of provocative recruitment approaches we can
bother and hamper the Soviet services and even get rid of
troublesome opponents, because by doctrine those known to be
compromised, and especially those who have become targets of
Western recruitment efforts, are recalled. Thus recruitment,
failures can help build other operations and help create a more
favorable climate for our activity.
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WORK WITH WALK-INS
Ivan A. Serovl
The following article is adapted from one of several on So-
viet intelligence doctrine written by high-ranking officers of
the GRU(the Soviet defense intelligence agency). It was origi-
nally published in 1962. The articles apparently constituted
part of an effort to improve the unsatisfactory performance
of the GRU, a purpose which had reportedly motivated the
installation of General of the Army Serov as its chief in 1958.
Although addressed particularly to GRU operations officers,
the papers can be said to reflect Soviet operational doctrine
generally. The civilian KGB, because of its security responsi-
bilities, is counterintelligence-oriented, but the operational
philosophies and practices of the two services are similar. The
Serov lecture on walk-ins, in particular, which formalizes a re-
vision of GRU operational principles in that field, is presum-
ably based on his long experience in MVD/KGB operations.
Serov's treatment shows that Soviet problems in assessing
and handling the walk-in are not unlike our own. Earlier, it
seems, the hazards had been evaded by a brush-off policy: GRU
officers avoided difficult decisions and the possibility of security
flaps by simply refusing to receive walk-ins. Serov changed
this policy. He makes it clear that walk-ins at GRU residen-
cies will now receive a hearing and be carefully assessed.
The main task of intelligence is to give timely warning to
our government and to the Command of the Armed Forces
regarding imperialist preparations for surprise attack on the
USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. Success in
discharging the important responsibilities placed on intelli-
gence depends to a great extent on proper planning and di-
rection of the work and on the ability to make use of all possible
means.
A significant role in intelligence activities is played by work
with walk-ins,2 i.e., persons who approach Soviet representa-
tives of their own accord, wishing to help the Soviet Union and
offering their services, in particular to obtain documents of
value to us. In a number of countries (USA, France, Western
Germany, Italy, and others) approaches by such walk-iris are
not an infrequent occurrence. For this there is, in our view, a
logical explanation.
Many people in capitalist countries are in serious financial
straits, living in constant anxiety about the future. They con-
sequently resort to any possible means of earning some money
to put aside, and for the sake of this financial security they are
ready to run the risks involved in offering to collaborate with
'Serov has had a long career in the Soviet security and intelligence
services. Reportedly rising through the Central Committee apparatus
that controlled the services, he entered State Security (then the NK'VD)
during the thirties. He first gained notoriety as organizer of deporta-
tions from the Baltic states after their annexation in 1940 and of the
relocation of suspect nationalities in the USSR during the war. When
Lavrentiy Beriya was overthrown in 1954, Serov became chief of the
reorganized and carefully subordinated State Security service. His
appointment as chief of the GRU at the end of 1958 was not made
public, but it is said to have been made because of high-level disappoint-
ment with GRU performance. The discovery in 1963 that GRU officer
Oleg Penkovskiy was a US-UK agent led to Serov's dismissal from
this post.
'The Russian word is dobrozhelatel, "well-wisher," as used here
virtually the equivalent of our "walk-in." Note the term's positive
psychological value in contrast to the derogatory connotation of our
"defector."
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us. In these countries there also live many who came from
countries of the socialist camp and have retained their love for
the motherland, and others who have paid visits during the
last few years to the Soviet Union, have come to know the So-
viet people better, and are genuinely eager to do what they can
to help us.
The majority, to be sure, of those who turn up regularly at
our embassies declaring that they are in sympathy with the
Soviet Union and want to help it in some way or other offer
"inventions" or "important" documents which, when checked,
prove to be of no value. Counterintelligence often makes use
of such approaches in order to see which of our officers react
to the "tempting" offers and so find out which ones are intelli-
gence officers and what their methods are. These visitors
bring drawings and various descriptions of their "inventions"
and ask to see the military or naval attache to show them to
him. As a rule they are received by personnel of the attache's
office. They usually say that they are in sympathy with the
USSR and for this reason are approaching the Soviet embassy;
otherwise they would have offered their services to the Ameri-
cans-naturally they would like to get some financial reward.
Some declare that they are ready to go to the USSR in order
to develop the invention. But in the course of detailed con-
versation with these "inventors" it emerges as a rule that they
know little about their own inventions or about military equip-
ment in the branches in which they have presented themselves
as specialists. This probing of their story leads to the timely
detection of counterintelligence agents.
One might think that work with walk-ins presents no spe-
cial difficulties, if only for the reason that one does not have
to seek them out, find ways of approaching them, etc. Such
reasoning is misleading. Working with persons who offer their
services is a very complicated business. First of all, it is diffi-
cult to make a quick assessment of the true motives of such a
person, to discern the real reasons for the offer, and accordingly
to make the right decision.
It will. be seen in the case histories following that people walk
into official Soviet establishments abroad with all kinds of mo-
tives. Some are ideologically close to us and genuinely and un-
selfishly anxious to help us; some are in sympathy with the
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Soviet Union but want at the same time to supplement their
income; and some, though not in accord with our ideas and
views, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us for finan-
cial reasons. On the other hand, Soviet representatives often
have to deal with unemployed persons who come to our estab-
lishments out of desperation as a last hope of getting some
means of livelihood; needless to say these have as a rule no
agent potential and cannot be of any use to us. Approaches
are also made by various kinds of rogues, swindlers, and black-
mailers, who in their search for easy money are ready to do
anything and to whom nothing is sacred; today they will sell
a state secret entrusted to them, and tomorrow they will be-
tray the one to whom they sold it. Finally, counterintelligence
often tries to plant agents under the guise of walk-ins, and
here the slightest mistake can lead to very undesirable conse-
quences.
Offers of service may be made by letter (through the mails
or in some other way), by telephone, or in person at the Soviet
establishment. The manner of approach can be very different.
Persons wanting to make money usually produce a large
quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about
themselves, trying to make a favorable impression. Extortion-
ers and blackmailers usually act impudent, making their offer
in the form of an ultimatum and even resorting to open threats.
It is essential that the staffs of the service attaches and other
mission offices be able to assess correctly the persons who ap-
proach them, their motives, and the material they offer, so as
to make the right decision regarding further action.
It must be said that until lately our officers, in the majority
of cases, have acted without thinking things out properly; on
the assumption that all offers are provocations they have as a
rule turned them down and reported their decision to the Cen-
ter 3 afterwards, when it was too late to correct any mistake.
It is only during the last two years, after intervention by the
Center, that legal residencies 4 and the military attaches' of-
flees have started to show greater thoughtfulness in making de-
cisions on such questions, and the results have not been slow
in becoming apparent.
We would say "Headquarters."
' Official-cover field stations.
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Here are some concrete examples of correct and incorrect ac-
tion by Soviet representatives with respect to persons offering
their services, together with some conclusions and practical
suggestions for improving work of this kind.
Potential Agents with Financial Motivation
Dangerous Contacts
In 1960 there was found in the mailbox of one of our em-
bassies an anonymous letter asking that contact be established
with the writer, who claimed he had something important that
he could tell us and gave only his home telephone number.
From this number the officers of the residency were able to de-
termine the name of the correspondent, and with the help of
local reference books they assembled all the essential details
about him (where he worked, his job, his office and home ad-
dresses, etc.). It was evident that he occupied a position which
gave him access to valuable information, and there was good
reason, therefore, for arranging a meeting with him. We shall
call him X.
The residency decided to telephone the number X had given
and ask him to come to a meeting at a stipulated place, but
to intercept him on his way there so that counterintelligence,
if it listened in on the telephone call, would not be able to
mount surveillance on the meeting. This plan was carried out.
During the meeting X gave some details about himself and
said that he had access to important documentary information
which he would pass to us if we would pay for it. His state-
ments about himself agreed with the information that had been
developed by the residency. At the end of the meeting it was
agreed that X would come the following week with some of the
material to one of the embassy's houses.
On the appointed day he arrived with the secret documents,
and they proved to be valuable. A talk was held with him in
which the possibilities of getting material of interest to us and
the motives which had prompted him to offer his services were
thoroughly explored. Then, as a further check on X's honesty,
it was suggested to him that he bring another batch of suitable
material to the same house. X refused to do this, saying that
he could not run the risk again, and suggested that arrange-
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ments be made for him to pass the material somewhere out of
town.
In the two meetings it had thus been determined that X was
being truthful, that his motives were financial, and that he was
exercising caution, evidently appreciating the gravity of estab-
lishing this relationship and aware of its possible consequences.
There was no doubt about the value of the material received
from him. Taking all this into account, the residency decided
to accept X's offer and in the future maintain contact with him
by dead-drop.
This decision was correct. But the residency had made some
mistakes. The first meeting should not have been arranged by
telephoning the number given in the letter but in person, by
meeting X "accidentally" on his way to work or home from
work-his office and home address were known. Moreover, a
second visit to the embassy's property should not have been
suggested even as a test; it could not be excluded that the house
was watched by counterintelligence, who might have appre-
hended X on the way in. If the residency's staff had given
thorough and thoughtful consideration to all the circumstances
involved they could have avoided these mistakes.
Amateur Lapse
Last year in a certain country a man who called himself
A telephoned our air attache at home, saying he was a spe-
cialist in aviation and would like to have a talk. He was told
that he could call at the air attache's house any time he liked.
He turned up a few days later and offered to hand over, at a
price, documentary information which was of interest to us. He
gave quite a lot of details about himself and in general terms
explained his access to the material. There seemed to be noth-
ing suspicious about his behavior. The residency officer con-
ducting the interview, however, evidently without adequate
training, did not make definite arrangements for a subsequent
meeting, and his arrangements for emergency contact were in-
secure.
The resident 6 reported A -'s offer to the Center, which
gave instructions to study his potential and if it seemed good to
make use of his services. A- was summoned to a meeting
S
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by telephone, as had been agreed. At this meeting a residency
officer ascertained his potential for supplying information, gave
him the task of producing a particular document, and agreed
on the way it should be passed.
At the appointed time A brought the document to the
air attache's office, and it proved to be of value. But before
long the residency received a cable to the effect that further
contact with him was risky, and it had to drop him.
On analysis it is easy to see that the residency made a num-
ber of serious errors from the very beginning of this case. First
of all, an inadequately trained officer was allowed to interview
A . Moreover, this officer did not display any initiative and
even failed to make arrangements for a subsequent meeting, so
that the reestablishment of contact required use of the tele-
phone. Repeated telephone conversations with A and his
visits to the air attache's house and office evidently attracted
the attention of counterintelligence; hence the warning cable.
Thus a possibly valuable source was lost through carelessness.
Nursing a Gambler
In 1961 our embassy in one of the NATO countries was visited
by a man we will call D. He gave an assumed name and said
he was a citizen of the country, working in one of its important
military establishments. He wanted to meet and have a talk
with some military official of ours. His request was granted; he
was introduced to a member of the military attache's staff.
D declared that on certain conditions he could hand us secret
information which passed through his office. He had not
brought any material with him, but he had access to a number
of important Secret and Top Secret documents which he could
show us at any time. He asked a very large sum for delivering
this material. He refused to give his real name. The interview-
ing intelligence officer expressed a desire to see the documents,
and they agreed on a meeting in town for this purpose. If the
rendezvous should fail, D could be reached on a public tele-
phone the number of which he supplied.
The residency analyzed the circumstances under which D had
presented himself, his behavior, and the operational situation
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and decided to check up on him more thoroughly. In particu-
lar, it was decided not to go through with the meeting but to
establish by means of secret observation whether D went to
the prescribed place and whether signs of counterintelligence
activity were in evidence in the area. At the appointed time
D showed up at the meeting place with a bundle, and nothing
suspicious was seen by the watchers stationed in the area.
With this reassurance, it was decided to ring D on the agreed.
public telephone and suggest that he bring the material to one
of our official buildings. If D was a plant, this location for the
delivery would reduce to a minimum the opportunity for coun-
terintelligence to stage an incident. D agreed, and at the stipu-
lated time he brought in two Top Secret documents. These
proved to be genuine and valuable. D was paid a suitable
amount for them and recruited as a regular agent.
Further meetings were held with D, both in the official build-
ing and in town. He handed over a number of valuable papers
to us, signed the receipts for money paid him, and gave his
hand-written agreement to collaborate with us on a regular
basis. His personal papers were also photographed. The resi-
dency continued to study D in person at these meetings and
through other channels.
In the course of this collaboration and study the following
facts were established about D:
He was fond of gambling.
He had offered us his services for financial reasons, being in
heavy debt because of gambling losses.
He did not sympathize with our ideas and did not disguise
his dislike of us.
Being an ardent gambler, he was often in urgent need of
money, and he not infrequently handed us ultimatums that
large sums should be paid him or he would cease his col-
laboration with us.
He was not only not intelligent but a very flighty person: re-
peatedly he failed to keep agreed appointments; sometimes
he turned up at meetings drunk; and on one occasion he
broke off the meeting in the middle and rushed away in a
rage.
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Because of D's slow-wittedness, the instability of his charac-
ter, his casual attitude, and his greed he was a very difficult
agent to run, and the maintenance of contact with him pre-
sented serious dangers. Some risk was justified because the
material he obtained was very valuable. But in working with
such a personality the officers of the residency should have been
especially circumspect and careful to avoid the slightest mis-
take. In particular, D should not have been asked to come to
an official building for the first meeting and especially not for
subsequent meetings: members of the staff of important mili-
tary establishments who have weaknesses of character and are
given to gambling are undoubtedly under the eye of counterin-
telligence.
American Peddler
A man walked into the official building of the military at-
tache in the USA. He gave his name, showed the cover of a Top
Secret document to an intelligence officer, and asked whether
it would be of interest to us. The officer answered that he might
be interested in the text, not in the cover. The man fished the
document out of the pocket of his overcoat and said that he
could let us have it for fifty dollars. The officer examined the
contents of the document and paid the money. It was agreed
that the visitor would later furnish another such document,
bringing it to the same building.
At the second meeting a thorough talk was held with the
man, going into his particulars and possibilities as an agent,
his job, and certain other questions concerning his history and
personal qualities. The residency's officers got the impression
that he was not playing a double game, had good potential, and
was genuinely anxious to work with us. They therefore came
to agreement with him on the terms under which he would reg-
ularly supply documentary material. Future meetings, how-
ever, would be held outside of Washington.
Later on, contact arrangements with this man grew gradu-
ally more complicated with the introduction of dead drops,
emergency meetings, reserve meetings, etc. During his collabo-
ration he furnished us a large quantity of valuable documents.
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The material was paid for in accordance with its nature and
value.6
It would appear that in this example everything went well.
Here too, however, mistakes were made. Clearly, not enough
thought had been given to the first steps. In the first place,
arrangements should not have been made for a second meet-
ing with the visitor in an official building. Even if it is assumed
that his first visit to a Soviet establishment had not been no-
ticed by counterintelligence, nothing can justify the risk which
the residency officers took in setting the second meeting there.
Moreover, the residency officers did not carry out a thorough
and all-around check when leaving for the first meeting with
this man outside. They should have, because they had. no
guarantee whatever that the visitor was not a counterintelli-
gence plant. Surely it cannot be excluded that counterintelli-
gence might sacrifice several important documents in order to
put through a planned scheme for compromising Soviet repre-
sentatives. This example shows that even when everything goes
as it should it is wrong not to have exercised the greatest vigi-
lance, foresight, and care, thinking everything through to its
logical end and committing oneself to action only when fully
convinced of success.
From Peddler to Agent
In April of last year a visitor-let us call him M-came into
our embassy in one of the European countries and asked to see
the military attache. He was interviewed first by the military
attache's interpreter and then by the attache himself. Show-
ing his personal papers, M explained that he was working at an.
important military target, was badly in need of money, and,
therefore was prepared, though not in sympathy with the Soviet;
"This operation, while not fully identified, may have been reflected
in several seemingly unrelated incidents that occurred in and around
Washington in 1954. In August of that year a guard from a Norfolk
shipyard where an aircraft carrier was under construction went into
the Soviet military attache's office. It was later ascertained that he
held a Q clearance. Although identified by six witnesses, he denied
even being in Washington on the date in question. On at least six
occasions during 1954 personnel of the Soviet naval attache's office
visited a wooded area near Arlington, Virginia. These visits, possibly
to service a dead drop, are believed to have some relationship to the
guard's activity.
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Union, to sell us documents of a military nature. As proof of
his bona fides he produced an important and undoubtedly gen-
uine NATO document which showed that he really had poten
tial as an agent.
M's papers were photographed, and arrangements were made
with him for a routine meeting in town. To this meeting he
brought another document and received payment for it. It was
agreed that in the future a purely commercial relationship
would be maintained, with transactions to be consummated
item by item on M's initiative.
During subsequent meetings the case officer, by displaying an
interest in M's family and home life, managed to win his con-
fidence and get on friendly terms with him. He succeeded in
finding out M's exact job, addresses, and telephone numbers.
Arrangements were made enabling either party to summon the
other to urgent meetings, and a system of signals was set up in
town. In this way M began to deliver a regular supply of the
top secret material to which he had access. Gradually relations
developed to the point that M became a real agent. This was
achieved through clever handling in which the case officer had
to overcome quite a number of difficulties; at the beginning,
for instance, M wanted to get a large sum of money immedi-
ately for handing over one or two documents.
Attention is drawn to this case because some military intelli-
gence officers have the wrong impression about the possibilities
and the time needed to get on agent terms with a walk-in.
Many act too hastily in this respect, evidently on the theory
that when someone comes in with an offer, then is the time
to act: recruit him and get a good mark. This is a harmful
approach, fraught with unpleasant consequences. Here it is
very relevant to quote the old proverb, "Seven times measure;
cut once."
The Gleaner
In 1957 an Austrian, one Sh , approached the Soviet con-
sulate in Vienna with an offer to obtain for us from the head-
quarters of American forces in West Germany several movies
showing tests of new American weapons. The case officer ex-
amined Sh 's papers and extracted the data for a name-
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check. Upon receiving a go-ahead from the Center he advanced.
the man his expenses for a round trip to West Germany, with
the understanding that he would be paid for the movies after
they had been examined.
After some days Sh returned and handed over a film, but
examination revealed that it depicted American aircraft and
other equipment of which photographs had appeared in open
newspapers and magazines and was therefore of no interest
whatever to us. A talk with Sh brought out that he
needed money and.had grasped at a straw to get into our serv-
ice, believing that he could be of use to us in some way.
Perennial Con-Man .
In December 1959 a stranger called at the Soviet consulate
in Copenhagen wanting to talk to someone in the military at-
tache's office. In the ensuing conversation the man gave his
name as V and said that in return for money he could give
us information verbally or in writing (with photographs at-
tached) on the Nike anti-aircraft missile sites in the Copen-
hagen area. He pointed out that he had previously sold mili-
tary information to an officer on the staff of the Soviet military
attache in Paris. He displayed several photographs of anti-
aircraft missile sites which seemed of doubtful value. He was
asked to stand by for a few days and then telephone the inter-
viewing officer at home.
A check was requested of the Center, and it was established
that although V really had been given money for passing
military information to our officers in France, his reports had
been of little value. The Center therefore instructed Copen-
hagen not to meet him or accept- any material from him.
Nevertheless, when V came again to the consulate a year
and a half later, on 15 July 1961, an officer in the military at-
tache's office entered into conversation with him. After telling
about his financial difficulties V offered to write a report
on the same old subject, the Nike missile sites around Copen-
hagen, for 600 Danish kroner. The military attache, instead
of turning down the offer, had V write the report on the
spot and paid him 300 kroner for it. The information was prac-
tically worthless, and the instruction to have no further contact
with the man had to be repeated.
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This shows how some people will try to take advantage of the
inexperience and ignorance of our officers and how some offi-
cers are hasty in their decisions, spend money unjustifiably,
and run unnecessary risks.
Traveler's Aid
In 1960 a certain B , a displaced person of Ukrainian na-
tionality, visited the official building of the military attache in
one of the European countries. He claimed to know that a
group of Ukrainian nationalists was preparing a terrorist act
against Soviet leaders and offered his services in ferreting out
the details of this plot and the identity of those who would
actually carry out the deed.
Instead of having a long talk with B to find out more
about him, his connections, and his sources of information, our
officer accepted his story on faith and arranged to meet him
the next day at a designated spot and give him the money he
needed to travel to the city where the terrorists were. On in-
structions from the Center, however, B -'s character and his
information were checked. It turned out that his story was
false. He had evidently invented the whole thing to get money
for moving from one country to another.
Et Dona Ferentes
In 1958 several approaches were made to the Soviet consulate
in Vienna by Greeks, mostly small merchants or students. A
Greek named Kh was especially persistent in offering his
services; he declared straight out that he wanted to help the
Soviet Union for financial reasons. Asked why he was making
this offer in Vienna rather than in Greece and how he thought
he could help us, he replied that he was afraid of visiting the
embassy in Athens but was often in Austria on business and
that he himself had no special access but could get information
through his brother, a sergeant at one of the American bases
in Greece.
It was learned later that Greeks were making similar offers
to embassies of other countries of the socialist camp, in fact to
all establishments where in their opinion they might find a
taker. This example shows, among other things, that walk-ins
should 'be checked against information from the military at-
tach6s of other countries.
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Blackmailers and Extortioners
A great danger is presented by persons who offer their serv-
ices from dishonest, mercenary motives or with provocation in
view-blackmailers, extortioners, swindlers, and persons acting
under the control of counterintelligence. Special care has to
be exercised in dealing with them.
Attractive Rogue
In 1959 a local national, U-, came to the official building
of a military attache. He had certification as test pilot for an
aircraft firm, and he offered the design of an electromagnetic:
engine he had developed. A brief examination showed the de-
sign to be of no interest whatever, and it was turned down.,
Nevertheless, the man did not leave; he complained about being;
badly off, mentioned debts, said that he was poorly treated
where he was working, and finally asked our officer for $5010 as
a loan, promising that he would help us in any way he could.
In general, the residency's officers formed a favorable impres-
sion of U-. In reporting the incident to the Center they
suggested that he be given a loan and that a receipt be obtained
for it. The Center did not approve this proposal; it saw many
suspicious features in U -'s approach and behavior, savoring
of preparations for a provocation. It sent instructions to break
off contact with him.
At the end of 1959 U- again approached our officer, re-
questing a meeting in town; and the resident, without the Cen-
ter's permission, authorized the renewed contact. At this
meeting U- handed our officer diagrams of some of the
equipment on the antisubmarine aircraft Argus, the value of
which was judged by intelligence to be moderate. He also, re-
ported that he had transferred to another aircraft company,
complained about his financial position, and asked for help. At
subsequent meetings he handed over two secret papers (one of
which was valuable), boasted about his access to secret docu-
ments especially on the Bornarc antiaircraft missile, asked that
he be advanced ten thousand dollars to buy a house, and hinted
that he had important connections in circles of interest to us.
The Center sent instructions to stop all contact with U--,
who, however, continued to telephone and call in person at the
official building and mail postcards there. The residency, for
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its part, tried insistently to get the Center's permission to have
meetings with the man and seemed to have no misgivings
that he might be a counterintelligence plant and bent on provo-
cation. Finally, when these efforts to reestablish contact proved
of no avail, U- resorted to blackmail and intimidation. In
several letters addressed to the military attache at his office
and offering more "important" documents, he demanded the
payment of ten thousand dollars for the material already sup-
plied and threatened to put the whole "transaction" into the
hands of counterintelligence and the law.
In analyzing this case it is easy to see that in addition to
the attempt at blackmail there cannot be excluded the
possibility that counterintelligence had a finger in the pie:
U-- may have been given the task of arousing the interest of
our officers in order to compromise them at some suitable
moment. Among the weaknesses shown by the residency's
officers was the fact that they failed to see through U- in
the initial stages of their work with him, made an incorrect
assessment of him, did not investigate his potential, did not
learn his real intentions, did not study or check up on him
properly, and did not attach sufficient importance to the sus-
picious features in his behavior.
American Imposters
In 1958 a stranger came to the Paris embassy, said that he
was a lieutenant in the U.S. Army and badly in need of money,
and, offered some typewritten documents. Our officers, without
studying the material properly, paid 'twenty thousand francs
for it. Examined more closely, what had seemed reports on
the disposition of individual U.S. units in West Germany
turned out to be only an exercise for use in typist training.
The "lieutenant" was not seen again in Paris, but some
time later he visited our embassy in Denmark, saying that he
had collaborated with the military attache's office in Paris and
asking for money against a promise of some documents. He
could have been just a swindler looking for some easy money,
but he may have been a plant of NATO counterintelligence
trying to identify our personnel.
In August 1960 a Second Lieutenant N- of the U.S. Army
Reserve called at our embassy in Paris. He said that he was
willing to help Soviet intelligence if we made it worth his
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while. He himself had no access to information but he had
a friend who did, a captain serving at an air base in Spain
who wanted to earn some money and had asked to be put in
touch with Soviet intelligence. N- asked for money for
a trip to Spain and promised to bring back a copy of the U.S.
field service regulations.
The conversation with N- was carried on through an in-
terpreter, since he spoke only English; but he made a good
impression on the officer who talked with him. On his personal
signature he was given the money to go see his friend. When
he got to Spain, however, he telephoned our officer demanding
more money. The tone he used left no doubt that he was
simply a rogue and an extortioner. Our officer hung up the
receiver.
Later it was discovered that N- had gone from the meet-
ing with our officer to French counterintelligence, where :tie
told them that he was an agent of the Soviet intelligence serv-
ice and was willing to help them. The French, however, al-
though they verified that he had visited our military attache,
had refused his services, recognizing that he was simply a
rogue. Two months later the man turned up at our embassy
in Beirut and approached the ambassador and the military
attache with the same kind of offer. On instruction from the
Center he was asked to leave the embassy.
This was an obvious example of carelessness and credulity
on the part of our officer in Paris.
Checkroom Trap
In May 1958 the embassy in Sweden received a letter writ-
ten in English which said:
"Do you know the method by which NATO intends to com-
bat your submarines? Have you heard of the DAR equipment,
which, in conjunction with new antisubmarine mines, can ...
[etc., etc.]? Do you know where the stations ... [for sub-
marine detection] will be situated? If you want answers
[to these questions], I will be glad to let you have the main
principles on which DAR equipment operates, and how this
equipment will detect your submarines regardless of the tem-
perature of the water. . . I can also explain to you how to
save hundreds of your submarines from the new mines. I can
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 Approved Foieke 2005/04/13
tell you approximately where the first two fields will be laid
(to within two miles).
"The writer of these lines, who wishes to remain anony-
mous, has come to Stockholm only for a few days and will soon
be returning to his station in Germany. For the information
to be supplied, if it is acceptable, I am asking ten thousand
American dollars. The information will be handed over to you
in portions worth three thousand American dollars each, pay-
ment to, be made later. This means that if the first lot of
material is to your liking, you will pay for it and will receive
another batch.
"The material can be handed over in Switzerland or in
Sweden, whichever you prefer. I will have two weeks' leave
in June or July. In order to convince me that you are inter-
ested, I would like you to pay my travel expenses in advance
at the same time you inform me which country you would like
to meet me in. Your answer, together with 1600 Swedish
kroner in the currency of any West European country, can be
left at the checkroom at Lidingo up until 1630 hours on Satur-
day, 10 May. You can put your message in a pair of old shoes
and tell the attendant at the checkroom that the parcel will
be picked up by a messenger from Mr. Ekker."
The letter was clearly a provocation. The residency acted
correctly in leaving it unanswered.
Cover Story
In August 1960 an approach to the military attache's office
in Vienna was made by a man who said he was a West German
citizen, Konrad Loezel, born 1921, living at Nuernberg,
Neuhausen 13. Interviewed by an assistant military attache,
Loezel declared that he was a genuine friend of the Soviet
Union and for a long time had sought an opportunity to get
into touch with us; he was in a position to pass us some very
important information, in particular the formula of a new
military material which had recently been developed in great
secrecy. He had a confederate, a Major Bauer, serving in the
NATO 3rd Fighter Squadron located at Fuerth; he himself
was in charge of a travel bureau in Nuernberg (he produced a
document to confirm this) ; he was a member of the Free Demo-
cratic Party of West Germany and a member of the Defense
Committee of the Bavarian Landtag, where he had many friends
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among the deputies; he was well informed about all military
construction work in Bavaria.
In giving all these details he was obviously trying to arouse
interest in his potential. But such a wealth of detail appeared
suspicious to the residency's officers, and they pressed for more
particulars on some of the points. Loezel grew confused in his
replies, and what he represented became evident.
Counterintelligence Plants
Lures in Rome
Once an Italian telephoned the embassy and asked for a
meeting in town with an officer of the military attache's staff,
specifying the time and place. The resident decided that no
one should go to the meeting, but the area where it was to be
held should be put under surveillance. It turned out that;
counterintelligence officers were stationed all around.
Another Italian took advantage of receptions and other of-
ficial functions to make approaches to first one and then other
Soviet representatives with offers of his services, attempting
to arrange meetings in other, less official surroundings. This,
person's conduct appeared suspicious to the residency's, of-,
ficers, and they politely but firmly turned down all his advances.
Then he switched his attentions to the Czech military attache,
and not without success. But during one of their meetings at a
restaurant, when the Italian had got up and gone to the
men's room, a waiter informed the Czech that his friend was
a provocateur employed by the police.
Although in these examples our officers displayed due cau-
tion and did not take the bait, it is unfortunately the case
that not all of them so conduct themselves always. Some
still show weaknesses in grasping a situation, do not analyze
events sufficiently deeply and thoroughly, and tolerate lapses
in security.
On Target
In the summer of 1958, on a Sunday, a certain P-- tele-
phoned to the building housing our mission and asked insist-
ently for a meeting with a member of the staff. The person on
duty that day, an intelligence officer of the residency whose
cover job was technical, not diplomatic, and in whom counter-
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intelligence had recently shown a particular interest, answered
that on a holiday there were no senior members of the staff in
the office. P replied that since he could not stay over until
Monday he would come along and have a talk with the duty
officer. The latter, explaining that he was busy at the moment,
asked P to call back a little later, and he immediately re-
ported the matter to the resident. Because of his current at-
traction for counterintelligence, he had been instructed to
drop all work with agents for the present.
Now the resident gave him strict orders that if P turned
up at the building he should listen to what he had to say
but not accept any material from him or commit himself in
any way by any arrangements or promises. ? The decision of
the resident was undoubtedly the correct one, especially since
one or two things P said had been suspicious; he was clearly
trying to interest the duty officer in his potential. Despite
the resident's instruction, however, the officer fell for the
temptingly easy dangled recruitment and when P tele-
phoned again agreed to meet him a long way out of town and
under the detailed arrangements he suggested.
The resident gave categorical orders that the meeting was
not to take place; he assumed that P was probably a coun-
terintelligence agent. The counterintelligence service was of
course aware that the officer in whom it was interested was
on duty that day. Having some knowledge of his character,
it reckoned on his not being able to resist P's offer to
hand over information "of a kind not previously received by
anyone." When it had aroused his interest and induced him to
come to a meeting outside of town, it would then try to com-
promise him.
This conclusion was strengthened by a further incident.
Some weeks later, when the same officer was on duty, a cer-
tain Mr. Kh telephoned for an appointment, came to the
building, and told this officer that he could pass us information
on military electronics. In confirmation of his access he pro-
duced a film showing the buildings of the school of military
electronics. Again the bf1icer displayed quite unjustified
trustfulness. He accepted the film, which was of no value
whatever, and arranged to meet Kh later in town to re-
turn it. This was evidently just what counterintelligence
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was trying to achieve-to catch our man at the meeting place
with the film on him, as tangible grounds for compromising
him. This meeting was likewise forbidden.
This example illustrates that the reception of walk-iris
should be reserved to experienced case officers who can handle
the interview expertly and avoid hasty decisions.
Miscellaneous Walk-Ins
Brush-Off Approved
At the end of 1959 one of the staff of a military attache's
office, Nikolay, noticed on his way home from work that he
was being followed by a counterintelligence car in which,
strangely, there was only the driver; usually at least. two
counterintelligence agents rode together. He had been about
to stop at a large self-service store to get some groceries.
While he was in a section of the store where there were no
other customers at the time, the counterintelligence man
came up and said that for a large sum of money he would re-
veal the whereabouts of two former citizens of countries of
the socialist camp who were betraying their motherland.
Nikolay replied, reasonably, that neither the whereabouts nor
the fate of traitors could be of interest to the countries they
had betrayed. The man did not give up, however; he advised
Nikolay to think about his offer and said that he hoped to have
further conversations with him on the subject.
The incident was reported to the Center. Although the
counterintelligence agent's whole behavior and the way he
had chosen to make the contact gave grounds to believe that
the money motive was genuine, the Center approved Nikolay's
refusal and issued instructions that if the agent made another
approach all his offers were to be turned down and no negotia-
tions entered into.
This example shows that in some, let us say very rare, cases
even counterintelligence officers may approach us in the hope
of making money. Our people must be particularly careful
in dealing with walk-ins in this category; when conversations
with them are approved by the Center they should be en-
trusted only to the most experienced and best trained officers,,
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Mistaken Brush-Off
In May 1959 two men, having asked for an interview, were
received by our military attache in Stockholm and his assistant.
They said that they had served in the army and had certain
information, particularly about the naval base, which they
would be willing to give us for an appropriate reward. The
military attache immediately broke off the conversation and
asked them to leave, and a few days later he reported the in-
cident to the official representative of the Swedish Ministry
of Defense, who informed the Swedish security police.
Almost a year later, on 25 March 1960, the Swedish news-
papers reported under sensational headlines the arrest of
these two men for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense,
the police had needed this time to establish their identity.
It is characteristic that the reactionary press, reviving in this
connection its periodic anti-Soviet spy-mania campaign, dis-
torted the facts in a tendentious way. Without denying that
the investigation was initiated by a warning from the Soviet
military attache, the newspapers made the deliberately false
charge that he had accepted documents from the men and in
informing the Ministry of Defense of their visit made no men-
tion of these.
Both the men were brought up for trial. On the stand they
denied any act or intent of espionage, declaring that they had
just wanted to trick a Soviet establishment into giving them
two thousand kroner to relieve them of the financial straits
they were in. The trial proceedings were also used as an ex-
cuse for anti-Soviet propaganda by the reactionary press.
In this case the military attache and his assistant had acted
very thoughtlessly. Their mistake not only repulsed and jeop-
ardized two men who may really have wanted to help us, not
only provided an opening for the development of anti-Soviet
propaganda, but also made the work of other Soviet represent-
atives more difficult. The case became known outside Sweden,
and it cannot be excluded that it has given pause to more than
one budding walk-in, making them wonder whether an ap-
proach to Soviet officials would get them anywhere.
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Haphazard Operation
During the period from April to August 1959 one of our em-
bassies began to receive by mail a series of unsolicited reports
always bearing the same signature in Russian, "Your, friend
Mun," but each time a different address in a certain town that
was off limits to our representatives. The first reports were
of no interest, but then documents of considerable value be-
gan to arrive, showing that Mun had good access to important
information on military-technical matters in his country.
The residency officers, however, did not move to establish con-
tact with him. They were uncertain about his real address,
and his telephone number was unknown. They therefore sat
back and waited for further initiatives on his part.
For some time nothing was received from Mun, but in Octo??
ber of the same year a letter arrived in which he pointed out
that he had sent us various kinds of "photographs" and asked
us to let him know whether we were receiving his letters; if so
he would continue to write now and then and "ask questions
about life in the USSR." In the letter he gave his true full
name and address. A check established that he really did live
in the town he had named from the beginning. The residency
replied that it was receiving his letters and gave him to tinder-
stand that it hoped to establish personal contact with him.
Having weighed and analyzed all the details of the case, the
Center decided that it was worth running some risk to estab-
lish contact with Mun and gave instructions that he should be
approached by a residency officer in a position to travel around
the country without informing the local authorities of his itin-
erary. Such a meeting took place, but then the contact was
broken with no warning or explanation to Mun, who, dis-
quieted and anxious to renew the operation, therefore came to
our official mission with valuable material on his person.
Thus faulty action on the part of the residency's officers
compelled Mun to behave in a way that compromised him.
They failed to take advantage of the favorable circumstances
that had been presented for collaboration and Mun's genuine
desire to help us, acted irresponsibly in conducting the opera-
tion, and did not display the necessary discreet initiative.
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Good Agent; Poor Access
At the end of 1961 the Soviet embassy in one of the Scandina-
vian countries was visited by a local citizen, N-, aged 22,
who declared that he supported the policy of the USSR and
was against that of the USA and would like to help us in any
way he could. At the first meeting he refused to give his sur-
name, wishing evidently to find out first what attitude we
would take towards him, but he handed over aerial photo-
graphs of NATO airfields in his country marked "Secret" (and
later judged to be of indifferent value). It was arranged that
he should come back again after ten days.
This time N- brought a secret text for training in work
on missiles. He said he had taken it from the safe of an officer
who :had left the key in the lock while off on an official trip.
Now he let us have his surname, his address, and job, but he
reported that he was being sent for a year to another city.
The case officer arranged to meet him, however, when he was
in town on leave or holiday.
The case officer got the impression' that N- was genu-
inely anxious to help us, that he really was who he said he
was, and that he was acting carefully and thoughtfully, more-
over. In his conversation he displayed knowledge of the kind
that a military man in his stated speciality should have; if he
could not answer a question he said so straight out; he had
withheld his name at the first meeting, and he had taken
measures to cover up his intentions as he walked past a police-
man on duty at the gates of the embassy.
The residency reported these views to the Center and sug-
gested that we should continue working with N-. It was
decided, however, that despite his genuine desire to be helpful
to us it would be unproductive to maintain further relations
with, him:; he was not now in a position to obtain information
of interest to. us. There remained the task of breaking off con-
tact with him skillfully, so as to preserve his access to us in
case some'valuable information came into his hands, and, more .
important, .tactfully, so that he would not feel hurt by the de
cision. All these. :considerations have to be taken into account;
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Died Aborning
In 1956 a Soviet embassy received .a letter from a Mr. Tom
saying that he was an ex-employee of an important establish-
ment in his country and had information which in his opinion
would be of great interest to the USSR. His address and tele-
phone number were given. A check of the city directory
showed such a person was listed, but at a different address.
Further checks, however, established that he had. recently
moved to a new apartment, at the address given in the letter.
The resident decided to make contact with Tom. A theater
ticket for a certain date was sent to his home address, and a
case officer, Peter, attended the same performance. Without
contacting Tom, he succeeded in identifying him and even got
the tag number on the car in which he drove away. Then
two weeks were devoted to attempts to intercept him on the
street as he left the apartment; these ended in failure.
Finally Peter, acting in accordance with a plan approved by
the Center, ascertained by telephone that Tom was at home
and after a few minutes paid him a visit in his suburban apart-
ment. Tom gave particulars about himself and provided some
information of apparent interest. He said that during: World
War II he had served as a captain in the air force. In :1954, he
had applied for employment in one of the important govern-
ment agencies, and after thorough security inquiries he got
the necessary clearance. His work involved study of the for-
eign press for items which might be of interest to the govern-
ment. In December 1955, however, he had left this agency of
his own accord.
A second meeting with Tom took place a week later. At
this meeting the question of how he could be useful was dis-
cussed, particularly the suggestion that he get a job at one of
the defense targets, where he could regularly get information
which would be of value to us and for which he would be paid.
Yet a third meeting was held, but at the fourth meeting Tom
did not show up.
Peter thereupon went to see him at home. Tom, whom- he
found very, nervous, told him categorically that he did not
wish to have any further contact with us. Two months later
the residency; saw a ,brief -noticein the local press, that Tom
had committed suicide. A week later Peter, on leave in Mos-
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 Pal -I s
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cow, learned that his entry visa to the country had been can-
celed. After a year the publication of certain details, coupled
with an analysis of material in our possession, showed that
Tom'.s contacts with 'us had most probably come to the notice
of counterintelligence, presumably through the telephone call
to his apartment.?
This example shows that counterintelligence keeps employ-
ees of important establishments under observation for some
time after they have stopped working there. Our officers
should bear this in mind.
Well-Wishing Only
In May of last year an American soldier came to the Soviet
embassy in one of the Latin American countries and asked to
see the military attache. He said he had made a special trip
there in order to tell us about the preparations for war being
made in the USA; he did not want to take part in another war
and kill honest people in the interests of American monopo-
lists. He gave from personal observation some details about
the battle 'training of American troops, handed over some
manuals which were of no value, and reported that after a few
months he would be going with his unit to Europe.
Two months later he came to see us again, handed over a
directive which was of some interest, and gave some verbal in-
formation. We arranged that on arrival in Europe he would
make contact with a representative of the Soviet military at-
tache in one of the West European countries. The Center
checked into the particulars which he had given about him-
self and confirmed them.
Soon the soldier did arrive in Europe and, as arranged, met
our representatives in a third country, having gone there on
leave ostensibly to see the sights. He was undoubtedly a gen-
uine walk-in, but he did not have access to secret material and
therefore could not be of any use. This operation was a waste
of effort.
'This case- appearsto be. that of Nick Clark Wallen, a former CIA
employee :who, committed suicide on 25 April 1956. The Washington
Sunday, Star, in reporting his death, said that Wallen had had a clan-
destine.'association' with .Anatoli A. Popov, assistant Soviet military
attach6, 6.nd`that the' latter's=re-entry visa had been canceled by the
State: Department: - q
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CIA-RDP78T03q'94 400200020001-1
We Muddle Through
In September 1961 a local citizen, K , came to the Soviet
embassy in an African country and said that he would like to
see our officer S . S came and introduced himself, but
K- refused to give his name. He did not want to talk in
the embassy; could S meet him in some public place in
town? S agreed, and they set a place and time.
When they met in town K- said that he was an employee
of the security service who had taken part in watching Soviet
citizens and those of other countries of the socialist camp and
expressed a desire to be helpful. He gave his name, but with
great reluctance. S decided that K -'s offer of his serv-
ices was an attempt at provocation. He recommended to the
resident that no more meetings with him be held.
The Center, however, concluded that S should have
another meeting with K under certain security precau-
tions which it specified. This was the right decision: to date
three further meetings have been held, and at two of these
useful written and verbal information has been received from
K-.
In analyzing this case note should be taken of the following
mistakes. Without a prior check and the receipt of confirma-
tory data on K- the case officer should not have gone to a
meeting with him. Having taken the risk, however, and hav-
ing recognized that K- was in a position to supply inforn:ia-
tion of interest to us, he should not have decided against fur-
ther meetings with him but conducted them in such a way that
the man would not think he was being exploited as an agent.
Key to Nothing
In October 1956 the officer on duty at one of our missions
found the key to a baggage locker in the mailbox. Clearly it
had come from someone wishing. to establish -contact with us.
An officer was given the touchy job of going to the airport and .
railroad station to study the layout and try to find out where
the corresponding locker was. He must have been either _ ;in-
sufficiently experienced or in -too big a hurry; he failed to dis-
cover anything
On the next day. a man .calling himself R- telephoned the
mission and asked whether the key had been used. Told we
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didn't know where it should be used, he said the locker was at
the 'bus station. Our officer went to the bus station, but he
spotted several counterintelligence cars in the neighborhood.
It was clear that the telephone conversation with R- had
been monitored, and of course we could not open the locker.
A day later R- telephoned the mission again, this time
from another town, to find out if we had succeeded in picking.
up his material. After this telephone call counterintelligence
again displayed activity with respect to our officers leaving
the mission. R- made no further attempt to get into
touch with us.
It can be hypothesized that R was a real walk-in' who
did not want to make personal contact for fear of compromis-
ing himself. If this was the case then the residency was un-
doubtedly .guilty of negligence in failing to find the locker
promptly and so not discovering what was in it and losing a
chance to establish relations with a person who could have
been useful. On the other hand, the possibility that R- was
acting under the direction of counterintelligence cannot be
excluded. The residency should in any case have first found
out whom it was dealing with-a genuine walk-in or a counter-
intelligence plant-and then acted in accordance with the
situation."
No Interest in. U.S. Bases
In the summer of 1959 a foreigner who described himself as
a Spanish journalist came to the consulate in Vienna. He said
that through reliable senior officer friends in the Spanish
army he had obtained plans of American military targets un-
der construction in Spain-airfields, roads, stores, and oil pipe-
'In October 1956 a man using the name Dr. Rubirosa telephoned the
office of. the Soviet military attache in Washington and asked for, an
assistant attache who had recently been declared persona non grata,
Later.. the same day an. unidentified man brought a small envelope to
the office door. The next day "Rubirosa" called to 'ask if a red key;
had been received. Then he called twice more: on 25 October he was,
told the informationwould be picked up as soon as possible, but on tHe.
following day theSoviets said, they were not interested. A Washington
bus te
i
al l
k
r
s
rm
n
oc
e
wa
found to contain schematic wiring diagrams
for. an electronic? device. Although Dr. Rubirosa" was never._Srm_ ly
identified;`a likely,:'suspect was. found in a former employee of~an
industria1?concern;`:a"mental case.
CIA-RDP78T0 1IA1 OO0200020001-1 SECRET
lines. These he wanted to sell. Refusing to give his name or
show his personal papers, he asked to talk to a member of the
consulate staff who had the necessary authority. He also re-
fused to show the plans to the consular official or to visit the
consulate a second time, declaring that the only question to
be settled was the price we would pay for the plans.
The resident was informed and he consulted. the KGB resi-
dent. The two then conferred with the embassy counselor,
and together they agreed on the following answer to be given
the Spaniard:. Since the Soviet Union has no intention of fight-
ing with Spain, ,plans of military structures on the territory of
Spain are of no interest whatever to us; the only thing in
which the Soviet Union is interested, and what it desires for
the Spanish people, is that they should rid themselves as
quickly as possible of the dictatorship of Franco. When he
was given this answer the Spaniard, surprised and angry, said
he would find another buyer for his plans and left.
Did the residents and counselor act correctly in this case?
Of course not. First of all, it is incorrect that American m.ili-
tary bases in Spain are of no interest to us. Moreover, the
officers did not even look at. the plans, did not examine any
details of the offer, and summarily repulsed a person who
might have proved of use to us. From this example it can be
seen that some of our officers do not attach sufficient impor-
tance to the fulfillment of the tasks given them, do not display
intelligent initiative, and make incorrect decisions.
Archery at Dusk
In the summer of 1958 an arrow from a sports bow with a
note attached to it was found in the courtyard of one of, our
missions. The note informed us that a person. using the name
Ar was prepared to give us information for a specified sum of
money and designated a time and place for a meeting in town.
The resident decided that we should. not meet with Ar accord-
ing to. these instructions.: He gave orders that the property
across the street. from the mission, whence the arrow. pre-
bl
suma
y came, should be. watched, for two days.
On the next day, a Sunday, when darkness was falling,, a car k
stopped not far from the mission premises. A young man, and
a girl got out and' started to.walk obtrusively 'toward our en.-
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trance, paying no attention to the counterintelligence men on
duty nearby. In the meantime a second young man who had
remained in the car shot another arrow into the courtyard.
This was found likewise to have a note attached, with the same
contents as the first.
Having analyzed all that had happened and taking into ac-
count that by that time the operational situation had become
unfavorable, the residency decided that it was inexpedient to
establish contact with Ar, especially since two other people
were in on the offer. It cannot be excluded that this was
quite a well-planned counterintelligence provocation scheme.
But it cannot be stated with certainty that these young people
were not genuinely anxious to help us.
Local Party Members
We do not run agents in friendly countries of the socialist
camp, and in' a number of other places (certain African and
Arab countries, Cuba) we do not recruit local citizens as
agents but use the citizens of capitalist countries who live
there. Everywhere we are forbidden to maintain agent rela-
tions with members of the fraternal Communist and Workers
Parties and other progressive elements.
Nevertheless it cannot be avoided that walk-ins from these
prohibited categories turn up at our missions. What should
be done in such cases? It is essential to listen to the visitor
patiently and attentively and then explain our position to
him so thoroughly as to arrive at complete mutual under-
standing and. send him away satisfied. The following case can
be cited as an example.
In January 1960 a Finnish citizen, A , came to the Soviet
embassy and asked for an interview with our military repre-
sentative. The military attache instructed his assistant to
receive the Finn. The visitor, giving his name, age, and ad-
dress, said that he was a construction foreman from Tampere
and that until recently. he had worked in the construction or=
ganization of the Ministry of Defense helping build under-
ground ammunition storage bunkers. His visit to the embassy'
was for the purpose of turning over to us the blueprints of
these bunkers.. He displayed one of the drawings, which,
sketched a bunker some 50 x 20 meters in floor area and which
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bore the stamp of the engineer department of the Finnish
armed forces.
The assistant military attache told A- that because of
the friendly relations between the USSR and Finland Soviet
representatives could not meddle in the internal affairs of his
country and its armed forces. A- understood our position
but explained his own by citing the fact that in spite of 'friendly
relations between the countries some Finnish officers contin-
ued to remain hostile to the USSR and were educating their
men in this spirit. He himself was a.member of the Finnish
Communist Party and of the Finland-USSR society,. actually
heading one of the local branches of this society; he therefore
had considered it his duty to inform the Soviet representative.,
The assistant attache thanked A for his warm attitude
toward the USSR and for his concern and good work on behalf
of Finnish-USSR relations. On this they parted.
General Precepts
The above examples illustrate that residency officers still
make quite a lot of blunders and bad judgments in working
with walk-ins. In order to avoid these and carry out such
work in a better planned and more effective way, some general
rules which should be adhered to can be summed up as follows.
Write-ins
On receiving by mail a letter with an offer of services, it is
essential to note whether the sender's name and address are
given, to check on the way mail is delivered to the establish-
ment, to know whether counterintelligence in that country
runs a mail scrutiny operation, and to examine any sugges-
tion of a meeting as to place and manner. If the letter has
been dropped into the establishment's mailbox. without going
through the mails, then the situation is simpler, but here too
it is essential to carry out the appropriate checks.
After this, the question of a meeting with the writer should
be settled: should he be. asked to` come to an official establish-
ment (embassy, - trade delegation, etc.), or to a safe house?,
More use should =be made of meetings in various public places;
- 14
erings, in order to. avoid, drawing the ;attention of counter`in'j
telligence fromthe beginning.
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 Approved For I e?IAL 2005/04/13
In talking to the write-in the main question should be
cleared up first-what information can he provide? Only later
and in a tactful way should efforts be made to get some par-
ticulars about him, bearing in mind that as a rule even a per-
son who is well disposed toward us will try to conceal such
particulars in order to avoid getting himself into trouble. On
the other hand, a write-in bent on provocation will boast about
his position and exaggerate his access, trying to make his prop-
osition attractive.
It is only after clearing up all these questions that a deci-
sion should be taken regarding further action-whether to
continue the contact and if so where to meet, or to drop it.
Callers in Person
If someone comes to a mission of ours with an offer to help
us, in this case too it is important to start the conversation by
clearing up the main question-what potential he has for pro-
viding material of interest-and then only gradually to in-
quire into his motives and other matters. If in the course of
the conversation it becomes clear that the visitor's potential
is limited, it is essential to tell him at once that we, the officials
at the embassy (or trade delegation or attache office), do not
indulge in such activities.
If a person's offer is of interest and his position gives him
access to valuable material, it should be determined whether
he has perchance been planted, by counterintelligence and
briefed to arouse our interest. His statements about where
he is employed and the kind of work he does should be checked
by probing thoroughly his knowledge of the work and deter-
mining whether he really does know all the details he should
or has only acquired a general acquaintance with it from
counterintelligence briefings. After this uncertainty has been
resolved the question of further meetings can be decided.
If a walk-in brings documents along when he first offers his
services it is best for the interviewing officer to pretend that
he does not know the language they are written in or on some
other pretext ask permission to show them to a colleague' in
order to determine their value; this will provide an opportunity
to photograph them. Depending on their value, the interview...
can Tie resumed with the object of determining the man's po
sition and potential, his financial terms, etc.
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A-RDP78T031'4200020001-1
If it is decided to pursue the operation it is essential to give
careful thought to arrangements for further meetings, the
planning of dead drops, etc. Personal meetings should be kept
as infrequent as possible; when they have to be held the cover
story for them should be carefully worked. out and the cir-
cumstances made to appear casual and natural so as to avoid
attracting counterintelligence attention.
Country Team Support
When walk-ins telephone to embassy personnel at their
homes or come to the official embassy buildings or other Soviet
establishments (trade delegation, TASS) asking to see a mili-
tary officer, they should not be directed to the military at-
tache's office, but a member of his staff should be sent to the
office where the visitor has called and the interview held there.
The attaches and residents should establish close liaison with
all Soviet establishments in order to be informed quickly when
a walk-in appears, and our officers should conduct the meet-
ings on the spot in these establishments. Only the most ex-
perienced officers should be given this assignment.
In the event of an approach by telephone it is generally
better to arrange to have the interview at a trade delegation,
TASS office, or similar installation rather than on the premises
of the military attache's office or the embassy. Counterintel-
ligence watches the former less closely, as a rule, and a mili-
tary representative sent to such a place can therefore hold the
meeting under more favorable conditions.
Persons -who come to Soviet establishments requesting po-
litical asylum, however, are handled through Ministry of For-
eign Affairs channels. We should not involve ourselves in such
matters."
Offers may also be made at exhibitions, receptions, and vari-
ous kinds of open meetings. It is essential to treat these with
the greatest caution; a person who approaches you in these
surroundings could photograph or otherwise compromise you,
in the course of your very first conversation with him.
In conclusion;-it should be emphasized once more that work'.
with walk-ins, is an important, part of agent operations for-.stra "
1
tegic intelligence and when
; properly, planned and conducte
can be very fruitful.?
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78T03194AA20D020001-1
Economic and political intel-
ligence representation on the
J-2 staff of the U.S. Taiwan
Defense Command.
THE ANALYST IN A WAR THEATER ROLE
Robert W. Smith
The gestation period of an elephant is said to be 18 to 21
months, and a new conception in intelligence organization is
likely to take about as long to bear fruit; but the birth of a
joint intelligence center including CIA overt analytic person-
nel on the forward bastion of Taiwan required considerably
less. It was after a visit to Taiwan in early 1955, where the
lack of coordination on intelligence matters in the American
community distressed him, that Chief of Naval Operations Ad-
miral Robert B. Carney suggested the establishment of such
a center. 'The idea appealed to the DCI, who offered to supply
initially two intelligence officers, then others as needed. The
Intelligence Advisory Committee was consulted on 28 March
1955, and two days later Navy Department representatives ac-
cepted the offer and approved the selection of two medium-
level officers from CIA intelligence production components who
were then serving in Japan. In the same month, naval officers
from the Formosa Defense Command of the Seventh Fleet
moved ashore and incorporated the Formosa Liaison Center-
as the American military establishment there had been
called-into a U.S. Formosa Defense Command, served by'the
new Joint Intelligence Center. In October the name was
changed to U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.
The Beginnings
Civilian participation was thus a feature from the very be-
ginning of the strong joint U.S. military presence on Taiwan
evoked by the anxieties of the time. The most prominent
milestones in, the chronology of -recurrent tensions since 1949
are recalled in the listing below:
tempt to -- take Chin-men.
June 1950 L. US 7th Fleet ordered to neutralize Strait.
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 Anil proved For Release 2005/04/13 :
April 1951 ..... MAAG Taiwan established.
July 1953 ...... Chicoms redeploy combat troops from Korea;
construction of roads and airfields in Fukien
gains momentum.
September 1954 After two months of propaganda on "Liberate
Taiwan and Off-Shore Islands" theme, Chicoms
bombard Chin-men with 6,000 shells on 3 Sep-
tember and continue through the end of
October.
February 1955 .. After capturing Ichiang Shan in a well-coordi-
nated air, naval, and amphibious assault in
January, Chicoms force Chinats to evacuate
Ta-chen Islands.
April 1955 .... Chou En-lai at Bandung Conference stresses
"peaceful liberation of Taiwan."
December 1956. Yingtan-Amoy Railroad, first rail line connecting
previously isolated Fukien province to the na-
tional network, completed.
June 1957 ...... Chicom artillery fires 6,000 shells on Chin-men.
July 1958 ...... Chicoms begin massive propaganda barrage re-
viving "Liberate Taiwan" theme, dormant since
1956, and occupy coastal airfields.
August-October Chicoms begin heavy firing on Chin-men, air and
1958 naval elements are employed, and Chin-men
garrison is urged to surrender. Rapid and
strong U.S. response results in ambassadorial
talks and ceasefire. In October Chicoms begin
odd-day firing pattern which they have main-
tained since.
June 1960 ...... Chicoms salute President Eisenhower's visit to
Taiwan with 175,000 shells directed agianst
Chin-men.
June 1962 ...... Chicoms redeploy six divisions from North China
into Fu-thou Military Region opposite Taiwan.
The two CIA officers, one from economic and one from cur-
rent intelligence production, arriving in April, found them-
selves among the first dozen persons comprising the Formosa
Defense Command.
they were able to furnish logistics, transpor-
tation.; and housekeeping assistance to-.the budding organiza-
tion. An immediate order of business in those threatening
days was the drawing up of a War Plan. Working relation-
ships were established with MAAG, Embassy, and ICA person-,
nel. At the same time the analysts began to discharge their
main responsibility; that of providing current intelligence on
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Approved For Release 2005/04/'
-RDP78T03194 260U2 1 1peater
the vigorous antagonist 100 short miles across the strait.
Files were set up, regular briefings were given, and reports
written. One of the first analytic efforts was an estimate of
the variables involved in the construction of the Chinese Com-
munist coastal airfield complex opposite Taiwan.
During this time the American community was in flux. In
July 1957 the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was officially es-
tablished as a subordinate unified command of CINCPPAC and
the bottom link in the chain of responsibility USTDC to
CINCPAC to JCS to SEC DEF. This arrangement gave a fillip
to the growth of a concerted, centralized intelligence effort
in the American community on Taiwan and formalized the
duties of the CIA officers. 25X1
In addition to their responsibilities in the USTDC intelli-
gence organization, the analysts had work to do
These grew, over the years, to such an extent
that one of the two officers is now working full time
25/11___j leaving only one in the USTDC intelligence organi-
zation. 25X1
The J-2 and the J-2.1
The Intelligence Division (J-2) of the USTDC is now.staffed
by 17 officers and 20 enlisted men from the four armed serv-
ices, along with the one CIA civilian. J-2 is charged with pro-
viding intelligence to the USTDC Commander and to CINC:PAC
and other commands as appropriate, formulating and coordi-
nating joint military intelligence and counterintelligence
planning, coordinating the activities of all U.S. military intel-
ligence and counterintelligence units operating in the area,
and representing USTDC and CINCPAC on military intelli-
gence matters with the military authorities of the Chinese
Nationalist Government.
The primary duty of the CIA representative is to provide in-
formation on Chinese Communist political, economic, and logils-
tic developments 4iffecting the USTDC mission. He is listed
on the J-2 organizational chart as a Political Adviser for the
purpose of coordination and in the J-2 staff nomenclature as
the J-2.1.
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IA-RDP78T031 S4AM010601 0.hfater
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELL
J-2 (SSO/SPO)
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
J-2.2
DEPUTY ACS INTELL
J-20
ADMINISTRATION
J-201
POLAD
J-2.1
His chief routine job is to provide political and economic in-
telligence items and assist in the preparation of the J-2 cur-
rent intelligence briefings which are given three times weekly
to the USTDC Commander, his senior staff, and guests, includ-
ing Chief of MAAG ROC (Major General), Chief 13th Air Task
Force (P) (Brigadier General), Deputy Chief of Mission., U.S.
25Xnbassy, and military attaches,
25)(=These briefings are based on all-source information re-
ceived daily from CIA, State, Defense, DIA, Unified Commands,
and Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence offices. At brief-
ing rehearsals, the J-2.1 offers suggestions and recommends
to the J-2 briefing staff changes in portions of the briefing
relating to his area of interest. He sits in on each briefing
in order to field any question that might fall in his corner.
He similarly helps compose and as often as possible is invited
to attend the Distinguished Visitor briefings given to the
many U.S. military and civilian callers at the Island. (During
the pre-Christmas rush to Hong Kong the traffic at this way-
station is particularly heavy.)
At the weekly meetings of the USTDC Indications Review
Committee the J-2.1 acts as principal drafting officer for, the
J-2. He also attends the Country Team Intelligence Corn-
mittee, which meets monthly. He is the liaison channel from
25XVSTDC requently briefing the principals
25X on intelligence developments. Occasionally he
does liaison chores for the USTDC Operations Division (J-3)
and, infrequently, with the Chinese military at USTDC's
request.
Crisis Activity.
During a crisis the routine becomes lively. The Country
Team Intelligence Committee, the Indications Review Commit-
PLANS AND POLICY
SECTION
J-21
USTDC
INDICATIONS
CENTER
'J-22
tee, and smaller ad hoc groups gather frequently, and, the
J-2.1 has a hand in nearly all of them. He accompanies the
J-2 to brief the Commander as required
He ma
aid the J 2
.
y
CURRENT INTELL PHOTO INTELL in drafting intelligence messages to higher commands and. also
SECTION SECTION contributes to itreps sent to CIA Headquarters. Following
J-23 J-24
is the record of .'a fairly routine flap of a type which occurs
frequently.
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52 SECRET SECRET _ 53
 25X1
Analyst in a War Theater
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
8:00 A.M. Chinese Intelligence Chief informs J-2 via special courier
that agent report states large-scale artillery bombard-
ment of Chin-men imminent. Military convoys re-
portedly active in Amoy area, civilians being evacuated,
and artillery units being reinforced.
8:30 A.M. J-2 consults with J-2.1 and passes information to USTDC
Commander.
8:45 A.M. J-2.1 conveys information
immediate check of sources.
8:55 A.M. J-2 requests the intelligence staffs of 13th Air Task Force
(P) and the MAAG, as well as the Service Attaches,
to check their intelligence sources for confirmation or
denial of report.
9:25 A.M. The Air Warning Center analysts of 13th Air Task Force
(P) back up the USTDC Indication Center analysts'
findings that Chicom aircraft and airbase activity is
normal with no peculiarities noted.
MAAG Intelligence Section informs J-2 that its observers
on Chin-men have noted nothing unusual in Amoy
area; junk and naval traffic normal.
25X1 9:50 AM.
25X1
informs J-2.1 that I fail to
substantiate report; contrariwise, decrease in normal
activities on coastal front opposite Chin-men had re-
cently been noted.
10:00 AM. J-2.1 reports information providedl to
J-2, who informs Commander that agent report prob-
ably erroneous.
10:30 AM. J-2 with J-2.1 assistance drafts reply to Chinese stating
that intensive study of all current intelligence fails to
substantiate report and requesting that Chinese keep
J-2 informed should anything further develop.
The Times Between
Between crises, the J-2.1, reverting to rumination, pries and
probes the manifold wrinkles of information seeking a good
intelligence thread. When he finds and unravels it, he offers
it to J--2 for the Command Briefing. If it deserves a wider
audience, he writes it up in an Information Report for the De-
fense Intelligence Agency. DIA often uses these reports in
its publications.
One such report may be cited as illustrating the analytic
aspect of the J-2.1's job. In the spring of 1959 he found in a
Chinese Communist newspaper a terse notice that planning
was under way for a million-kilowatt hydroelectric power sta-
tion north of Nan-ping in Fukien province. Knowing that a
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IA-RDP78T03194A0002000200~'1-~
project, of this size would have a powerful impact on the mili-
tary geography of Fukien, he began to probe. With substan-
tial help from an ICA engineer he "constructed" on paper the
dam necessary for such a plant and calculated the area re-
quired for the reservoir. Taking this abstraction he examined
photography and cartography of the Min River north of Nan-
ping for potential sites. Only one site emerged as feasible for
so large an installation. Applying to it the theoretical require-
ments, he was able to state that certain major roads and towns
and one airfield in the area would be inundated by the
reservoir.
Some uncertainty about the validity of the whole story
arose from the lack of publicity given the project; the Com-
munists usually propagandize large construction projects
heavily. A study of Communist press and broadcast report-
age for the region, however, revealed that the construction
of new railroads and highways was being projected around
and not through the indicated reservoir area. All these data
were then incorporated into a report to higher military head-
quarters. It was not until a year later that the Chinese Com-
munists announced the location thus pinpointed and con-
firmed in a lengthy elaboration the effects the construction
would have on the area.
Evaluation
The record of this civilian support to the U.S. military on
Taiwan is satisfying. On short notice the CIA representatives
were ensconced at a forward vantage in a critical war-of-
nerves battle area more than eight years ago. They found
working conditions as ideal as could be expected in an environ-
ment characterized by tension. While not deferring to the
J-2.1 in every instance-though in political and economic rnart-
ters his opinion generally obtained-the military officers af-
forded him recognition and prestige, and his ideas always get
a charitable ear. If he was occasionally shot down, no dum-
dums were used; he was demolished politely and with con-
sideration. In fact, a praise worthy function of the J-2.:t
was simply to be what he was, a civilian loner on whom rank
was never pulled, providing the staff a convenient neutral
channel through which various jobs which might otherwise
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have been dead-ended by the military structure could be car-
ried out.
The ;intelligence product resulting from this liaison has ma-
tured through recurring crises down the years. Although the
representation was originally conceived as one of support to
the U.S. military rather than to CIA Headquarters in Wash-
ington, it has had the beneficial side effect of providing CIA
with on-the-spot analysis at times of crisis. The four genera-
tions of representatives assigned there since the program's
genesis have learned much from their military counterparts
and, reciprocally, taught them something of CIA techniques
applicable to tactical and strategic intelligence problems.
And possibly their mutual collaboration may have brought
a better appreciation of that essence of intelligence flagged
60 years ago by G. K. Chesterton:
There are some people-and I am one of them-who think that
the most practical and important thing about a man is still his
view of the universe. We think for a landlady considering a
lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more im-
portant to know his philosophy. We think that for a general
about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's
numbers, but still more important to know his enemy's philosophy.
Approved FbVR9fJase 2005/04/1
Diagnosis of a methodological
malady and a suggested
course of therapy.
FOR, AN ECLECTIC SOVIETOLOGY
Richard W. Shryock
Writing several years ago, Daniel Bell, an articulate sociol-
ogist, entertaining writer, and part-time student of students
of Soviet affairs, identified at least ten schools of thought con-
cerned with the analysis of internal Soviet politics. His de-
scription ranged them from the conventional approach of the
political scientists through the somewhat more esoteric metth-
ods of the "content analyzers" on up to the way-out system of
the Freudians ("all Communists are homosexuals") . He did
not specify which school he favored but seemed to suggest
that each may have something to learn from the others. We
concur. In. the following we shall examine the sovietological
schisms in the intelligence community and enter a plea for
a more eclectic approach in this pursuit.
In official Washington the methods used for studying do-
mestic Soviet affairs are fewer than ten: I personally know of
no Freudian group, alas, and there is currently a paucity of
pure sociologists in the community. But there are a number
of other identifiable schools each holding the others in dis-
dain. This, obviously, is too bad; the development of strong
vested interests in one approach or another has taken place
at the expense of the substance of the research. There is a
great deal of energy expended on destructive criticism of the
work produced by other groups, with precious little exchange
of helpful ideas. Something should be done about it. This
paper is an effort to show how something can be done.
The Warring Schools
Some years ago a CIA analyst discovered Nikita Khrushchev
referred to as the First Secretary of the CPSU, whereas pre-
viously he had been identified in the official press only in lower
case, "first secretary." The conclusion from this evidence,
that Khrushchev was on his way up, was subsequently hailed
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as a methodological triumph, proof of a newfound world of
analytic method. No matter that indicators of Khrushchev's
ascending fortunes were apparent in almost all areas of So-
viet life; this little "esoteric communication" became cause
in part for the establishment of a whole new approach to
Soviet studies and a whole new corpus of political philosophy
concerning the Soviet and Communist systems.
This method does in fact provide the student with an oc-
casionally useful tool. It is based on a truth as old as poli-
tics: all political commentary, all speeches by leaders are to
a certain extent esoteric, i.e., they contain messages to the
elite not ordinarily decipherable by the layman. In a closed
society, naturally, the content is apt to be more esoteric
than in an open one. But what is as often forgotten as re-
membered by the professional adherents of this school is that
the important problem for the analyst is more likely to lie
in distinguishing between the politician's intentions and his
capabilities than in trying to ferret out the precise messages
that reveal the intent.
Another problem with this school is that it raises more
questions than it can answer, and so its practitioners are
prone to discover messages and then forget about their pos-
sible implications. Last spring, for example, a ranking mem-
ber of the CPSU Presidium, Kirilenko, was listed in official
media out of the normal alphabetical order; this was quickly
spotted by' alert readers of Pravda and other Soviet journals,
but no one could come up with a satisfactory explanation (ex-
cept possibly that of the waggish school that discerned a plot
by the Soviet typesetters' union). It could only be concluded,
solemnly, that this was "unusual," could not be mere happen-
stance, and thus surely meant something.
Regrettably, those who spend their time delving into these
arcane subtleties have only scorn for less sophisticated an-
alysts and, even more regrettably, do not make use of sources
other than the open Soviet press. Indeed, I have heard
them proclaim their disdain for other sources: "They serve
no useful function at all, merely confuse those of us using the
press." This is clearly no attitude from which to see the for-
est. We feel, indeed, that these analysts have been rooting
around one particular tree for so long as to be lost to their
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wider-ranging colleagues. Many of them, however, are gifted
students and well endowed, and therefore we address them an
anguished plea: come back!
In the school of the political scientists we find a less recon-
dite approach and a broader and more promising methodology.
If adequately informed, its practitioners often come up with
the right questions and, though less often, the right answers.
But they too have no use for other attitudes and method's
and are likely to listen only to themselves. Further, some
of them sometimes seem to forget that their task is not like
making an examination of the affairs of state and local gov-
ernments in, say, Pennsylvania. We have, for example, very
little need for a detailed map of election districts in the
Ukraine and even less for a thorough study, district by dis-
trict, of the election results.
Finally, the political scientists suffer from an analytical
malaise all too common to students of Soviet affairs, both for-
eign and domestic-power fixation. They think that all poll--
tics-indeed, all life-can be diagrammed according to a set
of political rules derived from the assumption that the po-
litical behavior of mankind is essentially a struggle for pure
power (no matter what the Freudians say). In fact, of course,
this does not work. Men do often behave as the political scien-
tists think they should behave, and certainly power is one of
the prime movers; but complete reliance on this notion can
lead to ghastly errors of interpretation.
A somewhat smaller school in the intelligence commun':ty
(one probably overlooked by Bell because it does not extend
to academic circles) can best be called the biographic
school. Analysts spend anxious hours scanning the back.,
grounds and careers of Soviet officials in search of clues as to
their future political behavior. To these practitioners, a com-
mon element in the lives of two functionaries-a coincidence
of birthplace or congruence of careers-somehow creates a
political alliance in perpetuity. Thus if party secretaries A
and B are found both to be Ukrainians who once served in
Omsk and they are now working together in Gosplan, they
obviously conspire together against non-Ukrainian. non-
Omskian careerists at a similar or slightly superior level. The
old school tie thus assumes a significance vastly exceeding its
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proverbial importance in Great Britain (where, as everyone
knows, Conservatives and Laborites all went to the same school
anyhow).
A sub-species of the biographic school is the provincial fac-
tion group, which resolves all politics by place of birth and
subsequent service. Thus the chief political forces in the
USSR are the Leningrad faction, the Moscow faction, and
the Kiev (or Ukrainian) faction. To some extent these group-
ings certainly exist, but they do not ordinarily determine the
direction of all Soviet political life. Like any school of study
which. concentrates on one analytic formula to the virtual
exclusion of others, the adherents of this one are blinded by
their own searchlight, and the fact that one "Leningrader"
may have served in Leningrad a full decade before another
does not dissuade them from tying the two together. The
achievement of discovering that two men served in the same
place, no matter when, is acclaimed as a breakthrough and
becomes a sufficient reward in itself.
Next we must contemplate the pure researchers. These
haunters of old files and library stacks are a breed apart.
They escape the world of current problems and political fore-
casting and retire amongst the musty shelves. Every so
often they may emerge with a scroll containing a seemingly
endless compilation of facts. This, if turned into a paper of
sorts, must be at least 100 pages long, contain no specula-
tion, reflect no insight, and, hopefully, avoid all conclusions.
A common denominator of very generally applicable qualities
may be isolated, but the chances are that this will be of only
marginal academic interest or else so long accepted as to be
platitudinous. This school is scarcely aware of the existence
of others, views current intelligence as "mere journalism" (as
if there were something heinous about journalism), and when
challenged deigns not to reply. After all, the facts speak for
themselves.
There is a Stalinist school of Soviet studies, too. Fortu-
nately its ablest practitioners are outside the community,
usually senior professors at august universities. They once
wrote a book (say in 1935), twice visited the USSR (in 1933
and 1938), and have established reputations. They do not
feel secure, however, in these elongated reputations and are
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therefore impelled to do two things: one, they decry the no-
tion that there can have been changes in the USSR since the
publication of their work-thus their analysis stands inznior-
tal--and two, they colonize other institutions and govern-
ment offices with students trained in their ideas. Thus some
adherents of this school reach Washington, and they make
themselves known, but always negatively. Throw one of them
a fresh idea and he tosses it right back. Being in a position
always to cry nay, they are of course ofttimes right. But
they are never novel.
We cannot end this examination without at least men-
tioning a few lesser but well-known Washington schools. A
pair are formed by the economic determinists and their breth-
ren the scientific determinists. All politics is but a reflection
of economics (or science) and can be studied only in the light
of this great truth. Non-Marxists, they outdo the Marxists
in their devotion to determinism. And finally there is the
clandestine school, for which everything is subordinated to the
greater mission of espionage, clandestine sources, and secret
data (Limited Background Use Only/Not Releasable to For-
eign Nationals). But it would be improper, really, to think of
this as a school of Soviet studies; rather it is an approach
which transcends the purely Soviet and all studies, including,
its own substantive results: it is a way of life.
These, then, are the schools, somewhat arbitrarily defined.
Clearly something should be done about their dissonance, and
soon. The analysis of Soviet politics is too important a pur-
suit to be fragmented by divisions based more on methodology
than on substance. Here are some ideas for putting it to-
gether.
Curative Measures
There is no such thing as the right school or the wrong
school. And there is no such person as the ideal soviet?ologist.
All schools have something worth while to contribute and
all political analysts can become good contributors. We need
researchers, content analysts, biographers, economists, and
even (if only to remind us of the nature of the society with
which we are dealing) Stalinists. We need political scien-
tists with broad background and insight, not necessarily Rus-
sian-speaking specialists in Soviet affairs. But we also need
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the experts whose Russian approximates native fluency.
Each has a proper function and a job to do.
What we are saying, perhaps, is that there should be no
single school or methodology at all, but a variety of schools,
or sub-schools, which ride with the assigned function, not
with the individual. But in another sense there should be
only one school, one which combines the discipline of the so-
cial scientist with the insight of the empathic specialist, per-
mitting the social scientist to lecture to the specialist and in
turn be tutored by him. Most important, the various analysts
should hold one another in respect, assuming the individual
worthy, and should exchange thoughts and ideas; there is no
room for tight compartmentation in sovietology.
This brings to mind some crucial intelligence failures and
the notion that at least some of them might have been
avoided if the various sovietological schools had been willing
to exchange ideas and had some medium for such an ex-
change. It might have occurred to a good content analyst in
1955, for example, that something of a fight was brewing be-
tween Khrushchev and Molotov and that this struggle per-
force involved questions of high national policy, such as the
proposed peace treaty with Austria. At the same time, the
political scientists who were viewing the problem from their
own vantage point might have maintained a relatively flexi-
ble attitude concerning the Austrian treaty had their views
not been predetermined by their devotion to power politics
and firm conviction that the USSR was not about to pull
back on any issue, anywhere, at any time.
As it was, the signing of the Austrian peace treaty caught
just about everyone by surprise. It had never occurred to the
Kremlinologists to tie the Moscow struggle in with matters
of policy, much less the peace treaty; they were concerned
strictly with a political struggle and esoteric manifestations
thereof. They were looking under rocks for invisible writing
on slugs and whatever else was uncovered, they were not look-
ing under the headlines in their morning papers. And mean-
while the political scientists, who normally speak only to one
another, were concentrating on those very headlines but were
ignorant of the factional duel in the Kremlin. Neither could
add the two and two together. And of course the researchers
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at this point were still playing games with the removal of
Beria, the Stalinists were looking for evidence of an ii-.crease
in troop strength in the Soviet zone in Austria, and the eco-
nomic determinists were racking up the statistics. concerning
the shipment of Austrian POL to the Soviet Union. And so on.
Perhaps, to be fair, we should cite at this point not another
failure but a particular triumph of the Kremlinologists. Or,
to be more accurate, a partial triumph: the political scien-
tists saw to it that the victory was not total. In 1958 a small
but persistent band of Kremlinologists discovered through
content analysis that the Chinese Communists and the So-
viets were engaged in an increasingly bitter strug?;le. They
published their findings and sought to advertise their con-
clusions, but their journals were obscure and their voices were
not heeded. The political scientists, in particular, sup-
pressed any corrupting notions of Bloc disarray, in part; be-
cause it did not jibe with their ideas of sensible power politics
and in part because of firmly held views long expressed in
their own writings.
Finally, of course, it became all too obvious that a dispute
in. fact existed. Still the political scientists had not learned
their lesson. While they now reluctantly admitted tlae gen-
eralization of a Sino-Soviet struggle, they were as .yet not
prepared to apply the generalization to any particular area of
politics or policy. Thus when the Kremlinologists demon-
strated, for example, that the Chinese and Soviets. were at
odds over the Congo and Algeria, the political scientists were
scornful. In one particular instance that we remember, an
article by a content analyst concerning the Algerian imbroglio
was almost killed by the strident criticism of a vested-interest
political scientist. Fortunately for the readership, this effort
was thwarted. In other instances, however, the Kremlinolo-?
gists were less fortunate; what the political scientists lack
in depth they more than make up in sheer numbers.
A small beginning toward a unified school has been made
with the creation of an ad hoc working group from overt, and
covert elements of CIA, chaired by the chief of a Soviet re-
search unit. Devoted in the first instance to a look at the suc-
cession struggle sure to follow the death of Khrushchev, it
must of necessity deal with other political problems and in
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fact does so. The national estimates process may sometimes
provide a similar opportunity: it occasions contacts on sub-
stantive matters between CIA and other intelligence organi-
zations, and when an estimate concerned at least in part with
internal Soviet politics is being coordinated there can be a
profitable cross-fertilization of ideas. It might be wise to put
this on a more regular basis, however, by adding to the CIA
ad hoc group some representatives from other agencies.
This working-group approach in any case needs strength-
ening by other measures. Most practical and perhaps desira-
ble would be a medium of written exchange among interested
sovietologists, both within the community and outside it.
Such a medium could be created, though it might require a
small government subsidy, in a journal devoted exclusively to
the field of sovietology. Researchers could be given space to
display their products (many of which might otherwise never
see the light of day), and analysts could present their specula-
tions and reviews. Non-sovietologists might be permitted to
ask questions and bring the specialists up to date on related
matters such as foreign affairs. The experts could testify and
the students learn. There is at present no periodical in exist-
ence which offers such opportunities to the practitioners of
the aggregate school. What more painless way to keep the
currents moving, to exchange ideas and gain inspiration?
What better way to end the provincialism so characteristic of
the field, to destroy the myths of exclusive infallibility nur-
tured by the several methodologists?
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Prescribes stronger medicine
for the foregoing ailment.
BETTER AN OFFICE OF SOVIETOLOGY
John Whitman
It is very good that Mr. Shryock has opened a discussion of
the methods of sovietology; the debate is overdue, and we are
in his debt. To my mind he exaggerates, here and there, the
devotion with which individual analysts cling to one method-
ology, forsaking all others, but as a generalization his diagno-
sis can stand as a fair statement of what's wrong and ought to
be set right.
I am surprised, however, that an intelligence officer of Mr.
Shryock's experience could bring himself to endorse, as even a
partial solution, an ad hoc working group. A task force by any
other name smells not one whiff better. Such a body, as any-
one knows, is nothing but a floating crap game from which
anyone can return and tell his boss that he won (or that the
dice were loaded). An ad hoc working group produces no pa-
pers, and its chairman writes no fitness reports.
The national estimating process contributes even less to the
synthesis of methods and insights for which Mr. Shryock calls.
While the drafters of an NIE may be partial to one or another
of Mr. Shryock's schools, they perform little sustained re-
search of their own and are in principle eclectic. Their esti-
mate is produced with little participation by the multifarious
units of sovietologists tucked away in various parts of the
community. While any of these schools may get its views pre-
sented in a contribution to the estimate, in practice it has lit-
tle chance to argue them during the drafting.
There is much merit in Mr. Shryock's new suggestion that
a journal of sovietology be founded, drawing on governmental
and academic analysts alike. The field is small, its practition-
ers are scattered, and they need a medium of communication
which would organize polemics and help set standards in an
area of investigation that is still relatively young. Such a
journal could also be a bazaar where analysts could trade with
each other not only questions which have no answers but an-
swers which have no questions (as on Kirilenko). The need
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is for a highly specialized, highly professional publication-
something only a sovietologist would read-and it is unlikely
to be met by private initiative, if only because more than half
the talent is in the intelligence community. And by making
the field respectable it might help solve the problem of where
the next generation of sovietologists is to come from.
But let us focus now on the most pregnant passage in Mr.
Shryock's essay: "....there should be a variety of schools, or
sub-schools, which ride with the assigned function, not with
the individual." The development of this thought may lead us
to the fundamental difficulty and suggest its cure.
Isn't it clear that the multiplicity of schools arises directly
from the multiplicity of assigned functions? If you sit a man
down at a desk and tell him he is responsible for culling and
translating gems from the Soviet press, don't be surprised if
his analyses, and therefore his selections, take no account of
the relative postures of the United States and the USSR in
strategic attack forces. If you sit another man down at a desk
somewhere else and tell him to keep books on the assignments
and associations of Kirilenko, don't be surprised if he can't
tell you whether the esoteric content of Kirilenko's speeches
suggests revisionist or dogmatic proclivities. Create two of-
fices for current reporting, tell one that it is responsible for
exploiting radio and press and the other that its primary con-
cern is "everything else" (whatever that is), and you can al-
most take it for granted that the resulting rivalry will not be
a fruitful one.
In CIA, as a glance at the Agency's organization shows, the
economic, scientific, and some other fields are legitimate sub-
jects for research, but politics is not. Under the existing
ground rules Soviet politics can be treated in CIA only as an
aspect-an important one, but still one aspect-of the proc-
essing of foreign documents and broadcasts, of the production
of biographic information, of the publication of current intel-
ligence, etc.
Mr. Shryock is right that all schools are needed. But I fear
that they will continue to work at cross purposes so long as
they remain in different bureaucracies rather than being
united in a single organizational framework devoted to exploit-
ing, all methodologies for a single aim-the analysis of Soviet
politics as a research problem.
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A promising start in exploiting the
emergency mass admission of Red
China re f ugeds to this country.
WINDFALL FROM HONG KONG
Charles F. Turgeon
In May 1962 more than 70,000 refugees streamed across the
briefly opened border between Communist China and. Hong
Kong. When President Kennedy announced that the United
States, in a humanitarian gesture, would receive several thou-
sand of them, the intelligence community was presented with
an exceptional opportunity to collect information at first hand
on the most denied of denied areas.
There is often no substitute for being able to talk to a per-
son who has lived and worked inside a country which can
otherwise be approached only through external methods such
as reconnaissance, technical analysis, open literature, and
third-country reporting. At a minimum, a refugee group can
normally contribute a substantial amount of basic i ntelli-
gence in the economic, political, geographic, and even scientific
fields. To a lesser degree, refugees' knowledge Of persons,
places, and procedures within a country are valuable for oper-
ational intelligence. Finally, if some of them have head signi-
ficant positions in the society and these are interviewed
promptly, they may make important contributions to current
intelligence.
Peculiarities of the Program
The program that has been developed to take advantage of
this opportunity, however, is quite unlike those set up for the
Hungarian refugees of 19561 and more recently those from
Cuba 2 whose resettlement was sponsored by the government.
The President's "Emergency Chinese Refugee Parole Program"
requires that the Chinese immigrants be sponsored. by private
individuals or groups willing to take responsibility for their
'See Studies II 1, p. 85 if.
' See Studies VII 4, p. 41 if.
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transportation, accommodation, and support. This private
sponsorship has a variety of critical implications for the in-
telligence collection program-most of them inhibitive.
When the government pays for the transportation and ar-
ranges for the livelihood of a political refugee, it has the right
to ask certain things of the refugee in return. When it does
not, as in this instance, it is in no position to put pressure
on him to contribute to the intelligence picture of his home-
land. Under a government resettlement program there is
usually a single port of entry for the refugees and a single
processing center, like Camp Kilmer for the Hungarians and
Opa-Locka for the Cubans, which offers an ideal opportunity for
intelligence screening en masse. There are no such facilities
for the Chinese refugees. They come in how and when they
can, through virtually every air- and seaport on both coasts,
bound for a variety of destinations in all the fifty states. Thus
they constitute an extremely diffuse and difficult intelligence
target. Moreover, no special funds, facilities, or personnel, ex-
cept for a limited number of interpreters, have been allocated
to the program.
The refugees who arrived during the first year largely ante-
dated the May 1962 influx into Hong Kong; they had escaped
during the 1950's and had been waiting there for approval to
enter the United States under the normal immigration quota
of 100 per year. When the quota was suddenly expanded, the
rules of fair play and the regulations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service required that these come first, however
ill it served the interests of the intelligence community or the
government of Hong Kong. Not until mid-1963, with the elim-
ination of this backlog, did the refugee group begin to assume
a current character.
The earlier refugees nevertheless turned out to have infor-
mation of value, as we shall see. Recency of residence can be
less important than former position and currency of commu-
nicatiions. A merchant who has lived in Hong Kong for seven
years but maintained his correspondence or travels to the
mainland can be a far more valuable source than a rice farmer
who got out yesterday. It is from persons such as this that a
large portion of the first year's intelligence was derived.
The methods that have been devised to reach the Chinese
immigrants are unique and still developing. The first notice
that one of them has entered the country comes to CIA head-
quarters from the central office of the Immigration Service
as a copy of a form giving only his name, port of entry, and
probable destination. The CIA office charged with domestic
collection alerts its appropriate field office to the presence of
this possible new intelligence source within its area of respon-
sibility. The field office then sends a representative to the
district, office of the Immigration Service to study the refugee's
Form No. FS-510, the Application for Visa he filled out in Hong
Kong, which is the only source of biographic data for an esti-
mate of his intelligence potential. Because of a lack of cor-
relation between the jurisdictional areas of the CIA field of-
fices and the I&NS districts, the CIA officer may have to
travel hundreds of miles to an Immigration office to see the
papers on a refugee living in the very city where his own of-
fice is located.
If the refugee appears to have possibilities, the field office
forwards a copy of the FS-510 or an abstract of its content to
headquarters, where the feasibility of opening a case on. him
is determined. Permission for contact with him must be ob-
tained from the FBI, not as a security check but in order to
keep clear of any refugee under investigation by the Bureau,
which has primacy of interest in resident alien affairs. If
there appears to be no conflict of interest the field office
is directed to make an initial contact for the purpose of obtain-
ing more biographic data and making a surer assessment of
the refugee's intelligence potential and willingness to cooper-
ate.
If the first interview shows that the source is worth debrief-
ing in depth, request is made for an Alien Security Check, a
full-scale security investigation conducted primarily by the
FBI, which establishes the classification of information that
can be discussed with the refugee. This is the last procedural
hurdle that has to be crossed, but there are other problems in
making the contact.
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The Contact
The first step in approaching a refugee is to locate him, and
this may be a problem. The Chinese have proved to be a highly
mobile group, often taking the stated address of their sponsor
as only a starting point in their travels. Some have settled in
surprisingly remote areas, but the greatest number are found
in the principal Chinese communities of New York and San
Francisco. There the ethnic solidarity of the neighborhood
affords them a dense cover under which they may hide from
government representatives out of fear of deportation.
If the refugee is still living with his sponsor, the latter may
stand on his rights as the party responsible for the refugee's
welfare and not allow him to be interviewed except by Immi-
gration officials. This block is rare but does occur, and from
it there is no present recourse. If the refugee is approached
at his place of employment, there may be no way to arrange a
secure interview, or the employer may be unwilling to give
him time off for it.
More basically, the intelligence officer must decide whether
to make a direct approach to the refugee himself or to seek
first the cooperation of his sponsor. The direct approach can
sometimes be effective because of its sudden impact: out of
surprise or fear the refugee may tell more about subjects of
intelligence interest than he would in the presence of his spon-
sor. The sponsor would at least constitute an additional party
in the line of communication with the refugee and might in-
tentionally or inadvertently restrain or reshape his responses
to questions. On the other hand, an approach through the
sponsor can have important advantages. Because not enough
qualified linguists are available to this project, the bilingual
Chinese-American sponsor may be the only means of talking
to the refugee. Moreover, his presence and tacit endorsement
of the interviewer may give the refugee the confidence to over-
come his normal reluctance to speak to a government repre-
sentative. The choice between the two approaches is not easy,
but because of the helpful and cooperative attitude of most
sponsors the one through them is becoming the way most
widely taken.
There is also the question of how the interviewer should
represent his position. If he were dealing with the sponsor
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alone he could perhaps present himself as a CIA officer, but he
is unlikely to do so with a refugee. To the Chinese in general,
intelligence is a dirty word, and for those who have lived under
the police state it is doubly bad. It is normal practice therefore
for the intelligence officer to represent himself as a govern-
rnent research worker seeking generalized, encyclopedic in-
formation on conditions in China.
In the introductory phase of the interview the officer at-
tempts to allay any fears about the use to be made of what-
ever information is offered. He assures the refugee that he
has no connection with tax, investigative, or police agencies
and stresses that whatever is said will be held in the strictest
confidence. If the refugee seems sensitive about his own cur-
rent, activities he is told that there is no interest in his 1. resent
affairs but only in his experiences in China.
After the interviewer has established his position, secured
the cooperation of the refugee, and, hopefully, built up some
rapport, he can proceed to the substance of the first interview.
In I his he is aided by a checklist of questions developed at
headquarters to elicit the maximum amount of biographic
data and reveal the subjects of intelligence interest in which
the source may be competent. The first interview, however,
is unlikely to take the form of a regimented march through all
the many questions on the checklist; the interviewer will use
them selectively and economically, having studied the refu-
gee',, FS-510 record with care, to get the most information
from him and cause him the least alarm. If this interview is
successful and shows the source to be of value, a. second one
is requested. If it is granted the Alien Security Check is initi-
ated, as described above, and a Notice of Intelligence Potential
is issued in the hope of receiving consumer requirements tail-
ored to the source. Having obtained a full security clearance
and a list of specific questions, the interviewer can then re-
turn to do a debriefing in depth.
The Chinese refugee is not an easy person to talk to. Be-
yond the language barrier, which is often monumental be-
cause of the diversity of dialects with which the extremely
limited interpreter force is confronted, there is that of his
native character. If not "inscrutable," the Chinese is natur-
ally reticent, and he manifests in particular all the family-
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protective instincts of his long tradition. One of the quickest
ways to quash an entire interview is to ask him questions con-
cerning his relatives on the mainland which he feels may
bring them into jeopardy. As compared with other refugees,
moreover, these more frequently left China for economic than
political reasons and therefore lack the volubility of men with
blood stirred high by a Cuban or Hungarian revolution. Fin-
ally, there is the dominant fact, of which most of them are
quite aware, that they have no legal obligation to aid the U.S.
government in any way.
The Product
Despite this multiplicity of difficulties, the product of the
first year's collection activity was good. In this period, accord-
ing to field office records, 6,510 refugees arrived in this coun-
try, 3,133 of them adults who could be regarded as potential
intelligence sources. The field forwarded biographic data on
838 of these as the most likely prospects, and headquarters
opened 207 cases. 170 were actually interviewed, and 397 in-
telligence reports were published, an average of more than
two per source.
The quality of these reports, relative to the great dearth
of information on Communist China, has been uniformly high.
They contain new data on such varied subjects as the state
of medical treatment, the cost of basic commodities, the politi-
cal climate, the numbers and kinds of newspapers published,
the production of electric power, biographies of important of-
ficials, security procedures employed by border guards, town
plans, travel regulations, construction projects, farming prac-
tices, dental care, research in medicine, physics, and biochem-
istry, and many others.
But if the quality of information elicited from these new
sources is heartening, the rate of production is not. The first-
year tally of 170 refugees interviewed, out of 3,133 adults avail-
able and 838 rated as having good potential, means that only
6% of the raw resource, or only 23% of its top fraction, was
exploited. The production lag appears to be more directly a
function of manpower shortage than of any other difficulty.
The sudden introduction of several thousand new potential
contacts into the case-load of the field offices has been too
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much for their existing staffs. It was expected that a total of
12,000 refugees would be in the country by the end of 1963.
The field officers must not only find time to see the refugees
but also arrange for interpreters; and here the manpower
shortage is even more critical. At the New York office, for
example, only two part-time interpreters were available for
the 1,961 Chinese refugees in its area.
Efforts are being made to enlist the aid of the military serv-
ices, who might furnish reservists to serve as interpreters in
the program. Other ways to improve exploitation have been
considered-identifying refugees of high potential and making
initial contact in Hong Kong, subsidizing transportation and
so controlling some of the refugees, and establishing one or
two interviewing centers which refugees already :here would
visit voluntarily. But none of these measures seems feasible
at the present time.
Future Sources
The limited and admittedly select group of refugees on
whom cases were opened in the first year included scientific
and technical personnel (18%), other professionals (9%), ex-
ecutives in banking, industry and commerce (3%), and. stu-.
dents (20%). The other half were farmers, merchants, sales-
men, clerks, miscellaneous craftsmen, and housewives. 41%
had finished college, and 20% had done graduate work. The
great majority, as expected, came from Kwangtung Province,
but nine other provinces and major cities, including, ,Shanghai
and Peking, were well represented.
This statistical picture will probably not hold true for the
second year; the likelihood is that it should even improve, at
least with respect to the currency of the information poten-
tial, as immigrants from the 1962 cross-over replace those who
had left China earlier. Even the last months of the first year
saw a marked improvement in the current and operational
information obtained.
At the same time plans are being laid for the long-term,
systematic utilization of the Chinese in this country. The
sponsors of the refugees have unexpectedly emerged as per-
sons with substantial intelligence potential, sometimes greater
than that of their proteges. Their value lies in the fact that
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as as important heads of families, businesses, or Chinese associa-
tions they have maintained extensive contacts with the main-
land, and in general they are cooperative in making available
their knowledge and these communications to U.S. intelli-
gence. A second group with similar potential consists of the
refugees who have now settled in this country and taken up
correspondence with family and friends still on the mainland.
Their letters are nearly always of intelligence interest, and
in some especially cooperative and favorable cases questions
pertinent to particular intelligence requirements may be in-
troduced into the correspondence. Both the sponsors and the
refugees can serve to alert intelligence to new and valuable
sources coming out of China.
Thus the Chinese refugee program promises to continue as
a unique and productive means of extracting information from
a country which is both the most bellicose Communist power
at the present time and perhaps our most difficult intelligence
target.
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74 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2005Q4113 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
Intelligence Articles VIII 1
25X1
Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
The work of one veteran intel-
ligence chief evokes reflections
from another.
ON "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"
Frank G. Wisner
Allen Dulles's book, aptly entitled The Craft of Intelligence,'
has been so extensively and variously reviewed by the profes-
sionals of the press and so much wisdom has been reflected in
the more thoughtful of these reviews that it was with the
greatest reluctance and diffidence on the part of the under-
signed that he was prevailed upon to undertake the task of ad-
dressing a further commentary to the readership of this pub-
lication. The evident presumption of attempting to provide
any useful commentary upon a work so cogently and con-
cisely written, and more particularly of venturing views of
possible value to such a uniquely sophisticated audience, would
have sufficed to deter this effort but for the opportunity thus
afforded of grinding certain special axes and getting in some
plugs for a number of strongly-held convictions. (Incident-
ally, it may be of interest to note in passing that the prepond-
erance of the book reviews have ranged from favorable to en-
thusiastic, with only a small proportion registering significant
dissatisfaction or hostility.)
Mr. Dulles has written a most valuable book, one which, in
the judgment of this reviewer, should be read and if possible
possessed by all persons having a serious professional interest
in the subject of intelligence, and hopefully also by a wide seg-
ment of the general public. It is essentially an encyclopedia
of the terminology, concepts, and craft of the trade, abun-
dantly illustrated by cases and anecdotes drawn from the au-
thor's own treasure-house of experience, and highly readable
in form.
Intelligence Terminology
One of the chief merits of the book from the standpoint of
the public in general is its clarification, through definition
`New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 277 pp. MORI/HRP PAGES Al-A16
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Al
 On "The Craft" Approved For Release 2005/04/13 1 CIA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1 On "The Craft"
and painstaking exposition, of the argot of the trade, which
has sprouted and proliferated in such lush profusion as to have
become highly confusing and dangerously misleading-largely
as the result of loose usage on the part of the considerable
and still growing number of amateurish exploiters of this rich
vein of literary ore. Newspapermen, the authors of popular
fiction, and, I fear, even a small number of would-be practi-
tioners of the profession of intelligence have all made their
contribution to the chaos, to the point that it was well overdue
for one of the leading and most revered experts in the field to
hack a clear track through the tangled undergrowth. In fact,
if it were possible for the intelligence community in general
to accept and conform to Mr. Dulles's definitions and support-
ing explanations for such variously used expressions as "de-
ception," "defector," "double agent," and "counterintelli-
gence," to mention but a few, much difficulty would be avoided
in future; and if as an extra dividend the interested represent-
atives of the fourth estate could be persuaded or influenced in
the direction of adopting these definitions, there would be in
time a constructive clarification of the public mind and a more
understanding appreciation of the problems of intelligence.
The repeated references in the Western press to both H. A. R.
("Kim") Philby (who recently skipped to Moscow to join his
old cronies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean) and George
Blake (now serving in England a heavy sentence for espio-
nage) as "British double agents," when in point of fact they
were highly important long-term Soviet penetration agents,
may serve to illuminate the reasons for concern on this score.
In sharp contrast with the large and ever-mounting stacks
of books and articles purporting to divulge the inside story
of U.S. intelligence and to "tell all" about our espionage sys-
tem and activities, Mr. Dulles does not reveal secrets which
are still sensitive (and many of which must always remain
so) but rather has confined himself to a serious discussion of
the principles and methods of sound intelligence operations.
Whereas the omission of such succulent tidbits has disap-
pointed many of the reviewers and also tends to circumscribe
the appeal of the book to the public, it is taken for granted
that the members of the intelligence community will under-
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stand and applaud its wisdom and will value this example of
security-mindedness and restraint. It is in fact an excellent
illustration of the general rule that persons having the deep-
est and most legitimate insights into intelligence matters are
most scrupulous in their trusteeship of such knowledge and
that the penchant for sensational revelations is the near mo-
nopoly of the charlatans and pretenders who scavenge along
the flanks of the intelligence enterprise.*
Classical Espionage
In his introductory recitation of the long historical back-
ground and the more recent evolution of modern intelligence,
counterintelligence, and other forms of clandestine opera-
tions, Mr. Dulles has provided some much-needed perspectives
on matters which will be alluded to later in this review. Hav-
ing thus set the stage for his examination and analysis of cur-
rent practices and procedures of the leading intelligence serv-
ices of the world, both friendly and opposed, he launches into
an admirably complete discussion of our intelligence requre-
ments and collection methods.
Here he places well-merited emphasis upon the progress re-
sulting from the invention and adaptation to the uses of in-
telligence of sophisticated scientific devices, but he does not
permit the glitter of these technological marvels to obscure
the perduring value of the classical methods of procurement.
Though the high-flying Mata Haris of today may with their
glass eyes be able to discern the most minute of man-:mad.e
molehills from untold miles of altitude, and though their
acoustical siblings of equivalent acuteness may be able to hear
across continents the rustle of a mounting missile, these are
not and will never become any substitute for the older and
less "exotic" measures which are essential to the discovery
and frustration of subversive intent. This point is made man-
ifest by Mr. Dulles in his numerous allusions to recent suc-
cesses of the covert intelligence and security agencies of the
United States. He has also called attention to many of the
detections of Soviet secret operatives which have been the
fruit of close cooperation as between the American services
and their allied opposite numbers.
*See note p. A16.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
Counterintelligence and the Adversary
The chapter on "Counterintelligence," taken together with
relevant and related portions of two or three other chapters,
viz. "The Main Opponent, etc." and "Volunteers," makes an
unusually valuable contribution toward a better comprehen-
sion of the true significance and vital importance of this
weapon in our own arsenal of defense. For one thing, Mr.
Dulles disposes of the popular misconception that counterin-
telligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that
it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon
it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition.
He shows that counterintelligence produces its most valuable
results by subtle but aggressive attacks upon its chief target-
the structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services.
These chapters also bring out the fact that counterintelligence
generates and delivers highly valuable by-products in the form
of positive intelligence and the detection and exposure of en-
emy deception, including their so-called "disinformation" ac-
tivities.
Lastly-, but by no means of lesser importance, there are the
frequently significant indicators of Soviet policy and inten-
tions which are provided by our successful operations in this
field. In this way our counterintelligence has been sounding
a much-needed warning that in spite of the ostensible shifts of
Soviet policy from warm to cold and vice versa, the fundamental
and consistent aims thereof are essentially hostile, and that
we must therefore at all times react most warily to Soviet
and other Communist overtures packaged in the attractive
wrappings of "peaceful coexistence," "the new Spirit of Mos-
cow," or whatever may be the sales slogan of the moment.
For example, during the peak of the euphoria which broke out
in certain Western capitals as the result of and in the wake
of the August treaty for a limited nuclear test ban, and long
before this premature and uncritical enthusiasm was be-
clouded by such recent Soviet actions 2 as their renewed inter-
ference with the Berlin access routes and their handling of
the Barghoorn affair, the best available counterintelligence
sources are understood never to have ceased signaling that
the thrust of Soviet policy continued to be aggressively antag-
onistic and that despite all of the fair words at the top there
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was not the slightest diminution in the vigor and intensity of
the Soviet effort at the level of the secret and subversive.
This may perhaps be another way of saying that the French
seem to have had something on their side of the argument in
maintaining that it would be a mistake quite capable of lead-
ing us into mortal danger to believe the test ban treaty to
signify any substantial easing of tensions and that the be-
havior into which the Russians have relapsed most recently 2
is in accordance with their normal pattern-the other being
both abnormal and highly transitory. Be that as it. may, of
such magnitude are the power, position, and prestige of the
intelligence and security empire within the Soviet scheme of
things as to suggest that it will be soon enough for us to be-
gin believing in the sincerity of Soviet protestations of peace-
ful intent when we have received satisfactory evidence
that they are muzzling their subversive bloodhounds and
dismantling their apparatus of clandestine conquest---covert
as well as open evidence, for example, in such matters as the
Soviet position, both proclaimed and clandestine, toward so--
called "wars of liberation."
Overt Aspects
It was obviously impossible for Mr. Dulles to cover in ade-
quate depth, in even such a comprehensive work as this, all
of the multiple and complex phases of the subject which
are currently included in the craft of intelligence. Doubtless
each member of the intelligence community reading the 'book
would desire a fuller treatment of his own pet subject, and this
reviewer, in full recognition of the unfairness of criticizing
a work which covers so much ground, finds himself in basic
agreement with certain observations in the most excellent re.-
view written by Professor Robert R. Bowie and published in
the New York Herald Tribune, edition of Sunday, October 1
1963.3 It is believed that the author might himself be willing
to acknowledge the existence of an imbalance in favor of
intelligence tradecraft, i.e., clandestine techniques and opera-
tions, and to the disadvantage of certain of the most impor-
' Written as of 20 November 1963, just before the assassination of
President Kennedy.
'In Book Week, distributed also with the Sunday Washington Post.
CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
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 On "The Craft"
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tant functions and problems of the research and analysis
and estimative processes.
Regrettably the experience and background of this reviewer
are not such as to permit him-nor would it otherwise be
either appropriate or possible in this short space to attempt-
to comment in detail upon these apparent deficiencies. How-
ever, in the hope that Mr. Dulles himself will soon find time
to give us the benefit of his wisdom and close knowledge per-
taining to these areas, it is suggested that more emphasis
should be devoted to the very great reliance which our sys-
tem places upon the open and above-board techniques of
scholarly research and analysis and to bringing home more
forcibly the weight accorded to the product of these efforts
in the scientific and technical fields, for example. It is further
recommended that Mr. Bowie's review be read by those in-
terested in these spheres of activity and their attendant dif-
ficulties. Mr. Dulles has been both wise and just in the dis-
tribution of his commendations among the personnel con-
cerned in the various departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment which collectively comprise our intelligence com-
munity. In so doing he has singled out for special praise nu-
merous non-CIA personnel and functions and he has attributed
to "the men and women of the CIA," to whom the book is
dedicated, no more than their fair share of the honors. Even
so, some larger measure of recognition for the contribution of
the researchers and analysts would be in order.
In this same general connection it may be worth noting at
this point what has long seemed to this reviewer to represent
one of the most notable distinctions between the West (the
U.S. and U.K. in particular) and the Russians in over-all ap-
proach and philosophy of intelligence operation. The rela-
tively greater emphasis and reliance placed by the leading
Western intelligence services upon the results obtainable from
extensive overt collection and expert analysis stand out in
marked contrast to the Soviet attitude and credo, in which
these measures and methods have heretofore and at least un-
very recently been regarded as distinctly secondary to,
til
and as valuable chiefly in so far as they served to confirm or
interpret, the intelligence produced by clandestine means-
most notably stolen documentary materials. This fundamen-
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tal difference in approach may be explainable in part by the
origins and character of the two opposing civilizations, Soviet,
intelligence having developed and at all times functioned.
within a highly secret and conspiratorial political atmosphere
in which intense suspicion of the freely spoken or written
word of the antagonist has been a major hallmark.
Although he has been out of Russia long enough to have
perhaps fallen behind the times, the former NKVD genera].
Alexander Orlov has provided a most incisive commentary
upon this significant distinction in his provocative and edify-
ing little book entitled Handbook of Intelligence and Guer-
rilla Warfare.4 According to Orlov, who was certainly in a po-
sition to know the facts, the Russians regard as true intelli-
gence only that which is produced by secret informants and
undercover agents, and they relegate to a category of far
lesser importance and credibility material coming from. overt
and legitimate sources. He explains that in the Russian view
the secrets of foreign states having the most vital interest
for them can be procured only from the classified govern-
mental. files of those states or from cooperative foreign officials
and civil servants having access thereto.
Although it is understood from other sources that the Rus-
sians have of late been paying more attention to the values
of overt collection and analysis than they did during the pe-
riod with which Orlov was so intimately familiar, it is never-
theless evident from the very massiveness of their clandestine
collection effort-to say nothing of the rich rewards which
they have to our knowledge been reaping from such sources--
that their main emphasis is still centered upon espionage and
the procurement of secret documentary materials. It is thus
a fair assumption that these activities and functions have not.
been downgraded in the Soviet system and that they are not,
likely to be at any time in the foreseeable future.
Deception
In commenting upon the techniques and the art of decep-
tion Mr. Dulles has made some very accurate observations
concerning the difficulties of mounting significant deception
'An adaptation was carried in Intelligence Articles VII 2, and the
book is reviewed elsewhere in this issue.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA
operations from the base of "open societies" such as ours in
peace time and the relative case of such operations on the part
of the Russians, who have all the advantages of the secrecy
and discipline of their police state society going for them. If
anything, he has understated the obstacles confronting West-
ern intelligence authorities in this area of activity; and he
might well have placed more stress than he has upon the free
assists which the opposition receives from a certain class of
representatives of the Western press who, it would appear,
have been seeking to elevate to the level of a national sport
the ferreting out and public exposure of the clandestine opera-
tions of their own governments.
Given the intimacy of our journalists with almost all eche-
lons of the Government, executive as well as legislative, and
taking into account the extensive coordination as between
all of the governmental arms which is essential to the suc-
cess of a significant deception operation, the opportunities and
possibilities for some leak or revelation fatal to the operation
are very great indeed; and frequently the sleuthing is done
for the Russians on a volunteer though doubtless unwitting
basis by those representatives of our own competitive and
"scoop-minded" information media who justify even the most
reprehensible forms of "keyhole journalism" on the ground
that they are acting as the chief guardians of our most cher-
ished institutions. The freedom of the press and the asserted
right of the public to know all are used indiscriminately to
either justify or condone actions which are damaging to our
national security and the principal beneficiary of which can-
not fail to be our mortal enemy. Thus the fruit that is
available to our side only as the result of our most diligent
and successful professional operations may be expected by the
Russians to fall gratis into their lap, and if in any particular
case the branches should appear to require a little agitation,
this is easy enough to arrange by the simple device of plant-
ing a few provocative questions about any policy or program
of ours, either real or apparent, that may be obscure or per-
plexing to them.
Sharpshooting
Although the roster of Communist methods of subversion
in the cold war provided by Mr. Dulles is very extensive, it
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seems to this reviewer that he omitted adequate treatment of
one of the most insidious and effective of their techniques.
Reference is here made to the evidence of skillful arid in-
creasingly successful attacks upon individual personalities by
the Chinese Communists as well as the Russians. These are
specialized operations targeted against key political and. mili-
tary leaders in various parts of the world-not limited to the
softer areas of the so-called uncommitted nations. This
method of subversion embraces the widest variety of ap-
proaches and is designed to capitalize on the vanity, cupidity,
prurience, ill health, hypochondria, superstition, or other spe-
cial susceptibility of the target individual. It is hand-tailored
for each particular case on the basis of the most intimate
knowledge and study of the individual, and it depends for its
success upon great skill and perseverance on the part of the
operatives employed.
This pinpoint, not to say needle-point, attack on selected
individuals in positions of power obviously provides tremen-
dous leverage if successful, and. its workings are most difficult
to perceive and to combat. Even though strongly suspected
of being under way in a particular case, the proof to and even
more so the persuasion of the subject of this mental massage
that he is being victimized or duped is well-nigh impossible, once
the infection has spread to the bloodstream. It is accordingly
all the more important for those having the responsibility for
guarding against and countering Communist subversive ac-
tivities to be on a special alert against this insidious form of
activity.
One of the most readily recognizable telltales of such an
operation is the sudden and otherwise inexplicable souring of
a leading political or military personality previously regarded
as pro-Western or at least dependably neutral in his views
and policies. Another indicator is the falling from grace and
departure or removal from office of a number of subordinate
officials known for their pro-Western and anti-Communist at-
titudes-for this may be the result of subtle and effective "well-
poisoning" against such personages, accomplished through
repeated insinuations and suggestions to their superior that
they are secretly hostile to him or are otherwise unreliable
RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
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instrumentalities of his will. The Russians may be less skill-
ful in their application of this ancient technique than the
Chinese, who possess all of the subtlety and sensitivity that
comes to them from centuries of familiarity with its tradi-
tional. use.
To accept as valid and treat with full seriousness the neces-
sity for remedial measures against this form of subversive
threat does not require disagreement with Mr. Dulles's propo-
sition that the Chinese have not yet achieved the full panoply
of subversive tactics which have been developed and assembled
by the Russians. They, the Chinese, are clearly making rapid
strides and may well already have perfected certain special-
ized techniques for which they have a greater natural aptitude
than their Communist competition.
The havoc that was wrought in Britain by the Profumo
scandal has been widely interpreted in the Western press as a
triumph of Soviet disruptive design, and even in Lord Den-
ning's fascinating analysis he poses (at page 8 of his Report)
the suggestion that Captain Eugene Ivanov's mission may
have been directed more toward the creation of a crisis of con-
fidence as between the Western allies than to the procure-
ment of intelligence information. Yet it seems as though
Ivanov was a fairly overt and heavy-handed operative, and
that if disruption was his objective, his success was due more
to lucky coincidence than to the cunning of his own contriv-
ances. At one critical Cliveden weekend in October of 1962
Ivanov is reliably reported to have been going so flat out in his
attempts to enlist high-level British sympathy and support
for the Soviet position over Cuba as to render himself both
objectionable and conspicuous; and it was just lagniappe
that on the earlier occasion Jack met Christine by chance
encounter at the pool and so swiftly succumbed to her
charms. Moreover, if such was his mission, Ivanov was also
the beneficiary of the most extraordinary series of failures of
coordination on the part of British authorities concerned, the
security services having been well aware of his significance
and the game that he was playing with the wretched Dr. Ward
as his tool nearly two years before the final explosion.
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Psywar
From what may be a particularly subjective point of view,
it is regretted that Mr. Dulles did not give us more in his
chapter entitled "Intelligence in the Cold War," for example
by pointing up more clearly the essential differences in [he
Communist and Western approaches to propaganda and other
forms of psychological warfare. The standard Soviet _ rac-
tice of constant and continuing reiteration of a theme or
thesis stands out in sharp contrast to the generally relevant
practice among Western propagandists, which seems to have
its origins in and to take its main inspiration from press at-
titudes toward "news." Even the most productive themes
and theses are quickly abandoned or allowed to sink soon
into disuse once the headlines have been made and the story
has been told.
Consider the contrary Soviet practice, which is well illus-
trated by their treatment of what must have been for their
propagandists the extremely difficult and discouraging sub-
ject of the brash betrayal and brutal suppression of the Hun-
garian freedom fighters in November 1956. Throughout the
non--Communist world and in many areas behind the iron cur-
tain there was at the beginning an almost universal revulsion
of feeling and condemnation for this act of naked Soviet
imperialism. Thus the Soviet propaganda machine was forced
to begin from far behind scratch and invent and fabricate
a whole series of justifications and rationalizations which few
Western propagandists would have believed likely to command
any significant degree of credence and acceptance. Yet in a
remarkably short space of time, by continuing to hammer
away at their bald-faced distortions, the Soviet mouthpieces
had succeeded at the least in beclouding the issues and at the
most in creating widespread belief that the Soviet action had
been justified in the interests of rescuing the Hungarian peo-
ple from slipping back into a state of "reactionary feudal-
ism." In getting off to their start they enjoyed a windfall
in the form of a strong assist from that self-proclaimed Prophet
of neutralism, Krishna Menon, who seemed only too happy
to serve as the Soviet stalking-horse in the United Nations de-
bate on intervention in Hungary and who was able to com-
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pletely confuse the discussion by his strident exploitation of
the Suez incident.
Neither the consistency nor the truth of Soviet representa-
tions has ever appeared to be of much concern to their propa-
gandists. They seem to proceed on the assumption that they
can get away with any amount of enlargement and tergiversa-
tion and to operate on the theory that the memory of man
for words spoken and deeds done is very short. Moreover,
they are not unduly concerned about being caught at and
called to account for even the most transparent of their
canards. The Philby case offers a good illustration of this
thick-skinned attitude and approach. Those who followed the
unfolding chapters of that case during the spring and sum-
mer months of 1963 will doubtless recall that many assets
of the Soviet propaganda mechanism were marshaled to plant
and cultivate the version that Philby's mysterious disappear-
ance from Beirut earlier in the year was in fact no mystery
at all. He was simply denounced as a British secret agent and
said to be operating in the deserts and mountains of the
Yemen to overthrow the "glorious new revolutionary regime"
there. In less than a month's time following the propagation
of this wholly fabricated story, which incidentally had picked
up widespread belief and following in the West, circum-
stances forced upon the Russians the acknowledgment of
Philby's defection to them, and they blandly announced the
awarding to him of Soviet citizenship. In so doing they gave
no slight indication of dismay, and there has never been any
attempt on their part to explain or correct their previous ac-
count of the disappearance. And they seem, unfortunately,
to have been permitted to slip off this hook with little diffi-
culty.
Exchanges
The still current incident arising from the imprisonment
by the Russians of Yale professor Frederick C. Barghoorn,
taken together with the mid-October event of the exchange
of two American prisoners-Walter Ciszek and Marvin Ma-
kinen--for two Soviet espionage agents picked up last August
by the FBI, provides timely corroboration for Mr. Dulles's reser-
vations concerning the wisdom of establishing a pattern of
this type of prisoner exchange. At page 119 Mr. Dulles ob-
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
serves-and without the benefit of these two late develop-
ments---many of the risks which are inherent in such traf-
ficking in the persons of real or alleged espionage agents. If
our Government is going to play at this game it should at
least do so with eyes wide open to the hazards which are in-
volved, including the possibility that the Russians, who are
very old hands at this form of enterprise, will be the gainers
in the preponderance of any such swaps as may be engineered
or acceded to by them.
It would certainly appear that in the Ciszek-Makin.en ex-
change the Russians gave up nothing of value to themselves
in releasing a middle-aged priest held since 1940 and a youth-
ful student, whereas they realized a very significant gain in
recovering two well-trained and experienced operatives-who,
had they been held and subjected to the pressures and un-
certainties which are the inevitable concomitants of convic-
tion and heavy sentences, could very conceivably have ended
by providing information and leads of the greatest value to the
security services of the United States and presumably other
Western allies. Irrespective of what may have been the con-
trolling reason for the arrest of Professor Barghoorn, and it
is anybody's guess whether the Russians were mainly moti-
vated by a desire to retaliate for the immediately preceding
arrest of their own agents-or to discourage the further de-
velopment of cultural contacts of this order-or simply to put
out of action a scholar who has long been a cinder in Kh:ru-
shchev's eye because of his expert knowledge of the Soviet sys-
tem and record of exposing the myth of "Soviet legality," it
is evident that he was quite innocent of the charge of es-
pionage for which he was claimed to have been arrested and
imprisoned. Moreover, if this incident had not backfired
with unforeseen violence in the faces of the Soviet policy mak
ers, Barghoorn could have become "very large wampum" as
a bargaining counter, to be held in reserve for coaxing out of
us the release of one or several of their intelligence officers
or agents caught in flagrante by the FBI.
Actually, as previously suggested, the Russians have been
playing at this game of "exchanges" for many years and have
on numerous earlier occasions shown themselves to be com-
pletely brazen and unscrupulous in their connected tactics.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
The Kindermann-Wolscht affair, which in 1924-26 resulted in
an impasse in Russo-German relations so serious as to have
threatened to sever diplomatic relations between the two
countries, furnishes an excellent example and a most reward-
ing case study of the underlying Soviet motivation and meth-
ods employed in arresting foreign persons innocent of espio-
nage and holding them for ultimate exchange in return for
their own professional spies and saboteurs.
That case began with the arrest in Russia on patently
trumped-up charges of -espionage of two young German stu-
dents (Kindermann and Wolscht) as an offsetting deterrent
to the trial which was about to commence in Germany of a
number of Chekist terrorist agents for planning and attempt-
ing to promote in 1923 a revolution to overthrow the then
very unstable German government. It did not conclude be-
fore the highly reputable German diplomat, Gustav Hilger
(who was attached to the staff of the German Ambassador
in Moscow), had been charged with aiding and abetting the
students, and until after most of the ranking governmental
officials on both sides had become deeply embroiled in the
controversy.
In the end, the Russians got bath their boy (Skoblevsky),
a personal pal of Stalin who had been dispatched by Trotsky
on his revolutionary mission, in return for the two obscure
German students who had been guilty of no crime in the first
place. For the fuller details of this highly illuminating study
in Soviet motives and methods the attention of readers is in-
vited to an article prepared by Professor Lamar Cecil, until re-
cently of John Hopkins University, and published in the
Journal of Central European Affairs, Volume XXI No. 2, July
1961.
The Trumpeting of Casualties
Early in his first chapter Mr. Dulles observes that "intelli-
gence is probably the least understood and the most misrep-
resented of the professions," and in the concluding chapters
he advances the most persuasive arguments in support of his
appeal-which he clearly appears to be making on behalf of
our intelligence community as a whole-for a better under-
standing of the difficulties and for a more sympathetic ac-
ceptance of the inevitable percentage of reverses which must
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
be expected in intelligence operations. The point is especially
well taken at this time in view of certain quite recent and
wholly unwarranted scapegoating for which the CIA in par-
ticular has been required to stand still.
But there has been a long-standing need for both official
and. public opinion in the United States and in the West more
generally to adopt a more sensible and realistic attitude to-
ward what might be termed the casualties of intelligence op-
erations in the cold war. The fact that our freedoms and
liberties and those of our friends and allies are being sub-
jected to the ubiquitous and relentless campaign of Comrnu-
nist espionage and subversion on a front as wide as the
world should entitle the Western intelligence and security
services which are courageously and effectively striving against
this unprecedented assault to a better break from their own
press and public opinion. Most thinking people have long
since digested and, however reluctantly, accepted the neces-
sity of combatting the Communist threat by the expenditure
of vast treasure and much blood. Why is it, then., that the
occasional intelligence casualties which are incurred in the
form of personnel losses and "blown" operations are the
subject of so much soul-searching self-criticism and anguished
cries of mea culpa, to say nothing of having become the stand-
ard butt of deliberate distortions and sharp ridicule?
The passages in the book which attempt to deal with this
problem include numerous historical references from. which
it should be clear to any fair-minded reader that clandestine
political warfare has been going on from time immemorial and
has long been a recognized arm of statecraft. It has affected
the destinies of nations and in innumerable cases has served
to protect the lives of people. At the worst, its execution in-
volves relatively few casualties, and for the most part none
at all. There is simply no rationality in the fact that peo-
ple, certainly including Americans, will cheer the spectacle
of massed military forces exterminating one another, as well
as innocent bystanders, by the millions, and when so-
called `peace" comes they will deplore as somehow unnatural
and immoral the kind of activity on our part which can con-
tribute so much to forestalling the necessity for armed con-
flict..
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To be sure, such programs involve secrecy as an essential
ingredient, and there appears to be a well-developed national
myth that secrecy in Government operations is bad per se.
At the same time and again quite illogically, we all practice
secrecy of one sort or another in our personal lives and busi-
ness dealings and have a constitutional distaste for people
who do not observe discretion in their private affairs.
No one should construe this as an appeal for a carte blanche
to conduct covert operations without the fullest coordination
with the policy levels of government or otherwise than in the
most meticulously careful and professional manner that it
may be possible to devise. But when these and all of the
other requisite tests are met, and when a top-level decision
has been taken to entrust an operation to agencies that in-
clude some of the most able and dedicated persons to be found
anywhere in the service of our Government, there should
be a greater public willingness to give those brethren who
are "serving the rice" some benefit of the doubt. When on
November 28, 1961, President Kennedy declared in comment-
ing upon the difficulties of the intelligence profession that
"its successes are unheralded and its failures are trumpeted"
it. was surely farthest from his intention to grant to critics
an unlimited shooting license to hunt within this sensitive
preserve.
.One such scavenger (as cited on p. A3) recently received his long
overdue comeuppance when Kenneth Hugh DeCourcy, editor and
publisher of the Intelligence Digest, was convicted on 13 December
last in the Old Bailey of fraud, forgery, and perjury and sentenced
to seven years.
Approved For Release 2005/04/1
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
Mnemosyne and the OSS
NO BUGLES FOR SPIES: Tales of the OSS. By Robert Hay-
den Alcorn. (New York: David McKay. 1962. 209 pp.
$3.95.)
No facet of the human psyche is more strange and won-
derful than the one associated with remembering. What
things does it record sharply and durably? What things dis-
tortedly? What things not at all? What years of one's life
does it store in discrete stacks? What in a disorderly,jumble?
What things that happened to someone else and what things
that never happened at all does it come to register, vividly
and in great detail, as one's very own? If you happen to have
served in OSS and if you now read Mr. Alcorn's putative
memoir, you too will find yourself ruminating about the mys-
teries of memory. You, even as I, will conclude that the book
is a good part fiction and the rest a highly inaccurate rem-
iniscence-which, incidentally, is contrived to do no harm
whatever to the reputation of the reminiscencer.
Mr.. Alcorn's account of his being hired by the Coordinator
of Information in November 1941 is a case in point. It seems
that General Donovan, hearing of his availability, sent
him to be interviewed by a number of the branch chiefs. The
interviews took place as ordered, and when Mr. Alcorn returned
and told of the secrets that he had inadvertently picked up
in their course, the General was mightily impressed. I.-le
turned to James Murphy, one of his personal aides., and said,
". . . `And Jimmy this is what I want. I want all potential
agent personnel [sic] channelled through Alcorn until further
notice. No more passing prospects around the organization,
from man to man. Alcorn can get all the basic information,
clear the spot security checks and then, if OK, send them on.'
He held out his hand to me. 'We need fellows like you. I'll
see you tomorrow.'"
To be sure, there are only a few stories of General Dono-
van that are incredible. But this is one. In the first, Place I
cannot conceive his having used the words, "agent personnel."
In the second, even if the word "agent" is something that
MORI/HRP PAGES A17-A20
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Mr. Alcorn's memory produced well after the fact, I cannot
believe the General would give such screening authority to a
man of 32 whose post-college experience in gainful employ-
ment was limited to one year's teaching of English in a boys'
school and two years of staff work in a congressman's office.
My credulity snapped when I realized that Mr. Alcorn left
General Donovan's office to take up (not the next day, by the
way, but some two months later) the most junior sort of
clerkship way down the line in the Personnel Division. To
Mr. Alcorn's credit, be it said, he was rapidly promoted and be-
fore the year's end relieved of interviewing "agent personnel."
In the autumn of 1942 he moved to the Research and Analysis
Branch as the administrative officer for that rather substan-
tial operation.
It is Mr. Alcorn's reminiscences of life in the R&A Branch
that soured this reviewer on the general credibility of the book.
Here he and I served at the same time, and the discrepancy
between our respective memories is all but limitless. He could
not have enjoyed his six months' tour much, as the following
passage will show:
Vanity seemed to rule the whole setup. In several instances,
men of high standing in their particular field were given key spots
as division heads. Then, when another scholar in the same field
became available, it was decided that one could not be placed
above the other in the chain of command. So a new board or
committee would be established for the late arrival from which he
could function without having to take orders from his colleague.
It was essential to give such a board or committee a pompous
title such as the Board of Analysts or the Board of Review but
to those in the know it was only a dodge, a rather tawdry and
pathetic one when you realize that it was played out against the
background provided by the Battle of Midway, the Coral Sea,
Okinawa and the like. [NOTE: The first two battles were fought
four or five months before Mr. Alcorn joined R&A, the Okinawa
campaign two years after he had left.]
As the branch grew, each doctor brought in his research as-
sistants from his former university. Then, when they were used
up, the prize pupils, the "teacher's pets," were brought in to do
the work. This latter move caused the General some uneasiness
lest the organization might become a haven for draft dodgers.
There seemed to be an increasing number of healthy young men
doing paper work that could and should be done by the older
men first brought in for the purpose.
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Recent Books: OSS
I find this not only false in tone but plain wrong in almost
every particular. And it is no less wrong than a dozen or more
other statements in this chapter, including such nonsense as
alleging that Professor Langer's intimates called him "Bull"
(in 30 years' association with him I have never heard him so
addressed or referred to), intimating an R&A Branch respon-
sibility for the functions of Stanley Lovell's Research arid De-
velopment unit, and misstating by 180 degress the organiza-
tion pattern of the branch he serviced as administrative offi-
cer. The funny story of the petulant professor (though left
unnamed, clearly identifiable) sitting on the floor is totally
untrue and a gratuitous calumny on a gifted and courageous
American scholar.
Nor are all the errors confined to the passages dealing with
R&A. They are generously scattered throughout. Just for
example: the Ascension Island story is ruined, the tale of the
courageous woman parachutist is mistold again, the source of
intelligence relating to the V-weapons is wrong, the date of
the creation of the COI is off by months, the steps in the dis-
solution of OSS and the beginnings of CIA are hopelessly con--
fused, and so on.
These things, small in themselves, do add up. They acid up
to the point of pretty thoroughly discrediting the whole book.
The well-told array of spy stories would in any circumstances
be hard to take in their entirety. At best you would have
gravely doubted the authenticity of some of their chilling de-
tails while perhaps accepting a probable core of truth. Now
you might be pardoned for dismissing them as fiction from
start to finish. You will feel doubly pardoned when you real-
ize that Mr. Alcorn's position as Special Funds Officer in. the
European theater took him personally no closer to the spy
business than it did to the clandestine trans-Adriatic supply
operations he writes about. Here he disarmingly notes that
his vantage point for observation of that thrilling episode was
when "... I now found myself involved, at General Donovan's
direction, with the Yugoslav court-in-exile [in London]. It
was perhaps the most pleasant assignment of the war for me."
How black and foreboding the Dalmatian coast as sensed from
Claridges.
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It is stupid in a reviewer to berate an author for not having
written another kind of book. I intend the following not as
berating but as bemoaning. For here and there in the book
there are passages where Mr. Alcorn writes of things he really
knew about. These have to do with the tasks of a special funds
officer. I find them interesting and informative. They have
a ring about them quite different from the rest of the book.
Perhaps if he had focussed his narrative on them, at some
risk to U.S. security interests and more to the sale of the book,
he might have made a substantial contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence-something that what he did produce is
not. SHERMAN KENT
Spies and Ddfectors
THE SECRET WAR: A Story of International Espionage Since
World War II. By Sanche de Gramont. (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1962. 507 pp. $5.95.)
The story of international espionage since World War II
told by Sanche de Gramont is a collection of spy and defector
case histories ostensibly recounted in support of the thesis
that clandestine operational techniques are the same on both
sides of the iron curtain. De Gramont limits his discussion of
international espionage to the American and Soviet intelli-
gence services, and he develops his point of view through sev-
eral chapters that compare the history, organization, meth-
ods, and probable future of CIA and the KGB.
.As examples of intelligence organizations at work, lie tells
the well-known histories of Judith Coplon, Harry Gold, Rudolf
Abel, Francis Gary Powers, George Blake, Lonsdale, Burgess
and Maclean, the Petrovs, Khokhlov, and Noel Field, with pass-
ing references to a miscellany of other figures. The stories
are told in detail: his account of the Coplon case, for example,
while not wholly accurate, is extensive and a more complete
one than has previously appeared.
At first glance De Gramont appears to give equal time, pro
and con, to CIA and the KGB. In the opening chapter, en-
titled "Total Espionage," he says ". . . the United States, like
the Soviet Union and because of the Soviet Union, is practicing
total espionage. It is matching the Soviet Union in the secret
warfare of intelligence just as it is matching it (or trying to)
in the construction of missiles. There are few techniques used
by Soviet espionage that American intelligence cannot dupli-
cate. The intelligence organizations of the two blocs are mon-
olithic and powerful, and work in a climate of secrecy and
ruthlessness."
The balance sheet which the author draws up is neverthe-
less curiously one-sided. In the first chapter, he says of CIA:
"These days it is fashionable to describe the agency as a
monster on the rampage."
"In that short time, which significantly coincides with the
Cold War, it had grown like a delicate child who in adolescence
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"Dulles' statement that `if you believe in a program, you
may have to break a little crockery to put it into effect' is
rather chilling now that the public has been given a glimpse
of CIA's closet full of broken dishes."
One looks in vain for similarly specific characterization of the
KGB.
At another point he remarks, "Soviet espionage, for all its
ubiquity and iniquity, would have trouble matching the CIA's
record in the last ten years of meddling in the affairs of other
countries." He then lists eleven instances of what he con-
siders CIA meddling. He makes no parallel list of Soviet med-
dling.
The nearest the author comes to comparing a single aspect
of the two services is in a discussion of the degree to which
they influence their respective governments' policies. De
Gramont's treatment of the relative importance of American
and Soviet intelligence organizations in the policy-making
process betrays either an astonishing ignorance about political
and administrative realities in the two states or an astonish-
ing contempt for his readers' critical faculties:
CIA
The CIA has in fact become as
direct a policy-maker as the State
Department through its political
forays. It is much more than an
intelligence agency and serves to
counter the spread of Commu-
nism throughout the world.
How can the CIA avoid being
right at the heart of policy, when
it selects anti-Communist regimes
to support in trouble spots such
as Laos, Iran, Guatemala.
It [CIA] has gone so far to meet
the Soviet threat that it is now
tagged an "invisible government"
operating without any mandate
from the people and without
check of any kind.
KGB
In the Soviet Union proselytiz-
ing is a party not an intelligence
function it is up to the party to
support leftist regimes, workers
groups and the like. Since 1956,
when the Cominform was dis-
solved, there has been no specific
agency directing the operations of
international Communism. Yet
under the party's Central Com-
mittee, these operations are still
an essential branch of Soviet for-
eign policy. They have never been
the function of Soviet intelligence.
Even though the chiefs of the
Soviet intelligence organizations
(KGB and MVD) are high up in
the party organization, qualified
sources believe that the policy-
making role of the Soviet espionage
and counter-espionage organiza-
tions is a minor one.
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Apparently indifferent, however, to conventional standards
of consistency, he writes, only a few pages before the "invisible
government" statement:
In fact, CIA is working under multiple government controls.
It is responsible first, of course, to the President, who checks on
the CIA through a board of consultants on foreign intelligence
activities. The board, on which President Kennedy's father has
served, travels all over the world looking into CIA's clandestine
operations and reports its findings to the President. Next the
CIA is responsible to the National Security Council (made up of
the President, Vice-President, CIA Director, Secretaries of State,
Defense, and Treasury, and director of the Office of Defense Mo-
bilization), which has a sub-committee on CIA operations. The
CIA acts on directives which it has been given by the President
and the National Security Council. The CIA is also responsible
to four Congressional committees, the House and Senate Awned
Forces and appropriations committees. CIA representatives have
appeared before other committees, including the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary and House Un-American Activities and Foreign
Relations committees.
The reason for his criticism of CIA, De Gramont implies, is
that in his opinion an intelligence organization has no place
in an open democratic society. "Before the last decade," he
says, "the United States was spied upon but not spying,
whereas the Soviet Union was spying but not spied upon. But
thanks to the pressures of the Cold War, the United States did
some catching up, and in doing so, strained some of the ele-
mentary principles of a democratic society. . . . The revela-
tion that the United States was waging an intelligence war
with as much vigor and determination as the Soviet Union
shattered the illusion of a `moral' cold war, a crusade fought
against godless Communism. . . . Can a society that believes
in government by the people, in the people's right to know, and
in noninterference in the affairs of other nations send agents
to spy on foreign governments, subvert Soviet officials, and
sanction the professional spy's arsenal of villainy?"
For the Soviets, on the other hand, he considers espionage
a normal activity, consistent with their form of government,
and therefore justified. "Soviet intelligence," he says, "oper-
ates at the heart of a system where secrecy is the air you
breathe and conspiracy is the ground you walk on. It could
no more be criticized for going too far than the Communist
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Party could be criticized for being the only party. The tradi-
tion of an all-powerful Soviet secret police and intelligence net
reaches back to the czars while the United States intelligence
apparatus is a child of the Cold War."
By a kind of intellectual sleight-of-hand, De Gramont shifts
almost imperceptibly from the thesis that espionage tech-
niques are the same the world over to the notion that CIA,
a late-comer to the field adopting Soviet espionage methods, is
therefore a police-state mechanism using totalitarian tech-
niques. On this basis he concludes, "The criticism leveled
against CIA was eminently healthy. The dangerous similarity
of methods and goals between Soviet and American intelli-
gence was brought into the open. The tension between the
democratic principle and the need for an effective intelligence
service was restored . . . . The CIA is considered a kind of
freak in a democratic society, but it is allowed to exist (under
increasing control, one hopes) because it has proved its ne-
cessity."
After his consistent disparagement, the author's final ac-
knowledgement that the existence of CIA is a necessity leaves
the reader wondering exactly what his point of view is. While
he makes indiscriminate use of sources, some clearly pro-Com-
munist, there is no indication that he wrote his book as a con-
tribution to the Soviet defamation campaign directed against
American intelligence. In some degree, nevertheless, the in-
accuracies, invidious comparisons, innuendo, and specious
reasoning serve the purposes of that campaign.
The observation that similar techniques are utilized by all
intelligence services is not remarkably penetrating or pro-
found. The idea that there is nothing to choose between in
U.S. and Soviet intelligence activity could be interpreted as an
application of the neutralist philosophy that there is no ad-
vantage in being committed to either one. De Gramont, who
is a French citizen and was once associated with French in-
telligence, does not go so far as to advocate that the French
and other European intelligence services should constitute a
Third Force in espionage.
The "plague on both your houses" thesis of the book raises
the question of whether it was inspired by French intelligence.
There is no hard evidence that it was. The point of view which
it propounds, however, is not inconsistent with French in-
terests and attitudes.
BURGESS AND MACLEAN. By Anthony Purdy and Douglas
Sutherland. (London: Seeker & Warburg. 196:3. 191 pp.
18/-,)
The flight of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean to the So-
viet Union is still front-page news in Britain more than twelve
years after the event. No incident, not even the Profumo
affair with its frosting of sex, has so deeply shaken British
complacency and self-confidence. More recent traitors such
as George Blake and William Vassall have angered and fright-
ened the British public, but these and other spies have been
sternly punished, then forgotten. Only Burgess and Maclean
remain close beneath the surface of British consciousness, a
constant preoccupation.
Certainly the reason for this preoccupation is not far to seek.
Burgess and Maclean were members in good standing of the
loosely formed upper-class governing group known as the Es-
tablishment. Both men came from this social and economic
class that has assumed the right and responsibility to govern.
Not even its enemies expect the Establishment ever to betray
the nation. George Blake, William Vassall, and Harry Bough-
ton were not members of this elite; their betrayal, although
reprehensible, was therefore not profoundly disturbing. But
since Burgess and Maclean went over to the Soviets, British
faith in the Establishment has been visibly shaken. It is not
likely to be fully restored in this century.
British preoccupation with the Burgess-Maclean case is re-
flected in the number of books on it.' Confined within a
small domain of fact by the requirements of official secrecy,
'In addition to wide and persistent press coverage on Burgess and
Maclean, the following books on the case have been published in the
United Kingdom: Tom Driberg, Guy Burgess, A Portrait with Back-
ground. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1956) ; Geoffrey Hoare, The
Missing Macleans (London: Cassell & Co., 1955) ; John S. Mather, ed.,
The Great Spy Scandal (London: Daily Express, 1955) ; Cyril Connelly,
The Missing Diplomats (London: Queen Anne Press, 1952). The Brit-
ish Government has published a white paper, Report Concerning the
Disappearance of Two Former Foreign Office Officers (London: Sta-
tionery Office, 1955).
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authors have been forced to tell and retell the same story,
adding whatever tidbits of gossip and bizarre interpretations
of events they could winnow from the chaff of oft-repeated
fact. Yet the books keep coming.
Purdy and Sutherland, both British journalists, have added
the latest volume to this pile. Unfortunately for them, their
book hit the stands a few weeks before Harold Philby, friend
of Burgess and former officer of MI-6, confounded his friends
and defenders by fleeing to the Soviet Union, an action which
the British Government chose to confirm only some months
later. At the same time the British authorities announced
that Philby had indeed been the "third man" who informed
Maclean that he was under investigation.
Perhaps, however, the authors had an inkling of Philby's
role. According to their account, a British diplomat in Wash-
ington told Burgess of the investigation that was closing in
on Maclean. They suggest that Burgess' subsequent outrage-
ous behavior may have been designed to force his recall to
London so that he could warn Maclean. If this was indeed
his intention, Burgess needed some weeks or months to achieve
the desired result, and such scheming does not appear to be
realistic. The true explanation might lie rather in Burgess'
fear that the investigation of Maclean would also uncover him.
Certainly his drinking and other escapades give the impres-
sion of a man falling apart under tension.
An interesting but hitherto neglected phase of the case is
its coverage through the years by the British press. The
authors review the exploits of their colleagues and the antics
of such buffoons as Col. Oreste Pinto, who was hired by the
Express to find the missing diplomats. They do not, however,
describe adequately the full role of the press in the search for
Burgess and Maclean, probably for obvious reasons of security.
As is natural, Purdy and Sutherland give much attention
to the security aspect of the affair. During much of 1962,
while this book was in preparation, Fleet Street and the Brit-
ish Government were at drawn daggers over the Vassall case.
British security agencies had become a favorite press target.
No British journalist was anxious to defend in any way the
British investigative and security services. The theatrical is-
suance of warrants in 1962 for the arrest of the fugitives if
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they returned to the United Kingdom, as was rumored, is ridi-
culed but not explained by the authors. Indeed they admit
that they do not know the answer to this puzzling gesture of
the authorities. Could it have been, they ask, an action to
prevent a possible return?
After twelve years the role of the British security agencies
in the drama remains a puzzle. Purdy and Sutherland clearly
know far more about this role than they can publish. The
actions of the security services remain the best kept secret
of the Burgess-Maclean case.
 Recent Books:: Soviet
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Soviet Intelligence
HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE AND GUERRILLA WAR-
FARE. By Alexander Orlov. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press. 1963. 187 pp. $4.)
Any observant layman who follows the details of Soviet in-
telligence operations in the press soon finds that they all have
one common factor. Each Soviet operation, wherever mounted
and whatever its target, has a single goal-obtaining classified
documents from the files of other governments.
The Soviet Government wants documents. It has little in-
terest in opinion, although it will accept the considered judg-
ment of experts who are its agents. It does collect overt in-
formation in great quantity also. But its principal interest
remains the classified files of other governments. The Soviet
regime puts first things first.
Alexander Orlov, a ranking officer of Soviet State Security
who commanded the NKVD in Spain until his defection in
1938, drives this point home. It is the principal theme of his
book. It is a fact that the American intelligence officer should
never forget.
Orlov declares that the purpose of his book is to recreate an
espionage handbook that he composed for the Soviets back in
1936. Fortunately for us, however, he has done no such
thing. Instead, he has made a survey of Soviet intelligence
practice, especially as it relates to the role of the "illegal" of
deep-cover agent, using his wide past experience to analyze
current Soviet techniques. Could his understanding of the
illegal's fears and difficulties in foreign parts derive from his
own personal experience? The result is in any case of the
greatest value to the layman and quite useful to the intelli-
gence expert. The central theme of Soviet preoccupation with
documents, however, remains Orlov's most significant contri-
bution.
This Soviet preoccupation must be impressed on the Ameri-
can intelligence officer, who, in all likelihood, has been over-
trained in the relative insignificance of covert information.
American students of intelligence work-usually they are
scholars and therefore committed to research-take pleasure
MORI/HRP PAGES A28-A30Approved For Release 2005/04/13: Cl
in stressing that clandestine collection of information plays
a rather minor role in the aggregate activity. The finished
intelligence product, they say, usually contains not more than
ten per cent of clandestine data. Then they try to smooth
the clandestine operator's ruffled feelings by admitting that it
is an "important ten per cent" just the same.
In Orlov's opinion, this Western reliance cn overt inforina-
tion often leads to unprovable hypotheses and at the worst to
wild leaps into the unknown. In contrast to the ten per cent
maximum of clandestine intelligence in the American end
product, he declares that the Soviet military intelligence serv-
ice, which does use some overt materials, puts 80 per cent
of its effort into secret operations, while Soviet State Security
relies entirely on clandestine techniques. Orlov clearly does
not approve of American intelligence practices.
Although the book is a contribution to our literature, the
intelligence officer will read it with some regret. Few officers
who have left the Soviet service can match Orlov's knowledge
of its operations, techniques, and personalities. His knowledge
of its history and development up to the late thirties is un-
surpassed. Because of Stalin's purges and of losses in the
war, few men like him who grew up with Soviet:, intelligence
remain. It is unfortunate, therefore, that he avoids giving his
American audience any insight into the service during the
campaign against Trotskiy and the great purges. His detailed
comments on it and its leading personalities during these fate-
ful years would be invaluable. Sensational accounts. such as
his own History of Stalin's Secret Crimes cannot meet this
need. The reader will put down the book with the hope that
some day Orlov will tell his own experiences and give us the
story of Soviet intelligence as he knows it.
The weakest section of this book is the final chapter on
guerrilla warfare; here the dated quality of Orlov's information
is most clearly shown. His elementary generalizations on
guerrilla activity are drawn from personal experience limited
to the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars. Soviet guerrilla ex-
perience in World War II, which importantly influenced pres-
ent-day guerrilla doctrine, is covered in only a page or two.
Postwar guerrilla activities are not mentioned.
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Regrettably the Handbook has neither index nor bibli-
ography.
THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND : A Military-Political History,
1918-41. By John Erickson. (New York: St. Martin's
Press. 1962. 889 pp. $15.)
When he submitted his manuscript for publication, the
author of this book could not know that approaching events
would. give it a unique timeliness. One of his principal themes
is the basic and continuing conflict between the Soviet armed
services and the power complex centering on the state security
service. This struggle first; developed in the days of Trotskiy.
It reached dramatic intensity when Marshal Tukhachevskiy
fell. Since the second World War the rise and fall of military
personalities has revealed discontent in the armed services.
Now the treason of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy has
thrown an embarrassing light on the struggle between these
forces. Erickson's book permits intelligence officers to study
the background and development of this conflict.
The author, who did his research while a Fellow of St. An-
thony's College, Oxford, discusses the history of the Soviet army
between the outbreak of the Revolution and the German in-
vasion of 1941. This is not a history of Soviet military insti-
tutions, but rather a discussion of the impact on the Soviet
armed forces of internal politics, international developments,
and leading Soviet personalities. Two lengthy chapters are
devoted to the military purges of 1937, their immediate
causes, and their complex effects on Soviet and world affairs.
Indeed, the theme of the purges, their origins, and their effect
on Soviet military policy are a major element of the book.
Although he cannot fully explain the military holocaust (no
one can in the present state of our knowledge), Erickson per-
forms a useful service in summarizing the events of 1937-1938,
stripping away some of the more improbable interpretations
of events, and placing the purge in the perspective of its time.
This perspective helps us to understand the developments of
the Penkovskiy affair.
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A selection from the most broadly
informative books on intelligence
operations and processes available
in English.
PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE'
The professional intelligence officer does not disdain the
study of the overt literature of his profession. Authentic pub-
lished accounts or analyses of intelligence processes and tech-
niques, case histories, and operational experiences are valuable
sources for the enrichment of professional knowledge. Much
can be learned through the study of this literature, not only
in background information, but also for application to cur-
rent problems.
The following bibliography has been confined to books avail-
able in English, with emphasis on the most broadly illuminat-
ing of these. Viewed as a symposium on intelligence methods or
as a composite history of intelligence, selections from public
literature cannot of course tell the whole story; many of `these
are at best of uneven quality, but they do offer material that
should be part of the intelligence officer's basic equipment.
Some items of supplementary reading are suggested in a few
of the annotations, and foreign editions are noted for the con-
venience of the reader abroad.
The selections fall into the following categories:
The Intelligence Process-theory, procedure, organization
Operational History:
From the earliest times up to World War II
Activities of the Western Allies in World War 11
Organized resistance against the Nazis
German intelligence in World War II
The Soviet Services
Evading Capture and Escape from Imprisonment
'November 1963 revision of original Spring 1961 edition.
MORI/HRP PAGES A31-A42
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THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS-
Theory, Procedure, Organization
DULLES, Allen W. The Craft of Intelligence. (New York: Harper
and Row, 1963. 277 p.)
Here the former Director of Central Intelligence, after touching on
some of the early history of intelligence, examines many current as-
pects of intelligence requirements, collection, and production, describes
the Communist intelligence service:,, and explores the uses of intel-
ligence. With the authority of his own experience he expounds the
role of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community in the
U.S. Government.
[An expansion of the author's article which appeared with this title
in the Britannica Book of the Year, 1963. A shorter version under the
same title was published in Harper's Magazine, April 1963.]
FARAGO, Ladislas. War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and In-
telligence. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954. 379 p.)
A comprehensive essay covering both the organization and proce-
dures of world intelligence agencies and their activities in the espio-
nage, counterespionage, sabotage, and propaganda fields. Marred by
doctrinal crudities, factual inaccuracies, and uncritical journalism, it
nevertheless is useful as a composite of the most important informa-
tion on intelligence doctrine publicly available in 1954. With source
citations and index.
[Published in the following foreign editions: War of Wits (London:
Hutchinson, 1956) ; Det Tysta Kriget (Stockholm: Ljus Forlag, 1956)
Les Secrets de i'Espionnage (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1955).]
HILSMAN, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions.
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. 187 p.)
An academic study of the theory of intelligence, with emphasis on
its relation to policy. Valuable for its provocative thesis that policy
is likely to go its own way in disregard of intelligence, while intel-
ligence tends to turn scholar, gathering and piecing together facts for
their own sake. The author later became director of State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
KENT, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949. 226 p.)
Foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national
intelligence production, by the present Chairman of the Board of Na-
tional Estimates. Lays down many principles which have since be-
come established in practice.
[Published in translation as Inteligencia Estrategica para la Politica
Mundial Norteamericana (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, Biblioteca del
Oficial, 1951), and in pirated Japanese and Chinese editions.]
RANSOM, Harry Howe. Central Intelligence and National Security.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. 287 c.)
A scholarly inquiry into the development, organization, and problems
of the U.S. intelligence system, with particular attention to the pro-
duction of national estimates. Includes a valuable bibliography.
WI[ITEHEAD, Don. The FBI Story: A. Report to the People. (New
York: Random House, 1956. 368 p.)
A laudatory account of FBI operations, both anticriminal and in the
maintenance of internal security.
(Published in the following foreign editions: The FBI Story (London:
Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957) ; Le F.B.I. (Paris: Morgan, 1957) ; La
Storia dello FBI (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1958) ; Hi:storia del F.B.I.
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1958) ; Die FBI-Story (Munich: Paul
List, 1959).]
U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment. Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. 76 p,)
The unclassified report of the intelligence task force of the second
Hoover Commission, under the chairmanship of General Mark W.
Clark. Considers problems of intelligence at the national and depart-
mental levels, including those of personnel, security, administration,
and functional organization.
[Also published as House Document No. 201, 84th Congress, 1st Session,
1955.1
OPERATIONAL HISTORY
Through World War I
BAKELESS, John. Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes. (Philadelphia:
J B. Lippincott, 1959. 406 p.)
The most nearly complete account of secret service in the American
Revolution, covering-in an impossible attempt at encyclopedic nar-
rative--both sides' activities on the American continent. The author
had experience in military intelligence.
BULLOCH, John. M. I. 5: The Origin and History of the British
Counter-Espionage Service. London: Arthur Barker, 1963. 206 p.)
A journalistic history of the British security service from its estab-
lishment in 1909 through the early months of World War II. In par-
ticular it describes the work and some of the methods of Captain
(later Major General) Sir Vernon Kell, Director of M.I.5 from 1909
to 1940, using as illustrative material many of the espionage cases,
largely German, with which the service coped during this period.
JAMES, Admiral Sir William. The Code Breakers of Room 40: The
Story of Admiral Sir William Hall, Genius of British Counter-
Intelligence. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. 2L2 p.)
Biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence during World
War I, by the officer in charge of communications intelligence. Cen-
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ters on the decipherment of German messages, including the notori-
ous Zimmermann telegram.
[Published in Great Britain under the title The Eyes of the Navy
(London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1955) .1
(For other reading on this subject, see Chapter IX, "Secret Intel-
ligence-1917-1919," in The Sky Was Always Blue, by Admiral Sir Wil-
liam James (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1951) ; The Man of Room 40,
by A. W. Ewing (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1940) ; 40 O. B., by Hugh Cle-
land Hoy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932): and The Zimmermann
Telegram, by Barbara W. Tuchman (New York: Viking, 1958) .1
ROWAN, Richard Wilmer. The Story of Secret Service. (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937. 732 p.)
The best comprehensive history of espionage and its practitioners
from biblical times to the end of World War I. Often sketchy and
sometimes over-dramatized, the treatment is generally sound and at
its best illuminated by perceptive reflections on the ways of human
kind.
[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: John Miles,
Ltd., 1938).1
STERN, Philip Van Doren. Secret Missions of the Civil War. (New
York: Rand McNally, 1959. 320 p.)
Integrated and annotated anthology of the best accounts of clan-
destine operations undertaken by both North and South during the
American Civil War.
YARDLEY, Herbert Osborn. The American Black Chamber. (Indi-
anapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931. 375 p.)
Querulous history of the first modern U.S. organization for com-
munications intelligence, by its founder and director during World
War I and through the twenties.
[Published in the following foreign editions: Secret Service in America
(London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1940) ; he Cabinet Noir Americain
(Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935) ; Amerikas Svarta
Kammare (Stockholm: Tidens Forlag, 1938) .i
BABINGTON-SMITH, Constance. Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intel-
ligence in World War II. (New York: Harper, 1957. 266 p.)
Description by a leading RAF photo interpreter of the development
of photo intelligence techniques, first by British and then by Allied
personnel, and their use in the European theater. Shows the role of
aerial photography in planning the D-Day landings, in targeting and
bomb damage assessment, in industrial analysis, and in learning the
secrets of German countermeasures, radar, and the new "V" weapons.
[Published in Great Britain under the title Evidence in Camera (Lon-
don: Chatto and Windus, 1958) .]
HYDE, H. Montgomery. Room 3603: The Story of the British Intel-
ligence Center in New York during World War II. (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963. 257 p.)
An anecdotal account of British secret intelligence operations in the
western hemisphere during World War II, by a member of the staff of
Sir William Stephenson, then Director of British Security Coordination
in the United States. Describes this organization's relationships with
the FBI, the support it gave to General Donovan in establishing the
OSS, and many BSC operations in intelligence collection, counter-
espionage and covert action.
[Published in Great Britain under the title The Quiet Canadian (Lon-
don: Ilamish Hamilton, 1962).]
IND, Colonel Allison. Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon
in the War against Japan. (New York: David McKay, 1958.
305 p.)
Kaleidoscopic scenes from the operations of the clandestine AIB
amalgamated from American, British, Australian, and Dutch personnel
under General MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific. The
author, AIB Deputy Controller, emphasizes the activities of the Aus-
tralian Coast Watchers concealed on Japanese-held islands but also
devotes sections to guerrilla and agent activity in the Philippines and
to sabotage operations.
[For further reading see Eric A. Feldt, The Coastwatchers (New York
and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1946; New York: ila:.lantine
Books, 1959).]
ALSOP, Stewart and Thomas Braden. Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and
American Espionage. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946.
237 p.)
Fragmentary but authentic examples of OSS clandestine intelligence
and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The authors
were OSS parachutists.
(Published in Swedish translation as O.S.S. (Stockholm: Ljiis, 1947).]
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
PEERS, William R. and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road. (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown & Co., 1963. 246 p.)
History of the operations of OSS Detachment 101 behind the Japanese
lines in Burma, by its commanding officer. Although the most spec-
tacular of these were paramilitary, they were intertwined with the
collection of important tactical intelligence for the regular military
forces
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STEAD, Philip John. Second Bureau. (London: Evans Bros., 1959.
212 p.)
Wartime history of the regular French military intelligence service,
comprising the Deuxieme Bureau and its supporting organizations for
clandestine collection and counterespionage. Based on French-lan-
guage accounts and on conversations with many officers of the service,
it shows the difficulty experienced in maintaining operations after
1940 in double clandestinity, secret from both the Germans and the
Vichy Government.
WOHLSTETTER, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.
(Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. 426 p.)
A painstaking study of the sequence of events in the months before
Pearl Harbor with respect to the acquisition and handling of intel-
ligence, especially communications intelligence, bearing on the attack
and its effect at the command level. It constitutes an exhaustive case
history of this classic warning situation, giving particular attention
to the uses and users of indications intelligence and tracing the in-
fluence of command organization, bureaucracy, security compartmenta-
tion, and incomplete communication on the effectiveness of warning.
[For further detailed reading see the Congressional Report of the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1946. 580 p.) The full text of
the Congressional hearings is contained in Hearings before the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Parts 1-39.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945-46).]
BUCKMASTER, Maurice James. Specially Employed: The Story of
British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance. (London: Batch-
worth Press. 1952. 200 p.)
The work of the French Section of the British Special Operations
Executive as described by its chief. Covers the organization of re-
sistance, many aspects of tradecraft, and the operations of a number
of individual agents in France.
[For further reading on this subject see Buckmaster's They Fought
Alone (New York: Norton, 1958; and British editions).]
COLLIER, Richard. Ten Thousand Eyes. (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1958. 320 p.)
Probably the best English-language account of the resistance agent
networks in France which, under the direction of Free French Head-
quarters in London, secured information on the beach and inland
defenses of Hitler's Atlantic Wall.
[Published in these foreign editions: Ten Thousand Eyes (London:
Collins, 1958) ; La Guerre Secrete du Mur de l'Atlantique (Paris:
Presses de la Cite, 1958) ; Tienduizend Ogen (Hoorn: U.-M. "West
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
Friesland," 1958) ; Zehntausend Augen (Konstanz and Stuttgart: Diana
Verlag, 1960).]
DELZELL, Charles F. Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian .Anti.Fascist
Resistance. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 620 p.)
Part I of this scholarly work traces the clandestine pelitica', opposi
tion to Mussolini from 1924 to 1943, Part II the armed partisan re-
sistance from 1943 to the end of the war.
HOWARTH, David Armine. Across To Norway. (New York: William
Sloane, 1952. 286 p.)
The story of Norwegian escapees assembled at a British base in the
Shetland Islands (where the author was deputy commander) to sail
their small boats back and forth as transport for saboteurs, agents, and
refugees. Also describes contacts with the Norwegian resistance and
evasion from capture by the enemy.
[Published in the following foreign editions: The Shetland Bus (Lon-
don: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1951) ; Sic Fuhren den Shetland Bus
(Tubingen: F. Schlichtenmayer [n.d.]).]
LAMPE, David. The Savage Canary: The Story of Resistance in Den-
mark. (London: Cassell, 1957. 236 p.)
High spots and personalities of the Danish resistance, with much
material on resistance tradecraft.
[Published also as The Danish Resistance (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1960) and in Danish as Den Utaemmede Kanariefugl (Copen-
hagen: Gyldendal, 1957).]
[For an excellent short panoramic pamphlet on this subject see Jurgen
Haestrup, From Occupied to Ally: Danish Resistance Movement
1940-45 (Copenhagen: Press and Information Department, Royal
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963).]
MONTAGU, Ewen Edward Samuel. The Man Who Never Was. (Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1954. 160 p.)
Account of a classic British deception operation which misled the
Germans about the coming Allied invasion of Sicily. The body of a
Marine officer was floated onto a beach in southern Spain with secret
documents indicating that Greece would be the point of invasion.
Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documenta-
tion, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions.
The author was in charge of this operation.
[Available in the following foreign editions: The Man Who 1Veve:- Was
(London: Evans Brothers, 1953) ; De Man Die Niet Bestoud (Utrecht:
Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1954) ; L'Homme Qui N'Existait Pas (Paris:
Juilliard, 1954) ; Mies Jota Ei Ollutkaan (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyh-
tio Otava, 1954).]
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[For further study see: Ian Colvin, The Unknown Courier (London:
William Kimber, 1953) ; and Sir Alfred Duff Cooper, Operation Heart-
break (New York: Viking Press, 1951), a fictionalized version of the
operation.]
EREMY (Gilbert Renault-Roulier). Memoirs of A Secret Agent of Free
France. Vol. I: The Silent Company, June 1940-June 1942. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. 406 p.)
The first of Remy's six volumes on his experiences. Describes his
escape from France and his joining the Free French Intelligence Serv-
ice in London, his trips back to set up an agent net, and his second
escape with his family.
l Volume II has also been translated, as Courage and Fear (London:
Arthur Barker Ltd., 1950). The other four volumes are: Comment
Meurt Un Reseau and Une A/faire de Trahison (Monte Carlo: Raoul
Solar, 1947) ; Les Mains Jointes (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1948)
... Mais le Temple Est Bdti (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1950).]
WOODHOUSE, Christopher Montague. Apple of Discord: A Survey of
Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting. (London:
Hutchinson, 1951. 320 p.)
An authoritative account of Greek resistance against the Germans
during World War II and the internal postwar struggle, with emphasis
on the political background. Col. Woodhouse commanded the Allied
Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas.
COLVIN, Ian Goodhope. Master Spy: The Incredible Story of Admiral
Wilhelm Canaris. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. 286 p.)
Ambivalent attitude and pro-Allied activities of the head of the
German Abwehr, based on published documents and interviews with
many of his former associates. Climax is the Admiral's involvement
in the plot to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, for which he paid
with his life.
(Published in the following foreign editions: Chief of Intelligence
(London; Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1951) ; L'Amiral Canaris, Notre Allie
Secret (Paris: Editions de la Paix, 1955) ; Admiral Canaris, Chef des
Geheimdienstes (Vienna: Wilhelm Frick Verlag, 1955) ; Canaris (Bar-
celona: Editorial ARE, 1956) ; Mysteriet Canaris (Bergen: John Griegs
Forlag, 1952).1
For further reading see: Karl Heinz Abshagen, Canaris (London:
Hutchinson, 1956) ; Allen W. Dulles, Germany's Underground (New
York: Macmillan, 1947) ; Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intel-
ligence (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).]
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
GISKES, Herman J. London Calling North Pole. (New York: British
Book Centre, 1953. 208 p.)
Story of a remarkable radio deception set up by the Germans after
their capt>re of a Dutch officer parachuted into Holland by the British
SOE to work with the resistance: undetected for nearly two years, it
netted 54 agents and quantities of British weapons and explosives
parachuted in to the Dutch. Also contains material on other opera-
tions of the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch. The author was
chief of the counterespionage unit in Holland.
[Published in the following foreign editions: London Calling North
Pole (London: William Kimber, 1953) ; Abwehr III F (Amsterdam:
Uitgeverij de Bezige Bij, 1949) ; Londres Appelle Pole Nord (Paris:
Librarie Plon, 1958) ; La Burla Maestra de la Guerra (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americana, 1954) ; Spione Uberspielen Spione (Hamburg:
Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1951).]
[For further study of this operation see Pieter Dourlein, Inside North
Pole (London: William Kimber, 1953) ; Joseph Schreider, Das War das
Englandspiel (Munich: Walter Stutz Verlag, 1950).]
SCHELLFNBERG, Walter. The Labyrinth: Memoirs. (New York:
Harper, 1956. 423 p.)
Political intrigues and intelligence accomplishments in the Third
Reich through the eyes of Himmler's chief of foreign intelligence.
[Published in the following foreign editions: The Schellenberg Memoirs
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1956) ; Le Chef du Contre-Espionnage Nazi
Parle (1933-45) (Paris: Rene Juilliard, 1957) ; Los Secretos del Servi:cio
Secreto Alemdn (Barcelona: Mateu, 1958) ; Memoiren (Cologne: Ver-
lag fiir I'olitik and Wirtschaft, 1959) ; Den Usynlige Front (CoPen-
hagen: Skrifola [n.d.]).]
WIGHTON, Charles and Gunter Peis. Hitler's Spies and Saboteurs:
Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General La-
housen. (New York: Henry Holt, 1958. 285 p.)
General Lahousen headed the Abwehr's sabotage section during part
of the war. This elaboration from his diary gives popularized case
histories of his agents in Great Britain, Ireland (in the British edition
only), and South Africa, and of the German saboteurs landed by sub-
marine on the U.S. coast who were rounded up by the FBI.
[Published in Great Britain under the title They Spied on England
(London: Odhams Press, 1958).]
AUSTRALIA. Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage. (Syd-
ney: Government Printer for New South Wales, 1955. 483 p.)
An excellent study of the Soviet espionage and subversion in Aus-
tralia brought to light by the defection in 1954 of MVD agent Vladimir
Petrov and his wife.
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[.See also Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Royal Commission
on Espionage and Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; London: Andre Deutsch, 1956).
Empire of Fear is also published in translations: L'Empire de la Peur
(Paris: Morgan, 1957) ; Imperio del Miedo (Mexico City: Ediciones
Zenit, 1957) ; Fryktens Land (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1956) ; Sant
Vittnesbord (Stockholm: Sven-Erik Berghs Fbrlag, 1956).]
CANADA. Report of the Royal Commission ... to Investigate ... the
Communication . . . of Confidential Information to Agents of a
Foreign Power. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's
Most Excellent Majesty, 1946. 733 p.)
An important detailed review of Soviet espionage, subversion, and
agent recruitment in Canada uncovered through the defection in 1945
of Soviet embassy code clerk Igor Gouzenko.
I Published in the following foreign-language editions: Russiak Spio-
nage i Canada (Copenhagen: Schultz Forlag, 1947) ; Le Rapport de la
Commission Royale (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946).]
DALLIN, David J. Soviet Espionage. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1955. 558 p.)
A scholarly historical study of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe,
Canada, and the United States, based on published materials, some un-
published documents, and interviews with former Soviet agents and
others.
[Published in the following foreign editions: Die Sowjetspionage (Co-
logne: Verlag fur Politik and Wirtschaft, 1956) ; Espionage Sovietico
(Buenos Aires: Agora, 1957) ; Al-Jasusiyyah Al-Shuyu'iyyah Al-Duwaliy-
yah (Baghdad: Al-Ani Press, 1963).]
DERIABIN, Peter and Frank Gibney. The Secret World. (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. 334 p.)
With its four appendices, the most detailed and factual compilation
available, for all its character as a defector's expose, on the organiza-
tion and activity of Soviet State Security from 1946 to 1953.
I Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Arthur
Barker, 1960).]
[For further study, see Deriabin's testimony before the Internal Se-
curity Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Communist Controls on Religious Activity, May 5, 1959; and his testi-
mony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities: The
Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations, March 17, 1959.]
FOOTE, Alexander. Handbook for Spies. (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
day, 1949. 273 p.)
Classic case history of the operation of a Soviet wartime intelligence
net. The author was a senior member of a group of agents in Switzer-
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land collecting information from Germany and reporting to Moscow
by radio.
(:Published in the following foreign editions: Handbook for Spies (Lon-
don: Museum Press, 1949) ; Les Secrets d'un Espion Soviietique (Brus-
sels: Editions de la Paix, 1951) ; Handbuch fur Spione (Darmstadt:
C. W. Leske Verlag, 1954) ; Manual Para Espias (Barcelona: Editorial
AHR., 1954).]
KAZNACHEEV, Aleksandr. Inside a Soviet Embassy. Edited, with an
Introduction, by Simon Wolin. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B.
Lippincott, 1962. 250 p.)
Experiences of the author as a junior intelligence officer in the Soviet
embassy in Rangoon before his defection in 1959. Creates an intimate
picture of Soviet intelligence life in relating episodes documenting his
development, training, and disillusionment and gives consi.dcrable in-
sight, into the Soviet operational- system.
[Published in Germany under the title: Wegweiser nach Westen (Co-
logne: Verlag Wissenschaft and Politik, 1962).]
[For further study see Kaznacheev's testimony before the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Soviet Intelligence in Asia, Hearing, December 14, 1959, and Conditions
in. the Soviet Union, Hearing, January 22, 1960.]
MONAT, Pawel (with John Dille). Spy in the U.S. (New York:: Har-
per and Row, 1962. 208 p.)
The only available account of Soviet Satellite intelligence operations
in the United States, by a former officer of the Polish military intel-
ligence service. Besides offering insight into Polish operational prac-
tices it shows how Soviet intelligence directs the activities of the Polish
services, not only by levying intelligence requirements but by indirect
controls.
[For further information along these lines see Monat's testimony be-
fore the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Soviet Espionage through Poland, June 1:3, 1960.1
ORLOV, Alexander. Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare.
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1963.
187 p.)
A thoughtful and generally approving analysis of Soviet intelligence
doctrine, illustrated by case histories drawn from the author's high-
level service in the NKVD in the 1930's.
WOLIN, Simon and Robert M. Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police. (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 408 p.)
Historical development and philosophical bases of the Soviet state
security services from the establishment of the Cheka in 1917 until
1956, presented largely through the accounts of defectors and victims.
The editors have contributed documentation and an excellent summary.
RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
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IPublished in Great Britain under the same title (London: Methuen &
Co., 1957).]
EVASION AND ESCAPE
BLAIR, Clay Jr. Beyond Courage. (New York: David McKay, 1955.
247 p.)
Stories of American airmen who, shot down behind enemy lines in
the Korean War, evaded capture and returned.
(Published in the following foreign editions: Beyond Courage (London:
Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1956) ; Met de Moed der Wanhoop (Utrecht:
Uitgeverij Het Spectrum 1955).]
CRAWLEY, Aidan Merivale. Escape from Germany: A History of
R.A.F. Escapes During the War. (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1956. 291 p.)
The sanitized version of an official history prepared for the British
Air Ministry. Describes the escape intelligence organizations (one of
which the author headed) in the German POW camps and the pris-
oners' continual efforts, successful and unsucce:;sful, to escape.
[Published in the following foreign editions: Escape from Germany
(London: Collins, 1958) ; R. A. F. Te Woet (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij
Nieuwe Wieken N. V., n.d.).]
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 Approved F -RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
I al
STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 8 NO. 2 SPRING 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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 SECRET SECRET
For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A00020002 -
F7 -1 1 1
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
25X1
25X1
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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SECRET I SECRET
 Approved For Release 2005/04/1
CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence,
25X1Room 1D 27 Langley and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted through channels. They should be typed
in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
DISTRIBUTION
25X1 For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the
25X1 Office of the Editor,
25X1
CIA-RDP78T03194A000200020 A4 4 SECRET
CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
A Crucial Estimate Relived ..... .. ... Sherman Kent 1
The failure to anticipate a wrong Soviet decision.
SECRET
Intelligence for Defense Planning ... .. W. E. Seidel 19
Estimative input to a systems analysis operation.
SECRET
Intelligence for Economic Defense
Sherman R. Abrahamson. 33
Community support in two trade control programs.
SECRET
The Coordination of Collection . Theodore H. Tenniswood 45
Persistent problems in "effective guidance" of over-
Seas efforts. SECRET
Meetings with Agents ... A. A. Konovalov & V. S. Sokolov 65
Soviet doctrine on a crucial tradecraft item. SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Style and Stereotypes in Intelligence Studies
Frank A. Knapp, Jr. Al
For some individuality in an overstandardized prod-
uct.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
British services ...................... ........ A7
World War II ............. .. ..... .......... All
Doctrine and pseudo-doctrine ... A16
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Sherman Kent chairs the Board of National Estimates.
Wallace E. Seidel is a member of the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis
Group.
Sherman R. Abrahamson is an economist in CIA's Office of Re-
search and Reports.
Theodore H. Tenniswood is a member of the CIA staff concerned
with clandestine procurement of foreign intelligence.
Lt. General A. A. Konovalov and Major General of Engineering
and Technical Services V. S. Sokolov
Frank A. Knapp, Jr., is a current intelligence analyst.
25X1
25X1
MORI/HRP THIS PAGE
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
How the logic of the estimating
process failed, in September
1962, to apprehend an illogical
Soviet policy decision.
A CRUCIAL ESTIMATE RELIVED
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter)
of each volume for articles published during the preceding
calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nomi-
nations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence
in the decision.
Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, entitled
"The Military Buildup in Cuba," became the official pronounce-
ment of the United States Intelligence Board on 19 September
1962. This estimate was undertaken when reporting from
Cuba began to indicate a steep acceleration in Soviet deliveries
of military supplies to Cuba. The tempo of its production was
more rapid than "routine," but far less rapid than "crash."
At the time it was completed, those of us engaged in it felt
that its conclusions A and B represented a basic analysis of
the situation. Here they are:
A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily
for the political advantages to be derived from it, and conse-
quently that the main purpose of the present military buildup
in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against
what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that
the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.
The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by en-
hancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet
military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recog-
nize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba
might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their
present purpose.
B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries
are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capa-
bilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction
with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be
regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in
power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home
and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that,
to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of
security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggres-
sive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America.
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And conclusions C and D were an attempt to predict what
further developments might occur. They read:
C, As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to estab-
lish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in pursub-
but a more "offensive" esaofc short-range g surface-to-surface
marines, se,
and additional t yp
missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will con-
tinue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether
they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction.
D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from
the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballis-
tic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet sub-
marine base there. As between these two, the testablishment of
a submarine base would be the more likely. to date
and however, would be incompatible with Soviet would indicate a
with Soviet policy as we we presently
far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet
relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently
would have important policy implications with respect to other
areas and other problems in East-West relations.
As is quite apparent, the thrust of these paragraphs was
that the Soviets would be unlikely to introduce strategic of-
fensive weapons into Cuba. ThsWis Wno blinking the fact that
hen the photographic
we came down on the wrong
evidence of 14 October was in, there was the proof.
Soon after the consequent crisis had subsided, a number of
investigations were set in train aiming to understand why the
estimate came out as it did. What follows are e e aozn
thoughts on the subject and some philosophical g cen-
tral about the business of intelligence estimating. My able
tral thought is that no intelligence mechanism imaginable
can be anything like one hundred percent sure
inf a rediicting
correctly the actions of a foreign g
such as this one was. If similar situations develop in the
future
sort ound to be
of evidentiary base, thesessituations too areo
soof y
susceptible to the same sort of misjudgment.
The Estimating Machine
Although many of our readers are aware of the process by
which National Intelligence Estimates are general produced, it is phaps desirable to set forth again g al ground-rules.
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When time allows (and it did in the case of the Cuba esti-
mate) the process is fairly complicated; it involves a lot of
thought and planning at the outset, a lot of research and writ-
ing in the intelligence research organizations of the military
and the State Department, a drafting by the ablest staff .in
the business, and a painstaking series of interagency ineetings
devoted to review and coordination. Before it gets the final
USIB imprimatur a full-dress NIE goes down an assembly line
of eight or more stations. At each it is supposed to receive
(and almost always does) the attention of a highly knowledge-
able group. The Cuba estimate passed through all these
stations.
The laborious procedure has seemed to me worth. while if
for no other reason than that it is aimed at achieving three
important goals: the production of a paper tailored exactly
to the requirements of the policy consumer; the full deploy-
ment of every relevant intelligence resource (documents and
knowledgeable people) within the community; and the attain-
ment of a best agreed judgment about imponderables, or lack-
ing unanimity the isolation and identification of dissenting
opinion..
In any of the major estimates it would not be difficult to
demonstrate that a thousand, perhaps thousands of, people
in intelligence work scattered all over the world had made
their modest witting or unwitting contribution to the finished
job. Foreign service officers, attaches, clandestine operators
and their operatives, eavesdroppers, document procurers, in-
terrogators, observers, "photographers" and the photo inter-
preters, reporters, researchers, sorters, indexers, reference and
technical specialists, and so on have been gathering, forward-
ing, arranging, and sifting the factual stuff upon which the
estimate rests. Final responsibility for the form and sub-
stance of the ultimate blue book rests with far fewer, but a
good number just the same. These are the estimators
throughout the community, including the staff of the Office of
National Estimates, the DCI's Board of National Estimates,
and the USIB principals themselves.
So much for what might be called the physique of the proc-
ess: it has also its purely intellectual aspects. Like any solid
conceptual construction, the National Intelligence Estimate
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is prepared in rough accordance with the procedures of the
scientific method.
In very general and, I fear, over-simplified terms, the proc-
ess goes like this. After a confrontation of the problem and
some decisions as to how it should be handled, there is a ran-
sacking of files and minds for all information relating to the
problem; and an evaluation, analysis, and digestion of this
information. There are emergent hypotheses as to the pos-
sible aggregate meaning of the information; some emerged be-
fore, some after its absorption. No one can say whence come
these essential yeasts of fruitful thought. Surely they grow
best in a medium of knowledge, experience, and intuitive
understanding. When they unfold, they are checked back
against the facts, weighed in the light of the specific circum-
stances and the analysts' general knowledge and understand-
ing of the world scene. Those that cannot stand up fall; those
that do stand up are ordered in varying degrees of likelihood.
The Search into Uncertainty
As an NIE begins to take form it carries three kinds of
statements. The first is easily disposed of; it is the statement
of indisputable fact ("The Soviets have a long-range heavy jet
bomber, the Bison"). The second and third kinds do not carry
any such certainty; each rests upon a varying degree of un-
certainty. They relate respectively (a) to things which are
knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and (b) to things
which are not known to anyone at all.
As an example of the former, we have seen the Bison up
close and from afar, photographed it in the air and on the
ground, listened to it and timed it in flight; but no reliable
source we have access to has had his hands on one or put one
through its paces. Its performance characteristics are ac-
cordingly a matter of calculation or estimate. Likewise, al-
though some Soviet official knows with perfect assurance how
many Bisons there are, we do not. Our calculation of Bison
order of battle is an estimate, an approximation.
Over the years our estimates of these knowable but unknown
things have probably come closer and closer to the objective
fact, but it is sobering to realize that there is still a notable
discrepancy between the CIA and Air Force estimates of oper-
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ational Bisons, and that only last year our seemingly solid es-
timate of Bear order of battle had to be revised upwards some
fifteen percent.
It is worth noting here that matters far less esoteric than
Bear order of battle can and often do present literally un-
solvable problems. An innocent might think that such know--
able things as the population of Yemen, the boundaries of
Communist China, the geodetic locus of Russian cities, and
thousands of other obvious matters of fact could be had for
the asking. Not only can they not be had for the asking, they
cannot be had at all. The reason is, of course, either that no
one has ever tried to find them out, or that those who have
tried have approached the problem from different angles with
different methodologies and gotten different answers, of which
no single one can be cited as the objective fact.
The third kind of statement, in (b) above, represents an
educated guess at something literally unknowable by any man
alive. Characteristically it often deals in futures and with
matters well beyond human control: Will Nkrumah be with
us for the next two years? five years? Or it deals with matters
.under human control but upon which no human decision has
been taken: How many Blinders will the Soviets have f.ve
years hence? What kind of antimissile capability? What will
be their stance in Cuba next year? It may be that the So-
viet leaders have temporized with these issues, agreed to go
planless for another six or eighteen months. Or it may be that
they have decided, but at this time next year will drastically
alter this year's decision. Ask almost anyone what he plans
to do with his 1965 holiday and see what you get. If you do
get anything, write it down and ask him the same question
a year from now.
If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact
the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not
then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an
excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown--a
venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as
he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In
the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a con-
clusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this
as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled.
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to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are
engaged in a hazardous occupation.
It has been murmured that a misjudgment such as oc-
curred in the Cuba SNIE warrants a complete overhaul of our
method, of producing estimates. In one sense of the word
"method," this cannot be done. As indicated earlier, the
method. in question is the one which students reared in the
Western tradition have found to be best adapted to the
search for truth. It is the classical method of the natural
sciences, retooled to serve the far less exact disciplines of the
so-called science of human activity-strategy, politics, eco-
nomics, sociology, etc. This is our method; we are stuck with
it, unless we choose to forsake it for the "programmer" and
his computer or go back to the medicine man and his mystical
communion with the All-Wise.
What can be done is to take a hard look at those stages of
the method where it is most vulnerable and where a relax-
ation of vigilance or an undue inflexibility may lead to error in
judgment. First consider the so-called evaluation of the
"facts."
The Matter of Mental Set
In our business we are as likely to be faced by the problem
of a plethora of raw intelligence as by one of its paucity. In
many of our tasks we have so large a volume of data that no
single person can read, evaluate, and mentally file it all. It
gets used in a finished intelligence study only through being
handled along the line by a group of people who divide the la-
bor. Obviously the individuals of this group are not identical
in talent or anything else, and each brings to the task his own
character, personality, and outlook on life. There is no way of
being sure that as they read and evaluate they all maintain
the same standards of criticism or use common criteria of
value and relevance.
Merely as an example of what I am saying: it could have
been that half a dozen such readers were inclined to believe
that the Soviets would put strategic weapons into Cuba and
another half-dozen inclined to believe the opposite. In some
measure the subsequent use of a given document depends upon
who handles it first and gives it an evaluation. It could be
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that a valuable piece of information falls into disrepute be-
cause its early readers did not believe its story. The obverse
is also possible-that an incorrect story should gain great cur-
rency because of being wholly believed by wishful critics. It is
a melancholy fact of life that neither case is a great rarity,
that man will often blind himself to truth by going for the
comforting hypothesis, by eschewing the painful.
What is true of the evaluation of raw intelligence at the
reporting or desk officer level is generally true all along the
line. The main difference between the early evaluation. and
that at the national estimates level is the quantity evaluated,
not necessarily the quality of the evaluation. The relatively
few people on the national estimates staff and board cannot,
indeed do not try to, read all incoming reports. They read
and appraise what survives the first few stages of the
winnowing-out process-still a formidable amount of paper.
For the rest they rely upon the word of the specialists who
have handled the material in the first instance. The senior
estimates people have had more experience than the average
and their skills are probably greater, but they are still men
with normal human fallibilities.
In last analysis these fallibilities lie in a man's hab'.its of
thought. Some minds when challenged respond with a, long-
harbored prejudice, some with an instantaneous cliche. Some
minds are fertile in the generation of new hypotheses and
roam freely and widely among them. Other minds not merely
are sterile in this respect but actively resist the new idea.
Any reputable and studious man knows the good and evil
of the ways of thought. No worthy soul consciously nourishes
a prejudice or willfully flashes a cliche; everyone knows the
virtues of open-mindedness; no one boasts imperviousness to a
new thought. And yet even in the best minds curious derelic-
tions occur.
The Data on Cuba
I do not believe, however, that any such derelictions occurred
in the matter of evaluating the evidence on Cuba. What little
data we had prior to 19 September I am sure we weighed and
measured with open minds.
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What was this evidence? To begin with, there was of course
no information that the Soviets had decided to deploy stra-
tegic missiles to Cuba and indeed no indication suggesting
such a decision. Moreover, months after that decision had
been reached, and during the period when the estimate was
being drafted and discussed, there was still no evidence that
the missiles were in fact moving to their emplacement. With
the benefit of hindsight one can go back over the thou-
sand and more bits of information collected from human ob-
servers in the six months ending 14 October and pick out a
few-a very few-which indicated the possible presence of
strategic missiles. The report of CIA's Inspector General says:
"It was not until shortly after mid-September that a few ground
observer reports began coming in which were specifically de-
scriptive or suggestive of the introduction into Cuba of Soviet
offensive weapons."
The IG goes on to list the "handful" which "can be related"
to these weapons. The list comes to eight. Of these I would
agree that no more than two or possibly three should have
stopped the clock. None of these was available before the
crucial estimate was put to bed. Even if they had been here
in time and even if we had intuitively felt (and a notable
among us did so feel) that such weapons were on the way,
these three bits of evidence would probably not, taken in the
context of the other thousands, have been seized on as point-
ing to the truth. In the mass of human observation and re-
porting there were items to support or destroy almost any
hypothesis one could generate.
Nor did the aerial photography of September dissipate the
uncertainty. Not only did it fail to spot the ominous indi-
cators of missile emplacement but over and over again it
made fools of ground observers by proving their reports in-
accurate or wrong. The moment of splendor for the U-2s,
cameras, film, and PIs when finally the sites and associated
equipment were photographed and identified had not yet ar-
rived with the close of the business day of 19 September.
Thus of the two classical invitations to error in the estimat-
ing business, we cannot be said to have fallen for the first:
I refer of course to the neglect or wishful misevaluation of
evidence because it does not support a preconceived hypo-
thesis.
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Though perhaps tempted, we also did not kick the problem
under the rug. We did ask ourselves the big question, "Are
the Soviets likely to use Cuba as a strategic base?" We asked
ourselves the next echelon of questions, "Are they likely to
base submarines, light bombers (IL-28s), heavier bombers, and
long-range missiles there?" Our answers are cited above.
The Logic of Intent
How could we have misjudged? The short answer is that,
lacking the direct evidence, we went to the next best thing,
namely information which might indicate the true course of
developments. We looked hard at the fact of the Soviet; mili-
tary buildup in Cuba for indications of its probable final[ scale
and nature. We concluded that the military supplies piling
into Cuba indicated a Soviet intent to give Castro a formida-
ble defensive capability-so formidable as to withstand any-
thing but a major military effort on the part of an attacker.
We felt that the Soviet leaders believed the worldwide politi-
cal consequences of such an effort would be recognized in the
United States and would be the strongest possible deterrent
to U.S. military moves to overthrow Castro. Obviously we did
not go on to argue that the Soviets might think they could
raise the deterrent still higher by supplying the Cubans wihhh
long-range missiles, which they would still proclaim to be
purely defensive.
As noted, however, we did consider the matter. And in
answering the questions that we posed ourselves on the likeli-
hood of the Soviets' building Cuba into what this country
would have to regard as a strategic base, we called upon an-
other range of indicators. These were indicators derivable
from precedents in Soviet foreign policy.
When we reviewed once again how cautiously the Soviet
leadership had threaded its way through other dangerous,
passages of the Cold War; when we took stock of the sense of
outrage and resolve evinced by the American people and gov-
ernment since the establishment of a Communist regime in
Cuba; when we estimated that the Soviets must be aware of
these American attitudes; and when we then asked ourselves
would the Soviets undertake the great risks at the high odds--
and in Cuba of all places-the indicator, the pattern of Soviet
foreign policy, shouted out its negative.
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With hindsight one may speculate that during the winter
and early spring of 1962, when the Soviets were making their
big Cuba decisions, they examined the posture of the United
States and thought they perceived a change in it. Is it pos-
sible that they viewed our acceptance of setbacks in Cuba (the
Bay of Pigs), in Berlin (the wall), and in Laos as evidence of a
softening of U.S. resolve? Perhaps they did, and on this
basis they estimated the risks of putting missiles into Cuba as
acceptably low. Perhaps, when they contemplated the large
strategic gains which would accrue if the operation succeeded,
their estimate of the U.S. mood was wishfully nudged in this
direction. And perhaps again, to close the circuit, they failed
to estimate at all the consequences of being themselves faced
down in a crisis. If all these speculations are correct-and
there is persuasive argument to sustain them-even in hind-
sight it is extremely difficult for many of us to follow their
inner logic or to blame ourselves for not having thought in
parallel with them.
On 15 October we realized that our estimate of the Soviets'
understanding of the mood of the United States and its prob-
able reaction was wrong. On 28 October we realized that the
Soviets had realized they had misjudged the United States.
In between we verified that our own feeling for the mood of
the United States and its probable reaction had been correct.
In a way our misestimate of Soviet intentions got an ex post
facto validation.
Ways Out We Did Not Take
In brooding over an imponderable-like the probable inten-
tions of the Soviet Union in the context of Cuba-there is a
strong temptation to make no estimate at all. In the ab-
sence of directly guiding evidence, why not say the Soviets
might do this, they might do that, or yet again they might
do the other-and leave it at that? Or like the news com-
mentators, lay out the scenario as it has unwound to date
and end with a "time alone will tell"? This sort of thing
has the attractions of judicious caution and an unexposed
neck, but it can scarcely be of use to the policy man and
planner who must prepare for future contingencies.
Even more tempting than no estimate is the "worst case"
estimate. This consists of racking up all the very worst
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things the adversary is capable of doing and estimating that
he may undertake them all, irrespective of the consequences
to his own larger objectives. If one estimates thus and if one
is believed by the planner, then it follows that the latter need
never be taken by unpleasant surprise.
Engaging in these worst-case exercises may momentarily
cheer the estimator. No one can accuse him of nonchalance
to potential danger; he has signaled its existence at each of the
points of the compass; congressional investigators will have
lean pickings with him. But in all likelihood a worse fate
awaits. Either his audience will tire of the cry of wolf' and
pay him no heed when he has really bad news to impart, or it
will be frightened into immobility or a drastically wrong
policy decision.
It was tempting in the matter of Cuba to go for the worst
case: but in the days before 19 September we knew that the
evidence would not sustain such an estimate, and our reading
of the indicators led us in the opposite direction.
Why No Revision?
If wrong as of 19 September, why did we not put things to
rights before the 14 October photographs? Why did we not
recall and modify the estimate when the early ground ob-
server reports reached us or when we finally got the photo of
the inbound Soviet ship with its deck cargo of crated IL--28s?
Could we not have repaired the damage a week or so in. ad-
vance of 14 October and given the policy-maker the advantage
of this precious time?
In the first place, these pre-14 October data almost certainly
would not, indeed should not, have caused the kind of shift of
language in the key paragraphs that would have sounded the
tocsin. Of themselves and in context they should not have
overpowered all to the contrary and dictated a one-hundred-
eighty-degree change to "The Soviets are almost certainly de-
veloping Cuba as a strategic base right now." The most they
should have contributed to a new version would have been in
the direction of softening the original "highly unlikely" and
adding a sentence or two to note the evidence, flag a new un-
certainty, and signal the possible emergence of a dangerous
threat. If we had recalled the estimate or issued a memo to
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its holders in early October we would have had a better record
on paper, but I very much doubt that whatever in con-
science we could have said would have galvanized high eche-
lons of government to crash action.
In the second place, it is not as if these new data had no
egress to the world of policy people except through National
Intelligence Estimates. The information was current intel-
ligence when it came in and it promptly went out to the key
customers as such. This is of course the route that most, if
not all, important items of intelligence follow. That con-
stituent part of an NIE. that I earlier referred to as the range
of knowable things that are known with a high degree of
certainty is often very largely made up of yesterday's current
intelligence.
In the multi-compartmented intelligence business, two com-
partments are at issue-an estimates compartment and one
for current intelligence. They are peopled by two quite sepa-
rate groups and follow quite different lines of work. Never-
theless, there is the closest interrelationship between them.
The current intelligence people handle almost minute by min-
ute the enormous volume of incoming stuff, evaluate it, edit it,
and disseminate it with great speed. The estimates people
work on a longer-range subject matter, hopefully at a more de-
liberate pace, and make their largest contributions in the area
of judicious speculation. NIEs are produced at the rate of 50
to 80 a year; individual current intelligence items at that of
some ten thousand a year. The current people look to esti-
mates as the correct medium for pulling together and project-
ing into the future the materials that continuously flow in.
The estimators for their part rely on the current people to
keep alert for news that will modify extant estimates.
The estimators do themselves keep the keenest sort of
watch for this kind of news. Indeed the estimates board mem-
bers and staff chiefs start every working day with a considera-
tion of new information that might require revision of a
standing NIE. But the board feels that certain criteria should
be met before it initiates a new estimate. These are: (1) The
subject matter of the estimate must be of considerable cur-
rent importance. (The situation in Blanka was important at
the time of our last estimate on the subject, but it is not very
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important now; hence today's news, which may give the lie
tp' major portions of the Blanka estimate, will not occasion
its formal revision.) (2) The new evidence must be firm and
must indicate a significant departure from what was previ-
ously estimated. (We would not normally recall an. estimate
to raise a key "probably" to an "almost certainly" nor to
change an estimated quantity by a few percentage points.
Unless we adhere to these criteria and let current intelligence
carry its share of the burden, very few NIEs could be definitely
buttoned up, and those which had been would have to be re-
opened for almost daily revisions. Maybe this is the -way we
should direct our future effort; some of our critics seem to im-
ply as much. Myself, I think not.)
The Enemy's Viewpoint
Some of our critics have suggested that we would have
avoided the error if we had done a better job of putting our-
selves in the place of the Soviet leadership-that if we had
only looked out on the world scene with their eyes and thought
about it the way they did we would not have misread indi-
cators and all would have been clear. Upon occasion this
proposition is made in a way to suggest that its articulator
feels that he has given birth to a brand new idea. "Your
trouble," he says, "is that you do not seem to realize you are
dealing with Russian Communists and a Soviet government
policy problem." As such statements are made, I must con-
fess to a quickening of pulse and a rise in temperature. I
have wondered if such people appear before pastry cooks to
tell them how useful they will find something called "wheat
flour" in their trade.
If there is a first rule in estimating the probable behavior of
the other man, it is the rule to try to cast yourself in his
image and see the world through his eyes. It is in pursuit of
this goal that intelligence services put the highest premium
on country-by-country expertise, that they seek out, and hire
men who have deeply studied and experienced a given nation's
ways of life, that they procure for these men daily install-
ments of information on the latest developments in the area
of their specialty. To the extent that objectivity of judg-
ment about the other man's probable behavior is the crux of
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the intelligence business, to that extent is the importance of
living the other man's life recognized and revered.
Since at least World War I intelligence services have from
time to time set a group of individuals apart and instructed
them to think of themselves as the enemy's general staff.
Their task as a red team is to ponder and act out the way the
enemy will respond to situations as they develop. The idea
seems to be that by the creation of an artificial frame-some-
times going to the lengths of letting the personnel in ques-
tion wear the enemy's uniform and speak his sort of broken
English-you will get a more realistic appreciation of the
enemy's probable behavior than without the frills. It does
not necessarily follow.
Consider the case of one intelligence service that created
such a unit to simulate a Kremlin staff. It not only assigned
some of its own officers but also employed the talents of some
real one-time Communists. This latter move was regarded as
the new "something" to cap all similar previous games. In a
short time all members of the group became spirited dialec-
ticians and as such were able to give Soviet problems impecca-
ble Marxist solutions-to which, however, a Stalin, a Malen-
kov, or a Khrushchev would not have given the time of day.
This particular exercise always seemed to me to have reached
a new high in human fatuity. Five James Burnhams may af-
ford insights into the working of Communist minds, but by no
means necessarily into those particular minds that are in
charge of Soviet policy.
Of course we did not go in for this sort of thing. We relied
as usual on our own Soviet experts. As normally, they did
try to observe and reason like the Soviet leadership. What
they could not do was to work out the propositions of an
aberrant faction of the leadership to the point of foreseeing
that this faction's view would have its temporary victory and
subsequent defeat.
The Determinants of Action
Within certain limits there is nothing very difficult or
esoteric about estimating how the other. man will probably
behave in a given situation. In hundreds of cases formal esti-
mates (NIEs, for example) have quite correctly-and many
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times boldly and almost unequivocally-called the turn. Be-
hind such judgments a large number of subjudgments are im-
plicit. The other man will act as diagnosed because (1) he is
in his right mind or at least he is not demonstrably unhinged.;
(2) he cannot capriciously make the decision by himself---at a,
minimum it will have to be discussed with advisers, and in
nondictatorial governments it will have to stand the test of
governmental and popular scrutiny; (3) he is aware of the
power of traditional forces in his country, the generally ac-
cepted notions of its broad national interests and objectives,
and the broad lines of policy which are calculated to protect
the one and forward the other; (4) he is well informed.
To the extent that the "other man's" diplomatic missions
and' intelligence service can observe and report the things he
must know prior to his decision, they have done so. He has
read and pondered. These and other phenomena very consid-
erably narrow the area of a foreign statesman's choice, and
once thus narrowed it is susceptible to fairly sure-footed
analysis by studious intelligence types. As long as all the dis-
cernible constants in the equation are operative the estimator
can be fairly confident of making a sound judgment.
It is when these constants do not rule that the real
trouble begins. It is when the other man zigs violently out
of the track of "normal" behavior that you are likely to lose
him. If you lack hard evidence of the prospective erratic tack
and the zig is so far out of line as to seem to you to be suicidal,
you will probably misestimate him every time. No estimating
process can be expected to divine exactly when the enemy is
about to make a dramatically wrong decision. We were mat
brought up to underestimate our enemies.
We missed the Soviet decision to put the missiles into Cuba
because we could not believe that Khrushchev could make
such a mistake. The fact that he did suggests that he might
do so again, and this in turn suggests that perhaps we do not
know some things about Soviet foreign policy decision-making
that we should. We can be reasonably sure that certain,
forces which sometimes mislead Western foreign offices are
seldom effective in the Soviet government. It is hard to be-
lieve, for example, that a Soviet foreign minister has to pay
much heed to an unreasonable press, or to domestic pressure
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groups, or, in the clutch, to the tender feelings of allies and
neutrals.
If these well-known phenomena are not operative, what
things are pressing a Soviet decision-maker towards a mis-
estimate or an unfortunate policy decision? Obviously there
are the fundamental drives inherent in Communism itself, but
for these and the many things that go with them we, as di-
viners of Soviet policy, are braced. Are there perhaps other
things of a lesser but nevertheless important nature that we
have not fully understood and taken into account? I would
like to suggest two that are closely linked: the role and func-
tioning of Soviet embassies; and the role of intelligence and
the philosophy of its collection, dissemination, and use. I
would like to suggest that if we were to study these more
deeply we might discover that many a Soviet misestimate and
wrong-headed policy is traceable to the peculiar way in which
the Soviets regard the mission of their ambassadors and the
role they assign to their intelligence service.
Whence the Decisive Intelligence?
Obviously you cannot divine the functions of Dobrynin in
Washington by studying Kohler in Moscow. Obviously a Soviet
foreign mission has a quite different aura from other foreign
missions we know a good deal about. But just what does a So-
viet ambassador's job description look like? What does his
government expect him to do beyond the normal diplomatic
functions all ambassadors perform? What are his reporting
functions, for example, and what kind of reporting staff does
he have? What do he and they use as the raw materials for
their purely informational dispatches-if indeed they write
any?
Does the embassy staff proper compete with the KGB men
in its reporting? We know that the top KGB dog in an em-
bassy has a certain primacy over locally-domiciled Soviet
citizens-including the ambassador. Does this primacy ex-
tend to reporting? Does the ambassador check his reports
out with the KGB boss before sending them off? One thing
we can be sure of-the KGB boss does not check his out with
the ambassador. If ambassadorial reports are written and
sent, who in Moscow reads them? Does Khrushchev? Do
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the Presidium members? How do the highest echelons of gov-
ernment regard them as against, say, KGB or GRU clandes-
tine reports and pilfered documents?
I find myself wondering a lot about Dobrynin. Suppose he
had been informed of Moscow's estimate that the U.S. resolve
had softened. Suppose he had agreed with this estimate in
general. Is it possible that he would have gone on to agree
with Moscow that the risks of sending strategic missiles to
Cuba were entirely acceptable? It may be that he was not
informed of this second estimate. But if he was so informed, I
have great difficulty believing he would have agreed with it.
Dobrynin is not a stupid man, and presumably he must have
sensed that Castro's Cuba occupied some special place in.
American foreign policy thinking. Is it possible that, sensing
the U.S. Mood, he did not report it, and bolster his findings
from what he read in the press and Congressional Record,
what he heard on the radio and TV? Is it not more likely
that he did send back such appraisals and that Moscow gave
them little notice because they were not picked up in a fancy
clandestine operation? Is it possible that the conspiratorial
mind in the Kremlin, when faced with a choice of interpreta-
tions, will not lean heavily toward that which comes via the
covert apparatus?
We have recently learned quite a lot about this apparatus
and the philosophy of its operation and use. We think we
have valid testimony from defectors who have come out of the
Soviet and Satellite intelligence services that enormous im-
portance is attached to clandestine procurement of docu-
ments containing the other man's secrets of state. We know
that whatever overt research and analysis work is done in the
Soviet government is not associated with the intelligence serv-
ices. That the findings of this type of effort are denied the
cachet of "intelligence" may rob them of standing, perhaps
even of credibility.
We know that the Soviet practice of evaluating raw reports
prior to dissemination is a pretty rough and ready affair (no
alphabetical and numerical scale of estimated reliability, for
example) that leaves the customer with a very free choice to
believe or disbelieve. There is evidence to indicate that a KG]3
resident abroad has the right to address a report to a military
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chief of staff or to the foreign minister or to Khrushchev him-
self. His boss in Moscow is in the chain of communication
and can, of course, stop dissemination to the high-placed ad-
dressee. But if the resident in question is known to be a
friend of the addressee the boss will think twice before he in-
terferes. We are reasonably certain that there is a hot wire
between Semichastny, chief of the KGB, and Chairman
Khrushchev and that it is used to carry current raw intelli-
aence between the two.
It is tempting to hope that some research and systematic
reinterrogation of recent defectors, together with new require-
ments served on our own intelligence services, might turn up
new insights into the Soviet process of decision-making. The
odds are pretty strongly against it; and yet the-to us-in-
credible wrongness of the Soviet decision to put the missiles
into Cuba all but compels an attempt to find out. Any light
that can be thrown on that particular decision might lessen
the chances of our misestimating the Soviets in a future case.
Problems in fashioning an
estimative product suitable
for input to systems analysis
in force planning.
INTELLIGENCE FOR DEFENSE PLANNING
W. E. Seidel
The story of intelligence support for defense planning at
the national level in the current Administration offers a good
case study in the relationship between national intelligence
and the consumer, or at least one of its most important con-
sumers. Although the history of long-range estimating and.
quantified projections has been a long and thorny one, the
requirements of the new defense planners are perhaps unique
in their degree of articulation, a refinement which stems
from the needs of the systematic analysis techniques used in
current planning. This review of the case to date proceeds
from the bias that the consumer is why we are in business.
In the latter part of 1961 the Comptroller of the Depart-
ment of Defense, Assistant Secretary Charles J. Hitch, laid
down specifications for intelligence estimates required by new
DoD methods of programming and planning initiated earlier
that yea.t.1 Nearly two years later Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of :Defense Dr. Alain Enthoven presented substantially
the same requirements again.2 A recent memorandum from
the Office of National Estimates succinctly characterizes
these requirements in the following terms: "As you know,
OSD has for several years been expressing the need for more
detailed quantitative projections of Soviet military capabili-
ties." 3
'Memorandum of 17 Nov. 1961 to DIA, "Future Needs Program for
Intelligence Estimates and Analysis of Intelligence" (Secret).
'Memorandum for Record 25 July 1963 (Revised 22 Sept. 1963), "Notes
on Long Range Intelligence Projections of Sino-Soviet Forces" (Secret) .
" Memorandum for the USIB Representatives, "Further Requirements
of OSD for Quantitative Projections on Soviet Military Capabilities,"
Sept. 1963 (Secret).
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 Below we look at the nature of the new requirements, re-
count the intelligence community's efforts to satisfy them,
consider some of the major problems they create, and offer
some hopefully constructive suggestions. To all colleagues,
known and unknown, who have grappled with the problem
we acknowledge our indebtedness and regret any inade-
quacy in this presentation.
The New Programming
What were the methods of programming and planning re-
ferred to by Mr. Hitch that generated new demands on in-
telligence? Here they cannot be described in detail, but they
are of such importance to our study that we must outline
their major aspects relevant to the intelligence problem.`
Under these methods the analysis of alternative U.S. strate-
gies, forces, and weapon systems is done within the frame of
reference of nine major categories or programs of defense:
Strategic Retaliatory Forces
Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
General Purpose Forces
Airlift and Sealift Forces
Reserve and Guard Forces
Research and Development
General Support
Civil Defense
Military Assistance Program
These programs are subdivided into more than 1000 elements,
sometimes at as many as four aggregative levels, constituting
well-defined, homogeneous groupings of particular types of
forces-B-52 squadrons, Atlas squadrons, Polaris subma-
rines, infantry divisions in Europe, etc.-each of which reflects
quantitatively the strength requirements of any particular
strategy.
' A short bibliography for the reader desiring more details might in-
clude: "Study Report on the Programming System for the Office of
the Secretary of Defense" prepared by the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, 25 June 1962; Novick, David, Pro-
gram Budgeting: Long Range Planning in the Department of Defense,
The Rand Corporation, RM-3359-ASDC, November 1962; Enthoven,
Alain C., "Systems Analysis and Decision Making," Military Review,
January 1963.
Defense Planninq
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There are figured also for each element of this framework
the inputs of manpower, equipment, military construction,
and other resources needed to attain the required strength.
Ultimately, the resources required to constitute any given
element, force structure, or strategy are gauged by the single
measure of cost in dollars, the only unit of measure applicable
to all the diverse elements. The total military output, the
sum of all program elements, is equal to the sum of all re-
source categories, the total input.
Two other aspects of the programming are highly rele-
vant to the intelligence problem. First, a program change
control system makes the quantitative data relevant to pro-
posed program changes promptly and fully available for
decision making. And second, a "Five-Year Force Structure
and Financial Program" provides a basic reporting format for
the entire force structure through time.
Programming is thus the determination of the specific time-
phased resource inputs necessary for accomplishing a given
output, while planning is the selection of the desired output.
The analytical process has been described as
. . . a cycle of definition of objectives, design of alternative systems
to achieve those objectives, evaluation of the alternatives in terms
of their effectiveness and costs, a questioning of the objectives and
a questioning of the other assumptions underlying the analysis, the
opening of new alternatives, the establishment of new objec-
tives.... and so on.'
What is new in the process, as Dr. Enthoven points out,
is that more than ever before, top defense officials are now
being aided in making these judgments by the systematic avail-
ability of quantitative information on the effectiveness and costs
of alternative strategies, forces, and weapon systems. This in-
formation is produced by a method sometimes called "Systems
Analysis."'
Systems analysis, the balancing of output in terms of the
program elements and their operational effectiveness against
input in terms of resources, thus provides for programming
any given force structure through time against its alterna-
b Alain C. Enthoven, "Systems Analysis and Decision Making," Muili-
tary Review, January 1963, p. 8.
6 Ibid.
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tives in pursuit of our defense objectives. The primary input
of systems analysis is quantitative data; the primary char-
acteristic of the method is articulate detail. Finally, a fact
of utmost relevance in its implications for intelligence, it is a
unified management system; and one of the interdependent
inputs it requires for planning is intelligence on the opposing
forces.
The Intelligence Requirement
Any significant change in key operations of the government
bureaucracy is likely to be preceded by a long period of sug-
gestion, study, and experimentation at various subordinate
or even non-government levels. So it was with the new pro-
gramining and planning process in the DoD. The intelli-
gence community, as a part of the larger national security
community, was aware of this early activity and participated
in it. Intelligence responses already manifest in early 1961
were mission-oriented Soviet military estimates, a Soviet mili-
tary cost estimating system-for the most part in a format
later adopted by the DoD-and weapon system effectiveness
evaluation methods developed from operations research tech-
niques employed in systems analysis. These were individual
adjustments, however; the intelligence community had not
unified and systematized its research and production in mili-
tary intelligence as a whole, had not made the organizational
and managerial changes necessary to create an integrated,
consumer-oriented program. It still has not.
One of the earliest frontal attacks on the problem of getting
improved military estimates for the new defense planners was
Project Lamp, initiated in early 1961.' A group of outside con-
sultants brought together at CIA produced a report entitled
"Systems Analysis and the Military Estimates Process" 8
which contained views and suggestions very similar to those
' By Robert W. Komer, then a special assistant to the Deputy Di-
rector/Intelligence, CIA.
"The authors were A. W. Marshall, J. E. Loftus (both from the Rand
Corporation) and G. E. Pugh. The report was later rewritten by
Marshall and Loftus and published as a Rand Memorandum (RM
2892-F'R, August 1962).
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issued later as requirements by the new defense planners.9
Although the authors offered some suggestions for implement-
ing their recommendations, they recognized that they had
not been asked, and indeed were in no position, to weigh
the merits of alternative organizational plans and the bureau-
cratic problems associated with them. Little or no action
seems to have been taken on the Project Lamp report.'()
The next development, in late 1961, was the statement from
Assistant Secretary Hitch, to which we have adverted, of the
requirement for intelligence support to the defense plan-
ners. It was articulate and thorough. We shall return to
its substance shortly.
The first major response to this requirement was the im-
plementation of a CIA study 11 suggesting that a group of
senior intelligence officers from C:[A and DIA prepare an-
nually an analysis of ten-year programs for alternative Soviet
force postures and of their associated costing, and that these
reports be submitted to USIB for review and then forwarded
to the Secretary of Defense by the Director of Central In-
telligence. By August 1962 such a CIA/DIA Joint Analysis
Group had been formed and was at work on a report of es-
sentially the kind suggested. This first report, entitled "Al.
ternative Ten Year Projections of Soviet Military Forces," was
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 1 April 1963.,
Although these JAG projections were of considerable value
to the defense planners,12 they had the shortcoming of being
limited to the time period not covered by the corresponding
national estimates. It was evident to the Office of National
Not surprisingly, since the latter had been closely associated with
Marshall in Rand. Anticipation of this result seems likely to have
been the reason for Komer's initiative.
"Presumably because of the many top-level personnel changes then
taking place or about to take place.
"Dr. Don R. Harris, "Intelligence Support for Long-Term Planning
of U.S. Force Requirements" (21 February 1962).
"In a Memorandum for Record dated 25 July 1963, Dr. Alain Enthoven
noted that "the Alternative Ten Year Projections of Soviet Military
Forces is a great step forward, and is already proving to be one of
the most valuable documents in the Pentagon."
 Defense Planning
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Estimates that the data in the national estimates and the
annual JAG paper did not serve to fill the planners' require-
ment.13 In the summer of 1963 the defense planners restated
their needs for an adequate intelligence support program.
The requirements statement of 25 July 1963 essentially
reiterated the needs listed on 17 Nov. 1961,14 as shown in the
following parallel presentation of key passages.
Projection Time
In order to evaluate specific
weapon. systems programs it will
be necessary to study US mili-
tary requirements in various
functional areas to cope with the
estimated Soviet (and where rel-
evant Sino-Soviet Bloc) military
posture during the next five to
ten years. . . . That estimates
of Soviet military posture need
to be extended at least 5 years
into the future is an obvious
point.
Specific Quantification
Each projection could itself be
detailed and specific. One of the
problems with current estimates
is that as uncertainty increases
they become hazy, vague or
simply terminate. There is a
tendency to become less quanti-
tative and more literary.
'3 In a memorandum 15 July 1963 to the Assistant Director for Na-
tional Estimates, an estimates staff expert on military matters noted,
"Over the years, the detail contained in our military estimates has in-
creased far beyond what we have considered to be necessary for the
highest, policymakers and their immediate staffs. The added detail
has been designed to serve the needs of military planners, but now
the needs of DoD go considerably beyond even this expanded coverage."
"Cited in footnotes 1 and 2 above.
DoD planners and decision
makers need to have projections
of the Soviet forces for at least
5 to 7 years into the future for
all major military forces as a
basis for decisions about force
levels and procurement.
The number and specific char-
acteristics of future Soviet forces
are essentially a quantitative
matter. We may be uncertain
about them, but we must have
an expression of what we know
about them in the numerical
terms.
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Format
In the kinds of analysis we
have in mind, estimates of Soviet
military posture in weapon sys-
tem terms are required. It would
also be useful if estimates of So-
viet forces were produced in for-
mat comparable to the func-
tional areas we are using for US
forces: General War Offensive
Forces, General War Defensive
Forces, General Purpose or Thea-
ter Forces, etc.
Over-all Estimate
More generally, taking an over-
all programming point of view
may be a useful method of im-
proving estimates of the future
Soviet military posture. Almost
invariably, projected estimates of
Soviet forces structures arrived
at piece-meal end up overstating
Soviet capabilities ...
Cost Data
It would be useful if estimates
of Soviet forces were accom-
panied by estimates of their cost
to the Soviets, preferably in
rubles. . . . Such cost estimates
would have an interest in terms
of comparing US expenditures in
various functional areas with the
corresponding Soviet expendi-
tures.
Treatment of Uncertainties
They [current estimates] give
no notion of the main alterna-
tives in most cases. Some more
constructive treatment of uncer-
tainties is needed both for the
direct use of the decision makers
and for the use of systematic
analysis that will be undertaken
of US military problems.
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I would recommend strongly
that the intelligence projections
be published in a book that is as
close in format as possible to the
Department of Defense Five Year
Force Structure and Financial
Program with an appendix like
our Weapon Systems Dictionary
describing individual weapons in
detail.
We need to have a projection
of the total Soviet program, and,
not just piece-meal estimates of
individual weapon systems and
forces.
We need estimates of cost. It
would be useful to have this both
in terms of ruble costs, in order
to get a feel for the impact of
the programs on the Soviet econ-
omy, and also in dollar costs
which are more familiar to us.
Next we need to have an ex-
plicit statement of the range of
uncertainty associated with each
projection. We can live quite
easily with three numbers ex-
pressing a high, a low and a most
likely estimate. . . . I believe
that the use of three numbers
calls attention to the whole range
and suggests to the user that if
he absolutely must use a single
number, he use the single most
likely rather than the pessim is tic.
 Defense Planning
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Patterns
In addition to the constraints Next we need to have a feeling
imposed by projected patterns of for the recent history of the So-
expenditures more systematic ac- viet program, to know what So-
count could be taken by a pro- viet forces have been, say, for
gramming approach of known the last three years ...
patterns of Soviet weapon system
replacement and phasing prac-
tices, lead time problems, etc.
The latest response of the intelligence community to these
requirements is a new series, "Intelligence Assumptions for
Planning-Soviet Military Capabilities Over the Next Six
Years," to be produced for the first time in the spring of
1964.. The production procedure is to parallel that for na-
tional estimates: ONE preparation of terms of reference, con-
tributions by USIB agencies, ONE preparation of the draft
paper, review by USIB representatives, and finally approval
by the USIB. The record of this move brings up to date of
writing the case history of the requirement.
Let us look now at some of the problems in the way of ful-
filling the requirement and in doing so try to offer construc-
tive criticism and suggest some positive measures that might
assist in meeting the needs of an important and articulate
consumer of the intelligence product. The problems could be
considered as lying in the realm of (a) communication, (b)
intelligence organization and bureaucracy, (c) intelligence
production and research methodology, or (d) intelligence
and policy.
Communication
Project Lamp was an attempt to communicate a require-
ment. It made most if not all of the specific points contained
in the two later official requirement statements. The sur-
rounding noise level created by personnel changes and the
way the problem was presented, together with the newness of
the problem and the unfamiliarity of the new planning meth-
ods, led to a failure of this communication.
The Hitch memorandum of 17 November 1961 was much
more specific. It resulted in considerable activity within DIA
(to which it was formally addressed), and at the USIB level
it elicited some real measure of response in the formation of
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the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group and changes in the esti-
mates. It may be that the memorandum was underpowered
for the weight of its communication content, that the plan-
ners were too busy organizing their new methods to concen-
trate on communicating to the intelligence community the
needs these engendered; the restatement of the requirement
in mid-1.963, referring explicitly to numerous desiderata not
covered in the NIE's, at any rate shows that the commu-
nity's response was still inadequate.
It is difficult in retrospect, however, to find any real weak-
nesses in the history of the communication of the require-
ment. The primary problem seems to have been the essen-
tial difficulty of communication on a complex matter between
two unfamiliar communicators; and this problem appears to
have been reduced with time, by numerous meetings between
planning and intelligence personnel, to relatively insignificant
proportions.
Intelligence Organization and Bureaucracy
Problems of organization and bureaucracy seem to have had
much more influence than strictly communication problems
on the intelligence community's response throughout. We
have already suggested that personnel changes at higher or.?-
ganizational echelons tended to delay the initial response,
that to Project Lamp. In both this and subsequent pres-
entations the requirement had also to overcome the force of
bureaucratic inertia.
A natural bias against change arises in any organization
from the fact that change is likely to disturb current rela-
tionships. More often than not, in addition, the status quo
psychology tends to associate demand for change with criticism
of the current regime. The intelligence community is no dif-
ferent from any other bureaucracy, government or private,
in this respect. Thus there was an initial tendency in the
intelligence community to downgrade the new requirernent,
to suggest that the major part of it was already being filled
and the remainder could be taken care of with minor adjust-
ments. The adjustments in question would be substantive
entries in existing national intelligence estimates.
The subsequent formation of the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis
Group attempted to meet the long-range aspects of the re-
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 Approve orPRei'ea"N 2005/04/1
quirernent not covered by the estimates. The Joint Analysis
Group represented an organizational adjunct of unspecified
duration which permitted continuance of existing organiza-
tional relationships. Although the planners applauded the
JAG effort and product, the over-all requirement still re-
mained a problem. The dynamics of bureaucratic interrela-
tionships and realities also appeared to be having some effect
upon the views of the planners: in restating the requirement
they not only reiterated their substantive needs but also ap-
peared to be asking for official approval on the national in-
telligence level.
From an organizational standpoint the latest solution, the
projected Intelligence Assumptions for Planning, again ac-
commodates the requirement within the existing structure
and at the same time guarantees USIB endorsement in some
form. The new IAP cannot help creating an improvement
in meeting the planner's requirements. It is suggested, how-
ever, that consideration of further organizational changes
could enhance our responsiveness and effectiveness even
more.
Briefly, it is suggested that a new staff group be established
within the Office of National Estimates to produce the IAP
and deal with other problems of the planners' total require-
ment on a full-time basis, without becoming involved in other
estimative production. This move would afford continuity of
work on the many problems inherent in the requirement.
Such a staff could prepare detailed terms of reference and
formats for contributors according to their capabilities and
integrate the contributions when received. Both CIA and
DIA could furnish personnel for the staff, in much the same
fashion that military and civilian personnel now serve in
ONE and on the JAG. One might even consider eliminating,
under this arrangement, the time-consuming and expensive
consideration of the IAP by the representatives of the USIB
members, personnel for the new staff being so selected as to
be themselves representative of the intelligence agencies.
The product could then be presented directly to the USIB
principals for approval.
The planners' views on the deficiencies of the national esti-
mates as an input to their process suggest that new habits
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and techniques are needed in patterning the new product;,
and this is still another reason for full-time attention to
the requirement in ONE. Some further considerations
with respect to these methodological problems are developed
below.
Intelligence Production and Research Methodology
In a military planning and programming system of the new
type, the intelligence inputs to the quantitative analysis must
consist of data comparable to those on the U.S. forces, or-
dered in a similar format. "Comparable" means equally
amenable to the rigors of the analytical technique. Such
inputs must be derived through intelligence's own detailed sys-
tematic analysis of Soviet military and related objectives, a).-
ternative means for achieving these objectives through a
given number of years, and the effectiveness and cost of the
program elements under each of these alternatives.. The
analytical cycle is the same as that of the U.S. military
planner, but the intelligence analyst must simulate the
complex of historic, economic, political, technological, and in-
stitutional influences operative in Soviet military planning and
programming.
Because systems analysis is a discipline with a logic of its
own, its requirements on the intelligence community include
the demands of that logic. Two areas in which it demands
fundamentally different methodological treatment from that,
currently provided in the intelligence community are quanti-
fication and ranges, of uncertainty. Systems analysis, like
the quantitative analysis practiced in the social sciences and
operations research, requires that the quantification used be
consistent and inviolate within the precincts of the stated
area, so that one -must accept all of the explicit derivatives
and interactions which result from offering a quantity or
series of quantities as representative of a given condition.
Even a cursory examination of the quantitative data in pres-
ent intelligence output would show that this criterion
could not be applied to most of it. These impressionistic fig-
ures were of course never meant to be subjected to this cri-
terion, and it could be strongly argued that the na.tiona'.[
estimates cannot be subjected to it for many reasons.
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A like problem arises in the treatment of uncertainty.
Intelligence estimates of military capabilities have always
had. to contend with a proliferation of uncertainties result-
ing from some lack of knowledge of the enemy compounded
by ignorance of the future. What is required here is ex-
plicit projection of ranges of uncertainty in estimates of fu-
ture weapon systems and force structures, where "explicit"
refers again to a quantitative expression of which all deriva-
tives are acceptable in terms of their logic, the factual sub-
stantive base, and the consequent interrelationships. In
most current estimates there appears to be an intentional
inconsistency in criteria for the measurement of uncertainty,
a device used at times to make critical problems stand out
from matters of lesser importance. It is true that even im-
pressionistic quantifying has a logic of its own, which can be
considered sophisticated in terms of requiring a consensus of
conceptual understanding among users; but the point is that
it cannot be subjected to any systematic analysis in depth.
This is not to say that quantification and specified ranges
of uncertainty in the intelligence input will necessarily make
the systems analysis output a satisfactory exclusive basis for
decision making. The specified range of uncertainty may
often be so great as to produce derivatives that are com-
pletely ambiguous, and at best the analysis can serve only
as an aid in what must remain a process of human judgment.
But the man who must decide whether to start building this
year, say, a $40 billion antimissile system around our cities in
order to have it operational in 1974 deserves all such aid he
can get, even if it should cost some millions or hundreds of
millions of dollars.
One other aspect of the question of research methodology
is its relationship to management and organization. Opera-
tions research and economic analysis techniques are not new
to the intelligence community; what is new is the way de-
fense planning has integrated them in a unified management
system to produce a complex systematic analysis woven of
interdependent parts. The resultant demands upon intelli-
gence call for its management of research and production
resources in a comparable system. Without the unified man-
agement disciplines of explicit format and channels for pro-
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gramming, change control, and progress reporting, the entire
fabric of the answer to the planners' requirement is jeopard-
ized by the likelihood of inconsistent data and uncontrolled
variables.
Intelligence and Policy
The new defense planners not only plan and offer alterna-
tives, they make defense policy. The old question of the
proper proximity of the intelligence officer and his product
to the policy maker and his decisions is not academic here;
the demands of the new programming and planning methods
for intelligence input increase the problems inherent in the
relationship. As one of the primary strategists of centralized
intelligence pointed out nearly fifteen years ago,
The only way out of the dilemma seems to me to lie in the very
compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee intelligence its
administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate
from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the
users familiar with the producers' organization, and the producers
with the users' organization"
Although this advice appears to have been taken more se-
riously during the current administration than ever before,
particularly in the field of defense planning and policy, it is
sobering that the familiarization effort has not been effective
enough to produce yet a satisfactory program of intelligence
support for the military planners, as our history of this re-
quirement shows.
One trend in intelligence estimating in the military field
relevant to the problems of producing the new Intellige rice
Assumptions for Planning is worth noting: for some time now
our military-related national estimates appear to have ori-
ented themselves more and more closely to current collec-
tion techniques 'rather than consumer problems. This has
produced a tendency to equate information with intelligence
and confine estimating for the most part to derivatives of
direct current information instead of covering the needs of
the consumer. Planning demands intelligence judgments.
The intelligence input to the planner (be it called estimates
or planning assumptions) is the intelligence officer's judg-
"Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 200-201.
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Defense Planning
The role
of inte
ment, based upon the best available evidence in broadest
sense and the best available research and analytical techniques.
As defense planners have repeatedly pointed out, if intelligence
does not provide the substantive judgments required, then the
planner must do it himself on the basis of his own limited
knowledge and experience. When this happens, intelligence
has failed in one of its fundamental missions.
lligence in
the U.S. and multilateral
trade control programs.
INTELLIGENCE FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE
The desirability of autarky, economic self-sufficiency, is a
recurrent theme in the literature on the theory of Commu-
nism. That it continues to be a cherished goal of the Com-
munist countries might seem questionable because the Bloc
has increased rather than decreased its imports from out-
side. A closer look at the trade information, however, reveals
that much of the increased importation is of high-quality,
latest--design machinery and equipment. Such imports are
consonant with autarky because they bring savings in costly
research and development effort. These savings, invested in
the domestic manufacture of such equipment, accelerate Bloc
economic growth and so hasten the day when even this kind
of import is both unnecessary and disadvantageous.
The Soviet program of quick-step economic growth and its
methods have received widespread attention, but not so well
publicized are the measures taken by the Western world in
general and the United States in particular to prevent the
Bloc from acquiring military equipment of advanced design
and related industrial technology. The industrialized coun-
tries of the West have joined together in a multilateral, co-
operative trade control program for this purpose, :and uni-
laterally, the United States has adopted a program with much
more stringent controls over the export of U.S. goods and
technical data.
To illustrate how these programs operate we shall examine
two recent cases. Within the past year the USSR ordered
from the Japan Electron Optics Laboratory, a Tokyo firm., two
electron-beam machiners valued at US$127,000 and from
the Finley-Moody Trading Corporation, an Illinois manufac-
turer of farm equipment, two forage harvesters and eight
self-unloading farm wagons worth about US$55,000. Be-
cause electron-beam machiners at the present time are used
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
Economic Defense
almost exclusively in fields related to advanced military tech-
nology--nuclear energy, missile and jet engines, microelec-
tronics-the United States, operating through the multilat-
eral trade control program, was influential in preventing the
shipment of the Japanese equipment to the USSR. The ex-
port of the U.S.-produced farm machinery, on the other hand,
was approved after the White House decided that our political
and economic gain from the sale would exceed any tech-
nological loss.
The Trade Control Programs
Although the United States had controlled exports to some
degree for a number of years, the security aspect of its pro-
gram was not embodied in any peacetime legislation until the
Export Control Act of 1949. This act, seeking to provide for
"the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of
their significance to national security," conferred on the
President very broad powers to restrict and control them.
These powers have from the beginning been delegated to
the Secretary of Commerce.
Even before the act was passed, restrictions on exports of
strategic goods from the United States to the Communist
countries had become increasingly effective. The Bloc there-
fore made greater efforts to get such exports by transship-
ment from third countries, and sometimes achieved amazing
results. For example copper, which was in critically short
supply in the Soviet Bloc, was also in short supply in the
West; and the United States, dominating the world copper
market, had a unilateral embargo on its export to the Bloc.
The Bloc nevertheless succeeded in obtaining U.S. copper from
Italy, a major recipient of Marshall Plan aid, showing the
ineffectiveness of unilateral controls. Moreover, Italy ac-
cepted grain from the USSR in exchange for the copper when
there was a surplus of grain in the United States. This and
other anomalies in the trade of West European countries
brought the realization that multilateral controls were neces-
sary.
In raid-1949 multilateral discussions were held on the sub-
ject, and in November a secret, informal, voluntary Con-
sultative Group was organized in Paris to formulate policy and
guidelines for selecting materials to be embargoed multilat-
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erally from the Bloc. All NATO countries (except Iceland)
joined the organization, and a Coordinating Committee,
COCOM, was established to carry out day-to-day and. item--
by-item deliberations.
The Communist conquest of the Chinese mainland in 1949
and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 opened. a
new phase in the controls program which culminated in, the
passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
1951. This, commonly called the Battle Act, provides in effect
for an embargo on the shipment of arms and other materials
of primary strategic significance to the USSR and nations un-
der its domination. An item is considered to be of primary
strategic significance if more than a minimal quantity
would contribute to Soviet war potential. The act also calls
for termination of all U.S. aid to countries that knowingly
ship embargoed materials to the Bloc except in "unusual car-
cumstances" when "the cessation of aid would clearly be
detrimental to the security of the United States." Of the
few actual shipments of embargoed goods made to Bloc destina-
tions by COCOM countries, none have been considered impor-
tant enough to require this retaliation.
Not long after the passage of the Battle Act, the U.S. effort
to reduce the trade of other non-Communist countries with
Communist China led to the formation of a separate China
Committee under the Consultative Group. CHINCOM con-
trols were much broader than those imposed on the Soviet
Bloc through COCOM: in addition to military articles arid re-
lated strategic material they covered most types of capital
goods such as industrial machinery and equipment, steel mill
products, and non-fabricated metals. The embargo was also
broadened through the inclusion of more countries in COCOM
and CHINCOM-Japan at the time of the Korean War, Greece
and Turkey in 1953-and strengthened by pledges of coopera:
tion from important neutral countries, notably Sweden and
Switzerland.
The West European countries, however, although they coop-
erated with the United States by embargoing the export of
strategic goods to China, continued even during the Korean
War to ship such material as textiles, textile machinery, fer-
tilizer, dyes, and drugs. The end of that war, together with
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the emergence of a new regime in the USSR and a recession
in the United States that might bring a decline in U.S. pur-
chases of European goods, increased the pressure from these
countries and Japan for a "substantial relaxation of regula-
tions" limiting trade with the Bloc. In several re-examina-
tions of the lists of embargoed goods the special differential
controls for Communist China and North Korea were aban-
doned, COCOM and CHINCOM became the same committee
wearing two hats, and the number of items on the COCOM
list was reduced to about one-third of what it had been. The
new lists focused more sharply on items embodying advanced
technology or unique materials whose denial would have a
relatively direct impact on Bloc military programs.
COCOM is an informal and almost amorphous organization,
having no direct relationship to any of the multilateral mili-
tary or economic organizations in Europe such as NATO,
OECD, and GATT. It has no charter and is based on no treaty.
Its agreements, accordingly, represent moral obligations
rather than legal commitments. But it does fulfill its major
purpose, to preserve a common policy on strategic trade con-
trols, and thus assures the participating governments that
they are according generally equal treatment to their respec-
tive business communities. The one exception in this respect
is the United States, which does not limit its controls to those
agreed in COCOM and approaches more inclusively the com-
plex and vexing question of what constitutes strategic goods.
The United States does not consider the multilateral sys-
tem of export controls adequate. Since 1950 it has maintained
unilaterally an embargo on practically all goods to Commu-
nist China, imposing both financial and shipping controls, and
has since extended them to North Vietnam. Even towards
the European Satellites and the USSR, the U.S. policy is to
embargo more items than any other member of COCOM. And
the U.S. embargo consistently cuts deeper than the COCOM
list into the field of general industrial goods.
U.S. policy thus contains a strange dichotomy, emphasizing
on the one hand the necessity for continuing the rather liberal
multiiateraJ program-for the effectiveness of any limitation
imposed on exports is dependent on support from other coun-
tries capable of supplying similar goods-and on the other
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the maintenance of the more stringent unilateral program.
This ambivalence has been a continuing source of difficulty
in the executive branch, especially between the Department
of State., which has primary responsibility for administering
the multilateral program, and the Department of Commerce
with its Export Control Act responsibilities. Both depart-
ments agree that the severer program should apply only when
a unilateral U.S. embargo is likely to have a recognizable im-
pact on Bloc capabilities. But determining when to deny and
when to approve sometimes generates troublesome problems
of judgment and evaluation, and these problems are carried
over into COCOM when other countries are affected by U.S.
unilateral actions.
Some U.S. exporters, and perhaps others as well, are dis-
tressed by what seems the use of a double standard. Traders
in some COCOM countries are permitted to sell some goods
that U.S. traders are prohibited from selling to countries of
the Communist Bloc. Moreover, the standard for U.S. export-
ers appears to vary from time to time: the same or a similar
commodity that has been approved for export to the Commu-
nist Bloc at one time may be denied at another, depending on
how the request is presented and what conditions are esti-
mated to prevail then in the Bloc. A classic example was an
application of the Bryant Manufacturing Company to ship
high-speed grinders used in the manufacture of ball bearings
to the USSR. Deliberations on this case began in 1960, and
successive decisions at intermediate levels in the U.S. govern-
ment oscillated between approval and denial for two years
before a final decision to deny was reached.
The Role of Intelligence: EDAC
Within the United States the machinery for coordinating
activities concerned with the multilateral program is the Eco-
nomic Defense Advisory Committee. The Chairman of EDAC
is the Battle Act Administrator, who also is the Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs. Other member agencies
are Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, AEC, All), and
CIA. The Office of Emergency Planning has observer status.
Representation on EDAC is at the assistant secretary level,
and the full committee is called into session only when irrt-
CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
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 ApprAOMMefease 2005/04/13 :
portant policy recommendations must be made. Otherwise
EDAC's advisory function is carried out by its Executive Com-
mittee, a smaller group at a lower level of representation.
Two working groups concern themselves respectively with
control policies and with problems of application and enforce-
ment.
With respect to the U.S. unilateral program a similar struc-
ture, the Advisory Committee on Export Policy, assists the
Secretary of Commerce. ACEP, chaired by the Assistant Sec-
retary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business,
includes all members of EDAC except AID, plus FAA, Interior,
and NASA. As in EDAC, routine matters are handled for
ACEI' by a lower-level group, the Operating Committee. CIA
is represented at every level in both the EDAC and ACEP
structures 'by personnel of its Office of Research and Reports,
and these representatives draw on the resources of the whole
intelligence community.
The headquarters of the multilateral program has remained
in Paris since its inception. There a resident delegation rep-
resenting the United States on the Consultative Group and
COCOM works with the foreign policy delegates of the other
member countries. When the State Department in Wash-
ington is apprised by its Paris representatives of problems re-
lating to the program, it convenes the appropriate EDAC com-
mittee to study them and render its advice, which is generally
influential in determining the instructions to be sent to Paris.
CIA representation on the EDAC groups guarantees that each
case is reviewed by economic intelligence analysts in the spe-
cialty concerned, and their responses frequently play a pivotal
role in the formulation of the instructions.
They did so in the case of the Soviet order for Japanese
electron-beam machiners. For many years COCOM members
have agreed that advanced equipment used in the production
of war material should be embargoed, and the advertising
brochure on these machines emphasized their use in nuclear
energy and microelectronic applications; but the COCOM pro-
gram provides for exceptions, if no member objects, to this
embargo. Here the Japanese had applied to COCOM for an ex-
ception on the grounds that, since the USSR already manu-
factured similar machines and hence was abreast of the tech-
IA-RDP78T0AV,VA60 d2db01-1
nology involved, no strategic risk was involved in selling it the
two Japanese models. If no COCOM member had objected,
Japan would have been free to go ahead without risking the
termination of U.S. aid for violation of the Battle Act.
The United States could, of course, object to any and all ex-
ceptions to the list of embargoed items, since the list itself is
limited to items agreed to be of strategic significance. But
such systematic objection could conceivably jeopardize the
whole COCOM arrangement; it would give substance to a sus-
picion that the entire program is designed mainly to achieve
U.S. political objectives. Therefore the policy has been to steer
a middle course, scrutinizing each exceptions request carefully
in order to stop shipments that would be of really significant
benefit to the Bloc military program. Which these are is in
nearly all cases determined in EDAC Working Group I after
analysis and discussion in committee sessions.
When the Japanese request for exception of the electron.-
beam machiners was discussed at an EDAC Working Group I
meeting, intelligence information was produced to show that
research and development work on such devices in the USSR
was still in a primitive stage and that the Soviets had
mounted, before turning successfully to Japan, a mult.ipronged
effort in the United States, the UK, and probably in '.France
and Germany as well to acquire technology and equipment in
this field. In their exceptions request the Japanese had al-
luded to broad industrial applications for these devices but
neglected to mention that such applications are only poten-
tial, that at present the machiners are used exclusively in
strategic applications. In view of this fact, together with the
intelligence finding that Soviet electron-beam technology is
still in its infancy, as opposed to the Japanese contention
that it is on a par with that in the United States, EDAC rec-
ommended denial, and the delegation in Paris was instructed
to interpose an objection. The Japanese government accord-
ingly refused to license the export of the equipment, and the
USSR continues to lag behind in this important field.
Intelligence, broadly speaking, is central to the operations
of EDAC Working Group II, the enforcement group. Its most
active members are the departments of Treasury, State, Com-
merce, and Defense. Each of these in one way or another
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 Economic Defense
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participates in checking on export activities. Treasury's Bu-
reau of Customs, for example, examines all export declarations
and permits, and when necessary its agents physically in-
spect articles to be exported. Foreign Service officers ascer-
tairt the reliability of certain consignees before an export
license is granted, and they determine whether licensed goods
were received and used in accordance with the license issued.
During these investigations much information on the export
activities of many firms is acquired. Sometimes sufficient
evidence of illegal exports is uncovered to support judicial or
quasi-judicial action, which may lead to criminal proceedings
against the offending firm or individual. In other cases, when
the evidence is not conclusive enough to support litigation, it
is forwarded to EDAC Working Group II for possible adminis-
trative action. If the Working Group agrees that a company
or individual has violated the security trade control laws, ap-
propriate agencies are authorized to take administrative ac-
tion, the withholding of various government privileges and
facilities which generally serves to curtail significantly the
business opportunities of an exporter.
The investigations are aided by certain information avail-
able to CIA which must be screened and sanitized before being
passed to the enforcement agencies. Frequently this informa-
tion its the first indication that a particular firm or individual
may be conducting illegal export activities. Occasionally it
contains hard evidence that a violation of the laws has oc-
curred.
The COCOM list of embargoed items is periodically re-
examined in Paris in order to add new items embodying the
latest technology and remove those no longer considered stra-
tegic under the agreed criteria. Before each such interna-
tional review, CIA economic analysts prepare an intelligence
statement on each item on the list, giving the latest informa-
tion on the situation in each Communist country with re-
spect to that item-actual and planned production, trade, re-
quirenaents, use pattern, technology, costs. Each statement
concludes with an assessment of the adequacy of the Bloc's
supply for strategic and non-strategic needs. These analyses
are indispensable to the EDAC members responsible for recom-
Approved For SECRET 2005/04/
mending changes in the embargo list and ultimately U.S.
Policy in the multilateral program.
Intelligence in ACEP
Under the unilateral U.S. Program, the Department of Com-
merce has developed an extensive system for licensing exports,
both. of commodities and of technical data, and all corrrner-
cial exports except to Canada are prohibited unless the De-
partment has established a "general license" covering them
or has issued a "validated license" for particular shipments.
The bulk (85 to 90 percent) of U.S. exports move to friendly
countries under general licenses. A General License Subgroup
A lists a small number of items that can be exported to the
Soviet Bloc without special application.
A detailed application must be submitted for a validated
license to ship any other exports to the Soviet Bloc (except
Poland) or to export to any country except Canada about a
thousand items carried on a "Positive List." Most of the :latter
are considered strategic or critical in some way to the Bloc ?s
military-industrial mobilization base.
items in short The remainder are
items in supply whose export would contribute to in.-
y pressures in the United States.
Now the goods that the Bloc has shown the greatest interest
in buying are not on either the GLSA or the Positive List. In
deciding whether to issue licenses for them the Secretary of
Commerce must determine in each case-usually after inter.--
agency review in the ACEP structure-whether the item falls
under the control criteria of the Export Control Act of 1949,
and particularly under its criterion, as amended in 1962, Of
whether the "export makes a significant contribution to the
military or economic potential of such nation or nations which
would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare
of the United States."
The workings of the ACEP and its Operating Committee and
the part played by intelligence can be most easily illustrated
by the case of the harvesters. In October 1962 the Finley-
Moody Trading Corporation applied for a license to export two
self-propelled forage harvesters to the USSR. Although har-
vesters are not considered strategic and therefore are not on
the Positive List, the "economic criterion" cited ab
ove required
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 Economic Defense
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that it be determined whether the export would contribute
significantly to the economic potential of the Bloc in a way
detrimental to U.S. welfare. Thus the request was taken up
by the Operating Committee, which had hitherto been most
often concerned with exceptions to the Positive List.
In the Operating Committee the CIA representative pre-
sented information developed by the Agriculture Branch of the
Agency's economic research organization. The intelligence
conclusion was that this equipment would not produce a sig-
nificant increase in Soviet green fodder output. The USSR
had designed, constructed, and was currently testing a ma-
chine of the same type, and acquisition of the U.S. machines
would be of benefit mainly by providing another design for
testing purposes. In the United States, moreover, self-
propelled forage harvesters have not been widely used despite
the fact that our farms are organized to permit their use if
they offered significant economies. A number of companies,
including International Harvester, that build forage har-
vesters have never produced a self-propelled model because
prospects for selling them are so poor. In the USSR, which
has been traditionally short of harvesting machinery and
where the collective and state farms have chronic difficulty
maintaining agricultural equipment in operating condition,
the economic loss in the event of a breakdown would be
greater with a self-propelled machine than with a conven-
tional tractor-drawn model: the tractor would still be avail-
able for other work. In a number of recent articles in the
press Soviet engineers have themselves questioned the advisa-
bility of large-scale production of self-propelled agricultural
equipment. Thus even if a large number of these new ma-
chines were available to the USSR it is doubtful that they
would create a notable improvement in Soviet agriculture.
Several meetings of the Operating Committee were necessary
to review evidence and hear different points of view before a
decision was reached to deny the license. The Departments
of State and Commerce voted in favor of licensing; Agricul-
ture and Defense opposed. Because of this disagreement the
case was reviewed at the next higher level, the ACEP proper.
Evidence on the case was heard again here, and when CIA
repeated its presentation on the situation and prospects for
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forage harvesters in the USSR the ACEP Chairman reversed
the decision of the Operating Committee Chairman and ap-
proved the export. This position was in turn reversed by the
Secretary of Commerce, an action that sent the whole matter
to the Export Control Review Board, which is composed. of the
President, and the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and De-
fense and to which the Secretary of Agriculture was invited
this time because of the nature of the case. After the dis-
cussion in the Review Board the Secretary of Commerce de-
cided to approve the shipment. Thus the ultimate decision in
this case, just as in the EDAC case of the Japanese electron
machinery, was clearly responsive to the intelligence infor-
mation supplied.
Although in these two typical cases the intelligence support;
came from CIA's economic research organization, it should not
be inferred that this is the only intelligence component sup-
porting the export control programs. While it provides the
representation on the interagency committees and is thus the
channel. through which intelligence is brought to bear, the
information itself is acquired and the analyses coordinated
with the participation of other parts of CIA and other agen-
cies. This procedure brings the entire intelligence cornmu.-
nity into contact with the EDAC and ACEP structures and as-
sures their members that all relevant intelligence informa-
tion is made available on each case.
The security trade control program of the United States is
not and never has been directed at cutting off all trade with
the Communist countries; the concensus is that the national
interest is better served by permitting some trade with them.
It is a program of selective embargo which requires judgments
on what trade to allow and under what conditions. It is these
judgments that render the role of intelligence in the pro-
gram a primary one.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78T0319 %ffi00020001-1
Responsibilities, machinery,
and problems in the over-all
direction of U.S. information
procurement efforts overseas.
THE COORDINATION OF COLLECTION
Theodore H. Tenniswood
The total U.S. foreign intelligence collection effort is a com--
posite of efforts by many government agencies and military
commands. For some of these agencies intelligence collection
is peripheral to their primary responsibilities, a small detail in
the perspective of their total functions. For others it consti-
tutes, not their major function, but a prominent and essen-
tial part thereof; an overseas military command, for example,
must have up-to-date intelligence-in order to carry out its mis-
sion. For the Central Intelligence Agency, on the other
hand, information gathering is a primary responsibility. An
effective over-all collection effort requires coordination of all
agencies and commands with respect to collection potential
and activity, and it was in part with this in mind that the
National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence
Agency and charged it with making recommendations to the
National Security Council for the coordination of U.S. intelli-
gence activities.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the locus of re-
sponsibility and authority for the coordination of collecting
elements abroad, to describe the machinery and procedures
which have been established for this coordination with respect
to a major category of collection, that of positive intelligence
through the use of human resources and related methods, to
highlight some of the attendant problems, and to suggest some
steps which might be taken to make our efforts more effective.
Responsibility
In December 1947 the National Security Council charged
the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the
coordination of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. This
charge, reiterated over the years, was specifically reempha-
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 Approved ~Sgrelea?se 2005/04/13
sized and strengthened by President Kennedy in his letter of
January 16, 1962, to Mr. McCone:
In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central
Intelligence, it is my wish that you serve as the Government's
principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you under-
take, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination
and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelli-
gence effort.
Neither the NSC injunction nor this letter from the Presi-
dent distinguishes between coordination at home and coordi-
nation abroad or between overt and covert activities. Co-
existing with these, however, are other NSC directives and a
presidential letter of May 29, 1961, to all U.S. ambassadors.
These documents place upon each ambassador the responsibil-
ity for coordinating overt intelligence collection activities in
his area while giving the DCI the responsibility for coordinat-
ing all clandestine collection efforts abroad. In addition,
they require the DCI to "ensure that planning for the utiliza-
tion of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence
purposes of each of the several departments and agencies
avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and
provides adequate coverage for national security purposes."
The existing directives taken together thus appear to con-
tain inconsistencies which could be reconciled only by assum-
ing that the President intended to make the ambassadors the
representatives of and responsible to the DCI when coordi-
nating overt intelligence collection efforts. There is, however,
no precedent or practice to support such an assumption, and
it is generally accepted that each ambassador is accountable
in this field, as in the discharge of his other responsibilities,
to the President, normally through the Secretary of State.
Some of the deficiencies in overt collection pointed out below
stem from this unresolved contradiction.
The Overt Collection Process
The overt procurement of foreign intelligence is an impor-
tant, part of the duties of military attaches and of those for-
eign service officers who are assigned reporting responsibilities.
Representatives of other U.S. agencies-USIA, Department of
Agriculture, AEC, and AID, as well as CIA, the military com-
mands, and other military elements-at times collect and re-
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IA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
port information; and in most countries nearly all of these
have a very considerable potential for overt collection, one
which if pursued with vigor could add much to the total body
of useful information in the hands of U.S. policy makers. Re-
quirements for intelligence information are placed upon em-
bassy reporting officers through Department of State chan-
nels and upon military attaches and other field representa-
tives through the channels of communication of their respec-
tive parent agencies.
Most information collection requirements are generated, as-
sembled, and processed in Washington for levying upon the col-
lectors abroad. The more critical national intelligence needs
are periodically arrayed in orderly perspective in terms of their
priority by the USIB and issued as Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives. The PNIOs serve to guide the planning for
collection by all means and methods. The individual depart-
ments and agencies have in addition their own "departmental"
needs as distinct from the "national." Each agency thus
drafts its own lists of requirements and sends them to its field
representatives for overt collection. Copies are often sent to
other agencies that have collection capabilities in the hope
that their representatives may also pick up some of the de-
sired information.
Frequently more than one department or agency has a need
for the same or very similar information, and so collectors are
asked to collect information "more than once." Suggestions
have therefore been made that some sort of inter-agency clear-
ing-house be established in Washington to screen requre-
ments and minimize overlapping and duplication; and within
the DoD, DIA has established a central point to clear and
authenticate the requirements of the individual military
services.
For coordinating the actual overt collection efforts in the
field there are no formal community-agreed directives setting
procedures to be used. Guidance is given newly-appointed am-
bassadors concerning their coordination responsibility before
they leave for their posts, and the guidance papers issued to
embassies often refer to information reporting and coordina-
tion responsibilities. But each ambassador is at Liberty to
establish whatever local coordination procedures he believes
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 necessary and conducive to the orderly collection of informa-
tion.
In some capitals the counselor of embassy or chief political
reporting officer is directed to exercise a general supervision
over these activities, and some ambassadors have charged the
local CIA station chief with the responsibility. In other coun-
tries the Country Team introduces some measure of coordina-
tion. In West Germany, where there are major military com-
mands, representatives of their intelligence components and
of the CIA station and the embassy meet regularly as a coordi-
nation committee to handle all manner of local intelligence
problems other than the coordination of clandestine collec-
tion. In many places, however, the ambassador has estab-
lished no formal or informal procedures for coordination, and
it has been left to the inherent good sense of the individual
collectors to extemporize and keep within bounds the conse-
quences of an uncoordinated pursuit of information and ma-
terial. On a few occasions CIA station chiefs have made an ef-
fort "on their own" to bring some coordination into the local
overt collection activity (and sometimes been rebuffed for
their "unauthorized" pains).
Deficiencies in the Overt Process
As indicated above, considerable efforts have been made in
Washington to coordinate the information requirements of the
several agencies. At times these efforts have been confused
by the intrusion of an erroneous view that no more than one
agency should require a particular kind or individual item of
information. The legitimate need of several agencies for the
same information cannot be eliminated by coordination, nor is
it realistic to expect an inter-agency coordination process to
be a vehicle for telling an agency that its stated need for a
particular piece of information is not legitimate.
Inter-agency coordination of requirements should, theo-
retically, insure that none of the required information is avail-
able anywhere in the United States, make a consolidated com-
pilation of the requirements of all agencies, and transmit
them to the various collectors in the field with agreed priori-
ties and in as orderly and non-duplicative a fashion as pos-
sible. But in practice the exhaustion of all stateside resources
Coordination
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before levying a requirement on an overseas collector would
require a greater research capability in each agency, or in a
centralized inter-agency locator system (or perhaps both),
than exists or is foreseeable. It is also inevitable that each
agency will continue to look to its own field representatives as
the ones most likely to make the effort necessary to satisfy its
needs.
Unless there is a strong collection coordination hand. in the
field, therefore, several collectors may be looking for the same
information or material in the same places at the same or dif-
ferent times, asking the same questions and making similar or.
identical requests of friendly local nationals and officials.
This duplication of effort not only is wasteful but frequently
makes all collection efforts progressively more difficult as local.
resources are picked clean by the first collector on the scene
or indigenous personnel develop a reluctance to tread the same
ground several times for benefit of the U.S. government.
Ideally the coordination process, both in Washington and in
the field, should not only act negatively against fruitless dup-
lication and unproductive efforts but also serve as a stimulus
to more aggressive, dynamic, and imaginative collection efforts
on the part of all. It should be part and parcel of a well-
planned embassy-wide collection effort. The ambassador
should feel that an aggressive collection effort is one of the
major functions of his mission, on a par with representation,
negotiation, and the exercise of the established consular func-
tions; and through an effective coordinated process he
should give positive direction to the overt collection efforts of
all the agencies represented in his mission, bringing together
all the requirements placed upon the representatives by their
respective headquarters in Washington and by military com-
mands and other U.S. units elsewhere.
In this process the capabilities of all elements for overt col-
lection should be laid out on the table, the requirerents
matched against them, and collection assignments so meted:
out as to take full advantage of them. Here the capabilities
of the host government which are available to U.S. elements
through local liaison must also be considered, and steps should
be taken to insure that a requirement is placed only onee on
any element of the host government, and then in accordance
Approved F se 2005/041
 Coordination
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
with its known capabilities. The coordination process should
include marshalling the material and information collected,
dispensing it to the agency representatives upon whom the re-
quiremments had been levied from Washington, and, as these
transmit it back to their respective headquarters, indicating
which other agency representatives are receiving the same ma-
terial and transmitting it to their headquarters through their
own channels.
A careful survey would probably uncover regrettably few ex-
amples of such well-planned and coordinated overt field col-
lection efforts. The Foreign Service does not wish its officers,
and most of the individual FSOs do not wish themselves, to be
looked upon as "intelligence officers." Similarly USIA, AID,
and MAAGs are inhibited by concern (sometimes more strongly
felt in their headquarters in Washington than by the field rep-
resentatives) over possible adverse effects on the performance
of their basic missions if they become associated in the minds
of the host government or people with U.S. intelligence ef-
forts. They frequently tend toward even greater cautious-
ness than is justified by this legitimate concern and often pass
up opportunities to collect and hand on information and ma-
terial of intelligence value.
We are most often, then, in a situation in which the overt
intelligence efforts of the U.S. mission are limited to three dis-
creet activities:
Political and economic reporting by embassy officers who
normally confine themselves to the most circumspect
methods for acquisition of the information they report.
(Only recently the USIB formally noted without reser-
vation a statement by the Department of State member
that Foreign Service reporting is not to be considered
as intelligence material.)
Overt collection by CIA station personnel as a by-product
of their official cover duties or of their clandestine op-
erational activities, often reported through embassy
channels.
The aggressive pursuit of intelligence by the service at-
taches, looking for information wherever they can find
it and expecting and getting little assistance from other
members of the mission.
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IA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
It should be that the ambassador and all U.S. representa-
tives in his mission look upon themselves in some degree as in-
telligence officers and act accordingly. The directives on overt
collection, in addition to providing that the senior U.S. repre-
sentative in each foreign country coordinate activities in his
area, also direct that "full utilization shall be made of the as-
signed duties, individual initiative, or favorable contacts of de-
partmental and agency representatives"; and they specify that
information collected by any U.S. agency in the field shall,
wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the local
representative of the Department of State, Department of De-
fense, or CIA, according to the subject matter, who, in turn,
shall be responsible for its onward transmission.
Clandestine Collection: The Rules
In contrast to practices in overt collection abroad, clandes-
tine collection activities have been made subject to standard-
ized coordination procedures. The basic principles of author-
ity for conducting U.S. clandestine collection abroad and of
responsibility for its coordination were laid -down. in 1947 by the
NSC. Subsequent revisions of its directive have not changed
these principles, which can be simply stated as follows.
The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsi-
bility for conducting U.S. clandestine collection activi-
ties abroad.
Subject to coordination by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the U.S. military services are authorized to carry
on supplementary clandestine collection activities
abroad to satisfy their own departmental needs..
The Director of Central Intelligence has responsibility
for the coordination of all U.S. clandestine collection ac-
tivities abroad.
The purpose of this coordination, the directive declares, is
"to ensure centralized direction," through "prior, comprehe:ri-
sive and continuing coordination of all clandestine ,activities"
abroad; and the procedures necessary to achieve this cen-
tralized direction and coordination are to be established by
the DCI in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board. To
this end the DCI, with the concurrence of the USIB, issued
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 Coordination
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four directives on 8 December 1959 establishing the implement-
ing procedures. These directives provide that:
The DCI shall designate representatives abroad to act for
him in exercising the clandestine coordination respon-
sibilities assigned to him. Each department or agency
concerned shall likewise provide for the designation of
representatives abroad to carry out the coordination
required.
All clandestine intelligence activities abroad, including
liaison with foreign clandestine services or with any for-
eign intelligence or security services on clandestine mat-
ters and including the establishment of cover, com-
mencing with the proposals therefor and including any
exploratory activities conducted in support thereof,
shall be coordinated prior to their initiation by the ap-
propriate designated representatives of the DCI.
The DCI's designated representative shall determine and
indicate whether the proposal or activity being coordi-
nated is harmful or potentially harmful, and if so why,
to the U.S. clandestine effort, and whether there is
duplication which is undesirable or would cause unco-
ordinated overlap with a similar activity planned or in
being.
The DCI's representative shall provide full cooperation,
support, and assistance, including any appropriate sug-
gestions, for improvement in the planning, exploration,
and implementation of the proposed activity.
If, during coordination, the DCI's representative consid-
ers a proposal or activity to be harmful or potentially
harmful to or undesirably duplicative within the U.S.
clandestine intelligence effort, the action shall not be
carried out unless adjustments are agreed upon (or un-
less the commander of a major overseas military com-
mand considers the proposed activity essential to the
immediate conduct of his mission or critical to the se-
curity of his forces and time does not permit referral of
the matter to the national level).
In the event agreement cannot be reached in the field, the
matter may be referred either by the department,
agency, or military command concerned or by the DCI's
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representative to the national level for agreement be-
tween the DCI and the appealing intelligence chief; but
the intelligence activity being coordinated shall not be
carried out until such agreement has been reached.
The DCI directives provide that the procedures thus estab-
lished be promulgated through the normal command channels
of the departments and agencies concerned. Although it has
been the view of some that no further implementing in-
structions are needed, that it should be sufficient to distribute
copies of the directives to the field components concerned,
nevertheless CIA and the Army have each unilaterally :issued
separate field instructions on the subject.
In 1.961, as a result of the apprehension and detention in
the USSR of some U.S. citizens, higher authority urged rep-
resentatives of the DCI to see that the coordination direc-
tives were fully implemented and at the same time made it
clear to intelligence chiefs in the armed services that this was
to be the order of the day henceforth. A more comprehensive
CIA field instruction was consequently sent out at this time.
Procedures
The DCI has designated the CIA station chief in each coun-
try his representative for coordinating all clandestine collec-
tion activities in that country. The mechanics of the coordi-
nation process in the field are worked out locally. Where 1! he
volume of military clandestine activity is considerable, as in
Germany, the procedures have been formalized. There they
include the assignment of fairly senior officers from both the
military components and the CIA station to devote nearly full
time to the coordination effort, the use of an agreed format
in submitting the details of each proposed activity to the CIA
station, and a formal memorandum recording the station
chief's concurrence or non-concurrence. In countries where
the military services are less active in the clandestine arena,
the procedures are more informal.
The procedure is inevitably more complicated when a mili-
tary element in one country proposes to run an operation into
another- The coordination of the part of the operation that
is to be carried out in the second country must be done by the
station chief in that country, because he is in the best posi-
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 d' Pion
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tion to appraise the security problems involved and the harm
to or duplication of other U.S. clandestine activities in the
area. In such instances CIA station-to-station communica-
tions are usually used, but sometimes the military element
may send an officer to the second country to discuss the pro-
posal with the station chief in person; or both methods of
communication may be used in the same case. If more than
two countries are involved, the coordination procedures are
not basically different; it simply requires messages to more
stations and trips to more countries.
A considerable volume of coordination for military clandes-
tine activities abroad is done in Washington, occasioned by
military proposals originating at the Washington level, prob-
lems in the field which require consultations in Washington,
and appeals from decisions of the DCI's representatives abroad.
Procedures for the coordination of proposals originating in
Washington parallel those employed in the field. A proposal
is normally submitted to the DCI in writing by the Defense
Intelligence Agency on behalf of one of the intelligence com-
ponents of the DoD. It is handled for the DCI by a Depart-
mental Coordination Group in CIA, which obtains the views
of the appropriate area divisions and field stations of the
Clandestine Services. When necessary in order to insure that
all facts concerning the proposed activity are clear or the
reasons supporting a decision are fully understood, oral dis-
cussions are held among personnel from CIA, DIA, and the
originating component before a formal reply is made.
When a military element appeals from a decision by a DCI
representative in the field, it sends its proposal and position,
with the decision of the DCI representative and his reasons,
through military channels to the DIA, which in turn addresses
a memorandum to the DCI. The DCI representative likewise
submits the entire case to his headquarters, where the DCI
obtains the views of the responsible Clandestine Services offi-
cers. In most instances CIA officers hold oral discussions
with people from DIA and the component service in an effort
to work out an agreed position between the DCI and the in-
telligence chief concerned. Then this can be ratified by a for-
mal memorandum of response from the DCI to the DIA.
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CIA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
Interagency Source Register
One of the useful facilities furthering the basic purposes of
coordinating clandestine activities is an Interagency Source
Register which was established in 1957 by agreement among
CIA and the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force,, and
State. Reference to this central file of human sources of
foreign intelligence prevents multiple recruitment or other un-
intentional duplicate use of sources or agents. The Register
is managed by the CIA Clandestine Services on behalf of the
entire intelligence community, but only the three armed serv-
ices and CIA have participated to date.
A participating member submits to the ISR a source's true
name and address, other identifying data, and the results of
field traces, with a request that he be registered on behalf of
the submitting member. A field component submits it's re-
quests for registration through its parent service in Washing-
ton, not through the CIA station chief. If a check of the ISR.
files and of the Clandestine Services' register show that the
person is not being utilized by one of the other members, the
submitting service is so notified and the name is registered in
the ISR. If another member has already registered the per-
son, the submitting member is notified that there is a prior
interest, but without identification of the member holding
that interest.
Once a source is registered, under the terms of the agree-
ment which established the ISR, no other member can use
him without permission from the registering member. Ar-
rangements are often made for joint usage or for the turn-
over of a source, but only after discussions, set up through
the ISR, between the interested agencies. When a clandestine
operation is submitted for coordination in the field, the sub-
mitting service states that the persons to be used in the op--
eration have been registered in the Interagency Source Reg-
ister in Washington.
Clandestine Collection Requirements
There is, or should be, a paramount question in the mind of
every clandestine collector and in the minds of those who
plan and manage clandestine collection activities, namely:
"What information do I hope to acquire by this activity?"
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 Approved For R& s`V' i J04/13 : CIA
Clandestine collection is costly and risky; it should not be un-
dertaken for trivial information nor for information obtain-
able by overt means, and certainly not as an end in itself.
It should always have a worthy intelligence information
goal.
To insure that CIA's clandestine collection is directed to-
ward satisfying national or interdepartmental intelligence
needs and getting significant information not obtainable by
other means, the USIB Interagency Clandestine Collection
Priorities Committee, commonly called the IPC, maintains a
community-agreed list of intelligence information require-
ments on the CIA service. Derived primarily from the PNIOs,
this list provides important guidelines for the orientation of
CIA espionage activities.
Difficulties in Practice
The National Security Council declared that although it
wants "centralized direction" of all U.S. clandestine intelli-
gence activities abroad, the DCI is to achieve this not through
the exercise of command authority over other agencies' activ-
ities but through agreed coordination procedures. In order
to achieve centralized direction in this way, the procedures
must be and are stringent; they give the DCI's representative
authority to prevent an activity from being carried out until
he (or the DCI on an appeal) is satisfied that it is not harmful
or potentially harmful to or undesirably duplicative within
the U.S. clandestine intelligence effort (except for the loophole
granted a major overseas command in critical circumstances).
In spite, however, of the apparent lack of ambiguity in these
directives, there have been and continue to be differences in
interpretation and misunderstandings between CIA and mili-
tary personnel which have made it difficult to implement
them fully in the field. One source of difficulty is lack of a com-
mon understanding in the community as to the basic elements
which make an activity clandestine. At times the misunder-
standings appear to verge upon refusal to accept the princi-
ples and purposes of the directives.
There is a school of thought suggesting that the military
services should not engage in clandestine collection activities
at all and that the coordination process should be used to
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limit their operations. In truth, clandestine activities are
frequently started by military elements and are well on the
road to implementation before being submitted for coordina-
tion. In some instances the impression is clear that a mili-
tary component has apparently made the deliberate decision
not to submit a number of activities for coordination, and on
a few occasions a particular service has consciously withheld
an operation from coordination on the grounds that it is "too
sensitive" (as though sensitivity did not make coordination all
the more important). In some instances the information goals
of military clandestine activities can be construed as "depart-
mental needs" only by the most liberal interpretation of that
phrase.
An additional source of misunderstanding lies in the role of
the CIA, as opposed to the DCI, in the coordination process.
Because the actual exercise of the DCI's coordination func-
tion, both in the field and at headquarters, is of necessity done
by the CIA Clandestine Services on his behalf, the suspicion
has from time to time arisen that the coordination process
was being used to further CIA's own clandestine activities.
Such suspicions are fed by a sentiment, held by some in the
community, that clandestine collecting organizations are
competitors in the collection business rather than co-workers,
one with the "primary" and the others with the "supplemen-
tary" roles respectively assigned by the NSC. (The Joint
Study Group noted in 1960 that CIA had been criticized for
acting as both "pitcher and umpire" in the handling of the
coordination process.)
The separate instructions which CIA and the Army have
each unilaterally sent to the field have done little to alleviate
these difficulties; they may have had the opposite effect. The
CIA instructions lay great emphasis upon the station chiefs'
responsibility as designated representatives of the DCI and
oblige them to apply generally the same operational judgment
to the proposals of the military services as they apply to their
own. The Army instructions, on the other hand, lay down the
"basic policy" that "Army intelligence collection operations
will be conducted within the letter and the spirit of the
DCIDs in order to insure the capability of taking to the high-
est governmental level all significant conflicts of interest
of any other intelligence service with Army intelligence re-
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 Approved For ReleM(;%W00n4/13 : CIA-R[
quirernents" [emphasis supplied]--a purpose out of harmony
with the emphasis in the directives on centralized direction in
order to avoid harm to the over-all effort or unnecessary du-
plication within it.
Particular Sensitivities
One of the touchy matters is disclosing to the DCI's repre-
sentative, i.e. the CIA station chief (and in practice to a few
additional members of the field station), the details of another
service's clandestine operations. Understandably, it goes
against the grain for any clandestine operator to disclose his
activities to anyone else, especially to someone outside his
own intelligence organization. And yet the DCI's representa-
tive clearly cannot make the required appraisal of a proposal
or activity unless he is given the details about it. The direc-
tives attempted to resolve this dilemma by specifying what
items of information should be furnished the DCI's represen-
tatives-area or base of operations, size and scope of the op-
eration, areas through which it is routed, cover to be utilized,
communications system, objectives and targets, agreements or
arrangements with offices of any foreign governments having
knowledge of the operation, type and status of sources, and
such other details as may be required."
The CIA instructions, taking advantage of this final phrase,
emphasize that the DCI's representatives shall require what-
ever information they need to form a judgment and in suf-
ficient detail to enable complete coordination. The Army in-
structions, on the other hand, state that the information
specified in the directives constitutes the "maximum" the
Army will provide and that for some operations less will be re-
quired. After receiving these instructions Army representa-
tives in several instances declared that they were no longer
at liberty to provide as much information as they had before.
The most sensitive information pertaining to an operation
is that concerning the source or agent employed. The agent
is the key element in any clandestine activity, and the poten-
tial harm or undesirable duplication of a proposed operation
cannot, in most instances, be judged with any degree of as-
surance without information concerning this element. The
directives require information on "type and status" of sources
but provide for their complete identification only in "excep-
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tional circumstances where it is required because of the sen
tivity or importance of an operation."
The armed services have for the most part interpreted tl
provision narrowly and been very reluctant to disclose t
true identity of their agents. When it is argued that sup
disclosures can be asked for under the "such other details
may be required" provision of the directives, the Army h.
taken the position that this provision was not intended
apply to any items specifically mentioned, as source identii
cation is, in the directives. The services also argue that it
the function of the ISR to prevent duplicate use of sourc(
and that their statement in coordinating an operation thn
all sources and agents involved are duly registered ther
should be sufficient. It is not, however, to prevent duplicatio:
of use that the DCI's representatives in many cases need t
know the true names, but to determine whether the agent
or sources have connections which while generally unobjec
tionable may nevertheless create a potential risk to the pro
posed operation or to others.
Prospective Questions
These varying instructions, interests, and points of view
have not prevented the generally effective coordination of in-
dividual operations, both in the field and in Washington; there
is general recognition that effective coordination is a practical
necessity. But whenever reluctance to disclose details of pro-
posed activities has to be overcome or whenever a seemingly
unreasonable demand for more information has to be clarified
or withdrawn, the coordination process is unduly delayed
while the DCI's representatives wait for more detail and mili-
tary units wait upon instructions from higher headquarters.
Of concern to some in CIA is the absence of any specific
authority in the directives for the DCI's representatives to
weigh the importance of the intelligence information objec-
tives of a proposed activity as a criterion in the coordination.
Although "objectives and targets" are listed among the in-
formation to be supplied, they are not mentioned as grounds
for withholding concurrence. Yet one of the basic considera-
tions in all clandestine activities is to balance the risk of an
operation against the information it might yield if successful.
Should a rather serious potential for failure or for harm in
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA
case of failure be controlling, no matter how important the
'information would be in case of success?
In the absence of specific authority most DCI representa-
tives have made no effort to take the information requirement
into account in the coordination process; they have concurred
or withheld concurrence without considering the importance
of the information requirement or whether it is confined to
"departmental" needs. The few who have attempted to include
this consideration in the coordination have usually found the
effort unproductive; their authority has been challenged by
the service concerned. And it can now be argued with respect
to DIA-validated requirements that those best in a position
to know the importance of departmental requirements have
already passed judgment on them.
A new factor which may complicate coordination procedures
in the field is the enlarged role which the DoD envisages for
the unified commands with respect to clandestine collection.
As the unified commands assume greater responsibility for
and supervision over the clandestine activities of the compo-
nent commands, they must inevitably become involved in the
coordination process. Several possible alterations or additions
to present procedures come to mind, but it will remain an
overriding requirement that the coordination be accomplished
by the DCI's designated representative, the CIA station chief
in the country in which the proposed activity is to take place.
He is the one in the best position to judge the probability of
undesirable duplication or harm entailed in a particular pro-
posal and to give it the most realistic and effective assistance.
Centralized direction is normally considered possible only
through the exercise of command. The NSC's concept that
centralized direction of clandestine collection should be
achieved through coordination rather than through command
has made planning and execution of the over-all U.S. effort
slower and more difficult. Direction by central command
might have eliminated more undesirable duplication and
caused more opportunities to be exploited than coordination
allows. But a single command over all clandestine collectors
is obviously incompatible with their being scattered among
different agencies and military commands abroad. Perhaps
we should lower our sights, for the time being, and worry less
about centralized direction than about attaining greater pro-
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DP78T03194A000200020001-1
fessionalism all along the line. This is probably the key to an
effective coordination which can keep harm, undesirable dupli-
cation, and instances of missed opportunities to a minimum.
For it is clear that the achievement of a fully coordinated
and at the same time effective U.S. clandestine collection
effort, difficult enough because of the misunderstandings which
persist concerning rights, authority, responsibilities, and the
procedures to be followed, has been made doubly so by a lack
of continuity among the personnel who handle the military
operations. Personnel assigned to this kind of duty for two
or three-or in a few instances more-years cannot be expected
to achieve competence through a formal course of training of a
few months' duration; and "on-the-job training," dangerous
in this business, should be permitted only under the most care-
ful supervision of experienced officers.
Although CIA's own operators may in some instances fall
short of the desired level of experienced competence, the
great body of them have reached the point that, professional
standards are high in the Agency, while the professional
standards of their counterparts in the military services have
not in the past kept pace. Recent steps taken by the DoD to
increase the number of military personnel permanently as-
signed to intelligence work (as by the creation of an Army
intelligence corps and selection of personnel for it from the
upper levels of all Army schools) and to centralize and improve
training for clandestine activities give promise of raising pro-
fessional qualifications in this field and should within a few
years produce real benefits.
The Role of the Ambassador
Ambassadors are of course concerned about possible political
embarrassment or adverse repercussions on the U.S. Govern-
ment if a clandestine operation were to go awry, and over the
years the DCI has taken steps to insure that clandestine col-
lection activities are conducted with minimum risk of such
embarrassment or repercussions. The CIA station chiefs have
been instructed accordingly with respect to their own opera-
tions and in addition, as the DCI's designated representatives,
have been told to consider the political risk as one of the
criteria for concurring in operations proposed by the military
services. One of the consequences has been a tendency on their
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 SECRET ApproO81'ease 2005/04/1
part to consult more closely with the ambassadors in order to
keep apprised of political sensitivities which may be affected
by operations. Actually, however, there are likely to be ad-
verse political repercussions from a clandestine collection ac-
tivity only if the activity and the U.S. hand in it are discovered.
The possibility of such repercussions depends primarily, there-
ex-
must planned
fore,
ambassadors soundly
o whether the matter in which operations
largely rely
ecuted, ecuted, a
the judgment of the chiefs of station.
It should be kept in mind that the risk of political repercus-
the
sions cus-
sions may not in all cases outweigh the importance
U.S. government of the information sought by an operation,
and this is not a matter on which the ambassador would nec-
essarily want to have the last word. Clandestine operations
abroad are run in response to requirements which the U.S.
intelligence community has carefully considered or in response
to information needs which a military commander abroad has
determined must be filled to carry out his mission; and the
risk of political embarrassment which an ambassador believes
they entail may not in all cases be of decisive significance
when weighed against the value of the information sought.
Overt-Clandestine Coordination
To complete the picture of the coordination of overseas col-
lection efforts, one should sketch the situation with respect to
coordinating overt and clandestine collection with each other
to prevent unnecessary duplication and overlap. There is an
intriguing clause in the directive setting forth the DCI's re-
sponsibility for coordinating all U.S. clandestine activities
abroad which stipulates that he shall "also coordinate clandes-
tine activities with overt collection abroad." There has been
no elaboration of this clause nor any attempt to lay down pro-
cedures for its implementation; the matter has in fact re-
mained dormant.
In practice there have been few complaints concerning over-
lap or unwarranted duplication between overt and clandestine
efforts, and those which do arise are usually found, on analysis,
to refer to requirements, rather than collection efforts, in
which the overt and clandestine overlap. A requirement
stated in fairly general or broad terms can in many instances
be fully satisfied only by employing all methods of collection,
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and it is not surprising that both overt and clandestine col-
lectors are sometimes striving to satisfy the same requirement.
Such "duplication" of collection efforts will often produce
complementary rather than duplicatory information.
Greater efficiency could no doubt be achieved if such re-
quirements were more thoroughly broken down into the ele-
ments suitable for overt collection and those which can. be
filled only by clandestine means. Efforts are made in Wash-
ington to do this through the IPC machinery and on a less
formal basis by consultation between those who originate
requirements and those responsible for levying them on the
collectors.. In reality, the high-priority targets of today
generally require action by all elements, and there is little
wastage in duplication. The possibility of operational harm
from overlap or duplication has in some missions been practi-
cally eliminated by keeping the CIA station chief sufficiently
informed of overt collection operations to enable him to keep
the security of his clandestine efforts from being jeopardized
by overt approaches to the same or similar targets.
The total U.S. collection program could be considerably im-
proved if coordination began at the beginning, i.e. in the early
planning stages at the Washington level. Community plan-
ning for collection has been sporadic, sometimes done through
the USIB committee structure or ad hoc groups, and generally
confined to individual countries or subjects. In addition? one
suspects, much is left to be desired in the way of comprehensive
planning by the departments and agencies for their individual
collection programs. This is not to deny that some of the
agencies make considerable effort to plan collection activities,
but the pattern is to plan for each function or area separately.
The Joint Study Group recommended that the USIB review
the plans and programs of each member of the intelligence
community at the beginning of each annual budget cycle
for consistency and proper allocation of effort. Efforts were
made to implement this recommendation for the fiscal years
1963 and 1964, but with only marginal effectiveness. The diffi-
culty stemmed in part at least from a lack of compatibility
among the planning methods of the several departments and
agencies. Recently the DCI, in his continuing effort, to dis-
charge the responsibilities laid on him by the presidential
letter of January 16, 1962, appointed a Deputy for National
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 ApprovedCF&r&*pe 2005/04/13
Intelligence Programs Evaluation with a staff of experienced
assistants. From the review which this group will make of
the programs of the intelligence agencies should come a better
knowledge of the complexities and feasibility of more effective
community planning for collection abroad.
In the collection planning process due weight should be
given to policy considerations which might militate against a
proposed activity, and the ambassadors in the areas concerned
should be consulted. But when the final decision taken in
Washington is favorable and plans have been formulated, it is
assumed an ambassador would wish to consider these facts
overriding.
The Essentials
It is frequently said that our collection efforts abroad can
be successfully coordinated if we display the old-fashioned
virtues of common sense, good will, and cooperation. No one
can doubt that without these ingredients they will suffer from
lack of effective coordination. But more is needed. There
must be a clear delineation and assumption of responsibilities
for the conduct of collection activities, for their coordination,
and for the presentation of proposals to those responsible for
coordination. There must also be an understanding on the
part of all collectors of the relative importance of their work
and their collection goals with respect to other U.S. intelli-
gence and policy interests, and there must be an understanding
of the practical limitations on collection through the exploita-
tion of human resources in foreign areas. Finally, it should
be recognized that coordination means more than cooperation
and that the responsibilities of the coordinator are, in the
national interest, transcending.
The adversary's view on a second
aspect of agent operations.
MEETINGS WITH AGENTS 1
A. A. Konovalov
and
V. S. Sokolov
The conditions under which intelligence work has to be car-
ried out in capitalist countries change periodically for better
or worse, and in the last few years these changes have led to a
considerable deterioration in the situation. Since last
spring, with the wrecking of the summit conference by the
Americans and a number of other important international
political events, the relations between our country and the
USA and NATO countries have deteriorated considerably and
still remain strained.
This has led in turn to a sharp deterioration in the agent
situation and conditions under which intelligence work under
official cover has to be carried out in the most important
capitalist countries. These conditions depend to a great e),..-
tent on our political relations with the country in question,
and sometimes they are entirely dependent on these relations.
This fact has given rise to a necessity to switch agent work,
to the extent possible, to illegal 2 methods. Yet the official
base, which has to bear the brunt of operational work at
present, will retain its importance for some time.
Operational Hazards
The severer conditions currently encountered have not
been marked by any new or special counterintelligence devices
or methods unknown to us, though such a possibility should
of course not be excluded. They are due mainly to greater
activity on the part of counterintelligence and more intensive
' This article is adapted from a paper issued in 1960 under Top Secret
classification by the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army,
Department of Special Training. For the circumstances of its issue
see Studies VIII 1, p. 16.
'Deep-cover.
MORI/HRP PAGES 65-91
64 SECRET E
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4
 Meetings with Agents
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use of familiar methods and procedures. In countries where
counterintelligence is very active-the USA, the Federal Ger-
man Republic, Great Britain, Sweden, Holland, and some
others--the operations of counterintelligence have a number
of more or less similar features. Some of those which figure
in the present intensified activity are the following:
Considerable intensification of stationary surveillance.
Surveillance by groups in cars, sometimes fully equipped
with radio. (In the past this was not so.)
Troublesome attempts to infiltrate provocateurs into our
network by exploiting our people's acquaintances among
local residents.
Stricter application of discriminatory measures against
our people when they travel about the country. (Be-
fore making such trips it is necessary to have special
permission, to provide details of the route, which has to
be approved by the authorities, and to indicate where
one is going to stay overnight.)
Introduction of stricter security measures for safeguard-
ing secrets at target installations in a number of coun-
tries.
Greater use of covert surveillance of intelligence officers.
Installation of signalling and eavesdropping devices in the
cars of our officers.
Recourse in the USA to flagrant provocation of our in-
telligence officers (even by arbitrary and unlawful acts).
The next-to-last item above is especially noteworthy.
American counterintelligence, for instance, surreptitiously in-
stalls in our officers' cars various types of radio-signalling
equipment which, when the car's ignition is switched on, emits
a constant radio signal on a particular frequency (but no
sound audible to the human ear). It thus becomes unneces-
sary for enemy counterintelligence to follow very closely
behind the target car, for it can determine the location of the
car at distances up to 20 miles by D/Ping the signal. There
have been cases when eavesdropping equipment connected to
radio transmitters has been placed in our cars so that the con-
versations between our officers in moving cars could be picked
up by the cars of counterintelligence men following a long
way (2-3 km.) behind.
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It is known for certain that in some countries the personnel
of our military attache offices are investigated not only by the
counterintelligence of the country concerned but also by
American counterintelligence organs. Several cases have con-
vinced us that American counterintelligence has a special de-
partment devoted to investigating our officers, evidently with
a view to mounting provocation operations against them.
For example, one of the American assistant military attaches
was outwardly very friendly towards one of our assistant
military attaches. This put our officer on the alert, but he
continued to meet the American concerned. In the end, it
became evident that the reason for this "friendliness" lay in
nothing else than the intention on the part of the American
to collect as much information as possible about our attache.
It is important to note also the intensification of anti-Com-
munist and anti-Soviet propaganda in the press, radio, movies,
and television, the systematic frightening of the population
and the rousing of spy mania by dragging up old so-called spy
cases, and attempts to compromise our establishments and
citizens by sending fabricators, "walk-ins," etc., to us. It is
known that the counterintelligence services of countries in
the aggressive blocs try, under the direction of American coun-
terintelligence, to coordinate their efforts in the common
struggle against Soviet intelligence and exchange information.
regarding our modus operandi and our intelligence officers.
All this makes intelligence work more difficult and puts a
high demand on the ability, tradecraft, and personal qualities
of our workers. Experience shows, however, that an able and
conscientious intelligence officer can achieve good results even
in difficult conditions, and on the other hand there have been
examples of unsatisfactory work on the part of intelligence of-
cers under conditions that did not appear to make the fulfill-
ment of their tasks difficult. Therefore in assessing this or that
officer abroad one must not weigh too heavily the difficulty of
the situation but center one's attention on the efforts he makes
to fulfill his tasks and on his personal qualities.
The Need for Meetings
Of all aspects of agent work the most crucial is that of per-
sonal meetings. The frequency, content, and duration of meetings and the conditions under which they are held depend on
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many circumstances. It is not necessary to have frequent
meetings with a well-trained and conscientious agent who has
secret writing materials and photographic equipment, a sys-
tem of reliable deaddrops and signals, and one-way radio com-
munications with the Center.:' With such agents personal
meetings can be held at intervals of one and a half to two years
and sometimes even longer, without detriment.
It is almost impossible to avoid personal meetings altogether,
however. The following are some of the circumstances that
require them.
Some agents refuse to have anything to do with imper-
sonal means of communication, have no confidence in
deaddrops and secret writing, and do not regard contact
via a local principal agent or a cutout as satisfactory.
If such agents are in a position to obtain documentary
information, then personal meetings with them are es-
sential. The frequency of meetings with such agents can
vary: they may be held often, or rarely. When the agent
situation deteriorates greatly, our intelligence officers un-
der official cover may have to drop all personal meet-
ings for a certain length of time.
Personal meetings are also essential for firming up, brief-
ing, and training new agents or ones with whom contact
has been broken for a long period. Others, working for
us for ideological reasons, express a desire to meet our
officers because this provides them their only oppor-
tunity to talk to Soviet people, and it is not always pos-
sible to turn down such a request from an agent.
Personal meetings are required for agents assigned agent-
organizational tasks, particularly the recruitment of new
agents; these obviously cannot do their work without
consultations. And finally, occasional meetings are
needed with persons in charge of safehouses and accom-
modation addresses. As a rule such persons are not
taught to use secret writing and other operational de-
vices, so impersonal means cannot be used for contact
with them.
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Of the several kinds of meetings with agents, those held
abroad by an intelligence officer working under the official cover
of a Soviet establishment in that country are the most danger-
ous, because the intelligence officer is often under surveillance
and is naturally not always successful in ensuring his own se-
cure approach to a meeting. Despite the fact that such meet-
ings involve great risk, however, they are still the main means
for directing agents.
It would be safer if meetings with an agent in the country
where he lives were carried out by a representative from our
Center arriving illegally 4 in the country. If this man has en-
tered the country without having aroused the suspicion of the
authorities, one can be more or less certain that the meetings
he holds will not come to the notice of counterintelligence. In
spite of their advantages, however, such meetings cannot be
used as the regular thing. They can be held only infrequently,
once or twice a year, since it is difficult to arrange the entry
of an illegal officer at shorter intervals. If such trips are made
according to a pattern and do not have sufficiently good cover
stories, they can lead to compromise.
Another arrangement that can be regarded as secure is
meeting in a third country to which the agent and our intelli-
gence officer can go in accordance with a prearranged plan,
having prepared a cover story to explain their simultaneous
arrival. But it would be difficult both for the agent and for
the intelligence officer to have a good cover for such. trips more
often than, say, once a year, even if the meetings were held in
different third countries.
The most favorable conditions for working with agents can
be created on our own territory. Now that a large number of
:foreigners come to our country as tourists or as, members of
various scientific, cultural, and social delegations, it its com-
paratively easy for an agent to enter the USSR. These trips,
however, can likewise be made only infrequently. Although the
entry into the USSR can be concealed, most agents, particu-
larly those in government service, have no opportunity to go
abroad oftener than once a year, during their leave. Moreover,
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it is necessary to have a cover story every time for the agent's
trip to another country and also to back up the cover story,
and this requires that additional measures be taken.
Consequently, despite all the advantages of holding personal
meetings with agents in third countries or in the USSR or hav-
ing intelligence officers enter the country illegally to hold them,
the practical possibilities for such arrangements are limited by
a number of circumstances. The result is that official-cover in-
telligence officers have to carry out personal meetings with
agents in the country where they live; and at present the num-
ber of such meetings considerably exceeds the number of all
other kinds of meetings.
Security under Official Cover
First let us examine the elements of a personal meeting held
by an officer under official cover which it is essential to disguise
and the ways of doing this. The requirements fall into five
phases:
Disguise for the departure of the intelligence officer from
the official building where he works, his home, or some
other place.
The carrying out of checks on the way to the meeting
place, including countersurveillance dispositions.
A cover story for the intelligence officer's actions at all
stages of the operation-his movements to the meeting
place, his establishing contact with the agent, his pres-
ence together with the agent at the meeting.
Security in receiving material from the agent and in pass-
ing instructions and money to him.
Secure delivery of the agent's material to the residency.
The departure of an intelligence officer working under official
cover for a meeting with an agent is one of the most compli-
cated actions in agent work; it has to be covered by some arti-
fice because it is made from an official building or place of resi-
dence that is likely to be under the eyes of counterintelligence
agents. The officer can never be sure what the situation will
be after he has set out, whether he will or will not be under
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DP78TO3194A000200020001-1
counterintelligence surveillance. The following devices have
been used in practice to make a successful departure possible:
Some dispersal of the efforts of counterintelligence by
previous and simultaneous departures for town of other
intelligence officers with convincing cover stories.
Covering the purpose of the departure by visits to estab-
lishments and business offices connected with the. intel-
ligence officer's official duties.
Covering it by taking members of his family to stores, a
movie, the theater, or a sports event.
Evasive departure by the officer (possible if he for instance
lives in a house containing many apartments, and hav-
ing several exits) to pick up an operational. car, parked
at a prearranged spot.
Smuggling the officer out concealed in a car.
If one of these actions is carried out naturally and does not
arouse the suspicions of counterintelligence, the officer will be
able to proceed to the meeting without being followed. If he
does not succeed in evading surveillance and it is absolutely
essential to have a personal meeting with the agent, he may
(with the permission of the resident,, obtained in advance)
make attempts in a natural way to shake off the surveil lance.
But as a general rule, if the agent is a valuable one, if the offi-
cer does not know the city well, if he has not had much, experi-
ence holding meetings in complicated circumstances, and in a
number of other cases, he should not attempt to shake off sur-
veillance but abandon the meeting. Precise instructions, as to
the conditions under which he is permitted to go through with
the meeting must be given by the resident.
Different methods can be used for evading surveillance.
Sometimes for this purpose two persons go out in one car, one
of them being the intelligence officer, who gets out unobtru-
sively in a downtown area. Or the car is driven to the center
of town or along the main arteries in the evening rush hours,
with the expectation that the counterintelligence cars will be
caught in traffic and not be able to maintain the surveillance.
Good knowledge of the city and the situation, skillful driv-
ing, ability to spot surveillance, and knowledge of the counter-
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intelligence's weak points have, as a rule, enabled our intelli-
gence officers to shake off surveillance quite naturally in cases
where this has been essential. It goes without saying that
when an officer not engaged in an agent operation notices he
is being followed he should not try to shake off the surveillance
and so alert counterintelligence unnecessarily.
Surveillance en Route
After convincing himself that he is not being followed, the
intelligence officer proceeds to the meeting place by a route
planned in advance with a view to suitability for checking
thoroughly against surveillance all along it. Only after he is
absolutely confident that he is not being followed does he go to
the agreed place and hold the meeting with the agent. In ad-
dition to the usual visual checks against surveillance, a coun-
tersurveillance setup and certain technical means 6 are used
for detecting it.
Countersurveillance is set up at two or three points on the
intelligence officer's route to the meeting place. At these points
a second, sometimes more experienced, officer watches the other
drive or walk past and determines whether or not he is being
followed. Having detected surveillance, the supporting officer
gives an agreed signal at a specified time warning the other
that he is being followed; this signal also denotes that the ar-
ranged meeting should not be carried out. The points selected
for countersurveillance must lie on a section of the route where
it is impossible for counterintelligence to maintain surveillance
from parallel streets.
Regardless of the use of technical means (with which it is
not always possible to detect the presence of surveillance), an
intelligence officer going to a meeting with an agent must
have a well-developed ability to check reliably and without mis-
take for surveillance and spot it for certain if it is there.
The Cover Story
An important matter which calls for special attention on the
part of an intelligence officer going to a personal meeting with
an agent is the cover story to account for his activities and in
6Presumably monitoring the radio communications of the surveil-
lance team.
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particular for his presence in various parts of town at various
stages of the operation. If the meeting is in the evening, the
ostensible purpose of his movements about town might be to
visit a movie theater, sports event, or any public place that is
open in the evening in the suburbs.
It is much harder to have a convincing cover story for the
actual contact with the agent and for being together with
him at the meeting place. A brief contact can be attributed
to a casual encounter, either party asking for example the way
to some address or where the movie theater is, but it is often
difficult to account for spending a longer time together. Be-
cause of this, meetings must be kept as short as possible when
it is only a matter of passing material and money.
If in the course of the work it becomes essential to have a
lengthy meeting with an agent in order to settle important
handling problems, then the plan for such a meeting should be
carefully thought out and usually approved by the Center.
Long meetings are usually held in safehouses or, in summer,
out of town under the guise of picnics, trips to the beach, fish-
ing parties, etc. For prolonged discussions we have recourse
also to meetings in third countries or in our country.
Some may question whether it is essential to have a cover
story for such an agent operation as a meeting. They may
argue that if enemy counterintelligence apprehends our case
officer together with an agent, then no cover story wilt help.
This is not in fact so. A cover story is necessary in all stages
of carrying out any agent operation in an urban area. When
counterintelligence is very active, a case officer must keep ever
in mind ostensible motives for all his behavior which. will ac-
count for it in the eyes of counterintelligence and conceal its
clandestine nature, so that his actions appear as natural and
plausible as possible to the counterintelligence agents, Thus
a cover story does not mean just having a verbal explanation
ready in case it is required but calls for a whole range of ac-
tions by the intelligence officer tacitly explaining his behavior.
Since counterintelligence carries out surveillance of our peo-
ple in official positions abroad, it is important to succeed in act-
ing out a prepared cover story and support it by observable
moves; the vigilance of counterintelligence's external surveil-
lance can thereby be weakened, experience shows, and the i.ntel.-
ligence officer left to carry out the operation undisturbed. Thus
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a cover story reduces the likelihood of compromise by being
caught together with an agent.
Moreover, a cover story plays an important part if the intel-
ligence officer does happen to be apprehended, alone or with the
agent. The circumstances may vary: our case officer may acci-
dentally, without any connection with his agent operation,
have aroused the interest of the police by some action that
seemed to them inexplicable, suspicious, or unlawful; or the
police may have been summoned by observant local volunteers
who suspected that something was wrong (one of our cars, for
example, was once stopped by American counterintelligence on
suspicion that "an abortion was being carried out in the car").
In either case our officer can escape unpleasantness (being
taken to the police station, etc.) only if he has a clear and con-
vincing cover story and acts calm and confident.
Or the enemy counterintelligence may have definite informa-
tion that an intelligence officer is involved in agent work and
decide to arrest him in the act of meeting the agent. This is
undoubtedly the worst case, but even here our case officer, act-
ing in accordance with a previously prepared cover story which
accounts for his contact and presence with the agent, must en-
deavor to prove that the arrest is unjustified and demand that
he be set free. In practice there have been quite a number of
cases where counterintelligence has been compelled to release
our men just because they acted with determination and in-
sistence. If he has a prepared cover story, an intelligence
officer can thus avoid a compromise or, in the extreme case,
attribute the incident to provocation on the part of enemy
counterintelligence.
Passing Material
When material is to be collected at meetings with agents,
one must take steps to minimize the possibility that the case
officer, if detained by counterintelligence, would be found to
have the agent material on him. Some useful arrangements
are provision for another officer to pick up the material and
deliver it promptly to the residency, the construction of hiding
places in operational cars in which the material can be securely
conveyed to the residency, and equipping operational cars with
means for the rapid destruction of compromising agent
material.
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The process of taking the material from an agent and pass-
ing it to another officer is a crucial one which calls for good
and clear planning, thorough checking to be sure that the
second officer has not been followed, and a well-thought-out
cover story to account for the movements and actions of all
persons taking part in the operation. The supporting officer
must reach the area of the meeting with such timing that in
the event of his having been followed the principal intelligence
officer is not exposed to the risk of compromise. It is impor-
tant that the routes followed by the principal and the sup-
porting officer should not cross, but meet in the area coming
from different directions. This enables the supporting officer
to carry out a thorough check on the way and arrive with full
assurance that there is no surveillance. If he does find that
he is being followed, he must lead the counterintelligence men
away from the area of the meeting and must on no account go
where the principal officer is.
There is some difficulty constructing a cover story for an
evening meeting between two intelligence officers in an area
far from where they work and live. Suitable places for passing
material under cover of an "accidental" meeting are the large
parking lots at suburban movie theaters, business centers,
and some grocery stores, drug stores, and restaurants.
Excursion Meetings
Our intelligence officers working under official cover have in
practice used illegal trips to distant towns in the country where
they are assigned as a means to hold secure meetings, with
agents. In planning such meetings there are certain, peculi-
arities which are described below.
Serious attention must be paid to finding a way to leave the
city securely. If the officer has a car and the trip is conipara-
tively short, it is not particularly difficult to do this: it is easy
to invent a cover story for a trip by car. But it is quite often
necessary to make long-distance trips, for which the most suit-
able means is train or aircraft. The officer can leave his car
where he usually parks it in order to give the impression that
he is at home. He can leave the city, after careful checking
for surveillance, by municipal or suburban public transporta-
tion. The security of the operation would be endangered if
he bought a train ticket at the railway station or a ticket office
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in the city, for in these places there are, as a rule, fixed coun-
terintelligence surveillance posts which might set up surveil-
lance on him. Usually he goes to a nearby town on his planned
route where the train stops.
It is best to do the next stage of the journey by train because
it is not necessary to give one's name when buying a ticket at
the station. You can buy one there one or two hours before the
train leaves. For a long train trip it is best to get a ticket for a
one-passenger Pullman compartment, in order to avoid unde-
sirable companions. (Persons of average means do travel this
way.) Moreover, it is much easier to get a Pullman ticket on
a busy rail line.
To save time it may be desirable to go part of the way by air.
A drawback in travelling by air is that you have to give your
name when you buy a ticket. A case officer should therefore
not go by air from the city where he lives or from neighboring
towns; if counterintelligence should notice that he is away and
make inquiries at the airline, it could easily establish when he
left and where he went.
In buying an airline ticket you can, if necessary, rent a car
to be available at your destination, where you have only to
show your receipt to the representative of the rental company
and pick up the key to the car (USA practice). A person rent-
ing a car while buying his ticket does not have to give any par-
ticulars about himself but only show an operator's license and
deposit $50. The use of a rented car has a number of advan-
tages. In the first place it enables the case officer to move
about freely. Secondly, it enables him to stay at roadside mo-
tels, which require no particulars when one registers except
name and address. Registration at hotels, on the other hand,
is now more complicated: you have to give your place of work
and the purpose of your visit. Thirdly, the car makes it pos-
sible to conceal your final destination.
Sample Meetings: One
It will be useful to give some examples to illustrate what we
have said about methods of holding meetings with agents.
Last summer a meeting was set up in the city where an in-
telligence officer and his agent lived: this operation is pictured
in Sketch 1. Three or four hours before the meeting was due
to take place (it was set for dinner time), the case officer who
76 Approved For RO'2005/04
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A
uu
1.
Embassy
2.
L._J
House where staff live
3.
Subway station
4.
Ylllll
Large stores
5.
Operational car
6.
L
Agent's car
Subwa
li
y
ne
8.
Route followed in subwa
y
9.
- - - - Route followed by operational car
10.
Taxl
11.
Route followed while in taxi
12.
Changing trains in subway
13.
Area of meeting
14.
CD
Technical means (TS)
Operational officer
Agent
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was going to hold it, together with a supporting intelligence
officer and a chauffeur, left the embassy and drove by their
usual route toward the :house where the embassy staff live.
Shortly before reaching the house both intelligence officers got
out of the car and went down into the subway. The chauffeur
(also an intelligence officer) went on to the area of the meet-
ing, to take his stand outside a large store in which the sup-
porting officer would be posted.
After changing trains en route, the intelligence officers left
the subway, went into a store, and made some purchases. Al-
together, they were there about 40 minutes. On leaving the
store they hailed a cruising taxi and went to another large
store. They went up to the top floor by escalator and then
down again and left the store by another exit. They walked
several blocks and went back down into the subway. They
changed trains once and came out at the opposite end of town
from where the meeting was to be.
Having spent some time in a restaurant, they took the sub-
way again to the vicinity of a third large store. The support-
ing officer telephoned from the store to the embassy residence,
spoke to his wife about his purchases, and was told (in coded
form) that technical means (TS-tekhnicheskoye sredstvo)
had detected no surveillance. Then both intelligence officers
went a few more stations by subway and finally arrived on
foot in the meeting area 20 minutes before it was to take place.
Ten minutes before the meeting the supporting officer fell be-
hind the officer who was to hold it and, having checked for
surveillance, went off to the large store where the operational
car was stationed.
The officer holding the meeting proceeded to the agreed place,
checked it, and made contact with the agent. They walked
a block to the agent's car, got in, and transferred the material
from agent to officer. A short distance from the store the officer
got out of the car, entered the store, and passed the material
to the supporting officer, who immediately took it in the op-
erational car to the embassy. The principal officer meanwhile
got back into the agent's car, and they finished discussing their
business while driving around. Then, after checking for sur-
veillance, the officer got out of the agent's car, went home by
public transportation, and immediately informed the resident
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by a code phrase that the meeting had been held successfully.
Later he saw the resident and reported verbally in detail.
Meeting Two
Another example of a meeting in the city where the intel-
ligence officer and agent live is shown in Sketch 2. On the day
of the meeting the case officer made no trips into town. He
remained at the embassy up to the end of the working clay and
drove toward home a few minutes after most of the staff had
left the building. About half way home the turned off to the
grocery store where he usually bought groceries. Now he no-
ticed a suspicious car behind him.
He went into the store, bought; some groceries, and started
home again. The car he had seen still followed him. He drove
straight home, parked his car near the house, and decided'. to
wait a while. He could afford to because the meeting had been
arranged for 10 o'clock in the evening.
He waited for an hour and a half and then left the house
by a side door and walked toward the nearest drug store, about
one kilometer away. He checked for surveillance and detected
none. After buying a few things at the drug store he began
to walk toward home. Then, having seen no signs of surveil-
lance, he turned into a side street and, following a route he
had planned along quiet streets and crossings, came to where
an operational car with a supporting intelligence officer was
waiting for him. If this car had been followed and so could
not get to the agreed place, another officer was in position in
another car a short distance away.
The case officer and supporting officer now drove along a
previously planned route, avoiding major arteries and cross-
roads, in the general direction of the place where the meeting
was to be held. On the way they made repeated checks for
surveillance; there was none. The route included one seg-
ment where it was impossible for counterintelligence to carry
out surveillance by using parallel streets. Here the case officer
checked for surveillance once more, and in addition a counter-
surveillance station had been set up: another intelligence offi-
cer sitting in a car in a movie theater parking lot was in a posi-
tion to observe the case officer drive past. If he had seen a
car following, he would have set up a danger signal at an
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 rve II1I J WITn Agenrs
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1. Embassy building
2. Counterintelligence car
5. Case officer's home
4. Drug store
5. Grocery store
6. Place where operational car is parked
7. Place for alternate operational car
8. Parking lot from which countersurveillance is carried
out
9. Movie theater
10. Segment where counterintelligence could not use
parallel streets
11. Place for countersurveillance's danger signal
12. Place for TS's danger signal
13. Place where case officer leaves car
14. Meeting place
15. Travel by car
16. . . . . . . . Travel by foot
Remarks
Participants checked against surveillance at all stages.
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agreed place, and the officer would not have gone to the
meeting.
There being no danger signal, the officers drove on to the
meeting area. The cover for their presence in this area was
to go to a movie, the last performance beginning at 10:30. Ten.
minutes before the time of meeting, 600 to 700 meters from the
meeting place, the case officer checked to see whether another
danger signal, this one based on information from TS, had
been set up. The signal, which was to have been an office car
at an agreed spot, was not there, so they drove on another 300
meters.
The supporting officer remained near the car while the case
officer proceeded on foot to the meeting place. Fifteen minutes
later he returned with the material, and they drove off. The
case officer got out near another movie theater and, while the
supporting officer delivered the material to the residency, made
his own way home and slipped unobtrusively into the house
through the side door.
Other Meetings
Here we shall only mention our experience in holding more
lengthy meetings (say three to five hours) outside the city. For
this purpose the case officer, after making checks and. acting
in accordance with an appropriate plan, drives out to a resort
area, where important operational matters are discussed with
the agent at a suitable spot (a wooded park, a restaurant) in.
quiet surroundings.
It will be useful to give an example of arrangements for a
meeting having the purpose of severing relations with a pro-
vocateur. Sketch 3 shows one of these.
In the past year it was established that agent K, whom offi-
cer V of our military attache office was actively engaged in de-
veloping, was a provocateur. For operational reasons we could
not reveal to K that we were aware he was collaborating with
counterintelligence. We managed to discover that counter-
intelligence intended to arrest V with compromising material
on him at a routine meeting during which K was to pass it
to him.
On instructions from the Center, an operation was planned
to mislead counterintelligence. Instead of V, an officer G,
who had a diplomatic passport, was sent to the meeting place
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2.
3.
4.c
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.
7
10.
11. ...........
SKETCH
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0 1
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O O
I
Military attache's house
Cafe
Route followed by operational car
Route followed by the counter-intelligence car
V
G
Counter-intelligence agents
The provocateur
Area of meeting
TS (Technical means)
Route followed by G. on foot
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with instructions not to contact K but to behave in such a
way that counterintelligence would come to the conclusion
that he was checking out the place. After examining the area,
officer G obtrusively telephoned the military attache that he
had established the presence of surveillance. Officer V had
driven into town at the same time, but on the way to the meet-
ing place he went into a restaurant and stayed there. With
technical means we discovered that surveillance was mounted
against the officers' cars on these trips.
Several hours after the meeting was missed, officer V tele-
phoned the provocateur, apologized that it had been impossible
for him to come, and warned him to be careful: he had noticed
something suspicious when he was driving into town. He
would call him again after a time and set up another meeting.
Needless to say, there were no more meetings of any kind
with K. Thus this operation succeeded in deceiving enemy
counterintelligence and frustrating the provocation planned
by it.
Emissaries from Headquarters
Illegal trips made by case officers of the Center for the pur-
pose of meeting agents require complicated and careful prep-
aration, but the preparatory effort is well worth while. Such
meetings provide an opportunity to work with an agent in a
calm and businesslike atmosphere, increase confidence in the
reliability of communications, and make it easier to induce
agents to work more actively. The preparation (working out
a cover story and a route, ordering and producing the main and
supporting documents) usually takes up to two months. For
officers going on a second illegal trip the time can be reduced;
in practice, the only limiting element is the time it takes to pro-
duce the necessary documents.
The most complicated and delicate part of an illegal trip is
passing through border and customs controls in the first capi-
talist country. The reason for this is not only that border offi-
cials take a somewhat greater interest in travellers from the
USSR and other countries of the socialist camp, but mainly
that our intelligence officers usually have with them documents
of a very compromising nature--two passports-which could
be found if a search were made.. Another awkward and vul-
nerable moment is the visit that our intelligence officer has to
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make, before returning home, to one of our consulates abroad
in order to obtain an entry visa to the USSR. Both these haz-
ards can be avoided, however, by arranging that passports be
passed to the intelligence officer through deaddrops in the
countries where they are.
After passing through border and customs controls in the
first capitalist country, the Center case officer, merging with
the mass of tourists and moving about freely, can easily carry
out agent operations. As a rule, however, he does not travel
directly from the USSR to the country where the meeting with
the agent has been arranged but passes through one or two
intervening countries in order to confuse his trail and make
sure he is not being watched.
If he and the agent do not know each other, contact is made
through a prearranged recognition meeting. As a rule, the
agent is given a place where he must arrive at a specified time
and a, route to take from there. This is done so that our officer
can recognize the agent and see whether he is being followed
before contacting him. The first meeting is usually a short
one, for making the agent's acquaintance and arranging an-
other meeting; the place for this is selected in advance or by
agreement with the agent, taking into account the nature of
the business to be taken up.
Third Countries
As a result of the great increase in tourist traffic, many of
our agents can make regular trips under good cover to Euro-
pean and other countries. A meeting between an agent and
one of our intelligence officers who has just arrived or is living
in the third country illegally is quite safe for both.
The counterintelligence of the country in which the agent
lives may use its operational apparatus to watch him care-
fully but covertly. Sometimes such surveillance is mounted
"preventively" on a person because he has access to valuable
classified information, not as a result of his having been com-
promised; or it may be that interest in him has arisen in con-
nection with his past activities or because he is active in pro-
gressive organizations. But when the agent leaves the country,
counterintelligence loses the ability to organize secret surveil-
lance along the route.
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Meetin s with A t
-RDP78T03194A00O200020&Y1'-~
Recently the press reported details of legal proceedings in
London against five individuals accused of espionage! From
these details it is evident that British counterintelligence was
able to keep close secret surveillance on them for six months
undetected but was unable to organize surveillance when they
trips to other European countries. The validity of
inference is attested by the fact that not a single one of the ax-
rested persons was charged with any kind of illegal activity
connected with espionage while he was travelling on the
continent.
Since the best and most reliable arrangement from the se-
curity viewpoint is an illegal meeting, it is desirable that :meet-
ings, especially with valuable agents, be carried out from illegal
bases in third countries. When this is not possible, an officer
from the Center can go to the country concerned under a cover
story. In some European countries where counterintelligence
is very active, our official residencies often resort to holding
meetings with agents in other countries where counterintelli-
gence is not so active. This method has been used for several
years and fully justifies itself.
The summoning of an agent to a third country is done by
sending instructions and details of the arrangements for the
meeting through deaddrops, by radio, or by technical means
(secret writing, microdots). On arrival in the country, the
Center's representative or the officer from a neighboring resi-
dency establishes contact with the agent, the first meeting
being as a rule a short one to tell the agent what the arrange-
ments for further work will be. Depending on the nature of
the business to be settled, work with the agent may be carried
out in safehouses, in public places, or out of town.
Agent Visits in the USSR
Bringing an agent to the USSR is by its nature and scope
a complicated operation. It is undertaken only for the most
important reasons, for example training in the use of radio
or planning an agent's future work. It is used very often for
training radio operators; such training is almost impossible in
the country in which the agent lives, because radio equipment
'The Lonsdale-Kroger-Houghton-Gee case.
IA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1
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 Approved o~-t~ ?2A( /4/13 : CIA-
is fairly complicated and calls for at least some technical
knowledge.
An agent may also be summoned to the USSR with a view
to firming him up as a member of an existing net. Cases arise
from time to time when such a measure becomes necessary, as
for instance when an agent is not yet sufficiently involved in
practical work and additional measures are called for, even to
getting compromising material on him, to force him to work
actively on behalf of our intelligence efforts. Sometimes the
summoning of an agent is connected with the necessity of as-
sessing him. In such a case his arrival will provide a test of
his attitude toward us as well as an opportunity to assess his
personal qualities and feelings. Finally, for agents who work
with us out of ideological motives and whose friendship for us
has been confirmed, a trip to the USSR can be regarded as a
great reward for their efforts.
The best way for the agent to enter the USSR is illegally,
though in certain cases the use of legal ways (tourists, scien-
tific-technical and cultural conferences, congresses, symposi-
ums, etc.) is not excluded. In such cases the Center and the
agent must be absolutely certain that the visit will appear en-
tirely natural and will not attract the attention of the coun-
terintelligence service of the agent's country. One must also
take into account the circumstances in which the agent will
find himself with respect to his intelligence work in Moscow.
If he travels as one of a party, it will be difficult or practically
impossible for him to explain convincingly his absence during
the times he has to meet with us. Consequently, it is preferable
that agents come here alone, without any connection with
groups of tourists or scientists. Naturally, the agent must
have a good cover story for such a trip.
There are at least three ways to bring an agent illegally into
the USSR. In the first the agent, under a suitable pretext and
with a good cover story, travels on his own documents to an in-
termediate country. There he makes a secure contact with a
representative of ours and gets from him a new passport with
entry visas to the USSR affixed in advance. He enters the
USSR on this passport. After completing his tasks here, he
leaves on the same passport for either the same or another in-
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DP78T031 94A00200OA001-1
ee -ngs wr gents
termediate country, where he changes back to his own pass-
port for the journey home.
Under a second procedure the agent arrives in 'West Ger-
many, whence he flies (in order to avoid entries in his docu-
ments) to West Berlin. He crosses into East Berlin " and is
brought by air to the Soviet Union. In travelling to West Ber-
lin he has used his own documents, which will show only that
he has been in West Germany. There will be nothing to show
that he has been in Berlin but his name on the airline's flight
list. In travelling from Berlin to the Soviet Union he uses new
documents (passport, certificate of identity, travel orders).
A third way, when a good cover story is available, is for the
agent to use his own documents for travel to one of the coun-
tries of the socialist camp and from there be brought to the
USSR, the visa being issued on a separate sheet of paper. The
reliability and the value of the agent, his social position, and
his personal qualities must be taken into account in choosing
among these procedures.
The use of an operational passport, as in the first two pro-
cedures above, is quite an acceptable device, but one must; take
into account the necessity for a great deal of preparatory
work. A cover story for the agent's departure from his coun-
try, his travel route, and arrangements for changing over to the
operational passport have to be worked out. The operational
passport has to be made ready, and for this it is necessary to
obtain from the agent in good time his photograph and all the
passport data. Arrangements must be made for contacting the
agent in a third country in order to give him the new docu-
ments and, if necessary, to pick up his own documents for safe-
keeping. And finally, signals have to be set up to denote his
departure and his safe return to his own country.
A Case History
An actual case from last January will serve as an example.
At that time agent A was brought to Moscow for training in
radio communications, codes, and secret writing and for brief-
ing about his future work. Two residencies participated in the
8 The wall now puts a crimp into this procedure.
 /,,feet gls with 2O1 i&4/13 : CIA-
Approved For ease
planning for this operation. The preparatory measures in-
cluded:
Detailed planning and study of the route by which the
agent should be taken to an intermediate country and
from there to the USSR.
Study and analysis of the operational situation on the
route (visa and passport regulations, border controls,
customs, currency restrictions, rules governing for-
eigners in the country of transit, etc.).
Working up a cover story for the agent, coordinating it
with him, and getting the necessary data for a passport.
Estimating logistical requirements (the cost of the trip).
Settling the details of the travel route.
Making arrangements for handling the agent at the Center
(safehouse, schedule of work, entertainment, trans-
port, food).
The route the agent was to follow was selected in the light
of his very good knowledge of the situation in adjacent coun-
tries and in Western Europe generally and his familiarity with
passport and visa requirements and currency restrictions. A
change to air transport was envisaged because it was known
that there was no strict control at the airport involved. To
give the agent his forged passport a recognition meeting was
pre-arranged at an intermediate point, where the agent also
gave his real passport to our officer for safekeeping.
Before the agent left his country, a meeting was held at
which his knowledge of his cover story was checked, arrange-
ments were made for contacting him on his return, and he was
given money for travelling expenses. He was also informed in
advance of the data and entries in the forged passport so that
he could get used to the cover story supporting it.
His cover for absence from his country was a vacation trip
to another country. Since there were then many West Euro-
pean tourists in that country, such a trip would not arouse sus-
picion. Another favorable circumstance was that the trip re-
quired no visa and documents were not stamped at the border.
To support this cover story the agent, on arrival in the inter-
mediate country, wrote several postcards to his acquaintances
at home and gave them to our intelligence officer, who mailed
them off at intervals while the agent was in Moscow.
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DP78T03194k0b200k1!0 nts
The agent's journey to Moscow and back to the third coun-
try and then his return to his own country took place without
incident or suspicious sign. His documents were not photo-
graphed anywhere. On reaching his country he set up at the
agreed place the signal denoting his safe arrival home.
While he was in Moscow he was trained in quiet surround-
ings by experienced instructors in radio communications,
codes, and operational equipment. He was given directions for
his future work. In addition, his presence in Moscow was uti-
lized to exert moral influence on him with a view to strength-
ening his sympathy for our country and thereby promoting
closer collaboration with us.
Alternatives
Despite all the advantages of training and briefing agents in
Moscow, a number of drawbacks make it difficult to use this
procedure. Some agents would have trouble getting a convinc-
ing cover story to account for a lengthy absence from their
work, family, etc.; moving an agent to the Soviet Union is
always a fairly complicated business; one cannot exclude the
possibility of a sudden change in the operational situation
while the agent is on the way to the Soviet Union, so that data
on him and his photograph come into the hands of hostile coun-
terintelligence services; and the agent must be a sufficiently
confident person to be able to pass calmly and naturally
through all the border checks without arousing anyone's sus-
picion. These difficulties lead to the necessity of holding some
lengthy meetings with agents both in the countries where they
are operating and in third countries where counterintelligence
is less active, particularly when it is a question of giving them
refresher courses in radio communications or briefings on their
work. Sometimes such meetings with agents can be held right
in the country where they are operating, especially if a safe-
house is available.
When their official positions allow an agent and an intelli-
gence officer to visit the same events and establishments (recep-
tions, conferences, business houses, sports arenas, stadiums),
it is convenient to use these for short meetings and conversra-
tions. Brief instructions can sometimes be passed to an agEmt
surreptitiously, by slipping him a note, and the intelligence
officer can get information from the agent in the same way.
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 Meetin s with
6~3e`d' 'oPW6se 200510113: CIA-RDP78TOg3194A
In the summer there are good opportunities to cover meet-
ings by going on picnics, making trips to the beach, and going
fishing. At picnics or on the beach the cover can be made still
more convincing if the officer takes along members of his fam-
ily. He and the agent, having agreed to meet at a particular
place, arrive in the area at different times. At an appointed
hour they leave their families on some natural pretext (taking
part in a game, visiting a snack bar, etc.) and meet and have a
talk. If a long meeting is required, a lonely, secluded spot
should be selected. The beach or picnic area should not be one
frequented by Soviet representatives, and thorough checks for
surveillance should be made on the way to it.
Fishing trips provide good cover for long meetings in the
summer time. It can be agreed with the agent to meet some-
where on the outskirts of town early in the morning. From
there, after a thorough check for surveillance, they can drive
in the agent's car to a place where motor boats can be rented,
rent one, and go out fishing. Or they can arrive separately at
the place where boats are rented, each rent a boat, and then
contrive to meet on the water. The first alternative is better
since only the agent's car is left parked at the dock, the boat is
rented in his name, and so there is no trace whatever of the
intelligence officer's presence either during the meeting or
afterward. He needs only make sure that he is not followed
on his way to meet the agent in the first place.
Many meetings are held in motels. Thus an agent, acting
in accordance with instructions, drives one evening to the out-
skirts of the city (or to a small town nearby), rents a one-room
cabin in his own name, and spends the night there. The next
morning our intelligence officer drives out to that vicinity,
making sure that he is not followed. He conceals his car and
walks to the motel. He recognizes the agent's quarters by his
car parked outside and enters without being noticed by any-
one. Throughout the day he briefs the agent on his work,
leaving after darkness falls. Thus his presence at the motel
is undiscovered.
People who live in small apartments have begun a fairly
widespread practice of making arrangements for out-of-town
guests of theirs to stay at' motels. The rooms or cabins at the
motels are rented, not by the guests when they arrive, but by
the hosts themselves as soon as they know that guests are com-
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L0b020001-1
ing. This practice also has possibilities for covering agent
meetings.
Other ways of covering meetings have been used. In some
residencies, meetings have even been held in the houses where
the Soviet officers live. Whatever cover measures the intelli-
gence officer takes, however, their effectiveness depends con-
siderably on whether the agent conducts himself correctly,
his ability to conceal his work, and the extent to which his be-
havior is disciplined. If he is undisciplined and does not
strictly observe contact arrangements, so that it becomes neces-
sary to take irregular steps such as calling him on the tele-
phone or intercepting him, all the cover precautions used by
the intelligence officer may at times become futile. The same
thing will happen if the agent does not take adequate steps
to conceal the temporary removal of documents or does not
have a convincing cover story to tell the members of his fam-
ily to account for absences and for having extra money.
An agent is unreliable if he is timid or lacks self-confidence.
Such an agent can attract suspicion to himself by his timid
behavior, whereas a bold and enterprising agent, behaving
naturally in accordance with a good cover story, will not stand
out from other local residents. The agent, like,the intelligence
officer, can take helpful initiatives to enhance the security of
operations under way in making checks for surveillance, in-
venting cover stories, etc. This is why agent training is a con-
tinuing concern.
New, more effective measures for cover, which could ensure
that work is continued under worsening conditions, should
be thought out and readied in advance. Some of the possibili-
ties are holding personal meetings with agents at night, hold-
ing them in specially selected officers' living quarters, using
new forms of impersonal contact, smuggling agents into official
establishments for meetings, and getting them in in the great
throng of guests coming to large receptions. But one must
not be limited to such examples; the whole body of intelligence
officers must work actively and creatively on this problem. In
present conditions, when counterintelligence in most of the
capitalist countries is very active, great importance must be
placed on measures for making personal meetings between in-
telligence officers and agents secure.
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 Approved
Intelligence Articles VIII 2
25X1
Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
For a touch of individualism
in the standardized product.
STYLE AND STEREOTYPES IN INTELLIGENCE
STUDIES
Droning monotony, fancy jargon, and Victorian stuffiness
in government prose, long the butt of an excessive amount of
satire, have again become a favorite target of journalists. A
top official of the Department of State acknowledged the vul-
nerability in a recent speech before a group of career officers
in his agency. Pointing out his concern over the abstruse
style used in the reports which he received, he made a plea for
the revival of the straightforward "declarative sentence" and
for direct expression of ideas.
In this wave of public baiting intelligence writing has not
been singled out for special attention, for the obvious reason
that it is classified, has limited distribution, and does meet a
high standard. On the other hand, it has certainly not es-
caped periodic jibes, often justified, from intelligence writers
and editors and from the recipients of their products.
A truism about any form of communication is that effective-
ness depends on not only what is said but how it is said. For-
mat and style are perhaps even more important in intelligence
than in most forms of writing. A keen analysis of any given
event or development can be mangled in the process of presen-
tation, for example by burying the critical portions in super-
fluous detail. The emphasis on brevity and clarity in intelli-
gence reports implicitly recognizes that the key officials who
are of influence in the formation of our foreign and defense
policies are under a variety of pressures and demands, that
they can devote only a limited part of their time to the great
volume of intelligence materials which flow across their desks.
Aware of this competition for time and attention, all intelli-
gence producers would like to feel that their efforts are pre-
sented as sharply, clearly, and effectively as possible.
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 Style and Stereotypes
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Mass Perfection
A uniform style adopted by all producing agencies and for
almost all types of intelligence production has been perfected
to a degree which may have reached the point of being self-
defeating. Extreme uniformity, even in perfection, risks hav-
ing a deadening effect. Regardless of originator, subject mat-
ter, area, or type of study-from reports of coup attempts and
general political estimates to specialized economic surveys-
finished intelligence is beginning to have a remarkably familiar
ring. How necessary is this uniformity?
Intelligence style has had to develop within the strict frame-
work of acceptable official prose and of course is limited by
these formal confines. However, since the product is classified
and not subject to general scrutiny, it would appear that in-
telligence components should have at least a little more flexi-
bility of expression than other government bureaus. In addi-
tion, it would have been reasonable to assume that the differ-
ent intelligence agencies and the several staffs for different
types of intelligence production-basic, current, estimative,
etc.-would have attempted to achieve some degree of individ-
uality, each developing its own style and format. But quite
the opposite has happened.
One of the causes of uniformity is the widespread and re-
curring use of a high percentage of fashionable words and
phrases derived from an invisible elite phrase book. Thus in-
telligence studies are generally chock-full of such words as
image, posture, mystique, offload, dialogue, presence-terms
currently considered choice in government, journalistic, and
academic circles. To borrow a phrase from the sociologists,
"cross-fertilization" explains the wide propagation of these
terms. All producers are perusing the output of the others
and consciously or unconsciously borrowing or plagiarizing
from it. This literary osmosis soon becomes a kind of disease
which adversely affects good writing.
The Editorial Compulsion
Not content with the osmotic leveling, editors have exer-
cised their authority to impose an extreme rigidity of style on
intelligence publications. Their usual explanation, to the
writer is that the next echelon of editors will perform even
Approved For Release 2005/04/1;
Style and Stereotypes
more drastic surgery on a manuscript if it is not carried out
at the initial stage. Other rationalizations for manuscript
changes go something like this: "We just don't use this word
(or phrase)." "This is inappropriate to our style." Or "the
chief simply writhes in anger whenever he sees this word."
Most frequently, however, editors make changes in the interest
of "the reader" (aka "consumer"). The editor smooths the
ruffled feelings of the analyst in the following terms: "The
reader will see a double meaning in this idea." "The reader
won't understand the terminology in this context." "The
reader will infer such-and-such from this paragraph."' The
clairvoyance of editors with respect to the thoughts and reac-
tions of this lone reader is nothing less than preternatural.
Embarrassingly, however, their psychic or telepathic finds are
occasionally reversed by the higher editorial echelon, which not
infrequently restores the analyst's original phrasing or some-
thing like it.
No one would deny that intelligence production of all types
requires a closely controlled style and format in order to fulfill
its purposes. Considerable uniformity is inevitable, in part be-
cause of the pressure of deadlines and the variance in writing
skills among analysts. If the latter were unleashed to give
expression to their personalities in their reports, chaos would
soon reign and the reputation of the producing component be
ruined. Some stereotyping, moreover, is necessarily intro-
duced by the primary additive of finished intelligence--int-er-
pretation, estimates, analysis, meaning. These cannot be
couched in absolutes, and the English language has just so
many synonyms to qualify unknowns and signal the difference
between fact, reported fact, and significance. The words pos-
sibly, probably, likely, unlikely, may be, seem, almost certainly,
according to, presumably, allegedly, ostensibly, believed to be,
and a few others are bound to recur in intelligence writing.
They are accepted as indispensable guides and warnings.
But there still remains a small degree of undeterminism in
the relatively rigid framework of both style and format. And
this small bit of leeway could provide a refreshing breath of
variety in intelligence presentation, sharpening the interest
and receptivity of the reader. For example, editors might
lower the bars slightly to permit the occasional passage of sen-
tences beginning with "But" or "And," a form of sentence
 Style and Stereotypes
Approved For Release 2005/04/13"
structure widely approved in the best grammatical circles and
highly effective when used sparingly. Or a single striking
phrase without a predicate. The granting of such small lib-
erties might encourage initiative and originality among ana-
lysts who otherwise tend to feel too hopelessly tethered by edi-
torial regulations. Too often an analyst will excuse a perfunc-
tory Job of writing and organization on the ground that "the
editors will rewrite the piece anyway, so why waste my time
on anything but the content?" A greater flexibility in presen-
tation than may be possible for periodic reporting under short
deadlines would be feasible for special studies and memoranda
which develop a subject in depth and detail and at greater lei-
sure. An occasional sampling of consumer opinion could
serve as a guide.
The Elegant Cliche
It is always easier to take negative action, and one eminently
practicable means of improving intelligence presentation and
at the same time eliminating some of its sameness requires
only a negative action on the part of editors and analysts-
the elimination of as many as possible of the popular cliches
that saturate the content of most government and journalistic
reporting. Clarity, accuracy, brevity, and directness are
among the cardinal qualities of intelligence writing and indeed
of any good non-fiction. These characteristics should not be
confused with the excessive and often contrived introduction
of terms once pungent and effective which through overuse
have become a mere jargon, perpetuated to give the sophisti-
cated a feeling of "belonging" and "togetherness." Shopworn
pretentious phraseology can be distracting if not actually re-
pelling to a reader.
For example, image, posture, presence, and confrontation.
The flexible word "situation" should not be made a cover for
all sins; it is often superfluous embroidery. A recent govern-
ment publication mentioned "the fat cow surplus situation" in
a particular foreign area; did the surplus of fat cows have to
be a situation? And are we really being more sophisticated in
saying that a cargo is "onloaded" or "offloaded?" The Eng-
lish-speaking peoples survived for many centuries with plain-
vanilla load and unload, and I have yet to get through my ob-
tuse skull the advantage in the new coinage.
Style and Stereotypes
The following is a small sampling of currently fashionable
cliches, listed for handy reference of analysts and editors. All
of them are recommended for the most "Limited Official Use"
to which it is possible to limit them.
image
posture
presence
mystique
confrontation
situation
structure
infrastructure
dialogue
on balance
political infighting
dichotomy
thrust (of an argument)
take-off stage (a program or
economy)
VERB FORMS
to play in low key
to stem from
to structure
to restructure
to onload
to offload
to move forward
to kick off (a political campaign,
program)
to trigger
to step up
to add a new dimension
to back-stop
Finally, the editors might to advantage dispense with the
term "the reader" when defending their changes during con-
frontations with analysts. The implication of this word in the
singular-an audience of only one-is wilting of the analyst's
posture and has an adverse impact on the projection of his
image. Besides, analysts always speak of editors in the plural,
because there always seem to be several echelons. Since the
analyst is guaranteed at least so many readers, the plural
form--on balance-would appear to be good usage in the
editorial dialogue.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
British Services
MI-5. By John Bulloch. (London: Arthur Barker. 1963.
206 pp. 21/-.)
Because this is the only book extant devoted entirely to
the British internal security service, there is a risk that in-
telligence officers generally, and even those with particular
interest in the British services, may give it exaggerated def-
erence. It is a journalist's account, with the advantage of
the readability and the hazard of the inaccuracies that mark
also the author's earlier publication on the Lonsdale-Hough-
ton espionage case.' This time, moreover, he had a special
axe to grind.
The timing of the MI-5 story is significant. It appeared
almost squarely in the middle of the bone-crushing Profumo
scandal and after nearly ten years of successive exposures of
deeply set Soviet long-range penetrations involving British
officials in sensitive positions at home and abroad. The book
summarily reviews some of these cases, but most of its con-
tent is concerned with British security's first and longest-
lived chief, Sir Vernon Kell, who founded the service in 1909
after the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had been set
up five years earlier, finally agreed that some action was nec-
essary to combat growing German aggressiveness.
Kell began as a Captain. He left the job in 1940 as a Major
General, the bureaucratic victim of two successful security
breaches by the Germans-Lieutenant Prien's penetration of
the Scapa Flow naval base and the sabotage of the Royal Gun-
powder Factory in Essex. He died, one judges from the book
an unhappy man, two years later.
With the encouragement and assistance of Lady Kell,
Bulloch here attempts to interpret the main developments
between 1909 and 1940 in a manner favorable to the old chief
and so to create a sort of memorial to him. It is therefore
not surprising that the book is less than accurate in all de-
tail, that it contains little new with respect to previously pub-
1 John Bulloch and Henry Miller, Spy Ring (London: Seeker and
Warburg, 1961.) Reviewed in Intelligence Articles V 4, p. 41.
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 Recent Books: The British Approved For Release 2005/
lished cases, and that it falls short of really illuminating the
record of British security's encounter during this period
with multiple, concurrent foreign adversaries.
It begins with an error in the fundament, characterizing
MI-5 (p. 9) as "an autonomous department directly answera-
ble to the Prime Minister." The recent report by Lord Den-
ning on the Profumo case makes it very clear that MI-5 has
not been directly responsible to the Prime Minister since
1952.2 The case histories that follow for the most part il-
lustrate Kell's prowess in World War I against the Imperial
German service. Almost all of these had been hashed and
re-hashed, for many years in primary and secondary accounts.
The fragmentary and selective considerations which the
book gives to the record of the security service since 1940
suggest plainly that MI-5 did not make a successful transi-
tion in its estimation of the main adversary during the pre-
ceding period-this notwithstanding Bulloch's claim that
British security in Kell's day "was very good indeed," largely
because "Kell was a very good Director" and "chose very good
men to work for him." The Burgess/Maclean and Philby
cases suggest that it was precisely during Kell's tenure that
the foundation of Soviet long-range penetration in the United
Kingdom was laid.3
There is, however, considerable material in MI-5 of anecdotal
value for a selective and critical reader. One item, for example,
is an explanation for the tradition in MI-6 (foreign intelli-
gence) to refer to its chief as "C." Bulloch traces this practice
to the World War I inter-service mystique under which Kell
signed official papers "K" and the head of MI-6, Captain
Mansfield Cumming, signed his "C," with the result that "the
Head of MI-6 is still known as `C,' though Captain Cumming
2 Pp. 79-80, Lord Denning's Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, September 1963). The report is probably the best available
source of accurate detail on MI-5 as a whole.
' For an insightful treatment-although the author stops short of the
conclusions warranted by his own data-see Neal Norman Wood, Com-
munism and British Intellectuals (New York, 1959), pp. 83-85, 118.
Alexander Orlov lays down the doctrine for such penetrations-in a
teasing statement that suggests he knows more than he can put into
print-in his Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann
Arbor, 1963), pp. 15-16.
Approved For Release 2005/0
is long dead, and the name of the present occupant of the post
does not begin with that letter." If you-like this reviewer---
thought "C" began as "Chief," you have some cortical re-
grouping to do.
It is clear from all Bulloch says that he finds nothing to
criticize in Kell's administration and much to condemn in the
banishment which he in effect suffered. Kell's only operating
rule was that no one should be accepted for service who was
not of pure British stock. Bulloch, noting that this rule is
still followed, adds: ". . . this precaution is still a sound one.
The latest example, that of George Blake, demonstrates that
MI-6 would do well to adopt the same principle, if it could be
done." The closest he comes to a judgment on MI-5's cur-
rent capabilities is the statement (p. 183) : "I believe, too, that
the time is overdue for another change in the pattern of
espionage and counterespionage."
On balance, the book represents an uneven treatment of
what from the U.S. viewpoint is a major ally's crucial activity
in defense of its secrets, which now include many of our own.
The author's special plea for MI-5's founder is nowhere more
evident than in his omission of any mention of his successors.
Not one is recalled by name or by indirection-not even Sir
Percy Sillitoe, who, from 1946 to 1953, reversed the policy of
his predecessor (and was in turn reversed by his successors)
with respect to the anonymity of the service.
BALTIC EPISODE. By Captain Augustus Agar. (London:
Hodder & Stoughton. 1963. 255 pp. 21/-.)
This memoir is a story primarily of British naval action in
the Gulf of Finland against the background of political irreso-
lution in the international relations of 1919-20. Although
it is subtitled "A Classic of Secret Service in Russian Waters,"
and although the author was indeed on an intelligence mis-
sion assigned personally by Director "C" of the Secret :[intelli-
gence Service, the remarkable thing about the episode is the
extent to which he prejudiced this mission for the sake of more
spectacular self-assigned activity and nevertheless apparently
won commendation from everyone, including C, after its con-
sequent failure.
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Directed to establish a secret hideout on the Finnish coast
near Petrograd for two fast Coastal Motor Boats by which
he could sneak in to reestablish contact with and eventually
exfiltrate an important agent cut off in Bolshevik Russia,'
Agar did establish his base and make the initial contact; but
then at the time of the Kronstadt rebellion he couldn't resist
putting a torpedo, on his own initiative and in spite of the
hazard to secrecy, into a Red battleship. This exploit gave
the British naval commander in the Baltic the idea of raiding
Kronstadt harbor with a whole squadron of the CMB's, and
Agar enthusiastically joined as a volunteer in the raid, which
of course left the situation impossible for the CMB's on his
intelligence mission. The agent whom he had been supposed to
rescue had to make his way out as best he could by land fron-
tier. Yet Agar harvested the VC and DSO, warm words from
C, and apparently even the gratitude of the agent. The in-
telligence moral in all this is a dubious one.
" Sir Paul Dukes, who gave his own account in The Story of "ST 25"
(London: Cassell, 1933).
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THE WEEK BEFORE PEARL HARBOR. By.A. A.. Hoehling.
(New York: W. W. Norton. 1963. 238 pp. $4.50.)
TORA, TORA, TORA. By Gordon Prange. (New York:
McGraw-Hill. 1964. Condensed in Reader's Digest, Octo-
ber-November 1963.)
The literature on the intelligence failure that led to the
disaster at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, is growing apace.
Last year Mrs. Wohlstetter, using as one of her primary
sources the lengthy congressional hearings on the case, pub-
lished her excellent study 1 analyzing in depth the breakdown
of the warning function. Now two new books have appeared,
one from the U.S. viewpoint, the other from the Japanese.
A. A. Hoehling has taken an approach emphasizing the
human relations at work in the complex of events, he has
interviewed most of the key command and intelligence person-
nel available and reviewed the papers of others. The result-
ing book is much more readable, if less scholarly, than Mrs.
Wohlstetter's, probably because the' role that personalities
played comes through more strongly. Perhaps their role is
overly stressed, and that of organization or the lack of it is
underplayed. It is noteworthy that there was no system for
coordination of intelligence either in Washington or in the
field, so that what exchange of views did take place was the
result of friendships or personally developed relationships
like those between McCollum of ONI and Bratton of G--2.
In this reviewer's opinion, the author makes too much of
the state of health of the key officials in Washington?
Roosevelt, Hull, Knox, and others. That decision-snaking
statesmen should have the health problems of advancing age
is no historical abnormality. Mr. Hoehling makes Roosevelt's
sinus treatments sound almost sinister, the villain that
opened the door to the Japanese surprise. But even if the
President's nasal passages had been completely clear--a condi-
tion practically impossible to achieve in Washington---this
'Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press,
1962). Reviewed in Intelligence Articles VII 3, p. 119.
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could have had little effect on his appreciation of intelligence
reports which he never personally received. Moreover, it was
Roosevelt who had been most certain that the breakdown of
the negotiations with Japan meant war and was under the
impression that all military units had been put on the alert.
Hoehling also takes too much at face value the statements
of Admiral Zacharias, a Naval Intelligence expert on the Far
East who, however, was never noted for the moderation of
his views: "Zacharias estimated," for example, that "there
were approximately 1,000 Japanese agents in the [Hawaiian]
islands."
Despite these shortcomings, The Week Before is not only
interesting reading but valuable to the history of intelligence.
Tora, Tora, Tora ("Tiger, Tiger, Tiger," a code message
sent by the attacking task force to report "Complete surprise
achieved") is the Japanese side of the story. It describes
Yamamoto's three-page letter of January 1941 to Admiral
Onishi outlining the plan for a surprise air attack on Pearl
Harbor, the war gaming of the attack in September, an October
meeting of the Japanese admirals at which there was strong
opinion that the American fleet would be alert and ready, the
opposition to the plan mounted by the Naval General Staff,
and the ultimate acceptance of Yamamoto's views.
Once a decision in favor of the attack was made-as a result
of Yamamoto's threat to resign if his plan were not accepted-
Japanese espionage in Hawaii was stepped up, using the legally
assigned consuls who were trained intelligence officers. Low-
level bombing practice was begun on Kagoshima Bay, selected
because it is shaped like Pearl Harbor. Finally, the details of
the attack itself are described through the eyes of the Japa-
nese attackers.
OF SPIES & STRATAGEMS. By Stanley P. Lovell. (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 191 pp. $3.95.)
In 1942, a 52-year-old New England manufacturer and in-
ventor found himself, to his surprise, taking on the job of
assistant to Dr. Vannevar Bush in Washington. Soon, even
more surprised, he was involved in an additional job as an as-
sistant to General Wild Bill Donovan, with the title Director
of Research and Development, Office of Strategic Services.
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Now 73, having fulfilled the obligation laid on him by Donovan
to wait twenty years before publishing any account of his OSS
experiences, he has written an amiable and attractive memoir.
Dr. Lovell's short book is both rewarding and disappointing.
It is marked by a modesty and generosity of spirit which other
OSS authors would do well to emulate. Here is one who does
not suggest, as some others have, that he would have won the
war single-handed if only he had not been thwarted by the
knaves and fools around him; he does not even mention the
fact that his work won him the Presidential Medal. of Merit.
He writes as a man who liked his outfit, his job, and his col-
leagues, and he succeeds in communicating his enthusiasm
for them. The eventual biographer of General Donovan will
be glad to draw on this warm, lively portrait and these telling
anecdotes of him.
It was the job of Dr. Lovell's men to invent or perfect the
devices used in clandestine operations of all kinds by OSS and
by resistance movements all over Europe and Asia. His book
is at its best and most useful when he describes the develop-
ment of more than a dozen of these devices, including the
following.
"Casey Jones," an explosive charge affixed to the under-
side of railroad cars and activated by an electric eye re-
sponding to the sudden darkness when the train en-
tered a tunnel (of special value for disrupting traffic
between Italy and Germany).
A silent, flashless pistol and submachinegun, which Gen-
eral Donovan demonstrated to President Roosevelt un-
der circumstances which the reader will probably find
as shocking as the President did.
"Firefly," a small plastic cylinder for slipping into a gas
tank, carrying an explosive charge to be activated sev-
eral hours later when the gasoline had slowly swelled
a rubber retaining ring.
"Caccolube," a compound in a small rubber sac to be in-
troduced into an automotive lubricating system through
the breather pipe; when heated it became a colloidal
dispersion in the oil and converted the cylinders to
shrapnel.
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"Bushmaster," a tube equipped with a .30-caliber rifle
cartridge and a delay mechanism, useful for posting
along jungle trails to persuade the Japanese that the
woods were full of snipers.
The famous tire spike which when dropped on roads and
runways always had one prong pointed into the vitals
of any approaching tire.
"The Stinger," a one-shot pistol containing a .22 over-
loaded cartridge, easily concealed because its size was
one-half by three inches.
"Aunt Jemima," a high explosive disguised as ordinary
flour, which could be kneaded, raised with yeast, and
even baked for concealment until it could be used.
Dr. Lovell describes these infernal machines with a wealth of
anecdotal detail, of which the best concerns Aunt Jemima-
what happened when he was told that the way to get rid of
an extra hundred pounds he had lying around his office was to
flush it down the toilet, and then, too late, was warned that
organic matter in the sewer would react with the compound
and blow up every building in Washington. The book is
equally interesting in telling about ideas that did not pan out,
such as pre-positioned charges to be activated by the ground
shock from air raids, and researches into post-hypnotic sug-
gestion. Lovell believes that two of his devices-some of the
silent flashless weapons and an explosive charge set off by an
increase of 5,000 feet in the altitude of an aircraft-got into
the wrong hands with disastrous results. But he is sure that
the whole array of unconventional weapons helped shorten
the war and thereby saved the lives of a great many fighting
men.
.Even so, the kind of detail which an R&D man can give
about his work of twenty years ago was bound to be disappoint-
ing. Some of his shop's inventions are still classified; some
probably could not be described fully for fear of putting
weapons into the hands of criminals. The whole book appears
to have been written from memory, without benefit of records
of any kind, and though Dr. Lovell's memory seems to be
pretty good it does not begin to answer all the questions one
would like to ask. He knows very little about the actual uses
to which his devices were put in the field and the results they
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achieved; this was inevitable in the nature of things, but it
leaves the reader wondering.
The author has been ill served by his publishers. The book's
jacket touts it, with gruesome inevitability, as "incredible
secrets of World War II revealed by a master spy." It also
capitalizes on the author's weakness for telling. :irrelevant
and not very persuasive stories he heard from other people,
which detract from the value of his own personal. reminis-
cences. A better editor would have persuaded him to stick to
things he knew for certain at first hand-life in the OSS, and
the work of research and development.
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Doctrine and Pseudo-Doctrine
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE IN MODERN WARFARE. By Lt.
Col. Irving Heymont. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co.
1960. 244 pp. $6.)
Col. Heymont's work might more appropriately have been
entitled "Handbook for Combat Intelligence Personnel"': it
is a sort of primer for enlisted personnel and junior officers
assigned to combat intelligence units for the first time. It
should be useful for this purpose, although developments in
the techniques of intelligence collection and production, or-
ganizational changes in the Pentagon, and the evolution of
new concepts in both conventional and nuclear warfare-to-
gether, perhaps, with security and classification barriers that
inhibited the author-tend to give it an already dated quality.
A little less than half the book-107 pages-is devoted to
the fundamentals-What is intelligence?. Principles of opera-
tion, Collection of information, Processing information into
intelligence, Counterintelligence, etc. The rest is a series of
annexes-short essays or illustrations-on subjects ranging
from the national intelligence organization to order of battle,
from technical intelligence to the format for intelligence es-
timates. All of these subjects are treated in specific relevance
to combat intelligence in the field, never as viewed from the
national level.
To the extent that this field orientation results in a lack
of perspective, it is unfortunate that the author's experience
had not included an assignment in intelligence at the Wash-
ington. level. To us at the national level it shows also that
we have failed to reflect downward the Washington viewpoint
and a knowledge of the way matters are handled here: even
on a totally unclassified basis much more could have been told
about the central process. In fairness to the author, however,
it should be noted that he clearly intended this volume not
as comprehensive analysis but as an elementary statement of
method.
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE. By Joachim Joesten. (New
York: Abelard-Schuman. 1963. 314 pp. $5.)
This sleazy potboiler devotes its opening paragraph to the
tired joke about the second oldest profession and then goes
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rapidly downhill. It tries to prove that intelligence "is all a
huge waste of time, money and energy, to say nothing of the
human agony, bloodshed and tears involved. Except perhaps
in a few instances, the results of all this frantic spying are
pitifully small. And in most cases they could have been ob-
tained by conventional means." (p. 9)
Joesten's qualification to sit thus in judgment is possession
of a file of newspaper clippings in eight languages. He boasts
that he is a know-nothing:
This book is based in its entirety on information that has already
appeared in print in one country or another. Not one iota. of it
has been obtained from classified material or through personal
contact with any Intelligence source whatsoever. As a matter
of fact, the author, in his research covering a period of many
years, has scrupulously avoided any opportunity to make such
contacts. He has never even spoken to any person whom he
knew to be in this game!
For, from the moment I had done so, I would have been auto-
matically disabled in the task I had set myself to accomplish: to
show in an objective, impartial, truthful way the workings of
intelligence throughout the world. The moment I had laid myself
open to the charge of using any still secret-that is unpublished-
information, I would inevitably have become one-sided, a reporter
of half-facts. (pp. 17f.)
This disarming confession seems to explain why Joestert has
forsaken journalism for potboiling with other men's clippings,
but it doesn't help his book. Half-facts would have been a
great improvement over what we get, and the charge to which
he lays himself open is that he has not even made good use of
the published sources. Ignoring all. serious books on postwar
intelligence, he has limited his selection of quotations from
newspapers and magazines to what serves or can be made to
serve his thesis.
His information on American intelligence is drawn from. the
likes of Westbrook Pegler, Robert Ruark, a notorious anony-
mous pamphlet, and the rumors about intelligence which are
often dished up by the New York Times. His account of ]3rit-?
ish intelligence is a farcical garble concocted from Sefton.
Delmer and a book full of howling misinformation about the
George Blake case. (The Lonsdale-Houghton-Gee-Kroger case,
which was much more accurately described in the newspapers,
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is dismissed in a few words, perhaps because its solution re-
flected credit on Western counterintelligence.)
His view of Soviet intelligence varies with the point he is
trying to prove: when he argues that all intelligence is evil
and futile he thoroughly belittles the value of Rudolf Abel to
the Soviets, but when he wants to show that American intel-
ligence is especially futile he emphasizes our folly in trading
off that "very valuable man" for "an airplane driver." He con-
cludes his comparison of Soviet and American services by say-
ing, "We have the best-paid spies in history. They have, as so
unimpeachable an authority as Mr. Tompkins has testified,
the best, period. The difference goes a long way towards ex-
plaining why we do so much losing in the cold war." (p. 67)
"Tommy" Tompkins, unimpeachable certainly but not an au-
thority on the over-all calibre of Soviet spies, prosecuted Abel
in 195'7 and now practices law in Newark. The use Joesten
makes of him typifies his citation of "highly authoritative"
sources throughout the book.
Joesten's sources keep letting him down. Take the matter
of definitions: Asking a man to spy for you "is known, in
English, as `letting one's hair down.' The Germans have an
even more expressive phrase for it: die Hosen herunterlassen,
which literally means `to pull one's pants off.'" (p. 44) "A
'walk-in' is a store or office operated by an Intelligence Service
as a commercial front for the convenience of volunteer in-
formers." (p. 45) "A `live mail drop' . . . is a courier whom
the agent meets at a secret rendezvous outside his operating
territory." (p. 171) Doubling an agent is always referred to
as "turning around." These are only the simplest of his
blunders; the important ones would take too much space to
demonstrate.
But Joesten makes up for any little slips by the vast sweep
of his judgments: "Virtually all major Intelligence operations
throughout the world now hinge on bribery." (p. 5) "Of all
the great nations in the world, the U.S., without question, has
shown the most marked ineptitude in spying." (p. 47) But it
would be immoral of us to improve: "To make proficiency in
spying a matter of national pride, as some misguided Ameri-
cans do, would seem to be on a level with the self-satisfaction
of that famous all-American whore who used to boast that she
was `the goddam best lay in the country.'" (p. 48) Thus he
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gets us going and coming. "The world's most successful spy,
nowadays, is the radar eye." (p. 58. The proof adduced, from
Aviation Week and the New York Times, might seem to argue
against American ineptitude.)
Joesten dearly loves a big round number. The U.S. "em-
ploys more than 100,000 people in military intelligence and
spends $2.5 billion a year on their upkeep and operations."
(p. 6, citing U.S. News & World Report) CIA "alone is believed
to employ upward of 30,000 people," (p. 6) and its budget "is
generally believed to run to around 1 billion dollars a year."
(p. 163) There is a passing reference to "the billion-dollar
slush fund which Congress has set up precisely for the purpose
of enticing defectors from the Soviet camp." (p. 259) It "can
hardly be doubted" that "the aggregate number of Germans
spying upon each other . . . runs into at least six figures"
(p. 6), leaving open the scary possibility that it might ruin
into seven or eight. This should not surprise anyone who
learns that "about forty" intelligence services are operating in
West Berlin alone (p. 150), and that, on the authority of the
Allgemeine Zeitung of Hanover, the total for all Berlin is "no
less than eighty." (p. 151, Joesten's italics)
About three-quarters of the book is made up of short chap-
ters rehashing newspaper accounts of twenty-odd postwar
spies and defectors, tricked out in revolting journalese of
which it would be tedious to give further examples. These ap-
pear to reproduce accurately what the press said, but Joesten
has added his own touches-invented conversations, imagined
trains of thought, phony pathos, heavy irony. The book's
best single line comes at a moment of heavy-breathing drama:
"'Pass me the pepper,' he commanded matter-of-factly." (p.
211)
Opponents of intelligence as a function of government will
have to do a lot better than this. When the book comes out as
a fifty-cent paperback, don't waste all that money on it.
TRUJILLO: The Last Caesar. By Arturo R. Espaillat. (Chi-
cago: Henry Regnezy. 1963. 192 pp. $4.95.)
This breezily written (presumably ghost-written) memoir
by the man who served Trujillo as chief of security from 1957
until his assassination characterizes intelligence work and
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political warfare in the Caribbean as "gutter fighting," "the
claw and fang," "an endless series of truly epic deceptions,
duplicity and betrayals." To the extent that this was a chief
message the author wished to convey, his book is successful:
the reader indeed feels plunged into the midst of habitual de-
ception and duplicity. For this very reason, however, he is
left without basis for sorting out General Espaillat's deceptive
fictions, self-serving or merely sensational, from whatever
kernels of truth may hide in his account.
One can only remain skeptical that Trujillo gave U.S. con-
gressmen and State Department officers "at least $5 million"
in bribes, that the U.S. ambassador's wife received a $17,000
brooch from him, that as early as 1957 Dominican intelligence
had made a "factual and in retrospect entirely accurate analy-
sis . . . of the Castro-Communist designs on our hemisphere"
and paid a U.S. senator-in vain-a quarter million dollars to
do something about them, that the assassination of Castillo
Armas "was the culmination of a conspiracy already known to
diplomats and intelligence officials in capitals from Washing-
ton to Rio de Janeiro," that "whole segments of the Guate-
malan secret service were controlled more by Trujillo than
by Armas," that the State Department "insisted that CIA's
anti-Castro operation be balanced off by also knocking Trujillo
out of the saddle" and therefore the Department is "better
skilled than the CIA when it comes to cloak and daggering,"
or that that author's only connection with the Galindez case
was such as to enable him to "state with some authority" that
Galindez' disappearance "was a factor in permitting the Com-
munist capture of Cuba."
The main impact of the book is that of an attempt to dis-
credit the U.S. government-congressmen, diplomatic officers,
the State Department, CIA. If that was also its main pur-
pose it defeats itself by acting too smart, swinging too wildly,
smoke-screening too heavily, and then expecting to be be-
lieved on its own say-so or that of columnists like Drew Pear-
son.
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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 8 NO. 3 SUMMER 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
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The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
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EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATIIICK
LAWRENCE R. HousroN
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25X1 Room ID 27 Langley II and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted through channels. They should be typed
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CONTENTS
Page
An Intelligent(" Role for the Footnote .. A. John Alexander 1
For the exteision of the academic revolution to in-
telligen,.,c production. CONFIDENTIAL
11
The Graphics Coordinator Program t. .. Anthony Porcaro
Overt collection of pictorial
Pitfalls of Civilian Cover..... . . A.S. Rogov 17
For the Soviet military intelligence officer. SECRET
Portrait of a Cuban Refugee ............ Andrew Wixson 3~5
Personality of a potential agent. SECRET
. Peter A. Naffsinger 43
"Face" Among), the Arabs ....... - - -
Dignity ihe prime value for Muslims. CONFIDENTIAL
Arthur B. Darling 55
Origins of Central Intelligence - political explorations.
In wartime conceptual and p
CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence ?gin. Recent Public Literature ................ 95
Europe long ago ... Irregular Warfare. CONFIDENTIAL
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a
0 r a revolu-
d octrine.
AN INTELLIGENCE ROLE FOR THE FOOTNOTE
A. John Alexander
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter)
of each volume for articles published during the preceding
calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nomi-
nations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence
in the decision.
After some dozen years' immersion in intelligence, I still
find myself reacting uncomfortably to its rather cavalier dis-
regard for the footnote. In that strange way each profession
has of altering accepted words to its own meanings, "foot-
note" in the jargon of the intelligence community designates
primarily the notation of a major disagreement on the part of
a member with an otherwise agreed estimate. Here, however,
I am referring to the footnote in its academic, scholarly, or
scientific sense, as a device for identifying and in some cases
even evaluating the source material used for a particular tex-
tual statement. Such a footnote is deeply scorned by practi-
tioners of intelligence and makes only a rare appearance in
most intelligence products.
During my years of intelligence apprenticeship I of course
noted the omission, but I assumed that the master crafts-
men knew best and there were very good reasons for it. I
assumed that the suppression of footnotes was part of one's
overall conversion from scholarship to intelligence: the para-
mount need of intelligence was a timely answer to a current
problem. Intelligence could not afford the luxury of extended
research, the comforting security of having explored all pos-
sible sources, the devotion of a lifetime of effort to the isola-
tion and exact determination of one particular item of knowl-
edge--culminating in a painstaking and exhaustive documen-
tation of the entire research process.
And now, I suppose, after these several years I am some-
thing of a master craftsman myself. I have my brood'. of ap-
prentices-and I teach them the same doctrine and they prac-
tice it. But throughout the whole process I continue to be
troubled. I wonder if the abandonment, for the most part,
by the intelligence community of the somewhat elaborate and
carefully developed apparatus of scholarship has been alto-
gether to the good. I wonder if we have not in fact been pay-
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 Approved Fur 2elea?se 2005/04/13
ing for it by an undesired but nevertheless real degradation
of the intelligence effort.
Bare Heights
As one trained in the rigorous academic disciplines, I find
abandonment of the reassuring apparatus of scholarship dis-
turbing in itself. But it is more than this general loss that
disturbs me. There are certain specific practices that also
provoke a sense of uneasiness. For example, and I find this
quite ironic, the higher the level of the intelligence product,
the less complete is its visible documentation. In other
words, the more serious its import and the closer it is to the
influential official who will act upon it, the slighter is its overt
back-up.
At the lowest level, of course, is the raw intelligence report.
This report is generally extraordinarily well evaluated and
supported. No scholar could really, within the normal limits
of national security, ask much more. The source, particu-
larly in CIA-originated reports, is carefully and intelligently
described as to his professional knowledge and competence, his
outlook, his opportunity to gather the information, and his
previous reliability. Not only the date of acquisition of this in-
formation but place as well is given. In some reports the rap-
porteur also provides a field evaluation of the substantive in-
formation elicited from the source. The user of this kind of
report can easily and effectively apply the canons of evidence
in evaluating and testing the information.
But as we move up the ladder of intelligence reports the
documentation gets sparser. The NIS, to use a well-known
example, is in effect a scholarly monograph, digesting a great
multitude of raw reports. Its total documentation usually
consists of a single, very brief paragraph commenting on the
general adequacy of the source material. No individual item
within the NIS section can be tracked down to a particular
source or specific group of sources. As one moves in the NIS
from the individual chapter sections to the overall brief, the
documentation becomes even more general and less mean-
ingful.
At the more exalted level of the NIE, documentation even in
the generalized form of comments on sources has usually dis-
appeared altogether. One is forced to rely on the shadings
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The Footn t
CIA-RDP78T03194A000g11W0020001-1
given to "possibly," "probably," and "likely" and on other
verbal devices for clues as to the quantity and quality of the
basic source data. These examples from the NIS and NIE are
paralleled in a great many other publications of similar re-
finement. One may admire the exquisite nuances and marvel
at what a burden of knowledge and implicit validation the
compressed language of a finished "appreciation" can be
forced to carry, but one cannot help being concerned about
the conclusions. Upon what foundations do those clever state-
ments rest?
If the final products were at least based upon documented
intermediate inputs, the uneasiness might be somewhat less.
But in my own experience the "contributions" or inputs,
with the exception of certain economic papers, are normally
devoid of any specific identification of the kinds and types of
reports or other evidence upon which they are based. And in
my experience those inputs are often based on other inputs
prepared at a lower echelon until at last we reach the analyst
with access to the raw data. At the upper level of joint or na-
tional discussion and negotiation and compromise, which
eventuates in the exquisite nuance, the carefully hedged
phrase, or sometimes a dissenting footnote, the remove from.
the original evidence can be, and often is, considerable.
The situation is not, of course, quite as dire as I have por-.
trayed it. The intermediaries, in the process of review and.
consolidation of inputs, do query the preparers of these con-
cerning items of unusual importance or of a critical nature,
and in some cases they join the basic analyst in an examina-
tion of the raw data itself in order to get a firmer grasp of a
particular issue. Furthermore, the final product, before be-
ing accepted and promulgated, is often returned to the ana-
lyst who prepared the initial input, and he has an opportu-
nity to note any deviations from what he believes the situa-
tion to be. These processes do provide a measure of control
and cross-check, some assurance that the available material
has been thoroughly exploited and properly interpreted. But
such processes seem partial and makeshift at best. They do
not always occur. And they do not, of course, provide external
participants in the final product with any real insight into
the quality and quantity of material utilized by their fellow
participants.
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Topside Review
Another situation that troubles me-and this is a related
problem-is the vast array of editors and reviewers under vari-
ous guises and the several levels of examination to which an
intelligence product is subjected before it is finally approved
for publication. What troubles me is not the review, but the
basis upon which it is accomplished. I recognize that many of
these reviewers are highly talented, experienced individuals.
Many are extremely devoted and conscientious and do their
best to do a thoroughgoing job. But what basis do they have
for their exalted "substantive" review?
In my experience, these reviewers have not generally-the
notable exception would be members of the Board of National
Estimates-been systematically exposed to the current take of
raw data. Their knowledge of current intelligence events is
based on hurried reading of generalized intelligence reports
or on sporadic attendance at selected briefings. They are not
aware in any particular instance-nor should they be-in any
real detail of the material actually available on a particular
subject. How do they know that this study in their hands
for review has indeed explored the appropriate material?
What variety of data has been utilized? Has the most recent
material been examined? How can they do a spot-check on a
particular item? Was a certain report seen, read, evaluated,
and then discarded as erroneous, or was omission of the data
in it inadvertent?
Lacking the apparatus of documentation, the reviewer gen-
erally has available only two methods by which to analyze the
draft before him. One is to discover an internal inconsistency
which calls into question the paper's overall accuracy or logic.
The other is to find a statement that seems to contradict
something he may have seen recently in his generalized read-
ing and, on a hunch, to question its validity. The great bulk
of any study, despite the reviewer's best intentions, is beyond
his capability to question, analyze, evaluate, or critically re-
view. What a haphazard and random method this is for high-
level substantive critique !
As a result much high-level review, in my experience, has
consisted of the discovery of occasional typographical errors,
small inconsistencies in numbers cited in different paragraphs
or on different pages, minor inconsistencies in nomenclature,
The Footnote
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say between a figure or chart and a textual reference, unpre-
ferred usage in spelling or hyphenating certain words, and
other venial errors which a diligent proofreader should have
caught. Any commentary on substantive validity, depth of re-
search, or adequacy of analysis has been rare and exceptio)aal.
The minor changes are dutifully made, assurances given that
more care will be exhibited next time, and the study is ac-
cepted and published as the agency's or the community's con-
sidered view.
I know that this is the system we live with, and I know that
it often works surprisingly well. I know also that at times
there are many vigorous discussions involving substance, and
that in this oral exchange there is often a rigorous testing
of propositions by an examination of the pertinent evidence.
But much reviewing is done without this stimulating personal
dialogue, without considering the evidence, and it is of this
that I seriously wonder, is it worth the time and effort`? Are
we in fact getting our money's worth? Or are we not deluding
ourselves? Is the review structure we have erected to assure
ourselves that we are getting a high quality product not for
the most part really a mere facade? Does the Emperor have
any clothes?
Undocumented Analysis
If reviewing is sometimes a pious, well-intentioned fraud
(one that I myself have had to commit), analysis at the basic
journeyman level also at times leaves much to be desired.
Not all analyses, of course, are based directly on the raw
data, with its usable annotations and evaluations. Much ana'-
ysis incorporates so-called finished intelligence, some of wh:icla
is poorly dated, and the exact sources of which are not at all
identified. Even the good and conscientious analyst does not
know, nor does he have any means of learning, upon how
solid a foundation that finished intelligence is based. It has
an official imprimatur; so, not having supporting raw data in
his files or time to procure and re-examine it-and, more im-
portant, following the traditional procedure of analysts-he
uses it in his own study. His product eventually becomes a
new piece of finished intelligence, which he or his successor
will use in yet another study. And so the fragile structure
can continue to be built of fragile materials. The weaknesses
continually compound.
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Another danger is the overconfident, glib, and persuasive
analyst who writes his studies "off the top of his head." He
can prepare a report rapidly and defend it with great self-
assurance, relying on his memory and general knowledge of
the subject matter. Sometimes this assurance is justified.
But how do we know when? Then there is the intermediate
intelligence officer who sometimes, for whatever reason, ig-
nores his analytical staff and prepares a report on his own-
again off the top of his head. It gets into the chain, and how
is the next reviewer, or even consumer, to know that it has
no substantial basis of research?
The hazards of insufficient documentation are evident
enough to need no further elaboration. The value of proper
documentation, moreover, and the system for it are not un-
known to intelligence officers of the community. Most-
whether in uniform or out--have at some time in their formal
training been exposed to documentation and its virtues, if
only in the preparation of a term paper. Many continue to
evaluate externally prepared reports and monographs in part
by reference to their bibliographies and footnotes. The
scholarly habits persist-except in the intelligence field itself.
Source Protection
Part of the reason for this condition is an item of cardinal
intelligence doctrine: do not betray the source. Concern for
protection of sources is of course legitimate, but it can be car-
ried to extremes. As illustrated above, there appears to be a
contradiction in the respective application of this doctrine
to raw reports and to finished intelligence. Meticulous defini-
tion of the source in an individual raw report is accepted (and
correctly) as necessary to the proper appreciation of the re-
port's content. It would appear equally necessary in finished
studies derived therefrom.
The argument can be made that finished intelligence has a
wider circulation than the raw reports and that there is
therefore a greater risk of jeopardizing sources by identifying
them in the finished product. In some cases this concern
may indeed be valid-and could certainly be met by producing
undocumented versions for the bulk of the circulation. But
for internal consumption by operating officials who want to
know (or should want to know!) the actual amount, validity,
and reliability of the basic information, a documented form
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should be available. And it should certainly be available dur-
ing the process of shaping up the final report-to the inter-
mediate analysts, reviewers, and negotiators.
I am not persuaded, however, that fear of source compro-
mise is a wholly valid argument. Footnotes will reveal report
numbers, subjects, place of origin, and rapporteurs, but would
not necessarily identify sensitive sources. Many sources are
open or obvious and could be cited without danger. If a
source is particularly sensitive, even its nature need not be
revealed, but a neutral documentary reference should make it
possible for a properly cleared user to run it down. (In ex-
ceptional cases of extremely sensitive sources it might of course
be necessary to prepare versions at that level of sensitivity.')
With effort and imagination, I believe that the source-com-
promise problem can be successfully met. One practical sug-
gestion is included in the procedure recommended below.
Practical Dibliculties
Another argument that can be and often is advanced is that
documentation is time-consuming and time is a luxury that
intelligence cannot afford. Admittedly it is time-consuming;
to prepare documentation; it would increase analytical, typing,
and perhaps reproduction time. It could even be argued that
it would increase editing, review, and final processing time,.
This is a plausible argument-but anyone familiar with the
realities of much intelligence production will, I'm afraid, be
unimpressed. Anyone who has been personally involved with
the time lags in production of NIS sections, say, with the pro-
longed back-and-forth traffic of editing and "nit-picking" at
most routine papers, will not believe that in much intelligence
production time is quite so greatly of the essence. I strongly
feel that the additional burden would be more than compen-
sated by the improved substantive quality of the final product
and that, as a matter of fact, much time would be saved.
There would, for example, be no frustrating searches for the
uncited sources of questioned statements.
It can also be argued that footnoting is a cumbersome,
awkward, and excessively time-consuming method of docu-
mentation--and here I would agree. I would not, for intelli-
gence purposes, advocate the adoption of the formal, ex-
tended-entry, bottom-of-the-page footnote system, requiring
exasperatingly frequent repetition of document source and
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 CONFIDENTIAL
ns in proper textual
title and producing further complicatio
pose a very simple sys-
alignment and pagination. I would pro
ournals. In this sys-
tern based upon that used in scientific j
graphy and numbered
tern sources are listed in a single biblio
are made in paren-
serially. Textual references to sources
by use of two groups
theses following the relevant statement
of numbers separated by ha
in the bibliography and the sec-
ond source by the number and giving the page reference.
Extended -discussions of particular source problems can ap-
pear as a series of appended numbered notes, referenced in
the text by the appropriate note number in parentheses. This
system is easy to employ and should present no difficulties to
the analyst; it should cause only minor inconvenience to the
consumer. And if a particular report needs to be sanitized
ap-
pended quickly of specific source references the bibliography p-
pended notes can simply be detached.
Why documentation has languished so long and amiably in community
o not know. desuetude in the i ftfrlom old academic r quu ements mayIbe
ersia and the eel part of the answer. But however it came about, the present
non-documentation system is well established and flourishing.
The habit is almost an addiction. Efforts to upset it fly in
the even
the face of human latradition,
mediocreeanalystes ~
In a sense, it is job protection
does not expose his work to careful examination. Years of
living with undocumented intelligence has blunted our per-
protest-
ception its dangers that is inadequacies.
or is is exceedingly
sometimes heardl
or :> it conscieience
small. Yet I think it is challenging.
Import an Old Revolution
It seems to me that we need a major revolution in inte equivalent doctrine. What we need is the intelligence eq
of the Academic Revolution that occurred inn n our sc o modernols
of
higher learning some hundred years ago
search methods were first introduced, primarily from Ger-
intellec-
many. This Academic Revolution, all
academic disc plines
tual history know, brought to graduate
(both scientific and humanistic) the tools, concepts, and ap-
paratus of modern scholarship. Along with concepts of free
inquiry, thorough exploitation of original sources, and objec-
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The footnote
tivity it brought the re
A common methodology
developed; and the field
of the self trained amate
Intelligence is undergo
tions are becoming prof
a common methodolo
quirement for precise documentation.
and certain common standards were
of scholarship, originally the domain
ur, gradually became professionalized.
ing this kind of evolution. Its opera-
essionalized; a professional esprit and
gy are gradually developing. This jour-
nal has been an important step in that direction, following
the classic pattern: it provides a necessary forum for the dis-
cussion of professional problems and helps create a common
background of classic cases, basic concepts, general principles,
and key problems in intelligence. It is in this forum that I
should like to see argued out the advantages and disadvantages
of a proper documentation of intelligence conclusions and
findings. I have stated-perhaps overstated?-the case in its
favor as a real necessity. Is there a valid defense for the
status quo?
In addition to a serious, probing, and hopefully rewarding;
discussion of the problem, I would also recommend experi-
mental application of the proposed doctrine to some specific
areas of intelligence production. As a beginning, I would sug-
gest it be tried on selected NIE's and NIS's, with careful evalu-
ation of the results after reasonable trial periods. Do they
seem worth the additional encumbrances? What is the re-
sponse of consumer officials to the improved documentation?
Has there indeed been a qualitative improvement in the prod-
uct? Or is it clear that formal, detailed documentation has
no real part to play in intelligence, that it is and has been
properly excluded from intelligence methodology?
In addition to this formal trial on standard products., it
seems to me that policy officials requesting ad hoc intelligence
studies or reports could very well consider including among
their proposed terms of reference a requirement for thorough
documentation. Since such a requirement may not occur to
them (assuming they are unlikely to have read this particu-
lar plea), the intelligence officials discussing the proposed
terms of reference might suggest it be included. Let us make
the offer and see if it is opted.
The end result of this discussion and selective application.
should be the development of an agreed working methodology
for intelligence documentation. The methodology must be
realistic. I should not like to see (and shudder at the possi-
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bilities!) the establishment of inflexible requirements for its
application. The apparatus of documentation should be ap-
plied only where it helps, not where it hinders. Certainly
daily field operational intelligence is an area where it might
prove to be an impediment and costly luxury. But through
intelligent trial and error a practical doctrine should evolve.
A system that has proved its worth in every other profes-
sional field surely deserves careful examination and consider-
ation by members of this one. It does not seem too soon to
consider applying here the concepts of a revolution now some
hundred years old.
A system for the overt collection
of pictorial intelligence world-wide.
THE GRAPHICS COORDINATOR PROGRAM
Anthony Porcaro
Areas of low priority in terms of current intelligence in-
terest can become extremely important with little advance
warning, as the British found out at Dunkirk and after with
respect to the all-too-familiar coast across the Channel,' and
one of the first limitations to be placed on foreigners in a new
"hot spot" is a restriction against photography. It is plain
that the community's effort to keep ready against the lpossi.-
bility of surprise good basic intelligence on all areas, centered
in the NIS program, needs to include a comprehensive and
up-to-date collection of photography. Our military attaches
abroad have primary responsibility for such collection with
respect to military subjects, but for photographs of political,
economic, or sociological interest the vehicle is the commu-
nity's Graphics Coordinator Program. It encourages a con-
tinuing flow of pictorial information from low-priority areas,
in particular from places where U.S. mission photographic ac-
tivities would otherwise be limited or non-existent, as, from
minor posts in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
History of the Program
The Program, rather new in its developed present form,
has antecedents in many years of less systematic effort. As
early as the summer of 1948, acting on the request of the
CIA Graphics Register, the Department of State sent out a
serial outlining for its foreign posts a program for the co]Llec-
tion of photography primarily on political, geographic, social,
and economic matter and listing types of subjects on which
coverage was desired. A year later a follow-up serial was sent
out, and as a device to encourage volunteer participation a
limited amount of film was made available for officers inter-
ested in photographing the types of subjects specified.
'See chapter on topographical intelligence in James Leasor's The
Clock with Four Hands (New York, 1959). The BBC's broadcast appeal
for tourist photography brought in nine million snapshots.
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In 1957, to stimulate further the interest of volunteers and
guide their efforts, Graphics Register adopted a practice of
briefing as many outgoing foreign service officers as possible.
This did increase the number of pictures sent back, but the
program still suffered the disadvantage of depending on vol-
untary, extra-curricular activity for which no one at the for-
eign post felt any particular responsibility. The Chief of Mis-
sion was often unaware of its existence.
Seeing this deficiency, State Department's intelligence chief
suggested that the responsibility could be tied down by desig-
nating one officer to act as Graphics Coordinator at each post.
If an amateur camera fan, actual or potential, were given this
job and furnished camera and film, he would be likely to pro-
duce a good deal of photography himself as well as encourage
others. This idea was explored with a number of Chiefs of
Mission during a trip to Africa in 1958 and met with their ap-
proval. Circular instructions were therefore prepared, in col-
laboration with the Graphics Register, and sent to the field
asking each post to name such a Coordinator, listing general
requirements for photography, suggesting possible sources,
outlining arrangements for providing equipment, and pre-
scribing what to do with the product.
This instruction produced an immediate increase in the
volume of photography reaching the Register, but it became
evident that Coordinators should have in handy form some
standard instructions on the use of the camera and more spe-
cific guidance for the collection effort. In March 1960, ac-
cordingly, a booklet entitled Guide to Graphics Coordinators
was produced and copies sent to 260 posts abroad. The Guide
has a large section on the technical aspects of photography,
explains the rationale of the collection program, specifies the
subjects on which coverage is needed, and lists sources from
which the Coordinator might supplement his personal effort
and that of other officers at the post-local publications,
American travelers, and business firms for economic subjects.
The Political Section of the Foreign Affairs Manual also now
contains a section on the "Collection of Photographs" giving
standing instructions and encouragement.
Today the Program has become an effective effort for the
collection of ground photography world-wide. There are Co-
ordinators in 191 foreign service posts with 219 cameras at
their disposal. During fiscal year 1963 they were responsible
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for the procurement of 42,000 photographs, more than 16,000
of which were suitable for acceptance into the photographic
files of the Graphics Register. As an official activity of foreign
posts, the Program is now one aspect under which these are
subject to periodic review by Foreign Service inspectors, and
the Graphics Register is asked to comment on the quality of
the Coordinator at each post.
The Register, one of CIA's services "of common concern" to
the community, directs the entire program, using the informal
State Department Operations Memorandum (for which it has
been delegated signing authority, subject to clearance through
the State country desks). It issues collection requirements,
furnishes supplies and equipment, when necessary provides
funds for the purchase of photography, and receives, proc-
esses, and files the product.
Requirements and Response
Graphics Coordinators, like most collectors, work best under
the guidance of a requirements list which contains specific
targets. Such a list, prepared for every country where the
Program is active, is sent to the posts with a reminder that
whether or not to attempt photography of any item on the
list is left to the discretion of the Chief of Mission. The ex-
ercise of local discretion is particularly necessary in places
where restrictions have been put on the use of cameras.
A great deal of effort is put into the preparation of the re-
quirements lists. An attempt is made to anticipate the needs
of scheduled intelligence production, particularly the NIS
series and a handbook program of the CIA Clandestine Serv-
ices. Consideration must be given to the requirements of
targeting groups, specific NPIC requirements for collateral
material, the standing requirements of CIA offices, and de-
ficiencies in the Register's general file. At the same time du-
plication of items in the requirements lists of military attaches
or of requirements already levied on other collectors must be
avoided.
The resulting list contains both general categories and
specific items. It can be supplemented at any time by ad hoc
requests to fill needs as they arise. Current requirements
and additional guidance may be sent to a Coordinator after
he has informed the Register of travel he has planned.
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 Gra hics Program
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The response to requirements is generally good; recent ex-
amples can be cited from Lisbon and from Ecuador. A list of
requirements prepared for Portugal reflected needs in the
preparation of NIS sections relating to health and sanitation,
fuels and power, and industrial development in that country.
Taking this list, the Coordinator collected all the required
photography not only on Portugal but on Portuguese Africa as
well, the latter from embassy personnel who had recently
travelled there. He also made excellent use of local publi-
cations.
The Coordinator in Ecuador, supplied with a list of air-
fields on which there was no photography, obtained good
photographs of the majority of these and reported that the
rest of them had been photographed by the air attache, so
that the pictures could be obtained through military chan-
nels. He also obtained. from local AID personnel exclusive
photographs in response to requirements on agriculture, ter-
rain, and ethnic groups.
In these two examples, as in experience generally, the value
of a list of specific photographic needs stands out. Without
such a list the Graphics Coordinator tends either not to func-
tion or to produce photography which is duplicative or other-
wise not worth incorporating into the Register's files.
Coordination with Military Attaches
In the second example above there was spontaneous coordi-
nation with a military attache in obtaining photography.
Photography of military activity, personnel, and installations
is ordinarily the exclusive responsibility of the military at-
taches. Nevertheless the Graphics Coordinator does not ig-
nore opportunities to photograph significant military items
in the absence of the appropriate attache. The attaches are
often overloaded and appreciate any help they can get. It is
only necessary, as the requirements instruction usually points
out, to coordinate with respect to overlapping civilian-military
interests.
In practice the military and civilian photo collection activ-
ities seldom duplicate but rather complement each other.
Not infrequently, therefore, they may combine in a team ef-
fort, as when the Coordinator in Phnom Penh flew with the
air attache along the border with South Vietnam in order to
photograph the sections on which he had requirements.
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Non-military subjects which are yet militarily significant:
like highways, bridges, and harbors-and therefore :normally
covered by attache photography can be deemphasized by the
Coordinator in favor of his economic and sociological require-
ments. But this does not mean that he should neglect tar-
gets of opportunity related to the military requirements.
Individual Spectaculars
Photo collection under this program, primarily a contribu-
tion to basic intelligence and production with long-range
requirements, occasionally turns up items that have startling
application to current intelligence problems. In the develop-
ing nations, in particular, the Coordinators have provided
significant first-hand reporting on Bloc shipments and on
new construction done with Bloc aid. The two following cases
illustrate the use of such photography as collateral material
in reaching important intelligence conclusions.
The Army attache in Panama photographed covered deck
cargo on two Soviet vessels that passed through the canal
together. One of the two went to Cuba; the other, carrying
cargo of identical configuration, went to Ghana. 'That en
route for Cuba was believed to be a military shipment until
a report with photography was received from the Coordinator
in Ghana showing that the second ship had carried only a
variety of agricultural machines. This pointed to a prob-
ability that the shipment to Cuba was also not military but
agricultural.
The Coordinator at Khorramshahr, Iran, photographed for
a period of years the deck cargo of Soviet ships which came
up the Persian Gulf en route to Iraq: there was a requirement
for information on the economic and military aid Iraq was
receiving. The resulting "Khorramshahr collection" became
a key matrix in developing the technique for identifying mili-
tary cargo such as Soviet MIG aircraft and related items from
the size and shape of crates or other packaging, a technique
that came into its own at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
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Ways in which Soviet military
intelligence officers abroad are
likely to betray themselves.
PITFALLS OF CIVILIAN COVER
A. S. Rogov
In present-day conditions the work of GRU residencies 2 un-
der civilian cover in Soviet establishments abroad has certain
advantages over that of intelligence officers in military attache
offices. Case officers of these legal3 residencies have great
opportunities to establish contacts among the people, and it
is more difficult for counterintelligence to detect their activi-
ties when under civilian cover. There are usually far more
civilian officials in a country than military personnel staffing
attache offices, and it would be very difficult to keep a watch
on all of them; counterintelligence therefore has to establish
which civilians are in fact intelligence officers, whereas in a
military attache office they can assume that every member of
the staff is a potential intelligence officer.
These advantages can be realized, however, only by an in-
telligence officer who is well versed in security practices, has
high moral qualities, and is well trained for the work. Those
who do not meet this high standard soon blow their cover and
miss their operational opportunities. On arousing the slight-
est suspicion, intelligence officers under civilian cover attract
more counterintelligence attention to themselves than mili-
tary personnel do, the probability of compromise increases,
and they have to drop operational work and often even be
recalled.
This article will examine shortcomings and errors in the
work of case officers under civilian cover during the last few
' Adapted from a Top Secret study published in 196:1 by the Soviet
GRU under the circumstances described in Studies VIII 1, p. 16. It
had recently been decided to increase the use of civilian official cover
(Tass, trade mission, foreign service) for military intelligence officers
abroad, replacing the transparent cover afforded by the offices of
the service attaches.
Field stations.
Oficial-cover. MORI/HRP PAGES
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 Approved'For Rerease 2005/04/1'
years. It is based on data taken from the actual work of our
officers, and it cites many real instances as examples. It takes
advantage of a number of documents of the intelligence serv-
ices of foreign countries which have fallen into our hands and
show how and from what indications they unmask our mili-
tary intelligence officers in their civilian cover.
The sources of the inadequacies and errors that have been
manifested in the work fall roughly into four categories:
The personal qualities and cover behavior of the case officers
and their families.
Relations with the heads of the establishments providing
the cover.
The level of operational competence and tradecraft skill
shown in working with agents.
The soundness of direction from the Center.4
Living the Cover
Although considerably more attention is now being paid to
the training of each officer to be put under civilian cover, both
when he is studying at the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
particularly when he is being instructed in the GRU opera-
tional directorates before leaving for abroad, it is still often
the case that intelligence officers first assuming this cover
have failed to rid themselves completely of military habits or
of other habits or weaknesses that enable counterintelligence
to unmask them by their behavior. Some retain the habit of
clicking their heels, say "Yes Sir," "Aye, aye," and "Certainly,
Sir," and sometimes even salute in greeting.
Some officers display vanity, trying to show that they know
more than others of the same rank in the cover establishment,
especially foreign languages, or acting the eager beaver for
benefit of the head of the establishment. Others, without
thinking of the consequences, make it a point to reestablish
old friendships with former colleagues from military school or
previous assignments who happen to be in the country or with
personnel of the military attache offices or other officers under
civilian cover who have already drawn some suspicion on
themselves.
Considerable harm is done by having inadequate qualifica-
tions for the cover jobs, particularly that of engineer in trade
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delegations. Counterintelligence looks for this in studying
new arrivals posted to Soviet establishments. "Representa-
tives of business firms" call on them, ostensibly for trade talks,
but actually to determine the extent of their expertise. This
practice on the part of counterintelligence is very widespr::.ad;
most of our officers have to pass such surreptitious examina-
tions.
Not all officers show initiative, imagination, and a creative
approach to the problems of maintaining cover. Many use
primer methods, stereotypes, for instance to discover whether
they are being followed during their first days in a country--
looking back, "losing" a handkerchief or gloves, "tying" their
shoelaces, etc. Some study the layout of places that are diffi-
cult for counterintelligence (interconnecting stores, passage-
ways between streets and houses) without proper regard to
security, some like to get counterintelligence agents to follow
them with a view to determining their methods or sometimes
simply out of curiosity, and some have taken photographs
under the eyes of counterintelligence. Some officers exagger-
ate the danger of being followed by counterintelligence, while
others, like our officer K, have proved unable to detect it. All
officers should keep a constant and attentive eye on the activi-
ties of counterintelligence and report objectively everything
they notice.
Sometimes case officers are too active in ordering all kinds
of local magazines and publications. This attracts the atten-
tion of counterintelligence.
An important shortcoming is failure to adhere always and
without exception to security measures in dealing with friends
and relatives. Some comrades being put under civilian cover
do not keep this secret while they are still at the Academy, so
that many persons at the MDA get to know about their ap-
pointment before they leave the country. Their unmasking
may start from this. Others do not observe security measures
in communicating with members of their families left behind.
The following case occurred quite recently: One of the officers
under civilian cover in France asked a civilian colleague who
was going on leave to take a parcel to his wife, giving him the
Moscow address. When the man went there he not only
could tell that this was obviously a military officer's home but
actually saw a photograph of our officer in his colonel's uni-
form. On returning to France he expressed his astonishment.
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,
Civilian Cover
Cases. still occur of officers sending letters home (and
getting them) via the residency and the GRU instead of
through the cover establishment. Arrangements are now
being put into effect in the GRU to get all correspondence
into the channels of the covering department (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, etc.).
Some officers do not pay enough attention to indoctrinat-
ing the members of their families, so that breaches of security
occur through them. Some wives are chatterboxes, and in
the course of conversation they often unintentionally reveal
that they have military husbands; many of them are indis-
creet on the telephone. A special danger is presented by chil-
dren, who often let it out that their father is a military man.
Members of families must be given special briefings on security
matters both before they leave for abroad and at their post.
Some officers try to get a private car as soon as possible,
even though other employees on their level in the cover es-
tablishment do not have cars. Car owners returning from
receptions where they have been drinking often drive them-
selves though they know they should not; this is fraught with
serious; consequences, especially as it may attract the atten-
tion of the police. Such infractions were committed twice by.
our officer Orlovskiy, under cover on the staff of the trade
delegation in England, who had to be recalled. The rule
against driving after drinking has to be obeyed.
It should be borne in mind that counterintelligence can tell
whether our officers' cars have been used in the evening as
well as on their cover business during the. day; it runs speed-
ometer checks for this purpose. We have a device which will
let us switch, off the speedometer when making trips that
should not come to the knowledge of counterintelligence, but
this device has not yet been brought into use.
Despite the fact that in training courses serious attention is
given to the use of caches in cars to hide material collected
from agents in the event of an accident or a surprise search,
some officers still do not use these caches but continue to carry
the material in their pockets or under the seat.
Some officers are indiscreet in using prearranged phrases in
telephone conversations, visit the embassy too often, espe-
cially. on holidays, though their cover establishment is not
there, stay too long in secret offices, and are seen without'rea-
son in areas where there are military targets. All this in-
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creases the interest of counterintelligence in them and en-
ables it to identify the intelligence officers among the civilian
employees.
One should also be careful about social parties in the eve-
ning (on birthdays, name-days, 23 February, etc.) to which an
officer invites others who are under cover. If the host hap-
pens to be compromised to any extent, counterintelligence 'will
as a rule make a note of all others present on the occasion.
Some of our officers do not get along with their colleagues
in the cover establishment; they do not always show the nec-
essary tact in relations with the other employees, quarrel with
them, and in this way unwittingly arouse the suspicions of
counterintelligence.
The Cover Boss
The success that officers under civilian cover enjoy in their
intelligence activities depends to a considerable extent on the
attitude the heads of the cover establishments have toward
them, on. the experience, tact, and skill of these, on their ap-
preciation of the importance of the intelligence tasks and their
willingness to help in any possible way. It happens quite
often that some establishment heads make things more diii'i-
cult for our officers because of inexperience, while others re-
fuse to give them the necessary help. If the local resident 6
does not take steps in time to eliminate the troubles, situa-
tions arise which make it easier for counterintelligence to
identify our people. Several of the most outstanding examples
of this are given below.
Often our officers are not met on arrival at the railroad
station or the port of entry. Some do not attach any signifi-
cance to this and make their own way to their destination.
Others, however, behaving incorrectly from the very begin-
ning, show great indignation and demand special considera-
tion (as in the case of G in England), as a result of which
they may at once attract counterintelligence attention.
Sometimes our officers arriving in a country are not given
accommodations in the same houses as other employees of
the cover establishment on the theory that the military intel-
ligence resident should make arrangements for housing his
own people and only "clean" employees should occupy estab-
lishment quarters. That leaves our people to find accommo-
6 Chief of station.
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 Approved For Release 2005
dations for themselves and at once attracts attention to them.
A similar situation exists in regard to our officers' private
cars. Some establishment heads for the same reasons will not
accept these in their garages, and this also arouses suspicion.
Heads of establishments sometimes will not agree to a
change in cover jobs,' or they do so unwillingly. As a result,
it often happens that the replacement for an intelligence
officer who may have been compromised must take over the
same position and live in the same house, unaware that by
these acts of succession he is enabling counterintelligence to
draw the appropriate conclusion.
As a rule, our officers do not work full time in their cover
jobs; they are often called "three-hour men." Establishment
heads usually do not like it that our men cannot devote all
their efforts to the interests of their establishment, and some-
times they even send cables to the Center about the unde-
sirability of giving them a three-hour man. Their displeas-
ure finds its expression in various ways. They often fail to
invite our officers to receptions they arrange, pleading either
forgetfulness or economy. Our residents must intervene in
each such case and take steps to eliminate the trouble.
Heads of establishments usually do not take steps to make
all their employees more active in order to cover intelligence
activity. As a result, while the intelligence officers are out
in town in the evenings, the other employees are likely to be
sitting at home with their families. This makes it easier for
counterintelligence to mount surveillance on our people. The
intelligence officers also travel about the country more, work
more energetically, are considerably more active at various
kinds of receptions, and show greater curiosity. This differ-
ence in behavior is bound to arouse the attention of counter-
intelligence.
In order not to draw attention to themselves, not to stand
out, our officers must weigh the situation in each specific case
and make their actions fit in with those of the other employees
of the establishment. This will make it more difficult for
counterintelligence to detect their real employment. At the
same time, all possible steps must be taken to make all em-
ployees of cover establishments more active. Then our people
will not stand out. In this respect the situation in our estab-
lishments abroad is still bad.
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Cases of bad relations between our officers and the heads of
establishments or other employees are not infrequent. In one
of our establishments in the UAR, the relations between its
head, consul--General S, and our officer P were so bad over the
two years of their association that operational work suffered
seriously. Unpleasant interdepartmental talks were held on
this subject at the Center. And there have been similar cases
in other countries.
It should be emphasized that most of the heads of cover es-.
tablishments are on the whole satisfied with the work of our
people, and our residents make an effort to have our officers
work actively, without watching the clock, in their cover jobs.
Nevertheless establishment heads sometimes complain to our
residents about the bad work of our officers. There are in
fact a few lazy ones, who explain their idleness in their cover
jobs as due to their preoccupation with residency matters and
at the same time justify the ineffectiveness of their work in
the intelligence field by claiming to be overloaded in the cover
jobs. In such cases only the resident can be an objective
judge. There is of course no room for idlers. On the other
hand, establishment heads cannot be allowed to give our offi-
cers so much work that they cannot perform their opera-
tional duties properly.
Operational Competence
Errors and shortcomings in operational work are caused by
inadequate experience, low intelligence qualifications, or in-
ability (and sometimes unwillingness) to adapt operations to
the particular modus operandi of the opposing counterintel-
ligence. This can be demonstrated by examples taken from.
practice. It is known, for instance, that counterintelligence
is less active on weekends and holidays. Instead of making
use of this circumstance, however, case officers still do most of
their agent work on ordinary weekdays.
A case officer selecting deaddrops usually has other persons
(a driver, a second case officer) along. If counterintelligence
detains one of them, it usually gets to know others, because
operational workers often do not adhere strictly enough to se-
curity rules, now and then are simply careless, and in particu-
lar do not take steps to avoid betraying whoever is with them.
In London, for instance, a case officer engaged in selecting a
site for a deaddrop was approached and asked by a counter-
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intelligence agent what he was doing. Instead of giving some
plausible explanation to allay the man's suspicions and shake
him off, he tried to get away by saying that a car was waiting
for him around the corner. Naturally, the counterintelligence
agent followed him to the car where the driver and another
case officer were waiting and examined their papers. Thus
counterintelligence learned the names of three of our officers.
In another case an officer who had determined in the course
of carrying out an operation that he was being watched went
to the car where his supporting officer was waiting and so gave
him away.
Agents are not infrequently given inaccurate descriptions of
deaddrops and their sites, and the selection of the sites and
deaddrops is not always sound. This makes the work much
more difficult. Thus on one occasion an agent placed the ma-
terial to be passed on the left of an agreed tree, but our case
officer was expecting it on the right; not looking on the other
side, he went off empty-handed. Another agent was told
that material was, being left for him under cover of a stone.
The agent took this literally; at the agreed spot he found the
stone, picked it up, and was much surprised that nothing was
under it. He put it back and went away, not realizing that
it contained 2,000 pounds sterling wrapped up and smeared
over with cement to look like a stone. Another time a report
was rolled up and concealed in a bone. The report was well
hidden, but a dog ran off with the bone.
There has been one case when a photograph of the agent
himself was passed via a deaddrop. This is of course quite
impermissible. In this connection one may mention that case
officers sometimes photograph a prospective agent, one under
assessment, at meetings and thereby arouse his suspicion.
The methods of setting up signals in conjunction with
deaddrops are deficient in variety. As a rule chalk of various
colors is used, although it is often washed away by the rain.
On one occasion "a twig from a tree, hung on a fence" was
to serve as a signal. But that day the wind was blowing hard
and not one but several twigs were on the fence, so there was
no telling whether one was the signal. Many case officers still
do not attach enough significance to the matter of setting
up signals, considering it to be of little importance. But de-
fective signals often cause operations to break down and have
to be repeated, thus increasing the danger of compromise.
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Not all case officers know what is meant by a system of
deaddrops or do not give it serious attention, so that they work
with agents for a whole year, say, through two or three dead-
drops. Training at the Military-Diplomatic Academy is evi-
dently bad in this respect.
Not infrequently case officers drive to deaddrops or meeting
sites directly from their cover establishment. This naturally
makes it possible that they are followed. They frequently
park their cars at deaddrops or at meeting sites, and these
can attract the attention of counterintelligence agents who
may be passing by by chance.
Case officers on trips and staying at hotels often carry on
conversations without taking security precautions, so that the
contents of the talks become known to counterintelligence
through the use of eavesdropping or recording devices. More
generally, our officers pay too little attention to the possibil-
ity that their conversations may be overheard by counter-
intelligence and to the fact that an eavesdropping or record-
ing device may be installed in any building or car. Often con-
versations whose content could serve as the starting point
for unmasking our case officers are carried on in the most un-
suitable places. Once more officers must be reminded al-
ways to take into account the possibility that a conversation
may be overheard and to find a place for it that makes this
impossible.
A lookout should also be kept for new methods being used
by counterintelligence in pursuit of our people and counter-
measures taken as necessary. Cases have lately come to our
notice in which fingerprints are taken of our officers staying
at hotels by means of dishes placed specially for them.
Some officers still indulge in the practice of using false
names when registering at hotels or making purchases at,
shops. This can only give counterintelligence cause for re-
flection and may serve as grounds for expulsion from the
country. Others, despite repeated orders to the contrary, still
visit night clubs, where counterintelligence is particularly
active.
Especially serious mistakes are made in recruiting work, and
it is consequently advisable to go into these in greater detail.
Recruiting
Many of our case officers reveal themselves prematurely,
often on first acquaintance, make arrangements with the re-
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cruit for a meeting in town, warn him about the need for being
careful, or take material of little value from him. Thus our
man "I" took material of little value from a Frenchman of
Polish origin; counterintelligence learned about it, and "I" had
to be recalled as blown. Cne officer under civilian cover made
the acquaintance of a local inhabitant while visiting an ex-
hibition and at once gave him the task of photographing a
naval exhibit which was of interest to us. Some officers quite
unjustifiably offer money to acquaintances or give them ex-
pensive presents, which only arouses unnecessary suspicions
and puts them on the alert instead of furthering the recruit-
ment. Often case officers are led up the garden path by ex-
tortioners whom they are "developing," paying them money
they have not earned. (This actually happened, for in-
stance, in Pakistan.)
By and large our officers do not display sufficient ability
and initiative in finding agents of use to us in the right places,
and meanwhile they cultivate persons of little value with the
result that they have many acquaintances but none of them
suitable candidates for further study and recruitment. Thus
they give an impression of great activity, but in reality all
this work is unproductive and unpromising.
Some officers still resort often to the recruitment of persons
whom they have met a few times at receptions and in whom
counterintelligence is therefore undoubtedly to some extent
interested. They make little effort to find persons who do not
come to receptions and do not visit our establishments, the
ones with whom really promising relationships can be estab-
lished.. They do not exercise the initiative and ingenuity to
establish and develop such connections through their friends,
avoiding receptions in order to preclude observation by coun-
terintelligence.
Not all of our officers have the ability to develop relations
with an acquaintance correctly and gradually in order to bring
him to the point of recruitment; and residents and their depu-
ties give them little help in this respect. Not enough effort
is made, either, to use trusted agents for talent-spotting or
recruiting.
As a, rule, the operational situation is studied superficially,
so that features in the internal situation of a country which
could facilitate recruiting work often remain unexploited.
(For example, national and class antipathies create a field
for recruitment among those who are dissatisfied with the po-
litical regime.) Many favorable opportunities such as the
revolutions in Turkey, Ethiopia, and Laos, when certain per
sons could have been recruited or intelligence officers could
have been dispatched to take advantage of the circumstances,
have been lost.
Documents of foreign intelligence services in our possession
show that they are aware of some of our working practices.
They know that our case officers usually make recruiting ap-
proaches to journalists, students, and employees of business
houses and pay particular attention to people in NATO who
are short of money; and watching out for such approaches,
their counterintelligence quickly mounts surveillance on our
people and starts to bring about their downfall. The docu-
ments also mention cases of our recruiting post and tele-
graph employees for the purpose of getting access to corre-
spondence.
The documents declare that the main task given to our
agents is to obtain information on nuclear weapons and on
industrial targets concerned with defense (one agent being
assigned to get such an important NATO document as MC-70)
and that the methods of recruitment fall into a definite pat-
tern: at first money or presents are often given, then small
tasks to obtain material of little importance, and then more
complicated assignments aimed at getting classified docu-
ments, which as a rule bring large financial rewards. Coun-
terintelligence agents planted on us, knowing this pattern,
can act with confidence and carry out their work without
arousing any special suspicion on the part of our officers.
The documents report that we do not look for agents among
Communists or prominent progressive figures, all the more so
as practically all Communists have been removed from clas-
sified targets. It is believed, they. say, that contact with
agents is established and maintained mainly by our people
holding medium-level diplomatic ranks, very seldom by em-
ployees in technical and ancillary jobs. All this must be taken
into account; by us; some comrades do think that agent op-
erations can be carried out only by persons who hold diplo-
matic passports.
Recent experience shows that case officers under civilian
cover, having little contact with military circles in their cover
duties and also partly barred by security considerations
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have practically no acquaintances in the armed forces of the
country where they are assigned. Consequently there have
been very few recruitments of military personnel. Since our
officers in military attache offices do not now recruit per-
sonally, we may be heading into a situation in which we not
only have no prospect of expanding our operational work
among armed forces personnel but are out of this field alto-
gether. It is therefore time to start seeking better and more
effective ways for officers under civilian cover to recruit armed
forces personnel, with special attention to more active work
by the staffs of military attaches in spotting and assessing
candidates for recruitment and then handing them over to
case officers under civilian cover.
There are many shortcomings in work with so-called walk-
ins.r, Not all of our case officers have the right approach in
determining their real motives and intentions, and this leads
now and then to unfortunate consequences. Quite recently,
in Washington, for example, there were two cases in which
our officers, in spite of our strained relations with the USA,
arranged to meet a walk-in in town, though not much effort
was needed to establish that both were obviously counterintel-
ligence plants. It was only through intervention by the Cen-
ter that these meetings did not take place. On the other
hand, in another country (in the jurisdiction of the Third Di-
rectorate) two walk-ins were turned over without sufficient
reason to the police. They were brought to trial and an up-
roar in the press was precipitated, while in the end it turned
out that they had really come to us with good intentions,
being genuinely eager to give us all the help they could. It
is doubtful that any walk-in will take the risk in that country
in the future.
Now we do have good agents who originally came to us as
walk-ins, so it is important to have the right approach in
dealing with such persons. It must, however, never be for-
gotten that the offer may be a provocation on the part of coun-
terintelligence, which is endeavoring under various pretexts
to infiltrate or plant its people on us and get our people to
come to meetings in town or accept documents of little value
in order to detect them or compromise and catch them red-
This subject was covered in extenso by General Serov in Studies
VIII 1, p. 17 if.
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handed. There are cases in which direct invitations are given
to our people to become traitors to the Motherland.
To avoid getting himself into the position of having such
an invitation put to him, to evade the traps set by counter-
intelligence, to weigh the situation correctly, to pass with
honor any test connected with attempts by counterintelligence
to plant agents on us or perpetrate some other provocation--
all this can be achieved by an intelligence officer who pos-
sesses high moral qualities and ability, is mature, experienced,
and enterprising, and knows how to behave in complicated
circumstances and find a way out of any situation.
Some case officers fall into the error of becoming careless
when dealing with trusted cutouts, notably in buying topo-
graphic maps or technical equipment of which the sale to us
is forbidden. Our officer T in the trade delegation in ]Eng-.
land, for example, was actively engaged in buying equipment;
through a person he trusted. The operation involved a great
deal of correspondence with the Center and the planning of
concerted action for transportation and delivery of the equip-
ment via other countries. It turned out, however, that all
this trouble was for nothing; the trusted intermediary was
acting under the control of counterintelligence.
Another case was the following. Our officer V in the USA
went with a trusted person to the latter's office to get maps.
While this man went into the office to pick out the maps, V
stayed in the car. That was fortunate, because it turned out
that a counterintelligence agent was watching all the time
out of a window, waiting for him to come into the office and
be caught; on the spot. What had happened was that coun-
terintelligence had already mounted an intensive surveillance
on V, and he had discussed the matter of obtaining the rn.aps
on the telephone, in disregard of security measures.. Al-
though V escaped a flagrant compromise, representations
about him nevertheless followed from the State Department.
It should be borne in mind that most stores selling maps
are under the surveillance of counterintelligence. In Canada
there occurred the following incident. Our officer K failed
to establish proper communications with a trusted person. in
connection with the purchase of city maps. One day this
person threw a note into K's mailbox saying that counterin-
telligence was taking an interest in him and he was there-
fore stopping work. Later, however, four days before a pre-
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arranged meeting, K found another note in which the man
said he would continue working. Despite the obvious contra-
diction in these notes, which should have put K on his guard,
he decided to go to the meeting. There he received some maps,
but not the ones he wanted; and after a few days he had to
leave Canada.
Headquarters Failings
In the direction and management at the Center there also
are quiite a lot of shortcomings which impede the activities of
officers under civilian cover.
The rule we have made that data on our officers who are
sent abroad should be removed from information offices has
become known to the counterintelligence services of foreign
countries, and this measure obviously now does more harm
than good. If counterintelligence knows that a person it is
checking on is a military man or that he lives in Moscow,
and an information office will not give any data about him,
then it can only conclude that he is probably an intelligence
officer. We must go into this question and find a remedy.
Formalism won't work; in some cases, possibly, it would be
better not to remove the files from information offices.
Some case officers under civilian cover continue to remain
in their posts for longer than the customary four years with-
out getting a cover promotion. Worse, there have been
cases, because of lapses on the part of GRU directorates, in
which an officer is given a cover post junior to one he held
earlier in another country, or vice versa (for instance, a
chauffeur in one country becomes a diplomatic official in
another). Our officers are given leave once every two years
instead, of annually as customary in the cover position. All
these discrepancies arouse the attention of counterintelli-
gence in all NATO countries, among whom, according to the
documents in our possession, such information is regularly
exchanged.
There are cases when officers under civilian cover receive
their salaries directly from the residency, thus revealing
themselves in the cover establishment as belonging to another
department. Here in Moscow, correspondence goes on be-
tween the finance departments of the GRU and other agen-
cies regarding the payment of the difference in rubles, so that
many employees in the other agencies get to know the iden-
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tity of officers under cover. Steps are now being taken to
eliminate these shortcomings.
Not infrequently the operational directorates make miscal-
culations and try to keep a case officer in place even
though he has been compromised instead of hurrying to :recall
him. At the present time the situation changes so quickly---
and usually for the worse-that such a delay sometimes leads
to the most unfortunate consequences. This happened in the
USA, for example, to our case officer M, who not unavoidably
was apprehended, is now being interrogated, and will be
brought to trial.
There are important shortcomings in the management and
execution of reporting functions. Officers under cover are
less effective in their reporting than the personnel of military
attache offices. They send in few reports of their observations
during trips they make around the country; they are igno-
rant of the military situation; they produce few records of
conversations. It is necessary to eliminate these shortcom-
ings as soon as possible.
Until recently our residents or case officers under civilian
cover, when they obtained some important information, re-
ported it first to the heads of the cover establishments and
then to the GRU, so that it was transmitted to the Center
in duplicate channels, and often the report via the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs even arrived first. Now such cases prac-
tically never occur.
Cooperation and coordination between GRU and KGB resi-
dencies have now improved greatly, so that it has become pos-
sible to eliminate unnecessary inquiries and duplication al-
most completely. Thus the decision of the Central Commit-
tee of the CPSU in this matter is being brought into force.
The legal residencies set up under non-military cover in
most countries have found themselves without the necessary
technical. security resources. They do not have their own
transport to use in operational work. Darkrooms for photog-
raphy and radio and operational equipment are still in the
military attache offices in most countries. These matters must
be put right as quickly as possible.
Residencies under civilian cover are still being sent officers
who lack the personal qualities to be good recruiters (ability
to attract those with whom they talk by their cheerfulness,
natural behavior, attentiveness, etc.), qualities which facili -
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tate the establishment of rapport and consequently lead to
success in recruiting. Not infrequently they are sent tongue-
tied, unsociable, sullen, and unattractive officers, bad mixers
who are unlikely to be able to establish a wide circle of ac-
giiaintances. There are also still cases when they are sent
officers who are without experience in running agents or have
displayed incompetence in solving operational problems.
Within residencies also, the direction of intelligence offi-
cers working under civilian cover leaves something to be de-
sired. Many residents try to direct each case officer sepa-
rately; this is done with great difficulty and often results in
having some officers really doing nothing. In present-day
conditions it is essential that our legal residencies be orga-
nized on more efficient lines. In any establishment where
there are even two case officers they should be constituted as
an administrative group, and in large residencies the subordi-
nation direct to the resident of any single officer working un-
der civilian cover should be avoided. The organization of legal
residencies should be such as to facilitate keeping an eye on the
progress of operational work, keeping each person active, and
maintaining the necessary security.
In conclusion it should be emphasized once more that in
the work of legal residencies there are still many shortcom-
ings and errors which bring, above all, poor recruiting re-
sults. Lack of good and thoughtful direction on the part of
residents and a low level of personal responsibility in individ-
ual case officers are likewise important shortcomings. Not
enough effort is made to study and take into account the ac-
tual operational situation in the country in question, and fa-
vorable situations for recruitment are not always exploited.
Recruiting methods are allowed to follow a pattern. Security
is weak. Little use is made in legal operations of such a good
method for directing agents as communication by secret
writing.
The operational directorates of the GRU must give better
briefings to persons being sent out, bringing to their attention
examples of poor methods which cause errors and shortcom-
ings in the work, and the directorates should also guide the
operational work of the legal residencies more efficiently. In
the field, the practical situation must always be taken into ac-
count and working in a set pattern must be avoided. We must
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increase the responsibility of the individual case officer with
respect to recruiting; a case officer to whom recruiting tasks
have been assigned has done his job when he returns only if
he has recruited at least one agent. We must improve the
training at the Military-Diplomatic Academy for work under
cover, stressing the development of students' ability to adapt
themselves to life in civilian positions.
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Composite character sketch of
a category of potential agent.
PORTRAIT OF A CUBAN REFUGEE
Andrew Wixson
A recent article on the personality of the Libyan pointed
out that "any attempt to characterize all members of a so-
ciety . . . is necessarily a stereotype, subject to error in indi-
vidual application." 1 The following attempt to describe the
composite personality of certain Cuban refugees is fraught
with even greater likelihood of error with respect to individuals
because the sample under study is much less homogeneous
than the Libyan was. It ranges from illiterate peasants to
highly educated members of professional groups; the level of
intelligence, which is comparable over-all with that found in
the United States, runs from nearly deficient to superior. In
addition, while the Libyan data were gathered through the
administration of a psychological test designed for such pur-
poses, the data analyzed in the present study are the by-prod-
uct of assessments conducted for a variety of reasons, often
under much less than ideal conditions.2 Two characteristics
were common to all members of the group: all had fled Cuba
because of their opposition to the Castro regime, and at the
time of their assessment all were either candidates for anti-
Castro clandestine activity or actively engaged in such ac-
tivity.
With such great variability in the sample it is riot antici-
pated that the personality descriptions which follow will be
accurate for any given individual. But a delineation of the
psychological features common to the majority of the group
will serve to describe a composite or representative Cuban
agent who manifests certain critical areas of adjustment.
These areas must be examined in each agent by the case offi-
'Studies, VII 1, p. 85 f.
This study is based on an analysis of tests administered to 201 male
and 19 female Cubans between May 1960 and October 1963. The
sample includes only those subjects for whom complete data are
available. MORI/HRP PAGES 35-41
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cer, but the general portrait presented below may give a
frame of reference from which to consider the individual op-
erational assessment. Successful handling will of course re-
quire careful study of the individual agent, for how any in-
dividual reacts to the psychological and environmental forces
acting upon him at any given time depends upon his own life
history and his current needs and motives.
The Male: Social Relationships
During his early years the typical Cuban male is inclined
to be. highly responsive to the world around him and to the
people in it. Since he is very sensitive to others' needs and
can respond appropriately to these needs, people tend to seek
him out as a companion and cater to him. As a result he is
apt to be somewhat spoiled, relatively immature, and over-
dependent upon those who take care of him. He discovers it
is easy to find people who will do things for him and make
allowances for his deficiencies. As he grows older, however,
and is expected to show more independence and self-reliance,
he may see, perhaps for the first time in his life, that his abil-
ity to play on others' feelings is not enough; rather than
being able to gain support from others for what he is, he only
meets with criticism for what he cannot do. His solution for
this problem is to develop means to keep people at a distance,
not only so they will be less demanding of him but also to con-
trol his own tendency to become involved with them. At the
same time he learns, unconsciously, to become more rational
and less emotional in his response to his environment.
On the surface, then, this representative Cuban exhibits
considerable defensiveness and control, a kind of detachment
in dealing with others. He is actively social, relating easily
to others on a superficial basis, but the chip on his shoulder
is readily apparent when he is threatened with becoming in-
timately involved. He makes a very favorable first impression
but deliberately holds people at a distance so that they will
make no more demands on him than he thinks he can tol-
erate. If they do demand more, he may withdraw from the
situation, thus gaining the reputation of being fickle and dis-
appointing. If withdrawal is not possible, he can be actively
cruel and hostile toward those with whom he is most intimate,
turning on them unexpectedly and violently as a means of
forcing them to retreat. He has at all times the potential
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for over-responding: he can be too demonstrative toward and
involved with people and activities which by his criteria he
finds proper and worthy, and at the same time he can be
equally demonstrative against and. hostile toward objects
which he considers bad or improper. This sort of loss of con-
trol is often followed by guilt reactions characterized by de-
pression and apathy, and in this phase there may be many
expressions of inferiority or unworthiness.
There are a considerable number of Cuban males who lack
the natural social skills and interpersonal sensitivity de-
scribed above. Most members of this second group emphasize
intellectual or procedural skills as a means for gaining ac-
ceptance. That is, they try to achieve recognition for what
they can do, not for what they are. Since they are very much
aware of the need to maintain some sort of social adjustment,
even though it be superficial, they tend to be much concerned
with the impression they make on others. They are quite
moody and unpredictable in their prolonged associations with
others, reacting strongly to real or imagined criticism of their
behavior. An alternative solution for this group is the adop-
tion of a limited but reasonably comfortable social role which
is rigidly maintained even if it becomes inappropriate. The
displaced person who does not change his way of behaving, in
spite of loss of wealth, rank, position, or status probably be-
longs in this subgroup. An example would be the former mili-
tary officer who acts toward his civilian colleagues as if he
were still in command of troops.
Attitudes toward Work
At the same time he is making this adjustment in his re-
lationships with other people, the typical Cuban tries to be
less emotional and more rational in his view of the world.
He tends to immerse himself in his daily routine and to be-
have as if he were a self-disciplined individual without need for
external direction and control. He admires intellectual
achievement in others and can himself learn facts arid pro-
cedures fairly rapidly, but these attributes only make him ap-
pear better informed and intellectually oriented than he is
in fact or he himself feels. Since he can retain information
with more ease than he can assimilate or understand it, he
tends to be defensive when he meets with any form of testing
or criticism. Unless he has a supervisor whom he respects
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and admires, his work productivity tends to fall off when he
is criticized. On the other hand, he can work quite compe-
tently without constant supervision if he knows exactly what
he is supposed to do or if he is working alone. It is stressful
for him to be subjected to continual demands to relate to
others. His initial reaction to such demands is further with-
drawal, and then if the demands persist either violent reac-
tion against those making them or flight from the situation.
There is a smaller but still numerous group whose outward
behavior under normal circumstances is quite similar to that
just described but whose reaction to solitude is quite different.
These, though also active and dedicated to their jobs, become
very tense and agitated when placed in situations which do
not allow them to interact with others. For them stress is
solitude; they require outside distraction and social demands
in order to maintain their adjustment.
Emotional Expression
Another mental mechanism the Cuban male uses to con-
trol his tendency toward emotional involvement with associ-
ates is denial of his inherent sensitivity. He avoids the neces-
sity for expressing his feelings by relying on procedures, rules,
and regulations of social intercourse and work activity. His
underlying sensitivity is evident in his ability to temper this
impersonal behavior with judgment; at the same time, how-
ever, he does not have his emotions under complete control,
so that he is apt to be somewhat inconsistent and unpredict-
able in his behavior. He can be cruel or even sadistic when one
least expects it or, on the other hand, almost overwhelmed
by guilt and remorse at having been cold or cruel to others.
By virtue of the very sensitivity he is trying to control,
the Cuban strongly retains the imprint of the culture from
which he springs: he is apt to be devoted to the traditions
and mores of his early surroundings. He has so learned
the rules, regulations, customs, and procedures his society
follows that he has a blueprint to guide him in almost every
situation he may meet. As a result, he is very cautious about
adopting new ways to meet new situations; he does not readily
accept new ideas unless he has some assurance that his peers
understand and accept them. In this sense he lacks versatil-
ity and adaptability. He may be prone to prejudgments and
logic-tight mental compartmentation; that is, he may be un-
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able to recognize that he is behaving inconsistently and in-
efficiently from one situation to another.
The Female
In general, the composite Cuban female sampled parallels the
male in her development.~i Initially sensitive, she, too, must
learn to become more aloof and less involved with the people
in her world. But her solution for the problem is considerably
less efficient, psychologically, than that of her male partner.
The typical Cuban female tends to be oriented somewhat
less to the intellectual than the male. This does not mean
that she is less intelligent but rather that she is much more
aware of the demands made on her by the environment. She
tries to reduce these demands by losing herself in the routine
activities of her life, compensating a certain lack of procedural
skill with sheer conscientiousness and determination. Some-
what more than the male, then, she can perform boring, te-
dious, and repetitive activities for long periods with little ap-
parent :fatigue or loss of efficiency. Since she is deliberately
not interested in making herself socially acceptable to more
than a few persons, she can function quite adequately in en-
vironments which most people would consider unfriendly,
cold, or unrewarding.
At the same time, however, since she is fundamentally de-
pendent upon someone in her world for support, guidance, and
gratification of her needs, she tends to be loyal to and in-
volved with a few key individuals. (The bond she has with
them is not a permanent one, for she can switch her allegi-
ance, albeit with considerable initial difficulty, from one to
another supporting figure.) Thus on the one hand she dis-
courages most approaches to social involvement by an imper-
sonal and fairly rigid adherence to conventional social rela-
tionships or, when particularly pressed, by being actively neg-
ative or hostile, and on the other she jealously guards the
few more intimate relationships which she has cautiously es-
tablished and views any threat to these with considerable
anxiety and suspicion. In the absence of threat, her long-
term relationships are more predictable and less fickle than
The observations which follow are tentative indeed; they are based
on a very small sample, probably not at all representative of Cuban
women in general.
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those of the male, but they are no more satisfying, in the
long run, than his disappointing superficiality.
Operational Implications
Given these personalities as generic, what tendencies with
respect to major strengths and weaknesses and potential han-
dling problems can be anticipated? The male, especially,
may have a potential for being particularly adept at recogniz-
ing and describing the feelings and attitudes of others with-
out himself becoming so involved as to lose his objectivity.
To the extent that this ability were verified in the individual
agent he could be used to evaluate the emotional states of
individuals or assess the relationships among members of a
group. The female is much less likely to be adept at such
evaluative tasks; she has more often pushed the development
of impersonal work skills at the expense of her fundamental
sensitivity.
The main psychological disadvantage of the adjustments we
have discussed here is that they take a great deal of energy
to maintain. Both male and female are under considerable
pressure to become more involved with others than they wish
to be. Keeping uninvolved leads to marked strain and tension
which are often relieved by the use of alcohol and drugs, al-
though not usually to the point of alcoholism or addiction.
Obviously, the case officer must check on his agent's tolerance
for fatigue and stress and how he counters these strains.
From a management point of view the Cuban may seem
disappointing in long-range performance and at the same time
overly sensitive to criticism. The male, seeming more intellec-
tual than he himself feels and being verbally fluent and able
to learn procedures quickly, may appear to understand some-
thing when he really does not. Thus he may be overrated
during training, and in operations the discrepancy between
expected and actual results may be increased by his lack of
versatility: once he has found a way of doing things he does
not readily shift to new patterns which may be demanded
by the operational situation. On the contrary, he may persist
in partially learned but inappropriate modes of behavior. The
female, as we have seen, is somewhat less capable procedurally,
but her dogged application covers her inefficiencies.
Each therefore has a potential for underlying feelings of
inferiority. Direction and control are necessary, but criti-
cism and testing, especially from someone who is not respected
n lA-RDP78T03194A000200'020001-1
and admired, may be extremely threatening. A supervisor
must be careful to direct his criticism to the methods and
procedures being used rather than to the performance of the
individual. But any change of procedures must be preceded
by long and careful training.
The biggest problem appears to be that of long-terrni loyalty
and control. Essentially, the Cuban is loyal only to himself.
With a few exceptions, he cannot tolerate close relationships
for long periods of time; only temporary liaison is possible.
In his relationship with a case officer he will tend to view him-
self as a colleague rather than as a subordinate.
In the approach to the female, a painstaking study of her
emotional needs must be made in order to find a way to win
her from those to whom she feels loyalty. The male, on the
other hand, can often be subverted by appeals to his intellec-
tual orientation and devotion to objectivity. One consequence
of these mental mechanisms is that he usually has quite ade-
quate justifications, in his own mind at least, for all his be-
havior. It may then be possible to provide him with an in-
tellectual rationale for engaging in activities inconsistent
with or contradictory to his usual pattern. If this is done
the new action will no longer be perceived as being incon-
sistent and can be carried out with little or no anxiety.
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The preservation of personal
dignity as a wellspring of
Muslim behavior.
"FACE" AMONG THE ARABS
Peter A. Naffsinger
George Washington, American children are told, having cut
down his father's favorite cherry tree, showed his sterling
character by confessing to the deed. An Arab hearing this
story not only fails to see the moral beauty of such behavior
but wonders why anyone would ever compromise his integrity
by admitting thus his guilt. As to Washington's explanation
that "I cannot tell a lie," the Arab asks how a man could rise
to the presidency if he were not suave enough to use a well-
concocted falsehood as a tactic in emergency behavior.
The values and rationale underlying these reactions are an
aspect of "national character," a factor said to be of impor-
tance in estimating likely courses of national action and cer-
tainly of importance in dealing man to man with individuals.
A syndrome of the Arab values can be called the face concept,
an understanding of which is essential for a case officer in
his interpersonal relationships with peoples stretching across
North Africa and from Greece to Japan. Although we are con-
cerned here specifically with Arabs, the same concept is ap-
plicable in a broad way to most Muslim groups and to some
Far Eastern peoples.
An understanding of the concept will help define an area
of potential difficulty in personal relations and give insight
into stated and unstated Eastern attitudes. It will explain
the extreme difficulty of resurrecting once-fallen political fig-
ures and getting them any public acceptance. It will show
motivating forces which may be operationally useful, for ex-
ample in contriving a character defamation.
The high value which the cultural patterns of the East place
upon the concept of personal dignity is central to that be-
havior from which the frustrated American encountering it
for the first time is likely to conclude that an Arab is a living
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non-sequitur or else deliberately perverse. Although there
are many demographic and cultural subgroupings of the East-
ern peoples-even the Arab may be an agricultural peasant,
a nomad of the desert, a seafarer of the Persian Gulf, a sophis-
ticated urbanite, a university student-the ideal of main-
taining face has a universality among them, so that a general
analysis of the concept will be pertinent, with minor varia-
tions, to all. Yet it should be borne in mind that, since cul-
tural groups consist of individual men, there will be individual
deviations from the generalizations drawn in the following
discussion.
Dignity vs. Objectivity
A society expects from all its members an adherence to its
own norms and values. According to the degree to which they
do so adhere, people are judged acceptable or not acceptable
in that society. For the American, earning social acceptabil-
ity by maintaining his honor is a matter of equating honor with
personal integrity. The American manifests his integrity by
an uncompromising willingness to face objective truth and
fact. Personal respect and acclaim go to him who makes a
ruthless search for facts regardless of how self-damaging the
results may be.
The American can apologize for revealed shortcomings and
gain respect and prestige with an honest effort to correct his
own errors. In our culturally determined scale of values the
achieving of impersonal objectivity with regard to facts and
truth is thus more important than preserving a man's per-
sonal dignity before the world at large. At all times and in
all circumstances the American is culturally obliged to recon-
cile his position and his person with truthfully interpreted
reality: witness the fact that the verb "to rationalize" usually
has for us an ethically negative flavor.
The Arab in his society is likewise expected to show per-
sonal integrity in order to be socially acceptable. He, however,
manifests his honor and integrity by making a public, outward
impression of dignity derived from an ostensible lack of guilt.
Even if facts and conditions speak to the contrary, the social
veneer of non-guilt must be maintained evident and dominant
if he is to achieve the socially demanded face. Dignity and
stature are granted only to those who show themselves as
flawless; the society of the Arab world has no place or respect
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for one whose faults or errors come to public knowledge.
Blame, fault, or error accruing to an Arab personally brings
his immediate fall from social grace and a loss of dignity or
face. He therefore feels revulsion and bitterness for any-
thing that tends to compromise him in this way.
Americans and most other Western-bred persons regard it
as merely socially inconsiderate or impolite to mention an-
other's errors in public. Management courses teach psy-
chologically graceful ways to correct erring employees with-
out hurting their feelings, suggesting for example "Maybe it
would be better if we did this another way" instead of a blunt
and ego-damaging "You are doing this all wrong." The Arab
would be quick to grasp the wide divergence between the two
approaches. But what in American life is a matter of tact
and consideration is to him a highly charged social confron-
tation with many complexities and subtle ramifications of
which the American would never have dreamed.
If, as becomes evident after some exposure to Arab be-
havior, a lack of guilt is what confers on an Arab the dignity
or face by which his personal integrity and social acceptabil-
ity are measured, there must be further consequences flowing
from such a displacement of criteria in the social value system
as this seems from the viewpoint of Western culture. If lack
of guilt gives social dignity, the Arab must maintain his
guiltless appearance at all costs. Facts and circumstances
can combine in many different ways to reflect unfavorably
upon any man, but the Arab cannot afford to allow accrued
facts or logic to impute any flaw or guilt to him personally.
In self-defense he must interpret the assembled facts sub-
jectively, deny them outright, or reject as illogical any con-
struction that leads to intimations of personal shortcomings.
To the American this defense is non-objective, a distortion of
truth, and therefore paradoxically destructive of integrity,
unless he can take the Arab point of view and recognize per-
sonal face as having a higher value than fact or logic in the
society.
There are, it is true, many situations in American and
Western society in which this kind of defensive thinking tends
to arise; but Westerners are expected to be able to recognize
and admit the logical flaws when they are pointed out to them.
Severe cases of inability to achieve objectivity are interpreted
in American society as manifesting pathological symptoms of
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neurosis or psychopathic personality. Not so in the Near
East. In the dynamics of the Arab social system dignity or
face is not compromised for the sake of the lesser values found
in fact and logic.
In an oil company installation near the Persian Gulf, an
American linguist in the training department, after drafting
some exercises to be used in instructing American employees
in spoken Arabic, gave them to three bilingual Saudi Arabs
working for him to check for syntactic and orthographic cor-
rectness before publication. The drafts were all tacitly
okayed, returned without change; but after they had been
published several glaring errors in the work were discovered.
Distressed, the linguist questioned the three Arabs, who re-
luctantly explained that the inaccuracies had of course been
obvious to them but they did not feel it would be right to point
them out and thereby cause embarrassment to their boss and
good friend !
Here the incompatible American and Arab attitudes re-
flected well the different dominant criteria of each. The
American was interested solely in the objective accuracy of
the work, a matter which was of secondary importance to the
Arabs. They believed in good faith that they had acted with
honor as gentlemen in protecting the linguist's dignity above
all other considerations.
If an American family in the Near East uses domestic help
from the local populace, it may often happen that a vase, say,
is accidentally knocked over and broken during the cleaning of
a room. When the housewife comes upon the pieces, perhaps
picked up and disposed of, her only minimally tactful "How did
you break the vase?" will be met with a startled look of sur-
prise, a sheepish grin, and then, after a few hestitating mo-
ments of agonized embarrassment, likely the reply, "Oh I
didn't; I would never break anything of yours!"
The housewife's account of the incident to her husband will
probably center on the outrage to her Western ethic-". . . and
after I saw the pieces he had the nerve to stand right there
and deny it to my face." But the servant, though he truly
regrets the accident and would not have done anything of the
sort on purpose, has by his own lights reacted naturally and
properly in repelling the immediate challenge to his dignity.
A subtler approach by the housewife, merely taking notice of
the debris in the presence of the servant, would probably have
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elicited from him a discreet explanation of how ". . . the vase
fell while I was dusting the furniture" and thus graciously
permitted him to save face.
In matters that may involve him in guilt or blame the
Arab's untruths, half-truths, avoidance of reply, or other
ploys that jar Westerners do not spring from any perverse de-
sire to deceive; they are facets of the need to maintain that
personal dignity and face which in his system of values take
precedence.
Public Image vs. Personal Conscience
As the American is taught to respect objectivity and! facts,
he is also encouraged to reconcile his personal position with
the relevant facts in any given situation. From his earliest;
years he is impressed, by story and example, with the nobility
his culture attaches to the act of admitting his guilt or per-
sonal failings which have contributed to some acknowledged
larger wrong. He is imbued with the conception that it is
manly to own up to his guilt straightforwardly, even at the
price of self-injury or extreme embarrassment.
So firmly is this idea imposed that every American, except
the psychopathic personality, can have intense feelings of per-
sonal guilt and may even lie awake nights worrying about
wrongs, real or fancied, that he has done to cause hurt to
others. He can relieve these guilt feelings by making an apol-
ogy to the injured party or otherwise rectifying the wrong.
The embarrassment entailed in admitting error is of less con-
sequence than the need to alleviate the pangs of guilt.
Christianity emphasizes the personal God within each man,
who enforces an ideal of perfection in behaviour and in
thought. The sacrifice of the "only begotten Son" dramatizes
this personal God interested in each individual soul. The
Christian is supposed, by prayer or confession, to ask pardon
for every instance of failure to reach perfection, and it is not,
difficult to see how this concept could instill a sense of per-
sonal guilt and obligation beyond self. The development of
conscience or capacity for feeling guilt in religious life nat-
urally spills over into non-religious contexts in cultures where
Christianity is dominant and so is evident in other acts of
life.
Offering sharply contrasting principles to these, Islam_
religion., social force, and almost complete way of life of the
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Arab Near East-naturally shapes much of the Arabs' cultural
attitude. Even the Christian Arabs are immersed in a back-
ground of Muslim culture. By definition and profession,
Islam is the "surrendering of the self to the will of Allah," and
it portrays a God remote, all-pervading, and wholly out of
contact with the individual man. In prayers, to be sure, Mus-
lims implore God to do well by them and lead them on the
right path. But all of Muslim theology conveys the feeling
that God is so all-pervading and at the same time so far above
and removed from the individual that all human actions and
their consequences are but the sequels of God's doings: the
individual is merely an animate pawn. This supremely im-
personal God, above and beyond rather than within a per-
son, impresses on the individual no requirement to accept
guilt or personal responsibility for anything or to develop a
conscience differentiating between intrinsic right and wrong.
Thus when a Westerner tries to show an Arab that he is to
blame for something, he never really succeeds in getting the
point across. Western personnel at oil installations in Iraq,
Syria, and the Persian Gulf area are frustrated in trying to
correct mistakes of Arab trainees on industrial equipment.
When confronted with having made a wrong move that could
have had the most serious of safety or technological conse-
quences, the Arab is unwilling and unable to accept the idea
that he should feel either sorry or responsible for his mistake.
He dismisses both blame and censure with a casual "min
allah"-"It is from God." To the remonstrance that it had
better not happen again he answers "inshallah," "If God wills
it," with exasperating nonchalance. In agent work, where su-
pervision cannot be so close, this indifference to personal re-
sponsibility and tendency to atomistic thinking will neces-
sarily be even more troublesome.
To the Arab, all is from Allah, and if Allah does all, the indi-
vidual cannot be held responsible. Man is required to follow
the teachings of the Koran and the Hadith and to perform
his religious obligations, but he is not answerable to an inner
God, a conscience. Instead of a sense of personal responsi-
bility for his acts, the Arab has a deeply inculcated fear of
outside forces; he realizes he must answer for his actions to
society. This social sensitivity, together with his all-is-from-
Allah fatalism, may in some measure explain why the Arab
world knows scarcely any suicides, that common aberration
-RDP78T031W 0626O'020001-1
of Christian living in the West. At any rate it explains why
he is more interested in the face he presents to society than
in exposing the facts of a situation.
The Surrogate
The Arab's need to project his self in a form completely ac-
ceptable to the harsh judgments of society renders his face,
his dignity mask, a type of surrogate as thought of in the
philosophy of Jung, one in which he wraps the very essence
of his being. This is another form of that transference of self
in complete allegiance which is an easily accomplished ina-
neuver in the Arab world and the entire Near East. In poli-
tics the surrogate takes the form of a popular personality who
has become the leader. The political surrogate with which
the people identify themselves and their very souls must al-
most undergo deification to be worthy of their complete faith,
allegiance, and devotion, and he must necessarily remain free
of any conceivable flaw, unblemished in their eyes. At the first
sign of failure, faltering, or political error, he immediately
loses all allegiance-transferred to some new strong political
personality moving in-and suffers his demise without anyone
wondering why he was once in such high acclaim. There is a
pointed moral here for anyone trying to influence political de-
velopments in Muslim countries: once a charismatic leader
had been overthrown, it would be most difficult to arouse sup-
port or popular following to place him in power again. Pro-
moters of a countercoup would be hawking tainted goods.
A similar surrogate within the individual is the outside
mask or face to which the self or ego is transferred by the
Arab, along with all his pride and self-esteem. This face pre-,
sented to society at large then assumes more importance than.
his real self. The finding of defects or faults in it constitutes
an attack on his very being, for there is no alternative surro-
gate to which the ego can be transferred. Hence the Arab
whose integrity or face is challenged and in danger of being
found imperfect is in quite a delicate position. He has to go to
extremes to keep his social mask intact, thus taking actions
completely contrary to the Western ethic and bewildering to
the Westerner.
The constant effort to keep up face seems almost paranoiac
by Western standards. Entertaining delusions of grandeur,
claiming to be persecuted, magnifying faults in others that
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one wants to hide in oneself, calling constantly for redemp-
tion and resurgence of past greatness-all this is behavior
typical of paranoia, but it is manifested in every Arabic politi-
cal newspaper and among individuals in day-to-day social in-
tercourse. It cannot be considered abnormal in the Arab
cultural setting. Given the importance of face to the Arab,
such behavior must be recognized as a socially practical and
accepted method of warding off or refuting any outside at-
tack on his integrity. The Westerner who, recognizing in the
Arab the personality traits which in Western culture signify
paranoia or inferiority complex, is pleased with himself for
being able to "see through the Arab's attempts at deceit and
trickery and his lies" shows his lack of appreciation of the
face concept in the Arab culture. It is the Westerner who has
learned always to allow the Arab a graceful way to save him-
self from implications of guilt when difficulties arise who will
make him a friend and avoid many frustrations and impasses
in the relationship.
There is a proverb in Chinese which can be roughly trans-
lated, "Point at the chicken to scold the dog." On its face
incomprehensible to the Westerner, it means that if the dog
has done something wrong you should berate the chicken in
his presence in order to get at the wrong-doer without causing
undue embarrassment. The chicken is not embarrassed be-
cause everyone knows it was not he who did it, and the dog
does not lose face through public shame or direct censure.
This principle was illustrated by an episode which occurred
in Teheran but could as easily have come from the Arab world.
A small radio had been stolen from the house of an American
employing two Iranian servants, A and B. A was clearly the
culprit, but direct accusation would have brought a quick
denial and reduced the chances for recovery of the radio.
Servant B was consulted; he advised the American housewife
to chastize him severely in front of A. She did, and the radio
was recovered with a minimum of interpersonal difficulty.
An incident cited by an American sociologist 1 illustrates
another kind of situation. An Arab who caught another man
in bed with his wife leveled a gun at them, but instead of
shooting he offered to let the man off if he would keep the af-
Hamady, Sania; Temperament and Character of the Arabs, Twayne
Publishers, New York. 1960. p. 37.
fair secret. The man promised and was let go. Later the Arab
divorced his wife quietly, and the incident was considered
closed. The double murder that might have been the outcome
in Western cultures would have made newspaper headlines, a,
result diametrically opposed to the Arab's priority considera-
tions. His pledging the wife and cuckolder to secrecy on pain
of death guaranteed that no outsiders would learn of the mat-
ter and thus saved him an embarrassing loss of face. The
quiet divorce rid him of his problem. The emotional distress
which other husbands might have felt was for the Arab a prob-
lem of secondary importance; he could tell himself that; Allah
determines all and therefore not to trouble himself with the
sequels of any acts. This story illustrates well the principle
that the Arab is the reverse of the Westerner in that he feels
very strongly the force of public shame in loss of face but is
able to slough off the feelings of personal inadequacy which
would be acute in a Westerner.
Subjective Fact
In Western cultures a fact is an objective absolute not sub-
ject to mutation through human interpretation. But the
Arab mentality treats fact and truth as relative, to some ex-
tent a projection of the mind for the benefit of the self' or ego.
With this subjective processing the facts become what the
Arab emotionally wants to believe is true. They can thus be
made to mesh harmoniously with criteria which stand higher
on the value scale because connected with the maintenance
of face. Neither facts nor their connotations can stand up
against the Arab's facade of personal dignity or be arrayed
to form an attack on his surrogate of face.
Many concepts of the philosophy of the ancient Greeks have
been discussed, adapted, and adopted by major Arab thinkers,
but there is little sign in present-day Arab culture that Greek
analytical self-critical philosophy ever entered the Near East.
The motto "Know thyself" is not quoted by the Arabs; if it,
were, it would have to have an entirely new meaning. Know-
ing oneself, to include defining and acknowledging one's weak-
nesses, would destroy the principle that the surrogate of face
or personal dignity must be defended at all costs and osten-
sible perfection maintained. The concept of self-examina-
tion, whether for purposes of self-management or self-
improvement, could not be accepted because of its conflict with
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the more honored cultural requirement of blameless dignity.
The Arab is likewise quite unacquainted with the idea of ex-
amining his conduct to find the sources of his mistakes or mis-
fortunes. If he did engage in such introspection he would be
forced to intensify the subjectivity of his factual interpreta-
tions in order to avoid findings which might be detrimental to
his face. In short, the Arab will not find anything wrong
with himself.
Many say that the Arab has no capacity for self-analysis;
but this is a rather shallow observation. If he lacked analyti-
cal ability, no Bedouin would ever have survived the desert
drought problems. It is when analysis impinges upon the
prime value of personal dignity that the use of subjective in-
terpretations in order to preclude embarrassing conclusions
begins to give outside observers doubts about the Arab's abil-
ity to reconcile himself with reality.
During the Israeli invasion of Sinai in October 1956, the
Saudi Arabs in the oil fields along the Persian Gulf felt per-
sonal concern about the plight of their Egyptian brothers. In
one instance some of those at a particular plant were much
worried about a news item to the effect that in three days of
fighting Israeli troops had captured five thousand Egyptians.
They held a powwow, buzzing and chattering about it among
themselves. After some time, however, the group broke up
and all went away looking relieved and happy. Asked how
they had resolved their anxiety, one of the more articulate ex-
plained that they had decided Israeli troops could never have
captured 5,000 of anything, even sheep, in the Sinai region.
Therefore the story was not true, and that ended the matter.
All was right with the world again.
A former German army doctor who specialized in psychiatry
and the diagnosis of mental disturbances was resident in
Damascus during 1953 and 1954. During this time he was
denied permission to practice in Syria, with the explanation
that although medical doctors were always welcome, there was
nothing wrong with Arabs mentally and hence no need for his
services.
Knowledgeable Arabs realize that their people and countries
fall in some measure short of the progress and development
that some other nations have achieved. Unable to find them-
selves at fault for this, they are naturally led to seek the cause
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of their troubles in outside sources-the will of Allah, the ina-
perialists, Israel, family and personal obligations, and many
real wrongs which have been done them. This saves the col-
lective face from appearing defective and allows those who can
accept subjectively interpreted facts to maintain their sense of
personal dignity and self-confidence.
The lack of objective self-analysis in the Near East gener-
ally permits a type of boasting which is honest in that there
is no real discrepancy between an Arab's outward show of,
say, fantastic courage and his true feelings. In the absence
of analysis he does not realize that he has weaknesses and
could not perform accordingly. Unending talk of courageous
endeavor and boasting his own virtues in order to give himself
faith in his surrogate of face may make the Arab seem insin-
cere to the Westerner; but if the latter challenges his boasts
the two are brought to an impasse. The Arab could not be
made to recognize his own weakness, and even if he could he
would not admit the threat to his dignity.
Some of the secondary schools of the Middle Eastern coun-
tries schedule athletic contests with one another, and after
each game members of the losing team will get together and
discuss the event. Not infrequently they conclude that "the
referee was against us" instead of acknowledging their own
faulty plays or the other team's superiority.
In any situation in which shame or guilt threatens the Arab
he will be able to explain away whatever impinges on his per-
sonal dignity with an array of facts that are meant to be ac-
cepted by the listener and not challenged. Whether the story
is believed or not and whether the facts are objective or logical
are secondary considerations; it is considered quite u.nman.-
nerly to embarrass him by challenging his explanations.
Many of the stories of Juha and his donkey which abound in
Arabic folklore have their point for the Arab not in the hap-
penings, logical or illogical, they portray but rather in. the
quick wit and inventive genius with which the hero survives
each incident.
In many phases of the Arabic cultural setting the Westerner
with his fetish for objectivity is decidedly out of place, for a
subjective interpretation of facts and truth is most suitable
in a milieu where face and personal dignity are the things of
prime importance.
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In summation, the face concept can be said to have three
interrelated aspects. The Arab's extreme effort to show him-
self blameless, an effort which seems too transparent and un-
realistic to Westerners, is the product of the high value his
culture puts upon personal dignity, of his feeling ansvverable
for his conduct to society rather than to any divine conscience
within himself, and of his sense of the subjectivity of fact.
Conceptual exploration and inter-
departmental maneuvering under
pressure of war that laid the foun-
dation for a centralizing agency.
ORIGINS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'
Arthur B. Darling
The processes of intelligence and their attendant propa-
ganda, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics received tremendous
stimulus during the second World War. Fifth-column activi-
ties had become famous in the Spanish civil strife prior to the
Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland. An interdepart-
mental committee of the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of
Investigation in July 1939 sought to control spies, saboteurs,
and subversive persons. The overthrow of France in June
1940 and the expulsion of Britain's troops from the continent
at Dunkirk convinced leading Americans that this country
must prepare in every way for the eventuality of war. Ger-
man agents under Nazi direction were already at, work in
Latin America as their predecessors had been for the Kaiser.
The specter of an invasion even of North America, possessed
some minds. The British fleet had long supported the Monroe
Doctrine against foreign encroachment upon Anglo.-American
dominance in the western hemisphere. If Britain fell, there
would be no British fleet.
Arrangements were made to supply the British fleet with
destroyers in return for air and naval bases. Congress revived
the Selective Service of 1917 in September. Ambassador Ken-
nedy was making statements that Britain could not, stand up
to the German attack. The President sent William J. Done-
van in July to find out. Donovan was to study too Germany's
fifth-column practices. He returned by August 4 to report
orally to Secretary Knox and the President upon those prac-
tices, Britain's organization for secret intelligence, and what
Donovan liked to call "unorthodox warfare." The German ac-
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With slight adaptations and the omission of documentation, this
article reproduces Chapter I of a history of the Central Intelligence
Agency to 1950 completed by the author in 1953.
RDP78T03194A000200020001-1 MORI/HRP PAGES 55-94
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 CeYfralra e ,1,ntlelliaggean805/04/1 3: C
tivities were spread before the American public in a series of
newspaper articles signed by Edgar A. Mowrer and Colonel
Donovan. British advices and plans entered from time to time
into the development of an American system of intelligence
and clandestine operations.
Donovan belived that Britain would stand. He was abroad
again before Christmas to make a strategic survey of Ameri-
can economic and political interests in the Mediterranean and
the Near East. Many Americans found it hard to discover
those interests, though the Navy had once fought Barbary cor-
sairs on the coasts of Africa and put the Marines ashore in
Tripoli, and there still were American missionaries, hospitals,
and colleges in the Near East. Donovan saw them, and a good
deal more as he worked with a British officer against the pro-
Nazi regent, Prince Paul, in Yugoslavia. The Germans sensed
enough of his purposes to keep him from conferring with the
French commander, General Weygand.
Strategic Information
By March 18 Colonel Donovan was home to report upon the
dangers to shipping, the importance of northwest Africa to
the. United States, the use of psychological and political war-
fare, and upon a central intelligence committee which he saw
taking form in London under the exigencies of war. At Roose-
velt's direction he talked with Secretaries Stimson and Knox
and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an intelli-
gence agency with the accompanying forces of propaganda
and subversion. They recommended it to the President. The
result was Donovan's proposal on June 10, 1941, that there
should be a "service of strategic information." Strategy with-
out information, he said, was helpless. Information collected
for no strategic purpose was futile.
With this memorandum, his first written statement on the
subject, Donovan began the foundations for what has become
the Central Intelligence Agency. Whether or not he was aware
of it at the time, he indicated, too, the difficulties that would
perplex the administrators of this common service for the de-
partments of the Government.
He suggested that a Coordinator of Strategic Information
should have an advisory panel consisting of the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the heads of the intelli-
gence services of the Army and the Navy, and corresponding
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officials from other departments concerned. He would. draw
the personnel of his central agency from the Army and the
Navy as well as from civilian sources. He would make sure
that the agency should not displace or encroach upon the de-
partments, although it might collect information independ-
ently. It was to analyze and interpret information of many
kinds for use by the departments. Above all, it was "to con-
stitute a means by which the President, as Commander in
Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate
and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military
operational decisions could be based."
Donovan would place under the direction of the Coordina-
tor of Strategic Information that psychological warfare which
he had observed the Germans using so effectively upon. "tlie
moral and spiritual defenses of a nation." He did not include
in his memorandum the physical subversion and guerrilla
warfare which he had also in mind. They had been discussed
with the cabinet officers; they were implicit in the plan. True
to the military character of his whole conception, he proposed
that the Coordinator of Strategic Information should be re-
sponsible directly to the President.
This led at once to disagreement with the armed services
which has complicated relationships ever since between them
and the central intelligence service. President Roosevelt's rnil-
itary order of June 25, 1941, as Commander in Chief, created
the office of Coordinator of Strategic Information and gave hire
military authority. It aroused so much opposition that it had
to be rewritten. Another order on July 11, 1941, established
the office of Coordinator of Information, omitting the word
"Strategic." It carefully protected the regular military and
naval advisers of the President from interference or impair-
ment of functions by this new aide to the Chief Executive.
Many in the armed services were far from pleased. It still
was in effect a military order. Colonel William J. Donovan
was of course to be the Coordinator of Information. Seria?or
Taft caught up their feeling, though in an overstatement of
the facts: Donovan could "boss the intelligence services of the
Army and Navy in the name of the President and have more
influence with the President on military and naval strategy
than the General Staffs."
Criticism from another quarter was more in keeping with
the facts. After a conference on June 18 with Donovan and
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Benjamin Cohen, counsel for the National Power Policy Com-
mittee, regarding Donovan's ideas on a "service of strategic
information," President Roosevelt sent Cohen to consult with
the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Donovan
too explained his plans for the future of the organization.
From the beginning officials in the Bureau had the impres-
sion that he was ambitious to make the powers of his new
agency "all-inclusive." He was interested in domestic morale
and economic defense, in research upon Latin America, in the
negotiations for peace at the end of the European war, in post-
war economic planning, and apparently anything and every-
thing else that pertained to the strategic intelligence neces-
sary to the formulation of national policy.
It is not surprising that members of the Bureau of the
Budget thought Donovan eager to compete with "many of the
old line agencies and most of the defense agencies." It was
rather soon for all of the possibilities which his avid imagina-
tion conceived. It was altogether too soon to draw the lines
and establish the interstices between rival institutions of the
government so that they worked harmoniously to the com-
mon end. The criticism was fair at the moment. It did not,
however, show due appreciation of the fact that, regardless of
his personal ambitions, Donovan was pioneering in the public
interest beyond the experiences and assumptions of the mo-
ment. He believed that it was his duty as well as opportunity
to put all elements of intelligence in one central organization.
This, he declared in 1953, was an American contribution in
the history of intelligence.
From COI to OSS
The office of the Coordinator of Information developed so
rapidly under Donovan's direction that many elements of a
central intelligence service were in operation by the time of
the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor in December. To
broadcast radio messages, issue pamphlets, and spread the
propaganda of truth regarding American principles, his For-
eign Information Service had begun to take shape even before
the President's order of July 11. With its listening outposts,
it was also soon obtaining information for the production of
intelligence. A Research and Analysis Branch, well estab-
lished in August, began to collect and evaluate the basic ma-
terials for intelligence reports. By October a Visual Presen-
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tation Branch was at work upon the techniques of delivering
such reports and related data to the departments and services
concerned.
An Oral Intelligence Unit was created to interview persons
recently arrived from abroad. Foreign nationals within this
country came under study to discover what they might reveal
concerning the conditions and opinions in the countries of
their origin. The collection of information by undercover
agents outside the western hemisphere had begun upon agree-
ment with the Army and the Navy in October that their clan-
destine intelligence services should be consolidated under the
Coordinator of Information.
There was agreement also with the British. During the first
World War an intimate relationship had existed between the
two governments on the diplomatic level, resulting in the ex-
change of information of great value. Now, with the consent
of Churchill, Donovan placed a branch office in London. The
British services had quarters in New York. The cooperation
was close between the intelligence systems of the two coun-
tries.
There was even planning for the eventuality of war before
it came with the disaster at Pearl Harbor. A section in I)ono-
van's office named "Special Activities-K and L Funds" was
established on October 10, 1941, to take charge of espionage,
sabotage, subversive activities, and guerrilla units. There had
been no formal authorization for these. The President's
order of July 11 merely provided for "such supplementary ac-
tivities as may facilitate the securing of information impor-
tant for national security not now available to the Govern-
ment." But the intent was clear. Donovan sent an. officer
to study British practices in close association with the ]British
Special Operations Executive. It was only a short step into
guerrilla warfare after the declaration of war. He submitted
to President Roosevelt on December 22, 1941, the plan long in
mind for an American force like the British Commandos, "im-
bued with the maximum of the offensive and imaginative
spirit," an excellent weapon of physical subversion to accom-
pany the black propaganda of psychological warfare.
The burst of war which he anticipated had two effects upon
Colonel Donovan. He pressed the organization of his office to
completion so that he might leave for a combat command, and
he urged that the Coordinator of Information be placed under
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the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These held their
first meeting on February 9, 1942, as they prepared to work
with their British counterparts in the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
Donovan sent a proposal through Secretary Knox to the
President that there be attached to the Navy an independent
force of land, sea, and air raiders, five thousand men, which
Donovan himself would command; and he suggested a succes-
sor as Coordinator of Information. Donovan was not per-
mitted to take command of American commandos. He had
instead to develop within his office the forces of physical sub-
version and guerrilla warfare. But the Office of Strategic
Services which succeeded the Coordinator of Information was
placed as he had wished under the direction of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff by military order of the President on June 13, 1942.
:Meanwhile the Coordinator of Information had come under
pressures that were generated by diverse temperaments quite
as much as by differences of opinion concerning methods in
war. Over Donovan's protests the Foreign Information Serv-
ice was removed from his jurisdiction and joined with other
information services in the new Office of War Information.
Donovan believed that the effectiveness of psychological war-
fare would be impaired if the control of propaganda directed
abroad were taken from the Coordinator of Information. It
is to be noted too that with the Foreign Information Service
went the listening outposts which were sources of information
for the production of intelligence reports by the Coordinator.
But this caused little hardship, as the Foreign Broadcast Mon-
itoring Service of the Federal Communications Commission
provided complete summaries of its auditing and the Office
of Strategic Services soon enlarged its own system of collect-
ing secret intelligence overseas.
Psywar Setup
'There was a prolonged dispute over psychological warfare.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had created a Joint Psychological
Warfare Committee in March but reorganized it on June 21,
1942, to make Donovan the chairman, as Director of the Office
of Strategic Services. The committee was composed of rep-
resentatives from the Army and the Navy and supported by
an. advisory committee drawn from the Department of State,
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the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, and the Office of War Information.
For the next six months plans and proposals, suggestions
and exceptions, basic estimates, reports, and dissents were
tossed back and forth between the Joint Psychological War-
fare Committee and its subcommittees on the one hand and
the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate groups on
the other without ever reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However stated or argued, specifically or in general terms, the
real matter at issue would seem to an outsider to have been
whether the OSS was to be an agent directly responsible to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the conception and conduct of
psychological warfare. If it reported to the Joint Psychologi-
cal Warfare Committee, OSS would run the risk of having its
projects stopped there by the overwhelming majority repre-
senting the Army and the Navy. The armed services did not
like any sort of independent paramilitary command. As Don-
ovan recalled in 1953, it was a critical moment in the whole
endeavor to establish an American system of central intelli-
gence.
The issue came to conclusion in December 1942. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff sent General McNarney and Admiral Horne to
inquire into the Office of Strategic Services. They visited it
separately. Donovan talked with them, showed them papers,
and asked them to spend a day watching it in operation..
There followed a directive from the Joint Chiefs on December
22 abolishing the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and
designating OSS the "agency" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
charged with the military program of psychological warfare.
Donovan received a note from General Marshall saying that
he could not let the holiday season pass without expressing
gratitude for his cooperation in the trying times of the past
year. Marshall regretted that Donovan, after voluntarily
coming under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs, had not
enjoyed smoother sailing. Marshall hoped that the new direc-
tive would eliminate most of the difficulties.
The Office of Strategic Services gained most of the points
for which it had contended. To supervise the military pro-
gram of psychological warfare and integrate it with military
and naval operations, there was established within OSS a new
Planning Group composed of one member from the Department
of State, two from the Army, two from the Navy, and :four in-
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eluding the chairman from OSS. An advisory committee was
to have representation from the Board of Economic Warfare,
Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs, Treasury, and other agencies from time to time as
their interests were concerned. After approval by the OSS
Director, the plans and projects of the Planning Group were
to be submitted through the Joint Staff Planners to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.
The operations of propaganda, and of economic warfare
within the military program for psychological warfare, were
reserved to the Office of War Information and to the Board of
Economic Warfare respectively. The Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to prepare such special
information and intelligence studies as the Joint Chiefs re-
quired.
Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, was un-
willing to share in this cooperative effort in psychological
warfare. He declined representation on the Advisory Commit-
tee of the OSS Planning Group. Admiral Leahy had written
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Planning Group would
be confined to recommendations to them; they would be the
ones to decide upon the propaganda they wished Mr. Davis to
execute. But he saw it differently. There was no purpose to
be served in giving advice to another group upon matters
which one was already under obligation to the President to
formulate and execute. The President, he said, could "hardly
be overruled by lesser authority." His representative would
be a visitor to the OSS group, not a member.
Intelligence Interchange
The intelligence needs of the Office of Strategic Services were
restricted by the directive of December 22, 1942, to those
"necessary for the planning and execution of the military pro-
gram for psychological warfare, and for the preparation of
assigned portions of intelligence digests and such other data
and visual presentation as may be requested." Moreover,
OSS intelligence collection was confined to the special opera-
tions of sabotage, espionage, and counterespionage in enemy-
occupied or controlled territory, guerrilla warfare, under-
ground groups, and contacts with foreign nationals in the
United States.
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These restrictions upon the OSS intelligence service were
not permitted to hamper its work for long, on paper. They
were removed from the text of the directive by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on April 4, 1943. And by the final revision of
the directive on October 27, 1943, OSS's function of collecting
information for the production of intelligence was :fully re-
stored. But collecting is not the same as receiving disserni-
nation from others, and having the right to receive information
is different from actually getting particular items. General
Vandenberg and Admiral Hillenkoetter were to find this true
again and again as Directors of Central Intelligence.
It had been agreed by both Army and Navy in October 1.941,
before the attack upon Pearl Harbor, that the "undercover
intelligence of the two services" should be consolidated under
the Coordinator of Information. As General Miles expressed
it, the work was "much more effective if under one head
rather than three. . ." A civilian agency, such as the Co-
ordinator of Information, had distinct advantages, he said, over
any military or naval agency in the administration of such
a service. At the same time the Army and Navy set up their
Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Committee to forestall the
Coordinator of Information. Ludwell L. Montague became :its
secretary on October 14.
Following the agreement with the Army and Navy, Dono-
van planned at once to put a wireless station and agents in
North Africa. But the understanding had contained the
reservation that in the event of war the Army and the Navy
should have full power to operate undercover intelligence
services of their own. After Pearl Harbor, the best that could
be obtained in the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
a statement that the military and naval intelligence services
and the Office of Strategic Services would "provide for the
complete and free interchange of information, evaluated as
to creditability of source, required for the execution of their
respective missions."
In practice this meant to the intelligence officers of the
Army and the Navy no obligation whatever upon them to turn
over to Donovan's OSS information about operations which
they thought should not be revealed. It is to be said on their
behalf that they had some reasons to fear that the civilians in
his agency were not disciplined in military security; the OSS
deserved part of its reputation for being a sieve. (When Ge),-i-
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era] Donovan read this statement in February 1953, he
blurted: "How could you say such a thing! That makes me
sore." The military men, he said, were the "leaky boys.") It
is also to be said that intelligence reports worth submitting
to the policy-makers cannot be had if strategic information
is withheld from those who have the task of making the
reports.
According to one who remarked that he ought to know be-
cause he was one of them, men in the armed services looked
with suspicion upon the expert economists, geographers, his-
torians, and scientists whom Donovan gathered about him;
they "lowered their horns" against those experts, said Gen-
eral Magruder, and they kept their horns down. We might
add that there was milling and bawling and pawing the dust,
but, no stampede.
A case in point was the refusal of the Navy to release its
radio intercepts to the Office of Strategic Services. Donovan
protested on October .22, 1942, that such action would impair
his ability to discharge his mission. When he had agreed to
refrain from cryptographic work, he had understood that the
proceeds from decoding by the armed forces would be made
available to the OSS. Otherwise it could not carry out the
duties specifically assigned to it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
His undercover representatives in foreign countries were en-
titled to the protection and help which would come from the
interceptions of enemy messages. The Research and Analysis
Branch needed the information for its strategic studies. The
Office of Strategic Services could not function completely with-
out such important materials.
Donovan's protest got a cool reception in the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman,
General George V. Strong, was unwilling to accept even the
obvious provisions in the directive of December 22, 1942, argu-
ing at first that it confined the Office of Strategic Services to
the planning and execution of psychological warfare. When
Donovan's deputy, General Magruder, showed that OSS had
much wider functions in the field of intelligence, General
Strong abandoned the argument but remained obviously re-
luctant to yield. The Navy representative then read a letter
from Admiral King stating that he would not agree to any in-
crease in the dissemination of intercept material. The at-
titude of the Committee as a whole was unsympathetic. So
General Magruder, having in mind "the longer range point
of view of being able to reconstruct harmonious relations with
the armed forces," did not press the legal point that the Office
of Strategic Services was entitled to such information.
The issue was seemingly closed on January 19, 1943, by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They ruled that release of information
was within the province of the representatives of the Anny
and Navy in the OSS Planning Group. This of course reduced
the question to specific instances and left power with the
Army and Navy still to withhold any particular piece of in-
formation. They are reluctant to this moment in 1953 to
give a central civilian agency intelligence which exposes their
capabilities in war. The result has been interference with the
flow of raw materials essential to the realistic estimates which
should go to the makers of diplomatic policy and military
strategy.
Integration Egorts
Early in 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint
Intelligence Collection Agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air
Forces. The joint agencies were not to engage in initial pro-
curement; they were only to assemble material in the field
offices and forward it to Washington. In theory this coopera-
tion should have been helpful to the OSS Secret Intelligence
Branch; in fact it laid its secret agents open to exposure in
the field and delayed their material in reaching the Branch in
Washington. Such interference gave Donovan's supporters
opportunity to argue that the armed services had established
the joint collection agencies to thwart OSS and keep it from
being the central agency in the national intelligence system.
The situation did seem to prove that instead of three or four
collecting agencies, there should be a single and exclusive col-
lector in the field of secret intelligence and counterespionage
abroad.
The Office of Strategic Services came under another cross
fire. After the experience at Pearl Harbor General Marshall
and Admiral King were convinced that something had to be
done about combining the intelligence services of the Army
and Navy, regardless of any arrangement with the OSS. Their
agreement apparently led in the spring of 1943 to a proposal
that the Joint Intelligence Committee should be reorganized.
It should have a civilian member besides the representatives of
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Central Intelligence
the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and OSS to form a better estimat-
ing board for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This civilian, by reason
of exceptional performance, might even become the chairman
of the Joint Intelligence Committee. There was resemblance
here to the British estimating committee, in which the civilian
representing the Foreign Office sat as chairman with the mili-
tary experts.
Each member of the reorganized Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee should have access to all of the intelligence in the service
which he represented, and presumably he would purvey it to
the Committee under restrictions which remained to be es-
tablished. The proposers of the plan seemed confident that
such ranking officers could be trusted to decide whether they
could release any item of information to the Committee with-
out jeopardy to their respective services and at the same time
supply the Committee with the proper materials for its esti-
mates.
More important in the plan, and perhaps the telltale, was
the suggestion that the OSS Research and Analysis Branch
should be linked with similar functions in the Office of Naval
Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service. The idea
was that the Research and Analysis Branch would thus be-
come a central agency. Files and personnel transferred from
the Army and Navy would be integrated with similar OSS files
and persons so that there would be a single activity engaged
in making strategic surveys.
The Research and Analysis Branch, thus augmented with
officers and other experts from the armed services, would be
directly under the Joint Intelligence Committee. The pre-
sumption was that the transferred officers would no longer be
directly responsible to the Army or the Navy but belong to
the central agency. The fact remained, however, that in the
Joint Intelligence Committee itself the OSS would have only
one representative while the Army, Navy, and Air Forces to-
gether would have three. Even if the civilian in the chair
agreed with the OSS representative, they would still be in the
minority on the Committee.
General Magruder broadly favored the plan. He reported to
Donovan in September that on the whole it recommended
steps "very close to our own desires." But he believed that the
Secret Intelligence and Counterespionage branches should
also be elevated to the "strategic level" along with Research
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and Analysis. They belonged in the organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff if it were to be the "authoritative body of the
future superior strategic intelligence service." The three
were, after all, the essentials in any central intelligence
service.
On. the other hand, he did not want to mix the intelligence
experts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with the civilians or
"scholar experts" in Research and Analysis. Each group
should retain "its own sense of responsibility"; the results of
their separate efforts should be brought together. Otherwise,
he said, their efforts would be wasted, and the chiefs of the
groups would not demand the best personnel. In hindsight,
military men and civilians since then seem to have worked
together in the same group on problems of intelligence more
effectively than General Magruder anticipated.
General Donovan did not take to the plan so readily as
Magruder. Possibly it looked to Donovan, as it well could,
more like an immediate attempt to deprive him of a ma:or
service within the OSS and narrow his activities still further
in the field of intelligence. The plan did not materialize.
In the words of a contemporary observer, the Army, Navy,
and Department of State were always glad to use the OSS Re-
search and Analysis Branch as a servant. They were not will-
ing to accept it as an equal partner in- final judgments. By
depriving it of the "sensitive information" which they had
within their control, they were able to keep it from being
what it was supposed to be, the competent research agency in
the political-economic-social field of national intelligence.
Functional Development
Notwithstanding serious blocks to the production of stra-
tegic reports and interference with its activities in other
ways, the Office of Strategic Services established institutions
and practices that are requisite to a national system of intelli-
gence.. It accumulated the wealth of experience for its suc-
cessors to enjoy. Among its legacies to the Central Intelai-
gence Agency were the methods and means of procuring both
overt and secret intelligence, the devices of counterespionage,
the procedures of research and analysis, and a considerable
number of skilled persons.
The foreign groups in the United States, a mosaic of na-
tionalities, were certain to be useful as sources of intelligence.
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It was important to exploit those who had come from nations
under the Nazis and the Communists. It was wise to keep
them under surveillance also for subversive activities. The
Foreign Nationalities Branch, established to scan the foreign
language press and to deal with political refugees and leaders
of foreign groups, at first met opposition from the Depart-
merits of Justice and State. The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion was afraid that the Branch would interfere with its work.
Members of the State Department were suspicious that the
Branch might usurp functions of policy-making. But the
Foreign Nationalities Branch demonstrated its value so effec-
tively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it was fixed as part of
the intelligence system. It obtained a large amount of sig-
nificant information concerning Czechoslovakia, Greece, and
Poland.
The Secret Intelligence Branch grew from a small organiza-
tion with a few overseas units which supplied the armed serv-
ices with fifty reports in May 1942 to a system of penetration
by land, sea, and air, producing five thousand reports a month
at its peak. Its area desks were increased and regrouped to
direct operations more effectively in neutral countries and to
gain access into adjacent hostile or occupied territories. A
Reporting Board controlled the dissemination of intelligence.
The. Branch developed a section to enlist the support of labor
in all countries not only for intelligence but for sabotage and
subversion. A "ship observer unit" obtained the especially
valuable intelligence to be had from seamen, their organiza-
tions, ship operators, and other maritime sources. A techni-
cal section provided information on roads, bridges, aqueducts,
weapons, and similar matters of engineering. It maintained
daily contact with the "Manhattan Project" in atomic energy.
The counterpart of Secret Intelligence, known as "X-2," de-
veloped a counterespionage network which spread from Lon-
don to Shanghai through Europe, Africa, the Near East, India,
Burma, and China, with each headquarters reporting directly
to Washington. By October 1945 a registry of enemies and sub-
versive persons had been developed in Washington that ran to
some 400,000 names. This with the records of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation constituted the backbone of security in-
telligence. Moreover, working agreements with the British,
French, and others were ready for the future.
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The British were willing to let Americans into their organi-
zation to learn about Hitler's agents but were not so disposed
to have the American intelligence services entering regions
where Britain had primary interests. In some instances the
reluctance amounted to downright refus5,1. This appears to
have been the case for some time in northern France, the Low
Countries, and Southeast Asia. It is to be said, though, that
the situation in the Far East was complicated further by
Chiang Kai-shek and Douglas MacArthur.
Before long, geographical understandings were established
upon the principle that the OSS would take a leading position
in the work of intelligence as the American military forces
penetrated certain areas. This was particularly true in West-
ern Europe as the invasion gained momentum. In other re-
gions the British intelligence services continued to dominate
and in some instances made it practically impossible for Ameri-
can intelligence officers to go about their business. In Istan-
bul and doubtless other places like it, for very good reasons of
security or rather the lack of it, the British did not care to
become involved with American intelligence.
In spite of all this, there was cooperation to a great degree
both in London and in New York. The British supplied OS ':3
with information on occasion when the U.S. Army and Navy
either could or would not do so. To be appreciated as well, the
British allowed American officers to observe the interrelation-
ships of their services and the working of their intelligence
system as a basis for improving the American system. The
study which William H. Jackson made of the British organi-
zation in 1945 and then with Kingman Douglass in 1946 in-
fluenced the development of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Other Accomplishments
However valuable in themselves, the first reports of the Re-
search and Analysis Branch, under the Coordinator of Infor-
mation, were neither well related to one another nor focused
properly upon the needs of the Army and Navy. For this
condition the services were in part responsible until they gave
better explanation of what they wanted. In 1942 strategic
surveys became the major enterprise of the Branch. This
basic intelligence laid bare at the demand of war the hard,
economic and geographical facts within the conflict of nations.
The R&A strategic surveys were the predecessors of the Joint
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Army-Navy Intelligence Studies, which in turn were super-
seded by the program of National Intelligence Surveys.
The Research and Analysis Branch also provided intelli-
gence on contemporary events. Information came from out-
posts of the Branch in such advantageous places for observa-
tion as London, Algiers, Cairo, Stockholm, New Delhi, Chung-
king, Bucharest, Istanbul, Rome, Lisbon, and Athens. This
current intelligence had usefulness distinct from the informa-
tion which came from Secret Intelligence and from the De-
partment of State. Collection by R&A was not hampered by
the secrecy of the one nor by the diplomatic protocol of the
other.
Reporting by photography as well as words was fully ap-
preciated in the Office of Strategic Services and passed on to its
successors in the national intelligence system. There was a
War Room with maps, charts, projectors. There was a Daily
Intelligence Summary and a Political Intelligence Weekly.
Called by whatever name, things indispensable stay much the
same.
There is always a need for supporting services like the re-
cruitment and training of personnel, legal advice, accounting,
procurement, and maintenance of equipment. The Office of
Strategic Services had such supporting services. Improve-
merit and expansion came with experience, but little change
in the essential functions. The methods of communication
were the best in existence at that time. The OSS used three
kinds of cover for its agents and operations-governmental,
commercial, and professional. The choice today among these
types of concealment is determined as then by the peculiari-
ties of the particular situation.
The covert activities of the Office of Strategic Services have
been examined in its War Report and are not to be appraised
project by project in this study. The Special Operations
Branch, in charge of sabotage and physical subversion, was
uppermost in the purposes of General Donovan; accordingly
it grew from small beginnings in 1941 until it had become a
valuable auxiliary to military operations in the theatres of
war where it was allowed to participate. Because no arrange-
ments satisfactory to both MacArthur and Donovan could be
made, OSS did not operate in the western Pacific, though it
had a role in China.
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Opinions of OSS varied from praise to blame in accordance
with the predilections and interests of the observers. Agree-
ment appears to have been general outside the Office itself,
however, that its Special Operations Branch should be liqui-
dated at the close of the war, along with its paramilitary enter-
prises such as guerrilla Operations Groups and the Maritime
Unit, whose frogmen have attracted so much attention.. This
was even more true of the Morale Operations Branch engaged
in black propaganda, although a movement began shortly
afterward to apply the lessons learned in this art of war. On
March. 5, 1946, Secretary of War Patterson wrote to Secretary
Forrestal of the Navy urging that a body of experts institute
some kind of system to develop weapons for the psychological
warfare of the future.
Looking Ahead
Long before the troops of the Allies invaded Germany or the
atomic bombs had fallen on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thoughts
were upon profiting in times of peace from wartime experi-
ence with the intelligence services. Brigadier General John
Magruder, before his association with OSS and while head cf
Lend Lease in China, had observed in practical operation the
need for joint intelligence among the services. Because of his
official position he obtained information more easily than the
military attache and others. He therefore suggested that all
should cooperate in gathering and verifying intelligence, and.
he proposed to General Stilwell that the practice be extended.
to Washington among the armed services at the highest level.
General Stilwell did not believe that it would succeed in
Washington. When Magruder returned to the United States
in the summer of 1942, however, he conferred enthusiastically
with General Donovan and put his coordination proposal on
paper. Donovan assured him that the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices was designed for just such a purpose and invited him to
join the organization as its Deputy Director for Intelligence.
The plan which Magruder proposed in August 1942 stressed:
the imperative need for coordinating all of the agencies con-
cerned with intelligence. The collecting services of the de-
partments obtained valuable information, he said, but not a.
single one was competent to furnish the complete information
necessary to "national decisions." There were no "sure and
continuous" connections between the intelligence agencies
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and those who were responsible for making the decisions and
plans. He found all of the intelligence services so "compart-
mented" that the only escape from the situation was to es-
tablish a "superior joint intelligence agency." No vital deci-
sions could be made for the conduct of the war without "com-
plete and digested intelligence."
Looking back upon this memorandum, we may well admire
the perception with which the author wrote of difficulties that
still persist in 1953. General Magruder did not then visualize
the intricate system for coordinating departmental intelli-
gence with strategic studies made independently by experts
in research and analysis. But he did appreciate the necessity
for synthesis of the information from all services for strategic
planning and decisions by those who had to make both diplo-
matic and military policies. Since the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was then at work on prob-
lems of intelligence for the Army and Navy, he thought of it
rather than of some other central agency for his purposes.
But he observed that the Joint Intelligence Committee would
have to be reorganized and its functions augmented or it could
not operate effectively as the body of advice, coordination, and
recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Magruder proposed in August 1942 that in place of the work-
ing staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee there should be
established a Joint Intelligence Bureau. This Bureau should
act as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under its di-
rector and deputy director there should be research divisions
in the several fields of intelligence-political, economic, mili-
tary, and others. The product of their effort should be sys-
tennatically administered by an initiating and reviewing com-
mittee. This key committee should make assignments to the
working groups, should requisition material from the various
departments concerned, and should approve the studies and
estiimates of the Bureau before they went through the direc-
tor's office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The committee of initiation and review within the Bureau
was to be composed of representatives from the intelligence
services of the departments. But it was clear that Magruder
intended that they should not be merely visitors from their
respective departments; they were to be members of the Bu-
reau. Although representing separate interests, they were to
be gathered into one body with functions expressly delegated
in accordance with the federal principle.
Congress itself, with sovereign powers expressly delegated in
the Constitution, is the best example of the principle. Though
representative of the states, component parts of the Union,
Congress exercises powers that are superior to and exclusive
of powers retained by the states; the product of its action is
national. The concept that the federal principle was applica-
ble within an agency of the government seems to have been
ahead of its time in the fall of 1942. There were, of course,
military men in the Office of Strategic Services, but the idea
that they represented the services from which they had come
at the same time that they worked as members of a central
intelligence agency was then highly theoretical.
General Magruder clung to his ideas and strengthened
them in dealing with those who obstructed the actual work-
ing of the Secret Intelligence Branch and the Research and
Analysis Branch of the OSS. He wrote on July 30, 1943, to the
Executive Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a series of
observations upon the U.S. intelligence service which explicitly
cited the obstructions: the Secret Intelligence Branch .had
reached an impressive stage of development in spite of the
fact that it was handicapped by outright resistance in some
quarters and by limitations imposed by well-intentioned ofj.i-
cials who lacked familiarity with its objectives and failed to
appreciate its value as a national asset.
The Research and Analysis Branch, he said, could be the
very core of an agency which could not be duplicated in any
other intelligence organization restricting itself to the needs
of a particular department. The Branch was uniquely de-
signed to serve a particular need. Its group of highly quali-
fied specialists should be the "servitors" of the Joint Chiefs
and have functions befitting their ability to produce. In-
stead, they were being denied access to information by other
agencies in spite of what were believed to be both the terms
and the spirit of the directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Magruder wished now in the fall of 1943 to see the Secret
Intelligence Branch and the Counterespionage Branch. taken
up to "the strategic level" and incorporated with the Research
and Analysis Branch in a superior intelligence agency uinder
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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The Donovan Plan
General Donovan looked beyond the immediate exigencies
of war even more than his deputy, General Magruder. At the
request of General Walter B. Smith, recently Secretary of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and now Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces
in North Africa, Donovan wrote on September 17, 1943, to
give his ideas in detail on the creation of a strategic intelli-
gence organization as an integral and permanent part of the
military establishment. Donovan had worked with Smith to
put, the Office of Strategic Services under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Though produced in war and quite naturally reflecting
that fact, Donovan's paper revealed that his thinking ran far
ahead into times of peace.
His was a long-range view of requirements. There must be
independence from other nations' intelligence for reasons of
security, verification of information, and control. Friends to-
day might not be so cordial tomorrow. Secret means had to
be maintained for collecting political, economic, sociological,
and psychological data. There should be counterintelligence
as a matter of course to protect these primary services. He
stressed the use of the radio and the need for independent
communications and passport privileges. A separate budget
and unvouchered funds were essential.
Donovan advocated a civilian director supported largely by
civilian personnel. He explained the importance of research
and analysis by experts in critical appraisal, by skilled tech-
nicians and specialists on particular regions. And, as was to
be expected of him, General Donovan associated these require-
ments for an intelligence service closely with physical subver-
sion and warfare upon morale. They were all indispensable
parts of a national intelligence system.
It may be only coincidence, but it is a striking coincidence,
that General Smith later became Director of Central Intelli-
gence and adhered to much these principles in administering
the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As General Smith had asked, Donovan consulted other of-
ficers experienced in intelligence, particularly Colonel Dudley
W. Clarke, a friend in the British Army who had much to do
with the Commandos. Taking up Clarke's suggestion of the
"ideal control" for a strategic intelligence organization, Dono-
van proposed that it should be included with the Army, Navy,
and Air Force as the "fourth arm" under the jurisdiction of
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chief of the intelligence orgard-
zation, or "Strategic Services," would be a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. All, of course, were under the President
as Commander in Chief.
General Donovan did not then let a question interfere which
later wrecked his plan in the committees of the Joint; Chiefs of
Staff. Whether the chief of "Strategic Services" should be re-
sponsible directly to the President or to the Secretary of a
department, he said in his letter to General Smith, did not af-
fect the issue, but he did not wish to have the strategic intelli-
gence organization placed under the control of one depart-
ment. It was to serve and support; not only the armed forces
but the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda services; that
is to say the Department of State, the Foreign Economic Ad-
ministration, and the Office of War Information of those days.
Here Donovan acknowledged "distracting political conse-
quences" in placing "Strategic Services" directly under the
control of the President. If it should be decided to have a
Department of Defense in which all the "Fighting Services"
would be placed, then the strategic intelligence organization
should be included on a parity with the others. If no such
legislation were enacted, "Strategic Services" could continue
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a civilian head appointed
by the President.
What led General Donovan to endeavor later to bring the
Office of Strategic Services back directly under the President
is hard to discover in the documentary evidence. His enemies
were certain that he was intent upon building the proverbial
empire. The hypothesis is too simple. One difficulty with it :is
that he was instantly removable from office at the President's
whim as even political appointees were not. Donovan will be
found fairly reasonable in discussing with the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the possibility,
though he did not favor the idea, of placing the Director of
Central Intelligence under a board consisting of the Secre-
taries of State, War, and the Navy. His opinion seems con-
sistently to have been that the responsibility should be in-
dividual; it should not be "diffused through intermediate eche-
lons." If he had to compromise he preferred to have the Di-
rector under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He thoroughly under-
stood the principle of chain of command.
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Peacetime OSS
Drawing further upon his staff, General Magruder and oth-
ers, for ideas and suggestions, Donovan stated his views again
in October 1944, when public thoughts, though still in the
midst of war, were upon the solemn endeavor at Dumbarton
Oaks to establish a United Nations which might settle inter-
national disputes by some means other than war. It was the
time of greatest cooperation between the Soviet Union and
the United States. It was before the Russian armies had
driven the Germans from Poland. It was also before British
and American troops had broken the last great German ef-
fort on the western front in the deathly fog and gloom of the
Battle of the Bulge, before they had swept over the Rhine
deep into Germany to meet the Russians on the Elbe, sus-
picious friends becoming foes. It was before the uncertain
agreements at Yalta and the rising quarrels over Poland, the
Balkan States, and Red China. It was before the United
States had the atomic bomb to drop upon Japan and compli-
cate further its negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The essentials to any central intelligence service, he
wrote, were plain and clear. There must be an uninterrupted
flow of intelligence in peace as in war so that national policy,
military and political, could be based upon knowledge. This
was to be obtained by both overt and clandestine means
abroad; there should be no clandestine operation within the
United States. Moreover, the central agency should have no
police power, nor should it be identified with any law-enforcing
body either at home or abroad. This statement should be
kept always in mind by those who are wont to accuse "Wild
Biill" Donovan of wishing to set up an American Gestapo.
The outstanding purpose of the central intelligence service
which Donovan proposed was to collect, analyze, and deliver
intelligence "on the policy or strategy level" to the policy-
makers of the government as directed by the President. This
intelligence was to serve the Army and the Navy as well as
the Department of State or any other branch of the govern-
ment. He would not interfere with the operational intelli-
gence of the departments. But he did intend to make the
principle of individual responsibility for national intelligence
starkly clear.
A director, appointed by the President and under his orders,
was to administer this central service and determine its policy
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with. the advice and assistance of a board of representatives
from the Department of State, the Army, and the Navy.
Donovan did not say "with the advice and consent" of those
representatives; he said "advice and assistance." Here was a
source of much argument, heated argument, and great d:iffr-
culty from that time on.
Charged with the duty of collecting information and pro-
ducing intelligence for the national defense, the central
agency should have its own means of communication arid of
control over all secret activities, espionage and counterespio-
nage, cryptanalysis, and subversive operations. It would have
to use both vouchered and unvouchered funds. It would need
as a matter of course a staff of specialists professionally
trained in analysis, expert in languages, informed about par-
ticular regions, possessed of the many skills necessary to the
working of so complicated an organization.
All. of these essentials to a central intelligence service, Gen-
eral Donovan believed, he had in the Office of Strategic Services.
There was no need to create a new agency. There would be
only the task of adjusting the OSS to peacetime conditions arid
establishing it within the Executive Office of the President.
The way to accomplish this now in the fall of 1944 would be
an executive order replacing that of June 13, 1942, which had
put the OSS under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
There were conferences about the plan with the President's
advisers in the White House. There were discussions, with
members of the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
whom the proposal would be eventually referred. There were
negotiations with representatives of the Foreign Economic Ad-
ministration, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department
of State. For Donovan was well aware that there were many
in the armed services and elsewhere who did not share his
views and who had ideas of their own about the kind of in-
telligence service the country should have.
The Department of State in particular, as having the major
interest in foreign policy, had begun to make provision for an
intelligence service within its organization. Donovan had
among his papers such a program dated September 30, 1944;
he knew that members of the State Department were con-
ferring with persons in the War Department, the Navy De-
partment, and the Bureau of the Budget. And then there
was the Federal Bureau of Investigation at work in Latin
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America as well as the continental United States, guarding
its prerogatives and patrolling its jurisdiction. It was ap-
parent that he must have his plan well in hand and properly
explained in advance of its presentation to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
At this juncture, shortly after receiving from Donovan a
preliminary draft, Roosevelt referred to him a different kind
of proposal that had been submitted. The President did not
give the name of its author, but Donovan knew that it came
from John F. Carter, commentator and author known as "Jay
Franklin." His plan had interest for opinions and purposes
other than General Donovan's. It afforded Donovan an op-
portunity to speak his mind forcefully as usual and place
credit where it was due.
Carter felt that "the British Intelligence" had already
"penetrated" the Office of Strategic Services, whose usefulness
after the war therefore would be impaired. The British would
pursue their own ends; these might not be "synonymous"
with American purposes. Carter offered to establish a less ex-
pensive and adequately camouflaged central office. He would
use the foreign contacts of American businessmen for sources
of information, working of course with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the intelligence services of the Army and
Navy. He would leave the evaluation of reports to the State
Department. Carter had formerly worked in the Depart-
ment.
Donovan dismissed the suggestion. The author's thinking
on intelligence, he said, was in the "horse and buggy stage."
As for British penetration of the Office of Strategic Services, it
was in fact cooperation from which OSS had greatly profited.
He might have added that his organization was dependent
upon British sources for much of its information. He de-
clared that it had maintained its integrity. In point of fact,
he said, the President would be interested to know that "both
our. Allies and our enemies know less about our inner work-
ings than we do about theirs."
No more was heard from Carter, unless he was one of those
who were advocating the expansion of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation into an intelligence service overseas. By Novem-
ber 7 word came from the White House to discourage that
movement. The Bureau was to have no intelligence functions
outside of the United States. But talk of it continued. At-
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torney General Biddle favored it in the spring of 1945.. His
successor, Tom Clark, proposed a similar measure in the fall
of 1945. It was some time before the question was settled
and the Bureau's agents finally withdrawn from. Latin
America.
Invitation to Battle
Donovan's final draft of his plan for a "Permanent World-
Wide Intelligence Service" went to the President on November
18, 1944. In it he stressed two requirements. Control of the
system should return from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
President. There should be a central authority reporting di-
rectly to the President with responsibility for setting objec-
tives and coordinating the material necessary in planning and
executing "national policy and strategy." Though they were
in the midst of war, he said, before they were aware of it, they
would be in the "tumult of rehabilitation." An orderly sys-
tem of intelligence would contribute to informed decisions.
They had in the government at the time the trained and spe-
cialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not
be dispersed.
In the draft of a directive which he inclosed, Donovan pro-
posed that the board to "advise and assist" the director of
this central intelligence service should consist of the Secre-
taries of State, War, and Navy and other members whom the
President might subsequently appoint. This designation of
the secretaries themselves is not to be overlooked. Donovan
had no thought here of making the departmental chiefs of in-
telligence advisors to the director, unless of course they
might happen to be named severally by the secretaries to sit
in their places as deputies. We shall find later that the op-
ponents of Donovan's plan advocated the use of the depart-
mental chiefs of intelligence as an advisory board. We shall
also find that General Donovan adhered to his idea that such
a board of advice should be at the high level of the secretaries
or their representatives.
The proposed executive order for the transfer of the Office
of Strategic Services and the directive to accompany it, as
finally drafted near the end of November 1944, contained the
expected provision for national intelligence, carefully dis-
tinguishing it from the operational intelligence of the Depart-
ments. The directive laid plans for subversive operations
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abroad and for liaison with the intelligence agencies of foreign
governments. It prohibited the use of any police power either
at home or abroad. In addition, it called for the dissolution of
all joint intelligence committees and agencies then operat-
ing under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy De-
partments. Their functions, personnel, and facilities were to
be given over to the Office of Strategic Services. In time of
war or unlimited national emergency, its operations were to
be coordinated with military plans and subject to the ap-
proval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; theatre commanders were
to have control in their areas. Under other conditions, there
were to be no geographical restrictions upon the operations of
the Office of Strategic Services. These last provisions were cer-
tainly not designed to win friends in the Army, the Navy, or
even the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Donovan's plan
looked like an invitation to ordeal by battle before the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. So it proved.
A memorandum from Magruder on November 22, 1944, had
specifically urged that the executive order be precise and de-
tailed. Otherwise, he said, the matter would not be "tied up";
the services would "worm out of generalities." The Joint In-
telligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would fit
into the plan, once the authority for it was obtained. It
could of course remain responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for correlating and evaluating military intelligence as such,
though eliminated as a body having to do with the estimates
for "national policy and strategy" which the Office of Stra-
tegic Services should provide.
General Donovan was ready by November 27 for the hear-
ing before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wrote to General
Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold of the Army,
Navy, and Army Air Forces, to Lieutenant General Embick,
chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Vice Admiral Horne, deputy of Ad-
miral King as Chief of Naval Operations, to Secretary Stimson
and Assistant Secretary McCloy of the War Department, to
Secretary Forrestal and Assistant Secretary Bard of the
Navy, and to Mr. James C. Dunn, the State Department's Of-
ficer of Foreign Affairs. To all of these ranking officers, heads
of departments and their assistants, Donovan explained his
plan for turning the OSS into a permanent central intelligence
system and enclosed a copy of his final memorandum for the
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President of November 18, 1944. He reiterated again an,
again in these letters that he did not propose to :interfer
with the operational intelligence services of the department
nor seek any police functions for the central agency. It wa
to be a coordinating agency. As he closed this phase of th
endeavor, General Donovan declared that it "might be well t(
capitalize on our errors of the past two years and put it int(
effect at once."
But this was not to happen. The FBI and the armed. serv
ices accepted the invitation to combat vociferously and a
length. Shouts of "Gestapo" echoed through the committee
and Congress into the press and back again from far corner;
of the world. The Department of State proceeded with it
own plan, aided and encouraged by the Bureau of the Budge
and the Department of Justice. Another full year passed be
fore a central intelligence service began to operate in tunes o:
peace, and then the Office of Strategic Services was no :[onge]
in existence.
Conceptual Controversy
The scene of action shifted to the committees of the Joini
Chiefs of Staff in December 1.944 as General Donovan wens
abroad on a tour of inspection. Members of the Joint Intelli-
gence Staff, working committee of the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee, for some time had been dissatisfied with the system.
of collecting and appraising intelligence. They were dis.
cussing issues and problems among themselves in the hopE
that they might discover common ground for the Army anc
Navy, Department of State, Foreign Economic Admir.Listra?
tion, and Office of Strategic Services. The Donovan plan dis-
turbed their thinking; it contained a provision agreeable tc
none of them. This, of course, was the idea that the Director
of Central Intelligence should be immediately responsible tc
the President and subject only to advice from the depart-
ments. In the end, the Joint Intelligence Staff had reason to
thank General Donovan. His thoughts were so great a shock
to departmental minds that the members of the Staff got for
their own suggestions an audience they otherwise might never
have received from their superiors in the Joint Intelligence
Committee.
A large part of the resistance to the Donovan plan in the
meetings of the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew
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out of malice toward General Donovan himself. Some re-
marks were kept from the record, but enough of the bitter-
ness came through to convince any reader that Donovan's
proposal would not be accepted because it was his. There was,
fortunately, also a body of criticism based upon honest and
constructive disapproval. There was agreement too with
many of his major principles.
Two separate proposals called for brevity's sake the "serv-
ices plan" and the "civilian plan" emerged from the contro-
versy. Both were influenced by the Donovan plan but re-
jected his provision that, the head of the central intelligence
agency should report directly to the President. They seri-
ously modified, though they did not entirely remove, his con-
cept of individual responsibility. As so well expressed during
the argument in the prolonged meeting of the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee on December 22, 1944, the issue lay between
"the principle of coordination and the principle of chain of
command."
The services plan placed authority jointly with the Secre-
taries of State, War, and the Navy, but did not elaborate upon
their conduct as a board. The thought may simply have been
that no one of them would be allowed by the others to have
control; all three therefore should operate by unanimous con-
sent. They could watch one another as each looked out for
his own interests. The idea that this group should function
as a whole, however, was inherent in the authority descending
to the secretaries from the President. Authority is single; it
is not divided when shared by several persons. The secretaries
were individually responsible to the President. But he could
assign tasks to them individually or collectively at his own
pleasure. As indicated in the debate of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, the assumption was logical that the three secre-
taries would function as a whole.
The real intent of the services plan seems nevertheless to
have lain in the word "federal" as it was applied to the "In-
telligence Directorate" designed to operate under the secre-
taries. This Directorate was to have a civilian head from the
Department of State and deputies from the War and Navy
Departments. It should have powers of inspection, coordina-
tion, and planning. It should have no administrative or op-
erating functions; apparently these were to remain with the
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respective departments. A "single national intelligence serv-
ice," according to this plan, was "undesirable."
Separate from the Directorate, however, there would be a
joint intelligence service to conduct operations of "common
concern" to the three departments and, it may be supposed,
any other agency or department which had interests involved
from time to time. Stress upon matters of common con-
cern in this manner accentuated the desire to keep other in-
terests of the departments distinctly their own concern.
Those who favored this plan, mostly representatives of the
armed services, wished to have the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to provide intelligence
estimates, or synthesis of departmental intelligence, on a
"strategic level." From their point of view, the fact, that the
Department of State, the Foreign Economic Administration,
and the Office of Strategic Services all had representation. in
the Joint Intelligence Committee made it possible and fairly
easy to develop the committee into a national est.iniatin.g
board.
The "civilian plan" accepted Donovan's principles and meth-
ods for the most part. The proposed central intelligence
agency for coordination and secret collection should operate
with an independent budget. All departments, though main-
taining their own operational intelligence, should make avail-
able to the central agency whatever materials the director
might request. The central agency should have no police
functions. In time of war it should come directly under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
But the advocates of this plan did not make the director im-
mediately responsible to the President. Though appointed by
the President, he would be subject to the "direction and con-
trol" of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy sitting
as a board of authority. In time of war a representative of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also be a member of this board.
A further exception to Donovan's plan appeared in the state-
ment that the collection of intelligence, except by clandestine
methods, should be the function of the existing agencies and
not of the central service. Nor would the civilian plan allow
the agency to engage in subversive operations abroad:; these
were not considered an appropriate function of the proposed
intelligence service. We should note also that the civilian
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plan did not give to the central agency the power of inspec-
tion which the services plan had provided for its Directorate.
Before he went abroad on December 26, General Donovan
sent to President Roosevelt a memorandum upon these two
proposals from the Joint Intelligence Staff. The plan of the
military members, he said, evaded early action. Worse than
that, it approached the problem of national intelligence from
the departmental point of view, providing a minimum of cen-
tralization. He was surprised at the lack of understanding
among responsible officers in the field of intelligence. They
did not seem to comprehend, he said, the importance of a cen-
tral service in which military and civilian experts would work
together to synthesize all available information and to make
estimates before the event of political or military develop-
ments. The plan of the civilians was another matter. It
closely followed his own ideas. Its end in view was a complete
system for producing estimates which should aid in the con-
struction of national policy.
Donovan reported to the President that he had appeared at
its request before the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,
which advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on political matters.
He had done so with apparent willingness to entertain the
idea in the plan of the civilians that there should be a board
between the President and the director of the proposed cen-
tral intelligence service. But there is no mistaking that he
was unwilling at that time to make such a concession unless
it were clearly understood that the director would be free to
administer the affairs of the agency. He might be a general
manager, with the secretaries over him as a board of direc-
tors. Put in colloquial language perhaps more accurately con-
veying the thought, this meant that the general manager
might be hired and fired by the secretaries, but so long as he
was in charge he was not to be bossed by them. Donovan
was determined to get an agency in which there would be real
centralization and coordination of the intelligence services
under a single administrator ultimately responsible to the
President.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported in Janu-
ary along much the same line which Donovan had given to
the President, but conveying the impression that he had been
more willing to concede to the "advice and control" of the sec-
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retaries as proposed in the plan of the civilians. The Com-
mittee spoke of a diagram subsequently furnished by Dono-
van's office to comprehend the possibility of an "Intelligence
Directing Board" over the Director.
The difference in interpretation did not lay General Dono-
van's statement open to question. It put different emphasis
upon the possibilities of the future,. The position which he
took now anticipated the practical situation of the Director of
Central Intelligence under the National Security Council. Al-
though by the 1947 Act of Congress the Council had authority
over the Director and the Agency, the Director had frequent
access to the President. His responsibility to the President in
actual working conditions was often immediate and direct,,
President Truman used the Agency as his personal infornia-
tion service.
Convergence and Crash
Pressure from above seems to have come upon the repre-
sentatives of the armed services in the Joint Intelligence Corn-
mittee. The long meeting of December 22, 1944, had ended in
agreement that the Joint Intelligence Staff should go over the
plans and perfect them. No hope was expressed that they
ever could be consolidated into one. The idea appears never-
theless to have lurked in the atmosphere; and when the rep-
resentative of the Army suggested that his subordinate on the
Joint Intelligence Staff should help the authors of the "civil-
ian plan" to perfect their inadequate proposals, results, caine
fast.
Within a week there was a single plan which had the merits
of General Donovan's original concepts coupled with specific
provision that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy
with the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (Admiral
Leahy) should constitute a National Intelligence Authority.
Later the fourth member was changed to be simply a repre-
sentative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Unmistakably intended to function as a whole, the National
Intelligence Authority would be charged with responsibility
for all federal intelligence activities related to the national se-
curity. Under it there was to be established a Central Intelli-,
gence Agency headed by a Director who should be appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the Authority,
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As a body of advisers to the Director, there was to be set
up a board consisting of the heads of the intelligence services
of the Army, Navy, Department of State, and other agencies
concerned with the national security. This advisory board
would be subordinated to the National Intelligence Authority
by the directive which established it. Its members, of course,
were severally responsible to their secretaries. There was no
indication in the plan that the advisory board was to dictate
to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was
to be only a means for conveying advice from the intelligence
officers of the departments.
Thus the members of the Joint Intelligence Staff, with a
good deal of independent thinking and inspiration as well as
external pressure, arrived at the principles for a national sys-
tem of intelligence which took account of conflicting interests
and yet centralized controls under an authority receiving its
power from the Chief Executive of the United States.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 18, 1945, that the plan of the
Joint Intelligence Staff, now the proposal of the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee, was superior to General Donovan's plan.
His would "overcentralize" the intelligence service. It would
subject the departmental intelligence agencies to central con-
trol without making that control responsible either to the
head of a single department or to the heads of all of the de-
partments as a body. The plan of the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee, on the other hand, would hold the Central Intelli-
gence Agency within bounds set by the secretaries in the Na-
tional Intelligence Authority.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee accepted the provi-
sion in the new plan that the Central Intelligence Agency
should have the power to inspect the operations of the depart-
mental intelligence agencies in connection with its planning
function. But to make certain that the use of this power
should not jeopardize military operations the JSSC amended
the plan so that the Authority and the Agency under it
should be responsible for protecting "intelligence sources and
methods" which had direct and important bearing upon
"military operations." Military men evidently did not at that
time object to inspection if it were accompanied by a duty to
protect military operations. Restriction came later upon the
right of inspection. In addition, it was separated from the
responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to guard
sources and methods of intelligence from unauthorized ex-
posure.
Essential features of the Central Intelligence Agency were
clearly in view during the month of January 1945 before the
conference at Yalta, the surrender of Germany, and the col-
lapse of Japan. The national system of intelligence, however,
was not to come into operation in time of war, when a people is
more easily governed, it is said, than in time of peace. Dono-
van's plan was released to the public by someone who has yet
to confess. Circumstantial evidence narrowed suspicion to
two or three who might have violated the secrecy of the docu-
ments. Motive for doing so could easily be found in hatred.
Donovan and his Office of Strategic Services had bitter ene:m:ies.
But no useful purpose is served in speculations here.
On February 9, 1945, the Chicago Tribune and the Washing-
ton Times Herald simultaneously produced Donovan's memo-
randum to the President and proposal. There were headlines
and editorials on a "super-spy system," "bigger and better spy--
ing," and "police state." There were interviews with Con-
gressmen who obliged with accusations of "super-Gestapo"
and the like. Then the plan of the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee got into the same newspapers. This rather successfully
destroyed the insinuations that Donovan and Roosevelt were
establishing a personal regime. But the exposure seemed to
dismay the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or possibly
they were glad of an excuse to set the whole question aside.
Reports from the Yalta Conference sent "super-spy" off the
front pages immediately. The American public was much
more interested in news of the troops driving into Germany.
Had the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to settle the issue at that;
time, they might have completed their study in secret session.
without much attention from the public and put aside the re-
sulting plan for establishment later. Instead, they recalled.
their papers on Donovan's proposal and the plan of the Joint
Intelligence Committee. They made some effort to discover
who had released the papers. Donovan persisted in trying to
find out, and he continued to urge acceptance of his plan. for a
central intelligence system. Others who seemed really to care
were few.
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Revival and Relapse
On April 5, shortly before his death, President Roosevelt sent
a brief note asking Donovan to call together the chiefs of in-
telli;gence and security units in the various executive agencies
so that a consensus might be obtained regarding a central
intelligence service. It must have seemed like going back to
the beginning and starting again, but General Donovan was
nothing if not persistent. He sent letters the very next day
to the secretaries and heads of agencies as suggested, with a
statement of his principles, a copy of the President's note,
and another copy of his memorandum for the President of
November 18, 1944.
To judge from the replies, these familiar proposals were a
new idea to some of the officials who received them. The ob-
jectives were not "sufficiently clear" to permit the Secretary
of the Treasury on April 12 to express a "firm opinion"; but
Henry Morgenthau was certain that the burdens upon the
President were already too heavy for him to be directly re-
sponsible for the proposed central intelligence agency. Roose-
velt died that day. Postmaster General Walker advised Dono-
van that "it must be clear that any government intelligence
service outside the Post Office Department must operate
through the Post Office Department and recognize the abso-
lute jurisdiction of this Department." This must have been
a new notion to General Donovan.
Secretary Wickard was content with the existing arrange-
ments between the Department of Agriculture and the De-
partment of State. He saw no reason for a separate office to
coordinate intelligence on foreign conditions and develop-
ments. Additional coordination of such intelligence he be-
lieved could be and in fact was being secured through the Bu-
reau of the Budget. Another original view: Donovan had re-
ceived much from the Bureau of the Budget on financial mat-
ters, plans, programs, but nothing worth the name of foreign
intelligence.
Attorney General Biddle replied with terse comment reflect-
ing the interests of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He
was satisfied with existing arrangements for the exchange of
intelligence among the Bureau, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
and the Military Intelligence Service of the Army. He did
not wish any change in the "middle of the war," nor did he
believe that Congress would grant an appropriation for such a
purpose. The intelligence service "should be organized quietly
and not in the manner suggested." He favored the idea, of a
policy committee consisting of representatives from the agen-
cies chiefly concerned-State, War, Navy, Justice, and the Of-
fice of Strategic Services. The Attorney General's reply could
have left no doubt where he stood. It may have recalled Car-
ter's proposal to President Roosevelt in the preceding fall, the
one General Donovan had placed in the "horse and buggy
stage."
Secretary Ickes replied that the central intelligence service
would be a handicap to his Department of the Interior if it
were to foreclose in any manner the ability of the Depart-
ment's bureaus to secure intelligence from any source, do-
mestic or foreign, which concerned matters under his jurisdic-
tion. To Ickes, General Donovan replied that he need have no
concern: one of the principle objectives of the agency would be
to coordinate intelligence for the very purpose of facilitating
and increasing the flow of material to the departments.
For the Department of Labor, Secretary Perkins replied
that she could not support the proposal to create an "Intelli-
gence Officer reporting directly to the President." She favored
keeping the State Department above any other agency in co-
ordinating foreign intelligence except the "narrowly defined
military subjects." She favored improved arrangements
among the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, so that
there would be no gaps and no need for coordination by some
officer reporting directly to the President.
The reply of Stimson, Secretary of War, on May 1, 1945? was
the most significant. General Donovan's plan had received
careful. consideration in the War Department. It was in en-
tire agreement with his objective. It differed with regard to
methods. From Stimson's point of view, responsibility should
not be separated from the authority to discharge that :re-
sponsibility. Security against foreign aggression was the pri-
mary concern of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and
Secretary of the Navy. All responsibility, therefore, should re-
main with them. Donovan's intelligence service, moreover,
would subject the operations of departmental intelligence to
control. outside the respective departments. This was not ad-
visable,, Secretary Stimson agreed that coordination must be
attained, but he did not think that "the coordinating author-
ity should engage in operations." The inevitable tendency,
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he declared, would be to expand its operating functions at the
expense of the agencies which had the responsibilities for op-
erations in intelligence.
Secretary Stimson's position was clear. The methods of co-
ordination and what combined operations were necessary
should be determined by the heads of the departments con-
trolling the operating agencies. This coordination was one of
the matters to be considered in the general problem of a single
Department of Defense. In short, Secretary Stimson did not
wish an independent agency with a separate budget. In any
event, he said, the Departments of State, War, Justice, and
the Navy had examined together the proposed central intelli-
gence service; they were in substantial agreement that it
should not be considered before the end of hostilities against
Germany and Japan. This statement gave further evidence
that the armed services had been more pleased than dismayed
in February when the Donovan plan got into the news.
General Magruder advised Donovan that the letter from
Stimson left two courses of action. Either he could try to de-
velop political pressures upon President Truman that were
stronger than the influence of the four Departments, or he
might compromise his cherished idea of independence from
them in order to obtain immediate action. Magruder knew
that he was recommending to Donovan a pet abomination in
suggesting compromise, but he felt that it would win over
many high-ranking officials in the Army, Navy, and the De-
partment of State. It would eliminate the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from consideration. It would make the situa-
tion less difficult for the President. If it won his support, "he
could restore large powers to the director" later in executive
orders.
General Donovan, however, would keep trying. He had
found some encouragement in the interest of the State De-
partment after the latest version of the so-called compromise
plan had come from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been pleased, too, that Ad-
miral Horne had requested a copy of the Joint Intelligence
Committee's final paper, presumably for study and report to
Admiral King. Donovan had cabled from London that he
would like to have his deputies at home pursue these oppor-
tunities. They should keep in mind as they discussed the
matter that so far as he was concerned the ultimate interests
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of the country required that the responsibility should be
vested in the President and not "diffused through intermedi-
ate echelons."
Donovan replied to Secretary Stimson on May 16. The
secretaries were to provide for security against aggression. It
was their primary concern. But that did not give them the
right, said Donovan, to exercise exclusive control over the pro-
posed central intelligence agency. That was the responsibility
of the President, who was Commander in Chief in peace as
well as in war; the "authority of decision" resided in him. Pol-
icy was necessarily dependent upon intelligence. To make
that decision, the President was entitled to an intelligence
service free from domination by one or any group of the de-
partments. Secretary Stimson's reply, however, had been
made on behalf of the Administration. Nothing further was
to be done after General Eisenhower took the surrender of the
Germans on May 7 until plans had been carried out for the
overwhelming defeat of Japan. The atomic bomb was tested
at Alamogordo on July 16.
Liquidation for OSS
After the surrender of Germany the House Appropriations
Committee inquired whether General MacArthur and Admiral
Nimitz wished to use the Office of Strategic Services in the
Pacific war. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without personal
comment, Admiral Leahy replied on May 25 and 27, 1945, by
quoting from messages of Admiral Nimitz and Generals Mac-
Arthur, Sultan, and Wedemeyer in the Far East and also from
Generals McNarney and Eisenhower concerning Europe.
General Sultan, in the India-Burma Theater, said that OSS
had furnished most effective assistance but was no longer
needed. Its present functions would be "more economically
and efficiently" accomplished within the War and Navy De-
partments "through normal command channels." Admiral
Nimitz answered that use of OSS in the Pacific had been very
limited. In his "considered opinion," better results could be
obtained if its tasks were "reassigned to the War and Navy De-
partments."
General MacArthur's view on the matter was as definite,
and characteristic: "No statement," he said, "has emanated
from this headquarters nor so far as known from this area in
comment on OSS. Any items that may have appeared in the
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press along this line must be regarded as speculative conjec-
ture. The OSS has not up to the present time operated within
this area, I know little of its methods, have no control of its
agencies, and consequently have no plans for its future em-
ployment." Donovan considered this a "very fair statement"
from MacArthur's own point of view.
General Eisenhower wrote that the future of OSS in the Eu-
ropean Theater would be subject to certain contingencies. It
would be confined of course to the functions of an intelligence-
gathering and counterespionage organization. Complete con-
trol of its activities by each theater commander would be es-
sential to efficient and smooth operations. But its value in
the European Theater would "continue to be very high."
General McNarney reported that OSS had done an "out-
standing job" in Italy. So long as conditions there, in Austria,
and in the Balkans remained unstable, it was essential to con-
tinue its secret intelligence work in that theater. Its staff in
the Mediterranean area could be reduced, but he specifically
recommended that trained OSS personnel be re-deployed to the
Pacific.
General Wedemeyer declared that OSS's potential value in
the China Theater was high. It was training twenty com-
mando groups and intelligence teams there. These and others
already trained were to be charged with "responsible missions
in direct support of contemplated future plans." According
to Donovan's memory, they might have accomplished much
to appraise the situation in Manchuria before the atomic bomb
was used in Japan.
The opinions of such commanders as Nimitz and MacArthur,
however, were likely to have more influence in this country
than Wedemeyer's plans for the China Theater. After the
atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was little
point to arguing the need for OSS activity in China. If the
mood of the American people prevailed, there was going to be
no theater of war in China.
It may be harder to govern in time of peace than in time
of war. It is more difficult still to control a people turning
from war to peace. Public relaxation in America with the
news from Tokyo Bay took on the aspects of an orgy; the
treatment of gasoline rationing that summer's evening, Au-
gust 14, 1945, was but one response of a people cherishing the
belief that government draws its just powers from the con-
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sent of the governed. More ominous was the rush to disband
America's forces. The fleet went into mothballs for a possi-
bility which later became fact in Korean waters. But there
were too many instances where demobilization meant disin-
tegration. Personnel disappeared beyond recall. The ruin of
much valuable organization was complete.
The Bureau of the Budget, obliged by the nature of its office
to peer into the costs of future events, quickly sensed the
change in the American mood following Japan's surrender.
Replacing the notice which he had sent on July 17 in regard
to expenditures for war, Director Smith of the Bureau advised
General Donovan on August 25, 1945, that the "overriding
consideration" now in estimating budgets for 1947 would be
to retain full employment and to resume the social and eco-
nomic progress which had been interrupted by the war. To
this end, there would be no expansion of present "peace-time
activities" unless it were to contribute to the "reconversion
process and the expansion of industry and trade."
The Office of Strategic Services was a wartime enterprise
with no "peacetime activities" established in the past. In
short, although Mr. Smith did not say so, it looked as t:hough:c
General Donovan were going to have a very hard time main-
taining his independent agency, whatever happened to its in-
dispensable functions. The Bureau of the Budget itself had
been studying for months the problems of an intelligence sys-
tem and had a plan of its own to propose.
Donovan strove to keep his organization intact. He wrote
on September 4 to Samuel Rosenman in the White House that
it was absurd to allocate different segments of its function
to different departments. The Office of Strategic Services had
been established "as an entity, every function supporting and
supplementing the other." It was time "to grow up" and
realize that the new responsibilities of the American people
required "an adequate intelligence system."
The expectation of the American people, however, was
clearly that expenditure for war would be stopped with the
fighting, and the "boys brought home." Apparently the rncod.
of the Negro spiritual was rather general that there would
be "no war, no more." There would be no place now in
American policy for sabotage, psychological warfare, and guer-
rilla tactics. Whatever services were necessary in peacetime
for the collection of information and the coordination of in-
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telligence might be had within the established Departments
of State, War, and the Navy, as so many of the Cabinet offi-
cers had written to Donovan in the spring. The Office of Stra-
tegic Services should be closed.
Responsible observers took stock as the OSS went out of
existence. For the first time in the history of the United
States, there had been established an organized network of
espionage and counterespionage operating in Europe, North
Africa, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East. American
scholars had been mobilized to supplement current informa-
tion with comprehensive surveys and to blend them into in-
telligence reports for the policymakers of the Government.
OSS had demonstrated the usefulness of a central body to
process materials from every source of information. Its ex-
periences indicated that a single authority ought to have
charge of collecting secret information outside of the United
States. Cooperation with the agencies of other governments
left :much still to be desired, but the value of the endeavor had
been shown. The Office of Strategic Services had closely as-
sociated secret intelligence with covert operations, economic
intrusion, and other subversive practices. The latter perhaps
could have been kept separate and administered in a "Depart-
ment of Dirty Tricks." The immovable fact was that the two
were complementary. Each seemed to work better when as-
sociated with the other. But the problem of their articula-
tion was not yet solved.
President Truman praised General Donovan on September
20, 1945, for exceptional leadership in a wartime activity.
More than this, he could say that General Donovan retired to
private life with the reward of knowing that the intelligence
services of the government for times of peace were being
erected upon the foundations which he had laid in the Office
of Strategic Services. It went out of existence as a wartime
expedient commended for many accomplishments. It was en-
titled to the greater praise of close study by those who had
charge of creating and administering the organization which
succeeded it.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
Europe Long Ago
SECRET DIPLOMACY, ESPIONAGE AND CRYPTOGRAPHY,
1500--1815. By James West fall Thompson and Saul K.
Padover. (New York: Frederick Ungar. 1963. 290 pp.
$6.50.)
Reprinted from 1937, a formidable title over feeble text.
Can hardly be recommended except for its bibliography: it
meticulously cites sources both primary and secondary. There
are 18 pages of illustrations; an appendix of 10 pages reviews
in an antiquarian spirit early developments in cryptography.
The text runs through European history from 1500 to 1815
giving hurried and often confused anecdotes of sensational
incidents--an old professor of history scandalizing himself
with stories our age takes with calm. He underlines the
ironies, deplores the wickedness:
The age which was dominated by Voltaire in literature produced
a number of diplomats and statesmen who were the apogee of
Machiavellism. International law was a mockery and public ethics
practically non-existent. Statesmen were systematically bought,
diplomats regularly bribed, and letters intercepted and copied . . .
In spite of the tedium engendered by the author's small-
town view of history, most readers with intelligence expe-
rience will discover something here they would like to know
more about. The notes show where to find out more.
H. H. Cooper
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Irregular Warfare
WARFARE IN THE ENEMY'S REAR. By Otto Heilbrunn.
New York: Praeger. 1963. 231 pp. $6.50.)
With this his third major work in English on unconven-
tional or irregular warfare,' Dr. Heilbrunn reinforces his
position as the foremost analyst in the field. It is a product
of painstaking research on the origins, structures, missions,
tactics, and battle records of irregular or special-purpose
forces that have operated during declared international wars.
While not neglecting earlier irregular units it centers on the
plethora of special forces formed by the main belligerents
in World War II. Counting only the larger ones like Merrill's
Marauders, Popski's Private Army, and Skorzeny's SS Special
Formation, and omitting the independent guerrilla formations
in eastern and western Europe, these ran to the astonishing
number of nineteen. The book thus offers us a systematic
comparative examination of different types of operations
conducted in different degrees of depth behind the enemy's
front by different kinds of irregular forces.
It also offers an answer to a question debated periodically
by a number of World War II commanders when they recall
(with mixed emotions) the diversity of special-purpose units
("private armies") and the frequent difficulty of coordinating
their operations with the main battle plan: when do unusual
or special operations require special forces and when can they
be carried out by orthodox line units with a little variation
in their composition and training? Noting that Britain alone
had more than twelve special-purpose units in the last war,
Heilbrunn argues for a sharp reduction by means of amal-
gamating some specialized functions and returning others to
the conventional forces: "Too many special units are unde-
sirable because they can't easily be controlled, and uneconomic
because they can't easily be employed if they become too
specialized."
The author concludes that "World War II has made the
importance of the rear war evident; it has shown what special
3 The others were Communist Guerrilla Warfare (with Brigadier
C. A. Dixon as co-author) and Partisan Warfare.
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forces and guerrillas, the air force, paratroops, and air landing
troops can do." He argues that special operations behind the
fronts, now that improved techniques of radio communication
and air resupply make for better coordination and efficiency,
are likely to become a permanent feature of modern warfare.
Even under nuclear conditions there is scope for special oper-
ations; formations in the enemy rear, he points out, will be
comparatively safe from nuclear attack, and they will find
even more targets because troops and installations will be
more widely dispersed. Elsewhere he shows the continuing
need for OSS-type agent operations in advance of and in con-
junction with the commitment of army special forces in
enemy-occupied territory.
In analyzing the role the ubiquitous Soviet partisans played
in the German rear, Heilbrunn remarks that "the most
startling innovation was their systematic use for army intel-
ligence and reconnaissance." In the beginning the partisans
sent this intelligence across by messengers, carrier pigeons,
and dogs, but by 1943 army intelligence officers had been as-
signed to partisan staffs, and instructions and reports were
transmitted by radio. In the same year the French under-
ground began to be charged with intelligence tasks. "The
value of partisan intelligence was frequently very high."
Most of one chapter is devoted to OSS and British SOE ac-
tivities in cooperation with partisans. Functioning in great
part as support and supply mechanisms, these two agencies
provided arms, radios, supplies, training in leadership and
tradecraft, and military missions. That both agencies re-
garded their activities as those of a special force is apparent
in their designation of field elements as either "Special Force
HQ" or "Special Force Detachment." Both had similar aims---
to encourage and help people in enemy-held territory form
secret forces for economic and military sabotage, harassment,
armed raids, and intelligence collection.
Heilbrunn contrasts the use of guerrillas in Burma with
that in Europe. In Burma OSS and various British elements
together brought into action against the Japanese army some
16,000 guerrillas, who, although command control and corn-
munications were tenuous, also collected some valuable intelli-
gence. It is virtually certain that if the Anglo-Americans had
not organized, trained, deployed, and supplied these irregulars
the Japanese would have faced no local guerrilla action. In
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 Europe, on the other hand, where command relations and
communications were tidier, the partisans sprang up independ-
ently and OSS and SOE were never able to establish control
over them. The European resistance was supplied, enabled to
build strength, and sometimes influenced, but almost never
commanded.
CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY
WARFARE: ALGERIA 1954-1962. (Washington, D.C.:
USGPO. 1963. 151 pp. Not for sale.)
This is the third study of an excellent scholarly series being
done by the Army-sponsored Special Operations Research
Office at American University. It portrays and analyzes the
character and dynamics of the French-Algerian agony of
1954-62. After detailing the historical background of the
Algerian dissidence it goes on to describe the organization,
strategy, and techniques of the revolutionary movement. Al-
though it does not have the study of French policy as part of
its central theme, it does describe French strategy and tac-
tics and the distracting political imbroglios, including the in-
trusion of French army elements.
The book shows amply that the economic plight of the
multiplying masses and the political frustrations of the in-
tellectuals lay at the base of the revolution, that the immo-
bilisme of French policy, stemming from the paralysis of weak
metropolitan governments by the reactionary right wing at
home and the colonists in Algeria, precipitated violent action,
and that the rise of Nassirism, the debacle in Indochina, and
the independence of numerous former colonies (importantly
including Tunisia and Morocco) contributed to the revolution-
ary process. This reviewer would add, as another appreciable
contributory factor, racial and communal antipathies.
The analysis of the early period of the revolt points by im-
plication to a grossly inaccurate French intelligence appraisal
which led to a critically inappropriate reaction. In the first
place the revolt caught the French by surprise; in the second,
they had not measured correctly the discontent of either the
masses or the elite; in the third, they misread the character
of the rebellion. In short, they did not see a revolution
coming.
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The FLN launched hostilities in November 1954, under the
leadership of the younger political nationalists, with a force
of no more than two to three thousand. Included, however,
were veterans of the European and Indochinese wars, and
from the outset their operations showed sophistication in un-
conventional warfare. From an inaccessible mountain base
the main force raided small military outposts and police sta-
tions to obtain weapons, while militants from underground
cells carried out acts of terror and sabotage in urban centers.
The French reacted as to the outbreak of a classical tribal
revolt. Bombing, strafing, and sweep operations were launched
against areas in which rebel activity had taken place, but they
achieved no useful results. Even pro-French clans and tribes
were disarmed. Lack of discrimination by the French :forces
and mistreatment of passive civilians made FLN recruitment
an easier task and silenced anti-FLN Moslem leaders. The
mass support base, dangerously small for the militant rebels
in the beginning, thus grew apace as the French, counter-
guerrilla and counterterror operations alienated the people.
Moreover, the French had been caught with a NATO-type mili-
tary force having the wrong equipment and training for un-
conventional warfare, a deficiency not made good for more
than eighteen months.
By the end of 1957 the French army had developed a pan-
oply of counterinsurgency activities-to be carried out by
"Specialized Administrative Sections"-comprising civic action,
"nation-building," and self-defense programs. But by this
time the revolutionary movement had established a redoubta-
ble mountain base, supply mechanisms in Tunisia and Morocco
to handle massive quantities of material from abroad, an
army able to engage the French at battalion level, the support
of the vast majority of Algerians, and information offices in
the major world capitals. Between 1958 and the cease-lire in
1962 the French were able to achieve at best a military
stalemate.
Writings on counterinsurgency operations abound with
statements of the need to win the people and with advice on
how to do it through civic action, nation-building, hygiene-
improving, we-help-you-to-help-yourself projects. Students of
this aspect of counterinsurgency will want to dig into the
experience in Algeria to examine and judge the French :meas-
ures. It will unfortunately be difficult to assess their effec-
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tiveness: the picture is muddied by cross-currents from the
coup attempt of army elements, the return of De Gaulle, and
his decision in late 1960 to suspend the programs in Algeria
while switching to a policy of disengagement. The SORO
study does not attempt to analyze the French psycho-eco-
nomic-civic program. It merely states in one place that
"French efforts to win the population over . . . came too late
to be, really effective," and in another that "civic action pro-
grams in the rural areas . . . were successful but too late."
Just what the program comprised and what its impact was
remain to be studied.
At least one authority known to this reviewer is convinced
that the French mistake was in their timing. They launched
their civic program and announced politically appetizing
goals only after failing to make progress in the war. Their
actions and proclamations thus bore the stamp of reluctant
concessions. What is more, according to this authority, the
record of broken French political promises to the Algerians
goes back at least to the Blum government. It is likely, there-
fore, that the latest assurances may have been regarded as
counterfeit. Finally, perhaps the French had not demon-
strated the essential condition for civilian cooperation: the
clear ability to protect cooperators from the wrath of the
insurgents.
On the other hand, another expert holds that by late 1960
the French were very close to the last stage of counterin-
surgency-mopping up the hard-core remnants. By then the
rebel force inside Algeria had been reduced to eight or nine
thousand and broken up into small, not very effective units
suffering from a critical ammunition shortage. The borders
had been sealed against supplies and reinforcements from
outside. The population was being returned increasingly to
French control. In short, the complex military-police-civic
action program for counterinsurgency-called quadrillage-
was working.
Thus the question of French effectiveness and prospects at
the time De Gaulle switched policies is controversial. In any
case, international opinion had by 1960 clearly tilted in favor
of independence for Algeria.
The rebels' intelligence-gathering system seems to have
been simple and effective. In the countryside they main-
tained a large number of civilian auxiliaries with a dual mis-
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sion, intelligence and quasi-military. These "infiltrated
French-held villages, prowled ahead of regular rebel columns,
and provided a steady stream of fresh information." They
were apparently well trained in observation and reporting,
and they were given specific requirements. They normally
reported to the intelligence officer of the regular unit operating
in their area, usually by courier. This unit would in turn
transmit the intelligence laterally and up to rebel army head-
quarters by courier or radio.
In the urban centers the rebel leaders' agents were in-
structed "to report on the daily activities of the French police
and armed forces." A large number of double agents were
used, with the mission of obtaining information on Drench.
administrative measures, troop movements, and materiel, and
this information was transmitted to higher headquarters..
With respect to the French forces, the study contains
brief illuminating passages on their operations but nothing
on their intelligence mechanisms.
COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. By David Galula.
New York: Praeger. 1964. 143 pp. $4.50.)
Drawing upon a rich military experience in West Europe,
Greece, the Far East, and Algeria and upon an incisive ana-
lytic talent, Galula has set forth a theoretical doctrine for
counterinsurgency operations which shines with logic and
simplicity. Counterinsurgency Warfare is surely the most
penetrating, most illuminating, and most constructive of all
the works in English on the theory and practice of corribatting;
revolutionary insurgency.
The author, a former French citizen and officer schooled
at St. Cyr, opens with an examination of the nature and gen-
eral characteristics of revolutionary war. He proceeds to de-
velop a statement of the prerequisites for successful insur-
gency from which early-warning specialists might do well to
compile a list of indicators. He then analyzes the growth pat-
terns, the environment, and the characteristics of the devel-
oping revolution.
Turning to the problem of defeating the insurgent, Galula
sets forth and proves four "laws," or principles, by ?which
the counterinsurgent authority should be guided. From these
principles he advances a series of deductions which form the
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general strategy of counterinsurgency, and then eight tacti-
cal steps or procedures emerge. These steps or operations,
spelled out in convincing detail, provide for the orderly and
systematic concentration and intensive employment of all the
assets available to the government-the state's administra-
tive apparatus, economic resources, information and propa-
ganda machinery, and military superiority in unit strength
and equipment. The design is to take and hold the initiative,
and the mood is relentlessly offensive. There is a brief demon-
stration of the essentiality of good intelligence, and the need
for professional skills in procuring intelligence is emphasized.
Conventional warfare has been thoroughly analyzed and
war-gamed over the centuries. Counterinsurgency warfare is
only beginning to be analyzed, and fogs of uncertainty and
confusion still drift across some current approaches and prac-
tices aimed at beating the insurgent. In advancing an ap-
parently sound, coherent doctrine for counterinsurgency, sim-
ple in concept and almost mathematically logical, Galula may
be taking us a long way toward the goal of a practical, effec-
tive framework for mounting such operations in the future.
This book should be highly regarded in our counterinsur-
gency schools and courses. It should be read by all who have
even a role behind a role-be it intelligence, operational, or
administrative-in the counterinsurgency field.
MODERN WARFARE. By Roger Trinquier. Translated from
the French La Guerre Moderne (Paris, 1961). (New York:
Praeger. 1964. 115 pp. $3.95.)
Colonel Trinquier opens and closes his book with a rap at
the traditionalist mold of the French Army, which he blames
for the loss of Indochina and Algeria. In between he ana-
lyzes and discusses his "modern warfare" as "an interlocking
system of actions" of military, political, psychological, and
economic nature-i.e., insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Paratrooper and hard-nosed veteran of some of the grimmest
actions in Indochina and Algeria, he spells out a general
strategy and tactics for counterinsurgency which are enough
like. Colonel Galula's, as described above, to suggest the coa-
lescence of a French "school" on this subject.
Both soldier-authors focus on the people-"The stake in
modern warfare is control of the people... The modern battle-
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field is limitless; the inhabitant is the center of the conflict."
Anti-guerrilla sweeps and pursuits by themselves do no good;
even the occasional spectacular success in battle is worthless
because the enemy quickly replaces his losses from the popu-
lation he controls. Both writers return time after time to
the axiom that the support of the people is the "sine qua
non of victory." Both show the need for good intelligence
personnel, putting heavy stress on police special-branch-type
operations against the insurgents' political apparatus. Trin-
quier in. particular gives considerable space to the application
of the craft of intelligence to counterinsurgency operations.
Both propose procedures and techniques obviously developed
from the quadrillage plan adopted in 1957 by the French in
Algeria, which might eventually have brought victory if high
policy had not changed. Quadrillage, in turn, appears to be a
sophisticated descendent of the tache de l'huile strategy 2 by
which Marshal Lyautey defeated the Moroccan rising in 1925.
Briefly, the French design comprises a series of highly co-
ordinated, complex, and intense military, police, and civic op-
erations, to be applied sector by sector. Military garrisons
and police reinforcements move into the towns in a designated
sector, controlling and restructuring the population, obtain-
ing intelligence, and destroying the insurgents' urban politi-
cal and terrorist machine. Civic action and economic, assist-
ance help win over the inhabitants, who are given help in
forming self-defense units. The program spreads outward, en-
compassing villages and settlements, and there may be some
relocation of the people. Increasingly isolated and cut off from
the population which has sustained them, the guerrillas are
pursued relentlessly by elite trained forces reinforced from
the town garrisons and are driven to their ultimate inaccessi-
ble refuges. There they can be denied food and supplies,
worn down, and eventually annihilated. Then the whole
process is repeated in another sector. It is a complicated,
lengthy, and unspectacular program, but it gives to the coun-
terinsurgents the initiative and the opportunity to use to full
advantage their preponderant strength and resources and their
organized administrative apparatus.
'This metaphor-and the idea-has been reanimated in Vietnam;
a current operational concept has been referred to as "the spreading
oil stain."
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Both authors' experience with the guerrilla has been in-
timate, and both's knowledge is factual. But within their
agreement on strategic principles they show appreciable dif-
ferences in approach and emphasis. Galula insists upon the
value of a civilian taking over-all leadership of the counter-
insurgency campaign; Trinquier assumes that a military fig-
ure will orchestrate the operations. Trinquier downgrades the
importance of civic action, information programs, and eco-
nomic projects before the victory is in sight-"Be generous
after victory." The main thing for him is the mounting of
intense, highly professional military and police operations, the
destruction of the insurgents' apparatus in the towns and vil-
lages, the restructuring of the population under local civilian
leaders chosen carefully for their initiative and intelligence,
and the development of self-defense units within an assuredly
secure environment. Galula tends more to a balance of the
two kinds of ingredients, but he agrees that "the population's
attitude in the middle stages of the war is dictated not so much
by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by
the more primitive concern for safety." He says that the
fundamental criteria governing the people's stand are which
side gives the best protection, which threatens the most, and
which is likely to win.
Trinquier asserts that terror is the basic weapon of "mod-
ern warfare"-though he emphatically opposes "unnecessary
violence"-and argues that the terrorist is no more criminal
or reprehensible than the bomber pilot who kills defenseless
people. Galula, while he does not discuss that point, might
disagree with the Trinquier dictum that terrorism is the
"most effective means" for either side to secure popular sup-
port. He proposes administrative, or bureaucratic, measures
to force recalcitrants to cooperate.
Only Trinquier takes up the problem of foreign aid for the
insurgents. He says that if the nation aiding them cannot
be persuaded or pressured to stop, then it becomes an enemy
and the war should be carried to it, but not by conventional
methods. He elaborates a technique for emplacing the hard
core of a revolutionary movement across its borders.
Trinquier's detailed treatment of anti-insurgent operations
and ;intelligence techniques contrasts with Galula's summary
approach. Both, however, emphasize that intelligence has to
come primarily from the population and that the people won't
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talk until they can be made to feel safe. Propaganda and new
bridges are unlikely to budge a man when his life is at stake.
As Trinquier puts it, "Fear of reprisal will always prevent
[people] from communicating to us information they
possess..."
Both stress the requirement that intelligence interrogators
be skilled professionals in the business, versed in techniques
and in substance. Trinquier discourses at length on. this
point. He also goes into detail on follow-up procedures for
the arrest of personnel and roll-up of a clandestine urban
organization and for the employment of stool pigeons. Both
emphasize the need to protect sources, and they propose tech-
niques for covering informers and agents from detection by
the enemy. Trinquier notes too the value and the "delicacy"
of inserting agents into the enemy organization.
In a grandiose and unrealistic passage, Trinquier cites the
need for a "vast intelligence network," great numbers of agents
trained in elementary clandestine procedures and placed in
appropriate cover jobs throughout "all phases of human ac-
tivity" to report on the insurgents' low echelons-the fund
raisers, propagandists, provocateurs. This network, despite
its extent, can be created at little expense, he says. Over this
essentially passive activity he proposes to place an "intelli-
gence-action service," an elite, highly trained corps of staff
officers. These officers would be capable of a variety of mis-
sions, including the pursuit and surveillance of leads spotted
by the network, their arrest and interrogation, and the
doubling of suitable enemy agents. In a curious passage he
remarks: "Experience has shown that, although confessions
and conversions may be difficult to obtain at lower echelons,
they are, at a higher level, and especially among intellectuals,
usually easy and quick."
Modern. Warfare may be opaque in a few places, too cate-
gorical in others, and debatable in still others. Its doctrinal
concepts may at times seem to neglect some practical diffi-
culties. But it remains a thoughtful and provocative work by
a French officer of rare counterrevolutionary experience, and
it deserves to be read by those who have or expect to have
counterinsurgency responsibilities.
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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 8 NO. 4 FALL 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE .R. HOUSTON
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Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 27 Langley I and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted through channels. They should be typed
in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
si1led through Secret.
DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the
O:tfice of the Editor,
Page
Cratology Pays Off Thaxter L. Goodell I
Vindication for the science of crate recognition. SECRET
African Numbers Game .................. Walter McDonald 11
Underdeveloped socio-economic statistics ad absurdum.
CONFIDENTL&L
Telemetry Analysis ..................... David S. Brandwein .21
The reconstruction of test flights and the missiles tested.
SECRET
Snooping on Space Pictures ................ Henry G. Plaster :31
Getting the video from Soviet spacecraft and making it work.
SECRET
The Diyarbakir Radar.. Stanley G. Zabetakis and John F. Peterson 41
Operation of a fixed-beam system blanketing Kapustin Yar.
SECRET
Words of Estimative Probability Sherman Kent 49
History of a semantics problem. CONFIDENTIAL
The Definition of Some Estimative Expressions ... David L. Wark 07
Still little agreement in actual usage. CONFIDENTIAL
Against Footnotes Allan Evans 81
Wrong field for the academic revolution. CONFIDENTIAL
Communications to the Editors ..... . .
More against footnotes. CONFIDENTIAL
The Missiles in Cuba . J. J. Rumpelmaycr 87
Lament for high-quality intelligence unrecognized. SECRET
Two Witnesses for the Defense
Harlow T. Munson and W. P. Southard 93
Unrecognized because indistinguishable. SECRET
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature. CONFIDENTIAL
From World War II ........... ....... . 99
Visible today .................. 104
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Thaxter L. Goodell is a member of CIA's economic research organiza-
tion.
Walter McDonald is a CIA economic analyst.
David S. Brandwein is Deputy Director of CIA's Foreign Missile and
Space Analysis Center.
Henry G. Plaster is a CIA space systems engineer.
Stanley G. Zabetakis and Captain John F. Peterson,
Sherman Kent chairs the Board of National Estimates.
David L. Wark is a junior officer trainee in CIA.
0
J. J. Rumpelmayer is
Harlow T. Munson and W. P. Southard are CIA analysts.
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A new kind of intelligence lore
struggles for recognition and is vin-
dicated.
CRATOLOGY PAYS OFF
Thaxter L. Goodell
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter)
of each volume for articles published during the preceding
calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nomi-
nations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence
in the decision.
During the 1962 Soviet military buildup in Cuba the term cratology
came into general use in the intelligence community to designate a.
new technique for identifying military cargoes from the appearance
of their shipping crates. Although the Cuban crisis was not solely
responsible for the development of the technique, if it had not made
crates a prominent issue the word would probably never have been
coined. This article describes how the catalog of information con-
stituting cratology was acquired and how it paid off at a crucial
moment. Its success rested on a foundation of dozens of separate
reports, photographs, and other pieces of evidence, most of them
individually inconsequential, which proved invaluable collectively.
Prior to 1961, reasonably complete reporting on arms deliveries to
countries receiving Soviet military assistance was made possible by a
variety of sources. In early 1961, however, a number of these sources
dried up, and an intensive search was mounted for new methods of
monitoring the movement of Soviet military equipment. Although
needed for the entire Soviet military aid program, this effort was
spurred by the situation even then in Cuba, where the first delivery
of MIG jet fighters was imminent in the spring of 1961.
CIA officers discussed with the Office of Naval Intelligence ways to
improve reporting on Soviet arms traffic and at ONI request agreed
to prepare a Collection Guide on how Soviet military equipment is
shipped. Tailored especially for observers in the Turkish straits and
other waterways where Soviet merchant ships must pass, the guide
was to lay out the broad outlines of Soviet military aid policy and
then detail methods of spotting arms shipments. It could explain
that almost all such shipments moved from the Black Sea on Soviet
ships, point out that military and civilian cargoes were seldom mixed,
and list characteristics such as light loads, false declarations, and
other tip-oils betraying the Soviet arms carrier.
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Primarily, however, the guide was to show examples of military
deck cargoes on Soviet ships and in particular the kinds of crate used
for aircraft. Extensive reporting had established that all Soviet mili-
tary aircraft are delivered as deck cargo, which alert observers can
easily report on if they know what to look for. MIG crates, for
example, had frequently been reported as looking like railroad cars.
A search was therefore begun for photographs of crates in order
to include them in the guide. The files of the Graphics Register were
combed for pictures of crated deck cargoes. Offices throughout
Washington were asked to dredge up examples of crates. Aircraft
production specialists and merchant shipping experts were consulted
on how aircraft are shipped. Most importantly, hundreds of photos
of Soviet ships passing through the Turkish straits were scanned for
deck cargoes. U.S. Navy personnel in Istanbul had been taking these
photos for years although there were relatively few consumers for
them in the intelligence community.
Quantities of photographs poured in as the search went on. Most
of them were discarded as inadequate in showing deck cargo, and
in many that had good pictures of crates these could not be identi-
fied; but by collating the photos with other intelligence it became
clear that different kinds of Soviet aircraft were invariably shipped
in distinctive crates on deck. Aside from the Cuba problem, air
order-of-battle intelligence for such countries as the UAR and Indo-
nesia had become increasingly important as Soviet military aid
deliveries had mushroomed, and crate counting seemed a reasonable
way to make up for a lack of other delivery information.
At this time the most clearly identifiable crate was that for the
MIG-]L9 fighter, which had just begun to be shipped abroad. In 1961
a Royal Air Force reconnaissance mission photographed a ship in the
Red Sea which had on deck 16 crates of a type never seen before.
Subsequent clandestine reporting had that ship delivering 16 MIC-19s
to Iraq. Four shorter crates aboard the same ship-later identified
as for MIG-15s-remained a puzzle for some time during this infancy
of cratology. Nevertheless, the incident was a milestone in the devel-
opment of the new technique.
The incident also illustrates well the difficulty at that time of getting
good reporting on Soviet military shipments. Earlier photographs
than those the British took in the Red Sea and passed to the U.S.
analysts had been taken when this ship sailed past Istanbul, but
these had been lost in the shuffle and did not become available in
Washington for many weeks; and the interim reporting described the
MIC-19 containers as large vans. Then later, as the ship proceeded
up the Shattalarab toward Basra, it was photographed again, but
the Washington analysts concerned were not even aware that this
was being done. Thanks largely to efforts of personnel in the
Graphics Register, these photos were obtained for use in the guide;
they were the best shots then available of crated aircraft and the
most useful material collected for the guide. By the time the guide
was published, however, the Soviets had unfortunately all but stopped
shipping M [G-19s.
Even after it was clearly established that these. crates were used
for MIG--19 fighters, there were few in mid-1961 who would accept
the evidence. When in June of that year a ship en route to Cuba
was seen with a dozen of them on deck, it proved nearly impossible
to report the shipment in a coordinated publication before it was
confirmed-much later-by high-altitude photography. The failure
to observe the first deliveries of MIG-15s to Cuba the month before,
in May, was not due to any extraordinary Soviet security measures
but to the fact that U.S. intelligence did not photograph ships en
route to Cuba and did not yet accept cratology as an analytical
technique.
Step Toward Respectability
In the summer of 1961 the Collection Guide finally took shape.
It described the reporting needed to follow Soviet maritime arms
traffic, and it included all photographs possible of identifiable deck
cargoes. It correctly identified the crates for MIG-15 and MIG-19
jet fighters, MI-4 helicopters, and IL-28 bombers. Although it was
a relatively primitive effort, the putting it together had been good
exercise in the use of intelligence from all sources. The MIG-19
identification depended on the cited RAF reconnaissance mission in
combination with clandestine reports from Iraq. and the UAR and
an East European defector's sketch of the crate. Identifying the
MIG-15 crate was partly guesswork, but a clandestine report from
Indonesia giving its dimensions narrowed the choice; confirmation was
achieved much later by putting together clandestine reports and ship
photography. MI-4 helicopter crates were identified chiefly through
the report of a U.S. air attache in Morocco: it described the one used.
for an MI-4 shipped to a Soviet trade fair in such detail that photo-
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graphs of similar crates taken in the Shattalarab were recognized and
could be included in the guide.
The most important crate identification in the guide, that for IL-28
bomber fuselages, had also been made through a combination of in-
formation from different sources. The clandestinely procured report
of an Indonesian arms mission which visited the USSR and Eastern
Europe in the late 1950s contained accurate dimensions for these
crates. Photographs of Soviet ships taken at Istanbul over a period
of several years showed many long crates fitting the specifications of
the Indonesian report. A check into the particular voyages of these
ships showed they had all gone to countries holding IL-28 bombers.
The conclusion that these were indeed II1 28 crates was virtually
inescapable.
When the Collection Guide was first published in 1961 its authors
were generally skeptical about how much interest or effort it would
arouse. To their surprise, it stimulated considerable interest in re-
porting on arms shipments, including photography and reports on
crates and the contents of crates. Observers especially in Istanbul
but also in the UAR, Indonesia, and other countries where Soviet
afros aid is prominent began to increase their reporting on crates.
This enhanced awareness of crates as a source of information on
Soviet military aid led gradually to the solution of additional identi-
fication problems. At the same time the acquisition of most of the
major documents concerning Soviet-Indonesian arms deals provided
a gold mine of detailed data on Soviet military aid practices, fre-
quently including information useful in solving crate puzzles. Similar
information obtained later in Iraq also contributed substantially to
the development of cratology.
Expanding Scope
An officer from the U.S. naval attache's office in Djakarta turned
in a perfect performance in using the guide to identify a group of
crates on the docks in Indonesia. As instructed in the guide, he
paced off the dimensions of the crates, he photographed them, he
noted their markings, and he wrote a report describing them. More-
over, he did not hesitate to reach conclusions about them: he identi-
fied both a helicopter crate and IL-28 bomber crates. His photos
of the latter turned out to be most important; they were the only
close-ups of IL-28 crates available to the intelligence community.
In late 1961 another advance was made when IL-14 transport air-
craft were moved by sea for the first time. Previously they had
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always been flown to their destinations, but when Cuba bought them
they had to be sent by ship. The Soviets placed them, wings re-
moved, on the deck of ships designed to carry timber, usually two
or three aircraft to a ship. Around each they built a large wooden
structure, usually of a shape like a cello. About a dozen of these
transports reached Cuba in late 1961 and early 1962, but only a few
of them were photographed and these could not be specifically iden-
tified by the photo interpreters, who were not working with other
intelligence sources. A few budding cratologists, however, got hold
of the photos, and this bit of information was tucked away with all
the rest.
In early 1962 a major step forward was taken when MIC--21 jet
fighter crates were spotted in the UAR. Several months were to pass
before photographs became available, but alert case officers in Egypt
provided a description of the crates soon after the Soviets had begun
shipping this plane abroad. In the summer of 1.962 the first photo-
graphs were received, from the assistant naval attache's office in
Istanbul. Alone these would have been useless, but taken in con-
junction with the earlier information from Egypt they clearly showed
the shipment to consist of MIG-21s.
The Cuban Buildup
By the time the 1962 Soviet military buildup in Cuba started in
July, cratology was an established technique, but its adherents were
confined to a very small circle. It was not accepted in many quarters
of the community, and coordinated intelligence based on crate counts
was a rarity. Nonetheless, what knowledge there was of crates was
incorporated into the efforts that were being made to bolster collec.
tion on Cuba. Photos of identifiable crates were included in a large
Cuba collection guide, and efforts to improve the monitoring of Soviet
shipping were continued. But because so many in the intelligence
community were unconvinced of the usefulness of these efforts, in-
formation on the first military shipments of the buildup was most
incomplete.
The first military shipments were detected as they left the Black
Sea in mid-July, and steps were taken immediately to provide for
photographing all ships and identifying any significant deck cargoes;
joint ONI-CIA efforts at the Bosporus had improved considerably by
mid-1962. But now many of these ships unfortunately transited the
straits at night or in bad weather, making photography impossible.
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Moreover, a sizable number of the military shipments were for the
first time made from Soviet Baltic ports, where our capabilities were
rather limited. And in the Atlantic there was no adequate network
to cover Soviet shipping and get photographs. Thus not all of the
ships carrying military cargoes were photographed during the first
six weeks, and the results on those that were were seldom dissemi-
nated in time to be useful. By mid-August the system for ship
photography was much improved, but it was not perfected until after
the October crisis.
Meanwhile, intelligence analysis focused on the flood of clandes-
tine and refugee reports from Cuba. By mid.-August it was abun-
dantly clear that something extraordinary was going on there,
involving an exceptionally large amount of materiel and of Soviet
manpower. Military construction was under way at many separate
locations. By mid-August many were convinced that a missile-
equipped air defense system, among other things, was being set up.
The evidence included ship photography and descriptions of activ-
ities in many separate reports. Some of the reports were remarkably
similar to those generated when the Soviets first shipped surface-to-
air missiles to Indonesia.
High-altitude photography of 29 August gave the first confirmation
of this conclusion. It also showed for the first time that six Komar
guided missile boats had been delivered to Cuba. There was no
immediate explanation of how these boats reached Cuba; it seemed
the system for watching shipping must have broken down badly. A
review of the ship photography, however, turned up a ship which
appeared to be carrying a big pile of wood. A sharp-eyed expert in
Soviet naval matters with a keen interest in the Komars correctly
concluded that the pile of wood was in fact two Komar boats covered
by a wooden housing to protect and disguise them. Eventually all
six Komars were pinned down to specific ships, and subsequent
Komar shipments were detected well in advance of arrival. The
Komar "crate" had taken its place in the files of cratology.
The MI-21 Story
MIG-21s were the next major crate issue in Cuba. High-altitude
photography of 5 September showed one assembled MIG-21 at Santa
Clara airfield and fuselage crates for a dozen or more others. At
that time no photographs of ships en route to Cuba had come in
showing crates like the recently identified MIG-21 containers. Was
it possible the Soviets were changing their ways and starting to carry
aircraft crates below deck? Those skeptical of cratology quickly
seized on this failure as reason to distrust crate counts for determin-
ing aircraft inventories.
Gradually, however, the pictures belatedly came in. Crates spotted
on the decks of two ships accounted for at least 22 MIG-21s, prob-
ably a few more. These, along with some U-2 photography and
ground observer reports, led to the conclusion that MIG-21 holdings
in Cuba were at least in the 25-to-30 range. The publication of this
conclusion in early October and the subsequent raising of the total
to 35 on the basis of new ship photography touched off a lively in-
telligence controversy over the validity of crate counts. There was
still only one MIG-21 that had actually been seen in high-altitude
photography, and that nearly a month before. The backers of crat-
ology argued that in the absence of new photographs of Cuban
airfields one had to reach conclusions on the basis of whatever in-
formation was available.
Cratology received its vindication on 20 October, when aerial
photography over Santa Clara showed 35 fully assembled MIG--2.1
fighters, as well as four other aircraft identified as probable MIC 21s.
The achievement was lost in the crush of events, of course, for by
now the photos of medium-range missiles had touched off the cli-
mactic East-West confrontation. Nevertheless the advance knowl-
edge of a buildup of high-performance jet fighters in Cuba had been
of considerable value. Without the warning provided by cratology,
the military planners who went into crash programs in October would
have been far more startled by the photos of the 20th showing 35 to
40 MIG-21s ready to bolster Cuba's air defense system.
From Defense to Offense
While the resolution of the MIG-21 controversy was a triumph
for cratology, the most important contribution the technique made
to the intelligence effort in the Cuban buildup was in identifying;
IL-28 bombers. If it never leads to another significant conclusion,
this one achievement assures cratology at least a small niche in the
annals of intelligence.
In early October the increasing tension generated by the buildup
was illustrated in a dispute over a large "cello-like" object seen on
the deck of a ship. The container was large enough for any of a
variety of aircraft, including the IL-28 bomber, a weapon of offense.
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The cratologists, however, were sure that such a structure housed
transport aircraft, being exactly the same as those used earlier to
ship IL-.14s to Cuba. Again argument flared over the validity of
concluding anything about contents from the shape of a wooden
structure on deck. This time, however, the negative conclusion that
the structure probably did not contain an IL 28 bomber was backed
up by a timely clandestine report and a photograph from Leningrad
showing an aircraft being loaded onto a ship.
Meanwhile, clandestine reports and refugee interrogations con-
tinued to pile up. Aerial photography had established that the
buildup encompassed a number of defensive systems, but ground
observer reports increasingly suggested items which could not be
reconciled with defensive measures. Two observers reported the
arrival of IL-28 bomber crates about 20 September, and at least one
of the two had based his identification on photographs of IL-28
crates in the Cuba collection guide. As usual, these reports were not
considered "hard" evidence, although in retrospect at least one was
valid.
The moment of truth for cratology occurred on 10 October, when
the first photographs of IL-28 crates en route to Cuba reached head-
quarters. Taken on 28 September, these showed the Soviet ship
Kasimov carrying ten crates which could only be for IL-28 bombers.
To make doubly sure and to convince others, however, the cratolo-
gists drew together all the precedents and evidence-photos and
report from the naval officer in Djakarta showing an end section of
the crates, the Indonesian document giving the dimensions for IL-28
containers, an old picture from Istanbul showing such crates being
shipped in 1959, a recent Istanbul photo showing the IL-28 crate
still in use on a ship en route to the UAR, and of course the clandes-
tine reports that the bombers had recently arrived in Cuba. A memo-
randum was prepared for the DCI reporting the new information and
detailing the basis for the weighty conclusion.
The observer reports which during the previous three weeks had
pointed to the possibility of a radical change in the nature of the
military buildup in Cuba had not been generally accepted as firm.
They had raised the flag of caution, but so-called hard evidence was
required for a conclusion that there really had been such a change.
The IL-28 crates provided this evidence. On the heels of persistent
reports pointing to MRBMs on the island, they led to the 14 October
flight of the U-2 which brought back the first photos of strategic
missile installations.
Additional air photography shortly thereafter turned up solid proof,
if it were still needed, of the validity of crate counting. Low-altitude
photographs at San Julian airfield in Pinar del Rio province caught a
cratologist's dream-IL-28s being uncrated and assembled. This
convincing evidence of the validity of crate information was entirely
eclipsed at the time by the threat of the Soviet strategic missiles, but
further evidence was obtained during the withdrawal of the bombers
from Cuba in early December. The Soviets, in order to show they
were not cheating, broke open the crates on the decks of ships to
allow inspection by U.S. personnel hovering nearby in helicopters.
As the crisis receded and efforts were directed toward sorting out
the pieces and reviewing the status of Soviet forces on the island, a
few other bits of cratology were produced. Largely by means of
crate counts, for instance, it was discovered that roughly 100 Soviet
helicopters had been delivered to Cuba, perhaps two-thirds of them
during the buildup. The size of this formidable counterinsurgency
weapon in Cuban hands was not apparent from other sources.
Crates for two types of cruise missiles were also identified as a result
of the repeated high and low altitude photography over Cuba, and
the information has since proved useful in other countries.
Reflections
The upshot was acceptance of cratology; the Cuban experience
demonstrated that this is a legitimate tool for intelligence analysts.
In a broader sense, it demonstrated the way many of the intelligence
community's resources can be successfully combined to solve a prob-
lem-the sort of problem which normally looms large for only a few
specialists but in this instance took on greatly increased significance.
Since that time regular procedures have been adopted to insure that
photographs are obtained of every Soviet ship which is a potential
arms carrier. The intelligence community has never worked together
better than now in following Soviet arms shipments. On those to
Cuba, the intense effort now applied is a far cry from the rather hap-
hazard picture-taking described at the beginning of this article.
Oddly enough, despite public attention to cratology, the Soviets
do not seem to have radically changed their procedures in shipping
arms abroad. We continue to see combat aircraft being crated in
precisely the way they have been for the past decade. With the
notable exception of a recent delivery of MIG-17s to Cuba, aircraft
continue to be carried as deck cargo. Recently it was determined
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that Egypt's holdings of MIG--21 jet fighters have climbed to over
100, and this conclusion was based almost entirely on crates; fewer
than half this number have ever been seen on the ground.
The list of identifiable crates has grown to cover about 17 different
containers, including all the types of combat aircraft the Soviets have
shipped abroad. It will probably continue to lengthen. The Czech
1,-29 jet-now becoming the standard trainer-is being shipped over-
seas, and the USSR is selling the huge MI-6 helicopter to non-
Communist countries.
Cratology is a very narrow intelligence specialty. It cannot hope
to have answers for more than a very limited number of intelligence
puzzles, and its chief use may he in helping to get accurate air-order-
of-battle information on countries receiving Soviet military aid. But
the story of its use in Cuba does have a moral applicable to dozens
of intelligence problems, namely, that momentous conclusions must
frequently rest on evidence piled up in a humdrum fashion, and
obscure knowledge can often provide the key piece in a larger pic-
ture. Many a collecting officer abroad must wonder why anyone
would want some of the information the cratologist asks for. The
individual pieces are indeed trivial, but together they have frequently
served useful purposes and in at least one instance paid off hand-
somely.
Expose: The artificiality of socio-
economic statistics on the new
nations.
AFRICAN NUMBERS GAME
Walter McDonald.
The proliferation of independent tropical African states has been
reflected in a proliferation of U.S. government publications, including
intelligence papers, on these countries. The National Intelligence
Survey program has sharply increased both the coverage of its series
on Africa and the frequency with which articles are updated. National
Intelligence Estimates on the area have multiplied. More recently
there have been a number of National Policy Papers. These publica-
tions require, in varying degree, supporting socio-economic statistics.
At a minimum they are likely to carry population data (present size
and rate of growth), Gross National Product, and per capita variations
on the GNP theme. Many, if not most, such statistics contained in
these reports---and drawing prestige from the high classification at the
top and bottom of every page-are patently absurd.
Official numbers coming out of tropical Africa are apt to be more
misleading than helpful. The state of backwardness in these under-
developed--or developing, to use the second-generation euphemism--
countries is such that the elaborate statistical organizations taken for
granted in the industrial West just do not exist. Many kinds of data
considered basic to economic measurement simply are not available,
and where data does exist it is often suppressed or grossly distorted
by government leaders for assorted political purposes. Despite these
obstacles, numbers which suggest great accuracy are continually en-
shrined in intelligence publications and by repetition have quickly
gained currency.
Emergent nations promptly acquire the accepted badges of in-
dependence--flag, anthem, national flower and bird. They also,
largely because Western-as well as Eastern-suppliers of financial
aid insist, soon formulate development plans, make population esti-
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mates, and devise systems of national accounts. Reasonable develop-
ment planning and population estimating are defensible and desirable,
but national accounting in most African countries is by almost any
standard. ludicrous. And the countries that fail to provide their own
national accounts find in Washington people eager to play the make-
believe game for them.
The theoretical and practical problems of calculating national ac-
counts for underdeveloped countries with very large non-monetized
sectors--that's lingua economica for "most of the people living in the
bush"-are formidable ones that would be of interest chiefly to
economists were it not for the current propensity of the policy maker
and others to make welfare comparisons among Afri an countries and
between Africa and the rest of the world. To suggest by statistical
comparison, such as is contained in the CIA-prepared Basic Intelligence
Factbook, that Cameroon, with a "per capita GNP of $86," is a shade
better off than the Malagasy Republic with a "per capita GNP of $85"
misleads rather than informs. The uselessness of such comparisons
has been pointed out by one economist as follows:
the usual African economic aggregates are certainly valueless at present
for most purposes; welfare comparisons using per capita income . . . are
obviously nonsensical when income estimates themselves are in part derived
by multiplying per capita averages of doubtful accuracy by population
estimates equally subject to error.'
The development of national accounts which reflect the actual econ-
omy is a sophisticated process, assuming a great quantity and variety
of accurate statistics. It is the more practicable the smaller the
non-monetized, or subsistence, sector, for it involves valuing the prod-
uct of the whole economy, including, in the case of Africa, the output
of those who live by the shifting agriculture of the bush and the even
more primitive hunting-and-fishing societies; and village chiefs and
subchiefs do not forward detailed statistical reports on wages, output,
and village government services to central statistical offices maintaining
the accounts.
In this situation, economists resort to imputation. Prices are as-
signed, where in fact money prices don't exist, to goods and services
in the subsistence sector; huts are valued and given rates of depreci-
ation. The figures for the products of one person are summed, multi-
plied by the estimated subsistence population, and lumped with the
output of the monetary sector. When this total is divided by the
P. Ady, African Studies in Income and Wealth (London, 1963).
estimated population of both sectors combined, the result is the statis-
tic called per capita GNP, which is supposed to tell something about
the nature of the economy and its rate of growth.
National accounting is most useful when applied to modern econo-
mies. But even when national accounts are quite accurately developed
they are often used improperly, and the resulting comparisons are
sometimes ridiculous. What useful purpose, for example, is served
by a finding that Kuwait in 1963 had the highest per capita national,
income in the world, $2,800 as against the United States' $2,500 and
Germany's mere $1,300?
Head Counts
Let us look closer, not at statistical practices involving complex
concepts or requiring some economic sophistication, but at the simpler
matter of counting population. This, perhaps the most basic of all
statistics, is a building block for most of the more complicated economic
and social aggregates and the one from which all per capita series are
derived. Unless population statistics are relatively accurate and de-
tailed, the economic aggregates derived from them can only be wrong,
the sole question being how wrong. From our survey of African
censuses we conclude that the officially released economic and social
aggregates for most of these countries must be wildly erroneous.
Census-taking in tropical Africa is subject to all of the technical
difficulties it encounters in industrial societies. In addition it is
hampered by special circumstances typical of countries with large
subsistence sectors and also by factors peculiar to the African scene.
Finally, there is the problem of political manipulation of the census.
Many African population figures currently in vogue were initially
the product of a colonial administration, later embellished by national
statistical offices. Generally the colonial figures Yendedcolobiellow;
underreporting was fairly widespread because of g
interest in the indigenous population and because the colonial census
was used as a basis for taxation or corvee. Independence has usually
brought: no notable improvement in either procedures or results.
Even when trained census takers are used, social problems can
markedly distort the data. Take the question of age. Few Africans
live by the clock, fewer still by the calendar, so enumerators must
attempt to date their lives by important local events such as memorable
floods or fires. Even those who keep better track of years have a
tendency to report in decades, giving the age of 40, say, instead of
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46. In Muslim Africa the tendency is to omit daughters, especially
those who have reached puberty but are not yet married, there being
a stigma on unmarried daughters. This results in a sharp drop in
the number of reported females from about 12 years old until time
of marriage, when they can be reported respectfully as wives. Such
phenomena are not limited to the more primitive African countries.
The age data in the 1960 census of Ghana, which had been under
British colonial administration for more than a century, was charac-
terized by the United Nations as "Very Rough," in the lowest category
of reliability.
Outright dishonesty in handling population statistics is quite common
throughout Africa. Even when that is absent, a conscientious attempt
to alert the user to the limitations of the data is rare except on the
part of foreign statisticians with reputations to preserve. The dis-
claimers are in any case soon detached from the statistics, and these
magically assume exactitude when printed in intelligence reports.
The classic disclaimer quoted below was attached to the 1953 Pilot
Population Census in the Sudan.
It must be clearly understood that the Department of Statistics accepts
no responsibility for what will be said in this chapter. It must be stated
clearly and without any qualifications that most, if not all, comments and
remarks in this chapter are of little value. Nevertheless, the temptation
to aim at producing a figure in respect of a country where no such figure
has been produced in the past is too great, even if in the process of doing
it more guesswork is undertaken than any respectable statistician, having
the good name of his trade in mind, would care to admit. It must also
be stated that should, by any chance, the population figures arrived at
during, the main census agree in any way with the sheer guesses in this
chapter, it will be pure coincidence and no credit will be claimed by the
Department of Statistics. On the other hand, should the guesses, as guesses
often are, be widely off the mark, no blame will be admitted.
The problems with African population statistics are best illustrated
by example. The countries discussed below were selected not because
they are the worst cases but because they exhibit different typical
forms of technical or politically inspired distortion.
Ghana, often described as having a well-trained civil service and
administratively head and shoulders above its African neighbors, was
thought capable of producing a reasonably good census. The 4,118,000
Ghanaians reported in 1948 were expected to increase to 5,100,000
by 1960. The 1960 census, however-the first since independence-
counted 6,726,820. Underestimation in the last colonial census would
account for some of the unexpectedly large increase, but not all; and
examination of the census procedure shows government manipulation
to achieve a political end.
President Nkrumah clearly decided to inflate the census. Instead
of having a single cut-off date for the entire country, as in usual prac-
tice, he decreed two, one for the north and a later one for the south.
At first glance this would not seem cause for major distortion. But in
Ghana there is a substantial seasonal migration from north to south.
The northern area was counted before the migration began, the south-
ern after the displacement reached its peak. This procedure not only
increased the total population by double-counting the Ghanaians that
moved from north to south and including as Ghanaians the large
number of non-Ghanaians from neighboring countries who regularly
join the southward migration, but it exaggerated in particular the
population of the southern area from which Nkrumah has drawn much
of his support.
The population figure is therefore probably inflated by about 30
percent, and the more than 4 percent annual increase indicated is
likewise an overstatement, the true figure probably lying closer to
2 percent. While double-counting gives Nkrumah the political bene-
fit of a larger population to rule, it also yields a larger divisor for
the derivation of per capita statistics. By government manipulation
Ghana thus became a larger but a per capita poorer country.
Estimates made before the Liberian census suggested a population
anywhere between 750,000 and 2,500,000. The lower figure was
based on a but count made on aerial photographs and multiplied by
5 inhabitants in some areas, 6 in others. The larger number was
President Tubman's personal estimate made on the eve of the census.
When the census then produced the disappointing figure 1,089,000, he
promptly suppressed it.
Apparently Tubman found it embarrassing to become ruler of a
country with only a million people after twenty years of ruling more
than twice that many. The higher figure was also convenient wl-yen
seeking foreign aid; the United States and other benefactors often use
per capita ai.d comparisons. It suggested an abundant untapped labor
force, moreover, to work new rubber plantations and mining eon-
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cessions. It promised a good domestic market for foreign investment
in consumer industry; a German investor was in fact dissuaded from
building a plant in Liberia by the information that the population
was less than half the number he had been told officially. (The census
results had become an open secret, and Tubman has recently been
leaning toward releasing them.)
Upper Volta, Sierra Leone
Some countries find it inconvenient to change the official population
estimates even when better data become available. In Upper Volta,
for example, the government reported for 1960 an "administrative"
population of 3,500,000, derived from a head count for tax purposes.
Then in 1961 a well-qualified Frenchman estimated, on the basis of
,in adequate sample, a total of 4,400,000-an upward revision of
roughly one-fourth. Nonetheless the government still uses its old
figure as the basis for fiscal planning. Acceptance of the better
estimate would deflate all the Upper Volta per capita statistics and.
present the country as even more abysmally poor than must be admitted
now.
Sierra Leone's census, undertaken with substantial U.S. assistance,
gave a population of 2,183,000 as of 1 April 1963. Initially the govern-
ment refused to accept the census at all because it created problems
of political representation. It now accepts the total figures but not
the regional breakdown. The reason is clear. The opposition party
is allowed only two seats in the legislature for an area (Koinadgu)
which the census shows to have a population of 729,000, while the
ruling party gets six seats to represent the population of the Western
Rural Area, enumerated at only 69,000. The government also con-
tinues to report the total of registered voters-males and females of
21 years and older-as 1,129,000. Such a voting list suggests a popu-
lation approaching 4 million, more than 70 percent too high. Tomb-
stone voter registration is not unknown in Africa.
Ethiopia
In all the countries discussed above there was at least some basis
for the cited estimates. But there are population statistics for which
no basis at all can be discerned. Ethiopia is a case in point. The
U.N. Demographic Yearbook generously describes the source of Ethi-
opian figures for 1961-giving a population of 21,600,000-as "con-
jectural." Most likely the statistics developed from official Ethiopian
statements rather than any basis in fact. Even now a new Ethiopian
population estimate is gaining currency in just this fashion. The
Ethiopian Herald of June 27, 1964, reported an interview with Ato
Scyoum Ejigu, Director-General of the National Election Board, who
had just completed an extensive study tour of the country. Here is
an excerpt::
. . . the present population of the country is 27,824,120 . . . this figure
was according to his personal findings while he was touring the Empire.
He received the figures and facts of the increase of population from provin-
cial and district governors, electoral stations and officers of the Governoratcs-
General.. According to Ato Seyoum's estimate of population the number
of parliamentarians to the Chamber of Deputies would have risen to 286
but, he said, since the official figure is 22,000,000 the number would be 250.
However, the Director-General believed that when his findings are approved
the 4th General Election Chamber of Deputies would have 286 representa-
tives.
Thus Ethiopia will probably add 5,824,120 citizens to the population
rolls. But we have no reason to assume that the result will be any
closer to the true number than the old 22 million was. We really
have no idea at all how many Ethiopians there are.
The situation would be amusing were it not that people insist on
making welfare comparisons based on per capita statistics. Should
we use the new estimate now to reduce further the Ethiopian per
capita GNP, already reported as one of the lowest in Africa? By
simple arithmetic Ethiopia might become the poorest country on the
continent. The absurdity of the entire per capita exercise become
apparent with this question.
Nigeria
The most extreme example of population confusion is currently
Nigeria. The 1952 official census reported a population of about
32 million, which, with a subsequent partial census, suggested a 1963
population between 37 and 41 million. But the 1963 census results
announced last February 24 put the number at 55,653,821 (a delight-
fully precise statistic). There is substantial evidence that chicanery
in taking the census greatly inflated the population; because of the
federal structure in Nigeria, changes in regional representation have
very serious political implications. But we are concerned here with
the economic aspects.
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Many analysts are reluctant to use the new data; they would prefer
to use the 40 or so million. Even on the basis of this figure it had
been concluded earlier:
Even if all the economic development plans were successfully completed,
the annual per capita increase in private consumption would be about 1
percent during the plan period, hardly enough to make a significant im-
pression on the consuming public; per capita GNP currently is less than
$85.00. We conclude that successful fulfillment of the development schemes
is not likely to make an appreciable contribution to political or social stability.
On the contrary, the necessarily slow place of economic growth postulated
is likely to engender disillusionment with the machinery of government and
the country's relatively democratic institutions.'
The outlook is even gloomier if we accept the new population figures,
which--probably falsely-depress the whole series of per capita
economic and sociological indicators-doctors per thousand, hospital
beds, investment, GNP, etc. But we may be required to accept them
by our customers.
Pakistan
The inadequacies of African statistics are paralleled in much of
the undeveloped world. At present the African statistical bias is
usually upward, but it can also be down. Mr. Said Ilasan, Chairman
of the Executive Committee of Pakistan's Institute of Development
Economics welcomed members of a seminar a some years ago with
the following observation.
We decided that population and its growth in South and Southeast Asia
must be understated so that the task of economic development of this area
may not appear to be a hopeless one. Again in our own country when the
first Five Year Plan was being framed I urged, and successfully too, that the
rate of [population] growth should not be shown as higher than 1.4 percent.
't'his was to keep despair away. We are, however, convinced that popula-
tion is growing faster than that. But as has been said, hope builds sooner
than knowledge destroys.
Prospects and Some Suggestions
There is little the intelligence analyst can do to improve the quantity
or quality of African statistics. Better statistical information will
come only with time and with the development of statistical offices in
' CIA/ORR comment on Nigeria Policy Paper, January 1964.
'On Population Growth and Economic Development with Special Reference
to Pakistan, September 8-13, 1959.
the countries concerned. Deliberate, politically inspired distortion
of social, economic, and political data by African leaders will probably
continue also for some time, until these leaders or their successor.;
reach a degree of political and economic maturity.
Although unable to improve the African statistics, we could at
least avoid giving them the currency and respectability they now
enjoy by virtue of inclusion in high-level intelligence reports. It is
recognized that it would be difficult to dispense with such numbers
entirely; it is proposed only that they be treated gingerly. If reports
which persist in using statistics with too many significant digits don't
mislead the reader, they must at least impress him with the naivete
of the drafting officer.
The solution to the problem requires a command or customer deci-
sion: in present practice the analyst is compelled by the requirements
laid on him to include in his reports statistics which he knows are silly
at best. Officers at all levels who request reports, whether short papers
for the same afternoon or long ones months ahead, should so frame
their requirements that the analyst's judgment may prevail with respect
to statistical presentations, as in the case of Nigeria. The present
assumption on the part of requesting officers that all countries have
common statistical series suitable for comparative purposes ought also
to be discarded. Fact books and other statistical compendia should
recognize that in a great many cases "facts" just do not exist.
Intelligence publications rarely originate statistics on the non-Co:m-
munist countries. The intelligence operation on them is for the most
part a sifting and evaluating process intended to qualify them prop-
erly. The most copious source of the new statistics is probably the
U.S. foreign aid program, for which voluminous "data" are produced
in connection with various country aid schemes. These country pro-
gram books are later reduced and presented, with the field's caveats
removed, in expensively bound volumes to the Congress and the
Executive. here the process really takes off; the, proliferation of new
"statistics" gets under way in earnest.
Knowledge of the utter unreliability of Ethiopian data on population,
as discussed above, is by no means the exclusive property of the
writer. Yet consider what happens when l' thiopia is reduced to
"numbers" and printed in a foreign aid publication. We find that the
annual population growth is 1.4 percent. We really have no idea
what the population growth is at all, but the report says 1.4 percent,
which means that the true rate of Ethiopian population increase falls
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between 1.35 percent and 1.45 percent. Put another way, it implies
that our information on the rate of increase is accurate to 5 one-
hundredths of 1 percent. The same report contains a population
total of 19.4 million for 1962, a per capita agricultural production
index, electric power per capita, acres per capita, literacy rate, pupils
as a percent of population, and people per doctor. This exercise in
pseudo-accuracy is repeated over and over again, country by country,
with Ingenuous indifference to the real situation. It recalls Mark
'1'wain's observation that "one gets such wholesale returns of con-
jecture out of such a trifling investment of facts."
Where we must give statistics we could use rounded figures. We
could express doubtful data in ranges, doing more qualitative and
less quantitative analysis. Population statistics, in particular, would
be more useful to the consumer presented in ranges, as perhaps 40-55
million for Nigeria. The loss in aura of exactness would be more
than compensated by increased credibility. Per capita GNP could
be given as "under $100" rather than $67. This rougher measure
would convey adequately the subsistence nature of the economy; $100
per year is only about 27 cents per day.
And that is all it needs to convey. Simple welfare comparisons
made among per capita GNP's for relatively primitive economies are
not very profitable. When you come down to it, it is quite apparent
that an individual cannot exist on 27 cents per day. And he doesn't.
IIc actually exists, in Africa, on a variety of goods and services pro-
vided largely by himself. These are valued at some kind of market
prices (usually by a foreign economist and often using city prices),
expressed in the local currency, and converted into dollars by simple
arithmetic. The result is then viewed, in our community, by an in-
dividual who has a weekly income that is some multiple of the African's
annual "per capita GNP," who is familiar chiefly with his own price
structure, who knows nothing of the original sins committed in the
GNP data, and who has little or no conception of the statistical errors
upon which his mental comparative processes must rest.
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Some of the ways in which Soviet
missile flights and the missiles
themselves can be reconstructed
by monitoring their signals.
TELEMETRY ANALYSIS
David S. Brandwcin
A ballistic missile stands on the launch pad poised for a test flight.
As the countdown nears zero, its rocket engines light up, the umbilical
cable linking it to the launch pad is cut, and the "bird" lifts off to
begin its trip into space. From the moment the umbilical cable falls
away, the missile's designers must rely on telemetry (measurements
of key variables converted into electrical signals and radioed to
ground stations) for their observation of the performance of its
components.
While the missile is in flight these multi-channel telemetry signals
are received at ground stations along the trajectory and relayed back:
to the control center, where the measurements are displayed, usually
in the form of line traces, one for each channel, on long strips of
paper. Anxious engineers cluster about a set of these "analog rec-
ords" to get a first quick look. Along with the records, the instru-
mentation specialists provide a key to the assignment of the telemetry
channels so as to identify which trace is recording which kind of
measurement and a list of calibrations, conversion factors for trans-
lating a given trace deflection into so many units of pressure, tempera-
ture, flow rate, or other variable.
All this must be done by any missile launch facility, whether it be
the U.S. Atlantic or Pacific missile range or the Soviet sites at
Tyuratam or Kapustin Yar. Thus when we intercept Soviet telcm-
etry we may be able to use it to measure the performance of Soviet
missiles. There are two very serious handicaps, however; first, the
intercept: usually covers only the time when the missile is above the
horizon of the place of interception, and second, we have neither a
key to the channel assignments nor a list of calibrations. The analyst
can do little about the first handicap; this is a problem for the col-
lectors. flow we seek to overcome the second one and the kinds of
information we get when we succeed are described below.
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In trying to identify the various Soviet measurements, we make use
first of all of the fact that certain basic measurements are required
on any flight, regardless of what additional specialized ones may be
called for. For instance, the propulsion system will always have a
measurement of acceleration and one of thrust chamber pressure;
and if the engine is liquid-fueled, with gas-driven turbopumps feed-
ing the propellants in, then we are likely to see pairs of measurements
of the pressures at the inlet and outlet of the pumps for both fuel
and oxidizer and readings of gas generator pressure, turbine speed,
and fuel and oxidizer flow rates. A liquid propellant missile stage
with the common instrumentation on the propulsion and propellant
feed systems is pictured schematically in Figure 1. We thus know
what to look for and can search the Soviet telemetry for counterparts
of readings on U.S. missile flights.
If a tentative identification is made, we can then apply various
tests, based on the laws of physics and on reasonable design practice,
to check its validity. A trace suspected of being an acceleration
measurement, for example, we check against the theoretical plot of
acceleration against time for a constant-thrust missile, a hyperbola
governed by the equation
a (Kr-t)-K2,
where a =acceleration,
t-time, and
K1, K2=constants.
If the identification of acceleration is validated, the next step derives
from the fact that the force producing the acceleration, the thrust
of the rocket, is proportional to the pressure in the thrust chamber.
If minor perturbations in the acceleration record, therefore, correlate
very closely with some in another trace that does not have the hyper-
bolic characteristic, this second trace becomes a fair candidate for the
thrust chamber pressure.
From here on, the analysis gets more complex as we delve deeper
into the system; but there is usually a reasonable expectation that,
so long as a good sample of telemetry is available, it will be possible
to identify all the major measurements. Of key importance here is
that the sample include a major transition period such as engine
shutdown. In a liquid-fueled turbopump-fed engine, for example,
the fact that the pressures in the propellant feed system drop to
zero at shutoff in considerably less than a second while the turbine,
FUEL TANK PRESSURE
OXIDIZER FLOW METER
TURBINE SPEED COUNTER
FIGURE 1. Typical Missile Stage Instrumentation.
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rotating at high speed with a great deal of inertia, takes 4 to 8 seconds
to coast to a stop is most useful for identification purposes.
Merely to have made a few of the key identifications brings a con-
siderable intelligence benefit, because we can then relate the firing
under study to earlier ones and form an opinion on whether it is one
of a series or is testing a new vehicle or possibly a new model of a
known missile. Given a fair sample of powered-flight telemetry, the
analyst can usually say whether the vehicle is liquid- or solid-fueled,
whether it has a single burning stage or multiple stages, and what
ratio of payload to total weight it probably has.
The single most important measurement and the one most useful
in the analysis is the acceleration of the missile along its longitudinal
axis. Every so often we intercept the signal before first-stage burn-
out, and the trace looks like the example shown in Figure 2 (but
without any annotations except time). From this record we would
know immediately that the missile had two main burning stages of
which the first shut down at 100 seconds, that it then coasted for five
seconds until the second stage ignited, and that this burned for an
additional 145 seconds to shutdown. The low plateau in the record
after second-stage shutdown would tell us that small vernier rocket
engines (for fine regulation of burnout velocity) operated for 10
seconds after main-engine cutoff, and the ratio of this acceleration
to that at main-engine cutoff would be the ratio of vernier engine
thrust to total thrust. The short negative displacement at 270 seconds
signals the firing of retrorockets to separate the rocket body from the
payload.
Note in the same figure the dotted line starting at second-stage burn-
out and continuing the hyperbolic curve that would reach infinity at
308 seconds. This is a theoretical extension of the acceleration, show-
ing how it would rise if the missile had continued burning and losing
weight at the normal rate of fuel consumption, so that when the
weight dropped to zero the acceleration would become infinite. The
significance of this is that it gives us an upper bound on the payload
weight in the form of a ratio between the weight of the vehicle at
burnout (payload plus empty rocket stage) and the weight of the
propellants burned by the stage, these two weights being proportional
respectively to the time from burnout to infinite acceleration and the
time from firing to burnout. Then, if through some additional analysis
BEGINNING OF
INTERCEPT
TOWARD THEORETICAL
INFINITE ACCELERATION
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
TIME
FicuRE 2. Typical Missile Acceleration Ilistory.
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it becomes possible to introduce an actual weight into the equation,
an estimate can be made of the ratio of empty stage weight alone
(largely tankage) to propellant weight, the stage can be sized, and
the payload can be determined. This process can now be repeated
for the first stage, so that the complete weight history of the vehicle
from liftoff to burnout becomes known.
Vibrations and Transition Times
Another approach of telemetry analysis, one which probably holds
the most promise for determination of missile size, is the examination
of time-related functions such as vibrations and pressure transients.
Telemetry traces identified as measurements of liquid level in the
propellant tanks have occasionally showed a rather slow oscillation of
low magnitude. This usually is indicative of wave action at the liquid
surface, or sloshing. Now the interesting thing is that the rate of
these oscillations, which can be measured directly from the traces,
is dependent only on the diameter of the tank, the acceleration of
the missile, and the shape of the tank bottom. Further, if the phe-
nomenon occurs when the liquid is more than a tank diameter away
from the bottom, then the shape of the bottom has no effect either,
and we need to know only the acceleration to get a measurement of
the diameter of the tank.
Analysts have also noted an oscillation of higher frequency super-
imposed on measurements of pump inlet pressures. Because a con-
ventional missile will have its tanks in line, feeding the propellant from
the upper tank to the engine requires a long pipe passing through or
around the lower tank. It has been found that in U.S. missiles this
pipe acts somewhat like an organ pipe: the longer it is, the lower
the frequency, or pitch, at which it will vibrate. The phenomenon
enables us to get the length of the pipe by measuring the frequency
and comparing it with that from known missiles, and this pipe length
is essentially equal to the length of the lower propellant tank.
Another occasional observation, one that seems promising but has
not yet proved productive, is that the entire missile vibrates at a fre-
quency which gradually changes as the burning proceeds and makes
a step change when the nose cone is separated at burnout. This is
as it should be, because the vibration frequency is related to the
stiffness of the missile, which is in turn a function of the length, diam-
eter, weight, and construction materials. Thus while the propellants
are burning the missile weight and stiffness are changing continuously,
but when the nose cone is separated the weight and length change
instantaneously, producing the step change in stiffness. Very little
intelligence has so far been derived from this type of analysis, how-
ever. The ballistic missile cannot be treated as a simple hollow cylin-
der; its complex structure has to be considered in detail.
The study of transient phenomena is another area which gives
promise of providing intelligence. Very recently it has been shown
that for a. wide variety of U.S. rocket engines the time it takes for the
chamber pressure to fall at cutoff from its operating level to near
zero seems to vary directly with the size, i.e., thrust, of the engine.
The relationship seems to hold for engines using different propellants
and operating at different chamber pressures. Furthermore, it seems
to hold for Soviet engines as well; those whose thrusts have been
estimated by other methods show pressure decay times that fall right
on the curve described by the U.S. data. The precision with which
we can read out the thrust is quite poor, but the method does give us
a rough cut at the size of the engine in a new missile, discriminating
between, say, a Saturn-size engine and a Titan-size one.
Liquid Level Measurements
A third approach which has been very useful is analysis of tele-
metered data on liquid levels. So far all the major Soviet ballistic
missiles have used liquid propellants, and they are often equipped
with instrumentation for measuring how full the tanks are. The
sensors are usually installed in both the fuel and oxidizer tanks, and
they allow us to monitor the efficiency of propellant utilization.
Ideally, one wants a missile to reach burnout with an excess of neither
fuel nor oxidizer, and how closely this ideal is approached is a measure
of the effectiveness of the system.
Information on the shapes of propellant tanks can be gained from
the level sensors. When the liquid is up in the main cylindrical
portion of the tank the rate of drop in level will be constant, but as
soon as the level enters the tank bottom it will start dropping at a
faster gate, and the precise way it falls with time will be ,a result: of
the geometry of the tank bottom-conical, elliptical, spherical, or
some other shape. Thus if we have a good record of the changing
liquid level near burnout we may be able to determine the shape of
the bottom. This is not just an interesting academic exercise, because
if we know the geometry of the bottom along with the time needed
to empty first the cylindrical part of the tank and then the bottom,
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we can calculate the ratio of length to diameter and exert some
leverage on the sizing problem.
Another important product of liquid level analysis is measurement
of the volumetric ratio of oxidizer to fuel. If, for instance, the level
sensors show twice as fast a drop in one tank as in the other, and if
we make the reasonable assumption that the two have the same
diameter, then we know that two volumes of one propellant are burned
for a single volume of the other. We would therefore know that
nitric acid is more likely to be the oxidizer than liquid oxygen, because
oxygen burns efficiently with the common fuels at volumetric ratios
lower than 1.6:1, whereas a 2:1 ratio would yield efficient combustion
for a nitric acid system. This kind of information, when supple-
mented by other data such as specific impulse (thrust per unit of
propellant flow rate) allows one to narrow the choice of propellant
combinations significantly.
Up to this point we have been talking mostly about measurements
in the form of ratios, because it has been very difficult to determine
absolute magnitudes. Two notable successes in calibration have been
achieved, however-with liquid level sensors and accelerometers.
These are described below.
The level sensor which has been calibrated is of the 'hump" type,
so called because its trace looks like this:
The calibration became possible when tank length for the vehicle was
determined by an independent method. The total burning time was
known, as well as the time it took for the instrument to cycle through
eight humps. Then the ratio of these two times could simply be
multiplied by the tank length to give the drop in level represented by
the cycle. Having the calibration, we could now obviously turn it
around and use it to measure tank length on any other Soviet missile
which might use the instrument.
Acceleration traces have been calibrated by two techniques. The
first is quite complex, requiring the history of the missile's acceleration
and velocity to be reconstructed from its powered flight trajectory
(usually with the help of a digital computer) by utilizing known or
estimated data such as probable launch location, staging and burnout
times, burnout position and velocity, ratio of acceleration at staging
to acceleration at burnout, pitch program, drag coefficient, and the
ratio of thrust in a vacuum to sea-level thrust.
The second technique, much simpler, can seldom be employed
because it requires an intercept of telemetry before lift-off. Such
intercepts are obtained only rarely because at launch the missile is
always below the horizon of our intercept sites; we receive on-pad
telemetry only when special atmospheric conditions cause the signals
to be ducted along the earth's surface. If we do receive such a
signal, and if an accelerometer is registering, then it will be reading
one "g" (the accelerometer measures gravitational effect rather than
acceleration proper) and by comparing this to its reading when the
missile is under power we can calculate the acceleration at any time.
Whichever method is used, if the accelerometer is calibrated then
we can go hack to the equation for acceleration presented earlier,
a (Kr-t) =K2,
and determine the magnitude of the constants K, and K2. Now Kr
is the initial weight of the missile stage divided by the flow rate,
while K2 is the specific impulse, the thrust of the missile divided by
the flow rate. Taking the last term first, the specific impulse is a
figure of merit for a rocket engine reflecting principally the chemical
energy available in the propellant combination, and it will be different
for different propellants. Further, if we have (from liquid level
sensor analysis) an idea of the ratio in which the propellants are mixed,
we can make a pretty good stab at identifying the propellants. Then
if by other methods we have sized the propellant tanks, we can now
calculate the propellant flow rate, which multiplied by the constants
K, and K2 gives respectively the initial weight of the missile stage
and its thrust.
It is hoped that these explanations will have given the reader a
better understanding of some of the mysteries of telemetry analysis
and its usefulness in acquiring missile intelligence. Perhaps he will
also appreciate more the fascination it holds for its devotees. One
should note here the cumulative effect of a successful analysis: one
breakthrough leads to another, that to another, and so on. Con-
versely, an erroneous conclusion will propagate errors, and in this
respect this intelligence endeavor is probable no different. from any
other.
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Highlights of our scientists' suc-
cess in intercepting and recon-
structing the video from Soviet
spacecraft.
SNOOPING ON SPACE PICTURES
Henry G. Plaster
Lunik III's pictures of the far side of the moon in October 1959
excited the world and proved that the Soviets had then the technology
to aim a camera in space by remote control, command it to take
pictures, automatically develop the film on board the spacecraft, and
finally scan the fixed film electronically and transmit fair-quality pic-
tures back to earth from lunar distances. Since then they have em-
ployed real-time (i.e., concurrent, "live") television systems in some
of their earth-orbiting vehicles to monitor the behavior of dog and
human passengers, and they have used in some of their Cosmos satel-
lites a delayed transmission system somewhat similar to that of
Lunik III.
A fascinating and extremely important aspect of the U.S. intelli-
gence effort devoted to these video systems is the work of engineering
analysis in "breaking out" the pictures contained in the radio transmis-
sions. The process has a trial-and-error aspect like cryptanalysis:
since both the horizontal and vertical sweep periods are unknown
variables, there are an infinite number of possible combinations. The
engineer usually begins by trying to synchronize the vertical axis
by hand while synchronizing the horizontal sweep electronically. It
requires hours of experimentation with the oscilloscope controls for
sweep speed, filtering, and focus, displaying and redisplaying some-
times as little as two seconds worth of recorded data, to get results.
The results of this technical analysis have been valuable to intel-
ligence consumers, and the successful effort deserves general recogni-
tion. It has involved special Elint collection techniques, new ap-
proaches to signal analysis, feedback to assist in subsequent collection,
and intelligence interpretation of the pictures for the consumers.
Lunar Surface Video
The very weak signals returning to earth from Lunik III could not
be picked up by standard Elint collection facilities and equipment.
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Through the cooperation of the University of Manchester in England,
therefore, use of the 250-foot radiotelescope at Jodrell Bank was
obtained. The Soviets announced that pictures of the far side of the
moon were taken betwee:i 0330 and 04102 (Greenwich Mean Time)
on 7 October 1959. Jodrell Bank succeeded in getting a signal on
the announced frequency of 183.6 megacycles between 1410 and
1.445Z that date. A ten-hour lag behind the actual picture-taking is
not excessive: the film first had to he developed, and then the elec-
tronic scanning and transmission had to wait until rotation of the
earth brought the Soviet deep-space station in the Crimea into posi-
tion to pick up the signal.
The graduate students working for Sir Bernard Lovell at Jodrell
Bank, however, in recording their intercept, narrowed the receiver
bandwidth so far, in order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, that
they "clipped off" much of the video information. Confirmation that
the Lunik III pictures released by the Soviets (See Figure 1) were
valid thus rested on a single poorly recorded intercept from which
it could be judged only that the picture was more likely of a test
pattern than of the moon. The signal bandwidth, however, was com-
patible with the parameters announced by the Soviets, and on the
basis of technical extrapolation it could he concluded that the Soviet
lunar pictures were authentic.
Spacecraft Passengers Televised
Sputniks 5 and 6, launched respectively on 19 August and 1 Decem-
ber 1960, both transmitted signals on 83 megacycles which were
initially reported by field Elint operators and later confirmed through
detailed analysis to be video transmissions. Soviet announcements
that the dog passengers on these satellites were being watched while
in orbit by means of a "radio-television" system spurred on analytical
efforts to demodulate this new type of signal, and before long CIA
technical analysts did succeed in producing pictures from Sputnik 6's
recorded signals. (See Figure 2.) These substantiated the Soviet
claim of having developed a special television transmission system
which could provide instantaneous reporting on the behavior of animal
or human passengers aboard a Soviet spacecraft.
More important to intelligence in early 1961, .however, was the es-
tablishment of a capability to determine as soon after launch as pos-
sible whether the Soviets had successfully orbited the first man in
space, a feat they were expected to attempt at any moment. The
FIGURE L :,oviet-released photograph of the far side of the moon taken by
Lunik III.
FIGURE 2. Demodulated video from Sputnik fi showing face and forelegs. of a
canine passenger.
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National Security Agency undertook to design and produce special
field collection equipment that would present oscilloscope pictures
while the transmission was being received. Several such sets were
produced or, a priority basis, and the first two were sent to Elint sites
in Alaska and Hawaii.
Demodulation of video transmissions from Sputnik 9 (9 March 1961)
and Sputnik 10 (25 March 1961) substantiated the Soviet announce-
ments that each of these single-orbit flights carried a dog passenger.
'T'hen on 12 April 1961 Sputnik 11 was launched, and 83-megacycle
transmissions were detected twenty minutes later as the spacecraft
passed over Alaska. Only 58 minutes after launch NSA reported that
reliable real-time readout of the signals clearly showed a man and
showed him moving. Thus before Gagarin had completed his his-
toric 108-minute flight, intelligence components had technical con-
firmation that a Soviet cosmonaut was in orbit and that he was alive
(See Figure 3).
Earth/Cloud Pictures from Orbit
In March 1962, after several failures, the Soviets launched the first
satellite in what they referred to as the "Cosmos series." They an-
nounced the purpose of the new project to be scientific data collec-
tion, including study of "the distribution and formation of cloud pat-
terns in the earth's atmosphere."
Cosmos 4 of the series, launched on 26 April 1962, transmitted sig-
nals, identified initially only as "a new data transmission system," in
the frequency band between 162 and 175 megacycles, one not pre-
viously used in Soviet space operations. CIA technical specialists
mounted an effort to demodulate these signals and similar ones from
Cosmos 7, launched on 28 July 1962. Through rigorous analysis they
established many of the signal parameters, but no identifiable pictures
could be produced. Though recorded by a number of Elint collection
sites, the signals were of insufficient quality for picture reconstruction
because the general-search equipment used was not suitable for re-
cording a highly complex wide-band, frequency-modulated video sig-
nal. From the unrecognizable pictures that were achieved it was nev-
ertheless concluded that a camera or cameras on board these Cosmos
vehicles were taking photographs, probably of cloud formations, that
these photographs were developed by an on-board film processor, and
that the fixed film was subsequently scanned electronically and the
signals transmitted to ground-based receivers in the Soviet Union.
FicuoF: 3. Dcmodulated video from Sputnik It showing movements of (agarin.
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Cosmos 9, launched on 27 September 1962, the third Cosmos vehicle
to transmit video signals, was the first from which recognizable pictures
could be reproduced. Since cloud cover was readily identifiable in
a rcrics of six pictures, CIA geophysics and electronics specialists con-
sulted representatives of the National Meteorological Satellite Center
of the U. S. Weather Bureau, the organization which processes the
Tiros weather satellite photographs. Through photogrammetric analy-
sis of the pictures, Cosmos 9 was adjudged to be an experimental
weather satellite, stabilized about three axes, earth-oriented, and
carrying a camera system with provision for delayed readout from
the film. NASA was briefed on these findings prior to the 5 December
1962 signing of its agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences
on cooperative space research and the exchange of data from meteoro-
logical satellites. The findings were also presented to a December
1962 meeting of technical representatives of the intelligence com-
munity, including some from the jet Propulsion Laboratory working
under an intelligence contract.
In direct consequence of this latter presentation, JPL technical
experts embarked on a detailed study of all intercepts of the Cosmos
video transmissions, making use of the most sophisticated electronic
and photographic equipment available. By the following May they
had succeeded in breaking out three overlapping pictures each com-
posed of sixteen subframes which had been transmitted in sequence.
("That they had been transmitted by electronically scanning the fixed
film, as in Lunik III, was confirmed by their showing readily recog-
nizable emulsion impurities.) Two of these pictures clearly showed
lake 'Van in Turkey (See Figures 4 and 5), and thus the entire land
area in the pictures, where free from cloud cover, could be identified
and the camera's field of view thereby defined. The wide-angle (85? )
lens employed was such as would be expected in a meteorological
satellite and not suitable for military reconnaissance. To achieve with
this lens a military reconnaissance resolution on the order of twenty
feet, the film would have to he five feet wide, a technological im-
possibility at present.
After Cosmos 15, launched on 22 April 1963, the Soviets orbited
no further Cosmos vehicles with video transmissions, though they
have launched and recovered more than a dozen that are believed
to have had reconnaissance cameras aboard. On the basis of the
stage of development manifested by the four that did transmit video,
NASA was again briefed concerning Soviet weather satellite capa-
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bilities prior to the formal implementation on 16 August 1963 of its
agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences regarding cooperative
space programs. This agreement called for a regular exchange of
data from meteorological satellites beginning in the second half of
1964., preceded by occasional exchange of experimental data during
the first half of the year. It set as an objective pictures covering an
area at least a thousand kilometers square with a resolution initially
of 2.5 kilometers, ultimately of one kilometer.
No further flight testing of the video system having occurred since
the spring of 1963, it became increasingly obvious as time passed
that the Soviets were not going to be able to meet their 1964 com-
mitments. As flown, the camera system identified through the video
transmissions could not have met them: the 85? lens would need an
altitude of 280 nautical miles to produce the required area coverage.
At this altitude, however, the Cosmos system could transmit photos
with an average resolution of at least 1800 feet, considerably better
than the 3280 feet ultimately aimed at in the agreement.
This information plus an estimate of the characteristics to be ex-
pected in the initial "operational" Soviet weather satellite was passed
along to NASA in advance of the May 1964 discussions in Geneva on
further implementation of the meteorological agreement. Although
the formal "memorandum of understanding" resulting from these dis-
cussions does not specify a new date for beginning the exchange of
data, the Soviets informally agreed to aim for early 1965.
Future Prospects
When the exchange of data from meteorological satellites begins,
anticipatedly in 1965, it will be up to the intelligence community to
establish that the cloud pictures the Soviets give us are as complete
and as good as what they receive from their satellites. After the
initial determination, periodic spot checks will be required.
Real-time television signals will undoubtedly be transmitted from
future Soviet manned spacecraft. TV pictures of Soviet cosmonauts'
movements would be of great help to us in assessing pilot participa-
tion in rendezvous and docking operations. The activity of passengers
in future Soviet orbital space stations will probably be monitored
through live TV cameras, and U. S. intelligence will be in a position
to check on it at the same time by operating readout devices at Elint
sites peripheral to the USSR.
Future Soviet lunar and planetary probes will probably use a
technique of picture taking and delayed electronic scanning and
transmission. For manned lunar missions, some sort of picture trans-
mission system will undoubtedly be employed, probably one with
more advanced techniques.
Constant upgrading of collection equipment and continued analysis
of transmitted video signals will ensure that U. S. intelligence will
remain in as favorable a position for assessing future Soviet space
efforts as it has enjoyed so far.
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Tour through one type of space-
flight tracking system.
THE DIYARBAKIR RADAR
Stanley G. Zabetakis
and
John F. Peterson
In September of 1938 five British radar stations which had just
been set up to cover the approaches to the Thames estuary were able
to monitor Mr. Chamberlain's historic flight to Munich. These sta-
tions were the first of an extended network that was soon maintaining
twenty-four-hour radar surveillance of the English coast. With this
act the art of war entered a new technological stage, and intelligence
acquired a new instrument for data gathering. Today collectors of
scientific and technical intelligence use radar for gathering denied
information on missile and space activities, as well as aerodynamic
developments, which is necessary for the analysis of opposing weapon
systems.
Today's radar is much more powerful and more complex than that
of 1938, but its operation is not beyond lay understanding. The
analyst, though he will probably never be called upon to operate
a radar system, will find his appreciation of and confidence in the
data produced by these systems increased by an acquaintance with
how they work. Flere we describe a ground-based radar at Diyar-
bakir, in eastern Turkey, which is not unlike other radar systems cur-
rently deployed to satisfy S&T intelligence collection requirements.
The first installation (designated AN/ FPS-17, XW-1) at Diyarbakir
was originally intended to provide mere surveillance of the USSR's
missile test range at Kapustin Yar south of Stalingrad-that is to
detect missile launchings. The data it came to produce, however,
transcend surveillance, permitting the derivation of missile trajectories,
the identification of earth satellite launches, the calculation of a sat-
ellite's ephemeris (position and orbit), and the synthesis of booster
rocket performance. The success achieved by this fixed-beam radar
has led to the co-location with it of a tracking radar (AN/FPS-79)
which, beginning in mid-1964, has given an additional capability for
estimating the configuration and dimensions of satellites or missiles and
observing the reentry of manned or unmanned vehicles. This article,
however, will confine its attention to the fixed-beam AN/FPS-17.
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Experimentation with the detection of missiles by a modified SCR
270 radar in 1948 and 1949 at IIolloman Air Force Base, along with
U.S. experience in the use of high-power components on other radars,
created a basis for believing that a megawatt-rated radar could be
fabricated for operation over much longer ranges than ever before.
The need for intelligence on Soviet missile activity being acute, a
formal requirement for such a radar was established, and Rome Air
Development Center was given responsibility for engineering the
system. In October 1954 General Electric, which had experience in
producing high-power VIIF equipment and radars, was awarded a
contract for the fabrication, installation, and testing of what was to
be at the time the world's largest and most powerful operational
radar. The contract stipulated that the equipment was to be in
operation at Site IX near Diyarbakir within nine months, by 1 June
1955. Construction began in February, and the scheduled operational
date was missed by fifteen minutes.
The original antenna installation was a large D.S. Kennedy para-
bolic reflector, 175 feet high by 110 feet wide, radiating in the fre-
quency range 175 to 215 megacycles. Standard GE high-power tele-
vision transmitters, modified for pulse operation, were used at the
beginning. Surveillance was carried out by six horizontal beams over
the Kapustin Yar area. In 1958 a second antenna, 150 feet high by
300 feet long, and new 1.2-megawatt transmitters were installed as
part of a modification kit which provided three additional horizontal
beams, a seven-beam vertical fan, and greater range capability. The
elaborated system includes automatic alarm circuitry, range-finding
circuitry, and data-processing equipment; it is equipped to make
35-mm photographic recordings of all signals received. A pre-
liminary reduction of data is accomplished on-site, but the final
processing is done in the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-
Patterson.
From 15 June 1955, when the first Soviet missile was detected, to
1 March 1964, 508 incidents (sightings) were reported, 147 of them
during the last two years of the period.
The system has eight separate radar sets or channels, each with
its own exciter, transmitter, duplexcr, receiver, and data display unit.
These eight channels feed electromagnetic energy into sixteen fixed
beams formed by the two antennas, each channel, or transmitter-re-
ceiver combination, being time-shared between two beams. Pneu-
matically driven switches operate on a three-second cycle to power
each beam alternately for 1.5 seconds. There are antenna feeds for
two additional beams which could be made to function with some
patchwork in the wiring.
The antenna feeds are positioned to produce in space the beam
pattern depicted in Figure 1. Beams 1 and 18 are those not ordinarily
energized. Beams 1 through 7 use the older of the two antennas;
8 through 18 are formed by the newer, "cinerama" antenna., whose
300-foot width gives them their narrow horizontal dimension. Beams
2 through 9 are projected in horizontal array; 10 through 17 (although
10 actually lies in the horizontal row) are grouped as the vertical com-
ponent. All beams of each group are powered simultaneously.
Except for being controlled by a master timing signal, each of the
eight channels operates independently of the others. Each trans.-
BEAM PATTERN
AN/FPS 17 (XW-1)
f
->@
2.5" r ~* ^ RADAR CHANNEL NR 1
RADAR CHANNEL NR 2
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mitter is on a slightly different frequency to prevent interaction with
the others. The transmitted pulse, 2000 microseconds long, is coded,
or tagged, by being passed through a tapped delay line which may
reverse the phase at 20-microsecond intervals. Upon reception the
returned signal is passed through the same tapped delay line and
compressed 1.100:1, to 20 microseconds, in order to increase the ac-
curacy and resolution of the range measurement, which is of course
a function of the interval between transmission and return.
Figure 2 shows the beam pattern superimposed on the target area.
The total azimuthal coverage is from 18? to 49.7?. The system
normally detects missiles or satellites launched from Kapustin Yar
at a nominal range of 800 nautical miles; it tracks one type of missile
out: as far as 1625 NM. The missiles and satellites are not sensed
at their maximum detectable range because the coverage of the fixed-
beam configuration does not conform with the test range layout.
' A delay line is what it sounds like, an artificial transmission detour that serves
to retard the signal. Here it is made up with series inductances and parallel
capacitances that yield a constant delay. Pick-off points at 20-microsecond
intervals permit these sub-pulses to be extracted in such sequence that they all
arrive together, to achieve the compression effect.
The electrical characteristics of each of the channels can be re-
capped as follows:
Frequency ........................... 175-215 megacycles
Peak power per beam ................ 1.2 megawatts
Pulse length ......................... 2000 microseconds
Pulse repetition rate .................. 30 cycles per second
Duty cycle (portion of time transmit- 0.06
ting)
Beam width (horizontally elongated) .. 2.5? x 1.8?
Beam width (vertically elongated) ..... 1? x 2?
Pulse compression ratio ................ 100:1
Range accuracy ...................... within 5 nautical miles
To illustrate how the capability of the system is calculated, we can
take typical logs which show channel 4, for example, operating with
the following parameters:
Peak power output ................... 1.0 megawatt
Minimum discernible signal ........... 130 decibels below one
milliwatt
Frequency ........................... 192 megacycles
Channel 4's maximum range of intercept capability for a target one
square meter in cross section is then determined by using these
parameters in the radar range equation
(4r)3 S
CptC2A2A
)
where:
R=Range in meters
Pt=Peak power transmitted in watts
G=:Antenna gain over isotropic (omnidirectional) radiator
A=Wave length in meters
S=Minimum discernible signal in watts
A=Target size in square meters
Substituting,
R4_ 106 watts (5000)2 (1.56m)2 1m2
(12.57)3 (1 ? 10)-16 watts
and
Range=2250 nautical miles.
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Sightings made by the fixed-beam system include vertical firings
(for upper-atmosphere research vehicles or booster checkout), ballistic
missiles fired to the nominal 650, 1050, and 2000 NM impact areas,
launches of Cosmos satellites, orbiting satellites, and natural abnor-
malities such as ionospheric disturbances or aurora.
Measurements and Processing
Data on target missiles or satellites are recorded in each radar
channel by photographing a five-inch intensity-modulated oscilloscope
with the camera shutter open on a 35-mm film moving approximately
five inches per minute. The range of an individual target is repre-
sented by its location across the width of the film, the time by a dot-
dash code along the length. In addition to this positional informa-
tion, the target's approximate radial velocity (velocity in the direc-
tion of observation) is determined by measuring the doppler fre-
quency shift in the radar signal when it is returned. The doppler
shift is found to within 500 cycles by determining which of eighteen
frequency filters covering successive bands 500 cycles per second wide
will pass the return signal. This measurement of radial velocity runs
from -4 to +4 nautical miles per second in increments of .219 NM.
All these data, together with the elevation and azimuth of the observ-
ing beam, are automatically converted to serial form, encoded in
standard teletype code, and punched on paper tape for teletype trans-
mission.
Data is thus received at Wright-Patterson first by teletype and then
on film, the latter accompanied by logs giving data on the target as
read by site personnel and data on equipment performance such as
peak transmitted power, frequency, and receiver sensitivity. The
film when it arrives is edited and marked to facilitate reading on the
"Oscar" (preliminary processing) equipment. Targets are sorted one
from another by differences in range and rate of range change, and
the returns on each are numbered in time sequence.
The FTD Oscar equipment consists of a film reader which gives
time and range data in analog form, a converter unit which changes
them to digital form, and an IBM printing cardpunch which receives
the digital data. The Oscar equipment and human operator thus
generate a deck of IBM cards for computer processing which con-
tains the history of each target's position through time. The first
step in the computer processing is to translate Oscar units into actual
radar range, "Z" (Greenwich mean) time, and beam number, the
latter fixing the azimuth and elevation of the return. During this
first step three separate quality-control checks are made on each I13M
card to eliminate erroneous data.
Those observations that succeed in passing all these tests are
taken to the second step of computer processing, the fitting of a
second-degree polynomial curve to the raw range/time data in ac-
cordance with the criterion of least squares.2 A standard deviation
from this curve is established, and any raw datum point showing a
deviation as large as three times the standard is discarded. Then sec-
ond-degree curves are similarly fitted to the azimuth/time and ele-
vation/time data. The three second-degree polynomials--for range/
time, azimuth/time, and elevation/time-are used to generate a value
for position and velocity at mean time of observation, and on the
basis of these values an initial estimate of the elliptical trajectory is
made.
In computing the elliptical path the earth is physically considered
a rotating homogeneous sphere and geometrically considered an
ellipsoid-that is, its equatorial bulge is ignored in the gravitational
computation but not with respect to intersections of its surface. An
ellipse not intersecting the earth's surface represents a satellite orbit;
one intersecting the earth's surface describes a trajectory above the
point of intersection.
The parameters of the ellipse are iterated with the computer? estab-
lishing a best-fit ellipse constrained by a weighted least-squares cri-
terion. Along this ellipse the target's track is computed--the history
through time of latitude, longitude, altitude, and such velocity and
angular parameters as may be of interest. A missile's actual range
is probably shorter than that of its computed trajectory because of its
non-elliptical thrusting path and atmospheric drag after its reentry.
The difference is on the order of 10 to 25 nautical miles for short and
medium range missiles, 50 NM for ICBM's.
` Under which a mathematical function is judged to be the one best approxi-
mating a series of observations if the sum of squares of its residuals ( deviations
from the raw data) is least. If there is systematic irregularity in the reliability
of the data the residuals are weighted accordingly.
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The case for consistent, unambig-
uous usage of a few key odds ex-
pressions.
WORDS OF ESTIMATIVE PROBABILITY
Sherman Kent
The briefing officer was reporting a photo reconnaissance mission.'
Pointing to the map, he made three statements:
1. "And at this location there is a new airfield. [He could have
located it to the second on a larger map.] Its longest run-
way is 10,000 feet."
2. "It is almost certainly a military airfield."
3. "The terrain is such that the Blanks could easily lengthen the
runways, otherwise improve the facilities, and incorporate this
field into their system of strategic staging bases. It is possible
that they will." Or, more daringly, "It would be logical for
them to do this and sooner or later they probably will."
The above are typical of three kinds of statements which populate
the literature of all substantive intelligence. The first is as close as
one can come to a statement of indisputable fact. It describes some-
thing knowable and known with a high degree of certainty. The
reconnaissance aircraft's position was known with precision and its
camera reproduced almost exactly what was there.
Estimative Uncertainty
The second is a judgment or estimate. It describes something which
is knowable in terms of the human understanding but not precisely
known by the man who is talking about it. There is strong evidence
to sustain his judgment: the only aircraft on the field are military air-
craft, many are parked in revetted hard-stands, the support area has
all the characteristics of similar known military installations, and so
on. Convincing as it is, this evidence is circumstantial. It cannot
justify a flat assertion that this is a military airfield. It makes the
case, say, 90 percent of the way. And some sort of verbal qualifier
' This particular briefing officer was not the photo-interpreter. See page 61
for the special language of P/Is.
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is necessary to show that the case is a 90-pcrccnter, not a 100. This
is why the briefer said "almost certainly."
The third statement is another judgment or estimate, this one made
almost without any evidence direct or indirect. It may be an estimate
of something that no man alive can know, for the Blanks may not yet
have made up their minds whether to lengthen the runways and build
up the base. Still the logic of the situation as it appears to the briefer
permits him to launch himself into the area of the literally unknowable
and make this estimate. He can use possible to indicate that runway
extension is neither certain nor impossible, or he can be bolder and use
probably to designate more precisely a degree of likelihood, a lower
one than he had attached to his estimate regarding the character of
the airfield.
Generally speaking, the most important passages of the literature of
substantive intelligence contain far more statements of the estimative
types two and three than of the factual type one. This is the case
because many of the things you most wish to know about the other
man are the secrets of state he guards most jealously. To the extent
his security measures work, to that extent your knowledge must be
imperfect and your statements accordingly qualified by designators
of your uncertainty. Simple prudence requires the qualifier in any
type-three statement to show a decent reticence before the unknowable.
Concern over these qualifiers is most characteristic of that part of the
intelligence production business known as estimates. This is no small
recondite compartment; it extends to almost every corner of all in-
telligence research work, from the short appraisals or comments of
a reports officer to the full-dress research study of the political or
economic analyst. Practically all substantive intelligence people con-
stantly make estimates. The remarks that follow are generally ad-
dressed to all these people and their readers, but most especially are
they addressed to that particular institution of the estimating busi-
ness known as the National Intelligence Estimate and its audience.
The NIE, taking into account the high echelon of its initiators, pro-
ducers, and consumers, should be the community's best effort to deal
with the relevant evidence imaginatively and judiciously. It should
set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to
the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment,
and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of
certitude lie behind each key statement. Ideally, once the commu-
nity has made up its mind in this matter, it should be able to choose a
word or a phrase which quite accurately describes the degree of its
certainty; and ideally, exactly this message should get through to
the reader.
It should not come as a surprise that the fact is far from the ideal,
that considerable difficulty attends both the fitting of a phrase to
the estimators' meaning and the extracting of that meaning by the
consumer. Indeed, from the vantage point of almost fourteen years
of experience, the difficulties seem practically insurmountable. The
why and wherefore of this particular area of semantics is the subject
of this essay.
Let me begin with a bit of history.2
Early Brush with Ambiguity
In March 1951 appeared NIE 29-51, "Probability of an :Invasion of
Yugoslavia in 1951." The following was its key judgment, made in
the final paragraph of the Conclusions: "Although it is imposs:ible to
determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe
that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations in-
dicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a
serious possibility." (Emphasis added.) Clearly this statement is
either of type two, a knowable thing of which our knowledge was
very imperfect, or of type three, a thing literally unknowable for the
reason that the Soviets themselves had not yet reached a binding
decision. Whichever it was, our duty was to look hard at the situa-
tion, decide how likely or unlikely an attack might be, and having
reached that decision, draft some language that would convey to the
reader our exact judgment.
The process of producing NIEs then was almost identical to what
it is today. This means that a draft had been prepared in the Office
of National Estimates on the basis of written contributions from the
IAC 3 agencies, that a score or so of Soviet, Satellite, and Yugcslav
experts from the intelligence community labored over it,, and. that an
all but final text presided over by the Board of National Estimates
had gone to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There the [AC
'Harry H. Ransom's Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge,
Mass., 1958) carries on pp. 196-7 a bob-tailed and somewhat garbled version of it.
'Intelligence Advisory Committee, USIB's predecessor.
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members, with the DCI in the chair, gave it its final review, revision,
and approval.
As is quite obvious from the sentence quoted above, Soviet and
Satellite intentions with respect to Yugoslavia were a matter of grave
concern in the high policy echelons of our government. The State
Department's Policy Planning Staff was probably the most important
group seized of the problem. Its chairman and members read NIE
29-51 with the sort of concentration intelligence producers can only
hope their product will command.
A few days after the estimate appeared, I was in informal con-
versation with the Policy Planning Staff's chairman. We spoke of
Yugoslavia and the estimate. Suddenly he said, "By the way, what
did you people mean by the expression `serious possibility'? What
kind of odds did you have in mind?" I told him that my personal
estimate was on the dark side, namely that the odds were around
65 to 35 in favor of an attack. He was somewhat jolted by this; he
and his colleagues had read "serious possibility" to mean odds very
considerably lower. Understandably troubled by this want of com-
munication, I began asking my own colleagues on the Board of National
Estimates what odds they had had in mind when they agreed to that
wording. It was another jolt to find that each Board member had
had somewhat different odds in mind and the low man was thinking
of about 20 to 80, the high of 80 to 20. The rest ranged in between.
Of my colleagues on the Board at least one-maybe more-shared
my concern. My most obvious co-worrier was Max Foster.4 He and
I were shaken perhaps more by the realization that Board members
who had worked over the estimate had failed to communicate with
each other than by the Board's failure to communicate with its audi-
ence. This NIE was, after all, the twenty-ninth that had appeared
since General Smith had established the Office of National Estimates.
Had Board members been seeming to agree on five month's worth of
estimative judgments with no real agreement at all? Was this the
case with all others who participated-ONE staffers and IAC repre-
sentatives, and even IAC members themselves? Were the NIEs dotted
with "serious possibilities" and other expressions that meant very dif-
` Maxwell E. Foster, one of the original eight members of the Board of National
Estimates, a lawyer by trade, and a gifted semanticist by avocation. Some will
remember him for his elegant and precise writing; none will forget his eccentricities.
Ile was the man who always wore his hat in the house.
ferent things to both producers and readers? What were we really
trying to say when we wrote a sentence such as this?
What we were trying to do was just what my Policy Planning friend
had assumed, namely to quote odds on this or that being the case or
taking place in the future. There is a language for odds; in fact
there are two-the precise mathematical language of the actuary or
the race track bookie and a less precise though useful verbal cduiva-
lent. We did not use the numbers, however, and it appeared that
we were misusing the words.
The No-Odds Possible
Our gross error in the Yugoslav estimate, and perhaps in its prede-
cessors, lay in our not having fully understood this particular part of
our task. As Foster and I saw it the substantive stuff we had been
dealing with had about it certain elements of dead certainty: Stalin
was in charge in the USSR, for example. These, if relevant, we stated
affirmatively or used impliedly as fact. There were also elements of
sheer impossibility (Yugoslavia was not going to crack off along its
borders and disappear physically from the face of the earth); these
we did not bother to state at all. In between these matters of cer-
tainty and impossibility lay the large area of the possible. With
respect to the elements herein we could perceive some that were more
likely to happen than not, some less likely. These were the elements
upon which we could make an estimate, choosing some word or phrase
to convey our judgment that the odds were such and such for or
against something coming to pass.
At the race track one might say:
'There are ten horses in the starting gate. It is possible that any one of
them will win-even the one with three legs.
But the odds (or chances) against the three-legger are overwhelming.
Here, as in estimating Yugoslav developments, there is evidence
to justify the citing of odds. But in the world that intelligence esti-
mates try hardest to penetrate-a world of closed covenants secretly
arrived at, of national business conducted behind walls of all but
impenetrable security, of skillfully planned deceptions, and so on-
such evidence is by no means invariably at hand. In a multitude of
the most important circumstances-situations you are duty bound to
consider and report on-about all you can say is that such and such
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is neither certain to happen nor is its happening an impossibility.
The short and proper way out is to say that its happening is possible
and stop there without any expression of odds. If you reserve the
use of "possible" for this special purpose-to signal something of high
importance whose chances of being or happening you cannot estimate
with greater precision-hopefully you will alert your reader to some
necessary contingency planning. (You may not if you have dulled
him by citing a lot of "possibles" of little real consequence.)
If our gross error lay in not perceiving the correctness-or at any
rate the utility-of the above formulation, our particular error lay in
using the word "possibility" with the modifier "serious." Foster and
I felt that it was going to be difficult enough for the estimators to
communicate a sense of odds even if they stuck to a fairly rigorous
vocabulary; it was going to be impossible if the vocabulary were
permitted to become as sloppily imprecise as in normal speech. We
had to have a way of differentiating between those possible things
about which we could make a statement of likelihood and the other
possible things about which we could not. The first cardinal rule to
emerge was thus, "The word `possible' (and its cognates 5) must not be
modified." The urge to drop into ordinary usage and write "just pos-
sible," "barely possible," "a distinct [or good] possibility," and so on
must be suppressed. The whole concept of "possibility" as here devel-
oped must stand naked of verbal modifiers.6
See page 59.
? This usage is wholly in accord with the findings of the lexicographers, who
almost invariably assign it the number one position. Further, it is readily under-
stood and generally employed by statisticians, scientists, and the like, who some-
times define it as "non-zero probability." This is much to my taste.
At the same time there can be no question of the existence of a second usage,
especially in the ordinary spoken word. The meaning here is most emphatically
not the broad range of "non-zero probability," but a variable low order of prob-
ability, say anywhere below 40 or 30 or 20 percent. Thus it would fall last in
a series that named descending odds: certain, probable, possible. When people
use it to signify very low odds, for example below 5 percent, they may say "re-
motely possible" or any of its many cognates. This of course is not to my liking,
but the intended meaning is clear. The serious trouble comes when another
group of users lifts the word out of its position in the cellar of odds and by
the addition of augmenting adjectives makes it do duty upstairs: "serious possi-
bility," "great possibility," "highly possible."
Once Foster and I had decided upon this first cardinal rule we
turned tot' e elements where likelihood could be estimated. We began
to think in terms of a chart which would show the mathematical. odds
equivalent to words and phrases of probability. Our starter was a
pretty complicated affair. We approached its construction from the
wrong end. Namely, we began with 11 words or phrases which
seemed to convey a feeling of 11 different orders of probability and
then attached numerical odds to them. At once we perceived our
folly. In the first place, given the inexactness of the intelligence
data we were working with, the distinctions we made between one
set of odds and its fellows above and below were unjustifiably sharp.
And second, even if in rare cases you could arrive at such exact tnathe-
matical odds, the verbal equivalent could not possibly convey that
exactness. The laudable precision would be lost on the reader.
So we tried again, this time with only five gradations, and beginning
with the numerical odds. The chart which emerged can be set down
in its classical simplicity thus:
100% Certainty
93%, give or take about 6%
Almost certain
?~
75%, give or take about 12%
Probable
0
50%, give or take about .10%
Chances about even
30%, give or take about '10%
Probably not
H
7%, give or take about 5%
Almost certainly not
0
% Impossibility
Important note to consumers: You should be quite clear that when we say
"such and such is unlikely" we mean that the chances of its NOT happening;
are in our judgment about three to one. Another, and to you critically
important, way of saying the same thing is that the chances of its HAPPEN-
ING are about one in four. Thus if we were to write, "It is unlikely that
Castro will attempt to shoot down a U-2 between now and November 1965,"
we mean there is in our view around a 25-percent chance that he will do
just that. If the estimate were to read, "It is almost certain Castro will
not . ," we would mean there was still an appreciable chance, say five
percent or less, that he would attempt the shoot-down.
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We had some charts run up and had some discussions in the com-
munity. There were those who thought the concept and the chart
a very fine thing. A retired intelligence professional thought well
enough of it to put it into a book.? CIA officers, addressing War
College audiences and the like, would sometimes flash a slide and
talk about it. A few copies got pasted on the walls of estimates offices
in the community. Some people were sufficiently taken that they
advocated putting it on the inside back cover of every NIE as a sort
of sure-fire handy glossary.
There were also those who did not think about the idea at all, and
others in opposition to it. Some fairly important people who had
a professional stake in this kind of thinking never took the trouble
to learn what it was all about. A good many did take a little trouble
and laughed. Still a third group found out all they needed to know
and attacked the whole proposition from a hard semantic base point.
Of these more later.
In the face of this inertia and opposition and with the early de-
parture of my only solid ally, Max Foster, I began backing away from
bold forward positions. I did continue harassing actions and in the
course of making a nuisance of myself to associates and colleagues did
pick up some useful converts, but I dropped all thought of getting
an agreed air-tight vocabulary of estimative expressions, let alone
reproducing the chart in the rear of every NIE. With the passage
of time it has appeared that the guerrilla strategy thrust upon me by
circumstance was the only one holding any chance of success. In
almost fourteen years this article is my first serious and systematic
attempt to get the message across, and it probably would not have
been written if David Wark s had not consulted me about his foray
into the same semantic problem.
The Aesthetic Opposition
What slowed me up in the first instance was the firm and reasoned
resistance of some of my colleagues. Quite figuratively I am going
'Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production (N.Y., 1957). The chart
appears on the inside cover and again on page 208-not exactly as above but
in full accord with my principles. The trouble conies on pp. 209-210, where
General Platt departs widely, and to me regrettably, from my notion of legitimate
synonyms.
"See the next following article.
Words of Probability
i
to call them the "poets"-as opposed to the "mathematicians"'--in
my circle of associates, and if the term conveys a modicum of dis-
approbation on my part, that is what I want it to do. Their attitude
toward the problem of communication seems to be fundainentally
defeatist. They appear to believe the most a writer can achieve when
working in a speculative area of human affairs is communication in
only the broadest general sense. If he gets the wrong message across
or no message at all-well, that is life.
Perhaps I overstate the poets' defeatism. In any case at least one
of them feels quite strongly that my brief for the "mathematicians"
is pretty much nonsense. He has said that my likening my side to the
mathematician's is a phoney; that I am in fact one with the sociologists
who try by artificial definitions to give language a bogus precision.
He has gone on to stress the function of rhetoric and its importance.
And he has been at some pains to point out how handy it would be
to use expressions like "just possible," "may well," and "doubtless"
as they are loosely used in conversation. Could there not be an
occasional relaxation of the rule?
Suppose one wrote a sentence: "Khrushchev may well have had in
the back of his mind such and such, or indeed it is distinctly possible
that somebody had just primed him...." Now suppose you delete
the "well" and the "distinctly"; has anything been lost? There will
be those who point out that "may well" and "distinctly possible" do
convey a flavor which is missing without them. Of course the flavor
in question is the flavor of odds, communicated without quoting them.
The poets would probably argue that in a sentence of this sort the
introduction of any of the terms for particular odds would make the
writer look silly. Everybody knows that you could not have the evi-
dence to sustain the use of, say, "probably" in these two instances.
Hence you can only suggest odds by the use of the "may well" and
"distinctly possible" and so say something without saying it, in short
fudge it. The poets feel wounded when urged to delete the whole
ambiguous sentence, arguing that this serves only to impoverish the
product. They grow impatient when you advocate dropping only
the "well" and the "distinctly." And as for your accusation of fudging,
they generally counterattack, inviting you to write something that
fudges nothing.
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There is a point which the poets can make with telling effect. It
is that there are probably just as many reading poets as there are
writing poets, and these are going to be numb to the intended meaning
of the "mathematician" writer. If you write to give no more than just
the general idea or general feel you may get through with great
success. Per contra, if you break your heart in an endeavor to make
yourself' fully and precisely understood, you may not.
I realize the truth in the above; I am not reconciled; I deplore it.
The Growth of Variants
Even, if there had been no poets it would have been an impractical
idea to print a chart on the inside of the back page of each NIE
as a sort of glossary. To have used the one on page 55 and stuck to
these words exclusively would have imposed intolerable restraints upon
the prose. Even if it had been desirable it would have been impossible
to enforce such rigidity. But this was really never at issue: from the
start a number of perfectly legitimate synonyms for the concept of
possibility and a number for each of the five orders of likelihood were
generally recognized.?
? Some of these synonymous meanings are expressed in verb forms. Thus it
is syntactically possible to use them closely coupled to one of the adverbial
expressions of odds, e.g., "we believe it likely that . . ." or "we estimate it is
almost certain that such and such will not . . . " If we really mean to assign
an odds value to these verb forms good usage would forbid this kind of doubling-
up. Mathematically, the probabilities would have to undergo a quite ridiculous
multiplication. Thus "we believe" (75?percent) multiplied by "likely" (75-!-
percent) would yield odds worse than 3 to 2 instead of 3 to 1. If we are not
assigning an odds value to "we believe" and "we estimate," the purist would say
we should not use them. Yet on many occasions a writer will feel uncomfortable-
and justifiably so-with a bare "It is likely that . . Such a bald statement
is seemingly more confident than the situation would warrant. The writer will
feel something akin to a compulsion towards modesty and a drive to soften the
"likely" by introducing it with a "we believe" or "we estimate." Almost in-
variably he does not intend to change the odds associated with "likely." If one
could set himself up as the arbiter, one would, I believe, rule that the "likely,"
or the "probably," or the "almost certainly," etc. was the operative expression
of odds and that its message was unaffected by the introducing verb.
Doubling tip in the "possibly" category is a different matter. We should avoid
"it might (or may) be possible for the Blanks to . . . " The verb should be
present or future indicative, normally "is" and "will be."
For example:
conceivable
could 11
Possible 10 ................. may
might
perhaps 12
virtually certain
all but certain
Almost certain ............. highly probable
highly likely
odds [or chances] overwhelming
likely
Probable. ................... we believe
we estimate
50-50 .....................
chances about even
chances a little better [or less]
than even
improbable
unlikely
Probably not la ............ we believe that . . . not
we estimate that . . . not
we doubt, doubtful
"These synonyms must not be modified; might well, could well, just could,
barely conceivable, etc. are as inadmissible as the original sin.
" e "Could" is included here because of many years' duty as a synonym for
possible." It has also served as a short way of noting a capability as in "The
Soviets could develop [for "have the capability to develop"] such and such a
radar though we have no evidence that they are doing so." The two usages are
close, to be sure, but not identical.
" As in, "It is almost certain that such and such will occur in the delta, perhaps
in Saigon itself."
" This group of words poses at least one very vexing problem. Suppose you
wish to make a positive estimate that there is, say, about a 30-percent chance
that such and such thing is the case. Assuming that the thing in question is
important, a 30-percent chance of its being the case is highly significant. If
you stick with the chart and write "it is improbable [or unlikely etc.] that such
and such is the case" you will probably convey a much more negative attitude
than you intend. There are many ways around the problem; they will, however,
require a few more words.
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almost impossible
virtually impossible
Almost certainly not .......
some slight chance
highly doubtful
If the chart were expanded to take care of these, it probably would
not fit on the inside back cover of the NIE, and even if it could be made
to, its complexity would probably exasperate gentle reader more than
it would edify him. Still worse, he would be confused by changes
that would have to be made in it from time to time, always to ac-
commodate newcomers among the accepted expressions.
The table of synonyms above did not come into being all at once;
it has grown to its present size by accretion. "We believe" came in
rather early, and as I remember via General Smith himself. "We esti-
mate" was a bit later; "we think," "we expect," and "we judge" are
part way in.14 If they make it all the way I trust they will be used
and understood in the "probably"/"we believe" bracket. "We doubt"
has been accepted within the last few years as a legitimate equivalent
of "probably not." There will be others-I sincerely hope not very
many. Keeping them out will take some doing. In the past, what-
ever the rigor insisted upon at the working and drafting level, who was
there to tell a General Smith or a Mr. Dulles, as he presided over the
IAC or USIB, that the revision he had just written out on a piece of
yellow paper was not permissible?
Consistency in Usage
From my remarks about the poets, it should be clear that my sym-
pathies lie with their mathematical opponents. But we mathemati-
cally-inclined are ourselves not in good array. You might almost say
that some of us are talking in the decimal, others in the binary, and
still others in the root five or seven systems.
For example, consider the letter-number device which has been
standard with attache and other reporting services, A-2, C-3, F-6, etc.
The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 designating the quality of a report's
content stand for, respectively: (1) confirmed by other independent
or reliable sources; (2) probably true; (3) possibly true; (4) doubt-
ful; (5) probably false; and (6) cannot be judged. Note that the
number 3, "possibly true," is in the middle of the scale of odds, doing
the duty I have hoped it should never be asked to do.
Or consider the findings of a distinguished intelligence research
project. The object was to identify certain military units with respect
to the chances of their existence or non-existence. One group of units
was called "firm," another "highly probable," a third "probable," and
a fourth general group "possible." Except for one important thing,
this kind of ordering was wholly to my taste. The word "firm" was
unfortunately not used, as one might expect, to describe a condition
of 100 percent certainty. Its begetters, upon cross-examination, owned
that it was meant to indicate something like 90-95 percent-roughly
the equivalent of my "almost certain." This usage puts the lower
categories slightly askew from the terminology of my chart--"highly
probable" equating to my "probable" and "probable" to my "chances
better than even." "Possible," however, was used exactly as I have fell:
it should be used, to designate something in the range of chances be-
tween the absolute barriers of "certainty" and "impossibility" to which
no numerical odds could be assigned.
There are other heresies among the mathematicians, if they can be so
proclaimed. For example, look at the way in which photo-interpreters
have defined their key evaluative words:
Suspect--Evidence is insufficient to permit designation of a function with
any degree of certainty, but photography or other information provides some
indications of what the function may be.
Possible--Evidence indicates that the designated function is reasonable
and more likely than other functions considered.
Probable-Evidence for the designated function is strong and other func-
tions appear quite doubtful.
This kind of formulation shows that someone-probably a number
of people--had spent a good amount of time striving for a set of
rigorous definitions. If you pause long enough to realize that the
photo-interpreter's first problem is identification and then take a hard
look at his word "suspect," you will see that it parallels my usage for
"possible." But the P/Is have preempted "possible" for other duty.
Their "possible" fits nicely into the slot of "probable" in my scale of
values, and their "probable" into my "almost certain."
We are in disarray.
""We anticipate," used regrettably as a synonym for "we expect," is also part
way in. .1 hope it gets out.
The green language of ordinary conversation abounds with estimates
given lightly and with a high order of confidence: "You're a shoo-in,"
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"Not a Chinaman's chance," "A million to one." When you hear one of
these expressions or read its more decorous counterpart you may realize
that the matter at issue and the related judgment required little soul-
searching on the part of the estimator. In the intelligence business,
too, there are many occasions when the obscurities of the unknown are
easily pierced and we can launch an estimative "probably" or an
"almost certainly not" with speed and conviction.
There are, however, estimates at the other end of the spectrum-
estimates which are patently impossible to make. The green language
is equally rich in coping with these: "Search me," "I wouldn't have
the foggiest," "Your guess is as good as mine," and so on.
It is unfortunate that intelligence estimators are not allowed this kind
of freedom in brushing off requests for estimates of the totally im-
penetrable. Some way or another a convention has been established
by which we may not write the sentence: "It is impossible to estimate
such and such." If we try this maneuver our masters will often rudely
ask, "Why can't you; what are you paid for, anyway?" If they do not
bludgeon us thus, they employ a combination of blackmail and flat-
tery before which even the most righteous among us are likely to fall.
The play goes like this: "You say you cannot estimate the number,
type, and performance characteristics of Chinese Communist long-
range missiles for mid-1970. This is data which is absolutely essential
for my planning. Obviously no one expects you to be wholly accurate
or very confident of your findings. But you people are after all the
experts, and it would be too bad if I had to go to others for this stuff
who know far less about it than you. And that is exactly what I will
do if you refuse my request."
At this point we do not invite our would-be consumer to seek out
his own crystal ball team. We accept his charge, but with grave
reservations. Sometimes we try to stay honest by introducing con-
tingencies. "This will probably continue to be the case but only
if .... if .... and if...." Then without closing out the contingencies
with firm estimates (which we are plainly unable to make) we merely
talk about the "ifs," hoping that he will keep them in mind as time
unfolds and that when sufficient returns are in he will himself make
the estimate or ask us to have a second look.
At other times again, when it is the whole subject rather than one
of its parts that cannot be estimated, we meet the impossible frontally.
We scrupulously avoid the word "estimate" in describing the docu-
ment and its findings. Rather, we proclaim these to be intelligence
assumptions for planning. In our opening paragraphs we are likely
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to be quite specific as to where our evidence begins and ends;, bow
we are speculating about quantities of things that the other man may
produce without knowing whether he has yet made the decision to
produce so many as one. We acknowledge our use of the crutch of
U.S. analogy, and so on. We promise to speak, not in discrete figures,
but in ranges of figures and ranges of our uncertainty regarding them.
Some years back we were obliged by force majeur to compose some
tables setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-
undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn
family of weapons. There were of course the appropriate passages
of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables
should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were
overprinted in red, "This table is based on assumptions stated in....
Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without
inclusion, in full, of the cautionary material in...." More recently
we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome
caveat but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new
departures.
The Lurking Weasel
Unhappily, making the easy estimate is not the commonplace of
our trade; making the impossible one is happily equally rare. What
is the commonplace is the difficult but not impossible estimate. And
how we, along with all humanity, hate the task! How fertile: the
human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment
of decisionl How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-
duckingl "I have a sneaker that . . . ," "I'd drop dead of surprise
if . . ."-expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without
meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have
before you become possessed of a sneaker; how much of the unex-
pected does it take to cause your heart to fail?
Even the well-disciplined intelligence brotherhood similarly quails
before the difficult but not impossible estimate and all too often resorts
to an expression of avoidance drawn from a more elegant lexicon.
What we consciously or subconsciously seek is an expression which
conveys a definite meaning but at the same time either absolves us
completely of the responsibility or makes the estimate at enough re-
moves from ourselves as not to implicate us. The "serious [or distinct]
possibility" clan of expressions is a case in point.
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Look at our use of "apparently" and "seemingly" and the verbal
appears" and "seems." We, the writers, are not the unique beings
to whom such and such "appears" or "seems" to he the case; with these
words we have become everybody or nobody at all. So also with
"suggests" and "indicates." Perhaps the "to us" is implicit, but we do
not so state; and far more importantly, we practically never say why
our suggestibilities were aroused or assess the weight of the reason
that aroused them. So still again with "presumably," "ostensibly,"
and--most serious of all-"reportedly" otherwise unmodified. The
latter taken literally and by itself carries no evaluative weight what-
soever, and who should know this better than we ourselves who each
day handle scores of "reports" whose credibility runs up and down
the scale between almost certain truth and almost certain nonsense.
It is a pleasure to report-authoritatively-that you will find very few
unmodified "reportedlys" in the NIEs.
We say "the Soviets probably fear that such and such action will
cause thus and so." What I think we mean is "The Soviets probably
estimate that if they do such and such the reaction will be disadvan-
tageous to them." If we say "they probably hope . . ." we mean
roughly the opposite. We talk of another country's willingness "to
risk such and such." This is a shorthand, and probably an unconscious
one, for the country's having estimated the odds against the unwanted
thing's happening as well as how unacceptable the unwanted thing
would be if it occurred. Its "risking the danger" removes the critical
judgment a step or two from our personal responsibility.
Words and expressions like these are far too much a part of us and
our habits of communication to be banned by fiat. No matter what
is said of their impreciseness or of the timidity of soul that attends
their use, they will continue to play an important part in written ex-
pression. If use them we must in NIEs, let us try to use them sparingly
and in places where they are least likely to obscure the thrust of our
key estimative passages.
Here may I return to the group to which I have especially addressed
the foregoing-the brotherhood of the NIE. Let us meet these key
estimates head on. Let us isolate and seize upon exactly the thing
that needs estimating. Let us endeavor to make clear to the reader
that the passage in question is of critical importance-the gut estimate,
as we call it among ourselves. Let us talk of it in terms of odds or
chances, and when we have made our best judgment let us assign it a
word or phrase that is chosen from one of the five rough categories of
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likelihood on the chart. Let the judgment be unmistakable and let
it be unmistakably ours.
If the matter is important and cannot be assigned an order of likeli-
hood, but is plainly something which is neither certain to come about
nor impossible, let us use the word "possible" or one of its stand-ins-
and with no modifier.
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Survey shows general agreement
on the meaning of "probable" and
some equivalents, elsewhere much
disagreement.
THE DEFINITION OF SOME ESTIMATIVE
EXPRESSIONS
David L. Wark
Finished intelligence, particularly in making estimative statements,
uses a number of modifiers like "highly probable," "unlikely," "possible"
that can be thought of as expressing a range of odds or a mathematical
probability, and these are supplemented by various other expressions,
especially verb forms, conveying the sense of probability less directly-
"may," "could," "we believe." Certain other words express not proba-
bility but quantity, imprecisely but perhaps within definable ranges-
"few," "several," "considerable." Some people object to any effort to
define the odds or quantities meant by such words. They argue that
context always modifies the meaning of words and, more broadly, that
rigid definitions deprive language of the freedom to adapt to changing
needs.
It is possible, however, to state the definitions in quantitative terms
without making them artificially precise. And if two-thirds of the
users and readers of the word probably, for example, feel it conveys
a range of odds between 6 and 8 out of 10, then it is more useful to
give it this definition than to define it more or less tautologically in
terms of other words of probability. This would not deny to context
its proper role as the arbiter of value, but only limit the range of its
influence. Nor would it freeze the language in perpetuity; as the
meanings of the words evolved the quantitative ranges could be
changed.
This article describes the results of a survey undertaken to deter-
mine if such words are indeed understood as measurable quantities
and if so to ascertain the extent to which there is a consensus about
the quantitative range of each. A three-part questionnaire on the
subject was distributed in the intelligence community-to INR/State,
the DIA Office of Estimates, and five CIA offices-and a simplified
version of it was sent to policy staffs in the White House, State, and
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the Pentagon. Responses were received from 240 intelligence analysts
and 63 policy officers.
The :responses showed a satisfactory consensus with respect to
various usages of likely and probable, phrases expressing greater cer-
tainty than these, and modifications of chance-good, better-than-even,
slight. There was no satisfactory agreement on the meaning of pos-
sible or a wide variety of verb forms such as we believe and might.
There was also little agreement on the non-odds quantitative words
such as few and many. The policy offices consistently assigned lower
probabilities than intelligence analysts did. Correlation between val-
ues assigned in and out of context was good.
The Questionnaire
Part One of the questionnaire listed 41 expressions that might be
thought of as indicating odds and offered the choice of 0, 10, 20, etc.
through 100 as the percentage probability or chances out of 100 sig-
nified by each. If the respondent believed that no quantitative
answer was satisfactory he could mark "Not Applicable" instead.
These expressions of course had to be judged without benefit of con-
text, but in order to check on the validity of such judgments some of
them were repeated in Part Two, where they were included in 17
sentences taken from intelligence documents which had been produced
in six different offices of the community. The names of all persons
and countries in the sentences were changed to sterilize them against
bias. Part Three then listed nine expressions of magnitude not refer-
ring to probability and offered an assortment of ranges for each.
The idea of a consensus is relative, but for purposes of Parts One
and Two it was defined as requiring 70% or more of respondents to
name odds within 10 points, plus or minus, of the most frequent
response. If the odds or chances most frequently specified for pos-
sibly were 50 out of a hundred (as they were) and 70% of all the
responses had fallen within the range 40 to 60, the requirements for
a consensus on this word would have been satisfied. Only one figure
was recorded for each question: when an answer was ranged by
marking several adjacent figures, it was recorded as the mean. Mr.
Kent's range of 10 to 90 for possible would thus have been recorded
as 50. Definitions were also considered invalidated by 20% or more
of "Not Applicable" responses rejecting the question.
The replies were tabulated in four categories in descending order
of valid definition, as follows:
Category A-a
Category B-a
Category
Category
Findings
consensus
spondents.
consensus
spondents.
including 90% or more of all re-
including 70% to 89% of all re-
marked "Not Applicable."
D-no consensus, and 20% or
marked "Not Applicable."
respondents
of respondents
The following tables summarize the findings of the survey. After
each expression from Parts One and Two are shown the odds most
frequently specified and the percentage of respondents within 1C) points
of that. For questions submitted to policy officers as well as analysts,
their responses are shown separately. The expressions of magnitude
in Part Three are listed with the percentage of "Not Applicable"
responses and the most frequent response for each.
Of the 41 expressions in Part One three fell into Category A (super.
consensus), thirteen into Category B (consensus), seventeen into Cate-
gory C (no consensus), and eight into Category D (rejected as inde-
finable). From Part Two five expressions in context fell into Category
B, twelve into Category C, and three into Category D. All the
quantitative phrases in Part Three were rejected as not measurable
by 20% or more of the respondents except for next few years and
next year or so. Though rejected by only 7%, next few years found
no consensus: 19% marked 2 to 3 years, 30% 2 to 4 years, and 34%
2 to 5 years. Next year or so meant 1 to 2 years to two-thirds of the
respondents, 1 to 3 years to the rest.
PART ONE (No Context)
ODDS-MOST FRE-
QUENT RESPONSE
PERCENT AGREEING
WITHIN 10 POINTS
Analyst Policy Analyst
Category A (90%-100% Consensus)
Policy
Almost Certainly .......................
90
90
99%
940/v
Are ...... ...........................
100
100
96%
92%%
Will ..... ...........................
100
100
91%
911~lo
Category B (70%-89% Consensus)
Probably . ...........................
75
70
90%
86%%
Probably not ..........................
20
20
85%
76%,
..........................
Probably will
80
-
85%
---
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ODDS-MOST FnE- PERCENT AGREEING
QUENT RESPONSE WITHIN 10 POINTS
PART TWO (In Context)
Ex:PRE.ssION ODDS-MOST FRE- PERCENT AGREEING
(IN CONDENSED CONTEXT) QUENT RESPONSE WITHIN 10 POINTS
Analyst Policy Analyst Policy
Analyst Policy Analyst Policy
Category B (70%-89% Consensus) (Continued)
Category B (70-89% Consensus)
We believe the chances are good that . .. 70 -
We believe . . . will not be . . . ........ 80 80
. . . will not be ... ...... 100 -
Undoubtedly
,
Highly probable .......................
90
85
83%
87%
Likely ....................... ........
70
-
83%
-
Undoubtedly ..........................
100
90
81%
86%
Good chance ..........................
70
70
81%
81%
Highly likely ..........................
90
80
80%
81%
Unlikely ..............................
20
20
80%
79%
Seems likely ...........................
70
-
80%
-
Better than even chance .................
60
60
78%
87%
Some slight chance .....................
10
10
77%
79%
May .................................
50
o
73%
-
Category C (No Consensus)
Seems unlikely .........................
20
-
68%
-
Might .................................
50
50
66%
59%
May indicate
50
66%
Could be expected
60
65%
Expect
80
64%
Could ................................
50
Must .................................
80
59%
Evidently .............................
70
59%
Apparently ............................
70
-
58%
Suggests
60
-
58%
-
Believe ...............................
70
70
55%
54%
Should
70
-
54%
-
Possibly ..............................
50
50
53%
5101o
Might be expected ......................
50*
-
51%
-
Indicates that
70
-
51%
-
Might be anticipated ...................
50
50
56%
50%
Apparently is intent ....................
60*
-
50%
-
Serious possibility ......................
60*
70
49%
55%
Category D (Rejected)
Estimate
75
56%
Seems ................................
50
55%
Ought ..............................
60
41%
Feel ............................... .
50f
35%
Reportedly ............................
50
35%
52%
Somewhat ............................
50*
27%
Ostensibly
50
20%
* The most frequent response to these questions was of the same order as a
second most frequent. Graphed, the responses would show two frequency peaks,
forming, in statistical terminology, a "bimodal" curve.
f The curve for this response is trimodal.
We estimate . . . will not be . . . ....... 80 70
Barring . . . , the economy will probably
continue . . . ....................... 80
Category C (No Consensus)
Apparently, . . . will not be .. . ........ 70 -
If . . . continue . . . , the president might
. . . be willing . . . ................ 50 50
. . . might also take . . . action .. . .... 50 -
. . . references . . . to undiminished im-
portance . . . suggest a belief . . . ..... 60* -
It is possible that . . . will become . . . .. 50 50
. . . visit . . . indicates that . . . is be-
ing . . .' . ........... ...........
70 -
. . . visit suggests . . . progress . . .' ..... 60 -
We believe . . . there is a possibility
that . . . ........................... 50 50
. . . speech . . . conveyed the impression
that .... ........................ 60*
comments suggest . . . changes may
well be less than speech . . . might indi-
cate . . .' ........................... 70* 65
Category D (Rejected)
comments suggest . . . that . . . gov-
ernment is not committed . . .' ......... of 50f
86'/o
--
76%>
76%o
74%
68%
--
65%
i4%
62%
--
59%
--
56%
57%
53%
-
51%
50%
43%
43%
1017o
18%
25%
The full context on these questions was the sentence, "Although lacking
drama of visits by top leaders, the travel of these delegations to Albania indicates
that the momentum of the Albanian-Polish rapprochement is being maintained and
suggests that some progress is being made in reducing the area of remaining
ideological differences." Respondents were asked to specify the probability that
Albania and Poland were headed toward a rapprochement and the probability that
the ideological differences would be settled.
'Respondents were asked for the probability that the speaker believed what
he conveyed.
'Respondents were asked for the probability that changes would be minor.
'Respondents were asked for the probability of that to which the "government
is not committed." The full context is given on page 73.
* Bimodal.
i Trirnodal.
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EXPRESSION ODDS-MOST FEE-
(IN CONDENSED CONTEXT) QUENT RESPONSE
PERCENT AGREEING
WITHIN 10 POINTS
Analyst Policy
Analyst Policy
Category D (Rejected)
This raises the question whether . . . they
(Continued)
mil ht . . . 50 -
51% -
We do not expect them to change . . .? .... 90f -
22% -
Cuba has allegedly bought ... ..........
50 -
38% -
6 This question was a non-sequitur. The full context is given on page 73.
f Trimodal.
PART THREE (Words of Magnitude)
PERCENT MOST FnE-
EXPRESSION REJECTING QUENT RESPONSE
Considerable .....
47%
10-100
Many ............... ........................
40%
10-1000
Substantial (portion)
36%
20-50%
Significant (portion)
34%
20-50%
Limited (portion) ..............................
30%
2-10%
Several ............. .........................
27%
2-5
Few ........... . ..................
28%
2-4
Next few years ................................
7%
2-5 years
Next year or so ......................... .. ..
1%
1-2 years
The difference between the good consensus on a set of odds for
one expression and no consensus on another shows up clearly when
the odds are graphed according to how frequently each set was
specified in the responses to a question. When 70% of all responses
fall within 10 points of the most frequent one, the graph has a steep
curve and a narrow base. The high, narrow peak indicates a clearly
defined consensus, whereas a broad-based curve with a single peak
shows less agreement and a curve with several peaks reflects clear
differences about what the word means.
Steady retrogression from consensus can be seen in graphs of sample
responses from successive categories. Following are these seven from
Parts One and Two.
Out of context:
Almost Certainly ... ...........
.. .......... ......... A
Probably ........... ........................... ......
B
Possibly ..............
C
Serious Possibility .................... .................
C
Seems ...................... ....................... .
D
In context:
"The North Koreans have thus far shown marked respect for
US power, and we do not expect them to change this basic at-
titude" expresses what probability that the North Koreans will
continue provocations against South Korea? Ii)
"At the same time, the reservations conveyed in the military
comment suggest that the practical military changes resulting
from the new line may well be less dramatic than the tone of
de Gaulle's speech might indicate-and that in any event, his
government is not committing itself to a one-weapon systein
of defense" expresses what probability that the military will.
have a one-weapon system? ............................. D
The red line in each graph traces the response pattern of 239 analysts,
the black line in the first four that of 63 policy officers. The dotted
black line is the latter adjusted to scale. "Mode" designates the
peaks of most frequent response.
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?~k'b' il?s CONFIDENTIIAL
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I
n
JO
0 10 20 30 40 50 E0 70
Oil_OS OUT Of 1,)0
11CSpnn seF fni' ?'A lmo.t Cc rLainli'" r; ha, x' . Ic a,'1,
defined i of opinion a cund ih Sic1,
, '0
the ba Ssthe < n.ii low with an aPl>rox,i~,n 1,
C 15
ianKe Sr ie s ecn '/~'.untl 09.
Ited Linc -- -- Anvil yst Curve
t3lack Line --- Polley Curve
hotted Line -- Policy Curve Ad-
looted to 9-al"
GRAPU No. 1. Category A: Almost Certainly (Significant Range 75-99).
Responses I" "Probably" show two definite
modes, 70 for policy and BO for analyst; the
base is almost twice as broad as Graph 1's
and the sides are not as steep.
KEY
Eed tine ----- Analyst Curve
Slack Line --- Policy Curve
WI ted Linc -- Policy Curve Ad-
justed to Scale
Pcs0000es n "Possibly" show
mode at 50 for both Policy and a --
lyst officers, but I'll 1h1P1 11 1h,
analyst's _ive is irregular with
Iced Linc ------ Analyst Curve
131ack Linc -- Policy CLrvle
IU,ttcd Linc -- Policy Curve Ad-
,lus tad to oldie
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74 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 75
 Responses for "Almost Certainly"
defined c u of opin Ion a and thi
the base ofs the ca is narrow with at
range between 75 and 99.
Red Line----- Analyst Curve
31 -c1, Line--- Policy Curve
hotted Line - Policy Curve Ad-
justed to Sonic
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CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200020001-1
Estimative Expressions
70i ~ .. ,--'r-r
~'. Responses on "Probably" show two definite
modes, 70 for policy and 80 for analyst; the
base is alienist twice as broad as Graph 1'a
and the sides are not an steep.
Roy
Rod tins ----- Analyst Curve
Black Lt.. --- Policy Curve
Dotted Line -- Policy Curve Ad-
jueted to Scale
GnA.rx No. 1. Category A: Almost Certainly (Significant Range 75-99).
GaA No. 2. Category B: Probably (Significant Range 50-90).
Responses o "Possibly" show a
mode at 50 for both policy and ane-
Iyst officers, but the shape of the
analyst's cur a is irregular with
a leaser ak vat 30; the base is
broad, rapenging from 10 to in.
Red Line ----- Analyst Curve
Dievt Line --- Policy curve
Dotted Line -- Policy Curve Ad-
Joe ted to Scale
ODDS OUT OF 100
GaAra No. 3. Category C: Possibly (Significant Range 10-60).
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------ .._-
50 three distinct madam and a very broad bas.
ranging from 25 to 95.
GRAPH No. 4. Category C: Serious Possibility (Significant Range 25-95).
KEY
Red Line -- Analyst Curve
40 50 60 7
ODDS OUT OF 100
GRAPH No. 5. Category D; Seems (Significant Range 30-80).
On this complicated question the analyst
rho from 0 to 100 and shows n clearly:
defined mode. There is no consensus for the
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CONFIDENTIAL
The cu e for "Seems" has a flat mode from
50 through TO and a broad base ranging from 30
to R0. This word w not included on the policy
version of the survey.
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Of the 303 questionnaires returned, only one indicated that no
quantitative equivalent was suitable for any of the probabilistic ex-
pressions. All others selected sets of odds for at least half of those
listed in Part One, and 80% did so for two-thirds of them. Even
though a number who disapprove of quantitative definitions probably
just did not bother to return their questionnaires, the results appear
to indicate that the vast majority in the intelligence community con-
sider it legitimate to think of such expressions in quantitative terms.
On the other hand, although more than 70% of both analysts and
policy officers agreed within a 20-point range on the expressions in
Categories A and B, the results for some offices on the analytical side
did not agree with the consensus for all analysts, and there were
similar exceptions among the policy offices. So when an analyst in
one office uses the word probably, policy officers and analysts in other
offices do not necessarily interpret the word to mean the same thing.
In Categories A and B, however, the differences are usually not great.
There follows the quantitative definition-most frequent plus and
minus 10-of expressions on which there was found to be a satis-
factory consensus.
CHANCES
OUT OF 100
Are ..................................................
90-100
Will .................................................
90-100
Almost Certainly ......................................
80-100
Undoubtedly ................... ......................
80-100
Highly Likely ....................... .. .......
75-95
Highly Probable ....................... ...............
75-95
Probably Will .........................................
70-90
Probably .............................................
60-80
Likely .................................. ............
60-80
Good Chance ........................ .......... ....
60-80
Seems Likely .......................... ...............
60-80
Better Than Even Chance ...............................
50-70
May .................................................
40-60
Probably Not .................................... ....
10-30
Unlikely ..............................................
10-30
Some Slight Chance ................... ........... ....
0-20
The out-of-context definitions in Part One were spot-checked by
the sentence questions of Part Two. The results are not conclusive:
only one sentence was provided for context, and there was no way
of telling if respondents were influenced by personal knowledge of
the subject matter. But despite these limitations, because the most
frequent definitions in and out of context agreed within 10 points,
it appears that nearly the same meanings were conveyed either way.
The comparison appears below.
MOST FREQUENT RESPONSE
IN CONTEXT ALONE
Analyst
Undoubtedly ......... 100
Believe .............. 80
Estimate ........... 80
Apparently .......... 70
Indicates that ........ 70
Believe the chances are
good .............. 70
Possible ............. 50
Might ............... 50
Policy
80
80
Analyst Policy
Undoubtedly . ..... 100 90
Believe 70 71)
Estimate 75 70
Apparently ... .... 70
Indicates that .. ..... 70 Good chance ... ..... 70 70
50 Possibly ...... ..... 50 50
- Might ............... 50 50
Although the coupling of a verb of opinion with an expression of
odds, as in "We believe the chances are good," seemed not to affect
the meaning of the latter for the respondents to the survey questions,
this writer agrees with Mr. Kent's purist that the doubling up of
probabilistic words is potentially confusing and should be avoided.
The response pattern on the Korean question (page 73 and Graph 6)
has an interesting side light in that the probability queried does not
follow from the estimative sentence. The questionnaire was not
designed to test the propensity of analysts and policy officers to draw
unsubstantiated conclusions, but in this one instance only 35% of
the respondents showed they recognized the non-sequitur by mark-
ing "Not Applicable."
The survey showed that for expressions on which there was a
consensus (and some others) the most frequent response was the
same from policy officers as from analysts within 10 points ,plus or
minus. But where differences did occur, the policy definitions were
consistently on the conservative side; see the following examples..
MOST FREQUENT RESPONSE
Analyst
Policy
Undoubtedly ...............................
100
90
Highly Probable ..................... ... ..
90
85
Highly Likely .......... ................... .. .
. 90
80
Probably ................................... ...
. 75
70
Estimate .................................... ..
. 75
70
The results from Part Three showed there is little consensus on
the common expressions of vague magnitude, at least without the
guidance of context.
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78 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 79
 Estimative Expressions
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Faults in the Survey
An effort was made to keep the questionnaire as simple to under-
stand and as short as possible. In Parts One and Three the effort
was generally successful, but Part Two was neither simple nor short.
Most of the questions in the latter related to specific people and
places, and there was danger that respondents would permit their
opinions and knowledge of the subject to influence their answers.
In addition, several of the estimative sentences were long and involved,
carrying the hazard of confusion about what they meant and what
was wanted in evaluation of them.
For pragmatic reasons, administration of the survey had to be
informal. It is possible that such things as attitudes of supervisors,
office collusion, or misunderstanding of the purpose of the survey
could have introduced bias. A careful perusal of each of the ques-
tionnaires failed to turn up any obvious evidence that such factors
influenced the findings. But if it were done again the questionnaire
should be modified in Part Two and the conditions under which it is
filled out should be controlled and standardized.
A "master craftsman" from State's
intelligence bureau takes up a
challenge and presents the case-
AGAINST FOOTNOTES
Allan Evans
The eloquent lead article in the last issue 1 challenges anyone to
come forth with a valid defense of the status quo that prevails in
our community with respect to footnotes. Age predisposes me to
defend status quos; my frequent statements in talking to intelligence
officer groups put me on the spot to repeat my arguments against
the use of footnotes. It may be that these views are conditioned by
circumstances in the Department of State and that these circum-
stances differ materially from those in the Department of Defense--
if so, it will be all the more useful to unearth variations in the taste
and requirements of major groups of consumers at whom our com-
munity is aiming. Let us see what can be said.
Customer is King
The first and most important arguments are that our customers
won't read fat papers and "almost certainly" in overwhelming majority
don't want to be bothered with documentation. I think no truth in
our business is more thoroughly substantiated by experience (either
footnoted or not) than that the impact of a paper varies in close
inverse relation to its size. We have, of course, the NIS, which is
indifferent to bigness, but it is an intelligence document of a very
special kind, designed for universal reference. The Department of
State issues stout papers, but for policy more often than intelligence,
purposes. There are technical areas of the government which revel
in extensive analyses. So far, however, as the general run of day-
to-day operation in this Department goes, our Bureau is prepared to
stand by the idea that, other things being equal, the shortest paper
has the most impact.
In closely related vein, our consumers are not going to spend their
time summoning up the documents they see referred to in footnotes.
'A. John Alexander, "An Intelligence Role for the Footnote," Studies VIII 3,
p. 1 ff.
MORI/HRP PAGES 81-84
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80 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 81
 CONFIDENTIAL A i st Footnotes Against Footnotes CONFIDENTIAL
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They think of our intelligence papers as the product either of par-
ticular analysts whom they know by name and whom they have learned
to trust, or of a particular organization which they trust to employ
analysts who are reliable. They expect Intelligence to speak as
authority, to present its conclusions with confidence, and they don't
want it to transfer to them the responsibility of reviewing the evidence
all over again.
Indleed, many consumers couldn't review the evidence. Many
readers-those overseas, for example-simply don't have the files
of material that we use here at headquarters. Why tantalize them
with alluring footnote references to luscious sources that are inac-
cessible to them?
I appreciate the excellent suggestion that footnotes be organized
in the modern manner at the back of the paper and be therefore
removable. When for special reasons footnotes are actually used,
the device would be valuable. In the usual case, however, it would
leave unjustified superscript figures throughout the text, to annoy
people and intrude a real if small barrier to smooth absorption of the
message. There might well be physical problems about tearing off
and restapling. These are minutiae, but in the bulk they might grow
important. I doubt that the real answer to the problem with con-
sumers lies along this line.
Quality and Control
These then are two positive arguments against introducing an ap-
paratus of footnotes into intelligence papers. Let us now look at
some of the arguments put forward in favor of this procedure. As
an historian, I can only applaud the appeal to the past in evocation
of the great scholarly revolution brought about by German methods
well over a century ago. But aren't a number of people becoming
a little sceptical about some parts of this revolution? Are there not
even sporadic attempts to escape from the yoke of that ultimate
German invention, the Ph.D.? Only the other day I heard a notable
authority on American scholarship draw a distinction between the
research associated with our Germanic discipline and what might
rightly be called thinking. Perhaps we should patronize the scholarly
revolution of our own age rather than that of the past, and stress the
production of ideas.
There is worry that without footnotes mediocre analysts will float
texts which are unreliable. What about the danger that mediocre
analysts, under cover of footnotes, will float texts in which they are
able to avoid the challenge of decisive thinking? I don't say that
only one of these two dangers exists. I think that they both exist,
and I suspect that they rather cancel out as arguments one way or
the other.
The article suggests that without the footnote the operation of review
and upper-level control is a hollow pretense. The answer here would
be in brief that without good supervision and control no amount of
footnotes will guarantee quality, but that if the supervision and higher
control are good the footnotes will not be necessary. I think the article
is a little unfair to the reviewer. According to the terms set forth,
every reviewer would have to be an expert in the subject of the paper
he was reviewing, or would have to make himself an expert: by reading
all the material in the footnotes. Teachers, I think, will realize that
this concept is too categorical. With good but not infinite knowledge
of the subject, and with sound intuitions about how style, logic, and
marshalling of ideas relate to accuracy and integrity of thinking,
teachers and scholars do very well at reviewing the works of students
and colleagues. These are the qualities required in the leaders of
intelligence operations; without these qualities no apparatus will make
intelligence products worth the money.
It is true that the judgments of an NIE float in the empyrean and
impress with their apparently unrooted boldness. It is also true, how-
ever, that the writers of those sentences approach them with prayer
and fasting, and work them out in fiery give and take, often over long
periods of time, in working groups which can test to their heart's
content the background of information and fact that underlies each
agency's opinion. If sometimes our NIEs approach being a little 'too
empyrean, so do the problems that our superiors and world affairs
force us to examine.
Intracommunity Practice
There are many lesser points. Certainly for intercommunication
within the intelligence community indications of source might be
useful; it would be a question of time and effort. As for the awful
thought that many analysts may take advantage of the status quo to
scamp their scholarly attention to detail in intelligence work, I should
argue both that most of them are thoroughly dedicated and that the
few who do try to get away with it are quickly found out. As a matter
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 CONFIDENTIAL Against Footnotes
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of fact, the working drafts of analysts often do have annotations, and
are carefully filed for reference.
There is one small suggestion in the article on which comment
requires a reference to the inner workings of a friendly agency; let
me nevertheless rush in and remark that some part of the difficulty
about documentation may be peculiar to the Defense Department
because of its habit of sending estimators rather than the basic ana-
lysts to working groups. Is it possible that this mode of operating
through layers accounts for some of the feeling that we lack full ex-
change of working data? I venture to suggest that the advantages
and disadvantages of this procedure well merit discussion.
In the end, there is one final and to my mind clinching argument.
As I have told many audiences, the essence of an NIE is what it
says about things to come-indeed, the culminating feat of the whole
intelligence process is to project the customer's view near or far
into the coming weeks or years. And, who will footnote the future?
Here internally, within the intelligence game itself, resides the chief
positive argument against footnotes-that a reliance on them will
blunt our willingness, if not our ability, to push along trails that cannot
be blazed with documents or references, and to explore what may lie
ahead..
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
More Against Footnotes
Dear Sirs:
Mr. Alexander does not consider the different circumstances that
apply to intelligence analysis and research in the academic world.
First, intelligence analysis is a team activity. The analyst commonly
does his work under the professional supervision of a section or branch
chief; he coordinates his manuscript with other specialists; and the
results arc reviewed by an editor who is, in my experience, a profes-
sional in his own right. Mr. Alexander omits the first two and dep-
recates the last of these mechanisms most unjustifiably. This team
effort constitutes a properly rigorous apparatus for maintaining quality
control. Admittedly, it doesn't always do what it should, but then
neither do footnotes. If a report is of doubtful quality, it is the
competency of staff rather than the adequacy of apparatus that we
need worry about.
A second difference is that most finished intelligence reports are
directed at a non-specialist. Footnotes documenting sources have
constituted an apparatus by which one scholar might convince another
of his views despite separation in space or time; papers in scholarly
journals may thus effectively address themselves to distant scholars.
Such scholarly communication is not, however, the purpose of most
intelligence reports. To document definitive intelligence statements
like the NIS and NIE would beg the question that led to their prepara-
tion. We do use footnotes in some intelligence research designed
mainly to increase the body of knowledge available to analysts. These
are for the convenience and edification of other specialists, who are
the primary end users. But finished intelligence is not issued so that
the recipient, who has his own work to do, can check the work that
has gone into it. Having stated his requirement, he must have faith
enough in the system to accept what he gets.
R. T. Allan, Jr.
Dear Sirs:
The major substantive shortcoming of Mr. Alexander's article is,
paradoxically, a lack of documentation-any evidence, that is, that a
lack of footnotes has caused "an undesired but nevertheless real deg-
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 CONFIDENTIAL To the Editors
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radation of the intelligence effort." His rhetorical questions give
the reader no basis for believing that the final intelligence products
would have been better if footnoted.
The analogy with other professions may be misleading. A scholar
writes for colleagues equally versed in the field of his particular study,
who can and will double-check his sources, and whose disagreements
may bring about a closer approximation to truth. The intelligence
analyst, on the contrary, writes not laterally, to his colleagues, but
vertically, to his superiors and ultimately to the policy makers-persons
whose elevation in the intelligence structure is inversely proportional
to their time or inclination to check sources.
The footnote requirement might indeed preclude top-of-the-head
analysis. But the greatest asset of many skilled analysts is their own
undocumentable experience. One immersed in Soviet propaganda
can say authoritatively that never before has some particular line
appeared, but he would be hard pressed to document his statement,
based as it is only on his acquired sensitivity. If one is to trust our
system at all, one must believe that most such undoeumentable inter-
pretations are well based, and that any advantages of source citation
would not justify the cost.
David McConnaughey
Probing for some profit from
a past mistake.
THE MISSILES IN CUBA
J. J. Rumpelmayer
Mr. Sherman Kent's thoughtful review 1 of the USIB's mistaken esti-
mate of 19 September 1962 and his explanation for its conclusion that
the Soviets would be unlikely to install strategic missiles on Cuba leave
the clandestine collector-who must necessarily be at the same time
something of an analyst and estimator-with two kinds of reservation
involving principles which will remain of importance in the future work
of the community. The first is an alternative reconstruction of the
Soviet attitude toward the opportunity and hazards of this move, and
by extension toward any future such opportunity and aggressive moves
in general. Here we are clearly intruding into the professional esti-
mators' business, but a fresh view from outside their circle may be of
use to them. The second is a matter close to the collector's heart-
recognition of the quality of his information and the putting it to
proper use.
The Soviet Position
Mr. Kent's central point is that the Soviet leaders, unexpectedly mis-
judging the severity of the potential U.S. reaction, made a serious mis-
take in trying to put the missiles in. He writes:
On 15 October [when the missiles were identified in U-2 photographs] we
realized that our estimate of the Soviets' understanding of the mood of the
United States and its probable reaction was wrong. On 28 October [when
Khrushchev agreed to withdraw them] we realized that the Soviets had
realized that they had misjudged the United States.
We submit that neither the U.S. estimate of the Soviet view of U.S.
reaction nor that Soviet view need have been wrong. On the contrary,
there is evidence that the Soviets did show, as the estimate put it,
"a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet
relations than the USSR has displayed thus far"-because the stakes
were higher than ever before-but were prepared to back down if
caught.
"'A Crucial Estimate Relived," Studies VIII 2, p. 1 if.
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A large democratic country like the United States cannot take an
adventurous position in foreign affairs if only because of the heavy
inertial factor which makes it so difficult to generate a program of
foreign, action or, once having mounted one, to call it off. The Soviets,
not needing to worry about this inertial factor, can with minimal
hazard to political integrity undertake a desired course
probing action.
An indication that they were prepared to pull out of Cuba if detected
lies in the promptness with which they executed the disengagement
operation as soon as they were convinced that the United States was
ready to act. They recalled to Soviet ports all vessels suitable for
missile loadings and began unloading the missiles without even waiting
for the blockade to be put into effect, evidently acting on a contingency
plan they would presumably not have had ready if they had really
underestimated the probable U.S. reaction.
The alternative explanation, then, which "might lessen the chances
of our misestimating the Soviets in a future case," is that they judged
the United States correctly but were not taking irrevocable action and
considered the possibility of a radical improvement in their strategic
posture worth the risk involved in a probe.
The Soviet Decision
Turning now to the quality of the reporting, we note Mr. Kent's
statement:
There was of course no information that the Soviets had decided to deploy
strategic missiles to Cuba and indeed no indication suggesting such a decision.
There was doubtless no firm information or verified indication, but
there were reports first hinting at and finally almost spelling out such
a decision. Consider the following series from the network of a single
clandestine source on the island disseminated between 5 July and 6
October.
Cuban CP member describes NATO as a belt of bases sur-
rounding the Soviet Union and says that in September Cuba
is going to be the buckle in this belt. (Speaker is livid and
uses very authoritative tone. )2
Close associate of Cho Guevara says "he" [possibly Fidel]
has desperate plan to ask the Soviet Union to locate in Cuba
an atomic base which would be like a buckle in the belt
of bases surrounding the USSR.'
13 July: Guevara, still very worried, had no recourse but to send
Raul Castro to Soviets to find out what aid Cuba can count
on. Guevara, a Stalinist and friend of Mao, does not have
confidence in the Soviets but knows that Cuba has extraor-?
dinary value for the Bloc. Before making any decision he
wants to know all the possibilities.'
23 August: Soviet ships unloaded at Mariel large quantity of prefabri-
cated concrete forms, some tubular five meters wide and
others semicircular three by ten meters and six inches thick.'
5 September: In mid-July Soviet ships received orders to speed up lead-
ing and unloading and leave Cuba quickly.'
7 September: Son of Cuban CP president says certain officer had a.ecom-
panied Guevara on recent trip to Moscow because he served
as liaison officer on "rocket project."
20 September: Fidel's personal pilot says, "We have . . . [in addition to
40-mile rockets and a radar system] many mobile ramps for
intermediate-range rockets. They don't know what is i:o
store for them."'
21 September: Cuban war plans chief says, "We will fight to the death and
perhaps we can win because we have everything including
atomic weapons. . . . 1000 Soviet technicians arc working
day and night to build the nuclear weapons base.""
6 October: The Cubans, having the buckle to the belt of atomic bases
surrounding the Soviet Union, can loose the belt and save
the USSR from strangulation.'?
Note that the viewpoint in the belt-and-buckle metaphor is Soviet:
it is the USSR that is to be saved; the enemy is NATO, not Yankee
imperialism. These ideas of Soviet origin were reflected in the sub-
sequent proposals to trade the Cuban foothold for Turkish bases. It
is true that the unequivocal spelling out of the meaning in the last of
these reports was much too late for the crucial estimate, but it still
came more than a week ahead of the photographic evidence that was
regarded as decisive.
It is not that these reports were lost in the mass of intelligence in-
formation coming in; they were brought to the particular attention of
the analysts. It must be simply that they were not taken seriously
enough. We know by hindsight, both from the confirmation of their
' TDCS-3/516,555.
TDCS-3/520,583, paragraph 3.
? CS-3/521,533.
' TDCS-3/521-936.
'TDCS-3/522,948.
? TDCS-3/523,169.
'? TDCS-3/524,449.
' TDCS-3/515,834, paragraph 5.
TDCS-3/516,558.
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main purport and from intensive debriefing and testing of the source,
that he was giving us strategically important information with no con-
coction or exaggeration. The failure of the warning function was
not in the observing or reporting but in interpretation. The problem
is one of how to get the right valuation put on this kind of material
when it comes in.
Signs of Deployment
With respect to "evidence that the missiles were in fact moving to
their emplacement" Mr. Kent writes:
With the benefit of hindsight one can go back over the thousand and more
bits of information collected from human observers in the six months ending
14 October and pick out a few-a very few-which indicated the possible
presence of strategic missiles.
Certainly they were comparatively few, but when you actually read
them they seem more impressive than when you just count them. We
sample in the abstracts below a half-dozen disseminated before the
date of the estimate and four others put out before photography at
last convinced the analysts.
10 August: Describing the exceedingly secure unloading of a Soviet ship
at Mariel on 1 August, source says that trucks unloaded with
extreme care probably carried rockets, nose cones, or most
probably atomic bombs."
24 August: On 5 August about 2000 Soviets arrived at Casilda with long
and short range rockets, construction equipment, and ex-
tremely large tanks. By 9 August a total of five ships had
arrived at Casilda 12
31 August: Since mid-August no unauthorized personnel have been
allowed at the Mariel docks. A 12-ft. concrete wall was
built around the port in less than 24 hours. Among cargo
unloaded were prefabricated concrete blocks two by four
meters by a foot thick with special hooks or metal bases
on the ends. These are welded together and cement poured
between sections to form platforms for rocket launch pads.
Rockets 40 feet long and 3 feet in diameter have also been
oflloaded.19 [Note that the blocks described had been desig-
nated one of the specific indicators for ballistic missiles of
medium or longer range.]
31 August: Source saw in military area [later verified as MRBM site]
a truck loaded with a fifty-foot-long rig that looked like a
launcher. On the ground nearby were more than a dozen
dark metal cylinders 30 feet long and 18 to 20 inches across.16
18 September: Source observed at certain location [later verified as MR.BM
site] a larger Soviet-guarded perimeter than had ever before
been established 12
18 September: In early August a chauffeur for Soviet military technicians
constructing a missile base at Monte de Soroa saw two very
large missiles being transported there "
21 September: During wee hours 12 September source saw two-axle trailers
65-70 feet long being pulled west toward Campo Libertad,
believes canvas-covered loads projecting over ends were large
missiles."
23 September: Source saw on Port Isabella docks 20 metal cylinders 45-50
feet long by about five feet in diameter. Later these were
hauled away on trailer-trucks.18
1 October: In mid-September source saw two cylindrical objects 40 feet
long by three feet in diameter loaded on each of six semi-
trailers i?
12 October: Ultimate source declared about 20 September, "Cuba no'w
has a Soviet missile with a range of about 600 miles." ?0
These are the kind of reports which, perhaps out of skepticism regard-
ing the capabilities of human observation, were set aside in the absence
of confirming photographic evidence.
Majority Rule
Although Mr. Kent did not intend the implication and would de-
plore it, it is an infelicitous fact that many of his expressions and
metaphors tend to imply that intelligence conclusions are controlled
by numbers of reports rather than the quality of individual reports:
Aggregate meaning of the information . . .
A plethora of raw intelligence .. .
So large a volume of data .. .
The quantity evaluated . . .
Still a formidable amount of paper . .
We weighed and measured .. .
" OOK-3/218,381.
TDCS-3/522,702.
OOK-3/218,886.
"TDCS-3/519,345.
" OOK-3/219,040.
"
OOK-3/236
675
TDCS-DB 3/651
139.
,
.
,
OOK-3/219
189
" TDCS-DB-3/651,223.
,
.
20 TDCS-3/525,154, first line.
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A few-a very few . . .
A handful .. .
The list comes to eight . . .
No more than two or possibly three should have stopped the clock .. .
'Three bits of evidence would probably not, taken in the context of the other
thousands .. .
This quantitative approach would explain how the needle of a key
strategic report might be smothered and lost under the haystack of a
mass of other information; but it is not an explanation that we can
resignedly accept and live with. It is diametrically opposed to a basic
doctrine of the clandestine collector-that the ideal item of intelligence
is a single nugget of great worth recognized and pulled out of the
general mass of indifferent information. Certainly that is the concept
under which the collecting is done.
Perhaps our problem is a peculiarly American one, paralleling our
faith in government by a concensus of the majority and our belief in
the intrinsic desirability of mass production. Perhaps, as suggested
above, it comes from having more confidence in machines than human
observation. The clandestine operator is prepared to fight for the
recognition of his rare nuggets against the tons of dross, but he needs
help from the analyst in pinpointing where the trouble lies. If we are
to learn from our historical mistakes and so be saved from repeating
them, this problem must be solved. The writer feels there are solu-
tions to be found.
An analyst view on the problem
of the clandestine collector.
TWO WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE
Harlow T. Munson
and
W. P. Southard
We have read Mr. Rumpelmayer's statement of his reservations 1
and we feel both qualified and obliged to offer some testimony. We
were the principal officers of two CIA groups which spent a year-
working separately on complementary studies-making reconstruc-
tions of the Soviet venture in Cuba; neither of us had been previously
engaged with Cuba. Our two studies,2 which considered the same
range of questions but different bodies of evidence, arrived at similar
conclusions, which are far from Mr. Rumpclmayer's.
Mr. Rumpelmayer's basic contention-the burden of his article-
is that not enough credence was given to clandestine reporting about
the strategic missiles, reporting which in his view pointed accurately
both to the decision to deploy them and to the actual deployment.
We will answer this first.
The Clandestine Reporting
In the course of one of our two studies, the vast body of this
reporting-comprising more than 14,000 reports-was examined mi-
nutely. The reports cited by Mr. Rumpelmayer were included in this
review. It was our judgment that the bulk of this material could not
have been evaluated with confidence at the time unless :information
were available from other sources against which it could be checked,
and that there would have been no way to identify the "rare nuggets"
among the "tons of dross." We found, indeed, that even in retrospect
one could not construct from the clandestine reporting alone a coher-
ent account of the course of the venture.
With respect to Soviet intentions, of the six reports disseminated
before 19 September-the date of the estimate-which are said to
point to those intentions, the first and sixth do point vaguely in that
direction. But the first seems to be cancelled by the second (which
See the foregoing article.
'Cuba, 1962: Khrushchev's Miscalculated Risk, ORR/P/ST, spring 1964, and
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makes both look like reports of Cuban hopes, not Soviet intentions,
and moreover of hopes which would have lagged behind the actual
agreement by about three months) ; and the sixth does not specify
the kind of "rocket project" (SAMs were known to be on the island).
Even if the source had been known to be reliable (and he was not so
known), neither report would seem to take the analyst as far as Raul
Castro's public boast, in the same period, that his negotiations with
the Russians had changed the balance of power in the world-a
remark which precisely described the aim of the missile base venture.
Similarly with respect to the actual deployment, of the ten reports
cited by Mr. Rumpelmayer under "signs of deployment" not one car-
ried a source appraisal that would have commanded the credence
of an analyst at the time. Three were evaluated F-3 and two F-6;
five carried no evaluation. The first four of the six disseminated before
19 September would not be accepted even now as accurately report-
ing on deployment (although the third, dated 31 August, de-
scribed credibly preparations for receiving missiles), because there
is pretty good evidence that no strategic missiles arrived before mid-
September.;
And the later reports (in addition to the good report of 31 August)
would have had to struggle for acceptance, because all such reports
had to be read in the light of the many false reports of previous
months: there had been more than 200 reports of Soviet missiles in
Cuba before January 1962, and the many reports of construction activ-
ity and equipment observed during the spring of 1962 (some in areas
where SAMs were later discovered) had been negated by photog-
raphy of those areas during or after the reported period of observation.
It was never a question of "majority rule" but rather, as always, a
question of credentials, grounds for credence. Majority rule, with
no attempt to discriminate, would have produced an estimate favoring
the large number of affirmative reports (long before the fact) over
the smaller number of negative photographs. But the credentials
of the two sets were very different. As for discriminating among the
reports themselves, Mr. Rumpelmayer makes clear, with respect to
the single good source of all of the reports cited as pointing to Soviet
intentions, that it was only afterwards that he was checked out as
a reliable source; in other words, his credentials had not been estab-
' One of the four described a missile sighting at a "base" later identified as
a resort area.
lished even to the collector's satisfaction at the time. Was there any
source with established credentials who was ignored?
As a matter of fact, these reports that could not be accepted without
corroboration were not ignored, were not "set aside." They had long
provided a part of the reason for conducting systematic aerial recon-
naissance of Cuba. And during September, when the reconnaissance
flights were basically peripheral and did not provide thorough cover-
age of the island, these reports did the best thing they could have
done: they set off the process which led to the collection of photo-
graphic evidence on 14 October. That is, by late September those
making the decisions had concluded-mainly on the basis of the
sharper and more credible reports after mid-September--that: what-
ever the reasons for contenting ourselves with less than thorough
coverage, there were better reasons for making a maximum effort;
and this decision was vindicated by the first subsequent flight.
Mr. Rumpelmayer puts his other contention-about Soviet esti-
mates--in these terms: the Soviet leaders were willing to increase
greatly the level of risk because the gains to be made from a success-
ful venture were so great-but they were prepared to withdraw "if
caught." To take the second part of the proposition first, this is
manifestly false unless one assumes that the missiles were to be used
solely for a surprise attack on the United States; their usefulness for
anything else depended directly on their being "caught," on their
presence being known when the program was completed.
Suppose we replace this second part with a formulation that many
observers would accept-that the Russians were prepared from the
start to withdraw (as Mr. Rumpelmayer says later of the actual dis-
engagement) as soon as "convinced that the United States was :ready
to act." But if we define the risk as the risk of U.S. military action
against Cuba or the USSR, then the first part of Mr. Rumpelmayer's
proposition is also false. That is, if Khrushchev was confident that
he would be given time to withdraw-that the venture would be
accepted as a "mere probing action"-then he was not consciously
accepting a high risk of this kind.
But what of the other kind of risk, the risk of failure, of a humiliating
withdrawal in the face of an American ultimatum? As Mr. Rumpel-
mayer puts it, the Russians would not have had ready a "contingency
plan" if they had really been wrong about the "probable U.S. reaction."
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Taking these words at face value, Khrushchev regarded U.S. willing-
ness to fight as the probable response, thus expected the venture to
fail, in other words was one of those sports who fly into Las Vegas
hoping for the best but cheerfully expecting to go home without a
dime (or with just a dime). This proposition is not patently false;
but the evidence does not support it.
Our two studies, cited above, agree Khrushchev recognized from
the start that there was some degree of risk of an American attack at
one ear another point in the venture but believed this risk to be small.
As witness, the Russians were aware of U.S. reconnaissance capabili-
ties but did not camouflage the strategic missiles or conceal their
deployment, left the MRBM sites identifiable for a long period prior
to the establishment of an IRBM capability (which would have com-
pleted the program), and did not employ their air defense system
against U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, Moreover, they sent the missiles
into Cuba after President Kennedy's firm and explicit warnings of
early September, without knowing that the pattern of reconnaissance
was to be changed to their advantage.
Similarly, the two studies agree that Khrushchev recognized from
the start a possibility of failure but believed at least until September-
perhaps until mid-October-that the United States would probably
acquiesce and until late October that the venture could be managed
to his profit even if the United States did not acquiesce. He seems
to have calculated-judging from some of his statements before the
crisis and his conduct during the week of the acknowledged crisis-
that the United States would at most impose a blockade and could
probably be tied up in negotiations in the course of which he could
either complete the program (and thus increase his deterrent) or at
least gain large concessions for withdrawal.
We agree with Mr. Rumpelmayer that Khrushchev had so much
of a "contingency plan" for withdrawal. But the character of the
"plan" is one of our reasons for thinking that he did not expect to
fail. Much of his behavior in the week of the crisis seemed improvised
and erratic: he lied about the missiles after their presence had been
established beyond doubt; he continued work on the bases while
frantically attempting to pacify the United States; he threatened to
run the blockade after ordering his ships to turn around; he warned
that he would fire the missiles and at the same time promised not to;
he transmitted an explicit offer of withdrawal for a no-invasion pledge
before transmitting his letter implying a willingness to withdraw; he
made his Cuba-for-Turkey proposal after having implicitly and ex-
plicitly offered a better deal; and he finally accepted the proposal
which President Kennedy attributed to him, a capitulation at Castro's
expense, without consulting Castro. This was hardly the smooth per-
formance of one who had been expecting to be forced to withdraw.
Thus we agree with Mr. Kent that Khrushchev made a serious mis-
take in judgment. He seems not to have recognized what American
estimators recognized and, not unreasonably, expected him to recog-
nize--that, if Soviet gains from a successful venture were to be so
great, it was probable that the United States would recognize what
was at stake and would act to deny such gains to its principal antag-
onist, just as President Kennedy had repeatedly told him.4
The Real Lessons
We too have some opinions as to lessons to be learned from the
Cuban venture-lessons which if learned would reduce the possibility
of "misestimating the Soviets in a future case."
The lesson for the collector is obvious: that he cannot expect his
good reports to be recognized and accepted at once if the record of
reports from the same kind of sources is a poor one. ("Wolf! Wolf!")
The lesson for the estimator might be this: to allow a brit more,
regularly, for Khrushchev's disposition to wishful thinking and for
his inclination to commit himself to a serious action without thinking
it through. He seems to have just now (August) done it again, in
making and publicizing his arrangements for the meetings of the
Communist parties.
For the analyst, the lesson might be to give Soviet public and private
statements the closest possible scrutiny, looking at them again and
again until satisfied that all of the possible implications have been
recognized. For example, the Soviet insistence on the formula of
the defensive purpose of the weapons in Cuba seems to have been in
part a means of inviting the United States to acquiesce in the deploy-
ment under this euphemism. Similarly, some Soviet statements seem
to have been implying an offer by Moscow (another observer has
privately made a good case for this) to continue doing what it was
' Khrushchev's failure to recognize this was foreseen by the only official known
to us to have predicted the deployment of the strategic missiles in Cuba. Chal-
lenging the draft estimate, this observer argued that Khrushchev might well
be so dazzled by his possible gains as to be unable to recognize the true level
of the risks.
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doing; in Cuba but not to embarrass the Administration by revealing
this until after the U.S. elections-at which time the program would
be complete-if the United States did not reveal it. A sense of these
implications need not have led to the conclusion that the Russians
did indeed intend to deploy strategic missiles in Cuba, but they
might have placed stronger qualifications on the official judgments of
what Moscow was up to and might have led to earlier warning.
There may be lessons for the policy-maker too. One of these was
apparently learned very rapidly and expressed in the decision of
late September to restore the pattern of thorough aerial reconnais-
sance over Cuba. The lesson was that a nation might be embarrassed
by the utilization of a given intelligence asset but might be destroyed
by the failure to use it.
The other lesson relates to the adversary's reading of U.S. behavior.
As the observer cited above was the first to remark, no American
official (so far as we know) chose to question the Russians directly
about this crafty formula of defensive purpose, to ask a knowledgeable
Russian official point-blank just what kind of weapons were going
into Cuba-a restraint which may have encouraged Moscow to be-
lieve that its invitation was being accepted. And there were other
features of American behavior, including the failure to make a maxi-
mum reconnaissance effort between 5 September and 14 October,
which could have been read by Moscow as indicating tacit agreement.
The policy-maker may be able to use more help than he normally gets
in judging how the signals he is sending-or things that he is doing
which. may be taken as signals-will be read.
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
From World War II
AN INSTANCE OF TREASON: Ozaki IIotsumi and the Sorge Spy
Ring. By Chalmers Johnson. (Stanford University Press. 1964.
.278 pp. $6.50.)
Popular spy anthologies have long paraded a strange combination
of fact and fantasy about Richard Sorge's espionage operation on be-
half of the Soviet Union twenty and more years ago in the Far East.
The first English-language work on the case was the heavily docu-
mented but somewhat inadequately researched Shanghai Conspiracy:
the Sorge Spy Ring by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General
MacArthur's intelligence chief.' General Willoughby and his staff,
working with a large number of documents procured by the occupa-
tion forces upon entering Japan, assembled for the military establish-
ment, a congressional committee, and the public an illuminating col-
lection of facts about the espionage activities in China and Japan of
Sorge, confessed member of the CPSU and agent of Department Four
(Intelligence) of the Soviet Army General Staff, and his ring. It was
this material which served as the basis for General Willoughby's book.
Details copied indiscriminately from the Japanese documents available
at the time, English transliterations from Japanese transliterations of
Russian names, errors made by translators unfamiliar with the Soviet
espionage establishment and its personalities, a tendency to accept
colorful characterizations of members of the ring, and a concentration
of interest on the angle of American involvement left the Willoughby
study an interesting but not unflawed account of the activities of the
net.
Later The Man With Three Faces, by Hans-Otto Meissner,2 a former
member of the German embassy staff in Tokyo, intermingled fact,
near-fact, and completely erroneous information with the author's
personal recollections. This uncritical work carried in an epilogue
the oft-repeated legends that Sorge was not executed as reported and
that the mysterious "Kiyomi," Sorge's mistress, had been machine-
gunned to death in a Shanghai cabaret in 1947 for having ]betrayed
1 New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952.
'London: Evans, 1955. Meissner should not be confused with Joseph Mei-
singer, a colonel in the Gestapo, who was assigned to the German embassy in
Tokyo as security officer at the time of Sorge's arrest.
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him. But the memoirs of the mistress, Miyake (Ishii) Hanako, very
much alive and running a boarding house for students in Tokyo, were
published the same year as Meissner's book.
It is from the Willoughby and Meissner English-language materials
that most of what has appeared in various anthologies and I-knew-
Richard-Sorge-when stories has been taken-and sometimes em-
broidered on to please the public taste.
In the meantime, however, some two hundred books and major
articles were written in Japan about Sorge and his associates. One,
we noised, was by his mistress, some came from minor members of the
net, one was a collection of letters written by a central figure in the
net, Ozaki Hotsumi, to his wife from prison, and yet another was
written by Ozaki's half-brother, who had been 13 years old when
Ozaki was arrested. With rare exception each of these many writings
contributed a little something to improve later ones. The most im-
portant single work was the three-volume Materials on Modern His-
tory: The Sorge Incident published in Japanese by Misuzu Shobo, a
leading publishing house.3 Devoted entirely to the police and court
records of the case, it printed for the first time many documents un-
available at the time of the Willoughby study. These three volumes
probably did more than any of the others to dispel myths which had
grown up around the figures in the Sorge net.
In An Instance of Treason Chalmers Johnson now brings together
and analyzes the most significant of these Japanese contributions to
the history of Soviet espionage. His study is centered on the back-
ground and activities of Ozaki Hotsumi, probably the most effective
member of the net. It gives also an excellent picture of the times
which produced Ozaki and of the other members of the net, but we
must wait for some future work to treat the many German-language
documents publicly available which deal with Sorge's earlier life
and German and Soviet associations.
Mr. Johnson corrects the several transliteration errors found in
earlier books and correctly identifies and discusses in extensive foot-
notes the Soviet personalities mentioned by Sorge in his confessions.
The professional student of the Sorge operation will be particularly
grateful to him for having included a glossary of pertinent Japanese
names in both romanized and ideograph form, a lengthy bibliography,
and a complete index. For the more general reader he debunks many
of the old myths; in only a few instances does he perpetuate previous
Gendai-shi Shiryo: Zoruge liken. Tokyo, 1962.
irregularities, and these are minor, generally a matter of being misled
by earlier writers' colorful inventions about personalities in the net.
The reader may not agree with Mr. Johnson's high evaluation of
Ozaki as an individual or as a revolutionary, but he will most certainly
be impressed by the chronicle of Ozaki's rise within Japanese circles
of influence and consequent access to official opinion and secret in-
formation. As a revolutionary a man such as Ozaki, it could be
argued, would likely have been purged if he had been within the
Soviet borders, for he was feudal in approach, supported the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a means of encouraging a resurgence
of nationalism throughout Asia, and dreamed of a revolution in Japan
coming not from the lower strata of society but from the intellectual
elite. However this may be, within the Japanese society existing at
the time he served the Soviet intelligence services almost if not equally
as well as Sorge himself.
Another point at which intelligence officers could possibly disagree
is when Mr. Johnson attempts to distinguish between cooperators and
real members of the net. His probings, however, of the status of
cooperator vs. agent, Soviet agent vs. Comintern agent, and the like
are more than semantic exercises. He explores in depth and accepts
the hypothesis that Sorge and Max Clausen, the net's radio operator,
were the only ones who knew that their superiors were officials of
Red Army intelligence, the other members of the net, including Ozaki,
believing themselves to be working for the Comintern. Then he makes
one of the most interesting points of the entire book: he explains how
the Japanese authorities found it legally advantageous to the prosecu-
tion to keep characterizing the net as a Comintern activity, as Sorge
first called it, despite his later confession of the role of Department
Four. Had this aspect of his confession been accepted, he might have
been spared from execution under Japanese law. This seeming tech-
nicality is particularly intriguing in the light of the recent Soviet
acknowledgement (Mayevsky article in Pravda, 4 Sept. 1964) that
Sorge was indeed an agent of the USSR,
The Mayevsky article confirms another conclusion reached by Mr.
Johnson, that the greatest achievement of the net was its report in
the fall of 1941 that the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Far East
but the Allied-controlled territory to the south, a report that made it
possible for Soviet forces to be moved west to save Moscow. It also
confirms that the net's earlier reporting on the German plan to attack
the USSR was highly accurate though ignored by Stalin. As Mr. John-
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son points out, Sorge considered this one of his major achievements,
and he claimed to have received a message of thanks and congratula-
tions from Moscow after his advance warning proved to have been
right.
The Soviet acknowledgement of Sorge, twenty-three years after his
arrest and twenty after his and Ozaki's execution, makes particularly
timely the publication of An Instance of Treason, the most complete
study in English to date of the operation of the net.
able in the words of a friend, Jack Winocour. On 28 April 1945
Reuters carried the story of Himmler's offer to Count Bernadotte to
surrender Germany to the Western Allies only, and this story was the
immediate cause for Hitler's disowning Himmlcr, naming Doenitz his
successor, and completing his suicide arrangements. It has not been
known how Reuters got the story. Winocour, then a British Informa-
tion Services officer attending the United Nations conference in San
Francisco, now tells-taking, quite unnecessarily, 15 pages to do so-
how he heard it in confidence from Anthony Eden and after struggling
with. his conscience half a day leaked it to a Reuters man..
AMATEUR AGENT. By Ewan Butler. (London: Harrap. 1963.
240 pp. 21/-.)
Butler worked for the British wartime covert action organization,
SOE, in Cairo, where he was in charge of black propaganda for the
Balkans and the Middle East, and then in Stockholm, from where,
under cover as assistant military attache, he was supposed to run
nuisance sabotage and morale operations into Germany. By the end
of the war he had placed eight sleeper agents in North Germany,
whose primary job, however, turned out to be reporting to the new
occupation authorities on the true loyalties of local dignitaries.
The book reads easily, but one feels some annoyance at the author's
air of superiority; he seems persuaded that the things he said and did
are of importance because it was he who did and said them. The
annoyance is enhanced for American readers by his patronizing at-
titude toward the OSS covert action mission in Stockholm. The in-
cidents he relates to show the Americans' lack of clandestine know-
how are, according to the recollections of the OSS officers concerned
and a check of the mission's records, products of his imagination.
Both OSS and SOE had to work primarily not on their own but as
backers of the Norwegian and Danish resistance and toward the war's
end through the Swedish service; but in the spring of 1945 OSS was
beginning to be the dominant mission and had an agent not in North
Germany but in Berlin.
Except for these inventions and misrepresentations and one astound-
ing error, declaring it to be the Scandinavian custom to put up a big
wreath in the main room instead of a Christmas tree, the events seem
to be recorded with only such embellishments as it's normal to allow
a story-teller. One can perhaps take seriously, therefore, a significant
footnote to the history of Hitler's last days which Butler makes avail-
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Visible Today
THE BAY OF PIGS. By Haynes Johnson with Manuel Artime, Jose
Perez San Roman, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. (New
York W. W. Norton. 1964. 368 pp. $5.95.)
Haynes Johnson's "Story of Brigade 2506," told from the viewpoint
of the Cubans who fought at the Bay of Pigs and survived Castro's
prisons, quite naturally follows his sources in laying the disaster at
the door of their presumed sponsor, the CIA. Beside extensive in-
terviews with the four leaders, he says he consulted many other
members of the Brigade and of the Cuban Families Committee, used
four works published by the Cuban government, and got "information
and other documentary material from sources which cannot be di-
vulged." To the best of this reviewer's knowledge he did not get
any material from the CIA or discuss the book with anybody in the
Agency.
The passages that reflect badly on CIA range from Artime's resent-
ment at having to take a polygraph test and Oliva's adverse comments
on the training program in Guatemala-actually, a Joint Chiefs of Staff
assessment team gave the training favorable marks-to charges that
the leaders were deceived about getting U.S. support and given faulty
intelligence for the operation.
San Roman and Oliva say they were told by a mysterious "Frank"
that the Brigade would not be the only unit involved in the landing,
that their air force would include fighter planes as well as B-26's, and
that the Marines, though not going in with them, "would be close to
us when we needed them." The Brigade leaders learned that they
were to establish and hold a beachhead until the civil government
arrived, set itself up, and asked for help from the United States and
Latin American countries. "Frank" is said to have told them that
there were forces in the Administration trying to block the invasion,
and that if they received an order to stop they were to ignore it and
go ahead with the plan.
Infiltration teams sent in by the Brigade, it is claimed, felt that CIA
didn't trust them because many messages sent from Cuba were never
acted upon. The Brigade commanders are reported to have been told
that Castro would not be able to react for seventy-two hours (an esti-
mate presumably based on the effect a dawn air raid would have on
his forces-but the raid was canceled). They were told that Castro's
communications were poor, that there would be few tanks and no
MORI/HRP PAGES 104-105
104
planes in the defending forces, and that in the first two days five
thousand Cubans would join the Brigade in a voluntary uprising.
Erneido Oliva, who had defected from Castro's army, is quoted earlier
as saying: "They asked me if I thought a guerrilla force could over-
throw Fidel, and I said no, because I knew the regular army. Fidel
had been too long in power and was too strong. I asked what backing
we had and I was answered, `We have all the backing necessary.' I
asked what the United States was going to do and they didn't
answer...." San Roman, it is said, "first began to doubt the intel-
ligence information when his flagship arrived at Playa Gir6n. Instead
of the deserted resort houses the CIA had said he would find, the
shore was ablaze with lights." And so on.
The allegation that the Brigade's leaders were told to disobey any
orders from Washington to cancel the operation is serious enough to
have required refutation, and that has been given under oath by the
officer involved. But it would be futile to try to check every state-
ment the Cubans claim was made to them. With respect to those
promising U.S, support, explicitly or by implication, the question is
what other approach the sponsors could or should have taken. You
don't send men into battle with a negative attitude. Nearly everybody,
American and Cuban alike, was convinced that victory was assured
and that the United States would be solidly behind the invaders.
Partly for this reason no disaster plan had been formulated--though
precious little about the covert operation was put into writing at all.
And to those who take at face value the stories of flaps in the action
I would recommend a study of the after-action reports done by par-
ticipants in any battle: there will be little consistency among them
about what happened before and during the fighting. No two human
beings see or hear alike, particularly under conditions of stress.
So much in defense of CIA. More generally, The Bay of Pigs is
well done, and a reasonable book about a disaster. Considering what
happened to them, the Cuban leaders show remarkably little bitter-
ness. The book is especially good, and probably quite accurate, about
the efforts made to free the prisoners and their eventual release. It
is weak and sketchy, for obvious reasons, about the planning and ex-
ecution of the operation from the U.S. viewpoint. It takes its place
on the shelf of literature about a battle that may one day be as well
covered as Gettysburg.
L. B. Kirkpatrick
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THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By David Wise and Thomas B.
Ross. (New York: Random. 1964. 375 pp. $5.95.)
The journalist-authors of this best-seller admit that Communist sub-
version and espionage pose a unique threat to the American people
and their government, and they accept the necessity under certain cir-
cumstances for secret American efforts to prevent Moscow and Peking
from gaining new allegiances. But they profess to believe that our
secret attempts to meet the Communist challenge constitute so real a
threat to our own freedoms that they must be exposed in as detailed
and dramatic a way as possible. If the Soviets are profiting from
these revelations, as they are, Wise and Ross apparently think that
such self-inflicted wounds must be endured in the battle against ex-
cessive secrecy.
Broadly stated, their thesis is that the U.S. intelligence community,
with the CIA at its heart, has grown so big and powerful that it
threatens the democracy it was designed to defend. The CIA, they
say, conducts its own clandestine foreign policy, and even the President
has been unable to control it. The State Department is powerless to
exert policy direction because its ambassadors are kept uninformed
and are habitually by-passed by CIA operatives. The Congress has
abdicated its legislative role and votes huge secret funds without
adequate knowledge of how the money is spent.
If all this were true, American democracy would certainly be in
serious trouble, and the alarm professed about the "invisible govern-
ment" would be justified. But is it true? Strangely enough, the
authors themselves provide, ambiguously, a negative answer to this
question which is so central to their major thesis. They concede the
existence of institutional arrangements designed to give the President
and his principal foreign policy advisors the very kind of close policy
control over secret operations that they ought to have. Early in the
book, they mention the existence of a "Special Group" which makes the
major decisions regarding clandestine operations, though they say it
is so secret that it is "unknown outside the innermost circle of the
Invisible Government." The reader must wait through 255 pages to
learn that the members of this policy group are no sinister shadows
but McGeorge Bundy in the White House, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
These are just the officials that one would expect the President to have
MORI/HRP PAGES 106-109
chosen to advise him on matters of high clandestine policy, and they
are far from invisible.
The authors, in order to prove their thesis, do try to show that the
Special Group is ineffective: they claim it meets in "a highly informal
way without the elaborate records and procedures of other NO
Government committees"; there is no "outside analysis" and "little
detached criticism"; the members are too busy with their other duties
to perform their supervisory function adequately. The impression
is left that the President and the Secretary of State arc not even
informed of the Group's decisions. One must have a very low opin-
ion of the sense of responsibility and competence of the men in these
key government positions to believe they behave so cavalierly. And
yet if one does not believe this, the authors' whole portrayal of an
irresponsible and invisible government becomes inherently incredible.
Similar treatment is accorded the President's Board on intelligence
activities formed under the Eisenhower administration and reconsti-
tuted by President Kennedy. This is dismissed as a superficial facade
with the remark that "both committees were composed of part-time
consultants who met only occasionally during the year," and it is
implied by use of the past tense that the Board is now extinct. Actu-
ally it is very much alive and its membership is no secret, having been
announced in a White House release of April 23, 1963. It includes
Clark Clifford, William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land,
William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Frank Pace. These are
able, experienced men who discharge conscientiously their duty of
advising the President on the workings of the intelligence community,
and it wouldn't have taken much journalistic initiative to find this
out. They have a right to resent being dismissed as "veneer."
In his last public reference to the CIA, at the time of the Diem
crisis in Vietnam, President Kennedy declared, ". . . I can find. nothing,
and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last
nine months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA
has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy;
it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and
responsibility . . . I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not
carried. out independent activities but has operated under close con-
trol of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the coopera,
tion of the National Security Council and under my instructions . .
The impression grows that Wise and Ross felt obliged to ignore or
at least belittle any evidence that the supervision of American intelli-
gence activity is in responsible hands.
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This impression is strengthened by their description of the role of
Congress. They grant that the CIA budget and program is subject
to review and approval by special subcommittees of the Appropria-
tions and Armed Services Committees of both Houses, but they reject
this congressional scrutiny as inadequate. They charge that the sub-
committees "are controlled by the most conservative elements in Con-
gress, men who are close personally and philosophically to those who
run the `Invisible Government."' Then they state the case for a
joint congressional watchdog committee, the one specific institutional
reform they argue for. So far the watchdog committee idea has been
opposed not only by successive administrations but also by the con-
gressional leadership.
If this book is widely accepted at its face value within the United
States, it can only reduce public confidence in the intelligence services
and make it more difficult for them to recruit the able men and women
we shall need in the difficult days that lie ahead. Although incom-
parably better researched than its forerunner by Andrew Tully,' it
too tends to portray the American on the clandestine fronts of the
cold war as typically a reactionary, unscrupulous blunderer. One
chapter purports to describe the desperate efforts of the Peace Corps
to prevent itself from being infiltrated by the CIA. Leaders of the
Corps are represented as being so fearful that CIA will disobey presi-
dential directives and attempt to infiltrate that they take the most
elaborate precautions. The implication is clear that CIA's irresponsi-
bility made such precautions necessary. Only at the end of the chap-
ter will the reader find a brief sentence admitting that no single case
of attempted infiltration was ever discovered.
Another effect of the book is to expose for the first time certain indi-
viduals and organizations as having intelligence connections and thus
sharply increase their vulnerability to Soviet attack. A spokesman
for Random House has been quoted as claiming that the book con-
tains nothing that had not already appeared in public print, but in
the first chapter the authors boast that "much of the material has
never been printed anywhere else before." They insist that they have
stayed "within the bounds of national security" but appear to have
reserved to themselves the right to decide what those limits are.
Such an attitude raises serious questions as to the responsibility of
the journalist in a free society in a time of cold war. In Great Britain,
which is second to none in its devotion to liberty, there exists an
Approved
Official Secrets Act under which the authors would have been tried
and sentenced to prison. Such a law in this country is not feasible,
but in its absence the American journalist carries an even heavier
responsibility than his British counterpart.
By far the most damaging consequence of this book will have been
its exploitation by the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet and Chi-
nese regimes. The CIA has understandably been for a long time a
primary target of the Soviet KGB, and everything from forgeries to
full-length books have been inspired by the Soviet propagandists in
their efforts to destroy the reputation of American intelligence organi-
zations and undermine their effectiveness. The KGB technicians must
find it hard to believe their good luck in being donated so much
useful ammunition by a reputable American publisher and two cer-
tifiably non-Communist journalists. The book is being reprinted and
replayed in press and radio from one end of the world to the other.
That much of this material has been printed before does not reduce
the value to the Soviets of having it gathered in one volume under
such genuine American auspices.
The problem of balancing freedom with security has been an ancient
dilemma for democratic states in their long struggle to survive against
aggressive totalitarianisms. This book may serve to dramatize the
problem, but it does not provide any deep insight or new solutions.
It was written not to enlighten but to shock and to sell.
Charles E. Valpey
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. By Jack Zlotnick. Revision of origi-
nal 1960 edition. (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the
Armed Forces. 1964. 75 pp. Not for sale.)
This is a textbook in the Industrial College's series "The Economics
of National Security." It describes the structure and functioning of
the U.S. intelligence community, takes the student through the produc-
tion of national estimates, current intelligence reports, and basic sur-
veys, explains procedures at successive stages of the intelligence proc-
ess from the levying of requirements to the dissemination of the prod-
uct, and then discusses each of the subject-matter specialities of the
intelligence spectrum-political, military, etc. It is slightly more ex-
pansive with respect of the process of analysis than other functions
and with respect to economic intelligence than other subject specialties.
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109-110 109
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Though an elementary text is inevitably less than exciting to an
experienced practitioner and an open work on intelligence is inevitably
curtailed by security considerations, for the newcomer or outsider
this is probably the most complete unclassified statement covering its
range of subjects available, and it is thoroughly sound. The new edi-
tion has an updated text and improved format. There remain more
typos than there should and a few textual slips-the "recent" Suez
crisis, "skilled agents" like Pontecorvo and "Allen" Nunn May-but
these are not frequent enough to shake the reader's justified confidence
in the authority of the work. It is a good textbook.
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