STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: IS

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SECRET
STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 12 NO. 2
SPRING 196EI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'
OFFICE OF TRAINING
AARCHIVAL ftRECOR
lga D 2005/04/2Y~gT -RDP - 03194AIRQ 0010002-0
C"NCY ARCHIVES, BLDG.
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
IF-C
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
EDITORIAL BOARD
ABBOT E. SMITH, Chairman
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
vitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted
directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 1D 27 Langley
I I and need not be coordinated or submitted through chan-
nels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original
on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text
following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be
classified through Secret.
DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office
dissemination center or the responsible Central Reference Service desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the
Editor,
All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially
and subject to recall.
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CONTENTS
Page
Glimpses of Electronic Intelligence:
Crystal Balls and Glass Bottles .......... William A. Gray
The implications of Soviet electron tubes. SECRET
1
Quality Elint .......................... William H. Nance
Precision measurement of radar parameters. SECRET
7
An Elint Vigil, Unmanned ............. Edmund L. Soohoo
Interception of signal leaks from a missile test. SECRET
21
A Value for Information .................... Max S. Oldham
How to figure what's worth finding out about strategic
forces. SECRET
29
Pricing Soviet Military Exports ............... Milton Kovner
Arms to the underdeveloped, in dollars' worth. SECRET
37
Soviet Reality Sans Potemkin ............ Gertrude Schroeder
The amenities of Moscow from the native point of view.
43
CONFIDENTIAL
VIP Health Watch ..
... Myles Maxfield and Edward
G. Greger
53
Remote diagnosis of foreign leaders. SECRET
Counterintelligence vs
The CI role agai
OFFICIAL USE.
. Insurgency ...... Carlos Revill
nst the Latin American guerrilla.
a Arango
65
Philatelic KGB .....
..... Contributed by Walter Pfo
rzheimer
83
Fiftieth anniversary stamp. UNCLASSIFIED
Communications to th
e Editors ....................
........
85
Comment on book reviews. OFFICIAL USE
Intelligence in Recent
Public Literature. OFFICIAL US
E
Doctrine ............................................
91
World War II ........................................
96
Anthologies ........................................
107
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An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribu-
tion to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the
Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles
submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if
no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles
on any subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in
its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged
primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on
literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial board and staff
are of course excluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each
volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The
editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but re-
serves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.
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Case histories showing how Soviet electronic
R&D can point to future military systems.
CRYSTAL BALLS AND GLASS BOTTLES
William A. Gray
During the summer of 1952 American ethnical intel-
ligence officers met near Frankfurt/Main with a German electronics
engineer recently returned from Leningrad. This "Dragon" returnee 1
described in some detail a costly development project then under
way in the Svetlana Works engineering department, where he had
been assigned by the Soviets.2 The project was to design a novel
radar tube, unusually large, with a very high peak power output, operat-
ing at metric (VHF) wavelengths, and having a duty cycle (percentage
of time active) several times higher than was then common practice
for pulse radars. This first-hand report provided authoritative con-
firmation of information reported earlier by other returnees. The
Germans thought the project quite ambitious, in view of the rather
primitive technology then prevailing at Svetlana. It had a further
meaning for us.
Scientific and technical intelligence officers have always clung to
the belief that any early tip-off on future military systems can be found
1 During 1945 and 1946 several hundred German electrical engineers and scien-
tists were taken to the USSR and used, with the support of a number of technically
qualified POWs, for R&D on behalf of Soviet electronics technology. By 1951
Operation Dragon had been established as an organized effort to elicit intelligence
information from these and other German specialists as they returned to 'Germany.
(For the application of Dragon to the German atomic scientists, see Henry S.
Lowenhaupt's "On The Soviet Nuclear Scent," Studies XI 4, p. 13 ff.) Most of
the electrical engineers proceeded without much delay to West Germany for em-
ployment in its rapidly growing electronics industry. Subsequently, attracted by
the pay scale and other ideological features, quite a few participated in a third
"brain drain," emigrating to the United States.
'The Svetlana Works was, and still is, a prestige engineering-manufacturing en-
terprise for electron devices. In the late thirties Svetlana facilities and technology
were modernized with American contract support. In the winter of 1941.-42, with
Leningrad under siege, most of the plant was evacuated to Novosibirsk. After the
war it was slowly rebuilt to its former preeminent position, though for some years
its facilities were in poor shape.
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in appropriate aspects of selected R&D efforts, so that intelligence on
adversary R&D can give our own planners and policy makers valuable
lead time. Outside the field of national security, the validity of this
concept has been demonstrated in the engineering industries, where
competitive industrial intelligence has used it for several genera-
tions. Its potential in the U.S.-Soviet competition is perhaps best
illustrated with respect to Soviet pulse power tube technology. The
development of pulse power tubes is directly and uniquely related
to radar evolution, since in general radar comprises the exclusive
end use for these devices. And although military radars are subject
to stringent security, the USSR is relatively free in publishing specifi-
cations for many classes of pulse tubes.
The Tall King
The importance of the story from Svetlana was the strong evidence
it provided of a Soviet intention to continue with a major effort to
develop and employ VHF radars-those with a wavelength on the
order of one meter. The United States I largely as a
result of wartime priorities and acquired skills, were emphasizing
the development of centimeter wave (UHF) radars, discounting
the potential of VHF on the grounds of poor resolution. The Soviets,
however, had used pulse triodes 3 operating in the VHF bands in
the majority of their wartime ground and naval radars, and now they
were evidently being impelled by considerations of their own-per-
haps their acquired know-how or the VHF's greater range capability
and freedom from clutter-to mount a big development program in
VHF radar technology.
The technical intelligence officers were thus aware at an early
date of the continued Soviet interest in VHF radar. On top of these
reports of the attempt at Svetlana to develop a superpower device
for it came the introduction, between 1952 and 1954, of updated ver-
sions of earlier VHF air-defense radars, the P-8 and P-10. Then in
1954 a Soviet vacuum tube catalog (acquired with some difficulty)
listed a pulse triode type GI-5B, the electrical and mechanical speci-
fications for which corresponded almost exactly with the data provided
'The triode is an electron tube with three elements-the cathode and anode,
say filament and plate, between which the electrons flow and a third element, say
a grid, which controls the flow. The amplification is achieved by other means,
externally applied magnetic fields and electric potential, in UHF and microwave
power tubes, the magnetron and the klystron amplifier.
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by our Dragon source from Svetlana. Apparently the lonti' md ex-
p(nsive development job there had been successful, and the device
was lacing put into production..
),'hat surmise was confirmed by a team of East Germai 'lectron
iul)e specialists who visited Soviet facilities in 1956. A copy of their
drip report revealed that the GI-5B pulse triode was in Ja C being
produced in the Svetlana factory. Then a year or two later a team
ol. American electronics specialists were invited to visit th USSR
aaul, by coincidence, were able to examine in some detail th(, ' vetlana
production line for this tube. The important feature of their report
s the observation that the production rate was extremely,, high for
a specialized device of this nature; there seemed to be a crash grogram
I (t meet a heavy immediate demand.
'I'his accumulation of evidence now provided a firm I iLsis for
i)rcdieting: that a new Soviet air-defense ground radar would be de-
ployed shortly, that it would operate at a frequency betwawi'(,n 150
tncl 200 Mllz, and that its purpose would be the long-range ' -tection
Of small, High-altitude aircraft targets. And so it was: in f 69, ap-
d)roximatcly five years after the GI-5B triode went into pro) Cluction
:i_nd nearly ten years after its design project was started at ` ,eetlana,
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ov~ef use es
the P-14 (Tall King) early-warning radar appeared in the Soviet
air-defense network. As against published specifications for the tube's
frequency, pulse length, and duty cycle-200 MHz maximum, 11 mi-
croseconds, and 0.0033 maximum-the measured values for the P-14
were 169-175 MHz, 8-12 microseconds, and 0.0025. The P-14 still
remains the main extended-range early-warning sensor in the Soviet
bloc air-defense system.
But Soviet R&D did not stop there. Abundant information acquired
over the next two years, mainly from unclassified industry publications,
showed that an extensive Soviet effort in product development had
been established to provide still more advanced pulse power tubes
for VHF radar service. In particular, two high-power triodes dating
from 1958 and 1959 merited attention. These tubes, types GI-4A
and GI-24A, had a close family resemblance to the Svetlana GI.-5B,
with a similar peak power and operating frequency. Both of them,
however, were designed to operate at much greater average power,
pulse length, and duty cycle and were water-cooled.
These features indicated intended application in systems which in-
volved large fixed ground installations and sophisticated data-proc-
essing to cope with targets at very long ranges. By early 1963, ac-
cordingly, it was possible to foresee that Soviet defense system projects
could be expected to include
large fixed ground VHF radar systems operating at frequencies between 150
and 200 MHz, employing high average powers and megawatt peak powers at
high duty cycle, for use at extreme ranges against small high-altitude targets.
At least two different projects appear probable, with parameters compatible
with antimissile and antisatellite system requirements.
At this point the technical intelligence officers ran into a familiar
occupational hazard of their craft-unsolicited advice from experts
who knew better. U.S. tests in the Pacific had demonstrated that
high-altitude nuclear explosions are likely to black out radio propaga-
tion in the lower frequency ranges. This was sufficient proof for the
"experts" that extreme-range antimissile radars in the VHF band would
not be practical and that the Soviets could therefore not be planning
any such systems to operate at frequencies below 500 MHz.4
'For the effects of this long unresolved disagreement, see David S. Brandwein's
"Interaction in Weapons R&D," Studies XII 1, p. 18 f.
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The Soviet decision-makers, however, not having the benefit of this
advice, continued with their program; and in 1967 the now famous
Hen House antimissile and antisatellite radars began transmissions
from their operational sites. Their operating frequency lies between
154 and 162 MHz, compared with the published values of 150 and
177 MHz for the GI-4A and GI-24A triodes respectively. They use
long pulses, pulse compression, and frequency scanning, with sophisti-
cated data processing. The duty cycle of one group is 0.027 and that
of the second 0.05, compared with published values of 0.03 and 0.05
for the two pulse triodes. Assuming that it is the GI-4A and GI-24A
pulse power triodes they are using, these complex defensive systems
first became operational approximately seven years after the intro-
duction of their tubes.
Although the USSR has been far less free in disseminating technical
data on radar power tubes in the centimeter wavelength bands, use-
ful intelligence information can be obtained. In 1964 a Czech elec-
tronics expert emigrated to the United States. Some years previously
both he and his director at Tesla had made business trips to Soviet
facilities working on magnetrons and klystrons. From him we learned
specific details about some multi-megawatt pulse magnetrons designed
for operation in the "18 centimeter" band that were in production by
1957 at a Moscow factory., He also described a multi-megawatt klys-
tron amplifier development that had started in Moscow in 1957 and
was well under way at Fryazino during 1961.
At the time of our discussions with this Czech engineer, only two
relatively low-power Soviet radars were known to operate in this
wavelength region. Neither was a likely candidate for the large
magnetrons described. Clearly, a new Soviet high-power centimeter
wave ground radar could be expected imminently. In 1965 the
Back Net air defense radar was confirmed to be just that. Operating
at several frequencies between 1700 and 2400 MHz, it is the newest
unit deployed at Soviet Bloc ground-controlled intercept stations
The "18 centimeter" band would cover approximately 1600 to 2400 MHz. In
the United States this portion of the UHF frequency range, although used for
communications services, has not been used for radar.
Je4 PIT
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Sovief Pulse Flies
rand in addition is being installed as the target acquisition rad,rr for
A w new Soviet long-range surface-to-air missiles.
As a final word, one must keep in mind that analyzing seMt-c red
l> oduets of the Soviets' R&D is useful to give a broad index of r Fieir
.echnological capabilities for designing new military systems. In the
r rrrowcr sense of predicting their deployment of particular systi ins,
?he opporti_mities for this approach are limited and the batting aver ege
s bound to he low. In the field of pulse power tubes here discus, d,
wo very significant trends in Soviet radar capabilities are app:u ent
horn what we have learned. First, centimeter wave radars emplo} rng
~r_;qucncy-controlled klystron power amplifiers rather than magnet r i rns
,an he expected; to (late, no known Soviet radar makes use of -his
sophisticated design that is important both for defense against rlec-
rjnie countermeasures and for better accuracy in measurer ec i its.
cccond, the techniques for precise control of signal phase and fregiwrrcy
values which increase the flexibility and quantity of target infornm,,f on
n the I fen [louse type of system may be used at any operating radar
vv.ivcfengtii whenever military requirements justify the expensive s-c,rn-
Oication.
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Precision measurement of the operating
parameters of uncooperating radars.
QUALITY ELINT
William H. Nance
Most of electronic intelligence is devoted to the intercept and
analysis of radar signals in order to locate radar sites and establish
the general characteristics of radar systems. This type of Elint, usually
called "radar order of battle," has proved to be of great value in the
Viet Nam air war, where the U.S. Air Force and Navy both conduct
large-scale Elint operations in support of air strike missions.
Another category of Elint receiving wide recognition in the intelli-
gence community is called "precision parameter measurements." This
technique involves either the measurement of radar signal characteris-
tics to a very high order of accuracy or measurements to determine
something about a radar's operation that will reveal its detection and
tracking capabilities. Of greatest importance are measurements which
will reveal a radar's vulnerability to electronic countermeasures.
As advanced radar systems with complex modes of operation have
been evolved to achieve greater range, accuracy, and immunity to
countermeasures, electronics intelligence groups are being pressed
harder and harder to develop equipment and techniques for meaning-
ful measurements of their parameters. Rather large-scale research
programs are being carried out to develop special receiving and re-
cording systems, and these often incorporate electronic computers to
process the vast quantity of information bits in a typical radar signal.
Studies of technical and operational feasibility are also undertaken
to devise methods of deploying these systems in collection operations.
In 1962-63 the CIA Office of Elint expanded its program of precision
measurements to determine the vulnerability of reconnaissance ve-
hicles and to develop equipment for electronic countermeasures. This
program has been highly successful in a variety of projects, develop-
ing a number of new approaches to the collection of electronic intelli-
gence. One of the most interesting of these is the technique for
accurately measuring the radiated power of an operating radar and
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descrihing the fine-grain structure of the radiation pattern. A Am-
plified review of this power-pattern technique, although it repro' Bents
only one facet of the precision measurements program, should give
some insight into the technical and operational problems encounet red
amid some idea of the accomplishments of the program.
The first serious attempt to measure the radiated power of a radar
or intelligence purposes was made by CIA in 1958 on the Soviet
early-warning radar known as Bar Lock. The Bar Lock was ,a iiiew
version of the Soviet multi-beam S-band' family of radars which had
?undergone a rapid and widespread deployment in East Germarw and
other areas peripheral to the USSR. Intelligence indicated this new
radar was deployed to detect and track the U-2 aircraft which ~c ere
Mist beginning to make deep penetrations over the Soviet Union.
Estimates of the Bar Lock's radiated power output, based lr:,ly
,upon photographic evidence, ranged as high as 5 megawatts peak
nnlsc power from each of its 5 transmitters. With 5 megawatts
o each beam the Bar Lock would have had ten times the power of
previous similar radars and would have significantly improved the
') to 4 Ctiz, or 2,000 to 4,000 megacycles per second.
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detection and tracking capabilities of the Soviet air defense system.
To meet this threat to the U-2, those responsible for the reconnaissance
program demanded firmer information on the Bar Lock's power out-
put and radiation pattern coverage.
A laboratory that provided scientific back-up to the U-2 program
assembled power-measurement equipment, crude by present-day
standards, and installed it in a C-119 aircraft. With little advance
testing, a series of flights was made through the air corridors to Berlin,
where Bar Lock signals were easily intercepted. The resulting power
measurements at various vertical angles in the antenna pattern were
not of high accuracy because of uncontrolled errors in the equipment.
The data did indicate, however, somewhat less than one megawatt of
peak power for each Bar Lock transmitter, and this was later con-
firmed by other sources. Although not entirely successful in power
measurement, this project suggested solutions to many technical prob-
lems and opened the way for follow-on developments.
In 1963 a contract was let with a major electronics laboratory
for research on the technical problems of precision power-pattern
measurement and for the development of measuring equipment. Be-
fore the end of the year a prototype system was flown against the
acquisition radar for a U.S. Nike Ajax and produced good results.
At the same time the procedures to be used in overseas deployment
were being simulated and studied, and a special laboratory was set
up to process and analyze the unique data to be collected. The
first two overseas deployments took place in 1963 against the Soviets'
Tall King radar in the Far East and Fan Song in Europe, and both
were successful. The appended Table lists the projects that followed,
producing precision data on the majority of the radar types, used in
the Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese air defense systems.
Antenna Pattern Measurements
The total radio frequency power fed to a radar antenna is essentially
determined by the type of output tube used in the transmitter, the
characteristics of the pulse train, and the losses by attenuation in
the system. The function of the antenna is to concentrate this power
in the desired direction, and its ability to do so is called gain. The
relative distribution of the energy in all directions is called the an-
tenna radiation pattern, generally consisting of a main bearn plus
side and back lobes. This antenna pattern and the level of power
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radiated are critical parameters in establishing the performance of
the radar. These parameters are priority requirements for intelligence
and ECM purposes.
The accurate and comprehensive measurement of a radar anten-
na pattern is a tedious process even for the designer. 'Test ranges
with elaborate instrumentation are necessary to insure that the fin-
ished antenna has a beam of the desired shape and that the side
and back lobes are properly suppressed. Moreover, the patterns
seen on the test ranges are not always maintained in operational use,
because environmental and ground effects at the site can make sig-
nificant changes in the pattern.
The objectives of Elint power-pattern measurements are to obtain
precise data on the maximum beam power, the total radiated power,
the antenna gain, and variation in gain (side and back lobe distribu-
tion) around the antenna. This requires the use of an airborne meas-
uring platform to avoid ground effects and to make measurements
at various angles of elevation. In theory, the Elint approach is the
same as that used on the antenna test range; the power density is
measured and then converted to radiated power on. the basis
of the known geometric relationship between the radar antenna
and the measurement system. In practice, the Elint operation has
all of the problems encountered on the test range plus additional
ones intrinsic to intelligence collection; the target radars are non-
cooperative and may not radiate at the time and in the direction
desired; all of the instrumentation to measure power density and
locate the aircraft's position must be carried in the aircraft. These
handicaps increase the number of potential sources of error which
must be eliminated, minimized, or calibrated.
The primary sources of error for power density measurements lie
in uncertainties in the gain of the receiving antenna, losses in the
transmission line, characteristics of the receiver, and the sources used
for calibration. Errors in the geometric data may be associated
with the position, altitude, and attitude of the aircraft, the location
of the target, atmospheric conditions, or ground effects.
Special Equipment
The design of the measuring equipment is centered upon the need
for very accurate measurement of individual pulse amplitude and the
use of calibration signals from laboratory standard power meters.
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]c t ranq a for antenna design. The verticle boom on the left hole the
nurcK-up nose section of a C-97 aircraft.
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During collection operations provision is made for the accurate cali-
bration of the receiving antennas, the transmission lines, and the re-
ceiving and recording systems with respect to attenuation losses or
other errors which may degrade the data. A description of the labo-
ratory-type receiving equipment, calibration sources, and data encoders
would be comprehensible only to electronic specialists. A brief dis-
cussion of antenna problems, however, should give some idea of the
development work behind power-pattern measurement systems.
The pattern of the receiving antenna is critical because the angle
at which the energy arrives is constantly changed by the movement
of the aircraft, including its roll, pitch, and yaw. In order that the
precise gain of the receiving antenna may be known and used in the
calculations for absolute power, it is highly desirable to have smooth
Figure 1. Typical omnidirectional patterns possible from aircraft -mounted
antennas (above 1,000 MHz.)
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"?%ad Ane - P?11
Figure 2. The towed, antenna-carrying vehicle used for power-pattern measure-
ments below 1,000 MHz. The RC-135 aircraft has a special A - frame boom
structure for launching and recovering the vehicle in flight. The specially de-
veloped towing cable serves as the RF transmission line between the antenna
and the receiving system in the aircraft. It also carries the electric: cable to
control the vehicle from the aircraft.
58480 2-68 C I A
omni-directional receiving patterns, with equal gain over a wide
sector. Airborne omni-antenna patterns are difficult to achieve be-
cause of interference from the aircraft structure, whose complex shape
breaks the pattern into sharp peaks and deep nulls. A special test
range was established for this program to find interference-free loca-
tions on aircraft surfaces which would yield patterns with smooth con-
tours. Mockups of complete aircraft nose sections and wingtips were
tested and in some cases new antenna elements were developed..
When the desired patterns were obtained the antenna elements
were carefully transferred from the mockups to the real aircraft. Even
with these meticulous efforts good patterns could be developed only
for the higher frequencies and only off the nose and wingtips of
certain aircraft, as shown in Figure 1. This limitation has often been
a handicap in collection operations.
In the radio frequencies below 1,000 MHz, where some important
Soviet radars operate, it proved impossible to produce good patterns
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SECRET Quality Elint
from antennas mounted on the aircraft. To solve the problem at
these frequencies a new phase of research was begun-the develop-
ment of aerodynamic antenna-carrying vehicles to be towed behind
the aircraft. Antennas mounted in these vehicles could be designed to
produce a smooth cardioid pattern with the one sharp null pointed
toward the towing aircraft. This null eliminates interference from
the aircraft, leaving patterns that are ideal for power measurements.
Although the towing of the antenna greatly increases the complexity
of the system, it has proved to be a good technical solution to the :re-
ceiving pattern problem at the lower radio frequencies. A typical
configuration is shown in Figure 2.
The collected data consist of measurements of pulse amplitude
taken from different portions of the radiation pattern as the radar
antenna rotates, or scans, and the aircraft moves through the pattern.
Measurements are recorded digitally, reduced, and read out on con-
tinuous-chart paper rolls which display the varying amplitudes mak-
ing up the pattern. The chart paper format is of sufficient accuracy
to allow antenna specialists to make direct measurements from the
display. Successive scan patterns together with geometric and other
calibration data, as shown in Figure 3, are processed by computer to
make up three-dimensional radiation patterns.
35
25
20
Figure 3. An example of the chart paper roll readout of the antenna pattern
data.
58481 2-68 CIA
Collection Operations
Ideally the flight path for power-pattern measurement is a radial
path from the horizon to directly over the radar site. If the radar
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antenna is making 360-degree scan rotations the radial flight will yield
continuous measurements around it at increasing angles of elevation.
This provides data from which the complete three-dimensional radia-
tion pattern can be described. Such flight paths, of course, are not
often possible; sometimes the data are limited to elevations of 15
degrees or less. Fortunately, the lower angles of a radar pattern are
of greatest importance for intelligence; that is where target detection
and tracking begin.
Each of the deployments shown in the Table was the result of
months of preparation, which included calibration and installation
of the equipment, detailed planning of the mission, operator training,
and the coordination of a multitude of technical and operational
matters. The radar types were selected on the basis of intelligence
priority and the particular target sites on the basis of air access, with
preference to isolated areas where other radars would not offer inter-
ference. The location of the site was known beforehand; the target
signals were identified by direction-finding equipment which was part
of the airborne system. During collection runs the aircraft's posi-
tion and attitude were recorded by special navigational instruments
so that the exact geometric relationships between the radar and the
measurement system would be known. Several of the projects were
completed in fewer than six missions; others required more than
40 to get the desired results..
The power-pattern measurement program has been carried out with
the full cooperation of U.S. Air Force organizations, which have fur-
nished the aircraft and crews and have also given the extensive
support required for airborne reconnaissance operations. The flight
missions have been conducted for the most part within the frame-
work of world-wide peripheral reconnaissance programs carried out
by the Strategic Air Command and other USAF elements. Exceptions
to established flight restrictions and security rules have been necessary
on only a few occasions.
As of this writing the most recent deployment was that listed as
Project See Top, in which a C-97 aircraft flew over the Gulf of
Tonkin to make measurements of the SA-2 Fan Song radar during
U.S. air strikes in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. The antenna patterns
recorded were used in the development of guidance systems for new
anti-radiation missiles designed to home on and destroy target radars.
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SECRET 17
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A series of reports on the power-pattern measurements have been
disseminated throughout the intelligence community, where the ac-
curacy and significance of the data have been widely accepted.
Present Capabilities
'1'lae Office of Elint power-pattern measurements are unique; there
is no other comparable program in the U.S. intelligence communiiy or
in the Elint organizations of allied countries. Even the radar design
and development laboratories have as yet produced no similar self-
contained airborne measurement systems. Because of these unique
capabilities, the USAF Air Proving Grounds Command and other
groups have several times arranged for the use of the OEL system
to compare the patterns of simulated Soviet radars with those of the
real ones operating in the USSR.
Airborne instrurnentation required for power-pattern measurement
18 SFCRFT
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As each project was carried out, improvements were made in the
instrumentation to enhance the system's accuracy and the conveni-
ence of its use. Now, instead of re-engineering the equipment
for each new project as was required in the early days, the use
of adaptable equipment is being emphasized. Receivers and record-
ing equipment are now available, along with the associated antenna
configurations and modified aircraft, for quick-reaction deployment
against any radar in the normally used frequency bands. Additional
instrumentation is being incorporated for the precision measurement
of other parameters in the signals, such as radio frequency coherency,
intra-pulse modulation, and pulse train characteristics.
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No Foreign Dissem
Stand-by for faint signals from
rare maintenance tests on a new
SAM model.
AN ELINT VIGIL, UNMANNED
Edmund L. Soohoo
One of the more difficult electronic intelligence collection prob-
lems is that of picking up the signals associated with a missile. It
is particularly difficult for the smaller missiles, such as surface-to-air
types which transmit signals of relatively low power, if they are be-
sides not often fired. A case in point is the Soviet SA-2 missile Guide-
line, older versions of which are used extensively against U.S. aircraft
in North Viet Nam. The newer models are so far deployed only
in the Soviet Union and a few Bloc countries, notably East Germany.
For the development of electronic countermeasures against surface-
to-air missile systems the prime intelligence targets are, first, the type
of proximity fuze they use to detonate the warhead, and second, the
tracking beacon which, emanating from a transponder on the missile
responsive to a ground guidance transmitter, serves to determine the
missile's position in flight. If the characteristics of the fuze are known
the warhead can be detonated at harmless ranges. If the tracking
beacon can be jammed, the ground radar's computer can be confused as
to the missile's location and so made to misdirect it. The Elint prob-
lem, then, is to determine the frequencies and modulation character-
istics of these signals in the normal peacetime environment when live
missile firings are rare and usually inaccessible. This problems exists
for the latest version of the Soviet SA-2 system.
The Problem Signals
This latest SA-2 system consists of the Fan Song E track-while-scan
radar and the Guideline III missile. At the operational launch site
there are a number of mobile vans housing the radar, the associated
computer, and the missile guidance transmitter. There are 6 missile
launchers. The radar is in the C-band microwave range, approx-
SECRET
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SECRET Elinf Vigil
imately 5000 MHz', and the guidance transmitter in the UHF L-band
(700-800 MHz). A mobile test van checks each missile's proximity
fuze, guidance system including beacon transponder, and autopilot
about once every six months.
These semiannual tests of the missiles' electronics are made with
special equipment connected up by cable to exercise the various
functions. But a certain amount of energy nevertheless leaks from
the missile antennas during the tests. Although its level is extremely
low-on the order of thousandths of a watt-such small amounts of
power can be detected at long ranges by the use of sufficiently sensi-
tive receiving equipment. The probability of intercept in any partic-
ular case depends upon the estimated power leakage, how close the
collection site is, and the sensitivity of the receiving system.
A further problem is that of keeping on the lookout for the signal and
recognizing it when it comes. If the test schedule is not known, a
24-hour surveillance is required over an extended period of time. The
signal may last only a few seconds for each missile tested. For
recognition purposes a "model" of the expected signal must be
constructed, comprising the limits of possible fuze and beacon signals
estimated on the basis of known systems and the current state of
the art. Fortunately the characteristics of a proximity fuze signal are
normally quite distinct from those of other radar-like signals. As
for the beacon signal, it will have the same pulse repetition fre-
quency as the ground radar, though at a different radio frequency,
so that it too should be recognizable.
Designing an Automatic Monitor
The first task is to set up specifications for the target signals. The
possible types of proximity fuze signals are basically three: contin-
uous wave, pulse, and FM. These could be narrowed on the basis
of U.S. practice and some intelligence on older Soviet proximity fuzes,
but it is dangerous to estimate Soviet electronic development from
U.S. analogies, since Soviet design practice and philosophy often
departs from ours even where ours is well understood and available to
1 By international agreement:
I Kilohertz= 1 kilocycle per second
1 Megahertz=1000 KHz
I Gigahertz (GHz) =1000 MHz
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Soviet designers. Therefore all possibilities, in the absence of positive
intelligence, must be considered equally likely. The postulated ranges
of frequency, modulation characteristics, and propagated power of
the proximity fuze signals are outlined in Figure 1. The beacon signal
is simply assumed to be a one-for-one pulse reply to the L -band
guidance transmitter, which is in synchronism with the Fan Song
E radar pulses.
Figure 1. SA-2 Guideline Proximity Fuze Model
Parameter I Expected Value Uncertainty
a. Carrier Radio Frequency ............ 3.6 to 3.8 GHz 3.2 to 4 GHz and
or 9 GHz 7.5 to 10.5 GHz
h. RF Carrier Modulation
(1) Pulse Modulation
(a) Pulse Width .............. 0.4 sec ........ 0.3 to 0.6 sec
(b) Pulse RF ................. 200 KHz ....... 100 to 250 KHz
(c) Duty Factor .............. 0.08 ........... 0.03 to 0.12
(d) Pulse RF Jitter ............ negligible ...... 10% noise jitter
(2) FM-CW or CW
(a) Voltage-Controlled Modula-
tion Frequency 1 MHz ........ 0.5 to 2.0 MHz
Frequency Deviation (peak
to peak) 10 MHz ....... 5 to 15 MHz
(b) External Ferrite Modulation
Frequency 50 KHz ....... 20 to 150 KHz
Frequency Deviation (peak
to peak) 1 MHz ........ 250 KHz to 2 MHz
(3) Modulation ................... sinusoidal ...... sinusoidal to noise
c. RF Power
(1) Pulse Carrier .................. 5 w peak ...... 3 to 10 w peak
(2) CW Carrier .................. 5 w average .... 3 to 10 w average
d. Antenna Gain ..................... 12 db ......... 10 to 15 db
(1) Antenna Pattern ............... hollow cone .... 4? to 12? 3-db BW
(2)
Antenna Front Sidelobes .......
-10 db
....... - 6 to -20 db
(3)
Antenna Back Lobes ...........
-7 db
........ -5 to - 10 db
(4)
Main Beam Polarization ........ linear .
........ linear to circular
(5)
Number of Channels ........... 2 ............. 2
Using these models for the target signals and further assuming
some parameters for the collection system and its distance from the
point of propagation, a calculation of the sensitivity required of the
receiver system may be made. The following is a sample such cal-
culation for the fuze signal at a single frequency to illustrate the
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method of determining whether the proposed system has sufficient
sensitivity.
Assumptions:
Fuze power .............................. 34 dbm (2.5 watts)'
Fuze frequency ........................... 9000 MHz (9 GHz)
Fuze antenna gain in direction of Elint site .... -7 dh
Path loss for 12-mile distance to Elint site .... 136 dh
Polarization coupling loss ................... 3 db
Received signal power at Elint site (34 minus
the three loss factors) -112 dbm
4-foot parabolic Flint antenna gain @9000 MHz 38 db
Receiver thermal noise ..................... - 108 dbm
System noise figure (Ratio with ideal) ........ 10 db
Signal-to-noise ratio required for receiver stop
and recognition in a 4-MHz bandwidth 10 db
Over-all system sensitivity to stop and qualify
a signal (Thermal noise increased by the
two noise ratio figures and reduced by the
antenna gain: -108 +10 +10 -38) -126 db:n
Thus the signal-to-noise ratio at this frequency would be 126-112=
14 db, a usable figure for collection purposes.
Construction of the System
A block diagram of the monitoring system as completed is shown
in Figure 2. All the signals are picked up by a single 4-foot para-
bolic reflector. The UHF guidance signal is taken off through its
own feed (co-located with the microwave feed) and processed as in-
dicated at the top of the diagram. The microwave signals in the
range 2-11 GHz are fed to a triplexer which separates them into S
(2-4 GHz), C (4-7 GHz), and X (7-11 GHz) bands. Traveling
wave tube amplifiers amplify the separate bands and feed S-, C-, and
X-band scanning receivers. The S-band receiver scans it contin-
uously, covering it every two seconds, but for the sake of simplicity
and economy scanner time is shared by the C- and X-band tuners
under the direction of a control unit that allows two seconds of scan-
ning in each band alternately.
The output from each of the microwave scanning receivers and
the UHF receiver are fed to the analyzer, a digital computer which
The decibel is a unit of comparison, a ratio of logarithms. It is related to
absolute power by specifying db (here 34) above (or with a minus sign, below)
I milliwatt (m).
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Elinf Vigil SECRET
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SECRET Elint Vigil
measures and qualifies the signals and prints out data on their char-
acteristics on a 12-column paper tape. The chief elements of data
here are frequency band, amplitude, whether pulse, C`V, or FM,
and synchronization of radar and tracking beacon pulses. At the same
time the digital voltmeters shown as DVM give a digital indication of
frequency by reading the sweep voltage analog of the scanning re-
ceivers and feed it to the analyzer for print-out as a direct frequency
reading on each intercept.
The FM demodulator shown processes the intermediate frequency
signals from the C- and X-band tuners, producing two I)C voltage
outputs proportional to the FM deviation and modulating frequencies.
'T'hese too are qualified and formatted by the analyzer and printed out
by the digital printer.
The time code generator is a digital device which gives the time
in hours, minutes, and seconds for recording with each qua:'.ified inter-
cept.
The antenna gearbox, drive motor, and control unit are used to
peak the received signal. They operate on the radar signal, since this
is transmitted for somewhat longer periods than the fuze or beacon
signal, giving time to orient the antenna precisely on target.
Properties and Prospects of Automation
The advantages of such an automated system are many. It can
operate 24 hours a day without constant attendance by an operator.
It can intercept signals that occur for only a few seconds at intervals
~f months which would probably be missed by an operato:r manually
sc arching the spectrum. The digital computer analyzes the data
concurrently, permitting decisions to be made without waiting for
time-consuming manual analysis. The cost of storing the output on
paper tape is much less than it would be on the magnetic tape used
for raw data, particularly when surveillance extends over a long period
of time.
There are also disadvantages, however, in such a system. Automatic
systems are expensive. They are sufficiently complex at present to
re-:quire skilled maintenance and frequent testing to assure proper
performance. They are subject to false alarms: noise occasionally
passes the signal qualification tests and causes a print-out of data,
or some genuine radar signal may fit within the boundaries of the
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Elint Vigil SECRET
signal model, necessarily rather broad in searching for unknown tar-
gets. Only further analysis can eliminate this type of error.
The foregoing is only one of the possible applications for automatic
Elint. Another would be statistical summary of the activity of one
or more target radars to establish a pattern of operation or the doctrine
which underlies it. By improving the precision with which the signal
parameters are measured it may be possible to "fingerprint" each
individual radar, something of great value to order-of-battle col-
lectors in separating simultaneous signals of the same type.
By using the general-purpose digital computer with large amounts
of storage, a program can be devised to recognize, sort, classify, and
periodically report on all signal activity available to a collection sys-
tem. There is already some activity in this area, but the sophistica-
tion possible with advanced programming techniques has. only barely
been explored. The potential here is the capability of doing almost
everything a human operator would do. Striking advances in this
direction are still around the corner. The classical Elint processes
of collection and analysis will be greatly compressed in time, and
the scope of things that are possible will be widened enormously.
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SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
A method to measure the worth of
different items of intelligence about
strategic forces.
A VALUE FOR INFORMATION
Max S. Oldham
Which is more valuable: our knowing the exact number of Soviet
ICBMs, or our knowing the exact number of Soviet ABM interceptors?
Is it worth more to us to learn the precise location of Soviet ICBMs
or to learn the exact range of Soviet defensive fighter planes? An-
swers to questions like these are important determinants in decisions
about procurement and use of intelligence collection systems. One
method to help reach the answers to such questions in the field of
strategic capability is described in this paper.
The War Game in Planning
The strategic capability of a country depends in the main on its
weapon systems, the potential target systems and forces opposing it,
and the quality of its information about these targets and forces.
Ideally, the weapon systems are selected on the basis of estimates as
to which alternative systems contribute more to a favorable outcome
in strategic war. One technique to compare the contributions of
alternatives is the strategic war game. Many scenarios involving dif-
ferent strategies on both sides are tried in order to cover as wide
as possible a range of variation. Different strategies might include at-
tacking the enemy's forces or alternatively attacking targets
of intrinsic value to him, acting to limit damage to oneself or to
assure a desired level of destruction to one's opponent. One simpli-
fied example of a strategic war game scenario is illustrated by
Figure 5 in the Annex at the end of this article.
Similar techniques are used to help the force operator allocate
specific weapons to specific targets and to help R&D managers
improve the allocation of their effort in the strategic field. These
processes rest on the assumption that the value of a system is mea-
sured by its performance in simulated war. This same assumption
is fundamental in using a strategic war game for determining the
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SECRET Value For Information
relative value of various kinds of information about an enemy's targets
or forces.
The outcome of a war game scenario can be expressed in terms
of damage to the value targets of the two adversaries-in fatalities,
total floor space destroyed, manufacturing facilities destroyed, or
some combination of these. It has been found that all of these units
of measure tend to have the same properties: as the Soviet force
is increased, for example, the U.S. damage goes up, regardless which
measure is used. The damage to both forces and value targets
is estimated from the results of weapons effects tests as well as the
experience of World War II. Because of the large number3 and types
of forces and targets involved, a computer is generally used in mea-
suring the outcome of the war game.
For planning the composition of U.S. forces the predicted outcomes
of the many scenarios for various alternative forces, together with
the costs of the alternative forces, are displayed as an aid to men
who must make decisions about future forces.
One assumption characteristic of most strategic war games is that
each side has complete knowledge of the forces and targets of his
adversary. This assumption, though not reflecting real life, can be
defended on the basis that changes in force procurement probably
do not change the state of knowledge about the enemy, and further
that one is looking only at changes in outcome which occur in a fixed
intelligence environment.
Relative Value of Information
In order to obtain changes in outcome due to changed information
when the forces are held constant, a modification of the usual scenario
is necessary. Instead of various alternative U.S. forces, alternative
U.S. information states are compared. (See illustration in Figure 6
of the Annex.) This is accomplished by forcing the U.S. planner to
allocate his force against an estimate of the Soviet force (for example,
the number of Soviet ICBMs) which is in error by a chosen, adjust-
able percentage. Then the impact of this particular error in informa-
tion is measured by comparing the outcome with that when fully
correct information is available.
The results of applying this process can be expressed in graphic
form as in Figure 1.
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I
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES
--------J
ERROR I N U.S. ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF SOVIET I CBMS
FIGURE I
PAYOFF OF
IMPROVED ESTIMATE
As the accuracy of our estimate of the number of Soviet ICBMs
increases from 40 percent error to 20 percent error along the horizontal
axis, the payoff for the improvement, measured in reduction of U.S.
damage, can be read on the vertical axis. Repeating this process, one
can determine the payoff, measured in the same units, of improvements
in the accuracy of our estimate of, say, the number of Soviet ABM
interceptors. A comparison of these two payoffs, one for improving
our knowledge of the number of Soviet ICBMs and the other for
improving our knowledge of the number of Soviet ABM interceptors,
then furnishes guidance for the best allocation of information collec-
tion resources to these two problems. One can extend this process
to consider the relative payoff of many other kinds of information-
ICBM accuracy, ICBM reliability, weapon yield, and so on..
These comparisons must, of course, be made over a range of possible
war sequences. Also, just as the relative value of forces changes over
the years, one could expect the relative value of different types of
intelligence to change with time. Judgments based on the relative
value of various types of intelligence must thus take into account the
long term, recognizing R&D and procurement times for forces as well
as for intelligence collection systems. Another factor of importance in
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a ue or r~ orma ion
the allocation of intelligence collection resources is the relative cost
of achieving specific improvements in the accuracy of estimates. De-
termining these costs is, in most cases, a complex and difficu!.t problem.
Sample Results
One of the particular aspects of intelligence which have been studied
in detail is the degree of exactitude with which the location of Soviet
ICBM launch sites needs to be known. Under approximate force
levels for 1970, the value to the United States of increasing accuracy
with respect to the location of these sites is shown in Figure 2.
SOVIET STRIKES FIRST
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1000 2000 3000
AVERAGE ERROR IN U. U.S. ESTIMATE
OF THE LOCATION OF SOVIET ICBMS IN FEET
Though this is generically like the curve of Figure 1, it has the
interesting property of returning no value to the United States for
eliminating an average error about the location of Soviet ICBM launch
sites of less than some 1,500 feet, regardless of which side strikes first.
Thus one might conclude that intelligence collection, however inex-
pensive, should not be used to improve accuracy in this matter to
better than within 1,500 feet. But there are possible changes in the
composition of forces which could change this conclusion, as shown
below. The importance of accuracy about location is related to the
hardness of the target and the yield and accuracy of the: attacking
weapons. The curve of Figure 2 was therefore recomputed with
average U.S. weapon yields reduced by a factor of 10, average U.S.
weapon CEPs reduced by a factor of 5, and Soviet site hardness in-
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creased by a factor of 5, conditions which are believed to represent
reasonable extremes. Now the curve of Figure 2 is changed to that
in Figure 3.
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES
1
LESS
SOVIET STRIKES FIRST
--------- --------------------
AVERAGE ERROR IN U. S. ESTIMATE OF THE LOCATION
OF SOVIET ICBMS IN FEET
Under these extreme conditions values are changed so that collection
efforts to improve U.S. knowledge of the location of Soviet ICBM
launch sites might be justified down to an average error of about
300 feet, but beyond that there is no further payoff.
The damage yardstick for measuring relative value, while satisfactory
for some purposes, does not give a basis for comparing the value of
improved information with the cost of obtaining it. Since collection
cost is generally measured in dollars, it is desirable to put a dollar
measure on the value of improved information. This would permit
a direct profit-or-loss comparison between costs and results and throw
light on decisions about specific collection programs.
One method currently being programmed from which the dollar
value of improved information can be derived is illustrated in Figure 4.
A basic curve like that of Figure 1 is generated and the improve-
ment in outcome (measured in reduction of damage) is derived for
an information improvement of, say, from 40 percent error to 20
percent. Now this same improvement in outcome can be achieved
SECRET 33
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a ue For In ormafion
1
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES
AUGMENTED
U.S. FORCE
without improving information by giving the United States more
forces. Assuming that this improvement in outcome is desired, the
value in dollars of decreasing the information error from 40 percent
to 20 percent is equal to the dollar cost of the optimized additional
force required to achieve the identical effect. This dollar value for
more accurate information may now be compared with the cost of
collecting that more accurate information, assuming such collec-
tion feasible.
So far only a few results have been obtained, but a flexible computer
program to place dollar values on improvements in information should
be available in the near future.
Strategic war is complex and has a large number of variations. No
war game can cover the myriad detail and variations of real life.
Therefore the results must be carefully evaluated for reasonableness,
the sensitivity of outcomes to variable inputs must be explored, and
an adequate understanding of the applicability and limitations of war
games must be developed. A strategic war game is a tool that could
he misused. Even with a sound war game concept, the major role
of computers requires the backing of extensive human evaluation and
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judgment during the entire process. Used with proper care and atten-
tion to detail, war games, like computers, can be a tremendous help.
If this concept, model, and methodology with respect to strategic
forces prove useful, there still remains a question-and challenge-
with respect to similar treatment of opposing forces on a broader front.
Can we develop a process of engagement analysis which might help
set relative values on various types of information about ground forces?
Are any non-military areas amenable to the application of engagement
analysis techniques? As yet these questions have not been explored.
ANNEX: A Sample Scenario
A sample strategic war scenario 1 is shown simplified in Figure 5.
MISSILES
BOMBERS
MISSILES
BOMBERS
CITIES CITIES
INDUSTRY INDUSTRY
^
^
^
1 Many have contributed to the buildup of strategic war gaming tech-
niques-RAND, Stanford Research Institute, and the armed services, to name
just a few. Of particular importance and deserving special mention are Mr.
Joseph Bosevich of Martin Company and Mr. Hugh Everett of the Lambda
Corporation, both of whom have made important contributions without which
this paper could not have been written.
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In this illustrative scenario the United States makes a first strike, allocating
its weapons against Soviet forces and targets judged to be of intrinsic value to
the Soviets. The Soviets then retaliate, applying the undestroyed portion of
their weapons to U.S. value targets. U.S. objectives in this scenario include
achievement of a preselected damage to Soviet value targets together with a
maximum attack on Soviet forces in order to hold to a minimum the damage
subsequently suffered by the U.S. value targets. The damage level to the
Soviet value targets which is chosen by the United States thus tends to de-
termine the relative allocation of U.S. weapons to Soviet forces and to Soviet
value targets. The matching of specific weapons to individual targets to
maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. force depends on weapon and target
characteristics as well as the composition and size of the U.S. force.
This scenario can be modified so that the impact of less than perfect informa-
tion can be measured. This modification is shown schematically in Figure 6.
MISSILES
BOMBERS
CITIES
INDUSTRY
MISSILES
BOMBERS
CITIES
INDUSTRY
MISSILES
BOMBERS
In planning and optimizing its attack the United States allocates its i:orces against
value targets and an estimated Soviet force. The difference between the actual
Soviet force and the U.S. estimate of it, with the effect of this error on the
outcome, can be varied in order to permit the generation of curves like those
in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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No Foreign Dissem
Dollar figures for arms aid: means of
derivation; limitations on significance;
valid uses.
PRICING SOVIET MILITARY EXPORTS
Milton Kovner
Understandably, the USSR has been reluctant to disclose the magni-
tude of its military exports, either in monetary or in quantitative: terms.
The U.S. intelligence community has estimated that such exports to
non-communist underdeveloped countries totaled about $3.5 billion
during the period 1956-1966. A review of the various approaches to
the fixing of this dollar value and its components, the ambiguities that
the figures embody, and their residual significance and usefulness may
be of interest for the methodological and conceptual problems it illus-
trates.
Market Price for Weapons
Sometimes the aggregate value of a military aid agreement, that
is the dollar or sterling price the Soviets set on the arms and equip-
ment in question, becomes known to U.S, intelligence and can be used
directly. More generally the deliveries of equipment, which are in
large part subject to intelligence observation, must be tabulated and
prices assigned to each kind of item in order to arrive at the total.
The assignment of prices is a complex process. In those few instances
when Soviet and U.S. equipment items are similar enough in mission
and capability to make cost comparisons meaningful, the Soviet prices
have been calculated on the estimated cost of production in the United
States. For the most part, however, they are derived from a repre-
sentative sample of Soviet equipment list prices in dollars or sterling
that has been garnered from clandestine sources. Thus the U.S. esti-
mates of the monetary value of Soviet military exports, whether ob-
tained in aggregate or piecemeal, are predicated largely on Soviet-
originated list price data:
The problem is that estimating the dollar value of military de-
liveries must be no less difficult for the Soviet pricers than for U.S.
analysts. In view of the divorce between internal and external prices
in communist countries and with official exchange rates which only im-
SECRET 37
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WP PAGES 37-42
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oviet Arms Ai
perfectly reflect parities in purchasing power, all communist countries
have been obliged to value their foreign trade transactions on the
basis of prevailing world market prices. (This has been he case for
intra-communist trade as well as for exchanges with non-communist
countries, so that an East European official once jokingly remarked to
British economist Alec Nove that even after the world revolution it
would be necessary to preserve one capitalist country: "Otherwise how
would we know at what prices to trade?") But given the absence of
meaningful "market" prices for military equipment, especially for
obsolete weapons or unique and highly sophisticated ha:rdware, the
USSR's list prices must be at best only a very crude approximation of
the dollar value of its military equipment.
Then the Soviets compound the ambiguities by inconsistencies in
the terms of their arms deals. Although virtually all their sales are
on long-term, low-interest credit and the list prices do not appear to
differ greatly from client to client, virtually all recipients of Soviet
arms have received substantial and widely varying discounts. Yemen
and Afghanistan, for example, have been given discounts of 95 percent
and 75 percent respectively, making virtual grants of Soviet arms aid
to them; Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and the UAR have had discounts aver-
aging from 48 to 63 percent; and at the low end of the spectrum In-
donesia has received little more than 25 percent discount while India,
as far as we can determine, has received none at all.
The Politics of Discounting
The motives behind this selective discount policy are obscure. It
has been suggested that weaponry, particularly when it is either ob-
solete or redundant to the needs of the Soviet or other Warsaw Pact
armed forces, has little or no alternative use, so the USSFL can afford
to be generous in its pricing. This argument seems less convincing
now that considerable discounts have been granted on. increasing
quantities of late-model and highly sophisticated equipment delivered
to underdeveloped clients in recent years-in some instances equip-
ment not yet delivered in quantity to East European countries.
Has the USSR made substantial discounts from its list prices in order
to gain entree into arms aid markets? If so, one would logically expect
that this motive would lose its force as military establishments in such
countries as the UAR become totally equipped with Soviet weaponry
and dependent on Moscow for technical support and spare parts. But
discounts have continued even to such captive markets.
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Soviet Arms Aid SECRET
Moscow's policy of selective discounting could reflect its assessment
of a recipient's ability to pay. If so, it seems to have miscalculated
grossly the repayment prospects of most of its military aid recipients,
and especially its largest clients, the UAR and Indonesia. Both coun-
tries have repeatedly requested and begrudgingly been granted re-
scheduling or moratoria of their military aid obligations. This propo-
sition would also raise a question why the USSR does not give any
outright grants of military aid, although admittedly the potential
leverage afforded by repayable credits would be a consideration.
Finally, the various levels of Soviet discounts may simply be an
expression of political favoritism. Yet it would be difficult to ra-
tionalize a Kremlin political preference scale which would place India
at the bottom for military aid discounts but accord it highest priority
for economic aid.
Although no single one of these suggested motives for the discount
practices is overly persuasive, it does seem reasonable to think of
Soviet calculations as compounded out of all of them, yielding a flexible
pricing policy that is responsive to buyer resistance, ability to pay,
political favoritism-and considerations of what the traffic will bear.
Foreign Trade "Residuals"
Another possible way to arrive at the aggregate dollar value of the
military exports may be provided by lacunae in official Soviet foreign
trade statistics. In each year since 1955 the sum of Soviet exports to
individual countries, as given in these statistics, has fallen short of
the announced global total of exports. The unexplained "residuals"
have averaged about $175 million a year, ranging as high as $450 million
in 1962. The Soviets, although undoubtedly aware of these incon-
gruities in their foreign trade statistics, have remained conspicuously
silent about them. Since 1965, however, they have provided a. break-
down. of foreign trade by major geographic area which has enabled
us to charge almost the entire value of the residuals to trade with
noncommunist underdeveloped countries.
Intelligence offices and others' have hypothesized that the bulk of
these export residuals may in fact represent the dollar value of Soviet
'See, for example, Estimating Soviet Military Aid Deliveries: A Possible Alter-
native Method, CIA/RR A. ERA 65-2, November 1965 (S/NF), and 0. Hoeffding,
A Possible Measure of Soviet Military Exports to Noncommunist Countries, Rand
Memorandum RM-4611-PR, February 1966 (S).
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SECRET Soviei& Arms Aid
exports of military equipment, either under credits or, to a far lesser
extent, for cash.2 The a priori arguments that can be adduced in sup-
port of this hypothesis seem persuasive, to wit:
In the years preceding 1955, when there were no known deliveries
of military equipment to underdeveloped countries, the residuals
were negligible. In each year since then they have been sub-
stantial and they are associated with the underdeveloped coun-
tries, to which the Soviet military exports then began to be
directed.
Official Soviet trade data include a comprehensive commodity
breakdown of Soviet exports to underdeveloped countries but
give no listings for the substantial quantities of military equip-
ment known to have been delivered to them.
Inclusion of the value of cash and credit military exports in the
Soviet aggregate figures would be consistent with the Soviet
practice of excluding "merchandise delivered under agreements
to provide aid free of charge to foreign countries."
It would make good sense statistically to include, even in such
oblique fashion, the aggregate value of military credit and
cash sales because the payments on them (largely in com-
modities) would be included in Soviet import statistics.
The reporting of aggregate military exports, undistributed by
country of destination, would be in conformity with general
practice in the West, which treats the value and composition of
military exports to individual countries as confidential but may
reveal aggregate value on a global or area basis.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine what other category of exports
of this magnitude Moscow would wish to avoid identifying by
type or country of destination.
Quantitative Check
Two tests of the validity of the hypothesis would be (1) how close
the total of Soviet military aid deliveries during the period 1956-66
(as estimated by U.S. intelligence) is to the cumulative total of resid-
uals during these years, and (2) how good the correlation is between
'A small portion of the residuals could be accounted for by exports to countries
with which there were no bilateral trade agreements and trade was less than 2
million rubles.
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Soviet Arms Aid SECRET
U.S. estimates of Soviet military exports by year and the annual trade.
residuals.
The U.S. estimate for the entire period 1956-66, we noted, was ap-
proximately $3.5 billion on the basis of Soviet list prices. It has been
estimated, largely from information supplied by clandestine sources,
that roughly 56 percent of this total was payable in cash or through
long-term credits; the remainder was represented by discounts from
established list prices, i.e. constituted virtual grants. The cumula-
tive trade residuals for the ten-year period total $2 billion. If this
figure, excluding the discounts as "aid free of charge," represents the
cash-credit portion of military exports, i.e. roughly 56 percent of the
total, the dollar value of the total delivered would be $3.6 billion,
remarkably close to the independent intelligence estimates.
Between annual export residuals and U.S. estimates of annual mili-
tary exports the correlation is inconclusive up to 1962-perhaps be-
cause substantial quantities of arms were exported from East European
countries, all or in part on Soviet account,3 perhaps because of the
lower reliability of U.S. estimates during the early years-but since
1962 the relationship has been quite close:
Trade
Residuals
($000,000)
Export Values
Not Discounted
(percent)'
Derived
Totals
($000,000)
Independent
Estimates
($000,000)
1962
450
53.4
843
839
1963
203
48.0
423
576
1964
219
69.7
314
276
1965
270
73.9
365
341
1966
368
75.2
489
455
Totals
1,510
62.0
2,434
2,487
There is some error involved in applying discount rates per agree-
ment to actual deliveries during the same year (Soviet military aid
agreements are implemented rapidly, but it is unlikely that all goods
actually moved during the year in which each agreement was signed),
but the direction of change and even the absolute dollar values of the
annual military exports as reached by the two methods are never-
theless in convincingly close agreement.
'East Europe, primarily Czechoslovakia and Poland, delivered more than $450
million worth of military equipment to underdeveloped countries during 1955-60.
' Le., ratio of credit/cash portion to total value.
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SECRET Soviet Arms Aid
Uses and Limitations
The dependence of intelligence analysts on Soviet list price data
in deriving dollar values of Soviet military exports-prices which may
be just Moscow's crude appraisals of the market values of the equip-
ment and from which its negotiators readily grant substantial dis-
counts-detracts from the reliability of such estimates as a meaningful
index of the "real" value of Soviet arms shipments. Systematic ef-
forts to calculate the cost of items of equipment in terms of what it
would cost to produce them in the United States, although perhaps con-
ceptually more meaningful, have been bedeviled by a host of data
procurement and comparability problems. Such uncertainties not-
withstanding, the intelligence estimates based on Soviet list prices
(since these prices do not appear to differ markedly from year to year
or among client countries) do provide a consistent standard against
which to gauge the trend of Soviet military deliveries over time and
as distributed among the underdeveloped countries.
The uses to which the intelligence community can put the arms aid
data derived from trade residuals are somewhat more limited. They
reveal only the amounts payable in cash or credit for the Soviet mili-
tary equipment; they enable us to distribute the exports neither by
country of destination nor by type of equipment; and the Soviet foreign
trade statistics from which they are derived become available only
six to nine months after the end of the calendar year. They none-
theless, in giving the value of military exports for which repayment is
expected, provide useful insights into the balance-of-payments impact
of Soviet military aid on both the USSR and its underdeveloped clients
as a group. They also provide a check on the accuracy of the inde-
pendent estimates of the dollar value of the exports.
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No Foreign Dissem
A logical but little used methodology
for overt observation in the USSR.
SOVIET REALITY SANS POTEMKIN
Gertrude Schroeder
Statements about the size and growth of the Soviet economy in
relation to that of the United States have long occupied an important
place in intelligence estimates of the USSR's capabilities. So also
have statements about the comparative levels of living in the two
countries and bow they are changing over time. CIA's current esti-
mates are that the Soviet gross national product is somewhat less than
half of U.S. GNP and that per capita consumption is about one-third.
Consumption Analysis
In presenting these deceptively neat figures the economic analyst
goes on to say that they undoubtedly overstate the relative position
of the USSR because the calculations cannot allow adequately for the
superior quality of U.S. products and the much greater variety and
assortment of products available here. These qualitative factors are
particularly important in comparing levels of living in the two coun-
tries. For the purpose of this comparison the economic analyst first
assembles data on consumer expenditures, product by product, for
the United States in dollars and for the USSR in rubles. He must
then convert the figures to a common currency unit by calculating
ruble-dollar ratios for these products on the basis of their prices in the
two countries. This latter is an extremely difficult and laborious
process, for the analyst must try to match the individual products as
closely as possible and include as many as he can.
In the latest set of consumption comparisons 1 CIA concluded that
with respect to food, clothing, and personal services the allowance
made for the quality factor had been more or less adequate. We
had equated apples with apples and bread with bread, and we had
compared Soviet prices for items of clothing with the prices of the
cheapest counterparts in a Sears Roebuck catalogue. We decided
'CIA/RR ER 66-6. US and USSR. Comparisons of Size and Use of Gross
National Product, 1955-64, March 1966. Secret.
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MORI/HRP PAGES 43-51
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CONFIDENTIAL The Soviet Consumer
that a haircut was a haircut in either country. With respect to con-
sumer durables like refrigerators, radios, and automobiles, however,
we concluded that the best matchings we could make still did not
take sufficient account of the superior quality and durability of the
U.S. product. To make some allowance for this factor we raised the
ruble-dollar price ratios for these products by an arbitrary 20 percent.
And we said that even this adjustment was probably not enough and
that in addition there was no way at all to allow for the much greater
variety and assortment of goods available to consumers in the United
States, not to mention such extras as paper bags, plastic wrapping, and
attractive, well-lighted stores. Besides doing our best to quantify the
Comparative lot of consumers in the two countries, our estimates also
talk about the shoddy goods in Soviet stores, about queues, about the
poor quality of personal services to be found everywhere.
From all this I had formed a mental picture of what everyday
life for the average Russian was probably like. But I was eager to
see for myself, and when the chance to do so finally arose I was de-
termined to do my utmost to check on these preconceptions and
acquire the best possible basis for the judgments that I as an economic
intelligence analyst must make all the time.
The opportunity for a first-hand look was a four-month (June-
September 1967) assignment as assistant to the economic counselor
in the American embassy in Moscow. I was given the diplomatic
title of Attache, and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed
that I was a research analyst in CIA on temporary assignment with the
Department of State to help out the hard-pressed economics section of
the embassy during the summer. My main task was to read the daily
press and the economic journals and write despatches on significant
items. Aside from doing a good job for the embassy the principal ob-
jective of my TDY was to learn as much as I could about the daily
life of the ordinary Russian and obtain some insights into the workings
of the Soviet economic system.
I became aware very quickly that extraordinary measures of one
kind or another would be needed to accomplish this objective. Going
about Moscow in embassy cars, participating in the busy diplomatic
social life, and walking the streets in my typically American summer
clothes would net me little more than the superficial impressions that
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The Soviet Consumer CONFIDENTIAL
a tourist gets. I tried this way of doing things and found it pleasant
but unprofitable: going about as someone quite obviously foreign, I
got the usual treatment accorded foreigners. People were friendly and
polite; they insisted that I go to the head of any line I might be
standing in. It was evident that they wanted to make a good im-
pression; they wanted me to see the good side of Soviet society.
As much as possible I would be shown Potemkin villages and the
people who lived in them.
Clearly, I had to break out of this impasse. I needed to shed my
obvious foreignness and "go native." I needed to participate to the
maximum in the daily life of Moscow as ostensibly a Soviet citizen, so
as to experience and systematically observe the Soviet scene without
eliciting the Potemkin-village behavior. But I also had to take care
not to do anything that could create a problem for the embassy. I
believe that I succeeded in both respects: that is, I created no prob-
lems for the embassy, and to a considerable extent I managed to
become just one more Moskovite going about his business.
To go native one needs first of all to look and dress more or less
like a Russian, or at least someone from one of the other republics.
I managed to take on the drab appearance of the average Soviet
woman by wearing a tacky outfit consisting of gray-green skirt, nonde-
script tan blouse, much-worn brown loafers, and of course head scarf.
I shed my stockings; Russian women don't wear them in the summer,
and American-type nylons are scarcely to be found anywhere. Since
I had brought along only one such outfit, I looked more and more
"native" as the weeks passed.
In addition to the appearance of a native, one needs a high degree
of fluency in the language. This I had, thanks to several years of
visiting the language laboratory and countless hours of practice. In
the process I had somehow acquired a Baltic accent, for to my sur-
prise Russians often took me for an Estonian. Finally, going native
entails a willingness to do things the hard way, i.e., the Soviet way.
Being taken for a foreigner in Moscow is much more pleasant than
being taken for an Estonian. Having an embassy car pick one up
after the ballet is nothing like fighting one's way onto a Moscow busl
Attired in my sloppy and deteriorating outfit and equipped with
the required language skills plus a willingness to rough it for the
sake of learning something, I spent almost all of my free time in Mos-
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CONFIDENTIAL The Soviet Consumer
cow wandering about the city. I rode subways, buses, trolleys, trams,
and suburban commuter trains; I acted the would-be purchaser in
dozens of bakeries, gastronoms (grocery stores), food stores, meat
stores, fish stores, furniture stores, book stores, department stores, cloth-
ing stores, and gift stores. Ditto for collective farm markets and
yarmarkas (miniature shopping centers), savings banks and stolovayas
("greasy spoons"). I wandered through parks and railroad stations,
visited churches and even the crematory. I walked about the street
in all parts of the city at various times of day and evening; I went on
city sightseeing tours with Russians. In all these activities I syste-
matically observed the people and their behavior, listened to their
conversations, and talked with them as one does in casual, everyday
contacts.
To the extent possible I did the same thing in other cities I visited-
Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku, Vladimir, and Novosibirsk.
Except for Novosibirsk, however, I could spend only a day or two in
these cities. My conclusions therefore relate for the most part to
things I observed in Moscow.
Shopping Pleasures
What are things like for the average urbanite in the USSR? From
what I myself experienced I concluded that everyday life is hard and
very, very frustrating. One of the worst aspects is the uncertainty
about almost everything. Take the matter of getting your groceries
bought. In the first place, you nearly always have to stand in a
queue. I stood in scores of them just to find out why the queue was
there and what it was like to stand in one. I would listen to the
gripes: "What puny little tomatoes! And 40 kopecks a kilogram! My
God, how is a person to get along?" "Don't give me that one. Can't
you see it's rotten?" "No cabbage, huh? There was some yesterday,
why not today?"
These were the complaints at a street stall on October Square near
my apartment. There were several such stalls near this square which
I inspected almost daily. You never knew whether a given stall would
be operating, and you could never be sure what would be for sale.
Tomatoes and eggs today, maybe. Tomorrow it night he only green
apples. Several times there was a barrel of pickled fish. Once there
were plaster statuettes! Another time a truckload of melons was
dumped on the sidewalk, and a long line quickly formed to buy them.
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e soviet onsumer
Across from the embassy one day a 30-person line formed to buy
shoddy-looking black briefcases. In Sokolniki Park I stood for a
while in a block-long line of would-be purchasers of nylon shopping
bags imported from Yugoslavia and selling for 3 rubles 50 kopecks
(about $4) each. People grumbled about the price but bought the
bags anyway. At 2 pm on a Tuesday 18 persons were standing in
a line at a counter where sausages were sold; apparently some rarely
available delicacy had appeared. Once on a Saturday afternoon
I saw a half-block line in front of a small dingy bakery near the
Kazan railroad station. Why? Having spent the preceding two hours
pushing my way through the mobs in three railroad stations that I
wanted to inspect, I was too tired to want to find out. Maybe there
were sweet rolls for sale that day: although bread was always avail-
able, I once visited five bakeries within walking distance of October
Square in search of a sweet roll.
I made it a. practice to visit the gastronom near the embassy at
different times during the day and on different days of the week.
One could never be sure of finding even the most staple of foods there.
Frequently there was no fresh meat, and if there was it was pretty
poor quality by American standards. Rarely were there any vegetables
except tomatoes (in season) and cabbage, and sometimes there were
none at all. There was usually a sign "No potatoes." On street cars
and trolleys women carrying loaded string bags would greet each
other, "Ah, potatoesl Where did you get them? How much did you
have to pay?" or "Where did you find that melon?"
On Wednesday about 5:30 I walked into a large gastronom on
the Arbat. The place was bedlam-packed with a pushing, shoving
crowd of women shoppers, each trying mightily to buy a thing or
two. I decided to take on the process of trying to buy tea and a
can of fish. I pushed my way through the mob in the dimly ]lit store
in the general direction of the counter where tea was sold. The
particular queue for tea was hard to locate in the crowd, but ][ finally
stationed myself at its end after having inadvertently gotten into its
middle and been rudely pushed aside and chewed out by the woman
in back of me. In due course, I got up to the counter.
The clerk was standing with her back to the customers, talking
angrily with a fellow clerk. I waited, and people back of me started
grousing. Finally, she turned around and glared at me. I asked does
she have a small package of tea and how much is it? "What: kind?"
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The Soviet Consumer
I hesitated. "Well, don't you know what you want? Can't you see
all these people are waiting? Make up your mind!" I pointed to a
stack of boxes of tea, and she said, "All right, 60 kopecks."
But that was only the first queue. Next I had to fight my way
through the line for the particular cashier that served the tea depart-
ment in order to pay 60 kopecks and get a ticket. Then I had to
return through the original queue to hand the ticket to the surly
clerk and get my tea. Ditto for the purchase of a can of fish. In
(lire need of a cup of coffee after all this, I made my way to a coffee
bar in a far corner, only to find it hopelessly mobbed. It was nearly
7 o'clock as I left the store, physically and nervously exhausted.
In my wanderings in and out of stores of all kinds I was particularly
struck by the miniscule amount of variety and assortment in the goods
available to Soviet purchasers. Shelves and showcases were usually
half empty. Where a woman in the United States or Western Europe
can choose from 20 to 30 kinds of shoes in her favorite store, a Soviet
woman can choose from perhaps five or six kinds in all. the stores
selling shoes in Moscow. Although book stores, in contrast, were
chuck full of books, opera librettas were not to be found even in
music stores, and the Russian classics (Pushkin, Tolstoy, Gogol)
were as scarce as hen's teeth. One can do much better for these at
Kamkin's in Washington, D. C.
With difficulties and frustrations such as those to put up with
every day, one can understand why the Russians treat one another (but
not foreigners) so very rudely. If you adhere to our custom of
keeping to the right when walking on the sidewalk, you merely get
pushed aside and glared at. Subway crowds at rush hours are
frequently violent; they shove you hard through the turnstile, race Pell
mell down the corridors, and push you onto the train with a brute
force that I had never experienced even in the crowded subways of
New York and London. If you can't keep up with the mob, say
just pause to read a directional sign, they start yelling at you.
Similar experiences are to be had on buses, which always seem to
be packed to twice their capacity. Once I had been pushed (literally!)
onto a bus and pressed against a pole near the door with such force
that I could neither stand up straight nor move. The bus stopped.
"Are you getting off?" asked a large middle-aged woman near me.
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No, said I. "You're notl Then why are you here? Can't you see
you're in everyone's way? You're blocking the door. Move!" I felt
myself become one with the pole as she and others pushed past me
and out the door.
And then there is the experience of getting dinner in one of the
better Moscow restaurants. (Incidentally, there are fewer than a
dozen good ones in this city of six and a half million; the rest are
really greasy spoons or worse. And one or two of the good ones
are frequently closed for repair.) There are always queues in front
of the restaurants at dinner hours. The doorkeeper locks the door
after letting each diner in, and those left outside bang on the door
and shout at him. When we were let in ahead of everyone else, having
had the embassy reserve a table, I would always be astonished to see
many empty tables.
Just as I had heard, it does nearly always take three hours to get
through dinner. The waiters are a seeming eternity between suc-
cessive operations. Signaling to them will get you nowhere. You can
see that they are not busy; they merely lean against the wall and
talk to one another. Often there seems to be some kind of argument
going on. Once in the hotel restaurant in Tbilisi while waiting to be
seated I listened in great embarrassment to the manageress reading
the riot act to a waitress. "Why are you sulking? Stop acting like
a child. You know it's not kulturniy to behave this way in public.
If you want to be naughty, do it at homel" The indifferent attitude
of clerks and waiters is not surprising; they have no real incentive
to behave otherwise. Their salaries are little above the legal minimum
wage (now 60 rubles a month), and the bonus system is such that they
can't add much over 5 rubles a month to this no matter what they
do. Tipping is rare.
Even getting a little recreation is full of difficulties for the ordinary
Russian. One Sunday morning, dressed in my native attire, I went
to the park "Exhibitions of the Achievements of the National Economy."
The entrance fee is 30 kopecks. The crowd got larger and more
vociferous the nearer I got to the gate. What was the problem? I
soon found out: only two cashiers' cages were open that day to ac-
commodate the huge crowd. I pushed my way through, trying to
locate the end of the queue. There seemed to be several, and people
argued loudly about which was first and who was or was not ahead
of whom.
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Near the cashier's cage stood a man whose job apparently was to
supervise the queues and mete out justice. After a half hour of being
pushed about and scolded for allegedly crashing some line, I decided
I had had it. I pushed ahead and clutched at the sleeve of this
supervisor, amid a barrage of verbal abuse from those around. "What
are you doing here?" said he. "The queue is over there! This is no
way to act." I assumed a helpless and confused air and said in
halting Russian, "I am an American. I don't know where the right
line is or how things are done here. I only want to get into the park."
Presto, in, seconds I had bought my ticket and was inl
In Novosibirsk I talked with a young girl, who said to me, "There
is so much here that is disgusting. Our papers are always telling us
how great things are. Tell me, did you see anything interesting in
our stores here in Novosibirsk, anything you wanted to buy?" No,
I said. "Of course not! There's nothing here, nothing! Do you
know that there are no women's shoes in this city and there haven't
been any for a long time? Once in a while some will come in and
then there is such a melee as you can't possibly imagine" And the
prices! A pair costs 30 rubles, and the things wear oul: in a few
months. Why? And all of us have to work so hard." I myself saw
no women's shoes in the stores I visited, and the bareness of the
shelves was indeed startling. Of the two so-called department stores
in the downtown section of this city of over a million, one was closed
for repair, and the one that was open resembled a small store that
had just had a close-out sale.
Daily life has a dull sameness. After a while everything seems
to look alike and the people seem bored and preoccupied. In Moscow
they walk about with a frown. And in Novosibirsk a young psy-
chiatrist said to me, "What have I to look forward to? Only to
getting married, maybe, and living out my days in this place. It's so
boring!" "Why don't you try to get to Moscow to do research,
perhaps?" I say. "To Moscow! Why, that's quite impossible. You
have to have connections, and I don't." "But you could work toward
it." "No, it's no use, none at all. You just don't understand. Con-
nections mean everything here."
New Perspective
In summary, I went to the USSR with a set of notions about what
to expect that I had formed over the years from reading and research
on the Soviet economy. I also had a collection of judgment factors,
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e ov:e onsumer
partly intuitive and partly derived from this same research and read-
ing, that I applied in drawing conclusions and speculating about prob-
able future developments in the Soviet economy. My four months of
living in the country itself, however, greatly altered these precon-
ceptions and modified the implicit judgment factors in many respects.
No amount of reading about the Soviet economy in Washington could
substitute for the summer in Moscow as I spent it.
As a result of this experience I think that our measurements of the
position of Soviet consumers in relation to those of the United States
(and Western Europe) favor the USSR to a much greater extent
than I had thought. The ruble-dollar ratios are far too low for most
consumer goods. Cabbages are not cabbages in both countries. The
cotton dress worn by the average Soviet woman is not equivalent to
the cheapest one in a Sears catalogue; the latter is of better quality
and more stylish. The arbitrary 20 percent adjustment that was made
in some of the ratios is clearly too little. The difference in variety
and assortment of goods available in the two countries is enormous-
far greater than I had thought. Queues and spot shortages were far
more in evidence than I expected. Shoddy goods were shoddier. And
I obtained a totally new impression of the behavior of ordinary Soviet
people toward one another.
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Nq Foreign Dissem
Facets of a program for assessing foreign
leaders' physical and psychic states.
VIP HEALTH WATCH
Myles Maxfield
and
Edward G. Greger
An inconspicuous article in a London newspaper of 2 July 1964
noted that a Dr. David M. Wallace had suddenly cancelled pending
appointments and left for Bucharest, Rumania. No other information
was given. Dr. Wallace, it developed, was a world-famous urologist.
Why would a famous Western specialist suddenly be summoned to
a communist country? Rumania had adequate medical facilities, in-
cluding competent specialists in urology, and its propaganda boasted
of giving its people the best of medical care. The calling of a non-
communist foreign physician was then a major aberration which could
only be explained by supposing that one of the highest dignitaries of
the regime was seriously ill.
Last Days of Gheorghiu-Dej
Files showed that Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Party and
. tctual ruler of Rumania, had a urinary tract problem. Although he
now appeared to be in robust health, he had undergone one operation
in the fall of 1962 and a follow-up in January or February 1.963 for
a polyp of the bladder. Official reports stated that the operations had
been successful. This type of polyp, however, tends to recur and
often undergoes malignant degeneration. If so, it becomes invasive
and spreads rapidly, offering an extremely poor prognosis. The
British specialist's unknown patient might therefore in fact be
Gheorghiu-Dej. This possibility, although there was no direct evi-
dence for it, was reported to the State Department and the White
House.
Half a year or so later, although official reports still insisted that he
was in perfect health for a man of his age, Dej turned over many of
his duties to a chosen successor, Ion Gheorghiu Maurer. On 20
March 1965 he died. The final medical bulletin gave the cause of
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death as cancer of the lung and liver, a metastatic extension of a
primary urinary tract carcinoma. U.S. officials had had. an eight-
inonth warning of the possibility of this change of government.
The VIP Program
The importance of foreseeing changes in government is only one
of the reasons why an effective VIP health watch is of value to intelli-
gence. There are countless historical cases in which the health of a
leader has affected the policy of a nation. Alexander the Great, an
epileptic, died at the age of 33 before his conquests cou:[d be com-
pleted or stabilized; the health of Julius Caesar and of Napoleon,
among others, is said to have adversely affected their historical roles.
In more recent times, the incapacitation of Woodrow Wilson in his
last few months severely prejudiced his programs. The deterioration
in Franklin Roosevelt's health toward the end of the war has been
linked with the Western failure to check Soviet political advances in
Eastern Europe.
Thus the mental and physical health of foreign leaders may often
have a significant and sometimes a critical impact on U,S. security
and foreign policy. For this reason the CIA maintains a program for
the collection, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of VIP medical
intelligence. The collection program is one of the most varied, compli-
cated, and challenging in the intelligence community, a Neal test of
the guile and ingenuity of the collection agencies. Materials range
from open unclassified information such as that used in the case of
Gheorghiu-Dej to highly sensitive reports with very limited distribu-
tion. Personal sources will include some who are trying too hard to
please and others who are actually hostile. The accuracy of agent
reporting tends to vary directly with the professional calibre of the
agent.
It will be instructive to review in some detail several co::ztemporary
cases in which the physical or mental health of a world leader has
played a significant role.
The Last Laugh
Medical diagnostics has opened a new and exciting chapter in the
field of medicine. Along with recent advances in bio-cybernetics,
symptom diagnosis and the prediction of future illnesses have been
greatly simplified for the modern physician. These advances have
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given an invaluable tool to the medical analyst who is called upon to
make definitive diagnoses on the basis of reported symptoms which
are often nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of political
opponents or opportunists. A diagnostician of some experience, by
utilizing his knowledge of biostatistics, may be able to make a tenta-
tive diagnosis as his patient first walks into his office.
A person with a moderately advanced case of cancer, for example,
can often be identified at first sight by his pallor, weight loss, and
drawn appearance; physical examination and laboratory tests only
provide confirmation. The expression Facies Gastrica, literally "gastric
appearance," has long keen in use to describe people with peptic
ulcers; it is easily recognized by the trained physician. Recently pub-
licized statistics have made the entire world aware of the higher
incidence of lung cancer in heavy smokers. Race, age, weight, cli-
mate, and habits are only a few of the factors the physician can use
in his diagnosis, prognosis, and predictions.
Yet predictions can be tricky. A simple case where symptoms and
statistics pointed to a terminal illness was that of Marshal Radion
Malinovskiy, the late Soviet Defense Minister. The 68-year-old Malin-
ovskiy was the prototype of the old-guard Soviet military officer-
working-class family, fought as enlisted man for the Tsar in World
War I, volunteer for the new Red Army, distinguished command record
in World War II, Marshal of the Soviet Union. He succeeded Zhukov
as Defense Minister in 1957.
He had been reported in ill health for several years, but the reports
became more numerous in about 1964. He began to miss some im-
portant gatherings, so there was speculation that he might be out
of favor politically if he was not seriously ill. It was known that he
was very much over-weight (300 lbs. at 57'), a diabetic, a heavy
drinker, suffering from hypertension (high blood pressure) and radi-
culitis (spinal nerve root inflammation). In addition he was reported
to have a "weak heart," and there were rumors that he had a heart
attack in September 1966.
Such information as this would almost make the medical analyst
feel guilty at taking any pay for predicting the outcome. It did not
even require the mechanical competence of a computer to add up a
prime cardiovascular problem for the ailing Marshal. His age, obesity,
hypertension, history of diabetes, and heavy drinking all pointed di-
rectly to this diagnosis. Eighty percent of people at the age of 70
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have arteriosclerosis; this of course predisposes to a cerekro-vascular
accident (stroke) or myocardial infarction (heart attack).
An analysis to this effect was officially recorded in Feb:ruary 1967,
with the notation that Malinovskiy was indeed ill physically rather
than politically and would probably succumb to his affliction in the
near future. He cooperated and died on 31 March, but--with char-
acteristic Bolshevik intransigence-of cancer.
False Alarm for Aidit
Medical misdiagnosis can also play an important part in political
developments. A most striking example of this was a mistaken prog-
nosis for President Sukarno of Indonesia just preceding the abortive
communist coup in September 1965. Although his bedroom proclivities
have almost become legend, Sukarno does have a serious health prob-
lem. He has lost the use of his left kidney because of two large
stones, and he has a large staghorn stone in his right kidney. He has
a moderate hypertension which is aggravated at times of stress. This
combination of impaired renal function and hypertension could give
rise to sudden complications that might cause his death at any time.
On the other hand, he could live five or more years with his condition.
In addition to his kidney condition and possibly related to it, Sukarno
reportedly had a urinary bladder polyp, a urinary bladder calculus
(removed in a Vienna clinic), and three attacks of coronary insuffi-
ciency. He was also reported to have suffered a minor stroke, to have
had swollen ankles and feet, and to have numerous other complaints.
In short, he would not be considered a good insurance risk. His medi-
cal history was of great concern not only to U.S. intelligence but
evidently to that of communist China also, as may be seen from what
follows.
Sukarno had been receiving medical treatment in Vienna from the
internationally known internist Professor Karl Fellinger. It was Fel-
linger who had diagnosed Sukarno's kidney stones and in collaboration
with Professor Ubelhoer, a Viennese urologist, had removed the large
calculus from his bladder. Dr. Fellinger strongly recommended that
Sukarno return to Vienna to have his left kidney and the large stone
in his right kidney removed surgically: failure to do so would result
in further kidney damage.
Sukarno, however, had an almost pathological fear of surgery, since
a soothsayer had once predicted that he would die by steel, Because
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of this fear and at the suggestion of Foreign Minister Subandrio, who
was a physician himself, he turned to communist Chinese physicians in
Djarkarta, who promised help by nonsurgical techniques. Given
acupuncture treatments and oriental herb medicines, he was convinced
that his condition was improving. This reliance on the Chinese phy-
sicians gave the Chinese intelligence service and the PKI (the Indo-
nesian Communist Party) an immediate source of critically important
information, for if Sukarno were suddenly removed from the scene
they could expect the anti-communist Indonesian army to move im-
mediately to crush the PKI.
Against this eventuality the PKI, with Chinese military aid, were
preparing a coup which would eliminate the army threat while main-
taining Sukarno as a figurehead. The Chinese physicians in the mean-
time were to monitor Sukarno's state of health and keep the PKI
leader, D. N. Aidit, informed. At this point fate and misdiagnosis
played their role. On 28 September 1965 Sukarno, while making a
speech, was stricken with such a severe pain originating from his
kidney that he was forced to leave the speaker's platform. (It is
quite possible that he had passed a small stone from his kidney to
his bladder, a process usually accompanied by excruciating pain.)
The Chinese doctor who attended him thought this the end; he de-
clared that Sukarno would not live more than a week.
This was the signal for the PKI to move. At that point, however, the
coup was only in the early stages of preparation; weapons that had been
smuggled in for PKI paramilitary units had not been distributed, were
still in their crates. Therefore it failed. Although several of the top
generals were murdered by communist execution squads, the army
chief, General Abdul Nasution, managed to elude capture. He quickly
called up the Siliwangi Division under Generals Suharto and Adjie
and prevented a PKI take-over. His aide, General Mokoginta, effec-
tively handled the situation in Sumatra. If the coup had been delayed
until the PKI was fully armed and prepared, the outcome could
easily have been reversed. Thus a medical misdiagnosis by a com-
munist physician precipitated the miscarriage of a communist bid to
take over the largest country in Southeast Asia.
The Resurrection of Segni
Every newly graduated physician tends to jump to definitive
diagnoses and prognoses based on textbook symptoms. Very soon in
his career, however, he finds that some patients do not behave accord-
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ing to hoyle. Those who by all standards should die within hours
sometimes live on for months or even years; on the other hand those
with a favorable prognosis may die the next day. For the 'VIP Health
Watch analyst this problem is aggravated. Instead of making a phy-
sician's direct examination of the patient's subjective and objective
symptoms and complaints, he must usually work through a third- or
sometimes fourth-party relationship. Symptoms are sometimes re-
ported through a source who may be depending on rumor or even
wishful speculation; many sources play amateur diagnosticir;an.
Such was the case of the 73-year old President Antonio Segni of
Italy. The silver-haired Segni had a history of circulatory troubles and
was suffering from an unspecified stomach ailment, probably ulcers.
On 7 August 1964 he had a stroke which paralyzed all motor faculties
on the right side of his body and affected his speech. On 15 August,
at 1515 hours Rome time, a person close to Segni reported that he
was in a deep coma, that the doctors had given up all hope for his
recovery, and that he was being kept alive as long as possible for the
sake of his family but would die by nightfall. There were other
similar reports.
Every medical intern has seen many such cases in which stroke
patients suffer permanent brain damage and are kept alive only through
the use of drugs and a mechanical respirator. In the light of the
familiar symptoms and the reliability of the sources reporting them,
the conclusion seemed obvious that Segni would not be with us much
longer. This prediction was dutifully made in official intelligence
publications; the Italian President was given only hours to live. But
a month later he was sitting up in his hospital bed speaking with little
difficulty and drinking coca cola. In the halls of the CIA there is
now a more cautious and (one hopes) wiser medical prognosticator
who is still jokingly reminded of the "grave" finding he made in 1964.
Good Medicine for Wheelus
The discovery in 1958 of major oil deposits in the young country
of Libya, ruled by King Mohammad Idris, has changed it from one
of the poorest countries in the world to one of comparative wealth.
Before that, ever since its independence in 1951, it had rel:ied heavily
on Great Britain and the United States for economic and military aid.
In 1954 the United States, in exchange for her economic assistance,
=4ad been granted rights for the construction of the Air Force complex
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at Wheelus. This base, served as an important link in the world-wide
network of the Strategic Air Command.
The oil freed Libya from dependence on U.S. aid and at the same
time aroused Egyptian President Nasser's interest in the country. An
Egyptian propaganda campaign in 1964 against Western bases and
"colonialists" aroused considerable Libyan popular protest, especially
in urban areas, where there were violent demonstrations. The U.S.
Air Force officers assigned to renegotiate the base rights with King
Idris that year were quite concerned. Wheelus still served as a
valuable tactical base, a storage facility for critical material and. weap-
ons, and a key site for U.S. air rescue operations.
VIP Health Watch analysts were able to furnish the USAF some
useful information concerning the 74-year-old King. Although his
health was fairly good for a man of his age, he tended to be concerned
about it, and he had become almost completely dependent on medical
care afforded him and his family at the Wheelus Base Hospital. He
had great faith in American physicians, openly proclaiming them the
best. In 1959 they had treated him for trachoma, from which he
enjoyed a complete recovery. In 1960, after he fell and sustained a
painful hematoma on his knee, this was likewise treated at the
Wheelus facilities (by Dr. Watson Jones, a British physician). Every
year Idris receives a complete physical examination there. In addi-
tion he is thankful to USAF physicians for a successful hysterectomy
on his wife.
Under these circumstances Air Force negotiators were able to con-
clude a favorable new lease on the base, and in spite of the recent
turmoil in the Near East it is still there.
How Does a Gamal Grow
A study of the character of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser
on the basis of his psychological and medical background provides in-
sight into his behavior vis-A-vis the Soviets, the West, Israel, and the
rest of the Arab world. At the age of eight years Gamal was sent
for schooling to live in Cairo with his Uncle Khalil, who had recently
been released from imprisonment for organizing demonstrations
against the British. Here the boy developed a taste for intrigue and
became fiercely independent, objecting violently to authority of any
kind, whether that of his father, his adult neighbors, his teachers, or
the police. He was not told until he returned home for the summer
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vacation that his mother had meanwhile died in childbirth; this made
him very bitter and widened the gulf between him and his father.
The father remarried, and Gamal never again lived happily at home.
At the age of twelve, Nasser participated in a riot and was arrested.
As a young man he continued his classical revolutionary development,
joining the Young Egypt Party, leading demonstrations, becoming dis-
illusioned and switching to the Wafd Party, leading more demonstra-
tions. He became very popular with his fellow students, disputed
bitterly with the school headmaster and the police, and spent some
more time in jail. When he was refused readmission to school, his
fellow students rioted until he was admitted. He refused hospitaliza-
tion for a head injury received during a riot against the British. His
antagonism toward authority and rules was extraordinary.
At the age of 20 he graduated from the Egyptian Royal Military
Academy and as a young lieutenant organized the "Free Officers,"
a secret society of young Egyptian Army officers whose principles
were to give allegiance to no one, form no alliances, make no promises,
and have no ideology. When he was 34 he participated. in an un-
successful assassination attempt against General Sirry Amir, and then
he led the coup unseating King Farouk and establishing General
Mohammed Naguib as President. At the age of 36 he deposed Naguib
and became President himself.
It would be surprising if Nasser's independence, defiance of au-
thority, and taste for leadership had changed on assuming the presi-
dency, and indeed they have been evident from the first in actions
like his repression of Egyptian communists while taking Soviet aid,
his seizure of Suez, his attempts to establish an expanded United
Arab Republic and exercise leadership over the entire Arab World.
Notable on the other hand in the established pattern of his behavior
are his quiet and respectable family life and his fond admiration for
President Tito of Yugoslavia, although he has few close personal
friends.
Physically strong, Nasser is afflicted with a diabetes that is ap-
parently difficult to control. (He is dependent on Western insulin,
especially Swiss, for this; Soviet Bloc drugs have not been favorably re-
ceived in Soviet-aided countries, and even some high Soviet officials
prefer Western drugs, including specifically insulin, to their own.)
The diabetic's requirement for insulin depends upon his rate of
food intake and rate of metabolism, and these both vary with physi-
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cal activity or emotional stress. In some diabetics, and apparently this
is the case with Nasser, the balance is quite delicate, difficult to
maintain, and definitely affected by emotional incidents. There have
been at least two episodes reported in which he has been forced to
cease his activities immediately and get emergency medical aid-one
during the Suez crisis and the second very recently. Such at-
tacks may recur and limit his activities somewhat, but not seriously
for some years to come if competent medical care is quickly available.
Chinese Puzzle
The enigma of Red China, the most denied of denied areas, chal-
lenges us to make the most of any information we can develop bear-
ing on the hidden springs of the regime's policies and actions. A
psychological and medical analysis of its key personality, Mao Tse-
tung, may contribute to understanding some aspects of its course in the
past, including even the bizarre irrationality of the late "cultural revo-
lution."
Mao was born on 26 December 1893 in Shaoshan village, Hsiang
t'an hsien, a rural county some 20 miles south of the Hunan provin-
cial capital at Ch'angsha. He was the eldest of three sons and a
daughter. His father was a moderately wealthy farmer who earned
a good living trading rice. He was a hard-bitten peasant, however,
sharp-faced and bigoted, with a taste for Confucian classics; he had
fought for the Manchus and he respected the empress dowager. He
treated his servants and farm laborers with contempt, had few friends,
and took little interest in his family. He was restless, ill at ease,
and hot-tempered, an unattractive exemplar of the type of petty
capitalist that was to become a target of his son's revolutionary regime.
On one occasion Mao ran away into the woods for three days, re-
turning only because of the thought that his mother would have no
one to defend her. His mother, in contrast to his father, was placid
and devoted to her family. She was a deeply religious Buddhist and
averse to killing or any kind of brutality. For a period during his,
childhood Mao attended the Buddhist ceremonies with his mother,
who wanted him to be a priest. This early religious experience is
still evident in some of his writings and utterances. Only in recent
months this archpriest of an atheistic ideology referred to his eventual
demise as a "going to God."
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When Mao was thirteen years old there was a famine in his pro-
vince. The peasants protested against the local government and
demanded that the rice granaries be opened to them. Instead of
receiving help they were reprimanded, punished, and the leaders
executed. In the same year the Secret Society of Peasants (Ko
Lao Hui) was in conflict with the landlords in Shaoshhan. They
too were repressed and the leaders publicly executed. The young
Mao, in strong sympathy with the peasants, was left with an in-
delible impression of these injustices which must have had an in-
fluence on his later revolutionary doctrine.
Feeling the conflict between his studies and working in the fields,
he decided, under the encouragement of a school teacher, to go to
middle school. After a long argument with his father, who wanted
him to stay in the family enterprise, he went off with no extra money
beyond his tuition fees. In school he was at first lonely, poor, and
despised. He was known as "the dirty little peasant from Shaoshan."
When he went to the head of his class for excellence in studies, that
made him even more despised among the anti-intellectual students.
He became an intellectual, discussing the reform movement with stu-
dents of like inclinations. He was much moved by a book entitled,
"Great Heroes of the World," and especially its biography of George
Washington. During the rest of his education periods of excellence
were broken by some poor work as his interests developed and changed.
He became a leader of progressive movements and excelled in essay
writing and debating.
After refusing to consummate an early, arranged marriage, Mao
eventually married three times. In 1919, while in Peking attending
lectures at the University, he fell in love with Yang K'ai-hui, the
(laughter of a professor of philosophy, and he married her the fol-
lowing year in Shanghai. She was executed by Ho Chien, a Chinese
warlord, in 1928. His next wife, Ho Tzu-ch'un, in the course of
seven years bore him five children, three of whom they left in the care
of peasants they met on the Long March. Later attempts to locate
these were unsuccessful. Eventually this marriage ended in divorce.
his current wife Lam P'ui (Chiang Ching), a former Shanghai act-
ress, he married in 1939.
One of Mao's sons by Yang K'ai-hui (probably the one wife he
really loved) was killed in the Korean War. This has had a very
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strong emotional effect on him and may account in part for his almost
paranoid xenophobia, especially with respect to the United States.
A current medical review of the now 73-year-old Mao shows it
very unlikely that he any longer has the mental or physical stamina
to engage in continued personally demanding activities. His phys-
ical health is deteriorating and the prognosis for his life over the
next 3 to 5 years is not good. There is acceptable evidence that
he has arteriosclerosis and hypertension, with one stroke in December
1965 or January 1966 and possibly others previously. These dis-
orders form a coherent clinical entity, a disease that may account
in part for the loss of mental alertness, increasing rigidity of outlook,
and stubborness. The disease itself is serious, limiting his life ex-
pectancy and his physical stamina.
There is additional evidence that Mao's condition is compounded
with parkinsonism. This is a chronic progressive neurological disorder
which is frequently accompanied by mental depression; it will further
impair his physical and mental stamina. Heavy sedation is required
to control the tremors associated with parkinsonism. This very likely
explains the almost vegetable appearance of Mao on public occasions.
The natural progression of these diseases includes a high likelihood
of further strokes or heart attacks, increased rigidity of thought, un-
willingness to change ideas, and the development of paranoia. These
latter symptoms could quite possibly have been reflected in the
recent turmoil in China. Continued careful medical analysis will be
a factor in determining whether Mao can remain in command or is
likely to have power taken from him.
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The counterintelligence role in a
Latin American government's anti-
subversion effort.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VS. INSURGENCY
Carlos Revilla Arango
The counterintelligence force of established government authority
enjoys certain advantages in its conflict with that of an insurgent or-
ganization.' It has greater human and material resources. It operates
on a sure financial base, has powers of investigation and control, and
commands assets in the form of files and records which are not
easily built up by the insurgents. Its officers have legal status and
secure places of work instead of the hunted life of the dissidents.
These advantages often suffice to guarantee the government success.
Although the achievements of the counterintelligence force can be
reversed by military, political, or diplomatic action, the fact that it
does succeed, even temporarily, demonstrates the superiority of the
government operation. The excellent record made by the Tsarist
secret police against revolutionaries in the decades before the first
world war 2 is not the less so because of the imperial government's sub-
sequent political and military reversals. The successes of German
counterintelligence in occupied Europe, in spite of great popular
sympathy for its opponents, outweighed the failures; and the triumph of
established authority in Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and Greece is a
matter of record. The ultimate failure of British authority in Ireland
1 For an analysis of the counterpart effort of the insurgent organization against
the intelligence and security forces of the government, see the author's "Insurgent
Counterintelligence" in Studies XII 1, p. 39 if. Note that the product of "counter-
intelligence" as discussed in both these articles includes what would be positive
intelligence on a conventional adversary. This is not just because counterin-
telligence has been officially defined, somewhat extravagantly, to include counter-
subversion, but because the methods used by and against the subversives, fea-
turing subtle harassment, surveillance, penetration, and provocation, are the
hallmarks of counterintelligence. Counterintelligence forces should not, on the
other hand, be put to gathering information on guerrilla order of battle from
the standard military intelligence sources-captured documents, prisoner in-
terrogation, reconnaissance, etc.
2 See the Kronenbitter articles on the Okhrana, Studies IX 2 and 3, X 2 and 3,
XI 1 and 4, and XII 1.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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C.I vs. Insurgency
and French in Algeria derived from political decisions, not the weak-
ness of counterintelligence."
The governments of Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
and Peru have been engaged in struggles with dissidents. The sur-
vival of these governments depends on the efficacy of their counterinsur-
gency programs and, within these programs, on the performance of
their respective counterintelligence forces. And the success of the
latter depends in turn on the ability of the individual counterintelli-
gence officer to learn to know his enemy and to use his advantages to
good effect.
Exploration
The counterintelligence officer is responsible for getting information
on the organization, personnel, assets, plans, and activity of the dis-
sidents. He is also responsible for making the best possible use of
this information to negate their activity or turn it to the advantage
of the government; but his success in this will vary with the level and
importance of the information he acquires.
Usually he first seeks to identify the objectives of the insurgent
movement. He reads its manifestos, flysheets, pamphlets, newspa-
pers. Is he dealing with a Marxist-Leninist organization? If so, does
it take Peking's line? Or Moscow's? Is it opposed by communist
factions of the other persuasion in the country? Do minority poli-
tical groups sympathize with it? Do its social objectives differ sig-
nificantly from those the government itself is striving for?
Will the government's accomplishment of its social and economic
programs destroy the foundations of the insurgency? Can these pro-
grams be accomplished in time? A member of Peruvian President
Belaunde Terry's own Accion Popular said, "I'm not wait:.ng for my
son to have a better life-I want a better life myself." 4 This is the
impatience which makes the Indians invade the lands. Can the Presi-
dent's programs bring a better standard of living to the people before
the communists provoke them to rebel? The study of these broader
questions will make the counterintelligence officer more persuasive
in his later efforts to recruit members of the insurgent movement for
his own purposes.
'For a fuller discussion of this thesis see Andrew T. Molnar, et al., Under-
grounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Speck] Operations
Research Office, the American University, Washington D.C., 1963), pp. 11-12, 41.
'Time, October 8, 1965, pp. 36-40; also January 7, 1966, p. 34.
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Next, the counterintelligence officer must get details on the nature
and make-up of his adversary's forces. He must find out their num-
bers and the structure of their organization, trace its lines of command,
and determine its unit functions, geographic scope, and practices with
respect to compartmentation. At what stage in its development will
it be a serious threat to the government? Is it organized on the basis
of secret and street units? Does it follow the precept of General
Alberto Bayo to the effect that a cell should be limited to three per-
sons? 5 Does the cell leader report to an area or city coordinator? Do
the coordinators report independently to a central committee? What
is the size of the central committee? Does it approve its manifestos
meeting as a unit or do its members each indicate their individual
concurrence by signature? Do the members reside in this country,
or abroad? If abroad, how do they communicate with the resident
leadership and transmit instructions, money, propaganda? Do the
resident leaders travel abroad to report and receive briefings? Are
the written records of the movement kept abroad? Or where are they
secreted in this country? How do resident leaders communicate with
one another? What degree of autonomy is exercised by area coordi-
nators?
The Pursuit of Detail
As the counterintelligence officer finds the names of insurgents in
their manifestos or in police reports, he begins to compile a. :record
which will reflect their background, character, and motivation, their
past record, and their ambitions for the future. He takes particular
interest in Gustavo Ruiz de Somocurcio, for example.
On Thursday morning, Jan. 30, the Government security police raided a
Communist hide-out located at Piura 900, in the Lima suburb of Miraflores,
seizing a veritable arsenal of weapons, . . . Cuban flags, and a voluminous
collection of propaganda material, including several thousand copies of a
pamphlet entitled "La Revolucion Peruana en Marcha" written by Gustavo
Ruiz de Somocurcio, reportedly the leader of the group, who with a number
of his confederates was captured and placed under arrest. . . .?
He asks himself questions about Gustavo Ruiz. What kind of
house is it at Piura 900? How much would it cost to maintain such
a place? What family does Ruiz have? Did he have a telephone?
Did he have a police record? Has he ever traveled abroad? What
' See "Insurgent Counterintelligence," Studies XII 1, p. 41.
? Peruvian Times, February 7, 1964, p. 1.
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vs. Insurgency
schooling did he have? What was his service record, if any, in the
armed forces?
What was Ruiz's employment? How much was he paid? Was he a
conscientious worker? Did he get along well with his colleagues?
With whom was he friendly? What are their names and addresses?
Did he pay his bills promptly? If he rented, what does his landlord
have to say? Domestic servants? Friends of the family?
From telephone and residence directories, from police, passport,
and military files, from surveillance and investigators' reports, from
testimony of priests and professors, the counterintelligence officer
culls the answers to such questions, both hard fact and potentially use-
ful bits of gossip, speculation, criticism, and complaints from Ruiz's
contacts. At this point he still can draw only a pencil outline of
the subject and his motivation, his needs and his aims. The answers
to many questions can be developed only by further investigation.
And much work still remains to be done in identifying the men ar-
rested with Ruiz and discovering their functions in the insurgent
organization. Was one of them perchance a courier?
Couriers are an important target of the counterintelligence officer.
Ile will look for persons who make frequent trips abroad, checking
airline manifests, social column reports of arrivals and departures,
the government consular officers (who might be so conscientious as
to take note of the comings and goings of fellow nationals), or the
representatives of friendly governments who may have a parallel
interest in following the journeys of subversives.? An even more
important target for him are the area coordinators, because their knowl-
edge should surpass that of any individual cell member. But he
also makes every effort to pinpoint the location of meeting sites, the
identities of foreign support personnel, and the location of caching
and training sites. An inventory of the insurgent organization's phys-
ical and personnel assets can give some indication of its scope and
operational prospects.
The Larger Picture
From interrogation reports the counterintelligence officer may get
the location of safesites abroad and the identities of foreign sym-
' See Edwin M. Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere,"
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1237, 7507, March 11, 1963,
pp. 347-356, and No. 1238, March 18, 1963, pp. 404-412.
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pathizers. He may, for example, learn of a safehouse in Hong Kong,
perhaps one run by a Swiss national with a French passport. Does
its location or keeper identify a foreign sponsor? If one assumes
that it is a link to Red China, say a way point for travelers on the
mainland, does this conflict with data which suggest that the in-
surgents have a tie to Soviet Russia? Or perhaps he may acquire
the London address of a sympathizer with the insurgency. Does the
sympathizer serve as a maildrop? A source of funds? Why Lon-
don-a way point for travelers to Eastern Europe? Or he may
identify a financial contributor in Stockholm. Is this an inde-
pendent contributor or merely a channel for funds from Red China's
diplomats? Or he may run onto a German courier who travels be-
tween Paris and Rome. What is this for? If the insurgency draws
its major strength and sustenance from roots abroad, it is possible
that our officer confronts not only its own counterintelligence force
but that of the Soviet Union, or China's, or Cuba's.
Do the range and number of safesites suggest major financial back-
ing? The counterintelligence officer weighs against the apparent
legitimate income of the insurgents the assets and expenditures of
the organization as they become known to him, including the cost
of travel to Peking, or Moscow, or Havana, the rentals paid for houses
in Brussels, Madrid, or London, the funds needed for that courier
run from Paris to Rome. Some contributions may be made by fel-
low citizens buying political insurance. He watches the daily press
for editorialists who write sympathetically of the dissidents' objec-
tives, use their grievances as the basis for questioning officials, or
criticize the government for any resolute action against Indian land
invaders or striking workers.
He looks for patterns in incidents of bombing, kidnaping, assassina-
tion, and intimidation of police and private citizens. He recalls that
the killing of Caracas policemen not only demoralized the national
police service but signaled further acts of violence. He interprets the
shooting of an American consular official in Cordoba, Argentina, as
a demonstration of power by the guerrillas in that country in their
effort to win the uncommitted to their cause. He suspects that the
rash of kidnapings in Guatemala provides needed funds for dis-
sident groups there. He believes that the robbery of a Miraflores
bank in Lima accomplished that same purpose. He searches reports
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CI vs. Insurgency
of Indian land invasions and peasant uprisings for evidence of the
hand of the insurgent organization:
following the clash which took place on Feb. 4 near Sicuani . . . between
a detachment of the Guardia Civil (national police force) and highland
Indian invaders of farms and other private property, the police on Feb. 8
seized an arsenal of guns, munitions, and explosives in the home of a Com-
ununist agitator, Paulino Mamani, at Chara, 15 kms. from Sicuani. Mamani,
who proclaimed that he was "fighting for the poor," was reported to be
living in the greatest luxury, with a bank account of some two million soles,
said to have been accumulated from the contributions which he extracted
from his followers.'
Such incidents can provide indications of the imminence of larger
action. Organized attacks on police outposts, for example, can either
reflect a need for arms or serve to demonstrate the dissidents' power.
If the attackers seize arms, they probably need them; if not, they
probably have their own in sufficient quantity, worse luck. If they
carry away their dead and wounded, that is bad: they have disci-
pline and a sense of responsibility. If not, they are less likely to rep-
resent an immediate threat to the government.
A campaign of terror usually precedes any broad-scale action aimed
at the destruction of the government. But within such a campaign
its targets have different connotations of immediacy. The destruction
of a foreign-owned factory or plantation would be a low-heat action,
particularly if it followed a campaign of vilification by others not
participating in the insurgency. It could be just on-the-job training
for recruits. Or an action which pleased the general public and served
as a call to arms for the uncommitted. Assassination of a foreign
resident, however, may mark the beginning of action against all for-
eigners; it will provoke an intensive investigation by security police
and must therefore be rated somewhat higher in its connotation of
immediacy. Assassination of an official representative of a foreign
government must be placed yet higher on the scale, s:ince police
counteraction will be more severe. And the killing of someone in
the country's own government can be taken as a clear warning of
impending conflict.
As information is acquired, it must be recorded in a fashion which
makes for ready retrieval when needed. The counterintelligence
officer begins, for example, by preparing three-by-five cards on Gustavo
'Peruvian Times, February 14, 1964, p. 1.
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CI vs. Insurgency
Ruiz de Somocurcio and others who have come to his attention,
recording full name, alias if known, date and place of birth, address,
occupation, and data pertinent to their dissident role. Other cards,
devoted to addresses which appear to have been used as maildrops
or safe meeting sites, he cross-refers to those on the individuals or
organizations involved. He makes a similar file of cards on telephone
numbers used for dissident communications, and one on automobiles
used by couriers. He builds map files locating the dissidents' camps,
caches, etc., and including sketches or photographs of these places.
More expansive personality files, keyed to the three-by-five name
cards, extend to the subject's military and educational history, fam-
ily data, strength and weaknesses of character, position in the insur-
gent organization, and relationships with comrades and associates.
The counterintelligence officer can readily accumulate such data
on personalities engaged in overt activities for the insurgency. Sur-
veillance of these persons can lead him to echelons and persons
hitherto unknown, and then the surveillance can be lifted from the
overt targets and placed on the others. The theoretical compart-
mentation of overt elements from the clandestine is not always main-
tained. Friendship can be cause for violating it, need for ignoring
it, foolishness for overlooking it, and accident for disrupting it.
These records-three-by-five cards with summary data on the dis-
sidents, organizational and geographic charts showing locations and
functions, maps and sketches locating and describing training sites,
safesites, caching areas, and deaddrops, and above all the personality
files reflecting individual prejudices and purposes, fears, problems, and
motivation-are the counterintelligence officer's working file, his
tool for operations.
Control and Harassment
Established authority has powers which it can use to control, re-
strain, or harass members of the insurgent organization. The govern-
ment can declare martial law and suspend constitutional guarantees.
It can deny the insurgents the right to peaceful assembly, freedom to
propound their views in competition with official news media, and
freedom of movement. The police can increase their vigilance against
use of "the editorial pages of the poor,"-wall-painting-andl set up
checkpoints to intercept insurgent couriers.
Under these controls the dissidents cannot take advantage of dis-
asters, protest the imposition of martial law, or exploit the adrninistra-
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tion's blunders in managing the crisis. At the very time when they
might pose as champions of the people they have the least opportu-
nity to capitalize on events. On the afternoon of May 24, 1964,
a riot at the National Sports Stadium in Lima cost the lives of 301
persons. The Peruvian government was prompt in suspending con-
stitutional guarantees before the dissidents could exploit the break-
down of law and order which took place that night, and they were
powerless to add to the disaster.
As the government establishes curfews, increases its street patrols,
and activates checkpoints on roads leading to the capital, counter-
intelligence can increase its knowledge by studying the interrogation
reports on persons who travel in violation of the curfew. If the
government requires registration of all firearms, the investigation
and interrogation of violators may open up new channels to the
insurgency. Or, on advice of counterintelligence, police may raid
the home of a known member of the insurgent organization. The
arrest and detailed interrogation of all persons found there should
pave the way for further action.
Counterintelligence can begin its own harassment of the insurgent
organization by exploiting the arrest of individual members. Assume
that six self-confessed Marxist-Leninists have been detained by the
authorities. (In Peru, charges are not pressed against a person for
his political philosophy. But a pistol was found during a. search of
the premises, and none of the prisoners admits to ownership: grounds
to hold and question.) They are being investigated. Advise the
press in the course of the investigation that not all the prisoners have
been cooperative. The implication will disturb their friends; which
of the six have been cooperative? (Or is it a police trick? Yet they
cannot assume it to he a police trick.) Treat the prisoners kindly
and arrange for their early release. Their friends will interrogate
them-perhaps to the government's ultimate advantage.
Counterintelligence can denigrate individual leaders of the insur-
gency by publicizing their lapses in morality or high level of living.
For example Paulino Mamani, the champion of the poor with the
bank account of two million soles. Arrange for an interview by
reporters following his release from prison. Take photographs of
his home, his car, his maid, his children and their school. In a fea-
ture story, speculate about his plans for the future. Travel abroad?
.A vacation in Lima? He must patronize some restaurants in Cuzco.
Interview one of the owners, and ask for the names of Mamani's
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favorite dishes. Give the reporters the recipes for these, or better,
serve them to the reporters. Encourage them to comment on the
meal. And send the feature story to the newspapers, in the provinces,
where the guerrillas are going hungry.
These are mild harassments whose results cannot be foretold with
assurance; they are a casting of bread on the waters. Yet, consid-
ering the disappointments and frustrations to which the young guer-
rilla is subject, they can make his life seem less attractive. Coun-
terintelligence can intensify the climate of suspicion and concern
in which the guerrilla lives by using them together with police
harassment, control measures, and raids. It can also use further
provocative techniques to demoralize the adversary.
The counterintelligence officer can, for example, give a Judas
kiss to a member of the insurgency. He may direct a police offi-
cer well known in his precinct to approach this member while seated
with fellow dissidents in a favorite cafe and give him a warm, friendly
(and knowing) greeting. The target is left then to allay his friends'
suspicion, to protest his ignorance of the reason for the incident,
and to speculate himself on its purpose. Yet he greeted you by name,
in the familiar form. He smiled at you; he gave you a half abrazo.
He is well known here, as long assigned to this precinct. And this,
too, is where you are from. So he could have known you from the
past. But your record was never good here; you have said this many
times. You were always in trouble, you said. You had to leave here
because they were tough on you. You said. But we see that he
greeted you warmly. And the target knows, even as he tries to pro-
test his innocence, that a guerrilla can never explain a caress from
the police.
The counterintelligence officer should exploit the climate of sus-
picion in which members of the insurgency live. But on the other
hand he must anticipate their security scrutiny of any event which
is not of their doing. When he acts, therefore, he must protect the
source of the information he acts upon by diverting their security
investigation from it. One tactic he can use is that of the "lion in
the street." He can arrange for a police van ostensibly transport-
ing a criminal to sustain an accident in the street. In the ensuing
confusion, the criminal escapes. The police, of course, must estab-
lish a cordon around the area and search the houses and apartments
in it. They explain that the escaped criminal may have sought
sanctuary by holding an innocent family hostage. In their search
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they discover not the prisoner but a cache of dynamite and the
subversives they were after. In this way counterintelligence can
over the source of its original lead, apprehend its chosen targets, and
further shock the insurgent organization. The latter will make a
t:curity analysis, but not with the intensity that a direct arrest would
3 vave provoked.
Another provocation the counterintelligence officer may use is to
mail an insurgent a cryptic note of thanks for certain gif':s received
or services rendered. He might ask the addressee to meet him at
the "usual place." The target, out of town this week, lives with
t,ther members of the group, whose attention can be directed to
[lie note by a telephone message urging an immediate reply. They
become curious enough to examine it. Gifts? Usual place? Is it
rc woman? The handwriting looks like one with a. mustache! Have
you noticed a change in our friend of late? Why did our last job go
badly? Was he really going to visit his mother in the country?
Or the counterintelligence officer may release to the public a list
of subversives wanted for acts against the public weal. Later he
publishes another list which omits certain names that appeared on
the first one. He can select as the dropouts persons whom he knows
to be in some difficulty with the leadership. Since these lists are
read with an avidity appropriate to those of lottery winners, the
dropouts may soon drop as well from the favor of their comrades.
Then, in the classic process by which a suspicious conspiracy breeds
its own traitors, they may be persuaded by subsequent ill treatment
to work for the government in return for absolution or rewards.
Penetration: The Open Bid
The success of any action against art insurgency depends on the
accuracy of the information upon which it is based; and the most use-
ful information comes from sources within the enemy's ranks. There-
fore the key task of the counterintelligence officer is to acquire such
sources. His role is different from that of the police:
Counterintelligence does not knock at doors and arrest men. Rather it
sits among them while others knock on the door. It is arrested with them
and goes into the same cell. It works on escape routes with the patriots,
it aids them, steers them, and tries to protect them, going on the assumption
that knowing your enemy is better than destroying him and having to
search for a new enemy.'
'Hugo Bleicher, Colonel Henri's Story (London, 1954), p. 13.
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Yet it is essential that he control the time and tactics of the arrest
and provide the data on which formal charges may be based. He
should monitor his source's progress through the prison routine, advise
him as to his behavior under interrogation, and debrief him-privately
in the prison. He must resolve the source's problems of the moment
and guide him in his future actions. In all this the left hand must be
well coordinated with the right.
There are different ways to acquire inside sources. One can offer
to buy information from the hungriest member of the meanest cell
in an underground movement. Such a person does not generally have
access to much information, and the aim of the counterintelligence
officer must be at sources who possess or have good prospects of
gaining information of value. But since he must begin somewhere,
he will often make a first approach by shotgun through the official
or public press. Let all persons having knowledge of the personnel
or activities of such-and-such organization report same in writing to
post office box so-and-so. The constitutional rights of all those re-
porting will be safeguarded. Immunity will be granted to reporting
members of the organization with respect to offenses committed
against the state prior to this date. Reward. Such a plea will draw
a mass of conjectures and irrelevancies along with, possibly, some
pertinent facts which, moreover, he may already have on file. The
sources are likely to be persons only on the periphery of the move-
ment, from waiters with long ears to embittered wives with long
memories. Yet the public appeal may bear eventual good fruit, as
we shall see.
More subtly, counterintelligence can sponsor feature articles in the
press which describe the depredations, harmful activities, and con-
stant threat posed by the insurgent organization and incidentally
point out gaps in what is known about it. Readers having knowl-
edge in these particular areas are urged to write the author. The
virtue of this approach lies in narrowing the field of inquiry and
encouraging more specific returns.
In either case the public plea is unlikely to produce immediate
results of great value. But someday a guerrilla, leafing through old
newspapers reserved by cafe management for meaner purposes, may
discover the article. He may find it amusing, or even interesting.
He might clip and keep it for a time, possibly thinking of insurance
against a day when he falls from grace. In that case he will not dis-
cuss it with his colleagues, or at least not be the first to mention it.
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But if he ever finds himself in a situation which gives him little hope for
the future, he may remember this invitation.
A public plea of this nature, if inefficient, is secure in that it enables
the respondent to pick his own time and often place is i which to
make contact. He can not only satisfy himself of the good faith of
the advertiser, but also take time to develop or organize the infor-
mation requested. In taking these steps he commits himself of his
own volition; he is not brought to heel by the pressures of prison
life. It is true that a defector is not necessarily a great prize in terms
of what he can give. He may have come over because of lack of
advancement in the dissident organization or he may have lost con-
tact with its leaders and resigned himself to recovering what he can
by selling the past. But an aggressive counterintelligence program
often brings unexpected rewards; and a public plea for information
is an aggressive action, not a desperate alternative.
As he presses to expose or identify the personnel and activities of
the insurgency, as he engineers arrests and provokes the dissidents to
act against their own kind, as he intensifies the suspicion which per-
vades the enemy ranks, the counterintelligence officer often serves
as midwife to the birth of dissidents within the dissident o: ganization.
Young guerrillas find that its chains of discipline fetter their move-
inents and spirit more thoroughly than the regime it is dedicated
to overthrow. They are gradually discouraged by the denigration
of its leadership, provocations against its members, publicity for
its noxious activities, offers of rewards for information about it, and
the ever-increasing controls and suspicion it promotes. In time, some
of them begin looking for a way out, for a door from the garden;
and someday one finds this door. I believed something had to be
done. Things are not good in Peru; it is wrong to be hungry. Things
must be changed, but not in the way of Luis de la Puente. What do
you think we can do?
The counterintelligence officer must now ask many questions. What
does he really want? Money? Sanctuary? Revenge? Or is he an
agent of the adversary? If he comes in good faith, what information
can he provide? Can he identify the secret leaders, their safesites,
caching points, and couriers? Does he hold a position of any im-
portance? If he does, who knows that he is here? Will he return
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CI vs. Insurgency OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of his own free will? Can he return? How long before his absence
will be noticed?
The young defector is likely to pose few problems of control.
Though sometimes scarred by social inequities, he is, not usually deeply
marked by his underworld experience. His suspicions can, of course,
be aroused to a self-defeating pitch, but he is also easily confused.
He is not wary and patient like the old, who know the value of
what they have to offer, may recognize the pressures on the counter-
intelligence officer to produce results, and make demands for money
or other rewards accordingly.
The Penetration Agent
The value of a guerrilla who voluntarily offers his cooperation far
surpasses that of one recruited by inducements or of an agent inserted
into the insurgents' ranks. The bought or browbeat recruit has not
cast off clean his old allegiances. And the synthetic dissident lacks
the dedicated shine of the true believer.
If it is through an agent that counterintelligence is going to penetrate
the dissidents' organization, it must be through one whose ostensible
motivation they will understand and accept. It must also be some-
one whose talents or advantages of employment or location they need-
say a customs official, or a passport office employee. Into the same
category would fall international airline pilots (to serve as couriers),
hotel managers (as safesite keepers), postal officials (for the pro-
curement of post office boxes), interprovince bus drivers (as intra-
country couriers), and university professors (to spot and assess stu-
dent candidates). Such agents have to be briefed, prepared, and
directed with the greatest care.
In a longer-term process, the counterintelligence officer may select
a young student or worker and direct his activities as he simply
enters the general milieu of the dissidents without making any posi-
tive approach to join them. He should frequent the coffee shops
they patronize, move in the same university or labor circles, attend
their student or worker rallies, act sympathetic to their beliefs, and
serve as a spear-carrier in their public enterprises. In the course
of time, after watching his attitude and assessing his reliability, they
are likely to approach him. He should neither jump at the first
offer they make nor delay his assent too long. The insurgency wel-
comes those whom it persuades to drop their ploughshares, books, or
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fishnets to serve the cause, even as it views with suspicion those
who take it upon themselves to seek it out.
Recruiting in Place
Because the insurgent organization makes every effort: to screen
out espionage agents from among those who come to its doors un-
invited, mounting a thorough background investigation and other
checks, the counterintelligence officer may choose rather to recruit
a person already in place and avoid the hazards of trying to introduce
an outsider. Here his success will depend on how accurately he
selects and assesses the candidate. He must make an exhaustive
study of a candidate's dossier in order to assess his strengths and
weaknesses and measure his desires and needs. If the target can be
persuaded to cooperate, does he have access to the desired infor-
mation? Can he safely transmit it to the counterintelligence officer on
a continuing basis? When did he last participate in an approved
insurgent activity? If he is reassigned elsewhere, would there be
communications problems? Is he emotionally reliable? Through
whom should we make an offer to him, and in what manner? If he
accepts, how do we know it is in good faith? When in this world
of counterintelligence does "yes" mean "no"?
Dissidents under arrest constitute one pool for recruitment. These
candidates are most promising while still suffering from the trauma
of arrest and before news of it reaches the public. The prisoner
selected for recruitment is isolated from the others, and he is per-
mitted no contact with the general prison administration. No pub-
licity is given to the arrest, no record of it even made. The
counterintelligence officer bends every effort to win the man's co-
operation. With approval from above, he can promise him freedom,
immunity from prosecution for past offenses, and the prospect of a
bright future. He can assure him that no one will know of his
arrest or cooperation.
If the candidate is one of several taken by the police in an action
that has become known to the public, the counterintelligence officer
must carry out the recruitment under devious guises. He should
separate the prisoners, question each privately, assess them, review
their dossiers, and formally announce their detention to the press. At
this time he can also say that he is appreciative of the cooperation
some of the prisoners have given to the authorities. Then, before
interest in the case has subsided, he should release two of them,
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vs. insurgency
with a public statement that members of the underground do not
have to fear lengthy detention or maltreatment by the authorities. In
a separate statement at about the same time, the investigative police
should request that anyone with further information concerning vio-
lence against the government contact the department for an interview.
Immediately after the release of these two prisoners the dissidents
whose names appear in their dossiers should be arrested. If they
have fled abroad or are in hiding, the police should go through the
motions of searching their homes and offices. In another week, an-
other prisoner can be released without comment to the press. Finally,
the counterintelligence officer arranges for the charges against the
remaining three or more prisoners, including his newly recruited. source,
to be dismissed. The investigative action of the insurgent organi-
zation will then be concentrated on the first three prisoners.
The successful recruitment of a prisoner can be ascribed to the
trauma of detection and arrest, to the unfriendly regimen of the prison,
to the sense of failure he feels (in proportion to his devotion to the
cause), and to the effects of physical and spiritual separation from
his comrades. The arraignment before authority, the removal of his
clothes and personal possessions, the physical examination, the prison
garb, and the isolation aggravate his psychological distress. As he
lies in his cell, cut off from the discipline, demands, and dedication
of his organization, denied participation in the busy give-and-take of
his. colleagues, he is a ready target for a sympathetic and understanding
approach, for the friendly face and kindly manner of one who wants
to help him, for the counterintelligence officer. And if he can be
persuaded in this helpful spirit to take one corresponding step on
behalf of the government, he may become an agent serving counterin-
telligence with the same fervor he formerly devoted to the insurgent
cause.
The Decoy
The counterintelligence officer can also arrange for the creation of
a phony guerrilla group in the mountains or the city, in the hope that
the malcontents, social dropouts, and visionaries will flock to a modern-
day cave of Adullam. His purpose is to leech blood from the in-
surgent organization, identify potential enemies of the government,
and provide an emotional safety valve he can control. He can super-
vise military security sweeps of the area, setting the bounds of search
and informing his guerrillas of the impending action. Through manip-
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Cl vs. Insurgency
ulating publicity for his decoy group and government efforts to
crush it, he can build tip its leader as a new peasant hero, a superman
whose valor, cunning, ruthlessness-and charity towards the poor-
capture the public imagination.
In nourishment of this legend he can take natural disasters-a
burned warehouse, a washed-out bridge, a derailment or road-
blocking landslide-and attribute them to his heroic rebels. He can
have them raid isolated police outposts and then multiply their pur-
ported numbers in eyewitness accounts by peasants or passaars-by who
exist only in his imagination. He can prepare letters to the editor
in the name of his guerrilla. He can release photographs of a Hercu-
les, with features suitably obscured, to convince the skeptical that a
new Castro is on the horizon. He thus sets up a counter ~?ole to the
real insurgency, which cannot tolerate rival heroes, others' victories,
and competitors for public favor. It must, then, divert effort to pene-
trate the new threat and bring all forces into its fold. This diversion
can only weaken its proper struggle against the government.
The Shadow Battle
The counterintelligence officer sits with his maps, charts, cards, and
files, studying his adversary and the apparent timetable of his program.
He reads the propaganda and manifestos of the enemy organization; he
attends public rallies held in its name. He initiates action against it
to foil a particular undertaking, exploit information received from
agents, or unnerve his opponents. His aggressive moves force the
insurgency to conduct intensive security investigations, reorganize
components, relocate assets, revise its communications, or re-educate
its membership. He can even force it to compete with his decoys
in addition to its genuine political competitors.
He cannot, however, disrupt the insurgents by offering them secure
passage to freedom outside the country, as Fidel Castro has to the
dissident in his Cuba. The dissidents of Peru, Ecuador, 'Venezuela,
and Guatemala are Marxist-Leninists who do not seek safehaven in
free countries. These Latin American governments cannot protect
their authority, as Castro did, by offering a free exit to dissidents.
Nor can one defeat the dissidents by armed action. The insurgent
organization only thrives on violence. Counterintelligence tries, there-
fore, to discourage dissidents by provocative and harassing actions
based on information acquired through penetration. It ai`tempts to
attenuate the spirit and numbers of the insurgents, and it ce.n succeed
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vs. nsurgency
if it is granted time. Its failures can most often be ascribed to pres-
sures from above for immediate and dramatic achievements.
A carefully worked-out counterintelligence program is most un-
dramatic even when effective. It entails hard work and the amassing
of good records. It is drudgery. It produces no miracles. But if
unencumbered by a short-sighted policy from its superiors, it can pro-
vide respite for mending the social and economic fabric of the state.
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The USSR Ministry of Communications has issued a new postage stamp
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the All-Russian Extraordinary Com-
mission [CHEKA]. Founded on Vladimir Lenin's initiative, this Commission,
led by the ardent Bolshevik, Felix Dzerzhinsky, coped with honour with
its tasks in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat in the struggle
against counter-revolutionary conspiracies. Today the organ of State Se-
curity I KGB] also vigilantly protects the state interests of the USSR from
the schemes of foreign intelligence services.
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Your reviewer of the latest Wise & Ross extravaganza, The Espi-
onage Establishment,' failed to note one central problem with this
third team-effort to siphon off royalties and attention from the mar-
ketplace of intelligence sensationalism: the work is a plagiarism from
beginning to end.
In contrast to The Invisible Government, which provided chapter
notes (admittedly inadequate and misleading ones) with some refer-
ences, The Espionage Establishment has none. Neither book has ac-
knowledgments, but at least the earlier one, through these chapter
notes, implicitly acknowledged the sources of pilferage.
Of the approximately 46 footnotes which refer to sources (supple-
mented by some textual references), 19 are in the chapter on the
Soviet Union, to which your reviewer gave good marks. A check
of these sources makes clear that most of the material in the chapter
was not derived from them but plagiarized from elsewhere. Similarly,
the 14 or so source notes in the chapter on Great Britain are not
the basic sources utilized in this chapter.
The chapter on China has only one source reference (to biographic
data from Donald Klein). Your reviewer attributed most of the
material to "overt sources-Time magazine and other periodicals."
It would appear that most of the data, which your reviewer called
"dated," can be "dated" more specifically to 1965, when :Messrs.
Seagrave and Jones researched a piece for Esquire (January 1966).
Perhaps to avoid clouding their own resourcefulness and ingenuity,
Messrs. Wise & Ross failed to note this major source.
If your reviewer insists upon giving higher marks to The Espionage
Establishment than to The Invisible Government, he might at least
subtract a few points. for the new low in source attribution.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
85
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LY To e Editors
Wise and Ross have a reluctance-.in fact, a total block-about
using those three little words, "I don't know." This block is equally
apparent in their books and in their radio and TV appearances. For
example, the David Susskind show on 25 November 1967:
Susskind?. I want to ask you, how does our spy system-the CIA compare to
the Russian system, the British system?
Wise: Well, David, it's very hard to get into the business of rating these
systems. You know, there are some people who say that the Israeli system
may be the best of all, it's very small. I think that in some ways we're
better-we have a better system than the Soviets and perhaps, in some
ways, they're better than we are. It's kind of difficult to start giving them
marks .. .
Susskind: I mean, would [CIA in a training exercise] send you downtown in
Washington to tail a man? I mean, would you actually spy ::t up?
Wise: There have been reports-we have not gone into this very much-but
there have been reports of trainees being sent into a factory to swipe papers
and do this sort of thing.
Susskind: Is there any assassination in recent years that you can lay at the
doorstep of [CIA] superspying?
Wise: Well, we can tam that around a little and tell you about an attempt
that wasn't carried out .. .
Questioner: I'd like to know . . . what the ratio of women to men is in this
field.
Ross: Well-the ratio of men to women varies and it's a very difficult-it's an
intangible to get at because it's-it's a secret quantity.
Once they almost slipped, but quickly caught themselves. The
Jim Conway show in Chicago, 27 October 1967:
Fran: What do we know about the Soviet Intelligence? What do we know
really?
Ross: Well, frankly, we don't-our own intelligence knows a great deal.
The public knows relatively little which is one of the reasons why we
wrote this book.
In a nation which accords the press a freedom unmatched anywhere
else in the world, it seems in order to expect a corresponding sense
of responsibility on the part of the press. Few who have read The
U-2 Affair, The Invisible Government, and The Espionage Establish-
ment can doubt that the motivation of the authors is basically mer-
cenary. Though they call for an awakened, informed, and responsible
citizenry to redress the balance against Big Government:, one can't
help wondering whether they see themselves as citizens, i:oo, sharing
the same broad responsibilities, or whether they fancy themselves as
above it all, the monitors of a battle on a darkling plain below.
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ff M-
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To he Editors
The Espionage Establishment is a bad book, because it is superficial
and even hypocritical. The authors attempt to probe the motives of
others without honestly examining their own. They maintain stand-
ards of conduct for the government-that is, the people-without
accepting these standards for themselves. They conceal their sources
and pretend, without humility or honesty, to omniscience. Few would
take seriously a book by amateurs about surgery, say, or navigation, or
any other subject requiring professional expertise. But Wise and
Ross are two of several self-annointed experts who make-and will
probably continue to make-a good deal of money from just such
books about intelligence because there is no way for the general public
to judge their qualifications or the quality of their merchandise.
Henry L. Wardsworth
Agent Stalin
Dear Sirs:
I should like to comment a little further on The Young Stalin, by
Edward Ellis Smith, which you recently reviewed.' I agree with your
reviewer that the author tries too hard to show that Stalin was an
agent of the Tsarist Okhrana and that he remained one over too many
years, but I do not find the evidence very persuasive even for the early
period.
Part of the case for the agent thesis rests upon the portrayal of
Stalin as a daring revolutionary hero prominent in organizing strikes,
writing proclamations, setting up underground printshops, and inciting
the populace to rebellion; how could he be doing all this and yet
moving about almost with impunity in the Caucasus if he were not
in collusion with the police? But this picture of the young Stalin
derives from Soviet writers in the period of his dictatorship who had
no choice but to depict him with panegyrics. Biographers who did
not have to cater to Stalin's glorification-from Trotsky down to revo-
lutionary Georgians in exile-speak of him (under his nicknames
Soso, Koba, etc.) as an unimportant little malcontent, unnoticed not
only by the police but by the early revolutionaries. He had little
reason to hide.
Then there are the documents in the files of the Paris Okhrana,
preserved at the Hoover Institution, which Smith tries to use in support
of his theory but which really point in the opposite direction. Okhrana
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY To The Editors
headquarters sent the Paris office Stalin's name and description as a
subversive or suspect on four occasions between 1904 and 1911; these
are the only references to him in the files. Now the Petersburg head-
quarters would not have informed Paris about the identity of agents
working for it at home, within the Empire; but when a revolutionary
was recruited as an agent his name was as a rule deleted from the
roster of subversives, and Headquarters circulated to all outposts
lists of names to be deleted without giving any reason therefor.
Stalin's name appears on no such circular.
Moreover, it was Headquarters' practice to inform Paris, as well as
all outposts at home, about people who had in any way served as
agents or informers but then either were dropped as unreliable or
deserted the service of their own volition. If Stalin had been an
informer or penetration agent and dropped out in 1912 when opted
by Lenin for the Central Committee, the Okhrana home office which
had controlled him would have prepared such a circular for dissemina-
tion to the outposts. There is no such circular on Stalin. Even if
he had served the Okhrana only in the very first years of his adult
life, as a student at the Theological Seminary or employee at the
Tiflis Geophysical Observatory, when he was dismissed he would
have been reported in the circulars as a defector or an informer "not
meriting confidence" (nezasluzhivayushchi doveria) ; scores of such
circulars were disseminated regularly. But his name is not included
in any of them.
If Stalin had been informing some local police agent on fellow
students in the Seminary, he would most likely have been forced to
continue. Instead of letting him be expelled as a student and fired as
an employee, each time against his own wishes, the Okh:rana would
have seen to it that the Seminary retained him, just as it did other
agents among the students. Smith himself cites the case of agent
llemetrashili, who began his career at the same Theological Seminary
in Tiflis; he was made to continue with his schooling and eventually
converted into a regular penetration agent. The same Folder No. 1
at the Hoover Institution on Deep Cover Agents which documents this
case shows that again and again students and government employees
were reinstated or re-hired at the request of the police organs.
Incidentally, in referring to the Okhrana structure and personnel
strength, Mr. Smith makes without documentation statements that are
completely unrealistic. For example, he credits the Ok:zrana with
having in Petersburg, when Stalin came there in 1909, 2,500 profes-
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To The Editors
sional intelligence officers. According to all official tabulations, the
entire Okhrana at home and abroad could not muster a staff of that
size. Smith also questions Stalin's access to documentation and funds.
But most of the revolutionaries had the same problem, and quite a
few of them moved around much more than Stalin. Especially for
the Social Democrats, documentation was somehow always abundant.
Mr. Smith could have found at the Hoover Institute scores of 'listings
of all types of passports used by the Bolsheviks-of their own manu-
facture, stolen, doctored, or obtained officially through penetration.
Despite its forced inferences about Stalin as agent, The Young
Stalin has value in documenting the dictator's character as manifested
in its formative stages. He is similarly described in a perhaps still
unpublished manuscript to be found in Trotsky's files:
His youthful companions characterized him as sullen and quite unlike his
comrades in the nature of his activities. Wherever he appeared in his revo-
lutionary travels, there was talk of intrigue, breakdown of discipline, arbi-
trary behavior, slander of comrades, and denouncing of opponents to the po-
lice. Many of these reports were probably based on lies, but no other revo-
lutionary gave rise to talk of such a nature ... Koba's name never appeared
in any of our correspondence. He considered that, being a provincial, he
was slow getting ahead, and he looked on others with envy.
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THE REAL CIA. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (New York: The
Macmillan Company. 1968. 312 pp. $6.95.)
It is probable that no single person had as wide and deep a knowl-
edge of the Central Intelligence Agency as Mr. Kirkpatrick. His
interest and his contacts ran from chauffeurs and code clerks to the
level of Presidents. He had personal experience in middle and top
management, and his years as Inspector General and later as Executive
Director gave him unparalleled access to information. On top of
this he was energetic and questioning and had a most retentive
memory.
In writing the book his intent was to use this wealth of knowledge
to inform the public of what the Central Intelligence Agency really
does, how it does it, and the significance of its role. His contribution
in this regard is most welcome, and in some respects he succeeds
admirably. The opening and closing chapters, for instance, are on the
whole excellent expositions of the organization, function, and im-
portance of intelligence in the U.S. Government in the modern world,
They could, with some editing, have made an excellent piece for some
publication like Foreign Affairs but would then, of course, have been
read by an extremely limited audience.
To reach the wide audience at which he was aiming, Mr. Kirkpatrick
had to employ writing techniques other than simple exposition. He
could, of course, have gained publicity by discussing sensitive opera-
tions and so had the book touted as an expose, but he offers no new
information of this kind. He chose instead to appeal to public
interest by taking the anecdotal route based on his own experiences
relating to intelligence. Even here he has been most discreet and at
times has almost leaned over backwards to protect the security of
Agency operations. In Chapter 6, for instance, he discusses his
personal experience with what he refers to as a subsidiary outside
intelligence organization. This was indeed a revealing and appalling
episode, but the full lesson for the intelligence community does not
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t~F IAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Doctrine
come through as Mr. Kirkpatrick treats it somewhat elliptically in
the interest of security. Probably he is right to do so, but it is too bad.
A number of other episodes in the book that deal in historical detail
would seem to me not to have much interest for the current average
reader. I may be prejudiced on this; for having heard the author
tell most of the stories in person, it is clear to me that in writing
they lose considerable of the verve and salty tang that cane by word
of mouth. Chapter 9, describing the Joint Study Group's survey of
intelligence, and Chapter 10, which deals with Mr. M:cCone's re-
organization of the Agency, are pretty technical for the average
reader and contain a good deal of detail which contributes little to
the main theme.
The most controversial item in the book is the chapter covering
the Inspector General's review and report on the Bay of Pigs episode.
This report did reach the stated conclusions and supported them
strongly, but there were a number of highly placed officials intimately
concerned with the Bay of Pigs operation who were not even inter-
viewed by the Inspector General's staff during this review and who
strongly differ with his conclusions. It might have be,cn a better
course to point out some of the organizational shortcomings but leave
the final substantive judgments to history.
I was quite surprised by Mr. Kirkpatrick's version of the reason
General Smith left CIA as given at the end of Chapter 5. Everything
I had heard indicated that President Eisenhower was anxious to have
General Smith's formidable organizational talents applied to the
Department of State, and I had had indications from General Smith
that he relished the appointment. However, as in all moves of this
kind in Washington, various motivations are attributed to the persons
involved, and the truth may be somewhere between Mr. Kirkpatrick's
version and mine.
All in all, Mr. Kirkpatrick's book is a resounding defense of the
Agency, of its present position and role in the governmental structure,
and of the need for the best possible intelligence in view of the
current world situation. It should therefore be widely read, so I hope
I am wrong in some of my doubts about reader interest. I hope that
the anecdotal technique will catch the public eye and lead it on to
the more important aspects of the book.
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ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Knowledge and Policy in
Government and Industry. By Harold L. Wilensky. (New York:
Basic Books, Inc. 1967. 226 pp. $5.95.)
We have had books about intelligence from professors of history,
military men, diplomatists, newspaper scandal-mongers, and ex-
intelligence officers. Now we have one from a sociologist-a "be-
havioral scientist"-and it ought to be a useful, interesting, and
welcome contribution. It is in fact a disappointment.
For one thing, I find much difficulty in satisfying myself that I
understand what the author is trying to say. This is odd, since he
explains his purposes at the beginning of the text, occasionally frames
a generalization or a summary in the body of the book, and even
provides a chart at the end to tell what he has said. Yet there is such
a mass of statements of fact and declarations of theory, such a quoting
of examples and citing of research projects, such a straining for cate-
gorizations and. hypotheses, that one feels that some greater wisdom
than the chart reveals must somewhere be enunciated.
What, in fact, does it add up to? Something like the following:
There are more experts around nowadays than there used to be;
facts and figures are apt to count in deciding the policy of great or-
ganizations; experts can help with facts and figures; the bigger the
organization, the more experts it is likely to use. But oftentimes all
does not run smoothly. There are frequent intelligence failures.
These are rooted in "structural problems." For instance, in a big
organization with ranks and grades the boss does not always get
told the facts, especially the more unpleasant ones; great hierarchies
are apt to diminish the initiative and originality of individuals (yet
there must be hierarchies) ; specialized sub-divisions of experts war
amongst each other and become parochial (yet there must be spe-
cialization); intelligence organizations get over-centralized, remote,
etc. (yet there must be centralization). Some of the failures of
intelligence are owing to "doctrinal" shortcomings, e.g.: unevaluated
facts are often used by policy-makers and this is bad; over-emphasis
on secrecy often produces loyalty-security systems that encourage
time-serving and mediocrity; short, speedy, journalistic estimates are
favored by policy-makers but are inherently pretty undependable.
And so on-though this is a fair setting-forth of most of what appears
on the chart. All these propositions are true, especially since the author
qualifies them by the remarks summarized above in parentheses. But
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does one need all the apparatus of learning in this book, and all the
behavioral-science jargon, in order to establish such thing;?
Of course, one ought not to be too scornful. It may well be useful
to confirm by painstaking "research" many propositions which seem
obvious to common sense. After all, common sense tells us that the
sun goes round the earth; it proved worth while to examine this notion
further. Perhaps the propositions of this book are not obvious to
those outside the intelligence profession. Perhaps they really needed
examination. Perhaps the remedies which the author suggests for
the conditions which produce intelligence failures are not equally
obvious. I suspect, however, that by choosing different examples,
and reversing the trend of argument, one could establish a set of
propositions directly contrary to those in the book, granted that one
were permitted to qualify them to the extent that the author qualifies
his. And the author might have been more careful in his "research"
on some of the examples he uses to prove his points. Ile does not
know very much about the Bay of Pigs episode, for example, nor about
several other things which he blithely adduces as evidence.
In spite of these animadversions, there is a good deal of interest
in this book. For us, in governmental or military intelligence, it is
broadening to see "intelligence" considered as an aspect of business
organization: the disaster of the Edsel, for example, is attributed to
a failure of intelligence, and the sorry story of the "Great Salad Oil
Swindle" perpetrated by Anthony De Angelis from 1957 to 1963 is
given a whole entertaining chapter. Police work gets attention, and
a good deal is drawn from the author's own previous work on the
organization of labor unions. Indeed, the concept of intelligence
gets a wider definition than we are accustomed to; it is taken to embrace
the whole contribution of "experts" to enterprise. It thus includes
such things as the strategic studies of the RAND Corporation and the
activities of the Council of Economic Advisers. The author considers
this last to be a model of the way that intelligence ought to be
organized and administered.
I have struggled with this book for a long time and still have the
lurking feeling that it must somehow be a better book than it seems.
Certainly it will prove a quarry of material for the next man who
writes a book on intelligence, and it will furnish learned footnotes
to the next behavioral scientist who writes about the organization of
social enterprises.
Abbot Smith
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AL-HARB AL-NAFSIYYAH: Marakah al Kalimah wal-Mutaqad (Psy-
chological Warfare: the Battle of the Word and the Doctrine). By
Salah Nasr. (Cairo: Dar al-Qahirah lil Tibaah wal-Nashr. 1966.
Vol, I, 636 pp., LE 1 [$2.40]; Vol. II, 471 pp., 80 piastres [$2.00].)
The author of these volumes on psychological warfare is the former
Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Department presently
under arrest for his role in the Abd-al-Hakim Amir "suicide." Volume
I, devoted to "The Word," discusses a number of topics as diverse as
the formation of social attitudes, the nature of rumors, and the use
of psychological warfare to "combat imperialist intrigues against the
Egyption Revolution." Volume II, "The Doctrine," covers an equally
broad spectrum, ranging from brainwashing to methods of corrupting
public opinion.
The work is almost entirely derived from books in English on social
and abnormal psychology and on propaganda. It appears to have been
intended as lecture material in a training program for new Egyptian
intelligence officers. In its present form it may suffer from having
been sanitized for publication; in any case the treatment it gives to the
many topics it covers is very cursory, often little more than a short
definition of each.
Book seven of Vol. I, "Intelligence and Analysis," may be taken as
typical of the work. An intelligence officer glancing through its
chapter headings-the role of intelligence in psychological warfare, the
intelligence of propaganda, the analysis of propaganda-and its intro-
ductory affirmation that
The future of any country will depend on the exactness of the information
that intelligence supplies it as the basis on which important national policy
decisions are made .. .
is led to expect an interesting in-depth discussion of the subject, par-
ticularly from a professional who headed an intelligence service from
the mid-1950's until the summer of 1967. But instead he is taken on
a mad 60-page dash through some forty sub-topics into which the
chapters are divided, most of them having little relationship to the
chapter headings.
The result is first a feeling of dizziness in the reader, and then,
after a pause to collect one's thoughts, a sense of having been cheated.
John Bedrosian
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A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: The Unknown Story of the U.S.
Navy's Guerrilla Forces in World War II China. By Vice-Admiral
Milton E. Miles, USN (Ret.), as prepared from the original manu-
script by Hawthorne Daniel. (New York: Doubleday. 1967. 629
pp. $7.95.)
This is the posthumous revision of a manuscript left by "Mary"
Miles describing in great detail his experiences in organizing, develop-
ing, and operating Navy Group China, the American component of
a quasi-covert joint enterprise called the Sino-American Cooperative
Organization that was highly effective in irregular intelligence opera-
tions in the China Theater during World War II. The Chinese com-
ponent of SACO was supplied by General Tai Li's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Statistics. General Tai was Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted
subordinate, charged with China's internal security and the coordina-
tion of China's clandestine activities against Japan.
Miles was sent out in April 1942 with verbal orders from Admiral
King to survey the resources of the BIS and ascertain how it could
contribute to what were then the Navy planners' ultimate objectives,
landings on the China coast. "In the meantime," King directed, "do
what you can for the Navy and to heckle the Japanese." Miles, then
with the rank of Captain, satisfied himself as to the BIS potential and
worked out in consultation with Tai the draft of the agreement that
was to establish SACO. The essence of the compact was that Tai
would be in command but all SACO operations would be under joint
operational control. Miles would command the American component
and also take charge of certain joint activities which were of primary
interest to the American side-meteorological observation and report-
ing, for example.
The agreement became effective, after topside approval in the
Theater and in Washington, on 1 April 1943, but it was obvious from
the outset that SACO's efficacy would depend to a large degree on
the development of mutual confidence between the tvvo parties.
Tai was suspicious of all foreign intelligence liaison. He had refused
a liaison offered by the British, fearing that in the postwar period they
would work' against China's interests. He suspected that the OSS,
active in India and Burma, might be under British influence. He did
not wholly understand American wartime intelligence arrangements
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and so was dubious as to how far he could trust Miles and still protect
the interests of his country. Thus it was Miles' primary task to build
such trust.
Miles well appreciated this fact. The basic operational program for
Navy Group China, the program in which he indoctrinated his com-
mand, called for the creation of a truly combined Sino-American
operational staff to make the fullest possible use of Chinese knowledge
of their own country and the tactical problems of clandestine opera-
tions against the Japanese there on the one hand and take advantage
of American planning, organization, and grasp of techniques on the
other. This staff was to serve, rather than command, the men in the
field, and the field components were to be as integrated as the staff.
Whenever the BIS component of SACO balked at an operational plan
proposed by Navy Group China, the Navy planners simply made sure
that their Chinese colleagues fully understood the proposal and its
rationale. They never tried to coerce them to comply.
Thus there were never outstanding disagreements between the two
parties, and Tai began to trust the Americans in SACO. This was no
small gain. With the exception of the 14th Air Force, there were
few if any other American units in China whose personnel refrained
from overt public criticism of virtually every phase of the Chinese
war effort. Tai was well aware of this and could not help viewing
the Sino-American military alliance with some misgivings.
As BIS and Navy Group China continued to work together, their
developing spirit of mutual respect was enhanced by the fact that
Miles imposed austerity on his men and as a rule had them live with
and not much better than their Chinese colleagues. As mutual trust
led to mutual understanding, these led to a mutuality of effort, In the
long run, the BIS contingent of SACO probably contributed more
to the realization of purely Navy Group China objectives than the
Americans could to projects of more direct value to the BIS. Navy
Group China. was all too often hampered in meeting Chinese needs
by interference from the American Theater command and the American
Embassy.
Admiral Miles' comments on these joint operations-scattered
throughout the book, with greatest concentration in its thirteenth
chapter-form in their entirety a manual on how the United States
should carry out its liaison, intelligence and military, with lesser
powers. The most successful American commanders in China during
World War II were Generals Wedemeyer and Chennault, and their
approach to the Chinese was in many respects not unlike Miles'.
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The most entertaining part of the Admiral's book lies in his stories
about the SACO field units, some of the operations they carried out,
and his reconnaissance trips near Japanese-held territory. Miles is a
superb raconteur; and if he exaggerates the exploits of his men from
time to time and often fails to give credit to other Chinese and
American units associated with SACO in a given action, we must take
into account his intense pride in Navy Group China and the high
SACO esprit de corps that was so largely of his making.
Another subject that Admiral Miles deals with in considerable
detail, passim, is General Tai Li's character. To most Americans in
this country and in China, Tai was a sinister figure. Our Chungking
Embassy and most of the Western correspondents in China vied with
one another in condemning him. "China's Himmler" was one of the
kinder epithets they used on him, and senior American military officers
often echoed these sentiments. But as Miles points out, Tai's critics
had no first-hand evidence to support their charges; they were merely
parroting the accusations of his Chinese political rivals.
As China's chief of security, Tai was under oath to preserve the
political integrity of the Nationalist government, a body riddled
with dissension. That this integrity was preserved through the war
years was due at least as much to General Tai as any other man.
The force at his disposal was minimal, and he carried out l'ais respon-
sibilities much more by persuasion than by coercion. A policeman's
life is not a happy one. On the basis of conversations with knowl-
edgeable but disinterested Chinese and personal observation of activi-
ties at some of the BIS installations, I believe that Admiral Miles'
portrait of Tai is by far the most faithful that has appeared in print.
Too much of Miles' book is devoted to his effort, fruitless in the
end, to maintain a monopoly over American clandestine activities in
China. Here he was undoubtedly motivated by Admiral King's
injunction to "do what you can for the Navy," which it seems he
interpreted to mean the exclusion of other American armed services.
He went to great lengths to keep other American intelligence opera-
tional organizations, particularly OSS, from carrying out their func-
tions in areas where SACO was active. Doggedly he resisted the
attempts of General Wedemeyer to bring SACO under his command.
Ile goes into his discussions with Wedemeyer at considerable length,
pointing out the general's predisposition to favor OSS over SACO.
He is blind to the obvious fact that Wedemeyer found OSS a valuable
adjunct and much more manageable than SACO.
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He liked and respected Wedemeyer, and so concludes that the
General was badly advised by his staff. This may well have been
true too, for there was considerable opposition in the Army, both
in Washington and Chungking, to having a Navy unit in China per-
forming functions that could be carried out equally well by branches
of the ground and air forces. In any event, as Miles relates in some
detail, from the date that General Wedemeyer assumed command in
China, the fortunes of Navy Group China waned while those of
OSS grew and prospered in the same proportion.
Miles' bias in favor of the Navy and of Navy Group China leads
him to make extravagant claims and misstatements of fact too numer-
ous to list. The book tries to leave the impression that if it had not
been for the OSS and the Army, the SACO operation would have
shortened the war in China by a considerable amount of time. It
is sidetracked from the story of SACO's achievements (which were
many in the areas of coast watching and weather and radio intelli-
gence) and methods of operation to trying to prove how wrong
OSS and the Army were and how right SACO was. Throughout it
implies that OSS was not well led, created difficulties in the field,
and accomplished little. Some of the evidence it cites to this effect
is patently false: that John Coughlin moved his headquarters to Ceylon
for the sake of the good living there; that OSS requisitioned single-
barrel shotguns for use in the guerrilla fighting in Burma; that the
only successful operation in Thailand during the war was the one
Miles sponsored; that OSS personnel in SACO were prima donnas
because they did not want to use chopsticks at every meal.
Although A Different Kind of War is thus partisan, tortured, and
unconvincing in many places, with errors of fact and misleading con-
clusions, it is nevertheless of no slight worth. Its treatment of the
problem of melding clandestine operations with conventional military
intelligence and operations in an active theater is outstanding, required
reading for all concerned with such problems. It is of equal, if
not greater, value for the military or civilian officer responsible for
developing the military, covert action, or intelligence capacity of a
minor power. And those who served in China during World 'War II
will derive much pleasure from Miles' accounts of SACO operations
as well as from his revelations about the bitter rivalries in the Theater.
A. R. Northridge and
James R. Teevan
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LA GUERRE SECRETE DES SERVICES SPECIAUX FRANcAIS.
By Michel Garder. (Paris: Plon. 1967. 528 pp. 25 fr.,
If the French government had not disregarded the advice and
warnings of its intelligence service, World War II might have ended
differently and France might not be what she is today. Such is the
contention of Michel Garder in this book about the work of the Service
de Renseignements before and during the war. He center.; his history
of the SR from 1935 to 1945 on the biographies of General :Louis Rivet,
Colonel Paul Paillole, and Colonel Roger Lafond ("Verneuil"), three
of its key figures. A former counterespionage officer himself, Garder
knew and worked with all the French intelligence chiefs during the
10-year period. He obviously has the greatest admiration and respect
for Colonel Paillole, but his words of affection for Verneu:il are heart-
warming to anyone who ever knew "le petit pere."
Carder is writing about men loyal to Marechal Petain and General
Giraud. He ably defends this loyalty and the old SR and is definitely
hostile to the Gaullist BCRA (Bureau de Contre-espionnage, de
Renseignement, et d'Action) which eventually absorbed the SR. He
makes no effort to hide his disdain for General de Gaulle 's followers
who "deserted the sinking ship" and went to London, where Colonel
Passy (Andre de Wavrin) founded the BCRA, a complex mixture
"of shady patriotism, partisan spirit, pride in always having, been right,
and unhealthy suspicion of everything and everyone near or far that
smacked of the enemy number one-the Vichy heresy." The SR
veterans "felt uprooted in this environment which was not theirs;
another language was being spoken, and further, the spirit was dif-
ferent: we had a feeling of being watched."
In precise and authoritative language, often lit with flashes of appeal-
ing humor, Garder calmly tells the story of the SR of the "'old timers,"
professional soldiers and men of integrity, extraordinarily competent
and brave. These career officers constituted an intelligence organiza-
tion of great value because they were infected with "the virus of in-
telligence which the uninitiated cannot know." The book contains
revelations which clash brutally with the carefully nurtured official
version of events. Without a doubt it will become an annex in-
dispensable for a complete understanding of the history of World
War II.
In great detail, Garder describes the successes and failures of the
SR in the framework of the history of the period. As early as 1935,
he says, Colonel Rivet, head of the SR, had warned that Germany
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would occupy the Rhineland, as it did on 7 March 1936, but the
Sarraut government preferred to wait for the event to happen before
taking action. Admiral Canaris had advised Hitler that the French
would not move. The SR's remarkably good information on Hitler's
intentions before the war was due, according to Garder, to Paillole,
who from the beginning of his career believed in the doctrine of
offensive counterespionage as opposed to mere defensive reaction.
Moreover, it was his principle that "counterespionage does not mean
doubling traitors and defectors and gangsters who eat like scavengers
where they can. It means using people of integrity and trust. The
real penetration agent is one who is motivated by patriotism or hate
of the regime." "We must attack the enemy," Paillole used to say,
and the SR did attack. Rivet did not like the Popular Front, but he
did his job and did not meddle in politics as Canaris did in Germany.
His Guy Schlesser in 1936 "knew the German army better than the
French army." In Berlin, Paul Stehlin of the SR could and did see
Goering frequently, and Andre Francois-Poncet and Maurice Dejean
had excellent sources there.
By 1937, the author continues, the SR had three phenomenal sources
in Germany. One was a code clerk who furnished the blueprints
of the German code machine, so the French were reading the Nazi
traffic. That year the Service was able to get its controlled agents
recruited by the Abwehr. It had the OKW orders at the time General
Beck was replaced because of his opposition to the projected attack
on Czechoslovakia. Although it continued to warn the government,
Leon Blum took no action and General Gamelin was undisturbed.
"The Berlin post is too pessimistic," he would say; and then Stehlin
was only a captain. In 1938 the French government had over a
month's warning before Munich.
At this time the task before the SR was to eliminate traitors in
France who were giving information to the Abwehr and so become
the sole supplier itself. So successful was this effort that the com-
paratively rich Abwehr was financing French intelligence through
double-agent operations.
In 1939 no one in France except the SR believed in the possibility
of a German-Soviet pact. But Paillole and General Baril of the SR
predicted such a pact and Germany's march on Poland. Poland
was warned; and since at this time liaison between the French and
British was very close, MI-6 was also forewarned. Even the dis-
memberment of Poland did not convince certain Maginot-Line gen-
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orals in France that the Germans would attack the West, but the
SR had received the information that Hitler would invade the Low
Countries and also Norway and Denmark. Maisonneuve, an assistant
of Baril, predicted in the spring of 1940 that Hitler would overrun
France in a month, and everyone thought him crazy.
After the fall of France, Garder relates, Paillole immediately saw
the possibility of operating clandestinely and welcomed it. He or-
ganized a clandestine counterespionage service; his men took aliases
and went underground. Two months after the armistice, a security
service called Bureau des Menees Antinationales was established by
Colonel Rivet; it had the approval of the Nazis because it was
supposed to investigate "subversives" in unoccupied France. Admiral
Darlan was opposed to the MA but tolerated it. Laval, however,
instructed Rivet "to take no intelligence action against Germany and
not to collaborate with the British and the Americans." Rivet dis-
obeyed. The MA got hold of the OKW order, dated 10 May 1940 and
signed by Keitel, which called for an invasion of the UK and then
an attack on the USSR. This document was passed to the British
and the Soviets at Vichy.
From shortly after the Germans arrived in Paris until 1942 the SR
had a tap on the telephone cable between Paris and Berlin and
monitored the Wehrmacht traffic, including Hitler's calls from the
"Wolf's Lair." Garder says that this source was able to warn resistance
people who were about to be arrested. Judging by the product of the
tap, the Germans thought that Vichy was wholeheartedly on their
side. This was of course not the case; both Rivet and his associate
Revers did everything in their power to wage the secret war until
they were relieved of their commands by Darlan, who thought the
French should fight the Bolsheviks alongside the Abwehr. Rivet
described such ideas as "monstrous." Although loyal to the person
of Marechal Petain, Rivet and his group viewed collaboration with
the Germans as "the collaboration existing between a butcher and his
sausages." So when they were instructed to repress the Gaullists and
other anti-Nazis, they refused.
After the complete occupation of France, the SR continued to func-
tion under the cover of an organization called Travaux li.uraux, and
men with flair and prudence like Verneuil stayed in France throughout.
[n Algeria under Giraud, Rivet remained overall director, with Paillole
in charge of counterespionage. Paillole advised Giraud to make peace
with De Gaulle, and the De Gaulle-Giraud combination of the CFLN
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(Committee of National Liberation) was formed. In November 1943
a civilian, Jacques Soustelle, was put in charge of the Direction
Generale des Services Speciaux, so for the first time the SR was taken
out of the General Staff. After the liberation, the organization 'became
the DGER (Direction Generale d'Etude et de Recherche), and finally
the SDECE (Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-
espionnage). The book ends at this point because Rivet and Paillole
leave the picture and the BCRA triumphs over the SR in the successor
organization. A footnote might have indicated that in 1966, after
the Ben Barka case, the SDECE was again placed under the Ministry
of National Defense.
The author makes only two brief references to the very important
role of the Communists in the Resistance, noting that they took over
the Comite' pour Action Militaire only after the liquidation of jean
Moulin, the Gaullist resistance hero-who does not appear in his
book until page 388. Similarly, and even more puzzlingly, since he is
Russian-born and a recognized authority on Soviet affairs, he says
nothing whatever about the very significant activity of the Soviet
intelligence services in France during the 1935-45 period.
Paillole, who is still alive, having escaped the fate of 1Bidault,
Soustelle, and the generals who helped De Gaulle return to power
and were then purged, probably helped Garder write this book. It is
therefore understandable that the Gaullists are the villains, with men
like Saar-Demichel, Foccard, and Hounau not mentioned, and Passy,
Wybot, Fourcaud, and Vaudreuil mentioned only briefly. On the
other hand, Maurice Dumont, who was a protege of Paillole and
Verneuil, gets credit for "having liquidated in one blow the whole
anti-French espionage and propaganda network operated by the
German armistice commission in Casablanca."
Concerning OSS Garder writes:
The most unsuccessful feature of the impressive American war machine,
its Achilles' heel as it were, was none other than the famous OSS which so
many novels have since glorified. An improvised outfit, made up mainly of
incongruent elements, without traditions and approved methods, wasting
enormous resources in obtaining very meager results . . . the shakedown
cruise of this organization was not yet completed at the end of 1944. Never-
theless, this toy of the wealthy fascinated many neophytes of French intelli-
gence. It was to this type of fancy-dress OSS rather than to the old-time
intelligence service that the ambitious directors of the DGER tended to gravi-
tate, spurning with scorn that quality characteristically French-the sense of
size.
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The serious student of World War II intelligence must read Larder's
book, but he must balance this account of what happened with the
evidence of other witnesses, especially the Souvenirs of Passy, Memoires
de Guerre, Vol. III, of De Gaulle, Resistance by Georges Bidault,
Second Bureau by Philip Stead, Histoire de la Resistance by Henri
Michel, Envers et Contre Tout by Jacques Soustelle, Mes Camarades
Sont Morts by Pierre Nord, and Chemins Secrets by Colonel Groussard.
THE DEATH OF GENERAL SIKORSKI. By David Irving. (Lon-
don: William Kimber. 1967. 231 pp. 45/-.)
This book is of unusual counterintelligence interest. After ex-
amining all available evidence with 25 years of hindsight, David
Irving concludes that the cause of the airplane crash at Gibraltar in
which General Wladyslav Sikorski and his daughter and thirteen others
died remains a mystery. The Czech pilot, the only survivor, is said
to have been uncooperative with the author's inquiry.
At the time of his death on 4 July 1943, General Sikorsli, Premier
of the Polish government-in-exile and Chief of Staff of the Polish
Armed Forces, was a thorn in the side of the Soviets, the [Nazis, and
also the British. So rumors persist that this was a political assassina-
tion, and the findings of a British Court of Inquiry to the effect that
there was no evidence of sabotage and the pilot was in no way to blame
are disputed. The Poles pointed out that it had not been possible to
determine how the elevator controls had become jammed on takeoff
and rejected the British report as showing a tendency to pure polemics.
Irving delineates chronologically what happened before and after
Sikorski's death. His investigation of the case appears to have been
very thorough, but like Inspector Clousseau he cannot find its solution.
Solving old murders requires more than cold facts; some :hot flair is
indispensable. It seems we will have to wait for a Soviet defector
or someone like Maxwell Smart to tell us whether the Katyn massacre
and Sikorski's death were crimes closely connected, having a common
perpetrator.
The Soviets claim that the Nazis had the motive and opportunity to
murder Sikorski; they had a well-organized sabotage section. of proven
efficiency in Gibraltar. Many Poles, including the geneml's widow,
are inclined to believe that the crash was engineered by the Russians.
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The Communists in Warsaw at one stage even accused Stanislaw
Mikolajczyk of having caused Sikorski's death. German playwright
Rolf Hochhuth claims to have proof that he was murdered by British
intelligence; he learned this in the late autumn of 1963, he says, from
a member of the British intelligence services.
Irving comments on all these theories without resolving the con-
flict or establishing any significance in the following facts he offers:
that Alexander Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish
government in London, had his plane parked next to Si-
korski's Liberator in Gibraltar on the day of the "accident";
that in January 1942 the Polish Foreign Minister had asked Bogo-
molov about the fate of the 10,000 Poles, mostly officers, who
had been in prisoner-of-war camps in Kozielsk and Starobielsk
in the vicinity of Smolensk, and Bogomolov replied that they
had been freed (the world now knows what happened to them
in the Katyn forest);
that Sikorski had insisted on an investigation of the Katyn massa-
cre by the International Red Cross in Geneva after the bodies
were exhumed in April 1943, but none was conducted;
that Sikorski's plane had crashed once earlier, in taking off from
Montreal, and before that an incendiary device had been
found in it;
that in May 1943, a person speaking Polish advised Mikolajezyk
and other high Polish officers that Sikorski's plane had crashed
in Gibraltar, six weeks before the "accident" actually happened;
that there were a lot of British counterfeit pounds and furs. aboard
the plane at the time it crashed;
that FNU Pinder, identified as the head of the British intelligence
service in the Middle East, was also on board the Liberator;
that frogman Lieutenant Crabb, who years later disappeared
while Khrushchev was in London, was in Gibralter "working over
the boats" at the time and helped salvage the crashed Liberator;
that Dr. Josef Retinger, head of the Polish intelligence service,
who always accompanied Sikorski, did not do so on this trip;
that after the war Sumner Welles expressed before a U.S. con-
gressional hearing the belief that Sikorski's plane had been
sabotaged.
Thanks to Irving's book, we now know all these facts. The possi-
bility remains that some or even all of them have an explanation
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that is anything but sinister. But one is bound to wonder. We will
have to keep on wondering until an investigator with more flair than
Irving appears or until someone confesses to the assassination of
General Sikorski.
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Anthologies
GREAT TRUE SPY STORIES. Edited by Allen Dulles. (New York:
Harper & Row. 1968. 393 pp. $6.95.)
Allen Dulles has done both the general reading public and intelli-
gence trainees a service in compiling this anthology, a sort of case book
to accompany his Craft of Intelligence. As editor he contributes a fore-
word, a few explanatory paragraphs at the start of each of his eleven
sections, and introductory comments on each of the thirty-nine indi-
vidual stories in them. But his most important contribution lies in
the selection of these, made with the discrimination and care of a pro-
fessional. That places this book many cuts above any other anthology
in the field of which this reviewer is aware.
This professionalism does not mean that the book will not sell
well, for a paperback edition (when forthcoming) will be an eye-
catcher on any newsstand. While readers of the Ian Fleming genre,
or even devotees of David St. John or Edward S. Aarons, may mourn
the absence of a girl for every bed, fast cars, and special liqueurs,
these pages prove again that ofttimes in the real intelligence world
truth can be stranger than fiction; and when you get right down to
it there are some dandy adventure stories in the book. For those
who like their spy hero with weapon in hand, Mr. Dulles includes a
section entitled "Action: The Dagger Beneath the Cloak." Here we
have the kidnapping of two British intelligence officers by the Nazis
in 1939 as told by Walter Schellenberg; here also is the assassination
of two Ukrainian emigre leaders, Rebet and Bandera, by the Soviet
intelligence operative Stashinskiy, who subsequently defected himself.
Fewer than a quarter of the 39 stories date prior to World 'War II.
The surprise inclusion of a selection from The Memoirs of Jacques
Casanova seems to have given the editor particular satisfaction, in the
course of showing how an agent should not behave.
Mr. Dulles notes in his foreword that the anthology was not intended
. . . merely as a collection of entertaining spy stories. My aim has been
rather to present a comprehensive view of the business of clandestine intelli-
gence as it has been practiced during the present historical era and to do so
by drawing on available published materials.
The division of the material into eleven sections is accordingly done
by professional categories: Penetration, Networks, Counterespionage,
Double Agents, Defection, Evaluation, and the like.
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The first section; Penetration, opens with Richard Collier's exciting
narrative of how maps of Hitler's Atlantic Wall defenses were stolen
by an agent of the French Resistance. This is followed by a solid
piece on the anthologist's own wartime penetration agent in the Ger-
man Foreign Office. The section also contains Edward Sheehan's
excellent article on Kim Philby which appeared a few years ago in
The Saturday Evening Post. The recent disclosures on the Philby
case were published too late to be included, but in a postscript to the
Sheehan piece Mr. Dulles makes reference to them and. notes that
the Soviets
. . pushed rather than suppressed publicity regarding [Philby in Moscow],
in hopes, no doubt, that the more publicity that could be giver. to this affair
the deeper the wedge could be driven into the Anglo-American cooperation
which has been in operation for many years. Certainly it would only play
into Soviet hands if we engaged in recriminations as a result of the Philby
treason.
The Section on Codes and Ciphers includes the letters on our break-
ing of Japanese and German codes which General Marshall sent to
Governor Dewey at the start of the 1944 Presidential campaign in order
to forestall any exposure of this information in the course of Repub-
lican attacks on President Roosevelt's policies before Pearl Harbor.
Of these letters Mr. Dulles writes that "there is nothing like them in
the whole history of intelligence." Governor Dewey did keep silent
about our communications intelligence activity during his campaign,
but it is interesting to note that he was aware of its successes even
before he received the letters.
The whole anthology is recommended for good authentic bedside
reading.
SECRET SERVICE: Thirty-three Centuries of Espionage. By Rich-
ard Wilmer Rowan with Robert G. Deindorfer. (New York: Haw-
thorn. 1967. 788 pp. $10.)
The book under review is an updating of the late Mr. Rowan's
comprehensive history of espionage, originally entitled The Story of
Secret Service (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co.).
At the time of its original publication in 1937 it was probably the best
history of its kind extant, and it remains so today. Nevertheless it
left something to be desired. Although it was almost 700 pages long,
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ecent ~40o S: n o ogles
any history that ranges from Biblical times to the beginning of World
War II is bound to be rather sketchy in its treatment of cases. More-
over, Rowan was an amateur with respect to espionage, dedicated in
this study to be sure, but still a professional writer rather than a pro-
fessional intelligence officer.
From the mid-1930's on, increasing taxes and rising costs of living
made it impossible for families to pass great private libraries and
collections on to their heirs as they had done in the past. As a result,
countless such libraries and family archives went the way of either
public sale or gift to public libraries and institutions, where they
became available to scholars. Thus almost from the date that Rowan's
book was published, new original and secondary sources were com-
mencing to become available which could have been used to enhance
it greatly. On several occasions Rowan told this reviewer of his desire
to update The Story of Secret Service with regard both to the history
already covered and to new cases of the three subsequent decades.
With Rowan's death, his book has now been updated by Robert
Deindorfer and given the new title. Virtually the entire original text
has been retained, with some deletion and condensation. Deindor-
fer's additions commence at page 573 of the new volume and amount
to about one-seventh of the total. The results are disappointing. A
part-time "quickie" writer without professional intelligence background,
Deindorfer has not performed the research required to improve the
original Rowan text or to make his own 100-page contribution mean-
ingful. He apparently was writing in a hurry; he did in fact fail to
meet his deadlines for the book. His brush is broad, and there are
occasional inaccuracies. It is apparent from his text, and particularly
from his footnote references, that he made little use of the good sources
available to anyone willing to take the time to search them out.
Among the major postwar cases, one checks the index in vain for
such as that of Pacques in France, Frenzel and Felfe in Germany, and
Petrov in Australia. Penkovskiy is dealt with in nine lines and Wen-
nerstrom in eight. Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs are strangely absent.
Deindorfer notes the award of the National Security Medal to NSA
cryptologist Frank B. Rowlett, but makes no mention of the same
award to William F. Friedman or of his famous cryptologic successes.
Ile spins off a totally inadequate write-up of the OSS in eight pages,
devoting an additional five to Allen Dulles' penetration of the German
Foreign Office. He calls General Donovan "vain and opinionated"
but "thoroughly decent, dedicated," and he finds the designation of
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Donovan as the father of present-day American intelligence "a bit
excessive." Deindorfer's qualifications to make such judgments are
not evident.
Allen Dulles contributed a short preface to Secret Service, stressing
the need for secrecy in clandestine work and pointing out how wide of
the mark most of the literature is in this field. He notes the signifi-
cance of Rowan's original work and then goes overboard in kindness
to say that Deindorfer has brought "an accurate and objective sense
of perspective" to his portion of the present volume. This reviewer
recommends that the reader stop his reading of the book at page 572.
Walter Pforzheimer
THE DEFECTORS. By Colonel Vernon Hinchley. (London: Har-
rap. 1967. 250 pp. 25/-.)
The reader looking for a compendium of defector case studies should
run, not walk, past this sorry little book. It is a jumble of opinion,
distorted facts, and wrong conclusions on such cases as Burgess and
Maclean, Penkovskiy, Lord Haw-Haw, Hayhanen, Monat, Casement,
Rohrer ("No more damaging blow to Western Security was inflicted
than the defection of Sergeant Glenn Rohrer of the American Intelli-
gence Service [sic]"), Philby ("It is now suggested that Philby, like
Alger Hiss, was picked out by the Russians while he was still in the
university, as a man likely to rise in the world. But this is the kind
of rumour which always arises when a case comes out into the open.
'T'here is not the slightest evidence that it is true."), etc.
One suspects that the author had it in mind to show that if the
British have been embarrassed by defections from their ranks, the
Americans are in even worse shape: "The Americans look askance at
what they regard as the rather loose British Security system, but it is
a question of the beam and the mote." Colonel Hinchley's efforts to
substantiate this line are not convincing. The profundity of his efforts
in general may be judged by his conclusion. In this he says that
defectors must be serious-minded, mentally tough introverts, and he
doubts that they could ever be the life of a party. "In fact, all I have
against the average defector is that I could never like him very
much("
John P. Vaillancourt
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