A SYNTHESIS OF 'THE VIETNAM SITUATION; AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010031-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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VIETNAM 1967
Top Secret
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A Synthesis of
The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate
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CONTENTS
I. SUMMARY
II. SOUTH VIETNAM
A. The Military Picture (see section I)*
B. The Enemy Force (see section II)
C. The Communist Infrastructure (see section III)
D. Political Trends and Prospects (see section IV)
E. Economic Factors (see section V)
F. Pacification (see section VI)
::III. NORTH VIETNAM
A. North Vietnamese Attitudes Toward the War
(see section VII)
B. Impact of the US Air Strikes on North
Vietnamese Views (see section VIII)
C. Effects of the Air Strikes on North Vietnam's
Economy (see sections IX and X)
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
A. Chinese Attitudes Toward the War
(see section XI)
B. Soviet Attitudes Toward the War
C. Nort Vietnam's Propaganda Capabilities
in the Free World (see section XIII)
D. World Opinion and the US International
Position (see section XIV)
V. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO VARIOUS US COURSES
OF ACTION"
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 May 1967
A SYNTHESIS OF
"THE VIETNA+SEJ SITUATION[Jo AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE"
CIA has made a series of detailed analyses of the major
factors affecting the course of the war in Vietnam in mid-
Z967. From this, the)principal findings emerge:
SUMMARY-
A. The past year has seen gains for the allied
position in the South, but the strategic balance has
not been altered decisively. Two years of bomb dam-
age in the North and setbacks in the South have not
shaken Hanoi's determination to pursue the war. The
North Vietnamese have managed to keep pace with the
US troop build-up and to improve'their logistic po-
sition. Hanoi seems confident that it can force a
prolonged statemate which eventually will force the
US to scale down its objectives.
B. Basing their strategy on a war of attrition,
the North Vietnamese are unlikely to launch a large-
scale conventional attack across the Demilitarized
Zone in the near future. All indications point to
coordinated thrusts in various areas of the northern
and central provinces, mixing both conventional and
guerrilla actions, in an attempt to bleed and dis-
perse the allied field forces and expose the more
vulnerable pacification programs behind them.
C. While the political situation in Saigon con-
tinues remarkably stable, latent frictions could
quickly surface as the election in September nears.
The unity of the military establishment, crucial to
further political development, is threatened by
rivalry between Generals Ky and Thieu over the pres-
idential race.
D. Hanoi's determination not to negotiate from
a position of weakness appears to have been reinforced
by US air attacks on the North. The Communist leaders
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apparently see little to gain from an exchange of
views with the US and no prospect of formal negotia-
tions on terms acceptable to them.
E. There are compelling reasons why Peking
wants the war to go on. To yield at this point would
not only mark a defeat for the Chinese line of revo-
lutionary warfare but would enhance Soviet influence.
Although the Chinese are probably prepared to broaden
their military and economic aid to sustain Hanoi's
will and ability to prolong the war in the South, it
is doubtful that they are committed to success in
South Vietnam at any price. China clearly wants to
avoid a major confrontation with the US, although
Chinese intervention would be likely in the event of
air attacks on Chinese bases, a major invasion of
North Vietnam, or a disintegration of authority in
Hanoi.
F. Soviet leaders probably believe that there is
no prospect of movement toward negotiations for the
time being and appear to have concluded that they have
no alternative but to help Hanoi to carry on the war
until a political solution is possible.
G. The longer the war lasts, the more problems
the US will have with its international image and
world position. A long and intense conflict would
heighten fears of a broader war, would be widely de-
plored, and would bring heavy criticism on the US.
If the conflict does not spread, however, and if itd
outcome encourages the belief that East Asia has been
stabilized and Communist expansion blocked, it would
be widely recognized that the effort had been justi-
fied.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The Military Picture
1. During the past two years the character of the
war in South Vietnam has changed radically with the
build-up of men and materiel on both sides. Communist
prospects for an early victory have dimmed, but the
strategic balance has not altered decisively.
2. In 1965 the Vietnamese Communists had victory
in sight. Beginning in 1966 the allies gained the
initiative, and since then have carried the fight to
the enemy's base areas. Communist plans for offensive
action have been frustrated, and the Viet Cong's grip
on the people in some coastal areas has been broken.
In mid-1967, pressed hard by allied forces, the Com-
munists have their sights on a stalemate at the end
of a long and costly struggle.
3. Reverses in the South and sustained air attacks
on the North did not shake the determination of the
Communist leaders in Hanoi. The loss of their mili-
tary advantage in 1966 did not spell defeat in their
view, merely a prolonged conflict -- a contest of
wills in which the final outcome was not in doubt.
The fact of massive intervention by the US did, how-
ever, call for a change in strategy and force levels
to match the American effort.
The Enemy Force
4. Hanoi's response came in the form of large-scale
infiltration of North Vietnamese regulars across the
Demilitarized Zone and through the Laos corridor into
the highlands of South Vietnam in late 1966 and during
1967. As a result, the Communists have managed to
keep pace with the US build-up in terms of infantry
units, and to improve their fire support capability
as well. American forces of course now have substan-
tial advantages in tactical mobility and heavy fire-
power.
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5. Estimating the size, structure and effec-
tiveness of the enemy force in South Vietnam is
a difficult intelligence task complicated by methodo-
logical problems. It is difficult to acquire hard
data in a timely fashion. Also, when new kinds of
information become available, it is difficult to
relate the new data to the previous figures based
on a different breakdown of data. There is, for
example, the inevitable tension between the need to
apply stringent criteria of confirmation and ac-
ceptability (which tend to produce inherently low
"assessments," as do the assessments for real estate
taxation) with the need for appraisals (like those
a real estate salesman makes) which indicate what
allied forces actually may be facing. Over the past
year, our methodology and data base have improved
markedly. Further refinement is still possible,
but some problems, particularly acquisition prob-
lems involving timeliness, are inherently insoluble
(Communist infiltrators, for example, do not usually
defect soon after their arrival in South Vietnam).
6. The Communists have continued to expand their
main force units, despite the increasing effective-
ness of allied "search-and-destro? operations. Viet
Cong-North Vietnam main forces have expanded by 36
percent in the period since January 1966 -- from
85,000 to 115,000. The present level may be even
higher, since all the evidence on recent infiltra-
tions and recruitment is not yet in.
7. Part of this expansion of main force units has
been at the expense of lower-level Viet Cong forma-
tions. To accelerate the expansion, a number of
guerrilla elements were upgraded, causing a drain
on Viet Cong paramilitary formations and on the
so-called "political infrastructure." These forces
remain sizeable, however -- probably larger in fact
than current order of battle figures indicate. It
is difficult to compute the full strength of the
paramilitary, combat support and political elements
with any real precision. Latest order of battle
holdings peg the irregular forces at 113,000, but
recent studies indicate that the total may well be
close to 200,000. The strength of the support
forces, now carried at 25,000, may be several times
greater. In short, the over-all strength of the
insurgent apparatus in South Vietnam, currently
listed as 292,000, may be in the half-million range.
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8. This is not to suggest that the total Commu-
nist force structure has increased dramatically in
recent months. Instead, an accumulation Of improve-
ments in methodology and data now indicates that the
allies have long been facing a total organized opposi-
tion far larger than accepted official figures have
indicated. An appreciation of the probable true size
of this organized opposition will make possible far
more valid and useful interpretations of future input
and loss statistics.
9. Despite a rising casualty rate, the Communists
have shown that they are capable of replacing their
heavy losses, although probably at some cost in
quality. If they have an organized manpower base
of anywhere like the size estimated above, the Com-
munists should not have serious trouble in the near
future in finding replacement personnel, particularly
considering their ability to recruit in South Vietnam
outside their organized apparatus along with the
infiltration from the North. These two inputs prob-
ably run about 14,000 per month. Current losses may
be getting close to this figure, but they have prob-
ably not exceeded it. Thus, while the Communists
probably can keep up their present levels over the
next year, we doubt that they can add much to their
overall strength.
10. In addition to keeping pace with the expansion
of US forces, the Communists have also been able to
improve their logistical position in the face of
continuing air attacks on their depots and lines of
communications. This is reflected in the rising
rate at which they are expending ammunition.
11. While their strategic posture now appears some-
what improved over last year despite the allied
build-up, the Communists have been hurt. As the Viet
Cong position in the countryside has been eroded in
some areas as a result of allied military pressure,
enemy organization and morale has suffered. The
increase in the number of ralliers attests to this.
The Communists have reacted by adjusting their strat-
egy to a better mix of conventional and guerrilla
actions. Since the first of the year, intensive
guerrilla campaigns have been waged against the
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pacification program, and centers of population and
administration have been hit more methodically. The
aim has been not only to check the momentum of our
pacification program but to force a diversion of
allied forces to protect rear areas, thus reducing
the allied offensive potential.
12. All indications point to an intensification of
this kind of grindin ositional warfare next few mnnt-h$.
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Ind au Me mmunis e ort
wi e centered in the northern provinces, where
there is ready access to supplies and strong artil-
lery and antiaircraft support. Major thrusts in
the western highlands and central coastal provinces
will be coordinated with the northern offensive.
These-actions will be supported by extensive guer-
rilla probes in widely scattered areas to tie down
as many allied troops as possible.
13. Hanoi's aim is clear: to demonstrate that a
US build-up to half-a-million men has not conclu-
sively altered the balance. What we face now is a
crucial test of our ability to prevent a stalemate
and maintain the momentum of our recent successes.
Capabilities on both sides are such that in the major
actions ahead neither is likely to inflict decisive
defeat on the other. After that, the situation may
depend -- more even than in the past -- on which
side is the more determined to persist.
The Communist Infrastructure in :the South
14. We believe that over the next year or so
the Communists will probably be able to keep their
main force up to strength because of their organiza-
tional ability and their access to replacements in
the south and from the north. If allied pressure.
continues, however, along with progressive diminu-
tion of the areas under Communist control (and, hence,
the population base on which the Communists can
draw), in order to maintain their main force strength
the Communists will be impelled to impose an increas-
ing quantitative and qualitative drain on the other
elements of their force structure.
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15. The Communists' southern organization --
that which would remain if all ethnic North Vietnam-
ese elements we?e withdrawn from South Vietnam -- is
obviously large and complex but so tightly organized
and disciplined that it should be considered a col-
lective entity. Despite persistent propaganda pre-
tensions to the contrary, the insurgent structure
(i.e., the "National Liberation Front") is not a coali-
tion or confederation of disparate political bodies,
including ones of non-Communist persuasion. Instead,
the organized insurgency has always been directed
through a hierarchy of Communist party committees
with a vertical command line running from the Lao
Dong Politburo in Hanoi to every three-man hamlet cell
in South Vietnam. There are obviously debates within
the party hierarchy over strategy or tactics, but
there is no "NFL" position on either independent of
Hanoi.
16. The core of this southern organization is
the Communists' intricate network of provincial and
district committees and the Communist cadre who
work under these committees' jurisdiction and con-
trol. It is this committee/cadre structure which
maintains the insurgency's essential base at the
hamlet and village level. From this base, the lead-
ership exerts control over the rural population
which provides both the local (i.e., southern) man-
power and resources without which the insurgency would
collapse. Virtually all the members of this com-
mittee/cadre network are ethnic southerners (usually
operating in their native provinces). Many, if not
most, of those in positions of command authority were
trained in and infiltrated back from North Vietnam.
17. The data available in Washington do not
permit a province by province analysis of this Viet
Cong infrastructure or even a very meaningful quanti-
fied statement of its strength and effectiveness be-
yond that presented in our order of battle calcula-
tions. Available evidence does suggest, however,
that over the past year this cadre structure has suf-
fered some shrinkage in numbers, an overall decline
in quality (and, perhaps, zeal), and appreciable ero-
sion in morale, particularly at the lower levels.
The southern organization as a whole is still large,
strong, and effective. It is far from unravelling.
But is is fraying appreci.abl_? around the edges.
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18. Several factors have contributed to this trend.
One, obviously, is allied military power, pressure and
success. Another -- less obvious but at least equally
important -- is the past year's Communist policy of
stripping their local organizations in the drive to
increase their main force structure, a practice which
has produced morale problems and a qualitative deteriora-
tion in the local organizations so stripped.
19. The trends outlined above which have been in
process for over a year, could be arrested by a change
in Communist assignment practices (which may already
be in train), a diminution in allied pressure, or a
reversal of the Communists' military fortunes. While
they exist, however, these trends pose a grave poten-
tial threat to the organizational foundation on which
the Communists' whole "liberation war" strategy is
based.
Political Trends and Prospects
20. The political situation in South Vietnam
has stabilized to a degree which would have seemed
virtually impossible two years ago. All of the
volatile ingredients which make for politics in
Saigon are still there and could surface again
rapidly, but the trend of events still appears
favorable.
21. Political power remains predominantly
in the hands of the military establishment which
assumed control in May 1965. But the leading gen-
erals have shown a steadily increasing measure of
political sophistication and they have learned from
experience. They have coped with crises that pre-
vious governments could not weather. As their
confidence has grown, the military leadership has
shown an increasing inclination to move South
Vietnam gradually toward a more representative
form of government. While there is a long way to
go before this becomes a reality, the first steps
toward a constitutional system have been taken in
an orderly fashion.
22. For more than a year the military leaders
have been quietly exploring ways to develop a
mechanism within this constitutional framework for
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ensuring that they retain political control. Prime
Minister Ky has made overtures to a wide range of
civilian groups, and may eventually develop broad
support outside the military.
23. These developments have already placed
strains on the unity of the military establishment.
Until now the generals have preserved a remarkable
degree of cohesion. This is being threatened by
the rivalry shaping up between Generals Ky and Thieu
over the presidential election scheduled for Sep-
tember. Although the leaders have recognized that
military unity is essential to continued political
stability, they have been unable to agree among
themselves on who should be the candidate repre-
senting the military. Ky has formally announced
that he is a candidate for the presidency, and Thieu
has indicated that he may also enter the race.
24. The civilian opposition to the military
establishment is fragmented and almost certainly
incapable of developing the kind of organized effort
required to defeat a candidate with the undivided
support of the military. If Thieu goes through with
his threat to compete with Ky, the race would be
thrown wide open and the progress we have seen in
the political sphere could be quickly undone.
25. In any event, the temperature of political
life in Saigon will rise sharply during the summer
months as the election campaign builds up. Restive
civilian elements -- the militant Buddhist community
in particular -- will make the most of their oppor-
tunities, and much of the politicking will focus on
resentment against the US presence in South Vietnam.
Predictions cannot therefore be offered with confi-
dence. It remains the case, however, that South
Vietnam's record of political achievement has been
impressive, and that in the process now in train
there are signs of genuine political development.
Economic Factors
26. There are, obviously, economic considera-
tions which affect any estimate of South Vietnam's
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political prospects. The economy of South Vietnam,
greatly distorted by the war, will have to endure
additional strains during 1967 as the demand for
goods continues to exceed the available supply. A
substantial increase in US force strength could add
further pressures. Inflationary pressures were
eased somewhat by the GVN's reasonably well-executed
mid-1966 reforms, including a devaluation of the
piaster, but renewed pressures began to appear by
the end of 1966 and are still present. It would be
inaccurate to say that South Vietnam is on the verge
of a runaway inflation, but the danger is constantly
present and strenuous efforts by both the US and
the GVN will be necessary to hold inflationary
pressures within acceptable bounds.
Pacification
27. Progress in the Revolutionary Development
(RD) program has been slow so far this year, and
prospects for significant improvement quickly are
not bright. The pacification concepts now jointly
endorsed by the US and the South Vietnamese govern-
ment are fundamentally sound, however, and the long
term outlook is more favorable.
28. We have come a long way in developing an
understanding of the program, and in devising the
concepts, techniques, and organizational tools neces-
sary to a sucessful program. Formidable problems
remain, however. Planning delays, command and ad-
ministrative changes, and the preoccupation of
Vietnamese officials with broader political affairs
have all inpeded progress. Moreover, an intensified
Viet Cong campaign of guerrilla pressure has retarded
the program in some areas. The very intensity of
the Communists' counteraction, however, suggests
that they are concerned about its potential.
29. The magnitude of the task is reflected in
new statistics which indicate that of the 12,000 or-so
hamlets in South Vietnam, roughly one-third are
controlled by the Viet Cong and government influence
is marginal in another third. Only 14 percent of
the hamlets show real progress toward development.
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30. The chief obstacle to more rapid progress
is lack of security at the local level. This is now
the responsibility of the South Vietnamese Government,
and the army in particular. The Viet Cong attacks
on Revolutionary Development teams have revealed
serious weaknesses in carrying out this responsibil-
ity. Although more than 50 ARVN battalions have
theoretically been committed to direct support of
pacification, their performance has been spotty and
they have failed to take the kind of aggressive
action required to counter the Viet Cong campaign.
Even where ARVN commanders accept their mission
with good grace, they seldom seem to appreciate that
what is required is not a "screen" behind which
pacification efforts can be mounted but, instead,
an aggressive, offensive effort designed to harry,
render ineffective and, eventually, destroy the
Communists' district companies and village platoons.
Only one-third of the Popular and Regional forces
are committed to direct support of pacification,
and their efforts have not'been effectively coor-
dinated with RD activities. The Police Field Forces
continue generally to be misused in static security
functions rather than in support of RD,
31. The reorganization of US advisory and
support functions under MACV control should improve
coordination of US planning and operational activ-
ities. Some progress seems likely in more effective
concentration of resources, attaining further flexi-
bility, and reinvigorating the GVN administrative
machinery. Little improvement is likely, however,
until the Vietnamese armed forces develop the will
and the capability to deal with the problem effec-
tively. While we can expect limited advances in
areas where good security is provided by allied
forces, there are likely to be further setbacks in
areas more vulnerable to Viet Cong pressures.
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North Vietnamese Attitudes Toward the War
32. The decision on whether or not the Lao
Dong (Communist) Party will continue the war in
South Vietnam rests with the eleven members of the
Politburo in Hanoi (four of whom are ethnic south-
erners). This group of men shows every intention
of pursuing the war. Despite the prospect of
intensified US attacks, Hanoi continues to spurn
negotiations and to prepare for a long hard strug-
gle. Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants remain con-
vinced that they can outlast the US in Vietnam
and they have programmed their tactics to fit the
theory.
33. North Vietnam's leaders are convinced
that their motivation is stronger than ours. Ac-
cordingly, their strategy is geared to a war of
attrition. They believe the US must either win
quickly in South Vietnam or settle on terms favor-
able to the Communists, whereas a military stale-
mate will suffice for their purpose. .
34. The North Vietnamese position on
negotiations during recent months has remained
consistently negative. Hanoi refuses to offer any
quid pro quo in return for a cessation of the
bombing. Its release of the exchange of letters
between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh amounted
virtually to a rejection of secret diplomacy as a
means of promoting a settlement.
the North Vietnamese look
on negotiations primarily as a tactic to be used
in conjunction with warfare to extract-maximum
concessions from the US.
35. The continued movement of North Vietnamese
troops into South Vietnam is perhaps the best evi-
dence that Hanoi means to keep up the fight. The
buildup of these forces in the northern provinces
must have been planned with the realization that
the ground war would intensify and lead to further
escalation by the US. The increasing use by the
Communists of mortars and artillery and Hanoi's
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reported efforts to obtain additional Soviet and
Chinese military aid provide further evidence.
36. Consistent with a strategy of attrition,
it is unlikely that the Communists will attempt a
large-scale conventional attack across the
Demilitarized Zone in the near future. Nor does
it seem likely that they will commit their assets
in South Vietnam to one major campaign. They
probably will proceed along basically the same
lines as in the past, infiltrating sufficient re-
placement personnel to keep existing units at combat
level and sending in additional units as needed to
counter the introduction of more allied forces.
37. There are continuing signs of a debate
among Communist military leaders over the relative
merits of large-scale conventional actions and
guerrilla tactics. A compromise solution seems
to be emerging: heavier emphasis on guerrilla
activity but primary weight still on large unit
actions.
38. The North Vietnamese must realize that
any success' in campaign they plan to launch in the
northern provinces and western highlands will be
modest. They probably will be satisfied if these
engagements result in heavy US casualties, even if
it means heavier Communist losses.
39. Hanoi is unlikely in the foreseeable
future to seek help in the form of foreign combat
troops for use in South Vietnam. It is always
possible that for propaganda purposes an "inter-
national brigade" will be formed and sent south,
but only the Chinese are readily available in
sufficient strength to be of much use. The North
Vietnamese leaders appear confident that the man-
power available to them in North and South Vietnam
is sufficient to carry on the war.
the ommuni
believe they can cope with a force level of a
million men, and there was no reference to foreign
volunteers.
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40. This attitude stems in part from the fact
that no significant foreign ground combat force is
likely to be made available for fighting in the South.
Hanoi recognizes that the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries would not send substantial
ground forces to South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese
also appear to believe that there is little prospect
of significant Chinese Communist involvement as long
as the war is confined to the South. Even in the
event that Communist main forces in South Vietnam
were defeated and the guerrilla and political infra-
structure destroyed, it is unlikely that Hanoi would
call for Chinese assistance in the form of combat
personnel for the South. This is because, if for no
other reason, Hanoi almost certainly understands
that Peking would not respond favorably to such a
request.
41. At no time have Vietnamese Communist
spokesmen specified any point at which foreign com-
bat personnel of any nationality would be requested,
and all available evidence suggests that Hanoi does
not expect that point ever to be reached.
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Impact of the US Air Strikes on North Vietnamese Views
43. More than two years of air attacks have had
little effect on Hanoi's military strategy, on its
political tactics, and on its confidence in Communist
prospects over the long term. Intensified US air
operations do not seem to have shaken the North Viet-
namese leaders' conviction that they can withstand
the bombing until a time when the US is compelled to
scale down its objectives and modify its terms for
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negotiations. Nor has it caused them to change their
view that the outcome of this test of will and en-
durance will be determined by the ground war in the
South, not by the air war in the North.
44. Hanoi's determination not to negotiate
from a position of weakness has been reinforced by
the bombing. Its attitude toward negotiations con-
tinues to be colored by a conviction that the US is
bent on destroying the Viet Cong political and mili-
tary structure, dividing Vietnam indefinitely on the
Korean pattern, and maintaining an American presence
in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese consequently
see little to gain in an exchange of views with the
US and no prospect of formal negotiations on terms
acceptable to them. The air strikes have had no
discernible effect on their estimate that only a mil-
itary stalemate in the South will eventually force
an adjustment of US objectives.
45. There is little reason to believe that
Foreign Minister Trinh's reference in January to the
possibility of talks if the US ceased all "acts of
war" against the DRV represented a retreat force on
Hanoi by the air strikes alone. A shift toward more
flexible tactics had been under way since November,
apparently designed to discredit US policy initia-
tives and to stimulate greater world pressures for
American concessions. Hanoi may also have calculated
that a softer line would deter an escalation of the
war which they apparently expected following the
American elections. The implications of growing
disorder in China in late 1966 probably was another
factor in Hanoi's decision to modify its public
stance on negotiations.
46. Present evidence suggests that the North
Vietnamese are preparing for intensified air strikes.
Even with the prospect of more extensive destruction,
they are unlikely to change their stand. New devel-
opments in China or in the war in South Vietnam could
increase their interest in negotiations, but it
does not appear that the air strikes alone will do
so.
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Effects of the Air Strikes on North Vietnam's Economy
47. The bombings in the North and the war
effort in the South have caused a significant erosion
of the economy, but have not significantly affected
North Vietnam's ability to continue the war.
48. There are three principal reasons for this.
First, the economy is at a comparatively primitive
stage of development. Agriculture and small plants
and shops predominate, and the people have simple
needs, most of which are satisfied locally.
49. Second, imports from Communist countries
have provided large amounts of military equipment and
have enabled North Vietnam to make up shortfalls in
production and to take care of new needs. Imports
in the first four months of 1967 increased sharply,
and food imports were greater than for all of 1966.
50. Third, the North Vietnamese have been able
to compensate for the bombing in various ways, and
have shown considerable ingenuity in keeping lines
of communications open. In fact, by constructing
multiple bypasses at critical points and by improving
alternate systems, they have reduced the vulnerabil-
ity of their logistics net.
51. Most of the important industrial and power
plants in North Vietnam did not become targets until
this year, and the economy has not fully felt the
effects of the damage this year. Major industrial
production is sure to fall considerably. Even if
further bombing were to eliminate modern industry
entirely, however, the economy could still function
at levels adequate to supply the bulk of the popu-
lation's needs and to service and repair lines of
communication.
52. The overall level of economic activity
probably did not change much in 1965 and 1966, al-
though production declined in some sectors. Small-
scale industry has been little affected. North
Vietnam's industry produces little military equip-
ment; its major contribution to the war effort is
in maintaining transport equipment, most of which
is imported, and in helping keep: open lines of commu-
nication. Food production declined in 1966, partly
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because of poor weather, and textile production
also fell, but imports have taken up much or perhaps
all of the slack.
53. Efforts are under way to make the economy
more responsive to current needs. Local industries
are being developed, mostly with Communist aid, to
reduce the economy's vulnerability to bombing. In
addition, industry is being dispersed somewhat, and
non-essential civilians are being relocated from
some urban areas.
54. North Vietnam's chronic trade deficit in-
creased in 1966 as exports fell and imports grew,
but the trade deficit has been made up by aid from
other Communist countries.
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
Chinese Attitudes Toward the War
55. The expanding US military presence in South
Vietnam and intensifying air operations in the
North have caused Peking to alter its strategic
assessment of the war. The Chinese have had to
give increasing attention to the possibility that
out of Vietnam's "war of national liberation"
could come an attack on China, and their expres-
sions of military commitment to Hanoi have be-
come increasingly qualified. Peking's hostility
toward negotiations of any kind, however, has
grown even more rigid.
56. Peking sees compelling reasons for the war
in Vietnam to go on. For one thing, it realizes
that the USSR would play a dominant role in any
political solution and that in conditions of peace
Soviet economic and military aid to Hanoi would pose
a major threat to Chinese influence there. To
yield at this point would not only mark a defeat
for Peking's general line of revolutionary war-
fare but would represent a major gain for Mos-
cow.
57. We believe the Chinese are prepared to exert
considerable political pressure, to broaden mil-
itary and economic aid, and -='if requested'---to sta-
tion combat troops in North Vietnam in order to
sustain Hanoi's will and ability to prolong the
war in the South. We do not believe, however,
that Peking is committed to Communist success in
South Vietnam at any price. Rather than accept
the risk of a US attack on mainland China, we
think the Chinese would be inclined to accept a
termination of the fighting without negotiations,
in the hope that this might permit some level of
resistance to continue.
58. While we continue to believe that Peking wants
to avoid a major military confrontation with the
US, we are certain that the Chinese would fight
if the US launched a deliberate and sustained air
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attack on Chinese bases and supply lines in South
China. Two other situations probably would bring
some form of Chinese intervention: a major in-
vasion of North Vietnam, and the disintegration
of effective authority in Hanoi.
59. Peking's reaction to an extension of
ground operations across the DMZ would depend on its
assessment of the extent and nature of the threat
to the Hanoi regime. A landing just north of the
line with limited objectives might be answered
with only a conspicuous buildup of combat forces
in South China and perhaps northern parts of
North Vietnam. The Chinese would be prepared,
however, to engage US forces in North Vietnam
if they deemed it necessary to preserve the Com-
munist regime.
Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the War*
60. Soviet leaders see the war as advan-
tageous to them in many ways, but they also see disad-
vantages which make their options unpromising
and hazardous. They probably believe that there
is no prospect of movement toward a political
solution for several months at best and appear
to have concluded that for the time being they
have no alternative but to help Hanoi to carry
on the war, hoping that changes of attitude in
either Hanoi or Washington, or both, will make
a political solution possible later.
61. The Soviet leaders fear that the US, in
its impatience to get the war over, will escalate
the conflict in a way which will increase the
risks and costs for the USSR; in an effort to
forestall this they are currently stressing their
intention to move to more vigorous support of
North Vietnam. We believe that during the com-
ing months they will continue to supply equip-
ment designed to strengthen air and coastal de-
fenses in North VIetnam and to increase the fire-
power of both the regular North Vietnamese forces
and the Communist forces fighting in the South.
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62. The North Vietnamese at some point will
probably press the Soviets for more sophisticated
equipment than those types now arriving on the
scene or in the pipeline. These might include
cruise missiles and tactical rockets which could
be used to support North Vietnamese operations
in the DMZ area and against US warships. The
USSR might believe it had to respond to such pres-
sure, although it would be concerned that the
use of such weapons would provoke a still more
dangerous US response.
63. If the intensity of the conflict were to
be increased by the US, we believe that at some
point the USSR would create an atmosphere of
heightened tension with the US. The Soviets
might take certain actions designed to bolster
North Vietnam and to warn the US, such as the
provision of limited numbers of volunteers or
crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft.
The mining or the blockade of the North Vietnam-
ese coast would be most likely to provoke these
responses, since this would constitute a direct
challenge to the Soviets, and there would be
little they could do on the scene. We do not
think the Soviets are prepared to resort to
strong and direct threats of general war as a
means to protect North Vietnam or to preserve
Soviet face.
North Vietnam's Propaganda Capabilities in the
Free World
64. The North Vietnamese expend a great
amount of effort attempting to encourage interna-
tional support for their cause and opposition to
US actions in Vietnam.
65. Hanoi invites sympathetic foreigners
to North Vietnam, sends high-powered delegations
to leftist front meetings, and provides "docu-
mentary" evidence to interested parties showing
US "atrocities." The major channel through which
Hanoi pumps its propaganda to most non-Communist
countries is the local Communist party. Where-
ever possible, of course, influential newsmen
are used by the North Vietnamese to carry their
story to the free world.
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66. The Communists, world-wide, have had con-
siderable success in selling the concept that the
struggle in South Vietnam is indigenously rooted.,
and that North Vietnamese intervention in the fray
was prompted by prior US intervention. The preva-
lence of this view is a major political asset for
the Communists.
67. Hanoi's representatives in Paris, Cairo
and New Delhi are particularly effective in promot-
ing Hanoi's policies through both official and pub-
lic channels.
68. The North Vietnamese are hampered by sev-
eral factors, however, in their effort to elicit
such support. One inhibiting factor is the paucity
of permanent North Vietnamese representation in the
non-Communist world. Another is the fact that Hanoi's
policy toward negotiations has been far too inflexi-
ble to stimulate much support. Even its Soviet bloc
allies have found it difficult to argue North Viet-
nam's case on negotiations persuasively.
69. On balance, it appears that Hanoi's cause
is best served in the non-Communist world not by the
sympathy it has been able to generate but by the
fact that many non-Communist nations, fearing the
war will grow larger, apply pressure on the US to
bring the war to a close.
World Opinion and the US International Position
70. Articulate opinion in Europe generally
disapproves US intervention in Vietnam and our
military strategy in Vietnam. With certain excep-
tions (Spain and Portugal and, to some extent,
West Germany,) it is an almost universal view that
the US has blundered in the fact and the extent
of its involvement. Moreover, among intellectuals,
youth, and organized labor there is a strong moral
revulsion against the bombing policy and against
what has come to be thought of as the US objective,
namely, to impose a puppet militaristic regime
upon a people trying to establish their own na-
tional identity.
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71. These views contrast strongly with the of-
ficial policy of most governments, one which might be
described as support for our general objectives and
sympathy for the problems and difficulties we have
encountered. But even the governments which quite
honestly make these pronouncements of support often
maintain grave reserve about the wisdom and content
of our policy. With intensification of the bombing
campaign, an apparent slowdown in military progress
on the ground, and a growing suspicion about US will-
ingness to negotiate, the misgivings of these govern-
ment leaders have intensified.
72. Asian nations view the conflict more directly
because of its impact on power relationships in the
area. The Australians and New Zealanders, of course,
would-like to block Communist expansion and believe
it in their national interest to provide political
and military support to the effort. Other allies
feel the same way, notably the Thais and South
Koreans. Some countries not allied with us also
wish to block Communist expansion and wish to see
the US effort succeed, but they are cautious; they
do not wish to be in an exposed position in case of
a compromise political settlement.
73. Most LatinA:erican, African, and Near
Eastern countries have problems Of their own and
simply do not feel that Vietnam is related to their
concerns. They would like the war over with; many
feel that the US has lost interest in them or -- in
Latin America especially -- takes them for granted.
Those with useful bilateral relations with the US
want to avoid endangering those relations by criticiz-
ing the US. Those with poor relations with the US --
and these are largely the more radical of the new,
post-colonial regimes -- feel free to vent their
criticisms of the US.
74. The longer the war lasts, the more intract-
able our problems will become. Some of these will
be related to the conduct of the war itself. There
is little doubt that the US could make some increases
in the level of military action in Vietnam without
suffering serious and immediate damage to its inter-
national position; it is impossible to judge precisely
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what would precipitate such damage. Certain steps,
such as the use of nuclear weapons, would of course
do so. An accumulation of minor escalations might
have this effect.
75. A long and intense conflict would intensify
fears of Chinese involvement, would be widely re-
gretted, and would bring heavy and direct criticism
upon the United States, including criticism from
new quarters. But if the outcome were such as to
encourage the belief that East Asia had been stabilized
and Communist expansion blocked, many people and most
Asians would conclude that the effort had been j u9ti-
fied. On the other hand, if finally the US terminated
the conflict on terms which clearly constituted an
abandonment of its objectives, the US would suffer
very serious losses of prestige.
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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO VARIOUS US COURSES OF ACTIONS*
76. An increase in the US force level in South
Vietnam on the order of 200,000 men might dispel
certain notions that Hanoi has entertained about
weakening American resolve. Since Hanoi almost cer-
tainly believes that the outcome of the war will be
decided in the South and has based its strategy on
a war of attrition, the North Vietnamese would rec-
ognize that a large increase in US forces was more
of a threat to their objectives than increased
bombing.
77. Hanoi might estimate, however, that the
US buildup could be neutralized by a relatively small
increase in their own main forces, and that another
year of fighting at a higher level might generate
greater pressures in the US to end the war, espe-
cially in a presidential election year.
78. As long as Hanoi did not alter its basic
policy toward the war, the US buildup probably would
not occasion any significant changes in Soviet or
Chinese policies. North Vietnam probably would
receive some heavier weaponry for use by the Commu-
nist forces in the South.
79. A continuation of the US effort on about
the present level, with increases of no more than a
division or so, probably would be interpreted in
Hanoi as confirmation of its estimate that US policy
is constrained by internal factors and foreign
commitments. The North Vietnamese probably would
believe that American reluctance to commit a larger
number of new troops gave them an excellent chance
to outlast the US in a war of attrition. There would
be little reason for Moscow or Peking to react
significantly to a leveling off of US deployments.
80. An intensification of the present bombing
program, without any attempt to close ports or
strike airfields not already hit, probably would
fall within the limits of what Hanoi is prepared
to tolerate. There is probably no level of air or
naval action against North Vietnam which Hanoi has
determined in advance would be so intolerable that
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the war had to be stopped. Precise Communist
countermeasures against this course of action are
difficult to predict. There is not necessarily a
close relationship between the level of bombing
and Hanoi's strategy or Peking's and Moscow's
responses. Captured documents suggest that mili-
tary planning in South Vietnam proceeds without
much reference to US bombing of North Vietnam.
81. Intensified bombingvould cause Hanoi to
seek additional military assistance from the USSR
and China. The net result probably would be an
expansion of Chinese troop presence, possibly in-
cluding at some stage the introduction of combat
infantry
we would not
exclude the surtacing o some Soviet military
personnel in a "volunteer" role.
82. A similar bombing program including
effective interdiction of North Vietnamese harbors
would have the important additional effect of
posing a direct challenge to the USSR. Moscow
could react by countering US interdiction with
its own naval forces, by bringing pressure on the
US in some other area, or by accepting the neces-
sity of relying mainly on rail transport across
China to support Hanoi. The latter possibility
seems most likely.
83. Another principal effect would be to
place China in a commanding position. Peking would
not only control the remaining lines of supply
but its influence in Hanoi would almost certainly
increase at the expense of the USSR.
84. It is conceivable that interdiction of
the harbors accompanied by intensive bombing of
military, industrial and transportation targets
would cause the situation in North Vietnam gradually
to deteriorate to the point that Hanoi felt it nec-
essary to change its policies. Although we cannot
estimate in advance how much Hanoi might be willing
to absorb, we think it unlikely that the bombing
and mining program would create such pressures
that Hanoi would choose to negotiate or otherwise
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terminate the war. In any case, the critical factors
would be Hanoi's view of Communist prospects in the
South and its assessment of world reaction to the
new escalation.
85. A combination of pressures might eventually
persuade Hanoi that its military and political
situation as a whole and the prospects for success
in South Vietnam were deteriorating seriously. The
attitudes of its allies might then become critical.
We think it unlikely that the Chinese would offer,
or the Vietnamese accept, open intervention by Chi-
nese forces in South Vietnam. We think there would
be a good chance that at this stage the Soviets
would strongly urge Hanoi to move toward a political
settlement, although we do not think the Soviets
would apply any sort of sanction to compel Hanoi.
Hanoi might then decide both to negotiate and try
to keep a guerrilla action going in the South.
86. Communist reaction to a restriction of US
bombing to southern North Vietnam would depend to
a great extent on the timing and on what other US
actions accompanied or followed it. Hanoi and Peking
would have a strong inclination to attribute the
shift in bombing policy to international opinion
and to domestic US criticism, and thus see it as
confirming their view that the US will not persist
in a long struggle.
87. This interpretation might be dispelled if
the US could make it clear that the bombing was being
redirected in an effort to raise the cost of moving
men and supplies into South Vietnam. Hanoi would
have to recognize that the redirection of the bomb-
ing program would probably reduce criticism and
pressures in the US and abroad, thus strengthening
the possibility that the US could and would persist.
88. The Soviets would probably be more disposed
than Hanoi to view the US move as an effort to bring
about a settlement, and far less likely to consider
it a mark of failing US resolve. They would probably
advise Hanoi to probe the US position as a step
toward negotiations.
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