STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE, Vol. 6 No.1,Winter 1962

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• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: SINT

JOB NO, .227:03/.2.W
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LYmAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
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CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
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Page
The 1961 Studies hi Intelligence Award . . . . faces 1
Rubles Versus Dollars Rush V. Greenslade 1
Rules and verities of the GNP numbers game.
CONFIDENTIAL
Estimating Aircraft Performance . . Isadore Herman 13
From photograph to flight test by computation.
SECRET
Scooping the Soviet Press John Chandlee 23
Exploitation can blow an overt source. CONFIDENTIAL
Target: CIA Lester Hajek 29
The Soviet psywar drive on U.S. intelligence.
SECRET
Observations on the Double Agent. . . F. M. Begoum 57
Aims and precepts in a kind of human speleology.
SECRET
Intelligence and Covert Action. . . . Albert E. Riffice 73
Their wartime divorce in the British SOE.
CONFIDENTIAL
Cumulated Grouping of Articles in Volumes I through V 81
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Valediction
Allen W. Dulles
Comes the Teaching Machine John Fulcher
Auto-instruction for intelligence training.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
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THE 1961 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
The Studies' annual award of $500 for the most significant
contribution to intelligence literature was divided in 1961
between 1
printed in the fall issue. The editors found the competition
in excellence among the 1961 contributions extremely close.
Among the several others earnestly considered they distin-
gpighed two as particularly meritorious-4
respectively.
in the winter and spring issues
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Nonsense and significance be-
hind the international GNP
numbers game.
RUBLES VERSUS DOLLARS
Rush V. Greenslade
In the hearings on the Soviet economy before the Congres-
sional Joint Economic Committee in 1959, Morris Bornstein of
the University of Michigan presented three comparisons of
the U.S. and Soviet gross national products.' One of these
priced both countries' goods and services in dollars, the sec-
ond priced them both in rubles, and the third was the square
root of the product (the geometric mean) of the other two.
They showed, respectively, that in 1955 the Soviet GNP was
53% of ours when figured in dollars, 27% when figured in
rubles, or 38% when these two were averaged geometrically.
The procedure Bornstein used was identical with that used
by intelligence analysts, and the data and results were essen-
tially the same. Bornstein's paper was the first public revela-
tion of any figure except the geometric mean.
The calculation comparing total Soviet and American pro-
duction is done in response to the perennial question asked
of intelligence, where does the Soviet economy stand in rela-
tion to ours? Comparing quantities of individual products?
steel, coal, oil, electric power, cement, grain, tanks, aircraft?
is necessary and more useful, but people still want an overall
comparison, one that is comprehensive. Such comparisons of
gross national products in dollar and in ruble prices have
therefore been carried out as completely as possible. The geo-
metric mean has been used as a "best" single-value answer.
When, however, two alternative calculations of what sup-
posedly is the same thing differ so widely as by a factor of 2,
the meaning and usefulness of the figures or their average
are open to question. Since the Joint Economic Committee
hearings the use of the geometric mean as a meaningful
comparison has been challenged by both American and Soviet
I Comparisons of the U.S. and Soviet Economies, Joint Economic
Committee of Congress, USGPO, 1959, Part II, p. 377-395.
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CONFIDENTIAL Rubles vs. Dollars
economists for quite different reasons. The object of this
article is to set forth the main outlines of the very complex
calculations underlying the comparisons, to make clear their
conceptual basis, and to show what interpretations of the
comparative ratios are consequently justifiable. It will ex-
plain why the dollar and ruble comparisons are not so good,
and the geometric mean not nearly so bad, as critics have
alleged.
Unit-of-Measure Bias
Comparison of two heterogeneous baskets of goods and serv-
ices in aggregate requires that their contents be measured in
a common unit. Standard economic procedure is to use money
values as the unit of measure and to convert each basket of
goods into a monetary equivalent by a set of prices. Each
good or service in physical units (e.g., tons of coal) is multi-
plied by its price per unit (e.g., $25) and the resulting values
are added together. But what prices should be used?in an
international comparison which country's prices, and analo-
gously in computing growth of output from one period of time
to another, which period's prices? The choice, as Mr. Born-
stein's figures show, can be of major quantitative significance.
This now familiar impasse is referred to by economists as
the index number problem. It is conceptually insoluble. It
is also universal. It occurs unfailingly in any aggregative
comparison between two economic complexes separated in
time or space. Until a few years ago there were no interna-
tional comparisons based on a detailed valuation of one coun-
try's product in another country's prices. Most international
comparisons were derived simply by converting the total value
of one country's product in its own prices into the currency
of another country by the international exchange rate be-
tween the two. In 1954 the pioneering study of Gilbert and
Kravis 2 presented detailed comparisons of U.S. production
with that of, the UK, West Germany, France, and Italy. The
results showed that the foreign exchange rate conversions
were quite misleading. They also showed that the index num-
ber problem was significant for all the countries studied.
An International Comparison of National Products and the Pur-
chasing Power of Currencies, Milton Gilbert and Irving B. Kravis,
OEEC, Paris, 1954.
2 CONFIDENTIAL
Rubles vs. Dollars CONFIDENTIAL
The ratio of UK to U.S. GNP is significantly higher in U.S.
prices than it is in UK prices. Here the difference is less than
in the USSR/U.S. comparison; but in comparing U.S. produc-
tion with that of Italy the difference between the two ratios
is about as large as with the Soviet. So the difference be-
tween the ruble-valued comparison and the dollar-valued one
cannot be attributed solely to the artificiality of Soviet prices.
The index number bias is also uniform in direction. In
every case the ratio of country A's GNP to country B's GNP is
larger when the products are valued at B's prices than when
A's prices are used. This holds for the Western European
countries as well as for the USSR. In each bilateral compari-
son with the United States, the ratio of the other country's
GNP to ours is larger in dollars than in its own prices. The
same systematic bias holds in comparisons over time. In 1954
prices U.S. GNP in 1955 is 216% of that in 1929; in 1929 prices
it is 222%. A spectacular index number spread for time com-
parisons is found in measuring the growth of Soviet GNP:
in 1926/27 prices the 1937 Soviet national product, as meas-
ured by Jazny and Grossman, was 198% of the 1928; in 1937
prices it was 150% .3
The economic explanation for the index number problem is
fairly straightforward. The price pf one kind of goods rela-
tive to that of other kinds varies from time to time and place
to place. Given transport costs and barriers to trade, relative
prices may differ greatly between countries. Everyone is fa-
miliar with differences like the following: wine is relatively
cheap in France, while beer is relatively cheap in Germany;
domestic servants are relatively cheaper in most foreign
countries than in the United States; fuels, oil, coal, and nat-
ural gas are relatively much cheaper here than in Western
Europe; meat is relatively very expensive in the Soviet Union
but standard machine tools are relatively cheap. Relative
prices differ between countries because of differences in taste,
culture, and habits and also because of differences in natural
resources, capital/labor ratios, stage of development, and
other factors that affect the cost of production.
'Soviet Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, ed., Row, Peterson & Co.,
1953, p. 7.
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CONFIDENTIAL Rubles vs. Dollars
Patterns of output also vary between countries, and their
variation is related to the price patterns. Specifically, each
country tends to use and therefore to produce relatively more
of the goods which are relatively cheap. This tendency ac-
counts for the systematic direction of the index number bias.
To clarify this point a numerical example may be helpful.
Suppose two countries, F and G, produce only two commodi-
ties, wine and beer. The quantities produced and the prices
in each country are shown below.
COUNTRY F
Price per liter Output
(Francs) (million liters)
2 10
3
Wine
Beer
COUNTRY G
Output
(million liters)
5
10
Price per liter
(Marks)
2
1
Then the total value of output in the two countries can be
computed in either country's prices:
VALUE OF OUTPUT
In million Francs
Country F Country G
In million Marks
Country F Country G
Wine
20
10
20
10
Beer
9
30
3
10
Total
29
40
23
20
Ratio F/G
721/2%
115%
In country F wine is cheap relative to beer and the popula-
tion consumes relatively more wine, perhaps because the price
is cheap; and the price is cheap because resources for produc-
ing wine are abundant. It is also possible that wine is cheap
because the population likes wine and has concentrated on
the technique of its production. In country G the wine-beer
situation is reversed. Because of these inverse price and
output patterns, country G's total output is greater than F's
when measured in francs but smaller than F's when meas-
ured in its own currency.
If in this example one substitutes the United States and
the USSR for F and G and consumer goods and investment/
defense production for wine and beer respectively, it is easy
to visualize how the U.S./Soviet index number discrepancy
arises. In the United States consumer goods are relatively
cheap and investment/defense goods relatively expensive, and
our pattern of output favors consumer goods. In the USSR
4 CONFIDENTIAL
Rubles vs. Dollars CONFIDENTIAL
the situation is reversed. The ratio of Soviet to U.S. output
is larger in dollars because U.S. prices are relatively higher
for the goods the USSR produces in relatively large quantities.
The pattern of output by major end uses is shown in market
prices below.
COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. GNP FOR 1960 AT MARKET
PRICES IN 1955 DOLLARS AND RUBLES
END USE
RUBLE COMPARISON
DOLLAR COMPARISON
GEO-
METRIC
AVER-
A GE
USSR
(bil-
lion
rubles)
U.S.
(bil-
lion
rubles)
USSR
as per-
cent of
U.S.
USSR
(bil-
lion
dollars)
.
US.
(bil-
lion
dol-
lars)
USSR
as per-
cent of
U.S.
USSR
as per-
cent of
U.S.
Consumption
Investment
Defense
Government admin-
istration
Gross national prod-
uct .
1,172
447
156
22
4,700
514
162
30
24.9
87.0
96.3
73.0
143
102
39
10
315
78
38
14
45.4
130.8
103.0
71.0
33.6
106.7
99.6
72.0
1,797
5,406
33.2
294
445
66.1
46.8
The index number problem derives from differences in pat-
terns of output which in turn derive from differences in re-
sources and in national preferences. The wider the diver-
gence in patterns of output, the wider the index spread. Com-
parisons of developed with underdeveloped countries yield ex-
tremely large spreads between the two valuations simply be-
cause the patterns of output are so different.
Partisan Positions
As indicated earlier, this problem is insoluble. There is no
ground for choosing between the two alternative valuations.
A time-honored expedient has been followed in using their
geometric average in public pronouncements.4 The compari-
4 The geometric mean is used in preference to the arithmetic be-
cause economic growth and other changes in general proceed geo-
metrically; that is, constant percentage increases describe the changes
better than constant absolute increases. The geometric average of
two numbers exceeds the smaller of the two by the same percentage
as the larger exceeds the average.
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CONFIDENTIAL Rubles vs. Dollars
son the President made in his press conference of July 1961?
that the Soviet GNP was 47% of ours in 1959?was the geo-
metric average. This usage has been challenged by both So-
viet and American economists. The Soviet economists have
come out flatly for the dollar comparison, in which, of course,
Soviet GNP is higher relative to ours. Interestingly enough,
their justification is that in a planned socialist economy price
does not have to correspond to value, i.e., real costs, and in
fact does not in the Soviet Union. And therefore, they argue,
the ruble valuation is meaningless.
The Soviet argument is specious. As the studies of Gilbert
and Kravis show, the index number problem always occurs,
and in general the more divergent the pattern of output the
wider the spread between the two figures. The patterns of
U.S. and Soviet production are very divergent indeed. We can
estimate how much difference the irrationality of Soviet pric-
ing does make in the ruble comparison. We can eliminate a
considerable part (but by no means all) of the distortions in
Soviet prices by converting market prices to the Western ac-
counting concept of factor costs. Factor costs are calculated
by subtracting from market prices any direct taxes included
in them, like the Soviet turnover tax, and adding subsidies
granted to the industries. The adjustment of Soviet prices
to factor costs cannot be carried out in detail because de-
tailed data on turnover tax rates by commodity are not avail-
able. Preliminary calculations, however, indicate that the
use of factor costs would raise the Soviet GNP as a percentage
of the U.S. in rubles by a few points but would not eliminate
the bulk of the index number spread.5
Objections by American economists are more serious.
Abraham Becker of Rand 6 has argued that the average is
meaningless and should be abandoned, that the ruble and
dollar comparisons are equally correct measures of relative
output and should be equally and impartially cited. The basis
of his contention is that while the ruble and dollar compari-
sons are precisely defined by the two real price systems used
The ratio of 47% in 1959 used by the President incorporated an
upward adjustment from market price ratio to aLlow for the effect
of factor costs.
World Politics, p. 99, October 1960.
6 CONFIDENTIAL
Rubles vs. Dollars CONFIDENTIAL
in the calculations, the geometric average of the two does
not correspond to any existent price system. Another posi-
tion is taken by Francis Hoeber of the Stanford Research
Institute, who votes for the dollar comparison.? His argu-
ment, as nearly as I can tell, is simply that American prices
are more familiar to Americans, who will therefore under-
stand the dollar comparison better.
Both these positions impute more meaning to the compari-
sons than they can have. The GNP ratios have a broad, gen-
eral, far from precise meaning, one which tends to disappear
if you try to pin it down. Like a faintly fragrant flower, it
can be apprehended by gentle inhalations, but an attempt to
extract the scented oil and subject it to chemical analysis
will ruin it altogether.5
Unknowns in the Equation
As background for a better appreciation of what the GNP
index numbers mean let me outline some of the difficulties
inherent in the data used to calculate them.
Procedurally, the conversion of Soviet product values to dol-
lars and U.S. product values to rubles is carried out with
ruble/dollar price ratios for individual goods and services.
The ratios used, numbering a few hundred, are only a small
sample of all prices in either economy. Each price ratio is
applied to those sections of consumption, investment, defense,
and government administration for which it is deemed to be
representative: thus a man's suit, shirt, and pair of overalls
are taken to be representative of the whole men's clothing
category.
The small size of the price sample introduces a margin of
uncertainty. Worse than that, it is limited to prices the
USSR publishes, and it is therefore weakest in military hard-
ware, construction, and custom-built equipment. And of
course there can be no price ratios for the considerable num-
ber of both consumer and producer goods produced in the
United States but not in the USSR. For many services, such
Soviet Economic Potential, 1960-1970, Francis P. Hoeber and Robert
W. Campbell, Stanford Research Institute, 1961.
But we must reject on technical grounds any suggestion that the
ratios be described as faintly fragrant numbers.
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as health, education, and government administration, the
product itself, let alone the price, is indefinable. Here we use
wage and salary ruble/dollar ratios, thus implicitly assuming
that the services of one Russian doctor equal those of one
American doctor, and similarly in the other service profes-
sions.
The measurements are inherently quantitative. The qual-
ity and specifications of each product in the price ratio sample
are checked as carefully as possible: an average Russian
men's suit is paired not with an average' American suit but
with one that appears comparable in quality, well below the
American average. But this product-by-product comparabil-
ity, even if it could be achieved with accuracy, would not take
into account the vast difference in diversity and assortment
in the two countries. There is no way to quantify these fac-
tors, but we know from observation and from Soviet state-
ments that supplies of consumer goods of all kinds are badly
balanced, some types being in very short supply and others
in surplus and unsalable. Diversity and assortment problems
are evident in the investment field as well; for example, the
range and mix of agricultural equipment is poor by the So-
viets' owii admission. Nevertheless, if 100,000 agricultural
tractors of a certain type are produced they are included in
the measure of output, regardless whether there is a demand
and economic use for that number of these tractors.
Another deficiency in the statistical procedure concerns
the value of retail trade services, which is included in the
value of the consumer goods compared. The goods them-
selves are kept comparable by matching the physical qualities
of individual products, but there is no practical way of meas-
uring the quantity or quality of retail service that goes along
with the product. Thus a pound of ground beef is counted
the same in the two countries even if in one it is accom-
panied by air conditioning, soft music, and quick service, in
the other by clouds of flies, pungent odors, and interminable
queuing.
It is hard to believe that these data deficiencies do not favor
the USSR, making the dollar valuation of the Soviet product
too large by some few percentage points. On the other hand,
as we saw above, the use of ruble market prices rather than
8 CONFIDENTIAL
Rubles vs. Dollars CONFIDENTIAL
factor cost overstates the U.S. product in rubles. To what ex-
tent these two overstatements offset each other is impossible
to say. For all these reasons, over and above the index num-
ber problem, the total GNP comparisons should be regarded
as order of magnitude indicators and not as precise measures.
Rationale of the Mean
Let us now return to the meaning of the dollar and ruble
valuations and their geometric average. The valuation of one
country's output in its own or in another country's prices
has a precise statistical meaning given it by the calculation
procedure, i.e., the multiplication of commodities by a specified
list of prices. Further, these prices are taken from an actual
operating price system. But this is still far from an economic
meaning. The price systems of the two countries subject to
bilateral comparison are not the only possible scales of valu-
ation; consider the possibility and desirability of multilateral
international comparisons. If we were comparing the U.S.,
Soviet, and West German output there would be three price
systems and three sets of ratios for the U.S./Soviet GNP.
Each country added would add another set of comparative
ratios. In what sense then is the dollar or ruble valuation
uniquely "correct"?
In a precise economic sense none of the valuations are cor-
rect. Two production aggregates can be unambiguously com-
pared only if they are made up of identical proportions of the
different kinds of goods and services. The comparison of two
GNP's with different proportions can be given meaning only
by an assumption about the transferability of resources, the
assumption, for example, that the United States can shift re-
sources from the present pattern of output to any other one
at prevailing dollar costs and prices. The dollar ratio of Soviet
to U.S. GNP, 66% in 1960, would be unambiguously the meas-
ure of comparative output if the US were to shift resources
until its output had the same proportional pattern as the
USSR's and if the 1960 dollar value of this output were un-
changed. Similarly, if the USSR were to shift resources in
the opposite direction, leaving its ruble total unchanged, the
ruble ratio, 33%, would be unambiguously correct. The two
provisos are, of course, highly dubious assumptions. They
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imply that unit costs of production would remain constant
at all levels of output for all products.
This argument leads to the main conclusions I wish to draw.
First, the two comparisons could be described better as
equally incorrect than as equally correct. Second, the geo-
metric average of the two can be given a defined meaning by
assumptions no more dubious, possibly much less so. The
average ratio would be unambiguously correct if both coun-
tries could shift to an identical intermediate pattern of out-
put, the value of each total output in the domestic currency
remaining unchanged. The feasibility of such a shift is cer-
tainly not harder to conceive than a shift of either county
entirely over to the other country's pattern. The geometric
mean is a rough approximation to the comparison that would
hold if the pattern of output in both countries were a mean
between the present pattern& In this interpretation it is a
far from precise but still useful figure indicative of the rela-
tive overall size of the two GNP's.
Elements of Challenge
The third conclusion is that the capability for shifting re-
sources lies at the heart of these- interpretations. The fig-
ures shed no light on this capability; they require, on the
contrary, an arbitrary assumption about shifts in order to
have meaning. Thus specific questions about capability can-
not be answered. For example, how much could each country
produce of a specified list of defense goods and services under
full mobilization? One could not deduce an answer from
either the ruble or dollar comparison, but only, if at all, from
a detailed study of the mobilization potential of each economy,
industry by industry. The output comparisons really tell us
nothing about capabilities for producing alternative mixes
and hence nothing very precise about relative output. When
and if the USSR reaches a level of output measuring 103%
of the U.S. in dollar prices and 57% in ruble prieeg, it will be
impossible, and probably at that stage of the game irrelevant,
to say whether these ratios mean that it has caught up
with us.
If the aggregate GNP comparisons are so ambiguous, of
what use are they? They have found a place in the propa-
ganda battle between the Bloc and West, but their analytical
10 CONFIDENTIAL
Rubles vs. Dollars CONFIDENTIAL
usefulness is limited. The useful quantitative comparison be-
tween the U.S. and Soviet economies is not of total GNP but
of its separate segments. The table on page 5 shows that
although there is an index number discrepancy in the indi-
vidual consumption, investment, and defense components of
GNP, it is a smaller one. This is because the difference be-
tween the two countries in pattern of output for each indi-
vidual end use is less than in their production patterns as
a whole. A breakdown (as detailed as possible) of the two
GNP's in both sets of prices reveals precisely the divergence
in pattern of output which causes the index number problem
in the total GNP comparison and at the same time is obscured
by the aggregation. The comparisons by end use show also
the relative price differences which accompany the differences
in output patterns.
The point to be emphasized in conclusion is that overall
GNP comparisons dollar, ruble, or average?do not measure
in any significant sense the USSR's economic challenge to
the United States. It is the uses to which productive capacity
is put that are significant. Soviet GNP in 1960 may be 33, 47,
or 66 percent of ours, but Soviet defense expenditures are ap-
proximately equal to ours and investment for growth is also
equal or perhaps a little larger than ours. There is no policy
question that need hinge on the overall GNP comparison.
There is much more pertinent information available to U.S.
policy makers and also to the general public regarding Soviet
economic performance, the structure of the economy, the
uses of production, and the USSR's objectives, plans, and po-
tentialities. In speeches by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and in many other ways it has been publicly reiterated
that the Soviet economy, though significantly smaller than
the U.S. over all, is growing much faster, particularly in heavy
industry; that its production is concentrated along ominous
lines?investment for more growth, armaments, and the de-
velopment of new military technology; that its efforts in
these fields are already comparable in magnitude to our own;
that it is devoting its resources with all the power of a deter-
mined dictatorship to a long-run aim declared in Khru-
shchev's promise, "We will bury you."
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Ramified process of determining
the characteristics of a new
model displayed at a Soviet air
show.
ESTIMATING AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
Isadore Herman
When the Soviet Union unveils an airplane of new design,
as it did in some numbers at its air show last July, the U.S.
Air Force has an immediate requirement for an estimate of
the machine's performance characteristics in order to assess
its place and contribution in the complex of Soviet air power.
Such an estimate can be made with good reliability if a few
photographs of the plane have been taken from the ground.
The task begins with the photogrammetrist and the photo in-
terpreter.
Drawings to Scale
The first job?and it is not a simple one?is to transmute
the photographs into a three- or six-view drawing properly
dimensioned. It is the photogrammetrist who makes the cal-
culations for these drawings. He begins by determining the
true shape of the aircraft and the proportion its dimensions
bear to each other. Absolute values, the scale of the drawing,
can come later. A preliminary step is to get correction fac-
tors for any distortion in the photography due to the camera
itself. These should be readily available; all attach?ameras
are checked and calibrated before being sent out to the field.
The proportional drawing then becomes an optics problem to
be solved by descriptive geometry and spherical trigonometry.
If a rectangular block is photographed from an angle, the
lengths of the three sides on the image do not bear their true
proportions to one another and the angles are not right
angles. Knowing that the three sides are actually at right
angles, however, we can calculate what attitudes the block
could have been in to produce this image and what the ap-
parent proportion of the sides to one another would be at
various look angles. If we had several photographs of the
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block from different angles, we could plot each of these look
angles as a function of the apparent proportions of the sides
in each. The intersection of these lines, since they all refer
to the same block, would be the point which defined the true
proportion of the sides to one another. (See Figure I.)
An airplane has some of the geometric regularities of a rec-
tangular block and one of the methods used to find its pro-
portions is similar to this. A line drawn between the two
wing tips of any plane must be perpendicular to the center
line of the fuselage and the wing tips must be equidistant
from this center line. The tail must be perpendicular in the
third dimension. By measuring the apparent length, wing
span, angle between the line connecting wing tips and the
center line, and tail height, the photogrammetrist can de-
termine their true proportions as though they formed a block.
Then, using this true ratio of length to span and height to
span, he can work the equation backwards for any one photo-
alb
14
FIGUR,E 1
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Aircraft Performance
GEOMETRICAL ROLL-OUT
SECRET
SECRET
FIGITRE 2
graph and calculate what the roll, pitch, and yaw of the air-
plane had been with respect to the camera plate. (See
Figure 2.)
This data is furnished to the photo interpreter, who recti-
fies the aspect of the photographic image and produces the
required three-view proportional drawing. The photo inter-
preter here really wears two heads. He must use his knowl-
edge as a photo interpreter to find and reproduce visible fea-
tures of the airplane; but he must also use his ingenuity as
an illustrator to fill in the areas that are not seen so that
they will be properly portrayed. In reconstructing these un-
seen areas, there is an important interplay between the photo
interpreter and subject analysts expert in aircraft com-
ponents.
The next problem is that of scaling the drawing, of deter-
mining the absolute dimensions of the aircraft. If we know the
exact range from which the photograph was taken?most likely
if the plane was not in flight?we can calculate the scale directly
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as the quotient of the camera's focal length by the range.'
In the absence of this information we must rely either on
known aircraft or other objects also in the picture or on
features recognized from earlier models?such things as tur-
ret blisters, radar domes, and antennae--assuming that they
are still the same size. Analysts may have documentary data
containing clues to the size of external components, or material
in the photo research file may help.
The three-view dimensional drawing is thus completed by
personnel of the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force
Systems Command, which has central responsibility for esti-
mating the performance characteristics of the aircraft.
Many units of the FFD are involved in the performance esti-
mates?the Aircraft Directorate, the Propulsion Directorate,
the Engineering Analysis Directorate, the Electronics Direc-
torate, and the Weapons and Industry Directorate. They in-
clude specialists in propulsion, preliminary design structures,
aerodynamics, performance, weights, armament, and elec-
tronics. These are all represented on a task force assembled
for the estimating project. The Aircraft Directorate, in par-
ticular, monitors the progress of the analysis. All contribut-
ing units are now given copies of the drawing.
Performance Factors
The Propulsion Directorate has the task of estimating the
power available to the aircraft and the performance of its jet
engine. They have from the drawing the exhaust port diame-
ter and an inlet configuration and size. First they try to
correlate these with some engine known to be available, but
more often than not this is not possible. Then they take
whatever background information there is, make some as-
sumptions, and perform several analyses of alternative pos-
sibilities for the engine cycle to arrive at an initial estimate.
This is a thrust-velocity curve for sea level and one for some
altitude such as 35,000 feet. (See Figure 3.)
The weight analyst meanwhile is estiniating the take-off
gross weight of the airplane and breaking it down into fuel,
structure, landing gear, tail, wings, etc. The method is es-
See Kenneth E. Bofrone's "Intelligence Photography" in Studies
V 2, p. 9 if.
16 SECRET
Aircraft Performance SECRET
THRUST
VELOCITY
FIGURE 3
sentially the same as that used in industry for preliminary
design, approximating the component weights that have been
empirically determined to correspond to such-and-such di-
mensions, volumes, velocities, etc. For example, the weight of
a wing is a function of its dimensions, its structural material
and design, the speed regime for which it is intended, and the
weight of the airplane. The trick, supposing that we can get
values for these factors from our photographs, is to formulate
the precise relationship among them.2 Weight engineers
have devised complex formulae which vary with the manu-
facturer, one for an aircraft built by Douglas, for example,
and a different one for a Boeing airplane. It is our aim to
find the formula that applies in the USSR and ultimately its
variations for individual design bureaus in the USSR. In this
we still have a long way to go.
For a more specific illustration of this and some of the other
methods used in a narrow application of performance analysis, see
Theodore A. George's "The Calculation of Soviet Helicopter Perform-
ance" in Studies III 4, p. 43 if.
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The structures specialist, working from the three-view
drawing and any supporting information on such things as
rivet lines, determines the structural layout of the airplane.
This serves two purposes: it helps production analysts recon-
struct how the aircraft was built up and it provides a check
by limited stress analysis on whether the structural limits
of the airplane are exceeded by the performance estimated.
No complete stress analysis is run.
The layout specialist prepares an inboard profile, laying out
the equipment, fuel, engines, etc., in the skeleton of the three-
view drawing in functionally correct arrangement and pro-
viding accommodation for the volume of fuel estimated by the
weight analyst. The layout is also used in deriving the
weight distribution and balance of the plane.
Armament, electronic, and equipment specialists use the
dimensional data of the drawings along with features identi-
fied in the photographs to reconstruct the armament, elec-
tronic, and other component systems used in the plane.
These are not necessarily of importance in determining the
performance of the airplane itself, but they are later used by
weapons systems analysts when they evaluate its operational
effectiveness.
The aerodynamics specialists determine the drag and lift
factors affecting the airplane's performance. Drag estima-
tion for supersonic flow is complex, usually including skin
friction drag, compressibility drag, wave drag, interference
drag, and drag due to lift. Skin friction drag is a function of
the area of the aircraft exposed to the airstream (the
"wetted" area, in aerodynamic parlance). Compressibility
drag is encountered when speed becomes sufficient to com-
press the air around the forward surfaces; it creates a sharp
increase in total drag in the transonic region. Wave drag is
a result of pressure distributions unique in supersonic flow.
Interference drag is caused by the proximity of one compo-
nent of the airplane to another; for example, an airplane with
external tanks, because of the influence of the pressure dis-
tributions from the fuselage and wings on the tanks and vice
versa, has a total drag greater than the sum of that for the
clean airplane and that for the tanks in isolation. Drag due
to lift in supersonic flow is similar to that in subsonic flow,
but with an additional component. In supersonic flow the
18 SECRET
Aircraft Performance SECRET
center of pressure is located halfway back along the wings
(about 50 percent of wing chord, in technical language)
rather than at the forward quarter (25 percent chord) as in
subsonic, and there must be a trimming of the aircraft to
compensate for this shift in center of pressure. The trim
drag thus induced is the additional supersonic component of
the drag due to lift.
The foregoing types of drag are only those arising in the
external aerodynamics. Another type of drag is considered
along with the engine performance problem. Called spillage
or additive drag, it results from pressure differences around
and just inside the lip of the engine air intake. It is of suf-
ficient magnitude to require inclusion in estimates on super-
sonic aircraft.
The method of drag estimation used in FTD was chosen
from among those used by several aircraft companies after
determining which of them was most closely substantiated by
wind tunnel and flight tests. But knowledge of high-speed
aerodynamics is undergoing continual change as flight speeds
go up, and methods of performance estimation are advancing
accordingly. These advances are kept under constant study
and FTD methods are revised and supplemented to keep them
up to date.
In estimating lift, we are handicapped by the fact that
exact wing profiles cannot usually be established from photo-
graphs. But measurements of thickness, aspect ratio, area
dimensions, etc., enable us to select a typical airfoil approxi-
mating that of the airplane. Data obtained from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration on similar airfoils can
then be used to construct lift coefficients.
Mission, Performance
Now having data on weight, balance, stress limits, lift, and
drag, we check the power required to fly the airplane through
a regime of flight speeds against the initial estimate of engine
performance prepared by the Propulsion Directorate. It is a
question of deciding whether our reconstructed airplane and
engine are compatible in combination or whether we should
restudy the engine or the aerodynamics. There are several
choices that can be made both in engine parameters and in-
type of engine. For example, if the tailpipe is large, it could
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be a high-thrust engine with relatively high specific fuel con-
sumption or it could be a by-pass engine with much less
thrust but lower specific fuel consumption. Decisions on such
points as these are now made by the Aircraft Directorate proj-
ect monitors on the basis of all intelligence available regard-
ing the aircraft or the requirements it was designed to
satisfy.
Once it has been decided that our engine-airplane combina-
tion makes sense, the propulsion specialist prepares detailed
thrust and fuel flow curves as a function of velocity at a
range of altitudes, and the aerodynamics specialist computes
drag and lift coefficients as a function of velocity at these alti-
tudes. These two sets of data, together with that on weight,
are then turned over to the mission performance specialists
in the Engineering Analysis Directorate.
The mission on which the plane's performance is to be esti-
mated is divided into take-off run, climb to cruising altitude,
cruise to combat point, combat, and finally cruise home and
landing. Best climb performance for a jet aircraft is defined
as that in which it reaches its desired cruising altitude in the
minimum of time. In order to determine this for a particular
airplane it is necessary to find the forward speed that yields
the highest rate of climb at each of the whole range of alti-
tudes, in composite the speed profile necessary for reaching
the cruise altitude in the shortest period of time. In most
flight-testing activities, this is achieved by what are com-
monly called "saw-tooth climb tests," in which the airplane
is required to fly through an altitude span at various veloci-
ties and the speed at which the maximum rate of climb is
achieved is then established as best for that altitude and
weight.
We do essentially the same thing by calculations, compar-
ing the thrust available with the thrust required for the vari-
ous altitudes and weight conditions during the climb. When
rate of climb is plotted as a function of velocity at a given
altitude and weight, the top of the curve represents the speed
for .best climb and the point at which the curve crosses the
axis is the maximum speed for that altitude. (See Figure 4.)
To these results there must be applied an acceleration cor-
rection to? account for velocity changes with altitude; this is
taken care of in the computation.
20
SECRET
Aircraft Performance
RATE CLIMB
SPEED FOR BEST cume
SECRET
MAX. SPEED FOR
GIVEN VN/T AND ALT
VELOCITY
FIGURE 4
The power settings, altitudes, and speeds for cruise are the
chief factors in determining the maximum radius or range
for the airplane. The rules governing best performance dur-
ing the cruise portion of the mission are important because
the majority of the time in flight, at least for a bomber, is
spent in cruise and the largest amount of fuel is used. In
accordance with standard military specifications, a constant
potential rate of climb is maintained during the cruise for the
given weight condition, the variables being altitude and speed.
In designing an optimum mission performance, we pick a po-
tential rate of climb that will yield the maximum in nautical
miles per pound of fuel. This is not necessarily at the high-
est altitude, as one might conclude at first glance from the
fact that jet engines normally operate most efficiently with
respect to fuel consumption at the highest altitudes.
The type of combat and the power setting used therein are
important determinants of the amount of fuel consumed dur-
ing the combat portion of the mission_ As throughout the en-
tire mission, the weight of the airplane is important, and we
must take into consideration the amount of fuel burned at
any point. The weight of the bomb or ammunition also needs
to be considered.
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SECRET Aircraft Performance
There is a great deal of variation in standard requirements
for fuel reserves on landing. Normal military specifications
call for a 30-minute flying time reserve, but also 5 percent of
the initial fuel. If you take off with a 200,000-pound load, this
means landing with 10,000 pounds of fueL Such a reserve
seems to us excessive in estimating the radius of a bomber,
so we keep fuel for a 30-minute reserve endurance, but do not
allow the 5 percent. The 30 minutes are flown at maximum
endurance conditions at sea level and the number of engines
operating is determined accordingly. For the BISON this
meant two engines operating and two dead; when two engines
were operated at high power, the specific fuel consumption was
lowest and less fuel was required for the 30-minute period.
Computation
As must by now be evident, there is a great deal of computa-
tion required in preparing a performance estimate. To be
more precise, over 250 engineer man-hours used to be ex-
pended on the performance estimate for one airplane. With
the aid of automatic computers, however, it is now possible
to obtain in less than an hour an amount of data that had
previously taken about 180 man-hours. There are still 70 or
80 hours of engineering time required, but further research
indicates that we may be able to reduce this residue materi-
ally.
Roughly similar to this process of aircraft evaluation is mis-
sile evaluation; but even for a cruise missile, the mission pro-
file, the type of power plant, and the aerodynamics are
slightly different. They are different again in the ballistic
missile, where, however, automatic computers are particularly
useful in performing the tedious integrations necessary in
calculating the trajectory.
22 SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Background on, a sensitive overt
source of information. that has
been, publicly exposed in exploi-
tation.
SCOOPING THE SOVIET PRESS
John Olandlee
At a midafternoon press conference on August 30, 1961,
President Kennedy said that the American representative at
the Geneva talks on a nuclear test ban would continue for
another week his efforts to make progress with the Soviet
delegation. But within minutes after the press conference
was over, top U.S. officials were summoned to the White House
for urgent consultation. The reason for the hasty meeting
was soon revealed to the world through a statement read to
assembled reporters: the U.S. Government had intercepted a
transmission of the Soviet news agency TASS for the press
and radio in Central Asia which indicated that the USSR had
decided to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. In an
otherwise routine "international review" not to be released by
the regional press and radio before 0200 hours the next day
Moscow time (7 p.m. of August 30 EDT) , the newsmen were
told, TASS had included the following observation:
The decision adopted by the Soviet Government on carrying
out experimental explosions of nuclear weapons also serves the
interests of strengthening the security of our country and other
states of the socialist camp. These forced measures taken by
the Soviet Government are inspired by a striving to safeguard
a lasting peace and create an insuperable barrier to the unleashing
of a new war.
This revealing comment, filed by TASS almost five hours be-
fore public announcement of the decision in order that the
regional media might be prompt in attempting to shape public
opinion, was the beginning of the USSR's massive propaganda
effort to justify its new testing to its own people and to the
world. That U.S. officials could also take advantage of the
advance filing to prepare their own stand before Radio Moscow
began its worldwide campaign was not accidental, but the re-
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CONFIDENTIAL Press Scoop
suit of a regular watch on an internal TASS circuit main-
tained at Kyrenia, Cyprus, by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service monitors. This circuit had provided a good deal of
useful information since early 1960, and the gain realind in
publicly exposing the operation must be weighed against the
hazards therein to the source.
Monitoring Procedure
The circuit in question is a radioteletype transmission in
Cyrillic characters, apparently a trunk line, carrying some
30,000 words a day from Moscow to the Soviet hinterland.
The vast bulk of the copy is routine material more easily ob-
tainable from TASS's international transmissions and Mos-
cow broadcasts, some 60 percent international "news" reflect-
ing the Soviet view of world events and 40 percent domestic
propaganda like production pledges and achievements. There
is a small service file providing guidance on how the material
is to be handled, where it is to be printed, and so forth. But
the special value of the channel lies in its prereleases?
speeches, communiques, notes, announcements, and commen-
taries "embargoed" for publication or broadcast until a stated
future time.
The FBIS bureau on Cyprus has been able to monitor about.
80 percent of the total file, the figure varying with reception
conditions. Its mode of transmission demanded at the begin-
ning the solution of certain technical problems such as the
modification of twinplex teletype converters and the construc-
tion of teletype "baskets" to reproduce the Cyrillic alphabet.
The twinplex circuit?one that carries two transmissions si-
multaneously?in this case carries the same material on both
sides, one transmission lagging behind the other, as a back-
stop against garbling by bursts of interference. It has gen-
erally been necessary to monitor only one side of the circuit
if fading and drift are overcome by careful tuning.
The material received is scanned at frequent intervals by
the bureau's Russian linguists and items of significance se-
lected in consultation with editorial supervisors. Of these an
accurate English-language version is rapidly produced for
transmission to Washington. When there is a development
of major interest, Washington is alerted in a brief message
transmitted over special radioteletype channels in a matter
24 CONFIDENTIAL
Press Scoop CONFIDENTIAL
of seconds. Short informational summaries or excerpts of
critical passages are sent first, followed by a complete textual
translation when 'required. Occasionally the entire Russian-
language staff must be mobilized to get an item processed
quickly, and frequently the initial portions of a lengthy note
or speech are in the hands of the interested officers in Wash-
ington before TASS has reached the end. The selection for
processing is coordinated rapidly with the FBIS bureau in
London, which receives material from BBC's monitoring of
Moscow broadcasts and TASS international beams, in order to
avoid duplication.
Value of the Take
On numerous occasions speeches written for subsequent de-
livery by Soviet leaders have been carried in advance over the
TASS Cyrillic circuit. Khrushchev's speeches, for example,
have sometimes been filed as much as 30 hours before actual
delivery and thus made available to the intelligence commu-
nity and policy offices at a substantial time advantage. A
problem in utilizing the prerelease and a matter of interest
to the propaganda analyst lies in the fact that TASS fre-
quently transmits an extensive series of corrections to bring
the advance text into line with the speech as delivered or
sometimes to eliminate passages that may be sensitive.
An unusual departure from prereleased material occurred
during Khrushchev's visit to France in March 1960. The
circuit carried three speeches to be delivered by the Soviet
premier, all embargoed "until further notice." As it turned
out, one speech was delivered by Gromyko, and another was
apparently discarded by Khrushchev out of displeasure with
ungratifying aspects of his reception. Such cancellations
could give us evidence of contemplated Soviet gambits that
never materialin, and knowledge of unsurfaced instances of
accommodation or stiffening in Soviet positions could be of
considerable value to the analyst probing areas of Soviet flexi-
bility or intransigeance.
A frequent advantage of the monitoring of this internal
press transmission is advance receipt of such materials as ma-
jor diplomatic notes, which may be disseminated by TASS in
clear text for release at a later date. During the Cuban af-
fair of last April, a letter from Khrushchev warning Presi-
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CONFIDENTIAL Press Scoop
dent Kennedy against taking a "highly dangerous road" was
intercepted and delivered to the White House before it reached
the President through normal channels.
The TASS service file, although constituting only a small
segment of the circuit's traffic, is often revealing as to Soviet
methods of manufacturing "public opinion." Domestic bu-
reaus and republican press agencies are frequently told what
is desired in the way of "reaction reports," as well as types of
material "not desired." In May 1960, TASS asked for reac-
tion reports on public meetings denouncing the U-2 flights.
Just before Premier Khrushchev torpedoed the summit con-
ference in Paris the same month, TASS carried numerous
commentaries for use by the regional radio and press, but
then suddenly advised recipients that "where possible, the
various commentaries transmitted in connection with the
summit conference are not recommended for publication." A
major Soviet internal development was foreshadowed by a
message that the celebration of the 40th anniversary of So-
viet Armenia had been postponed, a fact not formally an-
nounced by Moscow for a number of days. Later a broad
shakeup in the Armenian party organization occurred.
TASS instructions accompanying items serve to control the
content of regional publications and broadcasts. Copy is gen-
erally preceded by a "flag" indicating what papers should use
the material. The wordage is tailored to the level of the pub-
lication: republican papers, for example, received 325 words
on a Khrushchev return to Moscow, territorial and regional
(oblast) papers 245, and district, town, and komsomol pa-
pers 115. Some items are accompanied by instruction on
what headline to use, for example "Interference of the United
States in the Affairs of the Dominican Republic." An inter-
esting sidelight is that when Khrushchev is scheduled to
make a nationwide talk, the papers are told that the an-
nouncement is "not to be published on the front page or in a
prominent place," apparently a reflection of efforts to bold
down the "cult of personality."
Hazards to the Source
The monitoring operation, like all others in FBIS, is done
overtly. Intercepts from Soviet internal circuits are distrib-
uted with the designation "Official Use Only" and not given
26 CONFIDENTIAL
Press Scoop CONFIDENTIAL
to the press as much of the FBIS product is; but foreign na-
tionals are used in processing them, and they are radioed in
clear text to Washington. It is to be assumed that Soviet in-
telligence has long been aware, through monitoring if in no
other way, that FBIS systematically intercepts and exploits
this TASS circuit. Presumably the need for rapid, inexpen-
sive dissemination of news and guidance to the regional press
and radio has overshadowed any apprehension about its being
tapped.
The U.S. scoop in being able to express dismay over the So-
viet resumption of testing before Moscow could begin its own
worldwide propaganda justification may, however, have
brought the vulnerability of materials carried on the circuit
dramatically to the attention of the top Soviet leaders and so
occasioned a reexamination of press copy dissemination pro-
cedures. There are already tentative and inconclusive indica-
tions that practices have been modified: no important em-
bargoed items have been intercepted since the White House
announcement, and in one case only alternate takes of a
story were carried on the circuit monitored. These anomalies
may have occurred by chance, but additional equipment is be-
ing shipped to Kyrenia to check out the other half of the twin-
plex circuit and branch circuits that hitherto carried only
duplicate material. If the Russians were sufficiently deter-
mined to avoid interception they could switch sensitive ma-
terials to landlines, VBF circuits, or more complex modes of
radioteletype transmission that would make monitoring at
least more difficult.
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SECRET
Features of the recent Soviet
psywar drive against U.S. intel-
ligence.
TARGET: CIA
Lester Hajek
It is part of the job of opposing intelligence services to fight
each other, and one means of carrying on this running battle
is arranging publicity to discredit the adversary in his own
country, among its allies and neutrals, and at home. Deni-
grating the opposing service at home serves to enhance the
people's vigilance against the enemy and their support for
the defending service (and more broadly as a convenient out-
let for the instinct to portray the enemy as evil) ; exposing it
among its allies and neutrals will make its liaison and its op-
erations abroad more difficult; and discrediting it with its own
people tends to undercut its freedom of action and its very
base. Much the same picture of it can be painted for all these
purposes if there are slight shifts in the lighting for different
audiences: people in the opposing nation should be impressed
with the ineffectiveness of their service, but not too much the
people at home; the adversary's allies should especially be
made aware of his treacherous spying on them.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Soviet propaganda and
other psywar operations long since fixed on U.S. intelligence
as one of their preferred targets. The main features of the
bugaboo they wish to make its public image have been de-
scribed in an earlier article.' During the past two or three
years, however, and especially since the capture of U-2 pilot
Powers and the failure of the Cuban invasion, the Soviet cam-
paign has been intensified, has been focused more narrowly on
CIA and a personal symbol of U.S. intelligence, Allen Dulles,
and has scored some telling blows. It has had the advantage
of being able to use the Western press while the Bloc press
remains impervious to Western influence. The major Bloc
'Leslie D. Weir's "Soviet Publicists Talk about U.S. Intelligence"
in Studies IV 3, p. A19 if.
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salvos have come in six openly published books or articles and
three series of covert mailings since 1959.
The six publications include, in addition to three "white"
propaganda productions issued in East Berlin and Moscow,
three from ostensibly non-Communist sources?one by Brit-
ish member of parliament Bob Edwards and Kenneth Dunne,
A Study of a Master Spy (Allen. Dulles) ,2 one published in
New York, Robert E. Light and Carl B. Marzani's Cuba vs. the
CIA, 3 and Fred J. Cook's The CIA, published as a special issue
of The Nation.4 What distinguishes these latter three from
the recent welter of more or less honest and spontaneous
scapegoating of the CIA and marks them as deliberate com-
ponents of the Soviet psywar campaign is the similarity of
their arguments to those of the Bloc books and in particular
their coordination in building up a distorted structure upon
certain document fragments that could have been furnished,
directly or indirectly, only by the Soviets.
The Hohenlohe Papers
Back in 1948 the Soviet Information Bureau published a
booklet entitled Falsifiers of History portraying the USSR as
the heroic vanquisher of fascism and the Western allies as
conniving only to turn Hitler against the East. As one of
many examples of this Western duplicity it cited "documents
captured by the Soviet troops at the time of the defeat of Hit-
ler Germany which . . . tell of negotiations which took place
between representatives of the Governments of the U.S.A. and
Germany in Switzerland in February 1943."
In these negotiations the U. S. A. was represented by a special
delegate of the United States Government, Allen Dulles (brother
of John Foster Dulles) , who figured under the pseudonym "Bull"
and had "direct instructions and authority from the White House."
His partner on the German side was Prince M. Hohenlohe, a
man closely connected with the ruling circles of Hitler Germany,
Leicester Printers Ltd., Church Gate, Leicester, England. Published
by Housmans Publishers & Booksellers and the Chemical Workers'
Union: 5 Caledonian Road, Kings Cross, N.I. Introduction dated
January 1961.
3Marzani and Munsell, 1961. Marzani is the only one of the five
authors known to be a Communist.
Vol. 192, No. 25, 24 June 1961.
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who acted as Hitler's representative under the assumed name
of "Pauls." The document containing a summary of these nego-
tiations belonged to the German Security Service (S.D.) .
It is evident from this document, the conversation touched on
important questions relating to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Rumania, and Hungary and, which is especially important, to
the conclusion of peace with Germany.
In the course of the conversation A. Dulles (Bull) states that
"In the future, a situation will never again be permitted to
arise where nations like the German would be compelled to resort
to desperate experiments and heroism as a result of injustice
and want. The German state must continue to exist as a factor
of order and rehabilitation. The partition of Germany or the
separation of Austria is out of the question."
Concerning Poland, Dulles (Bull) stated:
?,. . . by extending Poland to the East and preserving Rumania
and a strong Hungary the establishment of a cordon sanitaire
against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism must be supported."
The record of the conversation further says that:
"Mr. Bull more or less agrees to the political and industria
organization of Europe on the basis of large territories, on thE
assumption that a federated Greater Germany (similar to tilt
U. S. A.), with the adjoining Danubian Confederation will consti
tute the best guarantee of order and rehabilitation in Central anc
Eastern Europe."
Dulles (Bull) also stated that he fully recognized the claim o
German industry to the leading role in Europe.
It must be noted that this sounding was effected by the Brits'
and Americans without the knowledge or consent of their ally
the Soviet Union, and that nothing was communicated to till
Soviet Government concerning the result of it, even by way o
post factum information.
This might warrant the assumption that the Governments o
the U. S. A. and Great Britain had in this instance made ai
attempt to inaugurate negotiations with Hitler for a separate peace
Clearly, such behaviour on the part of the Governments o
Britain and? the U. S. A. can only be regarded as an infringe
ment of the most elementary duties and obligations of allies.
These documents, fragments of the supposed Hohenlohe re
port to the Sicherheitsdienst, are the seed which Bob Ed
wards, Carl Marzani, and Fred Cook will cooperate in bring
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ing to full flower in 1961. The Western writers will also re-
produce the reasons adduced by Falsifiers of History for the
U.S. Government's and Allen Dulles' solicitude about the fu-
ture of Germany:
The role played by the American monopolies, headed by the
du Pont, Morgan, Rockefeller, Lamont and other industrial baronial
families, in financing German heavy industry and establishing
the closest ties between American and German industry is well
known. . . The Schroeder bank . . . furnishes a typical example
of the close interlocking of American and German, as well as
British, capital. Allen Dulles, director of the J. Henry Schroeder
Banking Corporation in New York, which represented the Schroe-
der interests in London, Cologne, and Hamburg, played a leading
role in the affairs of this bank. An outstanding role in the New
York branch of the Schroeder bank was played by the law firm
of Sullivan and Cromwell, headed by John Foster Dulles . . .
and closely connected with the Rockefeller world oil trust, Stand-
ard Oil, as well as with the Chase National, the biggest bank in
America, which made enormous investments in German industry.
But first the East German and Soviet propagandists revive
and nurture the story. In 1959 it reappears, already putting
forth new shoots, in a chapter contributed to a German-lan-
guage historical study 5 by one Josef Hodic. Hodic has addi-
tional participants in the Dulles-Hohenlohe conversations on
both sides. He does not name the other Sicherheitsdienst
agents, but says that Mr. Dulles had a subordinate named
Robert Taylor (cover name Mr. Roberts) , an expert in Euro-
pean economics, who also dealt with the Nazi "emissaries."
He says further that the Hohenlohe reports were accompanied
by a cover letter over the signature of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer
Ahrens forwarding them from one Sicherheitsdienst office to
another.
Hodic weaves into his account references to the Schroeder
bank, I.G. Farben, Vereinigten Stahlwerke, etc., as links be-
tween the U.S. representative and the Nazis. He says that
. Mr. Dulles told Hohenlohe it was errors in Nazi foreign policy
'Die Hintergruende des Muenchner Abkommens von 1938, volume
2 of a series said to be prepared by a "Commission of Historians of
East Germany and Czechoslovakia." Edited by Drs. Karl Obermann
of Berlin and Josef Polisensky of Prague, published by Ruetten and
Loening, Berlin. Hodic's contribution is headed "Die Fortsetzung der
Politik von Muenchen durch die Westmaechte im Zweiten Weltkrieg."
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that had forced Great Britain and the United States to enter
the war, and he continues with a new interpretive account:
The basis from which Dulles began the negotiation was that
the next war would be conducted between the USA and her allies
on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. The entire post-
war order of Europe should be subordinated to this conception
of the development of the world. From this position Dulles criti-
cized fascist Germany's internal and external politics of recent
times. . . . Because of a psychological error?which was mentioned
many times?the German government caused the Anglo-Saxon
powers to enter a state of preparedness for war, caused Great
Britain to introduce general conscription, and caused the U. S. to
turn away from her isolationist policies. . . .
From the beginning Roosevelt's special representative recognized
the historical significance of Adolf Hitler. . . Dulles declared
that in principle he did not reject national socialism and its basic
ideas and actions. For example, he indicated that the last
Goebbels speech was a masterpiece and that he had read it with
great satisfaction. . . . The guiding principle for the new order
in Europe after the war must be the realization that the next
war will be between the USA and the USSR. . . . Germany should
not come out of the war weakened nor should people like the
Germans be forced to desperate measures to overcome injustices
and misery. Moreover, the German state must continue to exist
as a factor of order and restoration. There could be no question
of the division of Germany or the separation of Austria. A strong,
federalized Germany with a neighboring Danube confederation
could guarantee order and rejuvenation in Middle and Raste.rn
Europe. Through the expansion of Poland towards the East,
through the creation of a strong Hungary and a strong Rumania,
a cordon sanitaire would be erected.
Dulles and Taylor ascribed only a limited importance to the
Czechoslovakian question. Both of them visualized that some day
a solution to this question within the framework of the Reich
would be acceptable. . . .
Dulles . . . informed himself exhaustively on the question of
whether there existed among the German bourgeoisie and German
workers anar hustle or other nihilistic tendencies which would strive
for a sovietization of Germany. . . . For Dulles there was no
thought which was more unacceptable than that the Germans
might enter discussions of any sort with the Soviet Union after
the military catastrophe of 1943. Nothing disturbed him more
than the possibility of the postwar expansion of the influence
of the USSR in Europe or in the Middle East. Max Hohenlohe
emphasized that Mr. Dulles, unlike the British, did not want under
any conditions to see the Russians reach the Dardanelles or the
oil areas of Rumania and the Middle past.
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Dulles and Taylor never missed an opportunity to emphasize
that the discussion with Herr Hohenlohe and the other negotiators
was a pleasure, for they had heard enough from the old bankrupt
politicians, immigrants, and prejudiced Jews.
This elaboration, buried in the midst of other ponderous
historical "scholarship," cannot be counted a major salvo in
the anti-CIA campaign. But also in 1959 there was published
in East Berlin a cheap, sensational paper-back with a female
spy on its cover entitled Allen's Gangsters in Action, by Julius
Mader, 6 and containing, among other denigrations of the CIA,
a further distorted version of the Hohenlohe episode as em-
bellished by Hodic. Mader prints a facsimile of the purported
cover letter signed by SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Ahrens for-
warding the Hohenlohe report to Sicherheitsdienst office
VI D.7
Mader changes the identity of Mr. Dulles' "subordinate" and
carries the solution of "the Czechoslovakian problem" to its
logical conclusion:
Both of the American gentlemen (at the conference with the
SS deputy, in addition to Dulles, was present Mr. Myron Taylor,
a leading manager of the U.S. Steel Corporation?j.M.) could
imagine, for example, that one day and finally a solution to Czecho-
slovakia within the German Reich [italics in original] could be
acceptable. . . . The German state (in other words, the Hitlerian
version thereof?J.M.) must remain as a factor of order and res-
toration; there could be no question of a division of Germany
or a separation of Austria.
Mader treats the insidious influence of banking and big
business, especially oil, as follows:
After 1926 we find him [Allen Dulles] a partner in the law office
of Sullivan and Cromwell, established by his brother in 1911, which
is situated in Wall Street, New York, and which, significantly,
? Julius Mader, Aliens Gangster in Aktion, Berlin, Kongress-Verlag,
1959.
9 The Mader and Hodic versions had actually been anticipated, with
journalistic promptness, by the Czech party daily, Rude Pravo, which
in October 1958 carried a similar account, illustrated with a facsimile
of the Ahrens letter and a photograph of nine lines of Hohenlohe
report text.
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represents the interests of the Standard Oil Company, amo:
others, on a contractual basis. Then followed years during whi
he exercised the following functions: director of the Americ:
Bank Note Co., member of the board of directors and of the 3
search section of "Council on Foreign Relations" in New YO1
Together with his brother John Foster, five years his senior, All
Dulles hastily snatched up several million dollars and alrea
belonged to the "top drawer" of "better" American society. T
basis for his millions was sweat, but not his own.
The next year, 1960, saw the publication of an even mo
elaborate version of the Hohenlohe story in the New Tim
of Moscow.8 This eight-page article repeats all the ma
themes of the earlier versions and is the most complete
all, including a facsimile of the Ahrens letter and a phot
graph of five lines said to be from a Hohenlohe report.9 B
there remained the task of winning credence for this in
terial in the West by arranging for its publication from
ostensibly non-Communist source.
The British M. P. Bob Edwards and his co-author Kenne
Dunne met this requirement. In January 1961 Edwei?
writes:
Now let us analyse the famous negotiations that took place
Switzerland. For this purpose we shall have at our disposal thi
authentic documents comprising a record of the talks which
Dulles and his assistant held with the German emissaries Prir
Maximilian Egon Hohenlohe and Dr. Schudekopf. These do(
ments were written in April and belong to the files of the Depa
ment VI (Amt. [sic] VI) of the SS Reich Security Office.
Edwards does not tell how he came into possession of t:
"three authentic documents," nor does he print any facsin
les. But his account is detailed, spinning out all the ma
themes of the preceding versions and like them twisting i
vestigative conversations that may have taken place betwe
Mr. Dulles and German sources including Hohenlohe into I.
ficial negotiations with Nazi "emissaries."
"Documents, on Allen Dulles's Secret Negotiations with the Na
in 1943," New Times, published by Trud, Moscow, No. 27, July 19
Prepared for the press by L. Bezymensky and A. Leonidov.
'From a different page than the nine lines reproduced by Rude Pm.
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Mr. Dunes' representation of big business interests, how-
ever, is handled with greater restraint for the British audi-
ence:
He had little difficulty in obtaining a post in the highly re-
spectable legal firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. This firm, with
which old John Foster still had dealings, was one of the largest
in Wall Street. Among the mighty concerns to which it gave legal
advice were the Rockefellers themselves. Its ties with the Morgans
were no less firmly established.
But Edwards is careful to mention the matter of oil. Besides
repeating the passage from the earlier accounts in which Mr.
Dulles "on no account wished to see the Russians at the Dar-
danelles or in the oil areas of Rumania or Asia Minor," he
points out that
By 1926 . . . he had been placed in charge of Near East affairs
at the State Department. This was an extremely busy post, for
in the twenties the Near East was regarded with considerable
interest by the United States. The Near East meant oil.
The British book now becomes the ostensible source for the
two expos?published later in 1961 in the United States. In
Cuba Vs. the CIA, Light/Marzani announce:
A British Member of Parliament, Mr. Robert Edwards, has ob-
tained and published documents from the files of the SS Reich
Security Office of conversations held between Dulles and a high
SS official in February, 1943.
Note that the documents are now said to have been published,
and that Hohenlohe, who according to the Ahrens facsimile
was Sicherheitsdienst agent No. 144/7957, has become "a high
SS official." There is no discussion of how Edwards acquired
his mysterious documents.
Light/Marzani devote two pages to quotations and sum-
maries from Edwards, stressing the theme of Mr. Dulles' anti-
Semitism introduced in Hodic's reference to "prejudiced Jews"
and making the now familiar references to big business and
oil interests:
Dulles . . . became head of the Division for Near East af-
fairs. . . . Near Ra-qt means oil and during this period the battle
between American and British oil companies took place with
Rockefeller finally getting 25 per cent of the shares of Iraq Pe-
troleum Co., Mellon's group of the Gulf Oil Corporation getting
priority rights on the Bahrein Islands.
36 SECRET
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In 1926 Dulles resigned from the State Department for a post
in the powerful legal firm of Sullivan and Cromwell which had
ties and dealings with Rockefeller and Morgan among other
American corporations. Dulles' knowledge of oil stood him in
good stead as evidenced quickly by the affair of the so-called "Barco
Concession" in the oil fields of Colombia . . . [which] Colombian
President Dr. Miguel Abadia Mendez denounced. The Morgan-
Mellon group chose two experts on the art of putting pressure,
both former State Department officials?Allen Dulles and Francis
Loomis.
The culmination in this transformation from a 1948 tad-
pole hatched by the Soviet Information Bureau to a 1961 bull-
frog croaking in a supposedly American pond appears in
Fred J. Cook's The CIA. Except for a few changes in em-
phasis for the benefit of American readers, Cook follows the
Edwards text, even to the chapter headings, almost to the
point of plagiarism. A sample of his treatment:
The Near East, then as now, was a sensitive area, and for much
the same reason?oil. British interests had had a hammerlock on
the rich preserves of the entire Mediterranean basin and had
tried to freeze out American rivals; but now such companies as
Gulf and Standard Oil were no longer to be denied. The years
during which Dulles headed the key Near Eastern Division were,
as it so happened, the very years during which the Rockefeller
interests in Standard Oil negotiated a toehold in the Iraq Petroleum
Co., and the very years in which the Melons of Gulf were laying
the groundwork for valuable concessions in the Bahrein Islands.
Both of these developments became public and official in 1927,
the year after Dulles left the State Department to join the New
York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. . . .
Just as Allen Dulles was quitting the State Department, Dr.
Miguel Abadia-Mendez was elected President of Colombia. . . . He
threatened to repudiate the Barco Concession . . . . Worried
American oil barons . . . turned naturally to their legal brains.
One such brain was Francis B. Loomis, a former State Department
official; another, Allen W. Dulles. . . .
Dulles and his older brother, John Foster, . . . were partners
in the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell; they represented the same
clients and the same interests. . . . Most important among their
varied interests, and claiming a major share of their attention,
were some of Germany's greatest international cartels. . . . Out-
side Germany, the Schroeder financial empire stretched long and
powerful tentacles. In England, it had J. H. Schroeder Ltd.; in
the United States, the Schroeder Trust Company and the J. Henry
Schroeder Corporations. Allen Dulles sat on the board of directors
of both. . . .
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The Allen Dulles of 1918, of 1942-45, of 1947-48, seems the same
man, with the same strong alliances to top-level Germans regardless
of their ideology.
Cook makes a final important contribution to the develop-
ment of the Hohenlohe fabrication. Whereas Edwards keeps
very quiet about how he obtained his documents, Cook says
he got them "from absolutely reliable sources in Bonn."
Moreover, he attributes this claim to Edwards. (He says that
Edwards acquired a number of documents, including the three
dealing with Mr. Dulles and the SS, whereas Edwards claims a
total of three.) The whole composite structure thus ostensi-
bly rests now on an authentic Western original source.1?
Now that the Cook piece has appeared in The Nation, the
Communist propagandists are all set for their regular West to
East replay.11 The Bombay weekly Blitz, whose editor spe-
cializes in attacks on the United States and CIA, printed the
following in its 15 July 1961 issue:
Blitz-readers have heard of the cloak and dagger of the CIA,
the notorious American agency of espionage, subversion and aggres-
sion. Now they will read a terrible and terrifying exposure of this
secret agency and its international crimes by Fred J. Cook, whose
exposures have won him several important American press awards
during the last three years.
And the next day, 16 July, Izvestia carried an article by V.
Matveyev headed "The Nether Regions of Allen Dulles" and
subtitled "Department for Overthrowing Governments and
Imposing Puppet Regimes: Dollars Are Buying Diversionists
and Provocateurs" which consisted of excerpts and para-
phrases from the Cook article.
Portrait of a Monster
In tracing the development of the Hohenlohe legend to es-
tablish the direct line of descent that runs from the Soviet
Information Bureau to Edwards, Marzani, and Cook, we have
" On the cover of Edwards' book the title is superimposed upon the
image of a 1940 French intelligence report that includes the phrase
Source: Bonne ("Source: Good") . If pressed, Cook might argue that
he mistook Bonne for Bonn.
11 For examples of this standard procedure see Alma Fryxell's "Psywar
by Forgery" in Studies V 1, p. 25 if.
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seen illustrated some of the themes used in the recent can
paign of defamation against CIA. One might summarize:
Allen Dulles is pro-German, friendly to fascism, and ant
Semitic. He owes primary allegiance to rich and powerfl
private commercial interests, and his CIA is the servant (
big business.
Allusions to the ties between big business and U.S. intell
gence, like other government functions, are of course con
mon in the Bloc press and radio commentaries. At the tin
of Gomulka's coup in Poland, for example, it was said till
Allen Dulles had a special reason for being interested in P(
land: in private life he had been a lawyer for the "Harrima
group," which at one time owned extensive natural resourc(
and industrial enterprises in Upper Silesia. "This indicati
what is behind the alleged anxiety of the two Dulles fc
Polish independence." (Neues Deutschland, 23 October 1956
Similarly, in reviewing "The Fruits of American Espionage
The United Fruit Company grabbed the lion's share of the U.
victory in Guatemala. The Dulles brothers are principal shar
holders in this company. (V. Cholakow in Robotnichesko Del
23 March 1957.)
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But in 1960 the Communist media seemed to become esp
cially vehement in charging that U.S. intelligence was beir
perverted to the service of U.S. business:
The close and long association of Allen Dulles with the billionai
family, the Rockefellers, insured him for rapid advancement. .
It cannot be said that Dulles has not been grateful to his patror
On the contrary, he is trying in every way to poison the inte
national situation so that his masters may continue to mal
profits out of the armaments race. (The Soviet Internation
Affairs, 17 May 1960.)
On 29 May 1960 the Peking NCNA named China as CIA's fir
major target because "this happened to be where Standa-,
Oil suffered its greatest losses from revolution." And char
ing that CIA mobilized shock forces in 1953 to overthre
Iranian Premier Mossadegh, it suggested the reader "no
that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which Dulles was su
couring, was a client of Sullivan and Cromwell."
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TASS reported thus the final Soviet version of the Hohen-
lohe story on 10 August 1960:
V. Chernow has contributed to the New Times magazine an
article describing certain secrets of the office headed by Allen
Dulles. He points out that the Central Intelligence office, whose
activities reflect the will of the financial and industrial rulers
of the United States, now represents the direct tool of the American
monopolies in their violent all-out bid for world domination.
And on 25 August 1960 Neues Deutschland referred to
CIA, the espionage organization of Allen Dulles, the man who . . .
represents the interests of the big American monopoly association,
the Rockefeller trust.
A frightening conclusion often drawn or inferred from
these charges forms another theme of the campaign, and in-
deed its dominant note. It is that
The U.S. intelligence service poses a direct menace to world
peace. This theme can be illustrated in other contexts by
somewhat parallel quotations from Fred Cook and from the
third major white propaganda salvo, a Soviet compilation
called Caught in, the Act: Facts about U.S. Espionage and
Subversion Against the U.S.S.R.12
From Caught in the Act:
The aggressive, provocative nature of U.S. intelligence calls for
the constant and timely exposure of its machinations as dangerous
to the cause of peace.
It is quite obvious that spy flights like these along the Soviet
state frontiers, at a time when an accidental or wilful intrusion
by a spy plane into Soviet air space may happen at any moment,
are a threat to peace and a source of international tension.
The unmasking and stopping of the U.S. intelligence service's
criminal provocations against the peace-loving peoples is a prime
condition for guaranteeing durable peace.
From Cook:
Destructive as such incidents are to America's image, they do
not menace the peace of the world like the more grandiose CIA
endeavors that led directly to the crises of Quemoy and Matsu.
The Burmese crisis that all but turned friend into foe, the re-
current crises on Quemoy and Matsu, vividly illustrate the manner
In which the secret and militant activities of CIA create for us a
n Published by the Soviet Information Bureau, Moscow, 1960.
40
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foreign policy all their own. They illustrate the way the CI
tail wags the American dog and how such wagging can qui
easily plunge the whole animal?and all his brethren?into ti
most horrible of history's wars.
Our people do not understand that, even as our Presidents spea
the actions of CIA frequently invest their words with every a
pearance of the most arrant hypocrisy. The Presidents spec
peace; but the CIA overthrows regimes, plots internal sabotage at
revolution, foists opium-growers on a friendly nation, directs mi
tary invasions, backs right-wing militarists. These are not tl
actions of a democratic, peace-loving nation devoted to the hif
ideals we profess. These are the actions of the Comintern
right-wing robes.
The last two quotations from Cook lead us into the first
some other thematic characteristics with which the Sovi
psywax artists clothe their bogey-man. There are four
them:
CIA interferes with and even creates State Department ar
U.S. foreign policy. It tries unilaterally and secretly to ove
throw legal governments.
CIA is perfidious and unprincipled. It spies on Americc
friends as well as its foes.
CIA dominates and manipulates supposedly irulepende
organizations, governmental as well as private. It MiSILS
emigre groups and turns them into spy nests.
Despite the fact that it costs the U.S. taxpayer fantast
sums, CIA is incompetent.
We shall look at each of these in turn.
Cloaked Policy Maker
The theme that CIA warps national foreign policy or mak
its own policy is illustrated in the following passages fro
Bloc propaganda, including the major vehicles cited in t:
foregoing.
The job of the Office of National Estimates is to be the great(
falsifier in the world, so that U.S. policy can be warped. (A1/61
Gangsters)
Allen Dulles's separate policy. . . departs in many imports
details from official American policy. Systematically the Seca
Service delivers incomplete or even false information to the govel
ment, only to exploit the actual lag of the U.S. by releasing to t
public . . . reports. . . designed to further his aspirations
power. (Budapest Pesti Hirlap, 12 April 1960)
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42
This highly powerful organization headed by Allen Dulles is the
most influential of all American espionage organizations today.
This is no trifling matter in view of the fact that by now various
intelligence organizations have all but assumed top-level political
control. (Budapest Magyar Nemzet, 2 June 1960)
In our minds Mr. Allen Dulles has always been associated with
Mr. John Foster Dulles, and not only because they have lived their
fascinating lives almost side by side. Our anxiety is based on the
fact that such a combination of two similarly minded brothers in
two such posts (intelligence and diplomacy) automatically places
a question mark against Mr. Allen Dulles's noble intention of having
nothing to do with policy and supplying only hard facts. . . . Some
people assert that Allen Dulles not only worked in close contact
with John Foster but eventually began to conduct his own foreign
policy. On January 28, 1960, the Evening Star stated that the
C.I.A. was "beginning to make policies at home and abroad," and
on June 6 the Detroit Times remarked that to a certain extent
the C.I.A. was conducting "its own foreign policy." (Edwards/
Dunn)
The world has evidence that the decision to send the American
Sixth Fleet into Lebanon waters and land U.S. marines on Lebanon
territory also came from Mr. Dulles. It has been described how
in the early hours of the morning of July 14, 1958, he literally got
everyone out of bed and forced them to authorize the intervention.
(ibid.)
We cannot see that the C.I.A.'s "own foreign policy" has done
America a lot of good. Mr. Dulles was not original. He was so taken
up by brother John's political doctrine that he simply practised it in
his own peculiar way. Even today, for instance, sharp-tongued
Drew Pearson claims that America has two Secretaries of State.
One is known as Allen Dulles. Pearson adds that the C.I.A. has
harmed U.S. foreign policy on more than one occasion. We think
Pearson is right. (ibid.)
On June 29, 1959, the New York Times printed . . . a report of
the replies given by retired officers of the Foreign Service to a
Foreign Relations Committee inquiry on American foreign policy.
One high-ranking diplomat wrote: "Every senior officer of the
Foreign Service has heard something of C.I.A.'s subversive efforts
In foreign countries and probably most of them have some authen-
tic information about C.IA. operations of this nature in some
particular case. Unfortunately, most of these activities appear to
have been blundering affairs and most, if not all of them, seem to
have resulted to the disadvantage of the United States and some-
times in terrible failure." The truth of these remarks is now
obvious not only to former Foreign Service officials but to the
whole world. The West is a laughing stock in the eyes of the
East. (arid.)
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It is our profound conviction that in the next few years gr(
political struggles will take place in our country to take Americ
foreign policy out of the hands of the CIA, the Pentagon, the amn
ments corporations and the political diehards.. . . Despite Dul
protestations to the contrary, the CIA under his direction I
consistently edged into foreign policy and has acted again a
again as if it were a government superimposed on a governme
(Light/Marzani)
It is characteristic that the Senate Sub-Committee [on Natio]
Policy Machinery] qualified the U.S. secret service as an instrum(
of national policy, emphasizing thereby that the task of the see
service was not only to collect intelligence but also to take
direct hand in the conduct of state policy. (Caught in the Act
It is significant that as the CIA became the headquarters
United States espionage and subversion, it acquired great influei
in shaping United States foreign policy under the Eisenhox
Administration. . . . Thus, the well-informed West-German jo
nalist Joachim Joesten, in his book about the CIA" . . . wrote t]
the United States Central Intelligence Agency has in the p
decade left a peculiar imprint on the entire American foreign poli
The Central Intelligence Agency, its aims and methods, predo]
nate in Washington today over all other offices, principles and tra
tions. (ibid.)
The United States intelligence establishment is provided w
enormous funds, is vested with great powers, and has, in fact,
come a body which often exerts decisive influence on the ent
state policy of the United States. (ibid.)
In a basic sense, CIA made foreign policy and this (says 1
New Republic, for example) "was the natural end-result of a brc
usurpation of power which took place, almost unnoticed, dart
those anomalous years when one Dulles ran the State Departm4
and another the agency [emphasis added?L. & M] Since 1
death of Foster Dulles this usurpation has grown increasin
visible, and Cuba turned a searing spotlight on the phenomer
of a government which has come to have, in effect, two State]
partments." Perhaps the most important consequence of the h
ure of the Cuban invasion is that for the first time the Americ
people have had a glimpse of the sinister influence of the CIA
foreign policy. (Light/Marzani)
Time and again, CIA has meddled actively in the internal ails
of foreign governments. And it is in this field that some of
most vaunted successes raise grave questions about the drift a
intent of our foreign policy. . . . It is certainly questionable enot
to have American foreign policy tugged and hauled all over the rr
by the super-secret activities of CIA cloak-and-dagger boys, oper
ing free of any effective restraint or control. (Cook)
la Reviewed in Studies II 4, p. 82 it.
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The Hungarian Revolt of 1956. The CIA's role in promoting and
encouraging this abortive and tragic uprising, which we were not
prepared to support after we had instigated it, remains shrouded
in top-level, cloak-and-dagger secrecy. It seems well established,
however, that arms were smuggled into both Poland and Hungary,
either by the CIA or its Gehlen collaborators. . . . More important
than the unresolved issue of arms-smuggling . ? . is still another
unresolved matter?the responsibility of CIA in whipping up the
Hungarian rebels to fanatic self-sacrifice in a hopeless cause.
One of the three series of covert mailings supporting the
anti-CIA campaign was also devoted to this theme. It was a
forgery based on a Senate Foreign Relations Committee pam-
phlet which made public the views of selected retired Foreign
Service officers about U.S. foreign policy, views which Ed-
wards/Dunne quote from the New York Times in one of the
passages reproduced above. The pertinent section of the orig-
inal pamphlet read as follows:
It is recommended that members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations read Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and Na-
tional Security, Harvard University Press, 1958." This is as au-
thoritative a book on the CIA as is available. The author is an
enthusiastic supporter of CIA but in spite of himself, he presents a
frightening picture of an organization twice as big as the Depart-
ment of State spending tremendous sums under little or no super-
vision and he questions its compatibility with the American demo-
cratic system. He speaks of "undercover political intrigue" and
"backstage political action" and states that little reliable informa-
tion exists as to the extent to which CIA has aided foreign rebel-
lions. It is true that there is little accurate information available,
but every senior officer of the Department of State and every
senior officer of the Foreign Service has heard something of CIA's
subversive efforts in foreign countries and probably most of them
have some authentic information about CIA operations of this
nature in some particular case. Unfortunately, most of these ac-
tivities seem to have resulted to the disadvantage of the United
States and sometimes in terrible failure.
Ransom says: "Perceptive students of public affairs visiting or
working overseas often get the impression that CIA agents, and
the intelligence operatives of other Government agencies, are op-
erating in uncoordinated fashion in every dark alley, behind every
bush, and often in each other's hair." Most diplomatic and con-
sular officers abroad can vouch for the accuracy of this statement.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in most diplomatic
"Reviewed in Studies II 4, p. 79 if.
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and consular establishments abroad espionage agents of the C.
are stationed masquerading as diplomatic and consular office
Ransom says again: ". . . certainly the scope of CIA operatic).
is to a large extent self-determined . . . certainly the Congress h
no voice as to how and where CIA is to function, other than pi
hibiting it to engage in domestic security activities. . .
existence of a massive institution possessed of secret informatit
and operating invisibly at home and abroad is a locus of pow
unchecked by the normal processes of democratic government."
It is recommended: (a) That if the subversive activities of C:
in foreign countries are to be continued at all they be carried o
very, very rarely, be subjected to greater control than at presei
and be carried out more secretly and skillfully than at presei
(b) That the espionage activities of CIA be no longer carried o
from the protection of embassies, legations and consulates. Ai
(c) That Congress exercise greater control over the activities
CIA."
Beginning on 12 September 1960, the following forgery i
spired by this document was mailed in thermofax copies
various foreign embassies in Washington and to employe
of the Department of State and newspaper correspondeni
Honest workers of the Department of State and Foreign Servi
are deeply concerned over the tendency on the part of the Centr
Intelligence Agency to take over foreign policy functions from t
State Department.
Our Department has already lost to CIA a great deal of its i
fluence and control over U.S. foreign policy.
The CIA has burgeoned into an organization twice as big as t
State Department spending tremendous sums under little or:
supervision.
In most of our diplomatic and consular establishments abrol
hundreds of espionage agents of the CIA are stationed masquera
ing as diplomatic or consular officers.
It is true that there is little accurate information . . . b
every . . . officer of the Department of State and every . . offic
of the Foreign Service has heard something of CIA's subversi
efforts in foreign countries and probably most of them have sor
authentic information about CIA operations . . . in some particul
ease. Unfortunately, most of these activities seem to have be,
blundering affairs and most, if not all of them, seem. to have
suited to the disadvantage of the United States and sometimes
terrible failure.
15 Study of United States Foreign Policy: Summary of Views of Retir
Foreign Service Officers, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Rei
tions, United States Senate, printed by the GPO on 15 June 1959.
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This is what we propose:
(a) That the espionage activities . . . be no longer carried out
from the protection of U.S. embassies, legations and consulates.
(b) That if the subversive activities of CIA in foreign countries
are to be continued at all, they be carried out very, very rarely, be
subjected to greater control than at present, and be carried out
more skillfully and secretly than at present.
(c) That Congress exercise greater control over the activities
of CIA.
FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEES AND OTHER AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
AND ESPIONAGE
About two-thirds of the letter was copied verbatim from
the Senate document, but note the characteristic Commu-
nist phrase "Honest workers" in the part not copied. Note
also the striking similarity in name between the ostensible
sponsor and the genuine organization "Protestants and Other
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State,"
a kind of plagiarism the Bloc psywar operators often use in
creating a phantom organization. There are other indica-
tions of the origin of the document?that another recent Bloc
forgery was similarly based upon materials released by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,16 that it is a standard
Communist tactic to surface forgeries through mailings to pri-
vate individuals and newspaper correspondents, that it is fre-
quent Bloc practice to use photocopies or thermofax in order
to hamper technical analysis, and that the State Department
stationery, complete with seal, here used was used also in a
later series of mailings, as we shall see. Moreover, the enve-
lopes used were made of low-grade paper normally exported
from the United States, and the typewriter that made the
master copy of the letter and addressed all the envelopes is
a Remington Rand containing a style of type designed for
Estonian writing and is probably the same machine that
" See pages 29 and 42 of Hearing before the Subcommittee to In-
vestigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary: Testimony
of Richard Helms, Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency, June
2, 1961, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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typed a diplomatic note sent to Mr. Herter during his tent
as Secretary of State by the diplomatic representatives
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in Washington.
A sub-theme of the portrayal of CIA as undercover poli
maker, one prominent in the Foreign Service Employees f(
gery, is that CIA meddles in foreign affairs by seeking cla
destinely to overthrow legal governments. This facet is giv
particular attention in the following passages from the psym
salvos:
In early 1959, the Cambodian government forestalled a co
d'etat headed by the traitors Sam Sari and Dap Chkhoun. . . . T
records of the plot trial published in the Realite Cambogienne
October 1, 1959, disclosed that the Americans had a direct part
the matter." (Caught in the Act)
CIA agents played a big role in the overthrow of the Mossade
government in Iran. . . . Shortly before the overthrow, the cen
was visited by Allen Dulles, allegedly on his vacation. . . . Acco:
ing to the American press, the CIA spent some nineteen milli
dollars to bribe the officers who were to perpetrate the plot. (aril
The records convincingly proved that the American secret serv:
in collaboration with the Baghdad Pact members was prepari
a plot against the Syrian Republic. The conspirators sought
overthrow the legitimate Syrian government and to put dumm
in power in the country. (ibid.)
Of late the U.S. intelligence has been increasingly trying
organize espionage and subversion against the neutrals. . tryi
through plots to overthrow the lawfully elected governments
these countries and replace them with regimes that would side wi
the U.S A. (ibid.)
It has been published and never denied that the CIA has si
verted government after government, not stopping at the use
military force. The CIA role in overthrowing the Mossadegh
ernment in Iran and the Arbenz government in Guatemala I
been underlined in innumerable publications. A Saturday Eveni
Past article over four years ago declared that CIA agents h
worked with Naguib and Nasser in the overthrow of King Faro
in 1952 and the responsible British New Statesman (May 12, 196
flatly asserted that the CIA "disposed of Patrice Lumumba." ThE
are persistent reports in France that CIA agents were involved
the generals' abortive revolt in Algeria. There are strong groun
for believing the CIA supported Chiang Kai-shek's defeated troo
which retreated to Burma and set up bases there for hit-and-r
" This "proof" was itself a forgery. See Testimony of Richard Hell;
op. cit., p. 18.
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raids on China. This led to serious friction between the U.S. and
Burma. (Light/Marzani)
Consider the case of Chiang's Burmese opium growers. In 1951,
following the collapse of Chiang's regime on the mainland, several
thousands of his followers fled across the Yunnan border into
Northern Burma. American policy makers decided to arm and
equip these Nationalist troops for a reinvasion of Yunnan Province.
From Formosa, CIA allegedly masterminded the operation. Arms,
munitions, supplies were airlifted into Burma, but despite this
support, there is little evidence that Chiang's gallant warriors ever
wreaked much damage on the Chinese Reds. Instead, the Na-
tionalists discovered they could achieve the finer life more easily
by growing opium, and a great number of them settled down in
Northern Burma and proceeded to do just that.
The Burmese, a most unreasonable people, were not happy with
this ideal, CIA-created situation. For some inexplicable reason,
they seemed to resent the presence of this foreign army on their
soil; and when Chiang's fighters, showing no regard for Burmese
sovereignty, practically took over the state of Kengtung and estab-
lished their own government, the Burmese actually filed a vigorous
protest with the United States. As Charles Edmundson. . . wrote
in The Nation (Nov. 7, 1957) , the American Ambassador in Burma
hadn't been let in on the secret of what the CIA and the Chinese
Nationalists were up to. The Ambassador, William J. Sebald,
therefore denied in perfect good faith that America had anything
to do with supporting Chiang's guerrillas in Burma. Burmese
Prime Minister U Nu knew better and became so incensed he sus-
pended all U.S. Point Four activities and almost broke off relations
entirely. Eventually, our own Ambassador resigned his post in
protest against our own program, and American prestige through-
out Southeast Asia sported a couple of very unlovely black eyes.
(Cook)
When, hard on the heels of Cuba, the French generals in Algeria
tried to overthrow Charles de Gaulle, we were confronted by all-
but-official charges in the French press that CIA once more had
egged on the militarists. M. Soustelle, at a luncheon in Washing-
ton last December 7, is said to have talked long and earnestly to
CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell, Jr., on the proposition that
de Gaulle's program in Algeria could lead only to communism. CIA
is said to have been impressed; General ChaLle, who led the revolt,
is said to have had several meetings with CIA agents; he is reported
to have been given the impression that he would have the support
of the United States. (ibid.)
The rumor Light/Marzani and Cook cite of the CIA insti-
gation or backing of the Challe revolt was itself instituted
and spread by Bloc propagandists 18 as part of this campaign
See Testimony of Richard Helms, pp. 2-5.
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to picture CIA as seeking to overthrow legal governme]
through clandestine operations and more broadly as maki
U.S. policy instead of serving it. Cook also treats at so:
length and in similar free-wheeling style the Guatemal
coup and the overthrow of Mossadegh, and then concludes
follows:
The answer seems clear and unequivocal to anyone who will sti
the record. It has been given in a number of places?in E
Germany, in Poland, in Hungary, in the Middle East. Behind raf
of the eruptions that in recent years have shaken the peace of
uncertain world, close examination will reveal the fine, schem
hand of CIA. And it will reveal, too, that CIA time and again]
stirred up the brush fires without any regard for the long-ra3
consequences.
Treacherous Ally
The propaganda portrayal of CIA as perfidious and unpr
cipled, spying on friend and foe alike, is seen in the followl
passages:
The guiding principle of any coalition is an honorable attiti
to one's allies, particularly in face of the enemy. Mr. Dulles alloN
himself to violate this principle both in regard to Russia, w-hicl
understandable, knowing Dulles, and in regard to Britain, whicl
monstrous and incomprehensible. (Edwards/Dunne)
Now no one dared to believe that the American claim to leat
ship of the capitalistic camp, especially in . . [espionage] can
guaranteed through "official" agreements. Whoever would be re?
to make that assumption would ignore the law of the wolf, wt
dominates everywhere under capitalistic circumstances. . . . Th4
fore the secret services of capitalistic countries?except for a
tam n coordination against the socialistic camp?work consp
tonally against each other, now as in the past. (Allen's Gangste
The Wall Street journal wrote in an editorial on February 8, 1S