ONE YEAR OF POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900050002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 21, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
One Year of Po~iular Front Government in Finland
Secret
21 July 1967
No. 0299/67A
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ONE YEAR OF POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND
Finland's popular front government--a coalition
of Communist and non-Communist parties--is now a
little more than one year old. Despite some internal
strains among the four parties over domestic economic
policy, there is every indication that Prime Minister
Paasio's coalition will stay in power until the next
parliamentary election in 1970. This arrangement,
aside from being a departure in Finnish political
patterns, is having an impact elsewhere in Scandina-
via, notably in Sweden. Moscow has praised the tac-
tics of the Finnish Communists as a model to be fol-
lowed by all Western European Communist parties in
order to enhance their "respectability" and attract
non-Communist voters.
The Social Democratic Party
(SDP) was charged with forming
a new government, following the
Finnish elections in March 1966,
in which it won the largest
number of seats in parliament.
During the ensuing protracted
negotiations it became clear
that sizable elements in both
the Social Democratic Party and
the heretofore dominant Center
(Agrarian) Party were prepared
to consider cabinet cooperation
with the Communist-front, Fin-
nish People's Democratic League
(SKDL), which had been in effect
barred from public office since
1948. In the view of the non-
communist parties, cooperation
was desirable not only to ensure
stability in Soviet-Finnish rela-
tions--always a consideration in
Finland's domestic politics--but
also to make the Communists share
responsibility for the unpopular
domestic economic reforms the
new government would have to
undertake.
The SKDL was thus assigned
three minor cabinet portfolios,
of which two are held by acknowl-
edged members of the Finnish
Communist Party (FCP) itself.
In order to reassure those who
opposed Communist representation
in the government on security
grounds, the Social Democrats
and the Center leaders reorgan-
ized one of the ministries
headed by a Communist and trans-
ferred some of his responsibil-
ities. The Communists' eagerness
to participate in the government
was evidenced by their relatively
passive acceptance of the terms
for cabinet cooperation laid down
by the non-Communist parties.
The arguments of those fa-
voring Communist participation for
domestic political reasons appear
to have been justified. Finland's
economic problems required strong,
corrective measures which had been
all but impossible to push through
parliament because of opposition
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from the Communists, who made po-
litical capital of the sacrifices
such measures would require from
the people. Now, however, govern-
ment spending has been cur-tailed,
and an austerity budget and a re-
lated tax bill have been hammered
out and pushed through parliament
by the coalition parties. This
goes some way toward stabilizing
the economy, but the government
still faces difficult problems
in view of the continuing infla-
tionary trends and the economic
recession developing since late
1965.
Impact on Communist Party
Participation in the govern-
ment and association with its pol-
icies during the past year ag-
gravated dissension at all levels
within the FCP and the SKDL over
the merits of remaining in the
government. Frustration has in-
creased among the Communists as a
result of setbacks in municipal by-
elections last fall. Traditional-
minded hard-line elements (Stalin-
ists) in both parties want to pull
out of the coalition because they
think the concessions made to
the non-Communist parties amount
to "selling out the working classes."
On the other hand, the old fash-
ioned doctrinare concepts es-
poused by these elements has ex-
asperated the liberals in the
Communist party who are insisting
on an updating or reinterpreta-
tion of classical Communist dogma.
Probably a majority in the
FCP/SKDL favors the moderate strat-
egy advocated by SKDL chairman
Ele Alenius--who is also associate
minister of finance--to stay in
the government and oppose or
slow the adoption of measures
that would be unpopular with the
electorate. Alenius' ultimate
aim is to broaden areas of coopera-
tion with the Social Democrats in
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order to achieve the long-term
Communist goal of joint political
action between the two parties.
In order to allay the persist-
ent doubt of the public at large
over the wisdom of cabinet coopera-
tion with the Communists, liberal
elements in the FCP have been
pressing the party formally to
renounce force as a means of
achieving "socialism" in Finland.
They wish instead to emphasize the
peaceful nature of the transition.
The liberals also favor publicly
committing the party to the con-
cept of a genuinely multiparty
system. Anew draft party pro-
gram was recently submitted
which incorporates the peaceful
transition thesis. The draft
is expected to be reviewed and
approved by the FCP central com-
mittee early in the fall. The
Communists' ultimate object was
expressed by FCP vice chairman
5alomaa in a speech at East Ger-
many's party congress on 21 April,
in which he said: "Finland has
one of the largest Communist par-
ties in the capitalist world as
well as a strong social democracy.
The crux of the matter is there-
fore the merger of these two main
forces."
Such a "merger" is not likely
to be achieved anytime soon, how-
ever, given the history of em-
bittered relations between the
two parties and the traditional
Social Democratic antipathy toward
the Communists and Moscow. The
Social Democrats still vividly
remember their exclusion from
office for eight years because of
President Kekkonen's domestic
politicking and his desire to
avoid risking Soviet disapproval
as long as allegedly anti-Soviet
elements led the party. A large
body of opinion within the Social
Democratic Party remains unrec-
onciled to cabinet cooperation
with the Communists. This ele-
ment was persuaded to go along
with the coalition arrangement
only because it provided the one
means by which the Social Demo-
crats could emerge from political
isolation.
Implications for Social Democrats
These attitudes among the
Social Democrats have somewhat
altered, however, as a result of
their participation in the govern-
ment. The hard line which the
Social Democrats have traditionally
followed in their relations with
the FCP has become less clear,
and their attitude toward the
question of establishing party -to-
party relations with the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CP5U)
is changing.
As far as the domestic scene
is concerned, there seems to be
little likelihood that the Social
Democrats will agree to meaningful
cooperation with the FCP in the
trade union field or in an elec-
toral alliance. There is the
danger, however, that over a pe-
riod of time the lines between the
two parties may become blurred.
This might make it more difficult
to maintain party discipline and
could have an adverse impact on
the Social Democrats' electoral
prospects.
With regard to relations
with the CPSU, the position is
different. Until fairly recently
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the Social Democrats were among
Moscow's favorite whipping boys,
but this has changed following
the departure of the more mil-
itantly anti-Soviet elements
from the Socialist leadership and
the decision of the Social Demo-
crats to play a leading role in
the popular front government.
Moves are now in train to estab-
lish direct contacts between the
Social Democrats and the CPSU.
Prime Minister Paasio in his
capacity as party chairman is
scheduled to head a party dele-
gation to Moscow in the fall,
ostensibly to implement the
notification given by the SDP
secretary general to a meeting
last March of the Socialist In-
ternational Bureau in London.
The statement said that the Social
Democratic Party intended "to
open contacts, on the party level
particularly, with the Soviet
Union."
This visit is likely to be
greeted with mixed feelings in
Finland as well as among the So-
cial Democratic parties of West-
ern Europe, which expressed con-
cern at the London meeting. The
Finnish Communists, for their
part, probably believe that this
step will bring the Social Demo-
crats closer to political coopera-
tion. At the same time, however,
the FCP will hardly welcome the
prospect of having to share with
the Social Democrats the "party-
to-party" channel between Helsinki
and Moscow which it has heretofore
monopolized.
The Western European Social-
ist parties will continue to have
misgivings, but are not inclined
to oppose, recognizing that the
Finnish Social Democrats must make
a contribution to keeping Finnish-
Soviet relations on an even keel
because of their prominent role in
the government.
Moscow's Attitude
The role of the CPSU in the
Finnish situation is consonant
with Moscow's general strategy
of encouraging the development
of cooperation between Communists
and Social Democrats in "a total
front of all progressive forces,"
In Finland, this approach
has resulted in some loosening
of Moscow's reins on the FCPjSKDL.
Soviet party officials maintain
that the importance of assuring
Communist representation in the
Helsinki government far outweighs
whatever frustration and temporary
setbacks this involves for the
FCP. The visit to Finland last
November by a high-level Soviet
delegation, including Suslov
and Ponomarev, was probably in-
tended to bolster FCP morale and
strengthen the position of the
faction which favors continued
participation in the government.
This move was further underscored
by the return visit to Moscow in
early June of an FCP delegation
which met with top CPSU officials-.
The ensuing joint communique
prompted the Helsinki non-Commu-
nist press to remark that the
Finnish Communists were again--
as during a similar visit in
1965--acting like official gov-
ernment spokesmen rather than as
members of a political party.
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Various other Soviet offi-
cials have suggested that the
Finnish experiment might have
wider implications, and they have
indicated that it has been the
subject of some controversy in
CPSU circles. Some officials
have gone so far as to suggest
that the days of CPSU interven-
tion in the affairs of fraternal
parties in Western Europe are
over. They also disclaim the old
concept of FCP dictation to Fin-
land's other "socialist" parties
and continue to urge the FCP to
cooperate with non-Communists.
From all these indications
it seems fairly clear that there
are elements in the CPSU which
still oppose the popular front
strategy and that Finland is
serving as an important testing
ground. Presumably the reason-
ing is that if the Finnish ex-
periment weakens and divides the
Social Democrats, then the posi-
tion of the Communists in the
government will necessarily be
strengthened. To this extent,
developments in the Finnish situ-
ation could influence the future
direction of CPSU policies and
tactics.
This popular front theme was
strongly endorsed by Brezhnev him-
self at the recent conference of
European Communist parties at
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. He
urged the Western European par-
ties to enter into coalitions
which they need not necessarily
dominate. The FCP was singled out
for praise for having achieved
participation in this type of gov-
ernment.
Impact in Scandinavia
The Finnish experiment is
being watched with considerable
interest in Sweden, where the Com-
munists are divided into conflict-
ing hard-line and liberal factions
similar to those in the Finnish
party. The situation there is
further complicated by a conflict
in the governing Social Democratic
Party between older, moderate ele-
ments led by Prime Minister Er-
lander,and a youthful more radical
faction which favors cooperation
with the Communists.
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Despite the weakness of Er-
lander's minority Social Democratic
government, and the threat of de-
fections to the Communists from
the party's left wing, Erlander
has so far rejected Communist
proposals for cooperation in next
year's parliamentary elections.
There is still a possibility,
however, that he may alter this
position at the special party
congress scheduled for this fall.
Changing political align-
ments on the left are also evident
in Denmark, and to a lesser ex-
tent in Norway. Until recently
it seemed that Denmark might be
the next Scandinavian country to
adopt a popular front government.
Prime Minister Krag has a number
of political problems, not the
least of which is the declining
popularity of his Social Demo-
cratic Party. He has in conse-
quence been maneuvering with the
far left Socialist People's Party
(SPP), with which he concluded
an agreement last March on parlia-
mentary cooperation. The principal
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obstacles to a more formal ar-
rangement remain the SPP's opposi-
tion to Denmark's membership in
NATO and to accession to the EEC,
and no compromises on these is-
sues are in sight.
SPP leader Aksel Larsen,
however, lost ground at a recent
special congress of his party to
a faction which is dissatisfied
with SPP-SDP cooperation. This
faction gained a majority on the
SPP main board, and has eight
members in the parliamentary group.
Defection of any three of these
would wipe out the SPP-SDP major-
ity, a prospect threatening the
parliamentary cooperatian agree-
ment between the two parties. The
possibility of a coalition gov-
ernment has become even more re-
mote.
In Norway, where the Labor
Party, the Norwegian Socialis-t
People's Party (SPP), and the
Communist Party constitute the
leftist opposition to Prime Min-
ister Borten's coalition of
"bourgeois" parties, no sentiment
for a popular front arrangement
has emerged. As in Sweden, the
leadership of the Labor Party--
Norway's Social Democratic equiv-
alent--is strongly anti-Communist,
although there is some pressure
for cooperation with the SPP in
order to stem defections by Labor's
radical youth element.
Outlook
Judging by reactions in
Scandinavia, the "peoples'front"
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tactic currently being stressed
by the CPSU is having some suc-
cess. At the Karlovy Vary con-
ference the Soviets emphasized
that these fronts should include
not only Western European Commu-
nist parties and other parties on
the left, but also youth elements,
labor activists, social democrats,
intellectuals, center groups, and
even religious organizations.
This policy is aimed at enhance-
ment of the respectability of the
Communists, and is also likely to
lead to further blurring of dis-
tinctions between Communists and
Social Democrats.
Although the Soviets empha-
sized that circumstances peculiar
to each country must be consid-
ered, the popular front approach
benefits from the general decline
of Social Democratic electoral
strength throughout Scandinavia
over the last few years. Even
though some Social Democratic
parties are suffering more de-
fections to the right than to
the left, the "bourgeois" parties
seem unable to cooperate to take
advantage of this. Given the long
history of rivalry and antagonism
between the Social Democrats and
the Communists, it is understand-
able that the Social Democratic
leadership in these countries re-
gards the latest Communist united
front tactics as posin a far
more serious threat.
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