STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 1958]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 135
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: STUDY

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CON I EI"TIAL'
STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
JOB N0. ~~g39d1(~
BOX P1fl, _ ---------
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VOL. 2 NO. 1
LW
,1938
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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Mia
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibted by law.
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CONFIDEI"IMAL
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONTENTS
Page
Origin, Missions, and Structure of CIA
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
1
Strategic Thinking and Air Intelligence
Major General James H. Walsh
7
Concepts for a Philosophy of Air Intelligence
Lewis R. Long
31
Developments in Air Targeting : The Military Resources
Model . . . . . . . . . . Robert W. Leavitt
51
Horrible Thought . . . . . . . . . W. A. Tidwell
65
ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System
Charles A. Kroger, Jr.
71
Report on Hungarian Refugees . . . . Guy E. Coriden
85
Paper Mills and Fabrication . . . Stephen M. Arness
95
Lost Order, Lost Cause
C. Bowie Millican, Robert M. Gelman,
and Thomas A. Stanhope
103
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence
The New Class-An Analysis of the Communist System,
by Milovan Djilas . . . . . . . . Lena Marks
115
The Soviet Secret Police, by Simon Wolin and Robert M.
Slusser . . . . . . . . . . John Rondeau
123
We Spied . . . . . . . . . Walter L. Pforzheimer
131
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ORIGIN, MISSIONS, AND STRUCTURE OF CIA
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
This is a brief summary of the history of the modern origin of
the central intelligence concept and thus of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
In 1940 the fortunes of Britain and France were at their
lowest ebb. Some high-level officials of the US Government
were predicting that Great Britain could not hold out against
the Germans. To check on this, President Roosevelt sent Colo-
nel William J. Donovan, prominent New York attorney and
winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor as Commanding
60+1, Regiment in SATnrlrl War T abroad to dis-
Oar-c-- of th
e
t
fi
rs
cover and eport his estimate of the sil, atioi1. Don-all
visited the Mediterranean area, and on his second trip talked
to leaders of both Britain and QFr~ance. His report indicated
that Britain would hold out, lit he urged that the US im-
mediately organize itself for global warfare. Donovan's par-
ticular interest was in the intelligence field, and he went to
talk to Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of War Stimson,
and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an agency
which would combine intelligence with the forces of propa-
ganda and subversion.
On 10 June 1941, Donovan proposed "a service of strategic
information." This service would have an advisory panel com-
posed of the chiefs of intelligence of the Army, the Navy, the
Department of State, and the FBI. It would draw its personnel
from the Army and the Navy and would also have a civilian
staff. It would not displace or encroach upon the intelligence
prerogatives of the established departments, although it would
collect information independently. This was the start of the
Office of the Coordinator of Information which combined in-
formation, intelligence, and clandestine activities. In 1942,
however, the Coordinator of Information was split and the
Office of War Information - the predecessor of the present
? US Information Agency-was created and given the respon-
sibility for all overt attributable propaganda, information, and
to the Office of Strategic Services - went the responsibility for
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clandestine activities and for research and analysis of intelli-
gence.
From the OSS the present day intelligence community in-
herited certain assets. Among these were records and some
methods and means of procuring both overt and secret intelli-
gence. There were certain basic counterespionage files devel-
oped with the advice and assistance of some foreign intelligence
services, particularly the British. There was a considerable
reservoir of knowledge of procedures for research and analysis
of basic intelligence information. There were some skilled per-
sonnel. Finally, but far from last in importance, there were
agreements with key foreign intelligence services.
The history of the OSS, and particularly its relationship with
other US intelligence organizations during World War II, is far
too detailed for discussion in this essay. But it should be noted
that shortly after the creation of the Office of Strategic Services,
top-level officials in the US intelligence community started to
think about a peacetime intelligence service. On 25 August
1942, Brigadier General John Magruder wrote a paper on a
proposed plan for a joint intelligence bureau which would be
an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the next two years
there was considerable discussion of this and similar papers.
On 5 October 1944 a document was originated in the office of
General Donovan entitled "The Basis for a Permanent World-
Wide Intelligence Service." Certain of the principles enun-
ciated in this document are interesting,ta-mete. This service
would collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the policy or
strategy level. The proposed organiiai.on would have its own
means of communication and`corihroi over its secret operations.
It would not interfere with Npartmental intelligence and it
would not have any police function. An individual rather than
a collective responsibility for national intelligence was pro-
posed. Finally, the director of the proposed organization would
be responsible directly to the President.
It is interesting to note that Secretary of War Stimson com-
mented on the subject of intelligence coordination in his biog-
raphy "On Active Service in Peace and War." This quotation
reads: "Stimson was insistent that no impatience with its occa-
sional eccentricities should deprive the Army of the profits of co-
operation with General Donovan's Office of Strategic Services.
Throughout the war the intelligence activities of the United
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States Government remained incompletely coordinated, but
here again it was necessary to measure the profits of reorgani-
zation against its dislocations and on the whole, Stimson felt
that the American achievement in this field, measured against
the conditions of 1940, was more than satisfactory. A full re-
organization belonged to the post war period."
On 18 January 1945, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
reported to the JCS on the subject of a central intelligence
organization. The members propose first a national intelli-
gence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy and the Chief of Staffo :the President: There would be
an advisory board consisting of the heads of the various intel-
ligence services. The new organization would have the power
to inspect the operations of the various departmental intelli-
gence services and would have the responsibility for protecting
sources and methods.
At this juncture the press got in _Qf_the discussions for
creating a new intelligence organization and, on 9 February
1945, fairly complete details appeared in the Chicago Tribune
and the Washington Times Herald. There was considerable
furor, and some :members of Congress took a dim view of the
creation of what they felt might become a peacetime "gestapo."
Shortly after this - just a few days before his death -
President Roosevelt asked General Donovan to get together
with the heads of the various intelligence and security services
and get -a consensus of views on a central service. Donovan
did this and also went further and queried.,by letter, all of the
members of the Cabinet. Within the intelligence community
there was general agreement that a central service might be
appropriate, but there were several conflicting views as to
whether it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
Department of State, or to the President, and there was also
controversy as to whether there should be individual or collec-
tive responsibility for national intelligence. The response from
the Cabinet members was varied and ranged from yes to no.
After open hostilities had cea ed, as we all vividly remember,
there was almost frantic haste to demobilize not only the mili-
tary services but many of the war agencies. On 20 September
1945, the OSS was disbanded. Its Research and Analysis
Branch and its Presentation Unit were transferred to the De-
partment of State, its Secret Intelligence and Special Opera-
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tions Units were transferred to the Army, and the(forfne;=wvere
preserved in the Strategic Services Unit which reported to the
Secretary of the Army.
On 22 October 1945,a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt
on possible unification of the Army and Navy ,recommended a
central intelligence organization and a national security coun-
cil. On 14 November 1945,the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy met, discussed the proposed central intelligence organiza-
tion, and set up an interdepartmental working committee to
attempt to arrive at a unanimous recommendation.
The end product of these reports and committees was the
issuance on 22 January 1946 of the Executive Order creating the
Central Intelligence Group. ",.,.This Executive Order reflected
much of the thinking and work that had gone on during the
warms) A National Intelligence Authority was created, composed of
the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief
of Staff to the President. The Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Group was designated by the President, and per onneia
were to be assigned,from_ the respective departments l well as
recruited from civilian life. The Director of the new Central
Intelligence Group was charged by the Executive Order with
preparing plans for coordination. The new organization could
inspect the activities of departmental intelligence if such in-
spection were approved by the National Intelligence Authority.
It could recommend policies and objectives. It was responsible
for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence and
for the performance of services of common concern and such
other functions as directed. The Executive Order explicitly
stated that the departments would continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. Finally,
an Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of the heads of the
service intelligence agencies, was established to advise the Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Group.
With the creation of the Central Intelligence Group there
commenced a process of accretion of functions taken from the
wartime agencies and from departments which were anticipat-
ing reductions in budget under peacetime conditions. The
Strategic Services Unit was transferred from the Department
of the Army and became the Office of Special Operations
- charged with espionage and counterespionage functions. The
Washington Document Center was taken over from the Navy
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and shortly after that the Army's German Military Documents
Center at Fort Holabird joined this unit and together became
the Foreign Documents Division. The Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, an organization with worldwide bases for
monitoring all non-coded radio traffic, which had originally
been under the Federal Communications Commission, was
transferred from the Army and became the Foreign Broadcast
Information Division. During World War II the Army and
Navy and OSSIand occasionally other agencies had al4. ap-
proached US businesses and institutions in search of foreign
intelligence information. An early agreement was reached
that this domestic collection should be performed as a service
of common concern by Central Intelligence with other agencies
participating as they desired, and this became the Contact
Division. Another illustration of the type of functions taken
on is the division of responsibilities with the Department of
State on biographic intelligence. (The list would be much too
long if we attempted to enumerate all of the functions acquired
in this method.
Slightly over a year- and a -half after the creation of the
CIG-on 25 July 1947-the Congress, utilizing most of the fea-
tures of this Executive Order, passed the National Security Act
of 1947 creating the Central Intelligence Agency.
the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency becomes
fairly obvious with the preceding background. The National
Security Act of 1947 describes the general mission with em-
phasis on coordination and on performing services of common
concern. It should be clearly noted also that the legislation
assigns two roles to the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - over-all coordination,
as well as the role of head (s) of an Agency.
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STRATEGIC THINKING AND AIR INTELLIGENCE
Major General James H. Walsh
My purpose in this article is to discuss, in very broad terms,
some of the significant aspects of air strategy for the future
and the vital functions that intelligence must perform in order
to insure the success of future air operations. The suspicions
currently entertained that the Soviet sputnik may be getting
intelligence of both meteorological and cartographic nature re-
quired for accurate firing of ICBMs illustrate some of the possi-
ble relationships between air power and intelligence. In a rudi-
mentary way, even the first earth satellites point up the tasks
and capabilities of future intelligence systems required for
survival under conditions of international technological com-
petition - intelligence systems which must meet three basic
criteria: global coverage, instantaneous discovery, and abso-
lute accuracy.
I believe that we have a reasonably good understanding of
past and present concepts of air warfare and the relation of
intelligence to those concepts. it is far more difficult to look
into the future and to do so with the precision and clarity
needed to prepare ourselves effectively for the trials and dan-
gers ahead.
The reason for this basic uncertainty is not that many people
have neglected the problems of aerial technology and its stra-
tegic implications. The reason is rather that we are in the
midst of a technological revolution. Changes are becoming so
rapid, so penetrating and, in many instances, so contradictory
that the direct and indirect results of the technological revolu-
tion tend to control - and at the same time to confuse - the
nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Neverthe-
less, it is in this setting of dynamic technical change and a
world beset by what often seems an unlimited number of
related and unrelated political, economic, and military prob-
lems that we must attempt to examine the future direction of
air power.
To begin with, we already have seen major alterations in the
basic nature of air forces since World War II. The transition
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to jets, nuclear weapons, sonic speeds, countless black boxes,
and, to a degree, missiles typifies the changed environment
which governs today's air capabilities as compared with those
of 1945.
Fifteen years ago the RAF qualitatively was the world's lead-
ing air force. Today it is in third place. More important, it
is not in a class, by a broad margin, with the air forces of the
US and the USSR. It has neither the aircraft, the equipment,
the bases, the research and development, nor the funds to
become again a truly self-sufficient force, with strategic capa-
bilities as required by world conditions.
Fifteen years ago the Soviet Air Force was an adjunct of the
Russian army. Statistically it represented a force in quantity,
but it had poor operational know-how and no strategic capa-
bility. Its aircraft were fair, at best. Today the Soviet Air
Force is the largest in the world. It is equipped with modern
weapons, some of them as advanced as those of any other
nation. It has a well-funded and aggressive research and de-
velopment program. Although it still has many weaknesses,
the Soviet Air Force is making a bid for world air mastery.
The US Air Force also has come of age in the postwar period.
It has held the quality lead for most of that time and still holds
it for most of the important equipments. Its personnel are
superior in training and efficiency. But the USAF has prob-
lems, especially in areas outside the SAC program. Its progress
is not to be belittled, but in some areas its progress perhaps has
not been so fast or so forward as we would like it to be.
The fortunate aspect is that during the postwar period the
USAF has grown to be a global force. In fact, to this date, the
USAF - not forgetting its naval support - is the only global
force extant. This American capability is a fact of overriding
importance. It will remain a controlling factor in the inter-
national power equation, to a certain extent, irrespective of
technological slippage and of the inevitable acquisition by the
Soviet Union of a global missile force.
The most important single change since World War II is that
atomic airpower has become the dominant military force. The
only way a nation can deliver nuclear firepower overlong dis-
tances and in a short time is through the air. Sea and ground
delivery of nuclear warheads is important, particularly in spe-
cial situations. But in terms of a global nuclear war, these
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systems - and some of the secondary means of aerial de-
livery - can do no more than furnish local, regional, and tac-
tical support to the strategic air strike forces.
One of the changes upon us deals with defense in nuclear
aerial war. Whereas the offense still seems to have outdis-
tanced defense, the old axiom that like weapons are the best
defenses against like weapons again could become true.
For the moment there is very little one can do when an
atomic explosion occurs except to be underground, fully
equipped with food and non-contaminated water or, preferably,
plenty of Irish whiskey. Nevertheless, the very possession of
nuclear weapons for defensive purposes may act as a "prevent-
ing" factor - not because even the best defense would be capa-
ble of halting an attack, but because a good defense system
would boost the force requirements of the attacker, lower the
probability that he can execute his plan with full success, and
thus, in some cases at least, tend to induce him to delay his
aggression until he has reached the required force and tech-
nological levels. It is in the nature of a "race," that the
aggressor may be unable to achieve such a posture of superi-
ority that he can dare take the risk of nuclear attack. If this
should be a vain hope, for example, because the defender has
failed to keep up with the pace of the race, the actual use of
nuclear warheads against incoming vehicles should reduce the
effectiveness of the offense.
Some of our forward looking scientists are optimistic about
the feasibility of employing anti-ICBM missiles, which would
take advantage of the greatest point of vulnerability of the
early ballistic missile, its fixed trajectory. Many ideas have
been proposed about nuclear predetonation and sophisticated
employment of modern electronics to interfere with incoming
nuclear attack.
There are a number of passive defensive steps which could
be taken to lessen the vulnerability of our retaliatory force.
These include the dispersal of aircraft and missiles, shelters,
and other forms of base hardening, short exposure times, rapid
reaction procedures, and maintenance of a substantial portion
of the alert force in the air at all times.
Unfortunately such systems can be very costly. They are
limited in their coverage and may not be reliable enough for
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the safety of personnel and certain equipment. Elaborate pas-
sive defenses tend to disrupt and slow the ability of an air force
to retaliate as rapidly as required. For these reasons the stra-
tegic effectiveness of passive defense is predicated upon effec-
tive warning. By warning I refer to technical alarms such as
radar and infrared sensing and to interrelated strategic and
tactical indications intelligence.
The true effectiveness of defense will be a function of the
scope, size, quality, and mental effort put into requisite weapons
systems needed to furnish capabilities for protection, warning,
interception, and countermeasure tasks. It may be dubious
whether or not even the best defensive system pitted against
combinations of different types of attack weapons ever will
attain a high kill rate, but this may not be the critical point.
Rather, countersystems embodying nuclear warheads and
built around effective warning and reaction responses suggest
that a nation may be able to close the gap between the power
of the offense and present limitations on defense. Such sys-
tems could pre-empt the advantage of surprise by sneak attacks
by an aggressive nuclear delivery force. They would force the
attacker into more elaborate and costly delivery means, pri-
marily large and massive raids which are susceptible to stra-
tegic and tactical detection and to interception measures.
Through all these means and measures the offensive may not
necessarily be priced out of business, but its effectiveness should
be reduced against its primary objective - the opponent's re-
taliatory force. Thus, it would be hoped, the attacker would
be induced not to strike because of the uncertainty over the
success of his initial blow and also because he would have to
risk his main force at excessive loss rates. In nuclear war the
first blow must be decisive: the retaliatory force must be killed.
It is quite clear that intelligence influences the effectiveness
of defense. Whatever the technical proficiency of a defense
system, it can be improved by better intelligence, whereas even
the technically most promising defenses can be invalidated
through intelligence failure anywhere along the "assembly
line" - from scientific intelligence to tactical warning. Per-
haps it should be observed that good intelligence would allow
the utilization of foreign scientific and technological achieve-
ments for the improvement of our own posture. Beyond pro-
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viding us with better design patterns, such intelligence also
would enable us to build our equipment to such specifications
as to optimize its capabilities against the enemy's weapons.
I should like to turn now to a discussion of various tech-
nological factors, some of them here now and some on the
horizon, and try to relate them into a strategic pattern.
During the years ahead we shall be approaching practical
terminal limits in certain key parameters of weapons systems.
We already may have reached what could be called terminal
explosive power, not that it would be impossible to achieve
higher yields.
Within the next few decades we probably will attain terminal
speeds, at least for terrestrial operations. We cannot exceed
certain speeds without being forced from the earth's gravita-
tional field. Before we achieve theoretical terminal velocities
we should reach a far lower practical speed limit for operations
directed against targets on the ground. We must remember
that the attainment of maximum speed in flight may require
more time than would be necessary to reach a terrestrial tar-
get at lesser speeds.
We certainly shall be capable of terminal ranges in the sense
that future air and missile systems will be able to circumnavi-
gate the globe at least once. I am convinced that there will
be no practical limits to altitude, although there may be tem-
porary barriers to surmount before manned and powered space
flight becomes a reality. Such restrictions could occur in
metallurgy, engines, communications, aero medicine, and nu-
clear components, among other fields.
Let me dwell for a moment on the relationship of altitude to
tomorrow's air strategy. In the immediate future, altitude
essentially will be a matter of tactical advantage inasmuch
as, with respect to powered flight, we still shall be competing in
heights measured by thousands of feet. We have come to
recognize that the attack force with the higher altitude capa-
bility, generally speaking, is the force with the greater penetra-
tion capability. To achieve tactical altitude advantage we are
moving into speeds up to Mach 3 as a result of improved rocket
fuels, higher thrust engines, aerodynamic advances, and even
newer black boxes. I am talking about situations up to 100,000
feet.
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But today we also stand on the threshhold of entirely new
altitude dimensions. Space vehicles already have been climb-
ing to heights of 600 miles, and unpowered satellites, or sput-
niks, are flying around the earth approximately every hour and
a half, at heights up to over 1,000 miles. This altitude is by no
means a limit but soon will be exceeded. Disregarding the
future development of orbital flight, even at this point the
significance of the recent quantum jump is that we are acquir-
ing the capability of staying in the air.
This overriding technological fact will have the most pro-
found impact upon military operations. At present altitudes,
the airman must worry about hurricanes, fog, winds, and other
weather factors characteristic of the dense air which lies just
above the earth. Tomorrow's space flyers must be concerned
with meteoric showers, cosmic radiation, electronic barriers,
and Buck Rogers' conditions within his cabin. Instead of using
flight as a means of traveling from one point on the earth's
surface to another, either for friendly or unfriendly purposes,
the new problem will be to reach an orbit, maintain it, and
utilize nonpowered flight for scientific, military, and probably
economic purposes.
The flying machine of outer space will not spend 90 percent
of its time on the ground, but 100 percent of its time aloft. In
simple statistics, we are moving from transonic speeds and
periodic flights of several thousands miles in length into an
environment where speeds will be of the order of 16,000 knots
and "ranges," depending upon the height and shape of the or-
bit, easily may exceed 1 million miles per day and hundreds of
millions of miles per year.
The development of terminal weapons - in terms of ex-
plosive power, range, endurance, and speed - will not bring
the technological race to an end. Strategies will capitalize
on the new dimension of altitude and perhaps endurance rather
than distance as a decisive area of military competition. Mili-
tary superiority will be dependent upon relative advantages in
electronics, warning, and deception. Thus the sciences of in-
strumentation and intelligence will become truly decisive ele-
ments in the equation of a strategy in which the chief maneu-
vers seek to conquer altitude and achieve enduring control from
the ground to outer space.
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Modern air strategy will be affected by a number of additional
problems, each of which could become crucial in varying cir-
cumstances. There is, for example, the requirement that a
portion of the aerial strength must be on constant readiness
status. A strike force that requires one or two days to get
ready is a military liability. Even in today's war it would be
caught on the surface.
An effective air force must be numerically strong and able
to get its combat aircraft into the air in time. It must be
located on a large number of bases, preferably distributed on
several continents and located at varying distances from the
enemy. Moreover, it must be supported by reconnaissance
forces operating vigilantly around the clock. Only such an air
force is in a position to achieve a strategic, though not neces-
sarily physical, invulnerability.
In former wars, material strength was the decisive factor.
The speed with which fire power could be delivered was an
important but still a subsidiary element. The nature of a
future war is essentially no longer a dispute about territory but
a competition for gains in the time dimension. This is because,
in the first place, technology is a variable in time. The speed
with which this factor varies will continue to increase as long
as technological progress continues. In the second place, sur-
prise being a key to success in air and missile warfare, the initial
rounds of conflict are little more than a contest to operate
faster than the opponent. Surprise attack will be successful
if the attacker moves faster than the defender. It will fail if
the defender's "reaction time" deprives him of targets and dis-
rupts the attack schedule.
Intelligence must come to closer grips with the time dimen-
sion. We are dealing not with one uniform period but with a
whole set of different time categories. There is the time prob-
lem of maturing manpower, scientific discovery, and technolog-
ical invention - measured in generations. There is the dura-
tion of research and development programs, decisionmaking,
production, and incorporation of weapons into battle orders -
a period of years to decades. There is the complex problem of
warning - ranging all the way from advanced strategic warn-
ing measured in weeks, months, or even years, to tactical warn-
ing, measured in minutes. There is the problem of reaction
time and interception, measured in seconds and microseconds.
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Pre-emptive, retaliation, deterrence, counterforce, retarda-
tion, and disruption attacks all, in one way or another, are tied
to a specific time requirement. The more mobile warfare be-
comes, the more moving targetsare assuming significance, the
less it is a question of mere "capability" than of "capability in
time." An airplane carrying a high yield weapon can knock
out an air base; the problem is to destroy it at a time when the
target will be most lucrative - for example, just before the
moment when an attack is to be launched from that target.
Need I add that only intelligence can provide this all-impor-
tant "timing capability"?
Perhaps an additional illustration will clarify this thesis fur-
ther: "Reaction time in guided missiles." It is important to
count missiles in terms of numbers, warhead yields, and the
like. But the foremost problem is that of reaction time or
response.
If it takes a strategic missile force four hours to launch,
whereas the opponent can launch within minutes, the obvious
advantage belongs to the side with the shorter reaction time
- provided it has adequate warning. The 4-hour reacting force
will never leave the ground; its threat will be pre-empted. If
this is correct, it appears to be a mistake for intelligence to
count the degree of deterrent power primarily in numbers of
missiles or warhead yields. It will be necessary to assess, above
all, relative times of reaction.
Earlier we discussed the new parameters of altitude. It is
appropriate, I believe, that we reflect on the purpose of operat-
ing at such altitudes. The use of outer space will permit al-
most continuous observation of any point on the earth, a situa-
tion which, although not entirely without precedent, marks
a new departure in modern strategic warfare. Space platforms
are becoming indispensable elements of effective warning sys-
tems against future means of weapons delivery. Unless we
conquer space, a great deal of the scientific knowledge which
we require to remain in the technological race will not be avail-
able.
Furthermore, orbiting vehicles eventually will be used as
weapon carriers and thus will develop into crucial components
of offensive and defensive missile warfare.
All this poses the spectre of outer space military conflict
which will involve three phases: first, the competition to get
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vehicles into space in sufficient quantities to occupy desirable
orbits and to make profitable scientific use of orbital flights;
second, the development of military techniques for operating
from our own orbits and for countering the enemy's militarily
significant orbital activities; and third, the ability to neutralize
or destroy terrestrial and aerial components of orbital systems.
This new sphere of warfare raises some perplexing problems
in world relations. In addition to traditional surface bound-
aries, there will arise sovereignties over vacuous orbits and the
areas beneath them-a system of interlaced surface and spatial
boundaries thousands of miles in depth and tens of thousands
of miles in length.
A new pattern of international relations must be developed in
which orbits are occupied peacefully or conquered and in which
orbits must be delineated. During peacetime the nations must
respect each other's scientific and security operations in the
orbits, and in wartime, of course, the purpose will be to elimi-
nate all of the opponent's space vehicles. In turn, there must
be capabilities for protecting the satellites. It is clear that this
involves entirely new types of "aerial" operations, as it is also
clear that the diplomats and international lawyers will have to
do some hard thinking to settle peacefully the problems of orbit
allocation and orbit sovereignty.
The introduction of the orbital dimension into warfare sig-
nifies that factors such as Iron Curtains, the dispersal of air
bases and missile sites, and the ability of navies to "hide," so to
speak, in the vastness of the oceans will tend to lose signifi-
cance. The nature of the new implements is definitive enough
to suggest that the use of truly underground and of undersea
facilities may dominate the terrestrial scene. As a result, the
roles and techniques of surprise will undergo very profound
changes, the exact nature of which we cannot predict.
For a nation to exist and survive under these conditions, its
intelligence system must become a predominant security tech-
nique. Such a system must meet three criteria: global cover-
age, instantaneous discovery, and absolute accuracy. The sys-
tem must be fully operational both in war and peace. Intelli-
gence must be run not only for the benefit of, but by those who
are responsible for decisions of life or death.
I believe I have reached the point where it is necessary to
examine this strategic framework with its epochal implications
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in the practical light of where we are today and to consider the
future directions we must take.
The problems of strategic and technological surprise are
becoming increasingly serious. The danger of tactical sur-
prise is not lessened when the enemy, in addition to a high alti-
tude and rapid strike capability, also has a capability for low
altitude air attack and may be developing mixed high and low
altitude offensive forces.
Taking an even broader view, we can say that the nuclear
explosive and the supersonic delivery vehicle have appeared at
a moment when society is quite defenseless against such weap-
ons. During the last few centuries, war has taken place at the
margins of society. Society supported the war from its produc-
tion surpluses and remained intact as a going concern despite
losses and devastations.
You recall that during ancient times, the situation was dif-
ferent. During the Middle Ages, every town had to be self-
sufficient for defense, with walls, moats, shelters, food, and
water reserves. Practically every citizen had to bear arms.
The American frontier town serves as a more recent example
of this dangerous way of life.
I believe that society eventually will adjust itself to the mod-
ern technology of destruction. Perhaps we may have to be-
come troglodytes; our ancestors were. Architects may develop
new types of resistant houses and "safe" urban settlements.
Perhaps we shall develop anti-radiation protection. The prin-
ciple of "hardening" can be applied to many human needs.
I am predicting only that the human mind will not stop in-
venting. After it realizes the grim threat of modern weapons,
society gradually but inevitably will take measures to assure
its survival. I am basing this prediction on my faith that mod-
ern man, morally and intellectually, is not inferior to previous
generations of 700 and 2500 years ago.
Whether this process of social adjustment is going to last
20 or perhaps 50 years I am unable to say. But during this
interim phase, humanity well may be passing through the
greatest peril of its existence. A war five years from now prob-
ably will be immeasurably more destructive than a war around
2000 A. D. Our security, therefore, must be tailored to get us
and the Free World safely through this immediate period of
extreme hazard.
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It is this interim character of the present military situation
which confronts us with many perplexing problems. Defense
planning, which includes intelligence, is faced with numerous
paradoxes.
In this age of maximum offensive strength, there may be a
great deal of reluctance to use up-to-date weapons, simply be-
cause no one wants to unleash a nuclear war. Yet we must
prepare ourselves for a contest which requires us to put the
bulk of our resources into nuclear armaments. As a result,
we may have only limited capabilities to wage war in which
nuclear weapons do not provide the basic fire power.
Yet some people have gone so far as to advocate the retention
of full-fledged non-nuclear forces in addition to atomic forces.
It .is generally agreed that we should prepare ourselves to fight
with nuclear weapons. Yet some contend that we also should
retain a capability to fight in the style of World War II - high
explosives on the ground, at sea, and even from the air.
We probably could agree that the availability of non-nuclear
forces would be very advantageous. Several types of non-nu-
clear explosives will remain with us, even in the nuclear age.
Under certain tactical conditions, those may be even more ef-
fective than nuclear materials, which is the main reason why
they should be retained.
Unfortunately, the question is not one of advantage or dis-
advantage, or even of choice. The question is one of capability
in all aspects - manpower, military organization, research,
funds, training, equipment, tactics, and so on.
Suppose that we maintain both a nuclear and a non-nuclear
defense establishment. There is the high probability or near-
certainty that the investment in non-nuclear arms would be
invalidated as soon as the first atomic weapons are used. This
will happen, almost inevitably, at the first serious military set-
back of either belligerent.
But the question of non-nuclear armaments is not just a
matter of duplication. The cost of matching atomic systems
with non-nuclear weapons in terms of relative military effec-
tiveness would be exorbitant. More significant, such a second
force could not be established on any reasonable scale unless
we acquire two sets of our national resources, two sets of our
qualified manpower, and two sets of our country.
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Iam not raising the issue of limited versus general war. The
requirements of any local war situation can be met from avail-
able and programmed forces and resources.
Rather, I am addressing myself to the problem of attempt-
ing to build a non-nuclear force at the expense of our atomic
strike and defense units, which must be maintained at an in-
creasing degree of readiness because of the overwhelming pri-
ority of the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and the Free
World. We cannot turn back. There may be a collapse of
nuclear courage, but no longer can there be any doubt that
we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon.
A similar paradox confronts us in disarmament. If the
danger of attack could be eliminated by reductions of force
levels and by the outlawing of particular types of weapons, the
security of all nations unquestionably would be enhanced. The
trouble is that with the power of modern weapons, even minor
infractions to disarmament agreements may prove fatal.
After 1919, the Western Powers tried to control German arm-
aments. But practically every week a German arms violation
of the Versailles Treaty was reported. Many work shops re-
peatedly were discovered in which, it was said, machine guns
were being produced under the guise of baby carriages.
Nevertheless, the security of the Western Powers did not
seem vitally threatened, despite the fact that the Germans
maintained secret arsenals and continued surreptitiously to
produce weapons which they were not supposed to have. These
weapons did not seem powerful enough to pose a real threat to
Western security. Neither were the camouflaged divisions
which the Germans maintained secretly.
But in our time a nation which produces perhaps as few as
50, or as many as several hundred high-yield weapons could
become a real threat to the peace, even with makeshift delivery
vehicles, especially if other nations faithfully adhere to their
disarmament agreements. You are well aware of ominous in-
fractions to such agreements in North Korea.
The point is that we cannot go back in history and undo the
discoveries of nuclear fission, electronics, and aviation. We
have to live in the modern world. Technological progress will
tend to "break through" even the most elaborate and sophisti-
cated disarmament "controls." Each breakthrough will neces-
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sitate renegotiation of agreements. There will be little, if any,
stability and durability, let alone guarantee of assured inter-
national safety in such arrangements.
I confess that this is a very dismal picture. It will not be
changed by expectations that the human race will become
peaceful and angelic in the next 20 years. There are two
brutal facts which we have to remember. The first is that the
Soviet regime still is around. Although it sometimes seems to
be showing signs of middle or even old age, there is no new
evidence that proves that Kipling was wrong when he wrote :
"Make ye no peace with Adanizod, the Bear who walks like a
man."
The Soviets have not changed their basic objectives. Their
policies have remained constant in areas that count, including
their fantastic military preparedness effort. It is clear that
the Soviets do not expect that the millennium of peace has
dawned. While they prepare for war we cannot turn our backs.
When they talk conflict, we cannot risk to ignore the peril.
When they arm themselves with the most modern weapons, we
cannot reduce the magnitude of the threat by wishful thinking
about their supposed inability to do that which manifestly they
are doing.
We can philosophize that the Soviet Union will enter into an
evolution which, after some time, will transform the present
Bolsheviks into Jeffersonian Democrats or Puritan pacifists. I
do not believe that anyone who has studied Russian and other
revolutionary history seriously expects such a mutation will
take place.
Naturally, I do not postulate eternity for the Soviet system:
their time will come. The question is, when? So far, reports
about their demise usually proved quite "exaggerated." Their
resilience has been extraordinary. Distinguishing our hopes
from realistic planning assumptions, we would be foolhardy not
to give them an additional life expectancy of one or two
decades. We must assume that they will remain in power dur-
ing the entire period when the technological challenge to the
US will be at a maximum.
It is not certain, of course, that the Soviets deliberately will
launch an attack on the US. But at the same time we cannot
be sure they will not. In the same vein, there is no doubt but
that the social system of Russia is changing in many ways.
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But is this necessarily a favorable development? One danger
surely is that if the Soviet dictatorship were liquidated by force
or otherwise, this event - which only optimists expect at this
time - could precipitate a major internal crisis. Such a crisis
would be uncontrollable. This means that it could lead very
easily to a world conflagration. There just is no way by which
we could conjure away the ominous dangers in our future.
This leads me to the second point of pessimism about peace
in the foreseeable future. It is a mistake to consider the Bol-
sheviks as the only cause of conflict. Wherever we look at the
continents today, there is plenty of politically combustionable
material. Old political structures are breaking down. New
nations are emerging. Most of them have their own imperi-
alistic ambitions, and some of the older nations show frighten-
ing signs of decay. Economic difficulties, cultural transfor-
mations, intellectual crises, and ideological passions acerbate
many of these political changes, not to mention inflammatory
propaganda campaigns, political warfare, and the like.
Unfortunately many of the political minds still function as
though we were living in the time of gun powder and sea power.
Few have grasped the significance of the modern technology.
There is a dangerous timelag between political thinking and
technological reality. As industrial technology advances,
psychological stability weakens. We must admit the possi-
bility that world society will grow sicker and ever more un-
stable, even as the descendants of Icarus reach out for the
moon.
It is unjustified, therefore, to expect that all nations will
observe restraint in order to avoid nuclear conflict. Perhaps
most nations will, but the odds are that there will be a few who
will act irresponsibly. Hitler was not the last specimen of his
type.
Recent sociological research asserts that a large percentage
of political rulers and regimes have been, historically speaking,
criminal in motivation and action. There is no doubt that
many rulers, especially those who acquired unlimited powers,
may have been, at least partly, insane. In fact, a German
historian coined the term "Caesarian insanity" in order to
describe the actions of many Roman emperors.
Although we have made some political progress, the world
nevertheless has had more than its share of insane, criminal,
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and power-hungry rulers during the 20th century. Crime and
insanity rates tend to rise as industrial civilization advances.
It may be very convincing to us to say that because of the
existence of hydrogen weapons the power-seekers should mend
their ways. This type of argument remains unconvincing to
the evil doer who is willing to accept the risk, regardless of the
consequences.
There is only one way to reduce the probability of criminal
aggressiveness. That is, to remain militarily overpowering
and mentally more vigilant than the would-be aggressor - to
outsmart and outarm him at every turn and to apply per-
suasive techniques to protect him - and us - from making a
miscalculation. It is not enough to possess what could be
called a "statistical posture of deterrence." The aggressor also
must be convinced that it is inadvisable for him to break the
peace. But do we master the techniques by which we could
have such an impact on the opponent's mind?
We are in the midst of a lasting crisis which Mao Tse-tung
has described as "protracted conflict." Political and psycho-
logical weapons are being used every day to advance the Com-
munist cause. In modern conflict, even though actual shoot-
ing may not be taking place, air power and the threat of almost
instantaneous massive destruction have become the key ele-
ments of the psychological as well as the physical struggle.
The extent to which we can deter the opponent from attack-
ing us determines our freedom of action on many of the world's
battlefields. If the level of our ready deterrent strength is too
low to provide the assurance that the enemy will not react with
an all-out attack, we could be inhibited in executing proper
defense actions in subsidiary theaters.
Deterrence is a necessary condition for the maintenance of
peace - and the waging of limited war - but it cannot be a
static condition if it is to keep that peace. If any nation
acquires a more effective weapons system, the best posture of
deterrence existing before the technological mutation is subject
to rapid nullification. We live in a world where the threats to
tomorrow's peace are developing today in the laboratories and
on the drawing boards.
It is true that so long as the two main competitors run neck
to neck, even a major advantage in one or more technological
fields may not necessarily upset the balance. A state of mu-
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tual deterrence may be reached which essentially would mean
that a world conflagration could occur against the deliberate
planning of both the US and the Soviet Union. Hence I do not
believe that the Soviets merely are trying to catch up in the
technological race. On the contrary, they seem to have organ-
ized themselves to win the technological race on a broad front,
not only in many significant scientific areas but also in combat
operational strengths as distinguished from mockups and pro-
totypes. In other words, they may be trying to surpass us
simultaneously by at least one whole and perhaps two weapons
generations.
The technological race is the very essence of protracted con-
flict. It is the main event which we cannot afford to lose. The
essence of this conflict is not, as many of our contemporaries
believe, a series of limited wars in the jungle and in the desert.
Any American intervention into limited war depends crucially
upon our relative technological posture. If we lose the tech-
nological race we cannot fight on local and regional fronts.
Nor will an increase in our capability to fight in Bali or Tim-
buctu improve our over-all deterrence. It certainly is not likely
that, should the US fall behind in technological capability, the
Russians will press their advantage merely to get a few fringe
benefits. The struggle between Rome and Carthage is more
meaningful to our times than the formalized and restrained
war-tournaments of some epochs in the history of Christian
Europe.
Technological superiority in means of delivery is the essence
of success in nuclear war. The idea that nuclear war will take
the form of an exchange of mutual blows perhaps forecasts
correctly what is going to happen. However, this is not neces-
sarily a concept on which the military planner should work.
The purpose of planning for nuclear war is to achieve such a
predominance of strength that a nuclear blow can be delivered,
without the undue risk that a deadly retaliatory blow will be
returned. Even the Soviet military leaders who, during the
Stalinist period, belittled the importance of military surprise
now appear to recognize that surprise could be the condition
of nuclear success.
The acquisition and maintenance of a dynamic capability to
deliver a rapid and devastating blow - plus a proportionately
dynamic defense - are prerequisites to survival. The nation
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which insures that its retaliatory force is, in fact, effective at
all times, is obtaining maximum protection against preventive
and pre-emptive attacks. The success of preventive war and
pre-emptive nuclear launchings depends upon the achieve-
ment of triple or quadruple surprise - technological, tactical,
timing, and conceivably strategic. The US can keep its re-
taliatory guard up only if it is able to render those surprises
too costly, too impractical, and too uncertain. Thus surprise
attack will be too risky for enemy resort only if the US keeps
ahead in technology and intelligence, as well as in its force
levels and, above all, in reaction times.
Should we lose tempo and should one or more of these four
pillars of our security crumble, the enemy's superiority may
become such that he need not use nuclear weapons except as a
threat. The so-called ultimate threat of large hydrogen weap-
ons could become "demilitarized" -- by manipulated fear.
Suppose the aggressor says : "I grant that you can retaliate,
but you will be completely devastated through my first blows.
We leave it to you whether or not you want to elect your own
death. If you retaliate, you will die, at best with the comfort-
ing thought that you have killed some of us. Or you may
survive under our whip. That is your alternative." It is
known that the Soviets are doing considerable research on
conditioned reflexes and brain-washing techniques. Manipu-
lated fear and the conditioning of the opponents' mental and
psychological reactions are strategic concomitants to nuclear
weapons. The Soviets don't overlook a bet.
Previous wars have lasted for years. Ever since the emer-
gence of a modern industrial society with its long mobilization
requirements, war could not be short. A future war may be
decided within a matter of a few hours. I think it is wrong,
however, to place all attention on the destructive phase of this
type of conflict.
In previous times, the length of the war allowed us to remedy
the shortcomings and omissions of peace. Today and tomor-
row, once the climax of the conflict has come, we shall be the
prisoners of our previous decisions. In that critical phase we
shall not be able to increase our force levels, acquire a new set
of technological weapons, adjust our tactics to outdo those of
the enemy, or even reassure the fearful and give orders to the
panicky.
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The protracted conflict may last longer than any previous
war. Although the climactic or decision phase of this conflict
may be short, still, the conflict could endure for many decades.
We are in the battle now. As a consequence, the main battles
are being fought by military forces in continued readiness, by
warning and intelligence services, by the research and develop-
ment community, by national and industrial planners, and by
budget makers, as well as by moral and intellectual attitudes.
Militarily speaking, the decisive phase could be won or lost
by the staff and operational officers who 5 to 10 years before
the shooting select or reject certain weapons systems, succeed
or fail in shortening lead times, organize offensive and de-
fensive forces, determine the balance between force elements,
and plan deployment and reaction times. It also may be won
or lost by the executive and congressional branches which de-
cide, with a timelag of 2 to 3 years, the force levels to be main-
tained in any technological phase; by the weapons require-
ment, procurement, and logistics planners within the military;
and by industry, all of whom, together, have the task of devel-
oping and producing superior weapons faster and in larger
quantity than the enemy; finally, by intelligence officers who
must try to forecast the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the strategic equation 5 to 10 years ahead. The latter will suc-
ceed - or fail - depending on whether or not they convince
the powers-that-be that their best estimates are valid.
In protracted conflict, the climactic phase may be war in its
most extreme form. If the climax is a matter merely of threat
and surrender, it will be the most "peaceful" of all wars. To
intelligence its most significant aspect should be that pro-
tracted conflict is a war during peace.
It is easy to enumerate the need to win the technological race,
the requirements for adequate numbers of weapons and forces,
the advantage of hardened and dispersed base locations, the
necessity for fast reaction times, and so forth. But the basic
reason these requirements are difficult to satisfy is that no
nation has the economic capability to live up to the exigencies
of protracted conflict in the early period of the nuclear age.
I am not talking about budgets which can be increased and
reduced. I do not mean various degrees of economic mobiliza-
tion and readiness. Rather, I refer to more fundamental
limitations.
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To win the technological race a nation needs numerical and
qualitative superiority in technicians and inventive geniuses.
Unless the most revolutionary educational changes are made,
it is unlikely that sufficient scientists and technicians will be
produced to satisfy the growing needs of increasingly complex
military programs. Even a program which marshaled all edu-
cational resources into scientific and technical curricula prob-
ably would be inadequate for acquiring that degree of technical
superiority and material effort which makes the launching of a
nuclear attack or the psychological threat of such an attack
a relatively riskless affair.
The cost of weapons systems is rising geometrically, while the
increase in productive capabilities proceeds much slower.
There is the problem of protecting and rebuilding our cities and
facilities to survive in a nuclear environment. This is a prob-
lem - so far largely untouched - which clearly accentuates
the severe limitations on our economic capabilities to meet the
challenge of the nuclear age. In this time of economic plenty,
scarcity still is the supreme fact of civilian and, above all, mili-
tary economics.
Material resources are not the only limiting factor. Time,
which is a major resource, also is in short supply. For ex-
ample, the time needed to transform a blueprint into a modern
weapons system has become such that a military force never
possesses an active arsenal without at least some obsolescence.
I mean obsolescent in the sense that certain tasks simply can-
not be accomplished against opposition or must be undertaken
at excessive risks and costs.
There is one inescapable conclusion from this discrepancy
between requirement and capability. It is this: the future
strategist has the potential choice of an entire technological
spectrum of weapons. At least several weapons systems will be
able to do the same task.
Because of the technological potential available to both sides,
he will have to decide whether to select a faster or slower
weapon, an explosive with greater or lower yield, a weapon of
endurance or of stealth. Should he guard against high or low
level attack? Should he dispense with manned bombers in
favor of missiles? Should he select an earth satellite
"anchored" approximately 21,000 miles above its target to de-
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liver nuclear firepower - or should he use a submarine from
which to launch a missile?
In practical terms the strategist can select only a limited
number of systems from this entire technical spectrum, which
will grow as we progress further into the scientific era. Strat-
egists on the other side have to make similar eliminations.
The chances are that the choices may not be identical because
of different strategic objectives, production capabilities, opera-
tional doctrines, concepts of defensive warfare, and so forth.
In turn, because the choices probably will be different on both
sides, the possibility of surprise and other major military in-
itiatives will increase.
Therefore, intelligence must forecast, in ample time and cor-
rectly, the enemy selection so that proper defenses can be de-
signed. Of course, the choice of the enemy may impose the
need for counterweapons, which may have a feedback against
our original weapons choice.
It is necessary to insure that the relationship between what
we actually have and what we require to counter the enemy's
principal threats is such that we are not accepting undue risks.
If we made a poor or overly narrow selection from the spec-
trum, if intelligence fails to guide the research and develop-
ment community concerning the enemy's probable selections,
we might invite attack, provide inadequate defense, and jeop-
ardize life and liberty. But if our intelligence is keen and our
armament effort generous we might ensure peace for the period
of the technological cycle.
We are in a conflict which has and undoubtedly will endure
for decades but which at present is changing complexion. Gen-
eral J. F. C. Fuller coined the term "machine warfare" to de-
scribe World Wars I and II. This expression no longer fully
applies to future "technological warfare."
I am afraid that the Communists have shown a rather sophis-
ticated understanding of the strategic problems involved in this
new form of technological struggle. They seem to understand
interrelations between social conflicts and technical and eco-
nomic competition. More than that, they are organizing them-
selves to achieve an overwhelming strategic posture in the tech-
nological realm. They are girding to win the technological
race against the US. Whatever the disadvantages of a dicta-
torial system, their regime responds to rapid decisionmaking.
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In this area, we do not seem to have matched their strategic
comprehension. We are said to have made the decision never
to strike the first blow. At the same time we have neglected to
introduce sufficiently into our thinking the fact that if the
opponent is allowed opportunity to achieve a broad tactical suc-
cess through an initial blow, the retaliatory strategy must be
more costly and complicated in order to compensate for the
risk and loss which could occur at the outset and weaken the
retaliatory force before it goes into battle.
Under the postulate that the enemy strikes first, defense
must be more expensive than under the postulate that we shall
not surrender the initiative. It follows that we must not be re-
luctant to pay the price of our security against an opponent to
whom we present the gift of the deliberate surprise attack.
The technological race has engulfed us exactly as a fast flow-
ing river occasionally catches the unsuspecting oarsman. Such
a situation cannot be met and overcome by preaching to the
river, by throwing away the oars, or by using only one of two
hands. In such a situation, all skills and all strengths are
needed to ride out the rapids and not get smashed against the
rocks.
The fundamental conclusion I want to leave is that the tech-
nological race, because of various economic limitations and po-
litical climates, may not be won by any super power engaging
in the competition, even with all its strengths. But this race
very well may be lost by a country which fails to put its con-
tinued best efforts into the challenge.
It is to a large extent the duty of the national intelligence
community to explain to our nation's leadership the true na-
ture of this strategic problem. I pray that we will not fail in
this task which is indispensable not only to our survival but to
the survival of civilization.
Intelligence has been getting the facts about the Soviet Bloc,
or at least enough of them to enable many right decisions to be
made. But we have not been able, often enough, to get our
information and evaluations accepted and acted upon. The
somber fact is that as professional intelligence people we have
not entirely grasped the meaning of protracted conflict in the
nuclear missile age.
I believe it not unfair to state also that as professional intel-
ligence people we have been disappointingly slow in under-
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standing the nature of the pressing problems which are con-
fronting us. Only too often our categories of analysis and esti-
mates still reflect the strategic realities of a passing age. We
know all about the deposits of even the least important raw
materials, but we may miss major scientific discoveries. Our
battle orders of the infantry are considerably better than those
of earth satellites. We are adept in measuring floorspace, but
we are rarely engaged in comparing lead times. We are able
to refine our calculations of weapons yields to the first decimal,
but the analysts worrying about Soviet neuropsychology have
yet to break through to the national estimates. We produce
mountains of "data," but our progress in data handling para-
phrases Lenin's title, "one step forward, two steps backward."
We are considerably better in post mortems than in warning.
Our understanding of man's greatest resource, time, has re-
mained fuzzy in most areas.
All in all, although we often express our conviction as to how
important intelligence is to national security, we ourselves have
not quite realized the crucial position we are occupying in the
present power struggle. It is really the effectiveness of intel-
ligence which, together with the effectiveness of our scientists,
is the basis of technology. Beyond the development phase, in-
telligence is either a multiplier or a divisor of military strength-
in-being. It is the one "weapons system" which by necessity
is in constant touch with the enemy, regardless of whether
there is war or peace. And in war, of course, intelligence re-
mains a key condition of success.
But we must elevate our sights beyond the old saw of intel-
ligence being the "first line of defense." Intelligence is the fac-
tor which should make defense economically practical, tech-
nologically superior, and strategically victorious. In the mis-
sile age, intelligence literally will merge with the decisive weap-
ons system, lest the missiles be entirely ineffective.
But intelligence will not be able to do this job unless it comes
of age as a technological system in its own right. We must
get the equipment our ubiquitous, instantaneous, and ency-
clopedic mission requires. We must have the forces to operate
these tools. We must develop utilization techniques which are
at par with or better than those equipments. And we must
be able rapidly to feed our information to all users.
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One feature will remain unchanged: the ability to think.
Electric computers and space telescopes are no substitutes for
common sense and judgment. Reasoning by false analogy,
preoccupation with minor problems to the detriment of major
issues, emphasis on decimals and disregard for the large magni-
tude, wrong philosophies about the rules of evidence, delusion-
ary procedures such as the piling of estimates upon estimates
- not to mention normal human failings such as prejudices,
wishful thinking, parochial interest arguments, and subver-
sion - all those will remain possible in the era of technologi-
cal warfare. The machines, even the electrons, are no better
than the brains they are designed to serve. It is gratifying
to think that when the machine proves to be inadequate - for
example, because it may take three months to "program" it -
common sense and "conventional thinking" still will be called
upon to take its place.
The plain fact is that the machine, however good, will not
replace the analyst. The machine will make the human brain
a more powerful tool - this is the main reason we need it in
intelligence. Intelligence technology is indispensable for the
rapid handling of thousands of data and for the reduction of
innumerable variables to manageable factors. This technology
is the key to speed, coverage, and accuracy; to computation;
and to experimentation with, and testing of, our conclusions
and estimates (for example, through "gaining" techniques).
But intuition and insight are necessary to make the ma-
chines work. In turn, intelligence technology will make its
greatest contribution if it allows deeper insights and ever more
creative intuitions. Man has remained the key factor in tech-
nological warfare, as he was the key to victory when rocks and
clubs were the most powerful weapons. Military, or in a
broader sense, conflict intelligence will be at its best when it
is based on brain intelligence : IQ's plus wisdom.
Pending the dawn of the technological age in intelligence,
we should face up more courageously to the facts of life, how-
ever bitter.
As a nation and as the core of the Free World alliance, we
have been underrating the danger for more than twelve years.
Why was intelligence not more reliable? Why did we fail to
see the obvious? Our own thought patterns and our intel-
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lectual isolationism have proved to be far more dangerous
enemies to our security than the Iron Curtain and the ominous
developments behind it.
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CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY
OF AIR INTELLIGENCE
Lewis R. Long
I should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligence
that I feel would vitalize an air intelligence philosophy and
could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent
with the dominant role that air power must play in the years
to come. I make no claim of originality in all these concepts;
nor do I consider that they alone would form a sound air intel-
ligence doctrine. However, together with the valid concepts
contained in the doctrinal manuals, they would, I am con-
vinced, provide better guidance to the field than has hereto-
fore been available.
I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented
are meant to be applied within the framework of one overrid-
ing concept for a philosophy of air intelligence - that air intel-
ligence is geared to air power in a nuclear age and that it has
the same predominant characteristics as has the air force -
range, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability.
Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point
on the globe and returning to any desired location, air intelli-
gence must provide basic information to guide such flights in
peace or in war. Because air forces exert a dynamic impact on
all forms of international relations, air intelligence must be pre-
pared to expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire
structure of other nations and to advise and assist in the deter-
mination of air strategy and policies.
In the established principles for the successful employment
of air forces it is considered that the air forces are an entity.
Even so, air intelligence must be considered indivisible and re-
sponsive at all levels of operation to employment as a single
aggregate instrument. Air intelligence must be employed for
the attainment of a common objective, which -in essence -
is to contribute to the security of the nation. Air intelligence
provides the key to proper employment of the air forces in ex-
ercising the initiative in many different conditions of interna-
tional relations, in taking advantage of different opportunities
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as they occur, and also in creating. opportunities in which bene-
fits to the US may accrue by the utilization of air forces in peace
or in war. Air intelligence must also guide the air force in ex-
ploiting the principle of surprise, in order to attain both mili-
tary and psychological advantages through speed, deception,
audacity, originality, and concentration. For the present, air
intelligence must concentrate on indications of imminence of
hostilities, without neglecting information on capabilities and
vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. This concentra-
tion of effort not only will contribute to the security of our
forces but also will provide guidance for combat operations if
war is forced upon us. Finally, air intelligence must be care-
fully coordinated through proper control.
CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. Intelligence agencies are never
more at war than in periods of nominal peace. The logical out-
growth of this concept is, of course, the fact that the success
of the initial phases of war (and in this thermonuclear age
these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) will de-
pend on the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most
people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to the lat-
ter idea, but they balk completely at a rational consideration of
the first one when it comes to providing tangible support
needed by the intelligence structure. I have never, in peace-
time, seen an intelligence staff at any echelon that was not
undermanned, overworked, and restricted in its operations by
a lack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the
goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish
in the light of the command mission.
At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequate num-
bers of the best qualified personnel, maximum equipment, facil-
ities, and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal
status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically
stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the
support it could profitably employ - and fully justify - in
peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war we
might become involved in.
Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel, ma-
terial support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in terms
of what other writers have had to say, bearing in mind these
three basic intelligence missions : to provide timely warning of
the imminence of hostilities (whether on a total or limited war
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basis); to provide detailed knowledge of the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendly and
neutral nations; and to provide the best possible intelligence as
to the intentions of foreign nations, particularly those that are
our potential enemies.
PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily
on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts. Law-
yers, insurance adjustors, investigators, police enforcement of-
ficers, scientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put
into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried the intel-
ligence workload of the services. By and large, too, their con-
tributions compared favorably with those of professional mili-
tary people. There have been numerous attempts made to
identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel. Farago 1
lists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed
to possess" in order to qualify for that particular aspect of
intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could
be used as a starting basis for selection of personnel for other
intelligence tasks.
First of all, his morale must be high and he must be
genuinely interested in the job ahead.
Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterpris-
ing.
Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical
thinker. He must have good judgment and know how
to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be pro-
ficient in some occupational skill.
Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great
endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet,
tolerant and healthy.
Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other
people, to work as a member of a team, to understand
the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the
same foibles himself.
Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to
organize, administer and lead others. He must be will-
ing to accept responsibility.
1 Farago, Ladislas, War of Wits (NY, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954),
p. 187.
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34 CONFIDENTIAL
Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for ano-
nymity and know how to keep his mouth shut and pre-
serve a secret.
Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only
when bluffing and misleading become necessary.
Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring.
Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything,
to memorize details accurately. He must be able to
report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his ob-
servations and relate them to the greater complex of
things.
MATERIAL SUPPORT. I should like to stress the importance
of allocating the maximum in equipment, facilities, and funds
to intelligence work in time of peace with a quotation from
Sun Tzu,2 the Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the
art of war in 500 B. C. have influenced military thinking down
to this day.
Hostile armies may face each other for years, striv-
ing for victory which is decided in a single day. This
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condi-
tion simply because one grudges the outlay of a hun-
dred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the
height of inhumanity.
One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things be-
yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
In speaking of the cost of the British secret service as a
whole (both positive and counterintelligence), Seth noted :
In 1913 the Secret Services cost 46,000 pounds; in
1939, 500,000 pounds; during the recent war 52,000,-
000 pounds annually; and in 1953, 5,000,000 pounds.
. . . It is worth many times this amount, for though
the American, French and Russian (secret) services
2 Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War (Translation by Lionel Giles, Introduc-
tion and notes by B/G Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa., The
Military Service Publishing Co., 1944).
2Ronald Seth, Spies at Work, London: Peter Own Limited MCMLIV,
p. 202.
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are now more extensive than at any time in this cen-
tury, British secret service still maintains its lead in
performance and results.
Farago gives a somewhat different order of magnitude for
British expenditures for intelligence. He said that the 1954
budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the
highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service. He
pointed out, however, that this figure is deceptive because it
represents only allotments from public funds and he adds:
"The bulk of Britain's intelligence revenue comes from private
funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
some of whose shares are held by the Admiralty." 4
Farago then gave an indication of what US military services
are spending for intelligence. In fiscal year 1955, the Army
asked for $54,454,000 for intelligence, and for fiscal years 1952-
54, inclusive, the Army spent a total of $176,400,000 on intelli-
gence. Yet this represented less than one-half of one percent
of the total Army budget.5 Then, stressing his thesis that the
cold war is a "War of Wits," Farago pointed out relative ex-
penditures for intelligence in the Continental Army and in the
services today: 6
Between 1776 and 1781, George Washington spent
approximately eleven percent of his entire military
budget on intelligence operations. The fact that today
we spend less than one percent of our peacetime mili-
tary budget on these same activities shows how little
effort is being made to solve the "friction" by intel-
lectual means rather than brute force.
From the contacts I have had with various British intelli-
gence officers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and
some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from
comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF
intelligence, I am certainly inclined to agree, at least partially,
with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence
production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares
favorably with that produced by the much larger USAF intelli-
gence staffs. The British traditionally have been willing to
Farago, op. cit., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 51.
? Ibid., p. 345.
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spend a great amount of money, time, and effort in the collec-
tion of intelligence information, more, perhaps, than most
modern nations. They have not, in other words, weighed re-
sults obtained by intelligence efforts on a completely pragmatic
basis, as we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; they know
that one cannot package intelligence results on a "pound-for-
pound" basis. So for the past two hundred years they have
been preeminent in the field. This is not to say that they have
not made serious mistakes; but, by and large, their intelligence
estimates have been remarkably sound. Moreover, they have
used periods of nominal peace to extend and consolidate their
intelligence activities, not only for the purpose of preparing
for the next war but also (what is even more important) pre-
paring for the peace to follow.
FREEDOM OF ACTION. As background for a discussion of
the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force
intelligence, I should like to quote the following passage from
the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities: 7
Effect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of In-
telligence.
The task force has recognized the incompatibility in
method between the practice of diplomacy and the
more direct and active operations incident to the col-
lection of intelligence and the conduct of cold war.
While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts be-
tween them must be resolved, usually on a high level,
and always in the national interest. It must be real-
ized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that while
political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks
avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element
in the fight to preserve our national welfare and ex-
istence. Instances have come to the attention of the
task force where too conservative an attitude has pre-
vailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely
action in the field.
Although the foregoing comment was made in connection
with a discussion of the intelligence activities of the Depart-
Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress, by the Commission
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, June
1955, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as "Task Force Report.")
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ment of State, it is every bit as applicable to air intelligence As
to the Department of State because the air attache system,
which is a major contributor of intelligence information, func-
tions as an integral part of the State Department's Foreign
Service.
It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking, diplo-
matic considerations take precedence over the collection re-
quirements of the attaches. Nevertheless, within the frame-
work of that principle (which is a part of the principle of civil-
ian control over the military establishment), it should be ob-
vious from the implications of the Task Force findings that a
less conservative attitude toward opportunities for collection
of intelligence information should permeate not only the diplo-
matic service but also the military establishment.
I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestions for
carrying out intelligence operations. My concern is with the
promotion of principles that would provide the type of climate
in which competent people, using their innate intelligence and
ingenuity, can devise an infinite number of ways in which to
collect and produce air intelligence - ways which must, of
course, be within the framework of US national objectives at
all times. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that we should
take a page out of the British Secret Service book and put our
intelligence collection efforts on a basis where they can pay
their own way, at least in part. This would be a long-term
proposition and it would be impossible of achievement under
the existing regimentation that governs all business enter-
prises in which the government is officially engaged.
COEQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFF ELE-
MENTS. There is, as far as I can discern, no rhyme nor reason
in subordinating intelligence as a staff section to operations.
My biggest objection to the subordination of intelligence to op-
erations lies in the fact that the operations officer is automati-
cally placed in the position where he frequently makes purely
command decisions. The intelligence officer is supposed to
advise the commanding officer as to what the enemy can and
probably will attempt to do that would interfere with the ac-
complishment of the command mission. The operations officer
is supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what
his own forces can and should do. The commanding officer
is then in a position to weigh both his own and the enemy's
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38 CONFIDENTIAL
capabilities and to make a sound command decision as to
command action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer
to make such a decision, for the commanding officer is thereby
deprived of the full value (and probably full information) of
enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias,
commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told the Con-
gressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster
that one of the organizational deficiencies which was a con-
tributing factor was: 8
That the planning officers were allowed to take over
the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted
in individuals without a full knowledge of the Japanese
or their psychology determining what the Japanese
might do. This practice applied not only in Washing-
ton, but also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneous con-
clusion was reached by the planning officer that there
was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. Success achieved by intelligence
in peace will determine the outcome of the war.
General Kuter stated: 9
In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross
errors of judgment. There will be no time, should hos-
tilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of forces
that we have provided, the manner in which they have
been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And
the terrible penalty for failure could be quick and com-
plete defeat.
Many factors are involved in any satisfactory an-
swer. But one thing is sure. The question cannot be
answered satisfactorily unless we have the proper doc-
trine, and unless the doctrine is accepted.
For years the US has believed that its greatest military po-
tential lay in its industrial might. The validity of this belief
was demonstrated in World Wars I and II and again in Korea.
We can be sure that any Soviet attacks against this country
will be planned to destroy not only our retaliatory force but
also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no longer
8Zacharias, p. 253.
? Kuter, Lawrence S., Lt. Gen., "No Room For Error," Air Force Maga-
zine (AWC Curriculum Handout #36-4-a, 24 November 1955).
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will the US or any other country be able to build up its mili-
tary forces and rely on its industrial potential after the war
has begun." 10
Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is
to influence our preparations, provide a foundation for our
planning, and guide early phases of operations. It is true that
Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of the CIA,11 achieved un-
precedented success in the history of espionage with the intelli-
gence network he established in Germany, operating from
Switzerland, during the war.
. . . Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to
start a conspiracy within the high command of the
German armies in the south and to bring about the
surrender of the very army on which Hitler was de-
pendent for the prolonging of the war from behind the
legendary "Alpine redoubt."
However, the situation in Japan was a far different matter.
Through shortsightedness and perhaps ineptitude and inex-
perience, the US had failed to establish the groundwork for an
effective espionage system in Japan, notwithstanding the fact
that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware
of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view
of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between
Japan and the US right up to the surprise attack against Pearl
Harbor, this failure to develop, in advance of war, a workable
system for systematic collection (in Japan) of intelligence in-
formation during the war that most intelligence personnel
were sure was virtually inevitable is an extremely black mark
against the US intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover,
this country made no serious effort to establish an intelligence
net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the
effort was far too great in relation to its possible value. Farago
pointed out that it is a virtual impossibility ".. . to set up a
local network in an enemy country under wartime condi-
tions. . . ." 12 [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding]
10 Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co., p. 256.
Farago, op. cit., p. 183.
Ibid., p. 182.
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How can we account for the fact that, against all reasonable
odds, the US did establish a satisfactory espionage net in Ger-
many after war started but failed to do so in Japan, its other
major enemy? I suggest that the reason lies, among other
factors, in the accessibility of Germany before the outbreak
of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from
Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in
Japan. Interestingly enough, the Soviets failed to re-establish
within Germany an adequate espionage net :
. . . when their original. network, known as the
Rote Kapelle or Red Orchestra, was smashed. They
managed to create such networks only in countries of
their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland, tra-
ditional battleground of international espionage.13
The Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japan (remem-
ber the Sorge espionage case?) 14 It seems to me that there is a
direct correlation between the accessibility of a potential enemy
country just before the outbreak of hostilities and the proba-
bility of being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain
an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What
does this mean, as far as the US is concerned at the present
time? If it is difficult to penetrate the Iron Curtain today,
it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, we
must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong,
diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We cannot
do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment,
and funds. Yet maximum reliance must be placed on the
ability of intelligence to decide by whom, when, where, and in
what strength the US may be attacked. The responsibility of
the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I, since 1 July 1957),
USAF, is to develop this information regarding our suscepti-
bility to air attack - this in an air-nuclear age.
CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. Air intelligence must, on a con-
tinuing basis, encompass all aspects of power in foreign na-
tions (political, economic, and psychosocial, as well as mili-
tary), both in the present and in the historical perspective.
Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy.
18 Ibid., p. 182.
14 Ibid., pp. 163, 166, 179, 181, 212, 219-220.
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Heretofore, air intelligence (as well as army and navy in-
telligence) has confined itself primarily to an evaluation of the
military power of foreign nations. The National Security
Council has directed the air force to interest itself primarily in
intelligence of foreign air forces and has assigned responsi-
bility for covering other aspects of national power to the other
US intelligence agencies.
It has long been an American tradition that the military
establishment should remain free from the "taint of politics."
As a result, the military has shied away from any contact with
political problems. This even reached the point before World
War II where few of the regular military establishment exer-
cised their constitutional right to vote in elections.
This fear of military domination in our national life stems,
of course, from our inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny
and autocracy. Before the time that military power became
inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps
even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had
some validity in our national consciousness. However, Clause-
witz would not have subscribed to the complete separation of
military thinking from the remainder of national life and activ-
ities. He pointed out that war is merely an extension of na-
tional, political policy by other means.' Hitler demonstrated
his conviction that war is merely a "mopping-up process" by
capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly
the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by
word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics
and military action is extremely nebulous.
It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence
should "stick to its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining
the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in the tradi-
tional fashion (in which the army is supposed to develop intel-
ligence on foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval
forces; the air force, on foreign air forces; and the State Depart-
ment and CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths and
weaknesses). However, as it is air power that will have to
carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy, as well
as continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy
"Karl von Clausewitz, General, On War (Translation by O. J. Mattij s
Jolles), Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 16.
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warmaking potential and will to fight, air intelligence must
have the capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where
and when to hit the enemy in order to hurt him most.
It seems incontrovertible to me that we have reached a place
in history where the military establishment, particularly the
air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well
as the economic and psychosocial problems) - the traditional
American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General
Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed
on this point, in response to a question asked by the writer,
following his lecture to the Air War College. He stated, in
effect, "There is a growing community of thought that the mili-
tary establishment should get into the fields of political and
economic warfare, as well as psychological warfare." 16 Air in-
telligence, obviously, must be in the vanguard of this new
approach.
CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. Intelligence must take a dy-
namic approach. In speaking of the fact that data on the
Soviet Bloc are inadequate, the Task Force Report on Intelli-
gence Activities considered that security measures adopted by
the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly
in comparison with American security measures, which make
it relatively simple for foreign nations to collect vital secrets.
The task force admonishes, however:
. . . The information we need, particularly for our
Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through con-
centration on the prime target we must exert every
conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success
in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy
level, a willingness to accept certain calculated politi-
cal and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological
capabilities.17
Opportunities to increase air intelligence coverage of Soviet
capabilities and intentions include:
a. The increasing of our clandestine operations and efforts
to infiltrate the iron and bamboo curtains from all peripheral
countries, taking maximum advantage not only of border-
Samford, John A., Major General, "Objectives for the Use of Force,"
lecture to Army War College, 2 January 1956.
14 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 69.
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crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral
shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean
and the Black Sea coastal areas.
b. The establishment of contacts with and provision of sup-
port to (in return for services rendered) agents from among
known governments in exile, such as those from the Baltic and
East European Satellite nations; the known 10,000,000 Chinese
living outside China, as minority groups throughout Asia; all
known religious organizations, business firms, and govern-
mental agencies throughout the Free World having dealings
with the Soviet Bloc; all known visitors to Soviet-dominated
territory, such as trade union officials, scientists, airline and
shipping crewmen, and others; and all defectors from iron cur-
tain countries.
c. The attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, or otherwise
cause Soviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials, tech-
nicians, or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon their re-
turn - or to defect and remain in the West.
d. The making of surreptitious photographic penetration
flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to
cover peripheral areas.
e. The purchase of controlling interest in the most active
Western firms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellite na-
tions in order to use these firms to collect intelligence informa-
tion, spread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet and Satellite
nationals, and otherwise create situations behind the iron and
bamboo curtains that would be favorable to the West.
f. The employment of such outstanding historians as Alfred
J. Toynbee; political scientists, as Professor William M. Mc-
Govern and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers, as G. Don-
ald Hudson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; and authorities
on Russia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr. James
Burnham. The individuals named represent only a few of the
potential list of qualified consultants; the profound and
detailed knowledge of foreign peoples and areas in their re-
spective professions that is possessed by people of this stature
would furnish a wellspring of ideas of inestimable value to air
intelligence. In addition to enriching the staff with people of
this caliber we should hire outstanding representatives in the
advertising and public relations fields (preferably those having
experience in foreign areas), who can assist the factual experts
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in packaging the ideas we want to use in our "War of Wits"
with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of men.
CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. Intelligence should be used as an
offensive weapon, one capable of influencing the outcome of
either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total.
Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet
Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the
sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we
must be always on the alert to the possibility that such a con-
flict might arise through miscalculation on their part. The
dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite
peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we
cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping
war limited are very remote." "I
The difficulty is not in the lack of desire to exercise such
restraint, but in the fact that the things we stand to lose are
of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases
of conflict. To have mutual understanding and agreement be-
tween enemies is essential if conflict is to be localized. What
does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this : we must pro-
duce intelligence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air
intelligence should control or at least coordinate all air force
agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack
behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly military
operations in areas that may become the scene of battle or in
areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounter Com-
munist influences.
CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. Intelligence must be used system-
atically. Commanders, policymakers, planners, and opera-
tions personnel at all echelons must rely upon, then plan, then
act not only upon intelligence but also upon intelligence recom-
mendations - within practical limits of our own capability and
feasibility of such recommendations. We have long expressed
as a principle of intelligence the concept that it must be
supplied to the interested command in time to be of use.
Unfortunately, in intelligence circles there has not been, it
seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of intelli-
gence to the commander and his staff in such a form and so
convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attention
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and responsive command action that it warrants. Stressing
the need for reducing the margin of error inherent in any
human undertaking, General White pointed out the need for
educating our planners and our leaders. He said that poor
command decisions and inferior or unimaginative staff work
would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone into develop-
ing an extremely expensive air force. He added:
. . . Superior employment of air weapons must be
based on complete understanding of the nature of air
warfare, the political and military context within
which the air forces are operating, and a sound but
imaginative understanding of targets and weapons.19
There also has been entirely too little emphasis on the con-
cept that command plans and action should be based on in-
telligence. This has not always been the fault of intelligence.
Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational
plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for thQ
intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and intentions that
these selfsame plans were designed to counter. In my experi-
ence as a staff officer at various echelons of command, there
have been few instances in which command war plans, emer-
gency plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to
the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans.
More often than not, the intelligence annex is merely prepared
at the same time as the basic plan and the other annexes and
all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure,
and the one that we in intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces
in Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be
this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared
first and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies
in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the
annexes (including the intelligence annex) are then prepared
simultaneously, with a view to countering the threat indicated
in the intelligence estimate.
I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into
consideration at every stage in the planning cycle in the mili-
tary establishment stems by and large from an American pre-
White, Thomas D., "The Current Concept of American Military
Strength," AU Quarterly Review, Vol. VII, Spring 1954 (AWC Cur-
riculum Handout #56-2-B, 22 November 1955).
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dilection for ignoring in the policymaking cycle available in-
telligence regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual or
potential enemies.
It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some
way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to
stimulate an acceptance of that product and a willingness to
act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations
by intelligence for command action would, I believe, materially
improve this situation and would lead to a command acceptance
of a principle advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief
of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present
world situation makes it more important than ever to have com-
plete information upon which to base economical deployment
and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid sur-
prise (obviously the same principle applies to all military
forces). General Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligence con-
stitutes the fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the
formulation of plans, the development of materiel, the alloca-
tions of resources, and the conduct of operation." 20
CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. Intelligence must continuously
estimate enemy intentions as well as capabilities and vulnera-
bilities. One of the biggest reasons that commanders at times
have made their own estimates, rather than accept those of
their intelligence officers, is simply that the intelligence officers
havebeen unwilling to "go out on a limb" and estimate enemy
intentions. Before the early 1930's the "method of intentions"
was used by the US Army. It was a method used by the elder
von Moltke. Shortly before 1936 the American Army adopted
the "method of capabilities," which had been the method used
by Napoleon.21
Admittedly the "method of intentions" is a difficult one and,
for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhabit forming be-
cause the probability of error is extremely high. Success for
this method depends not only on an intimate knowledge of the
mentality of the opposing commanders as well as the tactical
doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things as
the physical and mental condition of the opponent, his normal
reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand, the
"Farago, op. cit., p. 8.
21 Command and General Staff School, "Military Intelligence," p. 7.
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"method of capabilities" takes into consideration all lines of
action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line
until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he
desired to adopt that line, he is physically incapable of doing
so. Thus it strives by elimination to reduce the possibility
down to one - the only one line of action which the enemy can
take. This is the ideal, as far as intelligence is concerned, but
it is seldom reached.
CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT. Intelligence is no longer a func-
tion of command, except at the higher echelons. All of the
services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid only
lip service to the principle that intelligence is a function of
command. This has been amply demonstrated by a lack of
provision for suitable intelligence staffing between World War
I and World War II and by a demeaning of intelligence func-
tions. My reasons for believing that intelligence should no
longer be considered a function of command at all echelons are
different from either of these.
In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the
US intelligence operations should be centrally controlled. Sec-
ond, the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably be car-
ried out at all echelons; therefore, even in a prolonged period
of cold war, air intelligence operations must be, if not actually
centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentrated in
a small number of locations where the complete intelligence
process is directed by one individual. Unquestionably, in the
past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even air divi-
sions and air forces occasionally may have felt a twinge of
conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear
to carry out all the intelligence functions that manuals said
they should, from collection through dissemination. These
individuals may now draw a sigh of relief, as I view it; for in
the air force, their primary intelligence function is to dissemi-
nate down to the troops air intelligence that has been received
from higher echelons.
It may be argued that I am hereby cutting the rug out from
under the principle I previously expressed - that the intelli-
gence officer should not be subordinated to other staff officers
but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the
contrary, in these lower units, and even when his recognized
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CONFIDENTIAL
duties are in accord with his actual duties, I still feel that the
intelligence officer at every echelon of command should remain
responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff,
and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain this inde-
pendence of other staff considerations in order best to present
to his commander the most complete intelligence picture and
the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though
he himself may not have developed either the intelligence esti-
mate of the situation or the recommendations based on it.
At the major air force command levels there is no question
in regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence
officer as intelligence should continue to be for his commander
a complete function of command, in the traditional sense. At
the lower echelons, intelligence would still be a command re-
sponsibility, but rather more in the "special staff" tradition
than the "general staff" concept.
CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. Major headquarters staffs should
get out of the operational aspects of intelligence to the maxi-
mum extent possible and should confine their attention largely
to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions. This
concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in
the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the
present tables of distribution, the intelligence staff of Head-
quarters USAF and the major subordinate commands would be
relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of
highly qualified personnel, representing the maximum intel-
ligence capability in the air force. Their functions would be
primarily policymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating.
They would be prepared to give flash estimates of indications
of the imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as required
by the commander and his staff. They would exercise staff
supervision not only over the intelligence activities of all sub-
ordinate units of the command, but also over the collection and
production activities of the intelligence centers belonging to
the command; these centers would perform the operational
aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command.
CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. Air Intelligence (to include coun-
terintelligence) must keep under continuous review and, to
the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish its
files concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions.
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What I am proposing is nothing less than declassifying cer-
tain carefully selected items of intelligence and counterintelli-
gence regarding Soviet activities and providing such informa-
tion to the American public on a planned basis. Let the Amer-
ican people get this information, but from authoritative sources
and not from newspaper columnists.
Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will
come from some of my fellow intelligence officers, because tradi-
tionally, intelligence has had a moral responsibility to protect
its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, intelligence files are
bulging with information that represents such a conglomera-
tion from so many sources that no one source could possibly be
harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type of infor-
mation for at least some of the detailed data on our own mili-
tary establishment that we now hand out so freely. I am confi-
dent that the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be
very favorable, and that in the long run, the story of air power
and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security
interests of the US can be made synonymous in the minds of
the American people.
So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies
and start a program designed to discomfort them on a global
scale - by informing and arousing the American public and
the rest of the free world with factual knowledge of Soviet ac-
tivities and intentions. For example, an article in the Sep-
tember 1955 Reader's Digest discussed the disturbing story of
the manner in which the Communists, who had infiltrated the
military services and governmental structure of Iran, were pre-
vented from taking over the entire country by the merest ac-
cident. As a result of the investigation, it was disclosed that
five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot, in-
cluding numerous high-ranking individuals in both the Army
and the police departments.22
This story, terrifying in its implication for other countries,
would, I submit, have had a much stronger impact on public
awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it
been officially released by a government intelligence agency,
rather than by a commercial writer. This is the type of run-
Joseph A. Mazandi and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch That Saved
Iran," Reader's Digest, September 1955, pp. 59-60.
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of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the services which
should be released to the public as soon and as fully as is prac-
ticable and, in any event, before some sharp news reporter can
capitalize it.
CONCEPT ELEVEN. All air intelligence concepts must be con-
sidered dynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to
meet changing world situations. It follows that air intelligence
philosophy must be considered in its broadest sense as a con-
stant search for principles. The doctrine and policies result-
ing from this process must be changed as new concepts are
developed.
In this context, General Kuter provides another valid con-
cept for developing an air intelligence policy, although he was
applying it in the larger sense to the whole spectrum of air
force thinking. "A true air doctrine accepted and exploited is
the key to a sound military policy. We have the doctrine, now
we must exploit it in a common strategy." 23 We don't, as yet,
have an air intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, but if
USAF will adopt that last admonition of General Kuter's as
the basic air force intelligence policy, it will be only a matter
of time until we have an air intelligence doctrine - one on
which the commands may then soundly base their own intel-
ligence policies.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING
I. THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL
The basic objective for air targeting is to present measure-
ments of the ability of the enemy to take actions which
threaten our national security. These measurements must be
presented in such a way as to guide our action against the
enemy's strengths. This objective is usually broken down into
subobjectives which illustrate clearly its breadth and com-
plexity. Expressed in terms of courses of enemy action which
are unacceptable to the US, these subobjectives are, in descend-
ing order of importance:
1. To deliver atomic weapons against the US, our forces
abroad, and our allies.
2. To resist the penetration of his airspace by our air forces.
3. To develop and produce potentially decisive weapons or
weapons systems.
4. To conduct large-scale land and naval operations against
our forces and our allies.
5. To develop and maintain the economic, political, and psy-
chological strengths necessary to support prolonged military
operations.
With the development of new weapons and weapons systems,
however, and the resultant capability of a single aircraft or
missile to deliver the equivalent of millions of tons of TNT on
one mission, the analysis and presentation of the strengths
supporting the first three subobjectives have assumed ever-
increasing importance and urgency. This compression of fire-
power in time brings the realization that the decision in future
wars may be reached in a matter of hours or days at most.
Old problems have been accentuated and many new ones cre-
ated by these developments. For example, selection of target
systems to achieve the subobjectives time-phased in the order
shown above is no longer sufficient. Analysis must produce
not only a priority of targets within each subobjective and
target system, but also an indication of how many of them
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must be attacked to achieve the objective. Thus analysis by
increments in time and space is becoming an essential element
in the targeting process.
The complexity of these problems and the speed with which
they must be solved have led to the introduction of new statis-
tical methods and of new machine computing techniques into
the targeting analysis process. For example, immediate
assessment of the damage and contamination effect of a given
attack will be necessary in order to determine the destruction
required of succeeding attacks. This involves a continuing
evaluation of target priorities and of net offensive strengths
throughout an air offensive until a decision is reached. Two-
sided war-gaming offers the best possibility for providing the
answers needed for this and similar problems. Because of the
time element and the great volume of data required by the new
statistical techniques, high-speed electronic computing is
essential. By this process hypothetical but highly probable
military situations in both peace and war can be examined and
tested for the types of detailed targeting information needed
by the analyst to guide and evaluate target selections. Only
in this way can the total targeting effort truly be said to pre-
sent measurements of the enemy's strengths in such a way as
to facilitate action against them.
During the last several years it has become increasingly
apparent that mathematical "Monte Carlo" and "input-out-
put" type models offer a new and promising technique for "war-
gaming" and for analyzing a nation's economic and military
resources for targeting purposes. The rapid advances in the
speed and data handling capacity of modern electronic com-
puters have now made these models feasible for application to
many air targets problems.
The purpose of the mathematical models is the selection of
targets for optimum forestalling of enemy courses of action.
This requires the models to answer the following questions in
order.
1. Present situation
a. What is the size and composition of the enemy mili-
tary establishment (military resources) ?
b. What is the size, composition, and productive ability
of the enemy economy (economic resources) ?
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c. What levels of military action will these resources sup-
port?
2. Mobilization capability
a. What would be the size and composition of enemy
military resources and economic resources after an all-out
mobilization period of x months?
b. What levels of military action would these resources
support?
3. Evaluation of damage
a. For any specified bombing attack what would be the
yield and location of all exploding weapons?
b. Given these explosions what would be the size and com-
position of the post attack military and economic resources
(including population) ?
c. Given the post attack resources what level of enemy
military action could be maintained?
4. Recuperation
What would be the size and composition of enemy mili-
tary and economic resources y months (or days) after the
specified attack, taking into account repair, rebuilding, con-
version of other facilities, and new construction?
For "war-gaming," that is, estimating net offensive capabili-
ties, the above questions must be asked about our own country
as well as about the enemy country.
The system of mathematical models which would answer
these questions is shown schematically in Figure 1.
The air battle, the damage, and the contamination models
would answer questions 3a and b above. Discussions of these
models are planned in subsequent issues.
The remaining questions concerning the present, post mobi-
lization, post attack, and post recuperation capabilities of the
military and the economy are the province of the military re-
sources model, which includes economic resources.
Procedurally, the military resources models determine the
number and size of missions, both offensive and defensive of
various types, which each country can carry out in a given span
of time. This information is fed to the air battle model which
together with the damage and contamination models deter-
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M-DAY D-DAY
MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
DAMAGE
MODEL
AIR
CONTAMINATION
MODEL
BATTLE
MODEL
DAMAGE
MODEL
CONTAMINATION
MODEL
MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
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mines the military, economic, and population resources re-
maining in each country after a period of air battle. The dam-
age information is in turn fed back to the military resources
model which determines the number, type, and size of missions
which each country can carry out after the first phase of air
battle. The process is then repeated for later phases of the air
battle.
If the models can, as is believed possible, answer the ques-
tions posed we have an exceedingly powerful tool not only for
target selection, but also for estimating the capability of a
country to carry out military action now and in the future
under various conditions and assumptions. The testing of
alternative target systems in the first and succeeding phases
can lead to the choice of the optimum target system for any
of several different strategic situations.
When then, is the military resources model and how is it de-
signed to answer the questions put to it?
The military resources model is an input-output model. This
is a kind of mathematical model about which it has been said,
it is much easier to understand what it is expected to do than
how it does it. What the military resources model is expected
to do is to estimate the capabilities of a military establishment
and its supporting economy to carry out military action. The
essential problem of making this estimate is that everything
must be considered simultaneously.
It is not enough to know that the capacity of the aeroengine
industry is so many engines per month. One must also know
whether there is enough steel (or electric power, copper, petro-
leum, ball bearings, and so on) to produce these engines while
at the same time the tank, gun, shipbuilding, ammunition, and
many other key industries (including reconstruction in a post
attack period) are also requiring steel. Furthermore, not only
the direct demand for steel must be considered. The aero-
engine industry consumes not only steel but also aluminum,
electric power, transportation, and many other inputs, the pro-
duction of which also requires some steel. In short, to know
the capabilities of one industry we must account for require-
ments of all industries for a vast range of raw materials, labor,
capital equipment, components, goods in process, transporta-
tion, and communications. Input-output models are a tech-
nique for doing just this. An input-output model shows for
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each industry (or military activity) the requirements for sup-
plies from each other industry.'
The military resources model consists of three sub-models or
grids; the military grid, the economic grid, and the transpor-
tation grid. The economic grid is in turn broken down into
geographical regions which are related to each other by the
transportation grid. The military resources model can be
illustrated schematically.
ECONOMIC GRID
Each of these grids consists of an inventory of resources and
a table of coefficients in the form of inputs required per unit
of output. For the economic grid the inventory of resources is
the capacities of all producing industries. The table of coeffi-
cients shows material, labor, and capital inputs per unit of in-
dustrial output; for example, kilowatt hours of electricity per
ton of aluminum and tons of aluminum per heavy bomber air-
craft. The military grid shows labor, equipment, and supplies
required per unit of military activity; for example, tons of fuel
per flying hour, number of aircraft per wing, tons of ammuni-
tion (by type) per division month, and so on. Its inventory
of resources is the number of military units of each kind and
their associated equipment. The transportation grid has as
its output units of transportation capacity on a regional basis.
This grid acts as a restraint on both the economic grid and the
military grid as transportation can be a bottleneck or restraint
both in the economy and within the military structure itself.
1 See Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 4, "The Role of Interindustry
Studies in Economic Intelligence," Robert Loring Allen, p. 97.
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Without knowing the full complexity of the statistical and
computational procedures (which is awe-inspiring) the reader
can now visualize the operation of these grids in answering our
initial questions. The military grid shows for a given set of
military forces the level of combat actions that could be main-
tained if the economy provides all the supplies the military re-
quires. The coefficients of the military grid determine the re-
quirements of the given level of combat actions from the econ-
omy. The economic and transportation grids determine how
much of these supplies can be forthcoming from the existing
inventory of economic resources.
At the present time the economic grid of the Soviet Bloc has
been largely completed. It has been constructed in two
parts-one covering the USSR and European Satellites and
the other the Peoples Republic of China. For the European
Bloc the grid distinguishes 240 producing industries or sectors
and their materials, components, capital equipment, and labor
inputs. Five test runs have been made and evaluated.2 On
the basis of the evaluation of these test runs, application of
this grid to certain types of live air targets problems is now be-
ing undertaken. However, a substantial data improvement
research program is going concurrently.
The military grid has been under development for about nine
months. It is expected that test runs of this grid will be made
in the summer of 1958.
The- transportation grid has been under development for
about six months, and it is expected that test runs of this grid
will be made in the summer of 1958. The construction of this
grid is being undertaken on two fronts. The first involves the
geographic disaggregation of the economic grids in terms of
local regions. The second consists of the development of a
transportation grid based on these regions. To date, 159 re-
gions covering the USSR have been designated, outlined, and
coded. The transportation net has been divided according to
these regions and the terminals and links within each region
coded and catalogued. The 159 regions correspond to Soviet
oblasts wherever possible in order to take advantage of the data
Distribution of these runs has been made throughout the intelli-
gence community. A few copies are still available for interested
readers.
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on production and transportation published by the Russians.
The effort to gather Soviet source information for the grid is
linked to a concerted effort to gather applicable data, both
classified and unclassified, from all other available sources.
The enormous complexity of the computations involved in
model analysis makes hand calculation completely unthink-
able. In the economic grid for the European Soviet Bloc, for
example, there are per unit of output of each of the 240 sectors
the commodity input requirements from each of the other 239
sectors. This will be further broken down into 159 geograph-
ical regions. Thus the number of coefficients to be simultane-
ously processed theoretically could be of the order of 240 x 240
x 159, or about 9 million.3 For any major problem millions of
individual arithmetic steps may be involved. Modern elec-
tronic computers, however, can perform this job. The revolu-
tionary aspect of these computers is the speed with which they
can file, sort, recall, and manipulate large masses of data.
These partially routine steps in arriving at intelligence esti-
mates on large areas, such as the Soviet Bloc, have always been
time-consuming and cumbersome. For the more difficult an-
alytical problems, electronic computers together with mathe-
matical models provide the analyst with a tool for considering
and holding in juxtaposition a great many more of the ele-
ments of the analysis than formerly was possible. This tech-
nique does not, by any means, eliminate the human judgment
factor. Rather it is believed that it will prove to be a powerful
tool in assisting intelligence analysts and planners to make
better judgments, and to be able to make them more rapidly.
Some of the more specific applications of the military re-
sources model to air targets problems are presented below.
1. Enemy Capabilities
The military resources model can be used to assess the
capability of the economy of the Soviet Bloc to mount and sus-
tain elements of military strength during a pre-attack period
under varying Bloc objectives, policies, and assumptions. The
government is constrained to work its available resources and
within technological relationships. If it wants a jet medium
The number is actually smaller since many of the coefficients are
zero. Only a machine, however, could remember which ones are
zero.
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bomber regiment it must provide planes, bombs, crews, air-
bases from which to operate, and so on, in specific quantities.
If a ton of steel is needed the government must see that steel
mill capacity, pig iron, scrap, coal, labor, and so on, are avail-
able in the correct amounts. If more steel capacity is needed
it must provide the steel, concrete, machinery, and so on, in
the right quantities and types to construct a new steel mill.
These resource restraints and technological relationships are
set out comprehensively and in detail by the military resources
model. The ability of the economy to support the mobiliza-
tion of desired combinations or "mixes" of air, land, and sea
forces can be measured. A typical problem would be a deter-
mination of the maximum "balanced" air, land, and sea forces
which could be activated in a specified mobilization period with
specified stockpiling and capital expansion policies. In addi-
tion to measuring the maximum activation of combat units,
the economic grid can be used to determine under a variety of
Bloc policies and objectives the maximum capability to pro-
duce specific weapons such as guided missiles and H-bombs at
specified times.
However, the economic-industrial grid does not take into
account any restraints or bottlenecks that might develop
within the military structure itself. Therefore, the outputs of
the economic grid are fed into the military grid as inputs. The
military grid is then used to assess the capability of the Soviet
Bloc military structure to mount and sustain, during a pre-
attack period, elements of military strength fully prepared to
engage in combat activities required by given strategies. The
ability of the military structure to support desired combina-
tions or "mixes" of air, land, and sea combat activities can be
measured under varying Bloc mobilization objectives, policies,
and assumptions. In addition to measuring the maximum
combat capabilities that can be sustained, the military model
can be used to determine the capability of the military struc-
ture to put into operation specific weapons, such as guided
missiles, within the available military resources, that is, trained
personnel, missile sites, logistics, and repair facilities.
The transportation grid would then be used to establish any
transportation restraints or bottlenecks which might develop
within the economy or military structure itself.
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2. Effects Analysis
Following their use in pre-attack situations, the three grids
of the military resources model can be used to determine the
capability of the Bloc economy, military structure, and trans-
portation system to re-mount various types of military strength
in the post-attack period after air attacks of different scope
and intensity. The analysis can be applied to various time
periods after the air attack. In very short periods of time only
the military, or possibly the military and transportation grids
might come into play, as the answers needed would be the avail-
abilities within the immediate military structure of the Soviet
Bloc to re-cycle air attacks and to sustain ground and naval
action. These answers would be in terms of availabilities of
aircraft, runways, fuel, men, and ammunition to produce flying
hours, and the needed inputs to produce ground division
months and units of naval action. The longer the time period
involved the more industrial and economic resources must be
analyzed and brought into play as supporting military re-
sources. In the analyses of recuperation periods of over a few
months the economic-industrial grid is heavily drawn upon.
However, the model as a whole is designed to cope with imme-
diate post-attack military assessment, as well as long range
economic and industrial recuperation assessment.
3. Selection of Air Targets
One of the outstanding advances of the model-computer
technique is the possibility of rapidly testing a great variety of
simulated air targets problems, using various assumptions, and
considering air attacks of varying magnitude and scope. Opti-
mum air target systems can be developed for a variety of cir-
cumstances as a result of repeated running of both pre-attack
capabilities problems and post-attack air target effects prob-
lems (a. and b. above). The resources such as airfields, mis-
sile sites, storage, supply, repair facilities, and industrial and
transportation installations which prove to be limiting factors
or bottlenecks in pre-attack mobilization problems and in the
re-mounting of combat activities in the post-attack period be-
come the air targets. The same techniques applied in simu-
lated problems would, of course, be applied to actual hot war
problems.
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4. Feasibility Testing
The necessity for balancing the internal flows within the
matrix of an input-output model make this type of model par-
ticularly suitable for testing the internal consistency of either
announced Soviet Bloc plans or of US intelligence estimates of
Soviet Bloc military or economic growth patterns. For exam-
ple, the internal consistency of either Soviet Bloc plans to
mount military strength or US intelligence estimates of Soviet
Bloc military growth plans can be tested. Estimates inde-
pendently projected for various types of air combat strength
can be tested one against the other in order to determine
whether or not the total projected strength estimate is internal-
ly consistent and whether or not such total strength can be sup-
ported by the Soviet Bloc military structure. The economic
grid can be used to check production estimates independently
arrived at for various military end products to determine
whether or not the production pattern so established is eco-
nomically feasible. The transportation grid should be of great
help in checking estimates of Soviet Bloc transportation pat-
terns and capability.
5. Mobilization Indicators
The military resources model can be used to establish indi-
cators of mobilization build-up. By testing the model under
various assumed mobilization conditions certain economic
changes as well as changes within the military structure can be
identified as indicators of partial or complete mobilization.
Specific changes in the use of resources can be identified as in-
dicating specific types of mobilization.
6. Intelligence Collection Indicators
In using the military resources model to solve a series of
simulated air targets problems, certain areas of economic and
military activity will be shown to be of critical significance to
the capability of the Soviet Bloc to mount and maintain mili-
tary strength. These critical sectors are those on which it is
most important to obtain accurate, current data for targeting
purposes. Thus the priority list of air targets intelligence re-
quirements can be sharpened, and emphasis can be placed on
the collection of certain key military and economic data.
7. Inputs for Operational Models
The military resources model is to be used to translate any
given over-all military strategy into requirements upon the
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economic-industrial, transportation, and military structure for
the creation of military formations and military resource ele-
ments together with the necessary military supporting activi-
ties in both pre- and post-attack situations. Operational
models such as the air battle model, currently being tested,
serve to indicate these requirements in a realistic manner.
The military resources model is designed to provide appropriate
inputs for these operational models in the form of units of com-
bat capability and to reflect the output of operational models
in changing requirements upon the military structure. Thus
the military resources model can define the maximum levels of
combat activity possible within the limitations of the Bloc mili-
tary and economic structure at any specified time.
8. Data Requirements ,
The validity of problem solutions provided by the military
resources model is dependent upon the accuracy of the data
inputs as well as the logic of the mathematical design of the
model. Each of the component parts of the model - the eco-
nomic grid, the military grid, and the transportation grid -
has its own data requirements which must be initially assem-
bled and subsequently kept up to date.
The economic grid contains a classification of economic ac-
tivity in the Soviet Bloc in the form of three submatrices or
grids; the commodity input grid, the capital input grid, and
the capital expansion grid. The data requirements of the com-
modity input grid or matrix consist of the commodity inputs
per unit of production for each of the 240 sectors of the matrix.
These sectors cover most of the commodities produced in the
Bloc. The data requirements of the capital input matrix con-
sist of the inputs of capital equipment and labor per unit of
production of each of these same commodities. The data re-
quired by the capital expansion matrix consist of the com-
modity and capital inputs necessary to increase available cap-
ital by one unit. The data described above are in the form of
technological coefficients which reflect the technological rela-
tionships currently operating as the economic restraints in any
desired mobilization or recuperation by the Soviet Bloc. In
order to reflect fully the flexibility of the Soviet Bloc economy
in meeting mobilization or wartime requirements the data in-
puts must reflect not only production processes currently in
use but also the alternative processes which could be used to
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break bottlenecks, or stoppages resulting from air attack. Thus
the economic grid requires the introduction of all practical
alternate input coefficients in order to establish realistic tech-
nological restraints. Because production technology changes
with the passage of time, these coefficients must be continually
scrutinized to insure that they reflect current technology. In
addition, changes are necessitated in the classification of com-
modities and capital equipment in the light of experience
gained in using the model for various types of problems. Those
economic sectors which prove to be the most sensitive to mobi-
lization or recuperation demands may require a more detailed
or disaggregated classification in the model, whereas less vital
sectors may be further aggregated.
The running of a simulation on the economic model requires,
in addition to the technological coefficients, data on the eco-
nomic resources available to the Soviet Bloc for the time period
being considered. Thus for each of the 240 commodity groups
in the grid, current data on Bloc capacity, inventory, and for-
eign trade must be assembled.
The data requirements of the military grid of the model
parallel those of the economic grid, but pertain to military
activities rather than economic activities. As previously men-
tioned, the output of the military grid, equivalent to commodity
outputs in the economic grid, is in units of frontline activity,
for example, flying hours of a specific type of bomber. For
each such military activity data on inputs of other military
activities as well as inputs of industrial commodities must be
determined. In addition, for each unit of military activity the
requirements of military capital aggregated in the form of
"resource elements" such as airstrips, naval bases, and repair
facilities must be determined together with the inputs neces-
sary to expand a military "resource element" by one unit. As
in the case of the economic grid, input data for alternative
processes of producing a unit of military activity must be
assembled and all coefficients in the grid must be kept in accord
with the most modern logistical processes used by the Soviet
Bloc. In the running of simulations on the military grid, data
on total Soviet Bloc capacity, inventories, and possible incre-
ments from foreign trade for each of the military activities in
the grid should be available for the time period under consid-
eration.
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The introduction of transportation factors into the military-
resources model requires an analysis of the Soviet Bloc eco-
nomic and military commodity flow structure in terms of geo-
graphic regions, thus greatly increasing the data needs. For
each region the types and amounts of transportation facilities
available must be determined in order to establish the freight-
handling capabilities of each region. For example, the analysis
of the USSR railroad system, currently underway, requires for
each terminal, link, and region estimates of the terminal motive
power and freight-car handling capacities, rail-link capacities,
and regional car-day requirements. In addition to these trans-
portation data requirements, the Soviet Bloc production and
consumption pattern must be established by geographic region.
This task requires the identification of the types and amounts
of economic and military capital facilities, or "resource ele-
ments," available in each region. In addition, the Soviet Bloc
"bill of goods," or final demand for military and civilian goods,
must be determined by geographic region. The regional con-
sumption of goods for military, government, and civilian use as
well as the regional consumption of construction materials and
producer durables must be estimated. Only when all these
data are introduced into the military resources model can the
transportation restraints, or "bottlenecks" under specified
mobilization and recuperation conditions be identified.
The data problem is formidable, but considerable progress
has been made, and. new sources of data are being found and
exploited. The data requirements for the model-machine tech-
nique do not represent a marked change from the require-
ments of traditional methods of analysis. However, the rigor-
ous analysis made possible by this technique or method simply
makes existing data deficiencies more apparent. Moreover,
this technique has the additional advantage of enabling the
analyst to identify those specific data requirements which are
the most crucial in target analysis by subjecting the data to
various types of sensitivity testing, e.g., the variation of coeffi-
cients, and data aggregations. The model also offers a means
of testing the reliability of coefficients in the light 9f known
output patterns of past years. It is believed that these various
testing techniques will contribute to a sharpening of the pri-
ority list of intelligence collection requirements.
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RET 65
HORRIBLE THOUGHT
The headshrinkers' literature is full of remarks about the
efforts of mankind to avoid thinking. As a matter of fact, I
rather imagine that a very small proportion of the brainpower
of the most creative thinker alive is ever devoted to creative
thought. In our society a fairly large proportion of this small
amount of creative thought is devoted to finding ways to help
mankind avoid thinking. Games, alcohol, tranquilizers, TV,
and business routine can all be used to help an individual fill
24 hours a day without ever having a creative thought. We like
cliches because they help us sound confident without thinking.
This does not mean that the average man is idle. On the con-
trary, he is probably a very active and useful citizen. As a
matter of fact, idleness is generally abhorred because it leaves
a vacuum that is an invitation to thought.
You and I may be exceptions to this general pattern in some
small degree, but I want the reader to recognize that if this
paper contains one small original thought, it will be here only
as a result of tremendous psychic effort spent in overcoming
my own urge not to think, and that if this thought, in its turn,
stimulates any creative thinking in the mind of the reader, it
will be only over the opposition of your shrewd and dogged sub-
conscious which tries so hard to protect you from the rash act
of thinking.
Having drafted this challenge to the reader's subconscious,
I now propose that we think about some of the problems of in-
telligence. (I almost said "look at some of the problems of in-
telligence." This just goes to show you how my subconscious
abhors the sound of the word "think.") To pose the problems
that I would like us to think about, I want first to go back into
a little intellectual history. Some of the readers will be much
more familiar with the events that I am about to describe than
I am, but here at least is my version.
In the early days of the postwar intelligence effort, the at-
tention of the intelligence community was focused primarily
on the interpretation of surface phenomena. Some of the
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questions at issue were almost unbelievably naive. For ex-
ample, there was not complete agreement on the general nature
of the Soviet Communist system, and there was a great deal of
discussion about the role of local Communist parties; some peo-
ple feeling that these were indigenous parties, and other peo-
ple feeling that they were part of the Soviet apparatus. Dur-
ing this period there was no agreement concerning standards
of analysis in the intelligence community. At one extreme,
some people used biased and emotional arguments without re-
gard to system. At the other extreme, some people claimed
that local Communist parties were not part of the Soviet ap-
paratus because there was not enough evidence on this question
to settle the matter in a court of law. As time went by, how-
ever, the intelligence community more and more came to accept
the standard techniques of political sciences, economics, soci-
ology, and so forth, and attempted to conform to academic
standards and rule of evidence.
General agreement on standards of thought tended to shift
the major problems inintelligence into the realm of facts. If
it was agreed that a given situation should be interpreted by
the use of the techniques of economics then the size of the
gross national product of a country involved in the situation
under study became an important fact, having great bearing
on the final analysis of the situation. The intelligence com-
munity, therefore, went through a period several years ago in
which major questions of the fact were important issues. Some
of us remember the blood and sweat shed over the numbers of
Soviet planes produced, the size of the gross national product
of Communist China, and the adequacy of the Chinese rail-
roads. The list could continue ad infinitum.
The focusing of the intelligence community on major ques-
tions of fact led to the development of additional techniques
for the establishment or verification of facts. Some of these
techniques, like the factory markings program, could be gen-
erally understood and accepted throughout the community.
Even in this field, however, and in related fields involving so-
phisticated statistical techniques, acceptance of the new meth-
od was neither immediate nor complete. Other techniques of
analysis in political and social fields also left some members of
the intelligence community gasping in their wake. At this
point, the intelligence community entered a stage which will
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always be with us to some extent. It is the stage in which
arguments about fact are caused by the technological gap be-
tween the informed and the uninformed analyst. This is a gap
that training and experience have narrowed considerably and
which probably can be narrowed even further in the future,
but it probably will exist to some degree as long as some parts
of the intelligence community develop new methods and new
ways of thinking and other parts of the intelligence community
lag in knowledge and understanding. It is not necessarily a
bad phenomenon. It at least means that somebody is out in
front and doing some thinking. It keeps the other fellows on
their toes.
As a result of over 10 years of development, the intelligence
community has now reached a high level 'of sophistication in
the application of standard techniques of analysis to intelli-
gence problems. Subsidiary methods such as style of writing
and the manner of presentation are excellent. The community
seems to have learned how to produce very good answers to
intelligence problems without generating an undue amount of
internal friction. All this is cause for considerable pride and
satisfaction.
As good as we may be, however, we are obviously not good
enough. We have just seen a classic example of one of our
major outstanding difficulties in the question of US policy to-
ward the launching of the Soviet earth satellite. There was no
failure of intelligence to report the facts relating to the Soviet
satellite program well in advance of the event, and intelligence
also pointed out that this event would be of distinct advantage
to the Soviet Union in the field of political prestige. Intelli-
gence had done the job our customers normally expect of us,
and yet in a real sense, the US was caught napping. The US
prepared a plan of what to do after the Soviets had launched
a satellite, but we did not take any action or even decide to take
any action before the event. In other words, our planners did
not fully recognize the magnitude of the blow the Soviet
launching would give to our prestige. It would be very easy for
us to sit back smugly and blame the unfortunate consequences
on the policymakers, who were adequately informed in advance
but who did not take adequate action in advance. Could it be
that we have not yet established adequate confidence in our
product in the minds of our consumers? Could it be that the
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fault still lay with the intelligence community? Could it be
that we have not yet devised the proper method of presentation
which would permit us to say "damn it, we mean it!"
If we are willing to recognize that it is possible for intelli-
gence to "fail" even when it is shrewdly accurate and timely,
we might find further food for thought in looking at the prob-
lems that we are being shrewdly accurate and timely about.
They tend to be problems that have a fairly immediate practical
application. No one could object to our tackling such problems.
When one looks for analysis in depth or in terms of long-term
trends, however, we find that it is generally lacking in our for-
mal publications. The bold analysis, the sharp intuition, the
long step ahead, and the provocative ideas are generally found
in informal bull sessions; in "think" pieces that have no true
status; in the internal staff memoranda of ONE, OCI, and so on;
and in some of the briefs and background material used by the
DDI on an ad hoc basis. They are almost never found in the
formal papers put forward by the community for the sober
guidance of our planners and policymakers.
There are strong conservative influences in our present sys-
tem of producing intelligence which would tend to resist change
in anything involving method and type of analysis, form of
presentation, and so on. Might we not be at a point of develop-
ment, however, where we need to make a quantum jump in the
conduct of intelligence? Is there any way in which intelligence
can learn to say better "we mean it," "these are the problems
that may arise in consequence," "these are the decisions that
must be decided?" How can we extend our analysis in time
and depth beyond present dimensions and yet carry with us the
conservative elements in the intelligence community?
There might be changes in organization or in the mechanics
of presentation which might improve our impact on the formu-
lation and execution of national policy. These things should
be explored, but no such changes could create, by themselves,
the change in the intellectual and visceral impact of intelli-
gence that we must aim for. The only sure way to conduct
national affairs with greater wisdom is for the responsible of-
ficials to think smarter thoughts. There is no mechanical or
organizational substitute for brains. Intelligence is an im-
portant and integral part of the process by which we conduct
our national affairs, and intelligence officers, therefore, have a
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tremendous responsibility to apply themselves to new ways of
thinking which will give us a more brilliant insight into the
dynamic world and our constantly changing place in it.
The real area in which we must seek improvement, there-
fore, is in that related to analysis. Perhaps we must learn to
pose a different kind of question to ourselves. Perhaps we need
to learn to think on a different time scale. Perhaps we need
to develop even more new methods of analysis. Perhaps we
need to do some combination of all of these things, and many
others as well.
There are probably many different ideas that should be ex-
amined. Here is a sample of the kind of thing that we might
think about. Might it not useful for us to engage systemati-
cally in backward analysis from hypothetical cases? For ex-
ample, intelligence predicted the launching of the Soviet earth
satellite and said that it would have unfortunate consequences.
But let us suppose that several years ago we had posed the fol-
lowing question: "What would be the impact on the policy
situation of the US and on its prestige if the Soviet Union were
to accomplish some technological breakthrough which would
support a Soviet claim for Soviet supremacy in the field of sci-
ence and technology?" If we had had this sort of analysis, it
might have been possible for us to point out in a much more
meaningful manner the way in which the Soviet missile pro-
gram and the development of a Soviet earth satellite might
place the Soviet Union in the favorable situation envisaged in
our hypothetical analysis. We could pose other similar ques-
tions such as : "What will be the effect on the world political
situation when Soviet industrial production equals US indus-
trial production?" "What would be the consequences if all
of the `third force' groups backed by the US came to power and
`right wing' parties disappeared?" "What would the world
look like after 20 years of disarmament and `peaceful coex-
istence?'" Analysis of these questions might put a vastly dif-
ferent light on intermediate developments leading toward the
hypothetical situation we have posed for ourselves.
There is undoubtedly room for improvement in our work, but
unfortunately as we get better and better, we have more and
more justification for continuing to think and do exactly as
we have been thinking and doing. This is more and more justi-
fication for not thinking creatively about improvement. We
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know, however, that there will always remain an important
challenge to us in intelligence as long as the US does not
act to accommodate itself adequately to world developments.
What do you think that we should do about it?
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ELINT
A SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
Charles A. Kroger, Jr.
During the initial phases of the Battle of Britain] a German
bomber, relatively safe under cover of darkness, flew over the
blacked-out landscape head' for Lond n., At a specific mo-
ment)the bomber dro` T! ombs, w c$'a c rately hit their
target, and another successful German Luftwaffe attack was
history. Electronic advancements by the Germans made this
possible. British interception and analysis of this new elec-
tronic bombing, device countered the Germans' success and
continued Q render less effectivevery subsequent electronic
advantage the Germans developed. In a parallel manner ,the
Germans developed a highly effective electronic intelligence
effort directed against the Allied raid orginating from Britain.
This phase of electronic intelligence, utilizing electronic means
to determine enemy electronic capabdi.tie,., began in England
just before World War Tana has been an ever increasing effort
which today is called ELINT.
ELINT is a coined word for the process of electronic intercept
and analysis or electronic intelligence - a process about which
very little has been written. The intelligence officer, unless he
is in the electronics field himself, has had little contact with
ELINT. By directive 1 ELINT is defined as: "the collection
(observation and recording), and the technical processing for
later intelligence purposes, of information on foreign, non-
communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from
other than atomic detonation sources." In simple* -terms,
ELINT is the detection and analysis of radiations from foreign
electronic devices for the purpose of extracting information of
value to intelligence.
Just as a flashlight radiates a beam of light observable
human eye, electronic devices emit or radiate nonvisible, rion-
audible radiations which are detectable and recordable, using
electronic devices just as the human ear hears sound. This
interception or collection of enemy radiations is the first stage
of ELINT.
The formal definition restricts ELINT to "noncommunica-
tion electromagnetic radiations other than atomic detonatioll'ORI/H RP PAGES
71-83
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sources." This means that ELINT is responsible for all radia-
tions except those used in voice or other communications such
as radio or telegraph and those resulting from atomic sources.
What other kind of radiations are there? To--name a few with.
which ELINT deals, there are radiations from missiles and mis-
sile guidance devices, radiations from developmental labora-
tories and field testing- stations working on electronic devices,
radar, navigational aids, anti-aircraft and aircraft gun direc-
tion, air-to-air or air-to-ground identification signals? and so on.
"Technical processing for later intelligence purposes" means
subjecting the collected ELINT raw data, usually in the form
of beeps on a magnetic tape or wire, to a detailed analysis by
use of complex electronic equipment. This equipment permits
the analyst to hear with his ears, to see on an oscilloscope, to
measure very accurately, to photograph, to compare with
standards and to investigate the intercepted signal in as many
ways as are necessary to identify the characteristics of the
foreign device. When the "technical processing" is completed 3
the technical analyst can pass to the intelligence analyst de-
tailed information on the location and capabilities of the for-
eign device. The intelligence community can then combine
this information with other knowledge to estimate the over-all
competence and possible intentions of foreign powers.
For a technical look at what ELINT really is let us turn for
a moment to basic physics. Here we remember that electro-
magnetic energy, like light, travels in waves. These waves vary
in length and form a spectrum. We are all familiar with the
rainbow with its colors ranging from red, having waves of 760
millimicrons in length (400 million megacycles/sec), to violet,
with waves of 385 millimicrons in length (800 million mega-
cycles/see). This color spectrum is a part of the electromag-
netic spectrum. The radio portion of this electromagnetic
spectrum is used primarily for communications and military
weapons. Currently, the military weapons use radio waves
varying from a few thousand cycles (waves per second) up to
100 kilomegacycles (one hundred billion waves per second).
The following diagram illustrates the position of the radio and
color spectrums in the over-all electromagnetic spectrum and
an expansion of the radio spectrum showing the bands where
different Soviet electronic devices radiate.
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For a specific example of how ELINT works, let us_ take a__
simplified look at Soviet radar. Soviet radar devices radiate
electronic impulses at certain frequencies and in definite beams
searching the sky for long distances and great altitudes for any
object that may be present. When these impulses strike an
object they bounce off and return to a ground or airborne re-
ceiver which calculates the length of time between emission
and reception and the strength of the signal received. From
thi -tl e Soviet radar operator can generally tell the size, speed,
direction, altitude, and other pertinent information about the
unseen object. Our Strategic Air Command, with its retalia-
tory mission, urgently requires every possible bit of information
on Soviet radars - particularly on their location and capa-
bility. This is where ELINT goes to work. By intercepting,
amplifying, recording and analyzing an enemy radar signal or
pulse,.. ,can learn all about it. By studying the type of radi-
ation, its modulation (AM, FM, pulse) its pulse repetition rate,
pulse duration, pulse shape, its radio frequency (position on
the electronic spectrum), its antenna pattern characteristics,
and so on, we can identify the radar, compare it with known
information, ascertain its range, location, use, and other essen-
tial information required to evaluate its capability as a radar
and its susceptibility to countermeasures.
This same process of ELINT pertains to any and all enemy
electronic devices including airborne intercept devices used by
guided missiles, guided missile launchers, fighter aircraft, long-
range and short-range navigational aids, ground controlled in-
tercept height finders, anti-aircraft and aircraft fire control
radar, blind bombing devices, electronic radiations emanating
from scientific laboratories or production plants,.aii'so-on.
What do these radiated signals sound like? Frankly,they
sound like noise or radio static during a thunder storm T---
--fact, before the more euphonious term of ELINT was coined, the
British called it "Noise Listening" and, during World War II,
had a "Noise Listening Bureau."
Although ELINT is a very complex field - constantly looking
beyond present knowledge of electronics to fulfill its role of pro-
viding timely information on new foreign electronic develop-
ments, it need not be pushed aside as too complicated to be
understood. Because of its complexity, some members of the
intelligence community are inclined to throw up their hands
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and ignore this potential tool. However, ELINT is not too
difficult to comprehend or use, nor is it an end in itself, but it
can contribute essential, accurate information to the intelli-
$ence process.
F Scientific intelligence and, in particular, ELINT, or electronic
intelligence, had its start in England immediately before World
:'War II. Early in 1939 the British Committee for the Scientific
i
no
n
e
.
g
ca
o
of new German weapons. One scientist, Dr. R. V. Jones, was
appointed to look into the matter. Before he even started his
task the war broke out and in June 1940, Dr. Jones, after con-
siderable study, concluded that the Germans had developed a
radio beam by which their bombers could operate over England
regardless of weather, darkness, or cloud cover and still be most
accurate in their blind bombing. This beam, just a little more
than one-half mile wide, passed directly over London. Based
on Dr. Jones' conclusion, steps were immediately taken to find
any possible countermeasures. A Royal Air Force search air-
craft was outfitted and it accomplished its mission of looking
fQr_and - detecting this German beam. Technical analysis of
this information provided the radio frequency and other char-
acteristics of the beam, thus permitting the British to jam it
and render it . ineffective. Henceforth, many bombs intended
for London fell harmlessly on the open countryside. This in-
terception and analysis of an enemy electronic radiation (later
known as Knicklbein) was the birth of present day ELINT.
The Germans altered their beam system and soon began using
a better system utilizing intersecting beams referred to as the
"X" apparatus, which provided greater accuracy. These beams
were at a different frequency than Knicklbein, requiring new
search and analysis before the British solved this new threat
and took countermeasures. With the "X" apparatus, the
bomber flew along an electronic beam while its position along
the beam was observed from a German radar station on the
continent. When the bomber was over the target, it was told
to drop its bombs By now Britain's ELINT capability of inter-
cepting and analyzing this electronic information was quite
effective and continued to grow in scope and importance
throughout the war.
During World War II theUS_jhade extensive use of electronic
intercept devices in - i the acific- and European Theatres of
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Operation. Special USAF and Navy planes equipped with
ELINT receivers ferreted out the secrets of German and Jap-
anese antiaircraft radar and aircraft warning devices. From
the use of such planes the word "fgr,'' was ~ oined- a term
presently applied to aircraft equipped to inves iga a enemy
electronic radiations. Among the most deadly weapons di-
rected against the Eighth Air Force were the German antiair-
craft guns which were equipped with extremely accurate radar
directors known as "Wurzbergs." The close formations of
American aircraft made a juicy target for the more than 16,000
German antiaircraft guns. By use of radar intercept equip-
ment (ELINT equipment) information was obtained which per-
mitted the use of jamming devices, and thus the one-billion
dollar investment of the Germans in their Wurzberg radars was
jiterall)ruined by the countermeasures made possible through
ELINT. Knowing we had this capability, the Germans began
a frantic search for non-jammable radar equipment, but the
war vi as.cver before they succeeded.
Following World War II there was a period in which interest
in ELINT, as in many wartime activities, tapered off. Some
effort continued but the real push to provide intelligence on
electronic advancements in other countries was not initiated
until the USSR clamped down its Iron Curtain. Since that
timhe collection and analysis of electronic signals radiating
behind the Curtain has been the constant goal of ELINT. Since
the birth of ELINT in 1940 the effort has grown in size, cost,
importance, complexity, coverage, and capability, and, like
most scientific efforts, is making yesterday's limits, today's
capabilities.
Electronic intercept, to use one connotation of ELINT, pro-
vides factual information. Unlike the collection of much in-
telligence information where we are forced to rely on word of
mouth, memory, or integrity of source, electronic radiations are
intercepted and recorded by machine. If a signal is being radi-
ated it can be recorded and later reported accurately even by
someone who doesn't understand all that he is doing. Because
of this factual nature, ELINT has provided substantiation of
many intelligence estimates based on other intelligence
processes.
During World War II, Air Force B-24 aircraft and radar-
equipped Navy Catalina aircraft were assigned the job of locat-
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ing enemy radar in the Pacific. They spotted and pinpointed
Japanese air-warning sets scattered all the way from the Solo-
mons to the China coast. A few days before the Leyte landing
in October 1944 one of the ferrets discovered a new Japanese
radar on Suluan Island at the mouth of the Leyte gulf. As
this radar commanded the approaches to the Leyte coast line
it was necessary to eliminate it and this was done on a com-
mando raid by the US Rangers.
Currently, ELINT is providing the Strategic Air Command
with the intelligence it requires on the location and range of
Soviet radar. Through ELINT, information is acquired on the
method, capability, and limitations of Soviet long-range navi-
gation systems upon which their atomic bombers rely. Soviet
missile tests are monitored by ELINT and the point may soon
be reached where, by interception and analysis of the telemeter-
ing signal from Soviet missiles, we will acquire missile per-
formance data vital to our National Intelligence Estimates.
(Telemetering is the electronic system used in missile testing
which records, codes, and transmits to ground test stations such
things as missile speed, flight path, guidance, skin tempera-
tures, and other behavior characteristics of the missile in
flight.)
Since early in World War II_ the Army, Navy, and Air Force
each hexpended varying degrees of effort on ELINT, and in
1952 the Central Intelligence Agency entered the ELINT field.
Although much of this individual endeavor was valuable, in
1954 better organization was given to ELINT - organization
on--a national level. The lack of proper dissemination of val-
uable intelligence produced by one organization but not always
readily available to the others in the community was noted as a
serious problem. When this situation came to the attention of
the National Security Council a study was made, and National
Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 17, entitled Elec-
tronic Intelligence (ELINT) was issued (in May 1955).
NSCID-17 established the first national policy for ELINT and
it is still the basic authority for the national ELINT program.
It directed that :
a. The US Communications Intelligence Board
(USCIB) shall be the national policy body for ELINT.
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b. The Department of Defense and the Central In-
telligence Agency shall be responsible for their respec-
tive ELINT collection activities.
c. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be
accomplished in a jointly-staffed center administered
by the Department of Defense.
d. All data collected by the collection agencies shall
be made available to the National Technical Process-
ing Center (NTPC).
e. The NTPC shall effect the fullest and most expe-
ditious processing possible and furnish the results to
the interested agencies.
The present national organization for ELINT is rather com-
plex, with many interlocking organizations and many formal
and informal coordinating committees. The important con-
sideration is that each of the services and CIA is free to run its
own collection operations designed to furnish information it
alone requires, but is, expected to submit all collected data to
the NTPC subject only to the minimum delays necessitated by
prior exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes.
One can immediately see the strong vertical organization for
ELINT within each major component. It should also be appre-
ciated that much horizontal collaboration is being accom-
plished by joint participation in such organizations as the
NTPC and AFOIN-Z in an effort to coordinate individual activi-
ties into a national ELINT program.
In October 1953 a study was made of ELINT in CIA. This
resulted in the appointment of an Agency ELINT staff officer
and in the preparation of an Agency ELINT program which the
Director of Central Intelligence approved on 29 May 1954.
Within the Agency ELINT is organized generally as follows.
The Office of Scien?ific Intelligence develops targets and
requirements for ELINT collection, furnishes scientific and
technical guidance to Agency collectors, and performs the tech-
nical analysis and collation of ELINT with all source material
in the production of scientific intelligence. The Clandestine
Services conducts a continuing review of the, potential and
ca al~jl ties for covert ELINT collection, implements peci =c
clandestine activity in response to approved ELINT require-
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nients, and coordinates US ELINT clandestine activities with
foreign governments. The Office of Communications arranges
for research, development, and procurement of ELINT equip-
ment as required to support clandestine ELINT collection. The
CIA ELINT Staff Officer advises the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and appropriate operating components on the
formulation, implementation, and coordination of ELINT
plans, policies, and programs.
On the national level, much work has gone into summarizing
what each organization requires in the ay of information on
enemy electronic developments. This sizeable' task has re-
sui.%ed in a formal statement of the currently definable Specific
ELINT Collection Requirements (SPECOR). This collection
guide is based on the priority of the National Intelligence Ob-
jectives. It has been disseminated throughout the services and
CIA field units for guidance as to what information the intelli-
gence community requires and in what priority.
To realize the need for an adequate requirements system,
consider that the ideal ELINT system is one capable of collect-
ing all signals of interest and extracting all of the useful infor-
mation from each signal. This is neither possible nor prac-
ticable, -ho ver. The questions of just what signals are of
interest and just what information about them is needed must
be answered in the light of the gaps in our intelligence. Thus,
as in other branches of technical intelligence, ELINT is faced
with the problem of relating scientific techniques to intelli-
gence problems.
In general, ELINT targets fall into two major categories.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force, charged with the military de-
fense of our country, are primarily concerned with the location
and capability of all enemy radar ,,on a current. basis. This is
referred to as the Radar Order of Battle (ROB). The Air
Force, for instance, must know where the heavy concentrations
of enemy radar are so that its planes can either skirt the area
or take proper countermeasures. The largest portion of inter-
cepted enemy electronic information falls into this category of
maintaining an adequate radar order of battle. CIA, on the
other hand, is primarily interested in scientific break-through,
or in not being surprised by new enemy electronic develop-
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ments. This means that most ELINT effort is directed toward
the interception and analysis of new and unusual electronic
signals. Naturally in the course of searching for new and un-
usual signals, much order of battle information is received.
This serves, in addition to supplementing the services opera-
tions, as a basis of comparison to determine what is new and
unusual. The ELINT objectives of first priority to CIA relate
to those signals which have yet to be intercepted or for which
the radiating source has yet to be seen. Specifically, the
targets are as follows :
a. Those non-communication signals which are, or
are suspected to be, associated with the Soviet or
Satellite ability to deliver atomic or other weapons of
destruction - that is, guidance or telemetry signals
associated with missiles, airborne navigation, and
bombing systems.
b. Those non-communication signals which are or
are suspected to be associated with the Soviet or Satel-
lite ability to defend their countries against the deliv-
ery of atomic or other weapons of destruction -that is,
early warning, ground-control intercept, gap-filling
radars, surface-to-air weapons systems, airborne weap-
ons systems, ground surveillance systems, jammers,
and so forth.
c. Those signals occupying an unusual portion of
the radio frequency spectrum not normally associated
with Soviet or Satellite equipment.
The equipment involved in ELINT is elaborate and com-
plex. To make matters worse, the higher _ up the frequency
spectrum you go the shorter your intercept range becomes,
and the present trend toward higher frequencies means that
ELINT equipment must get closer to the target or be designed
with greater ranges, both of which approach the impossible.
ELINT equipment falls into two main catagories: collection
equipment (airborne, maritime, fixed station, or agent-carried)
and analysis equipment (used on the ground to reproduce,
readout, and analyze the collected information). Basically,
the major components of an ELINT collection system are the
antenna, receiver, recorder, direction finder, and analyzer.
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The antenna corresponds to the human ear. It is that com-
ponent which first detects a signal. It is, of course, desirable
that the antenna be very sensitive or, as we say in ELINT,"ehave
high antenna gain.' This permits the maximum intercept
range. The ideal antenna system would have the following
characteristics :
a. a continuous and fixed broad area coverage,
b. very broad electronic spectrum coverage,
c. very high gain,
d. inherent capability for giving directional in-
formation.
These requirements are not all compatible. In practice it is
necessary to compromise in order to gain a workable system.
The decision as to which of the desirable characteristics can
be safely compromised, and to what extent, is based on the fre-
quency range of interest and also on the specific ELINT target
under consideration. For instance, broad area- coverage may
be obtained by either of two means - a broad beam antenna
fixed in space or a narrow beam, scanning antenna. The first
method demands a sacrifice in gain; The second limits the
time coverage of any part of the total area.
Following receipt of the signal by the antenna it is passed to
a receiver. The function of the receiver is to convert trans-
mitted information available at the antenna into a form that
can be measured and recorded. Basically1two general types of
receivers are in use today - the superheterodyne and the
crystal video. The operating characteristics of each receiver
may be outlined as follows:
Superheterodyne - slow scan.
a. inherently high sensitivity,
b. good frequency resolution,
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c. prohibitively long search time in many cases.
Crystal video - wide open.
a. low sensitivity reducing maximum probable
range,
b. frequency resolution problems,
c. search time considerably less than the super-
heterodyne.
From the receiver the signal goes neat to the recorder where
the signal is stored on magnetic tape or wire. There are two
main reasons for recording signals. A permanent record of the
signal is required for future analysis and for records, and on
signals of short duration or higher complexity the operator
may not have enough time or capability to evaluate the signal
parameters before the transmission is ended.
Direction-finding equipment issometimes utilized during the
interception of the signal. It displays incoming signals on an
oscilloscope or other azimuth-reading device giving the direc-
tion of the arrival of the signal.
Analyzers in the ELINT collection system are sometimes used
during interception to provide a preliminary observation of the
type of modulation and to measure the repetition rate, dura-
tion, and general shape of signal pulses. Signals are usually
presented by a cathode ray tube (similar to a television screen),
which provides a moving picture of the shape, size, and nature
of the incoming signal pulse or wave form. The pictures are
usually photographed as a permanent record. It should be
pointed out that ELINT collection devices need not be huge
as are those used in ground, sea, and some airborne
operations. Quite to the contrary, considerable use is made of
miniature equipment no larger than a book. ELINT collection
equipment is usually designed for the specific situation in-
volved, whether it be a 60-foot parabolic antenna on the ground
or a tiny unassuming, ~and-carried package.
The major comphts of an ELINT analysis system vary
greatly with the purpose of the analysis. Order-of-battle
analysis is often done automatically by IBM-type equipment.
The analysis that CIA performs is not for order of battle but is
to identify new and unusual signals. For this, man-operated
equipment is required and an analysis position contains at least
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I EARPHONES
RE DU EN CY
TO PLAY TAPE LOCATION ON
FROM NECOR OCR FRED ENCY
SPECTRUM
NUMBER OF AND SIGNAL BEAM WIDTH
SPACE BETWEEN ANU ROTATION AND/OR
51GNALS NOD PATE
the following fundamental equipment: a tape transport used
for duplicating or monitoring; a counter that measures and
illustrates the modulation frequency; an ink-on-paper recorder
to draw a continuous trace of the signal amplitude; an oscil-
loscope, which permits observation of the wave form; a vibra-
lizer to display modulation frequency components versus time;
filters to separate signals; a rapid-advance movie camera; and
a host of other equipment to permit the analyst to scan great
volumes of tape and film to separate that minute portion which,
upon detailed analysis, may prove to be a new electronic devel-
opment.
It is hoped that this basic discussion of ELINT will provide a
general concept of this complex scientific intelligence process.
It should be realized that in the interest of readability many
points have been simplified and technical details omitted so as
not to confuse the non-technical reader.
If one considers that one-third of the cost of a modern fighter
aircraft goes for electronic equipment and that most of the
electronic devices which make up this equipment radiate sig-
nals, then one begins to understand how much there is to learn
of Soviet capabilities by examining their use of electronics.
This also applies to ground and sea weapons, including missiles.
Recent news reports of Soviet developments in the scientific
field demonstrate how heavily the Russians are relying on elec-
tronics and how advanced their development is. The Soviet
earth satellites with their radiated signals are a responsibility
of ELINT. ELINT must continue to intercept and to analyze
Soviet electromagnetic emissions preferably in the research and
development stages in order to keep abreast of Soviet electronic
advancements and to attempt to predict future capabilities.
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REPORT ON HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
Guy E. Coriden
The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 provided an un-
precedented opportunity for the collection of intelligence on a
Soviet Bloc country. Each of the many facets of intelligence
activity played its role. Every known Free World and Bloc
intelligence organization was involved. Every Hungarian
refugee who could toddle was a potential target for an intelli-
gence-minded group. It is obviously impossible, therefore, to
claim with good conscience to tell the "intelligence story" of
the Hungarian Revolution. It is also impossible to get the
many participants to agree on which of the many efforts was
the most fruitful. This, then, will be the account of one
activity - the collection of the intelligence information and
material from the Hungarians who were admitted to the US.
Other operations will be mentioned only as they are considered
pertinent. Because the opportunity was unique, certain adap-
tations in intelligence collection methods were required to take
full advantage of it. The object was to extract the maximum
amount of intelligence at a minimum cost while still abiding
by decent rules of human conduct. As the methods used were
necessarily determined by the processing and resettlement pro-
cedures as well as by the official US Government attitude to-
ward intelligence exploitation, it might be well to begin with a
brief historical background.
The story of the revolution has been told many times, prob-
ably best by the UN in its massive report. The outbreak took
place on 23 October 1956, and in the months following, it is
estimated that 188,000 Hungarians found refuge in Austria and
18,000 in Yugoslavia. As of 1 September 1957, approximately
35,000 of these refugees had accepted asylum in the US.
In early November 1956, when it became apparent that a
massive influx of Hungarians was going to have to be resettled,
it was decided that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, would be the
processing center for all of the refugees. Because the installa-
tion was an Army camp, the Army was charged with the initial
responsibility for coordinating the resettlement effort and pro-
viding all of the housekeeping services. On 12 December 1956,
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however, the President appointed a civilian Committee for
Hungarian Refugee Relief under the chairmanship of Mr.
Tracey F. Voorhees. This Committee has coordinated all activ-
ities in connection with "Operation Mercy." In the process it
utilized the services of more than 20 volunteer and govern-
mental agencies. From the arrival of the first refugees on 21
November 1956 until early May 1957, when Camp Kilmer was
closed, transportation was provided by 214 MATS flights, 5
Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ocean voyages, and 133
flights chartered by the Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migration (ICEM). The Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization and the Public Health Service performed
the functions necessary for admitting aliens to the US, and
various charitable-religious agencies arranged for most of the
resettlements. Part of the job of fitting the individual's skills
to available employment opportunities was performed by the
National Academy of Sciences and the US Employment Service.
The processing and resettlement was handled with an amazing
degree of efficiency, and the sympathetic attitude of the Ameri-
can people was so sustained that by early May it was possible
to close Camp Kilmer. About 32,000 of the refugees had been
dispersed to various parts of the country, and those remaining
are being shuttled through the St. George Hotel in Brooklyn.
Lest the cursory nature of this account convey the idea
that this was a simple and smooth process, remember that the
operation involved the complete transplanting to the US of a
large number of participants in a violent revolution who had
lost most of their possessions and who had little or no knowl-
edge of the English language. Only 6,500 of these could come
under any available immigration quota. The rest were ad-
mitted under the Attorney General's discretionary authority,
and the rules were established and changed several times.
Indeed, methods and procedures were developed, abandoned,
and reinstituted many times in the early days of the operation.
Also the prevailing attitudes, both official and public, changed
appreciably over the months. In the early days the primary
concern was to provide a humanitarian welcome for the vic-
timized Hungarian people. Every effort was made to avoid
incidents which might cause unfavorable comment. This atti-
tude was motivated by a genuine sympathy and admiration for
the Hungarians and a determination to take full advantage of
Approved For Release Yll