VIET CONG MANPOWER PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200290008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
'I,NTELLI(JENCE
'OfL' a,ipo/4?er P "I)blt' 01.S
ARMY review(s) completed.
Secret
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WARNING
'1 hi~, drrcnment c1)iIt [ os information affecting the national
defr use of thc (1flhrl States, v~ithin the ineaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 79-1, of the CS (;ode, as amended.
Its trtnsmissr.on or revr lation of its contents to or re-
ecil)t by an ou:uithorizer rsou is prohibited by lavv.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Documentary Evidence . . . . . . ' ' 3
II. Reasons for Manpower Problems of the Viet Cong . . . 4
III. Consequences of Manpower Problems . . . . . . . . 5
IV. Changes in Manpower Policies . . . 6
Map
Administrative Divisions in South Vietnam following page . 4
- iii -
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VIET CONG MANPOWER PROBLEMS*
Summary
A study of enemy documents captured in South. Vietnam indicates that
during 1966 the Viet Cong experienced increasing difficulties in keeping
certain units up to strength and in recruiting new manpower for their
military units and civilian labor force. Their difficulties were largely
the result of the rapid expansion of Communist forces in 1965 and in-
creasing losses through combat, desertions, and defections. Growing
hardships anda:lessening of confidence in victory have contributed to the
growing number of desertions and defections and have hampered recruit-
ment as well. The evacuation of Vietnamese civilians to areas controlled
by the Government of South Vietnam and the increased presence of allied
troops have also impeded recruitment.
The Viet Cong have had to upgrade an increasing number of local and
irregular forces to keep main force units up to strength. The result has
been a deterioration in the quality of local and irregular forces. There
is as yet no indication that manpower problems will force the Viet Cong
to curtail their combat operations. If these problems worsen in 1967,
however, the pace and scope of combat operations may be affected.
This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office
of Research and Reports and coordinated with. the Office of Special Assist-
ant for Vietnamese Affairs, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the
Office of National Estimates; the estimates and conclusions represent the
best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of March 1967.
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I. Documentary Evidence
Documents issued by the Viet Cong Central Office of South Vietnam
(COSVN) as well as by Viet Cong regional and provincial agencies have
revealed manpower shortages and recruitment difficulties in a number
of areas. In its report for May 1966, for example, the Forward Supply
Council for Viet Cong Military Region I (see the map) acknowledged a
request of the Party Committee of Ba Ria Province to reduce the latter's
draft requirements by 40 percent. Farther south in Long An Province --
an area of traditionally strong Communist control -- a directive of the
Viet Cong Current Affairs Committee, dated April 1966, stated explicitly
that there had been manpower shortages and insufficient recruitment in
the province since the beginning of the year. Evidence of a lack of avail-
able recruits also is contained in a captured document (dated September
1966) of the Viet Cong military staff headquarters for Binh Duong Province.
In addition, two Viet Gong who recently defected to the Government of
South Vietnam reported unsuccessful recruitment drives in Quang Nam
Province in 1966.
.Inability to mobilize sufficient manpower to meet the requirements
of the "front lines" also is indicated in a Viet Cong directive of May
1966 for the Forward Supply Council of Phu Yen Province and in the
minutes for January 1967 of a district Forward Supply Council of the
recently established Viet Cong Thu Dau Mot Province (formerly, the
Viet Cong Binh Duong and Phuoc Thanh Provinces). Similarly, a cap-
tured document of the Viet Gong Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province
states that the difficulties encountered in the buildup of forces during
the first five months of 1966 were "due to the shortage of recruits, who
can no longer be obtained from villages and hamlets. " This document
also suggests that, in some areas, combat capabilities of Viet Cong
units have been affected by their inability to obtain necessary replace-
ments.
I I-- who defected to the Government of
South " tnam in August 1966 from the Viet Cong which 25X1
operates - provided urther evidence
of the inability of the Viet Cong to get needed replacements. He stated
that his division had considerable difficulty keeping up to strength
because of the lack of replacements. attempted 25X1
to maintain strength by using North. Vietnamese as fillers and by
taking recruits directly into the division from training centers, in
spite of the fact that many had apparently had no previous military ex-
perience. * Available evidence also indicates that some North Vietnamese
>Q It should be noted that there is evidence of the Viet Cong being used
as fillers for North Vietnamese Army units in other areas.
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forces have appeared as replacements even in local force units in Viet
Cong Military Regions V and VI.
A Viet Cong notebook, captured in the recent Operation Cedar Falls,
reveals the extent of the Viet Cong's inability to fulfill manpower goals.
This notebook, probably written by a member of the COSVN Current
Affairs Committee, indicated that Viet Cong recruitment throughout the
country is a serious problem and that irregular forces have decreased
in both quantity and quality. In addition, a captured 1966 report of the
Military Staff for Viet Cong Military Region IV stated that the Viet Cong
experienced "great problems in recruiting personnel" in the region.
The recruitment goal for 1966 was 5, 000 men, but only 600 men were
enlisted.
Captured documents also suggest that similar problems exist with
respect to civilian laborers. In populous Binh Dinh Province, where
the Communists have relied on local manpower to provide food and
replacements for their main force units in the highlands, an enemy
directive issued in May 1966 stated that, because of a shortage of
labor, military units would henceforth receive only 40 percent of their
rice ration in the form of husked rice. The remaining 60 percent would
be paddy to be husked by the units themselves. Similarly, a report
for May 1966 of the Forward Supply Council for Viet Cong Military
Region I revealed that during the first five months of 1966 the Com-
munists were able to recruit only about 45 percent of their civilian
manpower requirements in five of the seven provinces in this region.
An additional indication of the strained manpower situation is the grow-
ing criticism by high party officials of improper mobilization and use of
civilian laborers by local Viet Cong party committees.
II. Reasons for Manpower Problems of the Viet Cong
The current manpower problems of the Viet Cong are in part the
result of the considerable buildup of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
forces during 1965 and in part the result of their increasing losses through
combat, desertions, and defections. Viet Cong recruitment rose consider-
ably during 1965 as a result of increasing emphasis on main force opera-
tions. In order to satisfy their increased manpower needs, Viet Cong
main force units drew much more heavily on experienced local and
irregular forces to reinforce their own ranks. The demand for admin-
istrative and:sup'port. personnel also increased. Although reliable
estimates on the demand for and supply of Viet Cong manpower cannot
be made, available information suggests that the Viet Cong were at
least partly successful in meeting their increased manpower needs in
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Administrative Divisions in South Vietnam
COMMUNIST (VIET CONG)
UVEN
DUC
TUVEN
DUC
PHUOC NINH
QUANG TRI
THUA HIEN
QUANG NAM
QUANG T
VC Military Region (MR) boundary
- Province boundary
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Demililur ed Zone
------ RVN Corps boundary
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1965 .by recruiting new troops and by upgrading local forces, irregulars,
and low-level cadres. As a result, however, the number of irregular
forces appears to have fallen steadily since the end of 1965, contributing
in part to the growing manpower problems experienced by the Viet Cong
in 1966.
Losses by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces have also been
an important factor contributing to current manpower problems. Official
figures of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) on losses
by Communist main force units and local and irregular forces during
1966 are as follows: 56, 000 killed,* 2, 000 prisoners of war, and
13, 000 military defections. Enemy losses also included 7, 000 political
defections and an unknown but probably significant number of seriously
wounded and dead carried off the battlefield. In addition, it is estimated
that a large number of the Viet Cong deserted their units and returned
home. The total of these losses, however, is probably still below current
estimates of the number of Viet Cong recruited plus the number of
North Vietnamese infiltrated during 1966.
The growing number of desertions and defections stems partly from
the increasing physical and mental hardships experienced by the troops for example, shortages of food and medicines, high rates of illness,
increasing battle casualties, and the necessity to move frequently in
order to avoid allied military action. In addition, there is probably a
growing realization among the enemy rank and file that a decisive military
victory, is far from certain. Such factors also probably deter many poten-
tial recruits from joining the Viet Cong. Captured documents show that
recruitment is impeded as well by the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians
to government-controlled areas and by the increased presence of allied
troops. The notebook captured in Operation Cedar Falls, for example,
indicated that, as a result of the presence of US forces, ** the Viet Cong
lost control of or access to one million persons in rural areas during
the period from about mid-1965 to late 1966.
III. Consequences of Manpower Problems
As a result of these manpower problems, the Viet Cong have had
to upgrade an increasing number of irregular forces to secure replace-
ments for their main.fox,ce units. Because upgrading has been particu-
larly heavy over the past year and a half, there are now considerably
* It should be carefully noted that MACV figures on losses include
an undetermined number of civilian casualties.
** According to the notebook, there were .5 million persons in Viet Cong-
controlled areas in 1966. Official US figures for the number of persons
under Viet Cong control currently range from 3. 5 to 5 million persons.
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fewer trained men in the irregular forces. In two districts of Ba Xuyen
Province, for example, the Viet Cong complained early in 1966 that the
decision of COSVN in 1965 to upgrade guerrillas and village level cadres
to meet the needs of Viet Cong Military Region I resulted in their being
forced to recruit fillers who were incompetent and illiterate. Statements
25X1 of the defector, I also suggest that the enemy guerrilla
forces in several areas are no longer capable of supplying large numbers
of men with basic military experience for upgrading to main force units.
The captured Viet Cong notebook indicated that 20 to 30 percent of
"qualified or backbone cadre" (presumably at the hamlet and village
level) were transferred to higher echelons between mid-1965 and late
1966.
The guerrilla elements probably are now trying to hold on more
tightly to the qualified men still in their ranks, and in some areas
competition apparently has developed between Viet Cong main forces
and guerrillas for new recruits. A recently captured document, be-
lieved to have been prepared at least at the regional level and issued
early in 1966, indicated that the Viet Cong main force and guerrilla
units were competing vigorously for the assignment of new recruits
to their own services.
IV. Changes in Manpower Policies
To compensate for their inability to obtain needed recruits, the
Viet Cong have modified some of their policies for procuring man-
power. Captured documents indicate that they are now cutting back
on "excess" personnel working in civilian agencies and that these
"excess" staff people are being used as replacements in combat units.
In August 1966, the Viet Cong headquarters unit of Bien Hoa Province
issued a directive calling for a reduction of personnel working in Staff
and Political Sections and Rear Service agencies at province and district
levels to help meet the replacement requirements for combat units
in the province. Another captured document of September 1966 stated
that, in compliance with "higher echelon" directives, Viet Cong party
chapters should send some of their own members, including hamlet
and village cadre, to enlist in military units. Moreover, according
to a report of October 1966, the Viet Cong Party Committee of Tra
Vinh Province had directed that, wherever necessary, replacements
for combat units would be drawn from qualified administrative cadre
within the province.
Similarly, a captured document, dated November 1966, indicates
that the purpose of the COSVN directive to merge Viet Cong Binh Duong
(y
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and Phuoc Thanh Provinces into Thu Dau Mot Province was to improve
the command and control of military forces as well as to increase the
availability of reinforcements for combat units by reducing staff
agencies. Although Viet Cong civilian agencies probably have been
overstaffed, tentative evidence suggests that, in order to assure a
flow of qualified personnel in military units over the past year, some
functions of local party committees were sacrificed and in some areas
the local party structure was weakened temporarily.
There have been other modifications in Viet Cong recruitment
policies. Because of .a lack of males, Viet Cong forces appear to be
using women increasingly -- in both civilian and military capacities.
For example, the captured document of September 1966 indicates that
party chapters have been directed to widen the responsibilities of women
in order to offset the loss of male personnel. In addition, one of the
defectors from Quang Nam Province stated that because his unit was
unsuccessful in obtaining male recruits, it was forced to enlist women
as combatants. Other modifications include more widespread recruit-
ment of youths below the age of 16 and above age 50* and renewed
emphasis on getting former Viet Cong veterans to re-enlist and South.
Vietnamese troops to defect. Finally, there have been some instances
recently in which the Viet Cong apparently have resorted to wholesale
kidnapping of civilians within a.village. Such tactics are used at least
in part to dragoon more manpower into the ranks, and the practice of
forced recruitment now seems to be more widespread than in recent
years.
Viet Cong recruitment is normally conducted among men between
the ages of 16 and 50 and women between the ages of 16 and 45.
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