CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001300020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 13 September 1953
L-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 2
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
C] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2d 0 9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: L /I LT. REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
Comment on Krushchev's appointment as first party secretary (page 3).
FAR EAST
Rhee seen violating both armistice and agreement with United States
(page 4).
Burmese report. to UN accuses Taipei of insincerity (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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vo/o Iranian prime minister Zahedi presses for more American aid (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Proposed draft of new Austrian note to USSR accedes to Moscow's
demands (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
Argentine ambassador may be intermediary for re-establishment of
Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin American countries (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
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1. Comment on Khrushchev's appointment as first party secretary:
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elected N. S. Khrushchev as first secretary of the Communist Party,
thereby confirming him in a position which he has in fact held since
G. M. Malenkov left the Secretariat on 14 March. This action, which is
further evidence of the close ties between Khrushchev and Malenkov,
does not appear to change the power relationship which has existed since
Beria was purged.
The USSR Central Committee plenum has
Khrushchev, who is 59 years old, has been
a member of the Central Committee since 1934. After serving as first
secretary in the Ukraine from 1938 to 1949, he became first secretary of
Moscow oblast and a member of the Central Committee's Secretariat in
1949. In 1939 he was made a member of the Politburo and has recently
been ranked third in Soviet listings of Presidium members, following
Malenkov and Molotov. His position as first secretary of the Central
Committee, however, probably means he is second only to Malenkov in
actual influence.
Khrushchev, an agricultural expert, is
generally considered to have been the instigator in 1950 of the policy of
amalgamating collective farms into larger units. Under this policy the
number of farms decreased from 254,000 at the beginning of 1950 to
97,000 by October 1952. However, a concomitant part of Khrushchev's
idea, the resettling of peasants into agrogords or large towns, was seri-
ously criticized in the press and never implemented. A report on agri-
cultural shortcomings which he presented to the plenum just prior to his
election indicates that he is now directly responsible for Soviet agricultural
affairs, a field with which Malenkov has been particularly concerned since
1946.
Although the full text of the Central Committee
decree resulting fromKhr.ushchev's report is not yet available, it appears to
follow closely the program for agriculture which Malenkov outlined at the
recent session of the Supreme Soviet. The decree reveals that the Ministry
of State Farms has been re-.established. This move supports other indi-
cations that the merger following Stalin's death of the various ministries
concerned with agriculture resulted in too large and unwieldy an admin-
istrative unit which will now be broken up.
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FAR EAST
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2. Rhee seen violating both armistice and agreement with United States:
Ambassador Briggs believes that President
Rhee's action to expel Japanese vessels from
international waters adjacent to Korea in
violation of UN Command orders not only
contravenes his agreement with Secretary Dulles of 8 August, but
may be a violation of article 15 of the armistice as well. He notes
that if this challenge to the authority and responsibility of the UN
Command. is not effectively countered the UN-South Korea command
relationship might be undermined.
Briggs states that the US may sooner or
later have to face Rhee's intransigence with the full weight of its
power, including sanctions.
.Comment: Article 15 of the armistice
agreement states that naval forces "shall not engage in blockade
of any kind of Korea:' It is doubtful that President Rhee would
consider the dispute related to the armistice agreement, and he
would probably take the position that he is not bound by any deci-
sion which impairs Korea's sovereign rights or its "national
survival."
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4. Burmese report to UN accuses Taipei of insincerity:
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of Taipei's insincerity. The report, to be released in a few days
as an Assembly document, states that any withdrawal which may
take place will be._pnly a gesture. designed by thf Nationalist govern-
ment to save face. ?
To support their charges of bad faith, the
Burmese cite the blunt refusal of General Li Mt to cooperate, the
evasive actions of the Chinese representative on the committee, and
the continued flow of financial and material aid from Formosa to
Mong Hsat.
The Burmese government in a report to
the UN asserts that the four-power committee
in Bangkok is not likely to achieve "specta-
cular" results in its efforts to evacuate the
Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma because
-Comment: The American embassy in
Rangoon has warned that the tension which may develop in the
UN as a result oVa re-examination of this problem may force
Burma to request drastic actions against the Chinese Nationalist
government.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
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5. Iranian prime minister Zahedi presses for more American aid:
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Za e i tol his cabinet on 9 September that
he was ready to resign because of his
dissatisfaction over the scale of American financial aid.
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additional American aid prior to the opening of Congress. Reportedly
he was himself considering visiting President Eisenhower.
the possibility of sending a special emissary to Washington to-se-e.
After a conversation with Ambassador Hender-
son on 11 September, however, Zahedi seemed less upset.
Comment: In spite of Zahedi's declaration
that he has no intention of bargaining with the United States he appears
to be doing so. It is unlikely that he would resign his position only
because of disagreement over the scale of American financial aid.
Zahedi would probably not seriously consider
visiting the President without American encouragement and before
the domestic situation in Iran had stabilized.
WESTERN EUROPE
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Proposed draft of new Austrian note to USSR accedes to Moscow's
demands:
treaty nor uphold; a previous declaration that negotiations on the
old draft are impossible. The new note also appeals to the Soviet
Union to make it possible for Austria to fulfill "from its own re-'
sources" the burdens of the treaty, and requests Moscow to ad-
viSe Vienna if the prerequisites for a treaty have now been provided.
Western officials in Vienna have received
the text of a proposed Austrian note to the
USSR which states that Austria will no
longer support the short draft of the state
Comment: The proposed note follows
assurances from Foreign Minister Gruber that no immediate action
on the treaty was contemplated and that Austria is at this time
chiefly concerned with establishing a propaganda position. Never-
theless, it accedes to the Soviet demand for a "definite" Austrian
commitment on the short treaty and seems to invite Moscow to
impose still further, conditions.
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Since Soviet rejection of the short treaty
draft indicates unwillingness to ease the treaty burden, the Austrian
request for leniency is likely to be ineffective.
LATIN AMERICA
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7. Argentine ambassador may be intermediary for re-establishment of
Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin American countries:
Ambassador Bohlen ': reports that rumors in the
diplomatic colony in Moscow suggest that
Argentine ambassador Bravo is acting as
intermediary in efforts to re-establish
diplomatic relations between the USSR and -certain Latin American
countries. Bravo was evasive when Ambassador Bohlen raised
the subject.
Comment: The Soviet Union at this time
maintains diplomatic relations with only three Latin American
countries -- Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico.
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