STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 1 No. 4, Fall 1957]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300180001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 154
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1957
• Content Type: STUDY

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? STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
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JUST 22-- PICg1 REV _2...OLO__ AUDI: HR 10-2
VOL. 1 NO. 4
FALL 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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FOREWORD
The measure of maturity in any profession is the
literature of that profession. Any art or science de-
pends upon its adherents to develop new techniques
and to refine old ones to the improvement of that art
or science. The literature of a discipline is the forum
within which new ideas are examined and basic con-
cepts are defined and debated. The Studies in Intel-
ligence series provides such a medium for doctrinal
expression in the profession of intelligence.
A few outstanding works have been written in
the field of intelligence, but even these essays can-
not supply all the solutions to the new problems
which confront intelligence almost daily. For this
reason, I have been pleased to note the Studies in
Intelligence series as a dynamic means of refining our
doctrines. It is all too true that the busy people in
intelligence carry in their heads the methodology
evolved from their experience in the field. Through
the medium of this series, academic discussions of
some of the presently ill-defined concepts used in in-
telligence cannot but improve our capabilities to turn
out a better product.
Thus, the Studies are designed to bridge the gap
between experience and inexperience, between theory
and practice, and to provide for professional growth.
To these ends, and on the occasion of the Tenth An-
niversary of the Central Intelligence Agency, I com-
mend the Studies in Intelligence to you and wish it
all success in its mission.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK EDWARD L. ALLEN
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
EDITOR
WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER
4911110100.1.
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PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION
OF MANUSCRIPTS
Contributions to the Studies may come from any member of
the Intelligence Community or, upon invitation, from persons
outside the Intelligence Community. Articles should be sub-
mitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room
2013, R & S Building and need not be coordinated
or submitted through any normal channels. Two copies of
the manuscript are requested, double spaced, the original on
bond paper. Footnotes should be in the body of the text fol-
lowing the line in which the reference occurs. Classification
may be through SECRET.
Subsequent issues will be disseminated widely throughout the
Agency. To make sure of receiving copies, or to secure extra
copies, please call extension
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CONTENTS
Page
The Intelligence Necessary to the Formulation of a Sound
Strategy Lt Ge. John A. Samford 1
Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?/ ,. . Ray S. Cline 11
Coordination and Responsibility . . R. J. Smith 19
Industrial Planning in the US and the USSR
Edward L. Allen 27
Comparative Survey of Soviet and US Access to Published
Information Joseph Becker 35
Footnote to Cicero Dorothy J. Keatts 47
Technical Intelligence and Arms Inspection
Charles W. Mathews 55
Intelligence Research ? Some Suggested Approaches
Bernard Drell 79
The Role of Interindustry Studies in Economic Intelli-
gence Robert Loring Allen 97
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence
The Labyrinth The Memoirs of Hitler's Secret
Service Chief, by Walter Schellenberg
Clinton Gallagher 119
Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, by Roger
Hilsman John Whitman 136
Strategic Intelligence Production; Basic Principles, by
Washington Platt Louis Marengo 143
We Spied Walter L. Pforzheimer 151
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THE INTELLIGENCE NECESSARY TO THE
FORMULATION OF A SOUND STRATEGY
Lieutenant General John A. Samford
What follows is a consideration of the contribution that in-
telligence should make to the process of formulating a strategy.
For this purpose a strategy is defined as a plan, made in ad-
vance of hostilities, for achieving the necessary and desired
results of war. A sound strategy should give reasonable assur-
ance of achieving both necessities and desires, but should most
certainly be directed toward achievement of those things which
are assessed as being necessary.
The proper relationship of intelligence to strategy as a whole
and particularly to any one strategic plan is best understood if
intelligence is considered to be an identifying and measuring
activity even more than a gathering or collecting process.
It is the function of intelligence to identify and measure the
necessities in a contemplated war and the opportunities which
will arise in such a war. This requires a creative effort far
beyond the effort of gathering information. It is likely that
intelligence failures in the formulation of past strategy are
more often traceable to unattempted measurement or to inac-
curate measurement than to the lack of information, even
though information ofttimes has been deplorably poor.
The problem of identifying and measuring necessities is re-
lated to enemy threats, threats both of preemptive action and
resisting action. The problem of opportunities is related to
overcoming or frustrating these threats and to producing fur-
ther end results that are in accord with national purposes.
Enemy threats can be measured in terms of enemy strengths
and enemy purposes. Opportunities can be measured in terms
of enemy strengths and friendly purposes. When enemy
strengths and purposes combined have war consequences of
intolerable or unacceptable magnitude, the overcoming or frus-
trating of them become necessities of war.
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The intelligence necessary to formulation of a sound strategy
is that which identifies and measures all major threats from
enemy strengths and purposes and identifies and measures all
major opportunities open to friendly purposes.
There are four key words in this statement:
STRENGTHS)
PURPOSES
THREATS
OPPORTUNITIES
They are arranged in order of probable intelligence considera-
tion and in order of relative susceptibility to measurement.
Strength must be combined with purpose to constitute a
threat. Assessment of the strength ? or lack of it ? behind
a threat is necessary to the judgment of opportunity.
Intelligence currently is required to identify and measure a
greater variety of strengths than ever before in history. The
number and variety of military strengths still is increasing.
There are also economic strengths, industrial strengths, the
strengths of cohesion within a nation and between it and its
allies, the strengths of organization, of leadership, of racial
characteristics, of nationalism, of religion, of political fanati-
cism, and many other types.
In addition, any strength, particularly any military or in-
dustrial strength, needs to be measured in terms of both its
current and potential values. Many strategies have failed
through ignoring or through not using proper measurements
of the potential value of some strength ? some strength which
turned out to be a far more serious threat component than any
strength in being.
Technology may not have completely changed the nature of
war, but it has so expanded the nature and variety of strengths
involved in war that those strengths considered critical in
former days may no longer stand alone as such, but must be
considered in their relative stature with many others.
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The orthodox treatment of the order of battle of armies,
navies, and air forces covers only a part of the problem of
assessing military strengths ? and not even the major part
that it is so often considered as being.
Such is the great variety of military strengths ? including
the firepower, mobility, and tenacity of modern armies; the
submarine fleets that can cruise the oceans of the world with-
out resupply; the weapons of mass destruction which can them-
selves be divided into many categories; the specialized strengths
of air task forces and naval task forces that considering
them only in the current and existing sense presents a monu-
mental problem. The problem becomes literally staggering
when the difficulties of assessing current strengths are com-
bined with the probabilities and possibilities of future military
strengths that may have a bearing on any particular strategy.
Notable examples of possible military strengths of the near
future, which become probable if the forecast applies to a time
period of any magnitude, are the strengths represented by nu-
clear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.
Prior to any consideration of the variety of purposes that
need to be measured it will be helpful to differentiate between
what is ordinarily thought of as "war" and what is brought to
mind by the word "warfare." Among other things, such a dif-
ferentiation relieves the mind of any paradoxical confusion as
between a "war plan" and our national attitude against aggres-
sive war.
Although the purposes of war are the main guide to the
strategy of either side, the purposes of "warfare" are the ones
of primary importance to an intelligence staff and to a strat-
egy. These "warfare" purposes can be specific and various to
combine with the great variety of strengths that are available.
Depending upon the magnitude and types of strength and the
seriousness of purpose involved, each combination can be of
importance in the formulation of a proper strategy.
As an illustration, the basic war purpose of the Soviet Union
undoubtedly is that of imposing Moscow-controlled commu-
nism on the world. This purpose is the key to Soviet strategy
and should also exercise a positive influence on our own strat-
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egy. However, Soviet purposes of warfare are certainly more
specific than this, and it is at some level of more detailed pur-
pose that intelligence staffs must aim in order to identify and
measure major Soviet threats.
Soviet purposes of warfare probably include: occupying and
utilizing the resources of Western Europe; occupying and uti-
lizing the resources of the Middle East; keeping the United
Nations continually off balance in Asia and the Far East; suc-
cessfully resisting any effort to weaken the strengths of the
Soviet heartland; destroying the continental strengths of North
America; and an over-all and modifying purpose of eliminating
populations and peoples considered difficult to assimilate in a
communist world order.
Such detailed, specific purposes of warfare, combined with
Soviet strengths, create major threats of meaning to our
strategy.
It is likely, however, that a substantially more detailed state-
ment is required, or would be of advantage. The Soviet Union
does not yet have the relative strengths necessary to bid surely
for the broad war purpose of creating a communist-dominated
world order, but the Soviet Union does have the strengths, both
existing and potential, to bid separately and in varying com-
binations for many of the purposes of Soviet warfare. These
are the threats that intelligence today must measure as part of
its contribution to any strategy devised against the Soviet
Union.
A major difficulty confronting intelligence in connection
with any assessment of the problem of purpose comes from the
limited utility of the ideas "offensive" and "defensive." Be-
cause many of the most aggressive acts of warfare are basically
defensive in purpose, paradoxical confusion can result from the
use of "offensive" and "defensive" to indicate purpose in any
but the simplest situations. Even in the simple situations,
from which the ideas of offense and defense arose, it has be-
come customary to say "the best defense is a good offense,"
thus further illustrating the disservice which use of these
terms involves.
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Determination of threat stems from appraisal of strength
and purpose. Such identification may be sufficient in some
circumstances, but there is a growing opinion that intelligence
measurement of probable results of an activated threat is neces-
sary as well as desirable. Such measurement approaches what
can be termed "war gaming."
A successful measurement of this sort can have a great influ-
ence on strategy. The extent to which intelligence should
contribute to this process may be disputable, but it appears
certain that the intelligence necessary to a strategy will be
better if an advanced war gaming process of some sort is kept
closely in mind during all the processes of intelligence prepara-
tion. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that judgment of a threat
cannot have its proper influence on strategy until the value of
the threat is rounded out in terms of probable results if the
threat is activated.
The idea encompassed in expression of an enemy "capability"
certainly includes the element of accomplishment, and the
threat of a capability is a measurement which has little mean-
ing without the inclusion of the element.
Measuring the current threat posed by an enemy air force
requires conclusions in many areas such as:
a. The number, disposition, and types of aircraft and their
performance characteristics.
b. The weapons, logistics support, level and type of air train-
ing, and the control mechanisms.
c. The warfare purposes which such an air force can reason-
ably pursue.
For each major purpose it also is necessary to assess:
a. The enemy doctrine of employment.
b. The tactics used for resisting or evading opposition.
c. The quality of action to be expected in relationship to our
contemplated action.
d. The net value of probable accomplishment in terms of
service to the enemy purpose.
e. The probability of action being undertaken.
It is obvious that certain of these conclusions will be modi-
fied in any forecast of the future threat posed by the enemy air
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force. As some of the strength factors change, different ideas
as to purpose are brought to mind, particularly if the expected
changes in strength are in terms of performance, training,
weapons, or doctrine.
If the purpose being assessed is that of resistance to our own
air penetration, commonly termed the enemy's "air defense,"
the quality of his action and its net value to the enemy purpose
become of vital importance. Measurements of these factors
are too often made in terms such as good, poor, moderate, and
so on. They need to be made in terms that have a greater
meaning to the decision maker. If the quality of Soviet resist-
ance can be appraised in terms of such things as the known
quality of German resistance, matching new qualities of resist-
ing forces with new qualities of the penetrator, perhaps a
measurement can be provided that has meaning to both war
planner and engineer.
The problems involved in estimating the threats from an
enemy air force are illustrative of only one segment of the
picture. A great variety of enemy strengths and purposes are
involved, and efforts similar to those described for air forces
must be undertaken in relation to many if not all combinations
of them. To visualize this is to appreciate the full and tre-
mendous scope of the work which must be done to identify and
measure the "threats" which pose the necessities of war.
Opportunity is a function of enemy strength and friendly
purpose. If a good job has been done in assessing enemy
strengths and purposes in order to identify threats, much al-
ready has been done toward establishing opportunities. How-
ever, it would be mistaken to assume that enemy purposes and
friendly purposes are identically opposed. Variations of pur-
pose may be forced in accordance with the strength factor;
frustration of certain enemy purposes may have to be waived
if there is no adequate enemy vulnerability; or ? a devious
route to such frustration may be found if a direct one shows
inadequate promise.
It is in the opportunity field that the greatest intelligence
development is required, and this is true of the gathering or
collection function, as well as the creative one. Development
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of opportunities requires a vast amount of detailed knowledge
of which even the scope and kind is not well known. Experi-
ence in handling the modern strengths and purposes of war-
fare is as yet too slight for us to have more than a general idea
of the information needed to establish sound opportunities for
their use.
In this activity the process of an approach to war gaming
again becomes a major factor, and it should again be empha-
sized that intelligence necessary to strategy will be better if an
advanced war gaming activity is kept in mind during the intel-
ligence production process.
The USAF targeting activity is an example of an intelligence
effort directed toward analyzing opportunities for air action
to further major purposes of warfare.
The target organizations undertake to nominate "purposes"
of atomic warfare in terms consistent with the values of the
US national strength involved.
These purpose values currently are listed as follows:
a. To produce an initial paralysis of Soviet governmental
controls.
b. To prevent unacceptable launchings of Soviet atomic
weapons against the US and its Allies.
c. To prevent unacceptable massing and maneuver of Soviet
ground forces acting to occupy areas in Western Europe, the
Middle East, and the Far East.
d. To prevent unacceptable employment of the Soviet sea
forces.
e. To neutralize or destroy the general threat of Soviet air
action against Allied Air Forces in Western Europe, the Near
East, and the Far East.
f. To neutralize or destroy the ability of the Soviet Union
to sustain large-scale military operations.
g. To neutralize or destroy the ability of the Soviet Union
to develop or produce weapons having a decisive or stalemating
potential.
h. To sufficiently neutralize or destroy the political, social,
industrial, and economic strengths of the Soviet Union so that
governmental changes or decisions satisfying to the US will
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occur or may be readily forced by additional available or con-
templated pressures.
Certain of these purposes may be acceptable for many weap-
ons or many strengths, but it is probable that there will be
significant and important differences. The attractive sim-
plicity of the Casablanca directive to fatally weaken the Ger-
man capacity and will to wage war is now recognized as in-
adequate.
If from this example drawn from USAF targeting activities
it is possible to visualize the great variety of possible friendly
purposes that are involved ? purposes for land and sea war-
fare as well as air warfare, and all the subordinate varieties
of the three combined ? it should be possible to appreciate
the great scope of the effort involved in identifying opportu-
nities. This is an area of intelligence service which has never
been fully recognized and certainly has never been fully devel-
oped. In no other area of intelligence work is purpose so im-
portant as it is in this one. Unless purpose is clearly defined
in terms that permit an exacting search for precise conditions,
opportunities that have tragic instead of useful results may be
suggested and adopted as a part of strategy.
The Japanese in 1941 implemented a strategy that is out-
standing among all those which seem to have been based upon
intelligence misjudgments. Perhaps no nation has ever em-
barked upon a course of military action so poorly aimed at
achieving the necessary results in a war. The existing threats
of deployed forces in being and the opportunities to overcome
them seem the only intelligence assessments used, even if others
were made. The threats which stemmed from US industrial
strength and latent military strength seem not to have been
measured. All the information necessary to the making of
these measurements was available to the Japanese or readily
attainable but the measurements were not accurately made.
The Germans seem to have based their strategy upon meas-
urements of better scope but without sufficient accuracy. They
did not accurately measure the potential threat of US and
British Air Forces, the true threat of the Soviet armies, and the
full scope of opportunity to the German submarine.
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The strategy implemented by the Allies was largely a strategy
that evolved, but judgments of importance and accuracy were
made ? some in advance, some along the way. An early judg-
ment was made that the threats from German strength and
purpose were more pressing in time than were the Japanese
threats in the Pacific. The threat of latent German strengths
appears to have been adequately assessed. The German sub-
marine appears to have been measured in all its proper stature
and the opportunity to invade and occupy Germany was given a
timing that was consistent with success. The opportunities
to put Japanese strength on a shelf of impotence through air
and submarine attack were adequately assessed and the timing
of the invasion and occupation of Japan was made coincident
with greatest Japanese impotence.
It certainly can be said that Allied strategy succeeded in
achieving at least the necessary results of war with Germany
and Japan. Whether intelligence judgments as such were
made toward this end is not as important as is recognition
that intelligence judgments of this kind should have been made.
Intelligence necessary to an anti-Soviet strategy in today's
world must appraise a greater variety of strengths, purposes,
threats, and opportunities than ever before. United States
strategy must rely upon the adequacy and accuracy of these
judgments and cannot count upon Soviet errors of judgment
to make up for Western failures. It should be expected, in-
stead, that the enemy is not likely to make major errors in
judgment and will be extraordinarily keen and alert to take
advantage of any the West may make.
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IS INTELLIGENCE OVER-COORDINATED?
Ray S. Cline
Being in favor of coordination in the US intelligence commu-
nity has come to be like being against sin; everyone lines up
on the right side of the question. In fact, coordination has
become what Stephen Potter calls an "OK" word ? one which
defies precise definition but sounds good and brings prestige to
the user. Now I do not want to deny that coordination is a
good thing, but I would like to suggest that there can be too
much of a good thing. I am afraid the intelligence commu-
nity is suffering from over-coordination.
Part of the trouble is that few who are zealous for coordi-
nation stop to define what it is. In one sense ? unfortunately
not always understood ? coordination is the main business of
the Director of Central Intelligence. The public law creating
CIA establishes as its purpose "coordinating the intelligence
activities" of the departments and agencies of the US Govern-
ment, including the intelligence components of State, Army,
Navy, and Air.
I am sure that in the absence of any technical definition by
Congress the public statute employed the word "coordinate"
in its normal Webster's-dictionary meaning of "to regulate and
combine in harmonious action." This kind of coordination is
essential; I doubt that we have enough of it.
In the intelligence community, unfortunately, the "activity"
that has been coordinated tirelessly has not been the opera-
tional conduct of business or the analytical procedures followed
by the intelligence agencies, which the language of the law
would imply to a layman, but purely their verbal product in the
form of written reports and estimates. Regardless of how in-
harmoniously the intelligence agencies may engage in
"action," they have all settled down to coordination in the sense
of prolonged and detailed joint examination of the words issu-
ing forth from the national, intelligence machinery. The
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apparent objective is to insure that every agency approves of
all the language formulations employed in intelligence
estimates.
Because coordination is felt to be automatically a good thing,
the long and difficult path to unanimity on wording is pursued
without regard for the time wasted or ideas lost. The search
for the happy cliche, acceptable to all, shopworn but durable,
frequently ambiguous but always defensible, goes endlessly on.
It is this particular "coordination" process that is in a fair way
of becoming a millstone around the neck of the Washington
intelligence community.
It is ironic that the word "coordination" came into the gov-
ernment lexicon as the harbinger of a liberalizing and energiz-
ing influence at work in a ponderous bureaucratic machine.
"Coordination" was the term hit upon by the Army to describe
a system of staff consultation devised shortly before World War
II in order to escape from the hidebound staff "concurrence"
system then saddling the War Department General Staff with
an almost unworkable consultative procedure. Under this
post-World War I system, any Assistant Chief of Staff of the
War Department General Staff was obliged to get the "concur-
rence" of the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff on any action
affecting their mutual interests, whether the interests of the
other Assistant Chiefs of Staff were of major or minor
importance.
The difficulty of getting a fully concurred memorandum
through the War Department General Staff in the emergency
years of the late 1930's was so great that the more energetic
staff officers began to despair of ever being ready or able to fight
World War II. It was in this atmosphere that the coordination
system developed and the formal concurrence concept was
discarded.
The new procedure presumed that the officer proposing
action was ? on behalf of his Staff Division ? entirely respon-
sible for presenting information and making recommendations.
He was obliged to show his study and proposals to appropriate
officers in other Staff Divisions with overlapping interests to
insure that they had no reasonable grounds, deriving from
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other actions they were taking, for dissenting from the pro-
posed action. The ultimate objective was "harmonious ac-
tion" and prompt decision. Quibbling over phrases and de-
tails became unpopular under the pressure of the need for
speed.
The result was that officers consulted in this informal fashion
could initial a paper as having been "coordinated" with them
without feeling that they were taking full responsibility for the
phrasing of the study or the recommended course of action.
Coordination merely proved that officers legitimately concerned
had seen the paper and had interposed no objection that dis-
suaded the action officer from proceeding.
This War Department General Staff coordination system was
so successful in World War II that it became a matter of doc-
trine. In the armed services it became a truism that a paper
not carefully "coordinated" was not a good staff paper. There
is much to be said for this point of view, and this kind of coor-
dination is surely the responsibility legally placed on CIA in
intelligence matters ? that is, the obligation to consult and
discover the views of other interested parties in order to insure
"harmonious action." I wish it carried with it the original
connotation of performing this essential consultative task with
reasonable speed and without sacrifice of individual responsi-
bility for describing the situation requiring action.
The intelligence community does not recommend action, of
course, but it does describe situations which ought to be mean-
ingful in terms of actions policymaking officials are consid-
ering. A good intelligence estimate is not an abstract exercise
in cerebration but is a pointed analysis of a situation relating
to national security. It ought to be as effectively presented
and phrased as a good staff action paper ? perhaps even bet-
ter, because the subject matter is likely to be more abstract
and the nuances and color in the author's choice of words is
likely to be vital to a subtle understanding of the situation
being described.
By some lower-level-of-consciousness reasoning, coordination
in the intelligence business has in practice come to mean word-
by-word concurrence of all the intelligence agencies.
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This practice has not only slowed down the production of
intelligence estimates at the national security level but also has
insured that when fully coordinated estimates do emerge into
the daylight they usually reflect the carefully considered, care-
fully phrased views of nobody in particular. They are the drab
and soulless products of a bureaucratic system which seems to
have a life and a limping gait of its own.
These harsh remarks are not intended to suggest that our
national intelligence estimating machinery is of no value. To
the contrary, I would like to make clear at the outset that I
think the initial organization of this machinery in 1951 ? with
which I am very proud to have helped is one of the major
advances in the history of the US intelligence business. It is
obviously desirable for the government officials making na-
tional security decisions to have available in written form the
best composite judgments of the interagency intelligence com-
munity on the main strategic situations affecting US security.
gven with the deficiencies I have suggested, the coordinated
national estimates provide a sort of floor of common knowledge
and common agreement under the policymaking process. At
a minimum they serve the purpose of preventing wild ideas
from carrying the day in the absence of effective confrontation
with the agreed general view. In the old days it was perfectly
possible for one agency to produce a little thinkpiece setting
forth some preposterous theory about Soviet intentions and,
through the agency staff channels, present it on the highest
policy level without it occurring to anyone to question whether
or not this represented the best intelligence views of equally
well informed people in the intelligence community. I trust
this does not happen now, or at least that there are a great
many people who would stand up at some point during the
policy consideration to say that such a proposal should be
checked out against the national intelligence estimates. This
is clearly a net gain of enormous worth.
What I am suggesting, however, is that we have won that net
gain at the price of making our estimates much less timely,
interesting, and useful than they could be. If we had not al-
lowed ourselves to become so devoted to the concept of coordi-
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nation of the written word at all costs and at all lengths, I feel
we could do a better job of presenting the best views available
in the intelligence community rather than the lowest common,
denominator of agreed doctrine.
The first great defect of our coordination technique is merely
the staleness that passage of time brings to a long-disputed
thesis. In principle, of course, the national intelligence ma-
chinery can bring out an estimate in short order. I believe
that there are in history the recorded cases of estimates written
and agreed in two or three days. These were very short esti-
mates produced under circumstances of extraordinary urgency.
It is enough to say that what is usually called a "crash" esti-
mate is usually produced in about two weeks' time. A good
solid national intelligence estimate runs anywhere from six
weeks to six months. Perhaps we can afford the luxury of
writing estimates at this pace, but I very much doubt that the
estimates so produced are as useful as they would be if they
were produced much more rapidly. In the present system, un-
happily, the estimates are bound to contain very few surprises
and very little of immediate interest to our policymakers.
Much worse than this out-of-date quality, however, is the
second great defect of the coordinated estimate ? the flatness
of ideas agreed by four or five contributing draftees. It is
simply not true that the more people and the more views repre-
sented in the drafting of a paper, the better the paper is.
Sometimes a brilliant paper slips relatively unmarred through
drafting sessions in which a large number of people are in-
volved. But too often papers which, although imperfectly
phrased and controversially put, make a contribution to knowl-
edge at the beginning of the coordination process emerge either
so long afterward that all of the sparkle of the basic idea is lost
or so much watered-down and flattened-out as to be virtually
meaningless.
The reason for the delay, the watering-down, and the flat-
tening-out is not hard to find. Any group of working-level
government officers brought together to "coordinate" a paper
are under an enormous obligation to their bureaucratic supe-
riors to emasculate any sentence which suggests, or might sug-
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gest, the contrary of a view held in their particular part of the
bureaucratic forest. This caution tends to bring on a process
of horse-trading in which every interested party secures his
privilege of excluding an objectionable phrase in return for
permitting the exclusion of some sentence which is anathema
to another representative, although it may not be at all objec-
tionable to the rest of the group. Add up four or five or six
of these representatives as parties to the proceedings ? and
crank in the normal personal vagaries in reacting to someone
else's prose and you speedily reduce a paper to its lowest
common denominator of meaningfulness.
After all, we are all familiar with the phenomenon whereby
most people feel that it is possible to express their own ideas
only in their own words. This factor alone poses an almost
impossible situation for anyone trying to draft a simple, clean-
cut view of a complex intelligence problem.
I, too, happen to like my own prose better than the words
used so clumsily by other people. Unfortunately, I have dis-
covered that my colleagues also seem to prefer their own, even
over mine. My way of solving this problem, and the problem
of many drafters representing multiple interests, is to deter-
mine, on the basis of subject matter, whether a paper is mainly
my paper or my colleague's paper. If it is my paper I strongly
believe that the best way to get the main ideas across is for me
to draft it in my own words, presenting it in the way that seems
to me to be most effective.
At that point in drafting I like to consult all of my colleagues,
whoever they may be and whatever agency they may work for,
who know something about the subject. Inevitably I get a
considerable amount of comment, both on the main ideas and
on the words in which they are expressed. This I think is
healthy, and in many cases I am persuaded either that I am
wrong in what I was trying to say ? in which case I want to
change it by all means ? or that I have not presented it very
effectively ? in which case I am anxious to rephrase it in the
light of my failure to put it across. It may be that I think my
colleagues are simply dense, but nevertheless I ought to adjust
my verbal presentation of the problem to carry them along with
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me in understanding the subject and my view. All this con-
sultation with the best minds of the community is desirable,
even essential. It is what I consider to be coordination prop-
erly understood.
In other words, coordination is ideally a process of consul-
tation with knowledgeable and interested members of the in-
telligence community for the purpose of getting new informa-
tion, taking account of differing views, and insuring the most
effective presentation of an intelligence analysis. I think it is
true to say that in many cases a person drafting a paper on a
broad and complex subject is obligated to accept the informa-
tion supplied him and, in general, to adopt the interpretive
views held by the most expert and responsible people, wherever
they work. This sharing of knowledge is the whole reason for
working as an intelligence community.
On the other hand, if there is any function for a central and
coordinating group in the intelligence community, it is pre-
cisely in the sphere of subjecting to careful inquiry the views
of all members in the community on situations ?cutting across
specialized departmental interests, making a valid synthesis,
and presenting the general truth of the matter in an effective
manner, even though it may not fully please any single mem-
ber of the group. If, when this purpose has been accom-
plished, a responsible member of the community still feels that
the paper makes a major substantive error, as distinct from
being badly expressed, then I think it would be most proper for
the dissenting person to express himself as effectively as he can
in language of his own choosing setting forth where he feels
the basic paper has erred.
This last point ? the right of major dissent ? is an im-
portant one. I know from experience that in many complex
intelligence problems the most effective way to discover the
essential outlines of a tricky situation is to have an analyst
present his case and then to listen to the views of any dissent-
ing analyst. I submit that the net result of a strong view of
this sort with a substantive dissent is much more helpful and
meaningful to the person who actually needs to know some-
thing about the situation than is a compromise set of general
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cliches which do not indicate the difficulty and conflict of view
inherent in the situation as seen through the evidence the in-
telligence community possesses.
The sum and substance of what I have been saying is that
the US national security system would be better served if the
intelligence community took a less vigorous view of the mean-
ing of coordination and substituted more informal techniques
of consultation. In this way the intelligence community could
share knowledge and wisdom without delaying or weakening
the product.
Such an arrangement would work like a consulting group of
physicians, one a general practitioner and the others special-
ists. If the disease is complex and cuts across specialists'
lines, the general practitioner (CIA in intelligence) should
take responsibility for the diagnosis and treatment, consulting
and using the skills of the specialists (State, Army, Navy, Air,
et al.) . In no case should the doctors confuse the diagnosis
to disguise the fact that they could not agree among them-
selves nor, of course, should they let the patient die while they
argue.
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COORDINATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
R. J. Smith
In discussing the coordination of national intelligence it
seems to me essential to recognize at the outset that coordina-
tion is certainly here to stay and probably will continue to be
conducted pretty much along present lines. No amount of
talk will either make it go away or alter its basic nature. This
is so not because those people presently responsible for coordi-
nating national intelligence are insensitive to visions of an
ideal world where gentleman scholars would discuss world
problems broadly and then retire to write individual apprecia-
tions. It is so primarily because national intelligence has be-
come an integral part of the complex machinery for planning
and policymaking of the US Government and has thereby
acquired responsibilities not previously held by intelligence.
In the earlier and possibly more light-hearted years of CIA
it was always a matter of some speculation as to who the users
of national intelligence really were. We had a distribution list
with names on it, but we had little evidence as to what hap-
pened once the estimates were delivered. We were in the posi-
tion of shooting arrows into the air ? some of them elegantly
shaped and still bearing the tool marks of individual crafts-
men ? and having them land we knew not where. There was
some fretting over this uncertainty, but it was balanced to a
degree by an accompanying freedom in how we directed our
effort. Coordination in those days varied in its difficulty and
its intensiveness almost with the moods and states of health of
the participants. On one occasion, a coordination meeting
would become almost a pro forma operation. On another, it
might be the scene of sharply personal bickering and bad feel-
ing, illuminated with sparks of verbal wit and showered with
forensic displays.
Over the past five years this has changed. The broadening
development of the centralized planning and policymaking
mechanism has brought sharp changes in all governmental
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activities involved with problems of national security. Na-
tional intelligence has been affected along with the rest. At
the same time, national intelligence has gained strikingly in
prestige and authority, partly as a consequence of its new
responsibilities in policy and planning but also as a result of
growing maturity and technical improvement throughout the
entire intelligence community.
We no longer are in any doubt as to what use is made of
national estimates. In a majority of cases, the customer (the
National Security Council, one of its major members such as
the White House, or one of its subordinate components such as
the Planning Board) has given us specifications for the task
and has set a date for its completion. If our customer dis-
covers new specifications to be included, alterations are made
before the estimate is completed; if he discovers his need has
greater or less urgency than originally thought, the timing is
adjusted. In all those cases where the policy and planning
mechanism has originated the request, we know from the out-
set that the finished estimate will become the basis for a review
of US policy toward the area or problem under consideration.
We know this will be true also of a substantial number of other
estimates which have been initiated through other auspices,
including our own.
It is not new for intelligence to serve as a basis for policy.
To greater or less degree, this has always been so and has pro-
vided intelligence with its reason for being. What is new is
that this relationship has been formalized and institution-
alized in such fashion as to make the connection far more
direct and effective than ever before. Recognition throughout
the intelligence community of the immediacy of this connec-
tion has profoundly affected both the estimates themselves and
their coordination.
The present day national estimate bears only an indistinct
resemblance to one of its remote ancestors, the literary or
scholarly essay. In the days of our youth the resemblance was
more apparent than it is today, and it continues to be consid-
erably more apparent in British national intelligence papers,
known as "appreciations." (It may not be significant but it is
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at least interesting that for us the word "appreciation" carries
connotations of artistic endeavor and to the British the word
"estimate" conveys a mechanical totting up, not unlike the
estimate the plumber provides before beginning work.) It is
inevitable and proper that some readers, bringing to bear pri-
marily the standards for literary or scholarly essays, should
criticize the national estimates for general lack of reader ap-
peal. It is perhaps also inevitable but considerably less proper
that they should simultaneously place the blame for this con-
dition entirely on the process of coordination.
National estimates are not scholarly essays. They are pri-
marily work papers for planners and policymakers. This does
not mean that these papers need be unreadable, or that they
cannot be more readable than they sometimes are, but it does
mean that they must be the embodiment of precise writing.
Anyone who has ever tried to write really precisely ? so pre-
cisely that several different groups of planners can get exactly
the same content from a statement of fact or a judg-
ment ? knows that in order to reach such precision one must
boil off nearly all the esters of personal flavor and strive for a
flat objectivity. Also, in this connection, one must bear in
mind that the planners and policymakers in question are high
level and have neither the time nor the necessity to master
enormous quantities of detail. They need only that amount of
detail necessary to support the handful of key estimative judg-
ments to be made about the situation before them.
Having said this much, let us look more narrowly at the im-
pact of coordination upon these national estimates. First of
all, let there be no mistake about the necessity for coordina-
tion. Many criticisms of the present coordinated estimates
represent an attempt, in one guise or another, to squirm away
from this necessity. ,It may be true that one individual, or a
small group of talented individuals, could on many occasions
write estimates with sharper edges than coordinated estimates,
but the difficulty is that such estimates would not meet the
need of the White House and the National Security Council.
What the highest levels of the national government most em-
phatically do not need is a batch of estimates on the same
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subject by separate intelligence organizations, each paper out
of key with the other in exposition, emphasis, and conclusion.
This situation would merely pass responsibility for the ulti-
mate intelligence judgment on to the policymakers. What
they require instead is a single document which contains the
collective judgment of the intelligence community, an esti-
mate which delineates the areas of general intelligence agree-
ment and identifies where necessary the points of major sub-
stantive dissent, an estimate to which all the chief intelligence
officers of the national government will concur. Looked at
from this perspective, the coordination process becomes the
heart of the matter, not an unnecessary evil. Its character-
istic defects and its burdens become problems to be worked
with and to be eased, not avoided. In fact, looked at from this
angle, one can even recognize that the coordination process
has benefits and merits in its own right.
Knowing as they do that the finished national estimate will
become the basis for a policy which will vitally affect the mis-
sion and responsibilities of their department, the representa-
tives of the various intelligence agencies take the coordinating
sessions seriously. As their departments' spokesmen, they
have a deep and responsible interest in seeing that the final
estimate does not ignore information available to their depart-
ment or does not arrive at judgments contrary to the views of
their departmental intelligence specialists and chiefs. At the
same time, they must avoid damaging the prestige and in-
tegrity of their department by pushing departmental views in
defiance of contrary evidence or by failing to inform their
department of the extent to which its view stands in isolation
from the rest of the community.
The CIA responsibility in this process is different in kind but
equally great. In the first place, the draft discussed by the
coordination meeting is a CIA draft based on written contri-
butions from the several departmental agencies. These con-
tributions, frequently longer individually than the finished
estimate, are rich in detail and analysis and provide a broad
base for the estimate. The CIA drafters synthesize these de-
partmental papers into a single estimate, making such aug-
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mentations or changes in analysis or emphasis as they think
the objective situation requires. When this draft, well-tested
within CIA, is placed before the coordination meeting, it has
its own inner cohesion and strength. Like all well-constructed
and ramified pieces of writing, its built-in inertia makes it hard
to move very far. It responds gently to nudges but resists hard
shoves. Moreover, it has the support and protection of the
CIA representatives, including the chairman, who, though
ready to accept suggested improvements and useful additions
or corrections, are quick to challenge estimative changes un-
supported by sound evidence or objective reasoning. The
national estimate which emerges from this intensive coordina-
tion has been thoroughly stretched and tested but most times
has not been altered fundamentally. On those occasions when
deep-reaching changes have been made, the CIA representa-
tives have become convinced that these changes would produce
stronger, sounder estimates.
A common complaint about coordinated intelligence or
coordinated anything for that matter ? is that it merely rep-
resents the lowest common denominator of opinion. In the
light of the discussion above, the only accurate rebuttal to this
charge as it applies to national estimates is that it is not true.
It is true that some degree of compromise is nearly always
involved in the effort to reach full agreement. Short of going
to war, no method other than compromise would appear to be
available for reaching written agreement on really complicated
matters. This is all the more true in the realms of judgment
and future projection where national estimates must neces-
sarily operate. Intelligent and responsible compromise is an
essential tool in the coordination process, but, by definition,
intelligence compromise does not include adding buckets of
water to sound judgments merely to obtain agreed positions.
The avenue which enables us to avoid this undesirable result
is the dissent.
Keeping in mind that the primary mission of national intel-
ligence is to provide the White House and the NSC with agreed
estimates, it ought to be apparent that a national estimate
laden with dissents would not fit the requirement. By the
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same token, however, an estimate which glossed over, or com-
promised out of existence, legitimate and fundamental diver-
gences would not meet the requirement. One does not want to
confront the President or the Secretary of Defense at every turn
with unresolved differences which force him to make his own
choice. At the same time, one does not want to paper over
substantial divergences and let him believe no differences of
view exist.
One must realize, however, that dissents are not easily con-
trived. First, the actual substantive difference must be iso-
lated and the dissenter convinced that his is the dissenting and
not the majority view. Then he must accustom himself to the
notion of standing naked and alone in a footnote with his peers
arrayed against him in the main text. Each of these stages is
invariably accompanied by surges of new conviction on the part
of the dissenter that his position is the right one, after all, and
that one more try will convert the rest of the group. In short,
the trickiest and most vexing problems in coordination revolve
around the point at which the quest for agreement should be
abandoned and a clearly defined dissent should be prepared.
But to say it is hard is not to say it cannot be done. To prevent
enforced coordination, statements of dissent are employed now
as often as the skill of the CIA coordinators can bring them
about. Growing maturity among the intelligence community
will probably make this an easier result to obtain as time goes
on.
Another common complaint about coordination is that it
takes so much time the estimates are no longer fresh when they
are produced. In actual fact, this criticism has less validity
than almost any other. No one involved in producing na-
tional estimates would deny it takes time. Papers involving
special research problems or new techniques have taken as long
as ten months. Routine estimates commonly take six to eight
weeks. On the other hand, the IAC machinery has produced
a coordinated national estimate in five hours and has on sev-
eral occasions produced them in 36, 48, or 72 hours. At first
glance, in a world where the daily newspaper is regularly
scooped by television, six to eight weeks, let alone ten months,
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seems an unconscionable amount of time. Even five or forty-
eight hours seems long. Viewed from the perspective of opera-
tional or current intelligence, it probably is a long time.
Viewed from the perspective of planning national strategy, it
is not. A number of our estimates project forward five years
because it is necessary for some kinds of policy planning to look
five years ahead. Nearly all the estimates project at least a
year ahead. Against this time span, the time taken to produce
them does not seem long. To put it another way, an estimate
which could not withstand the passing of a mere eight weeks
could scarcely serve as the basis for planning a year or five
years ahead.
But whatever view one has about the right length of time to
spend producing a coordinated national estimate, the remark-
able fact is that the coordination itself ? the time spent in
meetings resolving differences in views and obtaining an agreed
text ? takes only a small fraction of the total time spent. A
study of twenty-four planned and routine national estimates,
the longest taking 285 days to produce and the shortest 62
days, discloses that the average time actually required for
coordination meetings was under ten percent. The remainder
was spent in the preparation of terms of reference, research,
the preparation of agency contributions, and the writing and
reviewing of the draft within CIA. Even this low percentage
figure does not tell the full story because it includes estimates
on such matters as Soviet gross capabilities, where weeks of
meetings were held to work over the complicated evidence un-
derlying detailed strength figures and capabilities estimates.
A more representative figure for coordination meetings would
be between one and three days, most commonly two.
Is one led inevitably by this discussion to the conclusion that
the necessary art of coordinating national estimates is in a
perfect state? The answer is certainly no. As in all good-
sized meetings, both within government and without, progress
in coordination sessions is frequently slow and uncertain. Too
frequently, those who know the least talk the most. Even
worse, on some occasions one of the participants may be virtu-
ally devoid of substantive grasp. Sometimes, persons with a
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fair understanding of the substance under discussion come so
rigidly instructed regarding a certain point that discussion of
it is futile. Almost always, there is a tendency among the
participants to commit that fundamental but all-too-human
semantic error, that of identifying the word inexorably with
the thought: Thought A can only be expressed by Word A.
What is the remedy for this state of affairs? What can be
done, particularly when much of the difficulty is inherent in
the method? Can we overcome the fundamental inefficiency
of the committee meeting, that peculiarly American contribu-
tion to the arts of governing? Well, certainly not, but we can
exploit fully our growing technique in running meetings,
extracting from them their maximum value as the creators of
new perspectives and holding to a minimum their nonproduc-
tive aspects. Can we elevate semantic understanding and
sophistication to such a level as to remove this most frequent
barrier to agreement? Again, no, at least not all at once, but
we can recognize this shortcoming in ourselves and thus con-
tribute to greater flexibility in achieving a solution.
In short, the path to improvement of the coordination proc-
ess lies not through the imposition of ideal solutions but
through gradual, slow advance by small adjustments here and
there. We can obtain better quality of representation at the
coordination meetings. There i8, in fact, perceptible progress
in this respect over the past several years. The advantages of
sending representatives with substantive understanding and
empowering them with a fair degree of latitude in negotiation
are already apparent to most of the IAC agencies. We can
achieve a higher degree of group responsibility and freedom
from partisan attitudes as maturity increases. Moreover, we
can adopt various innovations in procedure as they seem desir-
able. We could, just for example, ask the IAC agencies to send
representatives to participate with us in the drafting sessions
on certain occasions in order to speed the process and facilitate
agreement. But whatever we do, we cannot ? as I hope I have
made clear ? do away with the coordination process. It is the
heart of national intelligence. To make it tick strongly and
surely is our problem.
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INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN THE US
AND THE USSR
Edward L. Allen
The past 18 months has been a period of unprecedented free
discussion within the borders of the Soviet Union, of organiza-
tional and managerial techniques. We have already witnessed
a sweeping reorganization of industry. But there are a num-
ber of other basic economic problems nagging Soviet leaders.
For example, given the objective of rapid growth, what price
structure would act as the best stimulant? What tools of
analysis are really needed to decide among investment alterna-
tives or to develop an optimum procedure for equipment
replacement?
This brief article is "methodological" only in the sense that
it calls attention, once again, to the necessity of studying
developments in many countries to provide a background and
a framework of reference for getting at the meaning of trends
in any one nation. It is broadly focused on industrial plan-
ning in the US and in the USSR. Whatever communication
barriers are brought into being by iron curtains, they rarely
affect the transfer of ideas on economic organization between
national managerial elites.
Widespread borrowing of American production techniques
by the USSR has been a well-publicized feature of that nation's
industrial development since the institution of the first Five
Year Plan. In the last years of Stalin's life the notion was
temporarily advanced that Soviet excellence made a study of
capitalist accomplishment unnecessary and even unpatriotic.
This policy, which was part of a broader campaign against
"kowtowing to the West," was quickly ridiculed after 1953 and
replaced by an insistence on constant attention to the technical
achievements of capitalism. That there has been a counter-
part borrowing of certain Soviet methods by US industry is not
so well known.
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Although an absolute causal relationship may be difficult to
prove, some key components of Soviet planning are being
widely adopted by industrial corporations in the US. The most
striking adoption has been the five year plan, which is now a
routine practice in virtually all large corporations as well as in
many smaller firms. Further, long-range planning, a blue-
print for the next 10 to 15 years, is becoming common in Amer-
ican industry. The preparation of detailed 15-year pro forma
profit and loss statements as well as balance sheets is fre-
quently reported. Increased use of this tool is being widely
advocated by management consultants. For example, Bruce
Payne recently stated, "Long-range planning is the one really
new technique left to management that can give a company a
major competitive advantage." 1
Long-range planning in a predominantly free enterprise
economy has been made much more possible by a growing
realization that techniques are freely at hand to dampen the
traditionally wide swings of the business cycle. Given such
knowledge, plus the government decision to use counter-
cyclical measures as necessary, which was embodied in the
Employment Act of 1946 and reaffirmed by subsequent admin-
istrations, a much more solid base for future planning now
exists, compared with the years prior to World War II.
What general guidelines are available to the planner in a
free enterprise system? Unlike his Soviet counterpart, he
does not start with a given politically imposed decision from a
body similar to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, defining the basic goals of future economic
development. Certainly he is not told that the company
objective is to overtake and surpass company X in the shortest
possible period of time.
However, the American industrial planner's general frame of
reference is the same as that of his Soviet counterpart ? the
entire economy ? even though the former's efforts are devoted
to furthering the future of a single firm. This is true for two
Bruce Payne, "Steps in Long-Range Planning," Harvard Business
Review, March-April 1957, p. 95.
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reasons: first, company planning must begin with projections
of the future economic growth of the country (or countries)
which constitute the potential market; and second, because
there are few long-run institutional limitations on the types of
products a single firm can manufacture.
The general facts of life in a dynamic free enterprise society
?are best mirrored in national income data. Projections of
estimated gross national product and of its components, such
as purchases by consumers, government expenditures, and the
investment of private business, set the broad limits of market
possibilities, whether the firm is concerned with the manufac-
ture of consumer products or with capital goods. These sub-
aggregates of gross national product become the first analyti-
cal tool of future planning, as the sales of many industries are
closely related to them. The post-World War II years have
been marked by the setting up of company planning teams
including economists skilled in the use and limitations of such
data, financial executives, engineers, and legal advisers.
The second reason given for long-range planning in an econ-
omy-wide frame of reference ? product selection ? deserves
some elaboration. Broadly speaking, any company is free to
choose what it will make in the future, within the limitations
of its financial capabilities. There are numerous examples of
firms whose product line today was virtually nonexistent ten
years ago. These firms, by careful analysis of consumption
and investment trends and projections, have successfully
anticipated what the market would demand. Such planning
methods are in sharp contrast to Soviet practices, for they
affirm the sovereignty of the consumer, the fact that his de-
cisions, freely arrived at, are reflected back in the structuring
of American industry. It inevitably is the consumer who de-
cides how much to save as well as the pattern of his expendi-
tures.
To summarize, in the USSR, an industrial goal has been set
as a result of a political decision, an arbitrary division between
consumption and investment, and a set of rigid priorities,
traditionally giving primacy to heavy industry. The Soviet
planner then works out the necessary number of simultaneous
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equations to shape the economy to the will of the leadership.
In the US, the industrial goal of a firm has been set by weigh-
ing such factors as sales and profit potentials for individual
products against the background of key marketing variables,
including projections of sub-sectors of national income, popu-
lation, rate of family formation, and so on.2
Once the industrial plan goals have been set in the USSR,
they are usually given extensive publicity, except for the mili-
tary-end-product sector and for certain related industries, such
as nonferrous metals. This is not the case in the US. In a
competitive economy, future plans are shrouded in secrecy.
The reason for this attitude is of course the competitive nature
of our industry ? long-range plans of a leading manufacturer
would be most valuable to rival firms.
Although future planning is a relatively new technique in
American industry, there is an extensive body of literature
dealing with the "how to do it" phase.3 In comparing Soviet
and American planning literature, one finds a number of strik-
ing similarities. For example, the need for annual plan re-
visions, the necessity of "proportional development," and the
importance of maintaining the tempo of growth are common
to both. In the techniques of plan execution, there are other
parallelisms. In the use of cost accounting to control the
operations of subsidiary enterprises, the American term is
"responsibility accounting," whereas the Soviet term is "eco-
nomic accountability" (Khozraschet).
However, in the Soviet Union, the primary success of
"Socialist competition" is measured in units of physical pro-
duction. Whereas the Soviets devote a great deal of attention
to reducing production costs, when faced with a choice the,
planners require plant managers to meet the physical produc-
tion quotas at the expense of all other goals. Furthermore,
For an exposition of many factors considered in such an analysis,
see Gilbert Buick and Sanford Parker, "The Changing American
Market," Fortune, August 1953.
See, for example, "Industry Plans for the Future," Conference
Board Business Record, August 1952.
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as was true in the US during World War II, when the Soviet
leaders assign a very high production priority to a product,
they will pay almost any price to insure its availability. It is
questionable that this is entirely Marxian, for while Marx did
advocate "the management of things" (presumably the reason
for severely controlled allocations of labor and material in-
puts) , he also stressed the need for reducing costs, particularly
the labor-time cost component. The system of extremely elab-
orate plan controls, centrally allocating all important inputs,
is a leading technique in the Soviet economy which is com-
pletely lacking in the US except in wartime. The Kremlin
leaders apparently have decided that a socialized economy,
striving to maximize the rate of growth along predetermined
lines, cannot achieve this objective without centralized alloca-
tion of resources.
Rational planning in support of agreed upon objectives is
difficult in the USSR because there is no way in Soviet economic
theory to measure total cost. Estimates of cost of production
(sebestoimost') include physical production costs plus an in-
adequate allowance for depreciation but not the alternative
cost of investment capital. For example, a decision is made to
increase steel capacity by 5,000,000 tons. Should this be done
in one plant or ten, should a relatively capital-intensive produc-
tion method be used, or a simpler but more labor-intensive
method? Marx having rejected the concept of a "payment for
capital," interest computations on capital investment are not
permitted, and there is really no fully objective way a Soviet
planner can make such decisions. There is no Soviet substi-
tute tool analogous to the Western rate of interest (cost of
capital) to compare with projected profit (return on invest-
ment) to aid in a decision between alternative methods of im-
plementing plans. That capital investment decisions in the
USSR are made in primitive ways, by American standards, is
clearly shown in Pervukhin's 1954 admonition to the planners
to include the cost of the necessary expansion of coal mines in
computing total costs of generating thermal electric power as
compared with total costs of hydroelectric power.
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The lack of a method of measuring total costs leads Soviet
planners to employ a subterfuge, introducing capital charges
by the back door through a technique called, "the coefficient
of relative effectiveness." However, this technique was uncov-
ered and denounced by 1950 and no substitute has been found.
On the technological level, project engineers probably still
make use of the "coefficient of effectiveness" concept in decid-
ing on size and process techniques. Such coefficients however
are not standardized, nor are they quite "pure" ideologically,
and seldom if ever have the decisive influence which capital
costs have in a free enterprise economy. The most recent
Soviet literature complains that planners lean toward automa-
tion as a key yardstick in the decision-making process, which
often results in no production savings per unit of output com-
pared with far simpler (less capital intensive) methods of
production. Indeed, there are cases where costs have actually
increased after elaborate automatic production lines have been
set up.
In a free enterprise economy, a choice between alternative
methods of achieving an industrial goal is relatively simple.
The answer is found by comparing the various returns on in-
vestment implicit in the alternative programs of plan imple-
mentation. The measure of return on investment (abbrevi-
ated as r.o.i.) is also the major management tool for gauging
the success of decentralized operating divisions of a company.
Indeed, sound advice to US industrial princes who aspire to be
kings is, "keep your eye on the roi."
In a free market, return on investment, or profit rate, is
ultimately determined by the interplay of supply and demand
forces. In the Soviet Union, prices and profit rates are fixed
by the state; in no industry are above-cost returns tied to the
total investment or fixed assets of the industry, nor is there
any close connection between profit and the relative scarcity
(or demand) for goods. Soviet policy keeps profits for the
most efficient sector of industry (producer goods), relatively
low, while those for the least efficient sector (consumer goods),
are relatively high. The combination of high profit rates on
consumer products, plus the policy of loading these items with
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the bulk of the turnover tax (another profit to the state) ,
means that consumer prices are intended to perform a ration-
ing or allocation function.
Moving from investment planning comparisons to a com-
parison of plans for organizational structure, one finds con-
siderable similarity between large US corporations and the
structuring of Soviet industrial ministries. One commentator
on American industry has stated:
"It would not be very much of an exaggeration to say
that the very large divisions of General Motors are run
much like units of a planned economy. They resem-
ble remarkably, in their interior organization, the
Russian "trusts" . . . . Equally striking is the parallel
between the approach of the management . . . to the
problems of industrial organization." 4
More recently the USSR has put into effect a plan for the
massive decentralization of industrial control, following a prin-
ciple which has been generally acknowledged to be sound by US
industry for twenty years. The motives involved in operational
decentralization ? the development of local initiative, flexibil-
ity, bringing authority to make decisions as close to the point
of action as possible, and so on. The reasons given in Khrush-
chev's "Theses" for his program of organizational change
are almost identical with those set forth by Ralph Cordiner,
President of General Electric, in .a 1956 speech entitled, "De-
centralization: A Managerial - Philosophy." 5 Decentraliza-
tion in American industry is almost universally a functional
division, rather than a geographic division, as in the USSR.
Based on American experience, decentralization will work only
if (1) real authority for operational decisions is delegated,
(2) confidence exists that associates in decentralized operations
will have the ability to make correct decisions most of the time,
and (3) responsibility commensurate with authority is ac-
cepted and acted upon at all levels. Our experience with So-
Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, New York, 1946, P. 123.
Ralph J. Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional Managers, New
York, 1956, pp. 40-79.
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viet decentralization is too meager to estimate whether or not
a workable division of labor has been made ? whether the bulk
of operational (as opposed to broad policy) authority has in
fact been passed to the 105 regional Councils of National
Economy. Indeed, we presently do not possess enough detail
to know how much of the plan is based on "Marxist-Leninist
principles" and how much bears an unacknowledged "made in
America" label.
It is true that local Councils of National Economy emerged
in Russia during the period of War Communism, 1917-1921.
It is also true, however, that they quickly developed into anti-
regime centers, opposed to the centralized direction of the
state, and that it took many years to bring them under control.
They finally disappeared in 1932. As reconstituted in 1957, it
seems only logical to believe that the Councils' functions are
something different than an exact Leninist blueprint resur-
rected from the past, and that they have, in part, a foreign
origin.
However, rigid adherence to traditional Marxist economic
theory is not essential in a socialist state. Yugoslavia has
shown this to be true. In that country, capital funds (from
state investment allocations) are now bid for competitively by
individual enterprises and groups. Material resources are not
allocated centrally, and market relationships exist for both
producer and consumer goods. Demand determines prices as
well as do costs of production. The implementation of cen-
trally planned goals in Yugoslavia is brought about mainly by
relying on credit and fiscal policies and by channeling invest-
ment toward the desired sectors through the guidance of in-
vestment flows of the state bank.
Recent articles in Soviet economic journals have carried dis-
cussions suggesting substantial modifications of traditional
theory on prices. Advocates of change have come almost, but
not quite, to the point of suggesting the use of the Western
mechanism of the market in setting prices. In the present
atmosphere of intellectual ferment, changes in the Soviet econ-
omy and organization are rapid and sweeping. Will the next
major shift be toward the Yugoslav model?
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COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF SOVIET AND US
ACCESS TO PUBLISHED INFORMATION
Joseph Becker
In intelligence we are not often able to catch the Soviets red-
handed planning a bit of deception behind the scene. This
occurred, however, early in 1957, when the Library of Congress
discovered, attached to a book which it had requested from the
Tashkent Institute of Railway Engineers, a copy of an internal
USSR Government memorandum signed by the Deputy Chief
Of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Railways, to the Chief of the
Tashkent Institute granting the latter permission to send the
book in question to the Library of Congress, but suggesting
that he request, in return, a publication which the Institute
needed. It further instructed the Tashkent Institute to in-
form the Administration of Foreign Relations of the Ministry
of Railways concerning future requests received from Amer-
ican libraries as well as the kinds of technical literature
exchanged.1
Insignificant as this bureaucratic oversight was in the total
scheme of things, it did tend to highlight the fact that the
Soviets have a controlled program for requesting publication
exchanges with the US and also revealed their interest in
acquiring and using US publications.
Any US publication available to the American public is also
obtainable by the Soviets with little effort. During the last 10
years various committees within the US Government have tried
to introduce controls over unclassified information likely to be
of strategic value to the USSR, but as yet no practical system
has been developed which effectively denies US published mate-
rial to the Soviets while making the same data available to US
CIA, CR?B-3,800,071, Interest of the Ministry of Railways of the
USSR in the Exchange of Technical Literature on a Controlled Basis,
15 April 1957. (Confidential)
MORI/HRP PAGES 35-46
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researchers and scholars, and to our allies. On the other
hand, Soviet publishing and distribution is maintained under
centralized control in Moscow.2 The Soviets classify, or other-
wise limit to administrative channels, much information which
the Free World normally releases in the public domain. This
has naturally given rise to pressures in the US to impose equiv-
alent controls; but, thus far, no solution has been offered which
does not also carry with it the stigma of censorship. The idea
of introducing a concerted program forbidding publication of
all but prescribed information in the US has been patently
rejected as being in conflict with traditional American concepts
of free exchange of information.
Whereas in the US publishing is decentralized within the
commercial book trade, Soviet publications are printed and
distributed under direction from Moscow. Current Soviet
publications are listed in the Knizhnaya Letopis'. The Letopis'
itself was denied the US from 1949 to 1954, and only recently
were we able to secure a set for these years by means of an ex-
change between the Library of Congress and the Lenin State
Library. Priced publications listed in the Letopis' can be ob-
tained by US purchasers, but there are other items which are
footnoted as not available for export. Roughly half of the cur-
rent scientific and technical papers which relate to military
defense or new technological processes are classified by law and
therefore do not even appear in the Letopis'. Western students
of Soviet affairs have long believed that such security require-
ments may indeed have hampered the quality and progress of
scientific research within the Soviet Union. The fact that
over-classification can be a deterrent to useful dissemination
of information has, in the past year, become apparent in the
pronouncements of various Soviet leaders who have called
upon both scientific and technical administrators for a more
rational approach to security procedures within the USSR.
Bulganin emphasized this in his report to the 20th Party Con-
gress when he advocated that the Soviets ". . . reduce secrecy
2 CIA, 00-M-3,053,549, System of Book Supply to Soviet Libraries,
Moscow, 7 March 1957. (Unclassified)
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measures to allow a freer exchange of scientific information
and opinion." 3
In addition to security considerations, many Soviet unclassi-
fied scientific and technical journals are published in a limited
number of copies and these rarely leave the USSR ? sometimes
not even Moscow ? simply because of the shortage of paper
and printing facilities. A copy of a Russian report sent abroad
may mean that some Soviet researcher will go without a copy.
In spite of the inherent limitations of the Soviet publishing
system, there has been a noticeable effort to disseminate their
best publications abroad in the interest of gaining interna-
tional prestige. Another reason for the increase in material
available for export is simply that the Soviets are generating
more publications. Good evidence of this exists in the scien-
tific and technical fields: during 1950 the Soviets produced
1,408 scientific serial titles, whereas by 1955 the figure had
risen to 2,026.4
Intelligence analysts use Soviet publications actively in their
daily work. Restrictive as Soviet publishing has been, its
products have always been a source of reasonably accurate and
current information about the Soviet Bloc. The value to in-
telligence which derives from exploitation of Soviet literature
runs extremely high. It is estimated that roughly '75 to 90
percent of our total economic, scientific, and geographic
knowledge of the Soviet Bloc is based on analysis of open source
material. Knowing what the Soviets tell their citizens, tech-
nicians, and administrators greatly assists intelligence officers
in measuring the main stresses, strains, and vulnerabilities of
the Soviet system. In general, US open source publications
provide the Soviets with certain types of military intelligence
and other valuable scientific and technical information, while
Soviet publications provide the US with a reliable index to the
over-all development of the Soviet system and a multiplicity of
facts about its current status.
"Report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU," Joint Press Reading
Service, Section B, No. 54, 23 February 1956, pp. 33-34. (Unclassified)
Borshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, vol. 16, 1952, p. 251. Pechat'
SSSR, 1954. Pechat' SSSR, 1955. (Unclassified)
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Steps have therefore been taken within the intelligence com-
munity to make the flow of publications from the Soviet Bloc
more productive. Less emphasis has been placed on US de-
nials and more effort expended on better acquisition of Soviet
publications in order to increase net advantage to the US.
Exchange procedures, controlled within the US Government,
have produced needed Soviet publications in return for US
publications requested by the Soviets. Under NSCID 16,5
CIA, in collaboration with other agencies, has been instru-
mental in adopting further measures, as follows:
a. Arranging direct and third country procure-
ment of Soviet publications considered to be
of intelligence value.
b. Advising other federal agencies of what to
ask for in exchange when they receive a So-
viet request.
c. Working with other federal agencies in iden-
tifying subject areas of interest to the Soviets
wherein statements of research results might
possibly receive some kind of US pre-publica-
tion control.
d. Assisting other federal agencies in keeping
the flow of Soviet publications to the US as
free and open as possible.
and, e. Through the Inter-Departmental Committee
on Internal Security and, later, via the Office
of Strategic Information in the Department
of Commerce, supporting an inter-Agency
agreement to establish an Exchange Clearing
House at the Library of Congress for coordi-
nating US-Soviet exchanges, with particular
emphasis on intelligence and defense needs.
This Clearing House is functioning today.
CIA employs three main sources to obtain Soviet publica-
tions: (1) the State Department's publications procurement
5 NSC. NSCID No. 16, Foreign Language Publications, 7 March 1953.
(Confidential)
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officers in Moscow, Berlin, and Paris, (2) the domestic and
foreign commercial book trade, and, (3) exchange arrange-
ments made via the Exchange Clearing House at the Library
of Congress. The "take" has risen sharply during the past
few years. In 1953, for example, the Library of Congress re-
ported receipt of 8,250 Soviet items; by 1956, this figure had
reached 19,000. Similarly, Library of Congress exchange rela-
tions with Soviet libraries and research institutions expanded
from 3 to 133 contacts during the past 4 years.
Under CIA sponsorship, the Library of Congress systemati-
cally catalogs and publishes a Monthly List of Russian Acces-
? sions, in English, which indexes all Soviet books and periodicals
printed in the Russian language which are received by some
125 cooperating US libraries. This publication is unclassified
and therefore is of use not only to the intelligence community
but also to researchers in the academic world.
Two other unclassified bibliographic tools are deserving of
special mention, namely:
1. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a weekly publica-
tion of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies containing
translations of selected articles appearing in Soviet news-
papers. It issues a quarterly subject index to these trans-
lations and to English language periodical articles pub-
lished in the USSR. Although highly selective, the Cur-
rent Digest is one of the more useful bibliographic tools
because it is the only English language guide to the Soviet
press which is adequately indexed.
2. The Cyrillic Union Subject Catalog, a card index to the
Cyrillic language book holdings of the Library of Congress
and cooperating libraries throughout the US. Citations
are given in English and in transliterated form. The
Catalog contains about 200,000 author-and-title cards
and some 327,000 subject cards. CIA Library has the
only duplicate collection of subject cards available outside
the Library of Congress.
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A complete summary of the major US Government and com-
mercial indexing and abstracting services can be found in
CIA's Selected Reference Aids to Cyrillic Alphabet Materials.6
Exploitation of Soviet publications to meet classified intelli-
gence requirements is performed by CIA's Foreign Documents
Division in the Office of Operations which last year examined
15,179 Soviet newspapers, periodicals, and books for intelli-
gence based on requirements submitted by various agencies.
The Air Force is also engaged in a large-scale exploitation pro-
gram. To serve its technical and intelligence needs, it main-
tains units in Washington and at the Air Technical Intelli-
gence Center in Dayton, Ohio, which examine and translate
Soviet publications for a wide range of Air Force interests. The
products of both the CIA and Air Force exploitation efforts are
disseminated to analysts of the IAC agencies.
Policy with respect to the procurement and use of Soviet
publications for intelligence purposes is formulated by the
Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications. This
Committee was established to assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in carrying out the provisions of NSCID 16. It is
composed of representatives of the IAC and insures coordi-
nation of exploitation, reference, and publication procurement
activities within the intelligence community.
There is a corresponding effort on the part of the Soviets to
acquire and exploit foreign literature; this has been especially
true for scientific and technical materials. One Soviet pur-
chasing agency alone ? The Four Continent Book Corpora-
tion, in New York City ? purchased over $100,000 worth of US
scientific and technical publications in 1954. The All-Union
Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Acad-
emy of Sciences, USSR, regularly screens and abstracts over
10,000 foreign scientific and technical titles of journals, 80
percent of which derive from US and UK sources.7 The Insti-
a CIA. CIA/CD-3, Selected Reference Aids to Cyrillic Alphabet Ma-
terials, October 1952. (Secret)
'CIA. CIA/SI 101-57, Soviet Mechanization of Information Processes,
15 April 1957. (For official use only)
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tute issues 13 abstract periodicals and 30 "express-informa-
tion" bulletins based on this literature to some 10,000 Soviet
individuals and scientific and industrial bodies. Great em-
phasis is given to prompt dissemination of foreign technical
data. For example, a 9 February 1956 "express-information"
bulletin included a Russian language article, illustrated with
2 photographs, on computer mechanisms in the radar-warning
system SAGE ? based on material which had appeared in the
US publication Aviation Week of 30 January 1956.
The Soviets' intense interest in the exploitation of foreign
technical literature seems to be a matter of policy. Bulganin,
in a speech made at the Plenary Session of the Communist
Party Central Committee, 4 July 1955, said,8
. . . . Great harm is being done to the cause of tech-
nical progress in our country by the fact that many
heads of ministries and departments, workers in scien-
tific establishments and planning and designing bu-
reaus and executives of enterprises underestimate the
achievements of science and technology abroad. The
task of learning and utilizing all that is best and most
advanced in the sphere of technology in other coun-
tries has been neglected in the last few years. As a
result, some research institutes and design organiza-
tions have spent a considerable amount of time and
money in research on and the creation of what has
already been published in the foreign press and is al-
ready in use.
Some of our personnel have formed wholly erroneous
views on the study of foreign experience. These peo-
ple believe that the study of foreign experience is of no
use to them. Actually, such people only reveal their
ignorance by arrogant phrases.
Such views and wrong attitudes regarding problems
of studying the achievements of science and tech-
nology in other countries must be denounced. Every-
on Industrial Development," Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, vol. 7, No. 28, 24 August 1955, pp. 3-20, 24. (Unclassified)
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thing new being created by world science and tech-
nology must be constantly studied. Scientific tech-
nical information should be improved; relations with
the research establishments and progressive scientists
of foreign countries should be expanded; the purchase
of foreign technical literature and its publication in
the USSR should be increased; the work of technical
information services in ministries and at enterprises
should be improved; and the exchange of advanced
experience should be well organized.
From the viewpoint of military planning, the background
data contained in US open sources probably supplies the So-
viets with as much information as they require for strategic
purposes. Given the freedom of the US press and the synthe-
sized form in which its information appears, the Soviets not
only receive sound indications of the present scope, size, and
rate of progress of major US military programs but they can
also re-create with reasonable accuracy US estimates of Soviet
capabilities.
A continuing analysis, for example, of open source trade
publications and scientific periodicals alone could provide the
Soviets with fairly accurate information on the status of the
US guided missile program. This is borne out by the fact that
the Soviets have published unclassified articles on the program
which are detailed as to type, characteristics, and names and
locations of manufacturers.? Soviet open sources have also
contained location and construction details of such strategic
projects as the St. Lawrence Seaway, atomic reactor and elec-
tric power installations, rail and highway tunnels, and other
critical aspects of US power and transportation systems. Just
one report, such as the Organization of the Federal Govern-
ment for Scientific Activities published by the National Science
Foundation, can give the Soviets a complete, authoritative
account of the scope and emphasis of the US Government's
scientific research and development programs.
? Voprosy Raketnoy Tekhniki. Sbornik Perevodov i Obzorov Ino-
strannoy Periodicheskoy Literatury, Moscow. (Unclassified)
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? Scientific intelligence specialists believe that information
released through US publications on such subjects as transis-
tors, scatter propagation of radio broadcasting by cloud reflec-
tion, and wave guides for long distance transmission all re-
sulted in triggering Soviet interest and research. Since the
results of comparable scientific development work are not dis-
seminated outside the USSR, there is, of course, no chance for
the US to obtain reciprocal advantages. Also, there seems to
be good evidence that the USSR is relying on US technical
journals as a means of reducing Soviet expenditures in research
and development and shortening the time requirement to in-
troduce new products. A simple and inexpensive way of in-
creasing rubber production by 20 percent was adopted in the
USSR shortly after it was described in US published material.
Other patented developments are obtainable by the Soviets
through the US Patent Office for payment of a small fee.
There are several historic cases where the US probably gave
away more information of a specific detailed nature than was
necessary or advisable. Notable among these were:
a) The MIT Radiation Laboratory series ? 26 vol-
umes, published in the period 1947-1950, which
gave the world most of the results of US wartime
research and development on radar.
b) The Smythe report of 1946 ? which contains suf-
ficient detail to enable an expert to avoid blind
alleys of expensive atomic research. There is posi-
tive evidence that the Soviets used information
from this report in setting up their own atomic
research program.
Benefits accruing to the Soviets from aerial photographs,
maps, geodetic studies, and gravimetric data are particularly
great and are significant in that most of this information is
openly available to them whereas the Soviet published material
in these fields is ordinarily denied to us. Except for some vol-
untary tightening up within the US Government (for example,
certain astronomic and gravimetric data developed in defense
programs) , little can or has been done to control this situation
because it is recognized that in most instances indirect procure-
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ment through a third party can be accomplished by the Soviets
with very little trouble. When one considers how much time,
effort, and money the US spends to locate fragmentary geo-
detic data about the USSR, it is frustrating to think that they
can so readily obtain in the US, for example, any number of
large-scale maps and charts from which to position principal
US targets for Soviet missile weapons systems.
Our government has found information in Soviet open
sources to be of considerable value. In fact, many agencies
maintain full-time staffs to examine Soviet literature, and
extensive translation facilities have been set up throughout the
government for this purpose. To a lesser extent industry is
also interested in Soviet publications, and many firms hire
Russian language specialists to screen the literature in search
of useful technological data.
The production of economic intelligence on the USSR is
largely dependent upon published open source Russian ma-
terial. The statistical handbook entitled The National Econ-
omy of the USSR, 1956, and a later supplement, have been
invaluable in assessing the Soviet economy. In addition to the
statistical compilations issued by the Soviets, various technical
journals in the fields of industry, agriculture, and finance, as
well as those dealing with theoretical aspects of the Soviet
economy, are in daily use by our economic analysts.
Potential gains in the review of Soviet published material
may be even more significant. For example, Soviet theoretical
mathematics leads the world and is freely published; this
knowledge of new mathematical functions is important to the
long-range advancement of US science. One Soviet paper in
which mathematics was applied to an electronics problem, and
which was available in this country, could have saved consid-
erable US experimental research time and effort had the paper
been discovered and exploited promptly. Soviet open sources
have also indicated the areas in which the USSR is ahead of
us, such as the development of ceramic cutting tools and of
electro-spark and ultrasonic equipment.
Occasionally a Soviet publication can be of direct aid to in-
telligence work. A prime example of how intelligence can
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benefit from an openly available publication is the use to which
the Biographic Register, Office of Central Reference, put the
1951 Moscow telephone directory. The Register transliterated,
codified, consolidated, and punched the contents of the direc-
tory into IBM machine cards. The information was then
organized into three separate lists: by name, by address, and
by telephone number. Since in many instances Russians
engaged in key research projects work and live together for
security reasons, this rearrangement gave CIA some very val-
uable leads in its intelligence operations and substantive scien-
tific intelligence research. Later, the Leningrad telephone
directory was treated in the same way.
US gain lies, therefore, in making the most of what is con-
tained in Soviet published material. Through effective exploi-
tation, intelligence can develop a reliable yardstick with which
to measure the "state of the art" in various fields of Soviet
endeavor as well as to evaluate significant military and opera-
tional data whenever they appear. Consequently, a great deal
depends on the comprehensiveness of US acquisition programs
and on the thoroughness of exploitation and translation
activities.
There is an underlying difference between the publishing
systems of the two countries. A far greater quantity of infor-
mation appears publicly in the US than is the case in the USSR.
This condition exists because the Soviets have considered it
"normal" to classify much scientific, technical, and other devel-
opmental information as if it were military in nature. Re-
cently, however, there have been signs that these stringent
security practices may be relaxed. Both the volume and the
quality of USSR publications available for export have in-
creased steadily over the past five years and this trend is likely
to continue. Short of some form of censorship or pre-publica-
tion control, there is little the US can do to prevent the Soviets
from acquiring those US publications which receive public dis-
semination. The ways and means by which the US can in-
crease its yield of information from Soviet publications are to
continue to acquire as much as possible, to promote a greater
influx of published Soviet material, to improve and expand
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translation and exploitation services, to strive for net advan-
tage to the US in all exchanges, and to capitalize on any oppor-
tunities to obtain those Soviet publications not normally avail-
able for export.
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FOOTNOTE TO CICERO
Dorothy J. Keatts
One of the best known spy stories of our time is that of Opera-
tion Cicero, a textbook exercise in tradecraft set in neutral
Ankara during World War II. It is, perhaps, of little impor-
tance that the exercise remained rather academic ? that the
information pilfered in the best traditions of the cloak-and-dag-
ger business was never fully used by the Nazis; that the British,
warned of the Ciceronian activity, took no effective action to
stop it; and that Cicero himself was never brought to book.
As a matter of fact, the academic nature of the exercise makes
Operation Cicero a nice, neat package to handle, uncomplicated
by consequences and relatively free of loose ends.
Cicero was the code name given by the Germans to the valet
of the British Ambassador to Turkey. Cicero gained access to
secret documents in the British Embassy in Ankara, photo-
graphed them, and sold the negatives to the Germans for large
sums, paid in English pound notes. Apparently the Germans,
suspecting the motives of Cicero's activity, delayed action on
the information he provided. Before they were convinced of
the authenticity of the documents, Cicero's operation was blown
? happily for the literature of espionage, by a woman.
The case was first packaged and presented to the public by
L. C. Moyzisch, Nazi military attach?t the German Embassy
in Ankara in 1943-44 and purchasing agent in the Cicero trans-
actions. Moyzisch's book, Operation Cicero, was a competent
and factual piece of work. The movie version of the affair,
called "Five Fingers," was designed for the market, of course,
and bore the embellishments apparently necessary to success-
ful merchandising. The Studio One television version appeared
to lie a batch of clips from the movie, with new faces and voices
dubbed in. The general accuracy of the Moyzisch treatment
was confirmed by Franz von Papen, German ,Ambassador in
Ankara at the time of the Cicero operation, and by Allen Dulles,
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who reviewed the book for the American press. Both Herr von
Papen and Mr. Dulles, however, intimated that other chapters
on the affair might be written.
What those chapters may be, we do not know; and this essay
is in no sense intended to suggest what either Herr von Papen
or Mr. Dulles may have had in mind. This is simply a footnote
to Cicero ? a footnote on the woman in the case. The source
is the American who was assigned the job of getting the woman
out of Turkey before the Nazi agents could accomplish their
mission of bringing her back to the German Embassy, dead or
alive.
In his book, Moyzisch ascribes the collapse of the Cicero op-
eration to the treason of his neurotic secretary, Elisabet.
Elisabet, Moyzisch declares, sold out to the British and fright-
ened Cicero into seclusion. In essence, Moyzisch probably is
right, but his details need some revising and some supplement-
ing.
Elisabet's real name was Nele Kapp. Her father, a promi-
nent and respected German diplomat, was Consul General in
Sofia during the war. It was largely as a favor to her father
that Nele was allowed to go to Ankara to work. Nele's father
detested the Nazi regime ? silently, of course ? and so did
Nele. She had been brought up in English-speaking countries
and had gone to school in Calcutta and in Cleveland, Ohio.
During the early part of the war, she became a nurse in Stutt-
gart and later got into the German diplomatic service and was
sent to her father's post in Sofia. Nele was very unhappy in
Sofia and it was not long before she was transferred to Ankara
as a code clerk. Here her unhappiness increased and her neu-
roticism developed ? in fact, she was far more neurotic than
Moyzisch indicates.
Apparently Nele wanted very much to get away from it all
and decided to swap Nazi trade secrets for freedom. One of
her first contacts was made in the office of a German Jewish
dentist ? the same one, incidentally, who was being patronized
by some of her Nazi associates. She had a toothache, went to
the dentist, and told him that she would like to be put in
touch with an American. The dentist arranged for her to
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meet an American Foreign Service officer, also a victim of tooth-
ache. Nele told the American that her sympathies were en-
tirely on the anti-Nazi side, that her father was an anti-Nazi,
and that she wanted to give information to the Americans in
return for a promise from them to get her out of Turkey ? to
America.
The Foreign Service officer transmitted her offer to the Am-
bassador, Mr. Steinhardt, who said "The Americans will promise
nothing, but we will be glad to receive the information. If she
cares to take it on that basis, that's fine." After all, Nele was
German and was working for the Nazis. At that point Ambas-
sador Steinhardt turned the whole thing over to the American
Military Attach?and Nele began to keep her part of the one-
sided bargain.
Nele made a fairly full report of the Moyzisch activi-
ties ? lists of Nazi spies who were working throughout the
Middle East and other items which Moyzisch had thought im-
portant enough to cable to Berlin. Among these bits of infor-
mation was the fact that on certain days of the month, usually
on a Friday, Moyzisch got extremely excited, and.the code room
was locked. Nele reported that the man who called himself
Cicero would phone, and everybody was shooed out of the place.
All she knew about it was that it was very important and that
it had to do with the British.
The American Military Attach?eported this bit of intelli-
gence to Ambassador Steinhardt, who said that the British
should be told. The British were told that there was a German
agent called Cicero who was transmitting to the German Em-
bassy something of great importance, that about every two
weeks the Germans in the Embassy became very excited in
transmitting this information by code to Berlin. The British,
so far as we know, did not act on this advice. Had the Ger-
mans been putting to use the intelligence received from Cicero,
the British would have had reason to suspect a leak. Actually,
the Germans never did use the information.
This footnote really begins where Moyzisch's book ends ?
with the disappearance of Nele. She came to her American
contact one day and said that the Nazis had found out about
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her and, in typical fashion, instead of confronting her with it
they had offered her a vacation ? two tickets to Budapest on
the German plane which was to leave in two days from Istanbul.
She was to go to Istanbul, get on this plane, visit her sick moth-
er in Budapest, all at Nazi expense.
Nele said to the American, "I've got to get out. You've got
to get me out!", and (with the Embassy's concurrence). he
agreed to do it. It was a sticky business. Turkey was a neu-
tral country, and if she were detected in the presence of Amer-
icans there would be trouble. It was decided that she should
be sent to Cairo, where the American authorities would decide
what should be done with her. But how could she be got to
Cairo? All the roads, the stations, and the airports were care-
fully watched by Nazi agents, whose orders were that Nele
should be caught dead or alive.
A plan was contrived, and Nele's disappearing act began.
She was housed for a week with two American girls ? secre-
taries from the US Embassy. This cover device led to such
things as Nele being hidden under the beds when the girls'
boyfriends came and to having her appearance changed. Her
hair was very blonde ? ash blonde ? and the girls dyed it
black. The girl who did most of the dye job got her hands so
covered with dye that she couldn't go to work next day. Her
boss came out to see the poor sick girl, bearing roses and con-
dolences, both of which she had to accept with her hands under
the covers. She finally got the dye off with gasoline.
The next step in the plan was this. The Taurus Express
trains, both northbound and southbound, came into the sta-
tion in Ankara at exactly the same moment and remained to-
gether in the station for about five minutes. The northbound
train went to Istanbul but stopped soon at Ayash, a few miles
out of Ankara. At this stop, one caught the train if he'd
missed it in Ankara; it was possible to miss the train in Ankara
and get to Ayash by automobile before the train did. The
southbound Taurus went to Syria and to Baghdad and Iraq.
One of the members of the escape party (our source) went alone
to the station. Under pretense of going on an outing, some
Americans from the Embassy went noisily to the girls' apart-
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ment, got the American girls, Nele, her luggage, and drove
the disguised Nele to Ayash. The accomplice in the station
at Ankara climbed into the rear car of the southbound train,
moved forward a few cars, and then jumped out into the north-
bound train just as it was pulling out. His hope was that
his followers (and he expected to be followed) would be search-
ing the southbound train for him as the northbound Taurus
left the station.
He leaped unwittingly into an empty car, in which the con-
ductor was locking both front and rear doors. The doors had
to be opened, as he had to get out of the train at Ayash, grab
the girl and her suitcase, and get her in the train, all in a few
minutes. The only person who could open them was the con-
ductor. Our source told the conductor that he was in a ter-
rible predicament. He explained that he was an American citi-
zen and showed his passport. He said that he had just been
married and his bride and her friends had missed the train.
He explained that it was our custom after marriage to be con-
ducted separately to the train ? a silly American habit. The
conductor, obviously looking for a tip, cooperated whole-heart-
edly. He promised to open both doors and to watch at one
end while our source watched at the other for his bride. This
worked beautifully. Our man jumped off, grabbed Nele, hopped
back on the train, the conductor locked the doors again, and
the train went off northward.
Elisabet was clutching some tablets in her hand the whole
time of the escape ? she called them sleeping tablets. Our
friend gave her a loaded gun which she carried at all times.
He also took along for the trip a bottle of whisky which she
looked as if she needed ? he was quite sure he did ? and after
they got on the train he gave her a fairly thick slug of
it ? straight Scotch. They lay down in the two berths ? she
took the upper berth and he the lower and, after just a few
minutes, she said, "I'm going to be sick." He said, "Well, go
to the bathroom and be sick." She replied, "All right, but
you'll have to get outside. I'll knock on the door when you can
come in again." So he very politely went outside, ,smiled at
the conductor, waited for a knock, and went in again. This
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happened several times before they got off the train at about
six in the morning and, as they were leaving the train, the
conductor came up to the "bridegroom" and said, "Don't worry
too much; they're often like that the first night."
But ? Nele was not to go to Istanbul, where she certainly
would have been seen. That Taurus Express carries a few cars
which are taken off in the middle of the night to proceed to
Balikesir, which was near a British camp. (Although Turkey
was neutral almost until the end of the war, air bases by the
score were built under Royal Air Force supervision for use in
the event they became necessary. By now to some extent the
British were partners in the operation.) The "newlyweds"
got off the train in Balikesir, were met by a British officer,
driven to the RAF installation, put up for the night, then driven
in a British truck to Izmir. Here another difficulty was en-
countered. When the British representative took one look at
Nele he said, "That girl is a German. I'll have nothing to do
with her. The only good Germans are dead Germans."
This impasse was saved by an OSS man who had a caique
(a small boat much used in these waters) coming in from
Greece that night. Nele was taken in the caique to Cyprus
and thence to Cairo.
In Cairo, Nele was interned in a prisoner-of-war camp, which
made her very angry. She felt that she had been and could
continue to be of service to the US Intelligence service. She
wrote a letter to her American friend (who had helped her
escape from Turkey) ? which was intercepted, so that her
friend was questioned by the Army authorities for consorting
with the enemy. Despite this mess, Nele was sent to Amer-
ica, where she lived in Elizabeth, New Jersey, until the end
of the war. Then she got a job as a restaurant hostess in
Chicago, and is now living in California where she is mar-
ried, ? with one or more children. Our source last heard from
her from California. He feels that she probably has never writ-
ten anything of her story ? that, from the tone of her letters,
she probably would prefer to forget the whole thing.
What happened to Cicero? He didn't disappear entirely.
He actually, at one time, went to the German Embassy ? the
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postwar Free German Embassy ? and claimed that he should
be given real money to replace such counterfeit money as the
Nazis had given him. At times he had small jobs for Turkish
intelligence and, when last heard of, was a poor man, living in
Ankara.
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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE AND
ARMS INSPECTION
Charles W. Mathews
Although a few of the disarmament proposals offered before
World War II considered problems of mutual inspection, it was
only after the advent of the nuclear weapons that control and
inspection became dominant elements in disarmament plans.
In fact, it is because of the failures of past disarmament nego-
tiations that the emphasis on the development of inspection
plans has increased.
In July 1955, President Eisenhower said:
The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agree-
ments without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the
dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.
Thus, it is my view that the priority attention of our com-
bined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of
inspection and reporting.'
In the same speech the President suggested that successful
inspection and reporting "would do much to develop the mu-
tual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress
for all our people."
Subsequent proposals on disarmament have contained many
inspection and reporting proposals, and it appears at this time
that if any concrete disarmament steps are to be taken, inspec-
tion and reporting systems will be effected at least as early as
the commencement of disarmament actions.
That arms inspections should be used for the collection of
intelligence should not be surprising. The inspections them-
selves are overt collection of the information required to de-
termine the degree to which the suspect nation is fulfilling its
obligations for disarming or to allow the inspecting nations to
determine whether or not the suspect nation is prepared to
1 White House Press Release, 21 July 1955.
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launch a military attack. Although the inspection systems
will certainly be developed to prevent foreign nations from
acquiring national secrets outside the inspection plan, cer-
tainly all participating nations will seize upon this opportunity
to supplement their intelligence collection efforts. In Decem-
ber 1955, Khrushchev publicly recognized that the Soviets are
aware of the opportunities for intelligence operations inherent
in inspection plans when he attacked the US "open skies" plan
as a means used for the purpose of finding out more about the
forces of another country.2
This article is limited to discussion of the more important
opportunities that arms inspection will provide for the collec-
tion of technical intelligence; it does not discuss the require-
ment for such intelligence. Only a few of the major elements
of technical intelligence are considered. Consideration of the
ability of arms inspection teams to gather intelligence about
naval and ground weapons systems would undoubtedly lead to
the same broad conclusions, so discussion of those aspects is
omitted for the sake of brevity.
Under any plan of international arms inspection that may
be developed, there are certain to be restrictions which will
make the operation cumbersome and difficult. In any process
of disarmament, each participating nation seeks to keep its
own strength and to diminish that of the other nations as
much as possible. It has already been evidenced that the
major states concerned in the present effort also are seeking
their own maximum advantage. This is as it should be, but
when the conference table is approached in mutual distrust,
as in this case, it is reasonable to expect that stringent limi-
tations will be placed upon inspection personnel, equipment,
and methods.
First, it is virtually axiomatic that inspection personnel will
be subjected to continuous surveillance. On the basis of past
activities of Soviet Bloc representatives in the US, this country
would be reluctant to allow the inspection team to do their
work in the US without keeping them under constant surveil-
"No Open Sky," The New York Times, 1 January 1956.
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lance. Fears that Bloc representatives might participate in
subversive activities or might sabotage key installations are
deep seated in many American minds. A similar distrust of
Americans exists in the minds of the Soviet leaders. There-
fore, any treaty agreed upon will almost certainly provide for
placing the inspectors under continual surveillance.
Although an inspection agreement would probably have
clauses to the effect that movement of personnel will not be
impeded or delayed, past experience with Soviet Bloc controls
on inspection teams in Korea and on diplomatic officials
throughout the Bloc have educated us to the methods the Com-
munists employ to encumber the travel of foreigners. Delays,
which are sometimes critical in the determination of the mili-
tary posture of the nation, are likely to be all too frequent.
Aerial reconnaissance is commonly thought of as encom-
passing only visual and photographic observations of the
ground below, but unrestricted aerial reconnaissance would
allow the use of a number of other means of intelligence col-
lection. Inspection planes may carry electronic equipment
such as is now installed in the reconnaissance aircraft which
the Navy and the Air Force are operating in areas bordering
the Soviet Bloc. Furthermore, the reconnaissance aircraft can
be equipped with air-sampling and meteorological equipment.
Unquestionably neither the USSR nor the US will be willing
to give the inspection teams complete access to military or
industrial facilities. It is certain that principal government
offices and military headquarters will be declared "off limits"
to the inspectors. Research laboratories will probably fall in
the same category. Production facilities of all types probably
will be subjected to inspection; however, the patent rights and
special production techniques of manufactures will be pro-
tected. This may mean that on occasion inspections will be
limited to long-term surveillance of inputs and outputs, which
would be effective for determination of some types of produc-
tion but of little value for determination of others.
When, on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower submitted pro-
posals for arms inspection to the heads of governments in
Geneva, he signaled a major change in American policy. In
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reality he said that an age of approximate equality of US and
Soviet air-atomic striking forces is upon us. Therefore, meas-
ures must now be taken to prevent either side from mounting
massive surprise attacks. In a speech to Foreign Air Attaches
in Philadelphia, Donald A. Quarles said:
Mutual respect for each others strength was in the back-
ground of the "summit" conference at Geneva. The Presi-
dent's plan to exchange military blueprints and facilities
for mutual surveillance is addressed to the fundamentals
of the situation: namely, that for the air atomic might
to be an effective deterrent against aggression, and there-
fore against war, it must be coupled with mutual surveil-
lance against surprise attack.3
Aerial reconnaissance was proposed by the President as a
simple first step to this end. The US was put on notice that
to fail to have adequate strategic warning, that is, intelligence,
of a pending attack is tantamount to disaster.
On first thought, one would be likely to say that nuclear
weapons should be the primary target of an arms inspection
operation. There is no question that surveillance of the
weapons stockpiles by itself would make it impossible for the
Soviet Union to launch a catastrophic blow against the US
without prior warning. No other weapon has been demon-
strated to have, or appears in theory to have, sufficient le-
thality so that the USSR would consider it a good enough risk
to flaunt before the nuclear retaliatory force of the US.
Would arms inspection enable the US to count and survey
the Soviet nuclear stockpile?
A few years ago knowledge of production of the uranium
mines in the Soviet Bloc was considered necessary in order to
establish some measure of the Soviet atomic threat. Now we
have more and better information about Soviet atomic energy
plants. In spite of an increase of knowledge about the Soviet
atomic energy program, however, there remains a critical need
for more information. The best efforts of the technical intelli-
8 Donald A. Quarles, Speech to Foreign Air Attaches, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 2 September 1955.
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gence community have developed only a rough estimate of the
quantity of fissionable material that the Soviet Union has.
The allocation of the material to the production of various
types of weapons or to the nuclear reactor program is not
accurately established. There is not enough information
available to permit a direct estimate of the weapons stockpile.
The first question about control of nuclear weapons through
an inspection plan is concerned with the ability of the inspec-
tors to determine and control the weapons stockpile. It is
probably not possible to inventory atomic weapons in being.
In a recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Eugene Rabinowitch wrote:
Technical feasibility of atomic disarmament depends
now on a reliable inventory of existing stocks of fission-
able materials. Considering the extremely small bulk of
these materials, and the absence of penetrating radiations
emanating from them, which could reveal their presence
to properly equipped outside inspectors, the only possi-
bility of inventorying them is for the agents of the UN
control body to be led to the stockpiles by national officials
who know where they are located. Neither the West nor
the USSR can be expected to base their own atomic dis-
armament on the faith that the other side has not con-
cealed a substantial part of its stockpile.4
If knowledge of Soviet production of raw ores is no longer of
critical importance, and if it is considered not feasible to count
and control the Soviet stockpile, then what principal questions
regarding nuclear weapons might be answered through arms
inspection operations? Other pressing intelligence questions
which should be considered are:
a. What are the types and characteristics of the Soviet nu-
clear weapons?
b. Where are the nuclear materials prepared and where are
the weapons assembled?
c. Where are the nuclear weapons storage sites?
'Eugene Rabinowitch, "Living with H-Bombs," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, vol. XI, No. 1, January 1955.
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d. What is the system for deploying the weapons to the mili-
tary forces?
e. What employment of nuclear energy is being developed
other than for weapons?
What are the types and characteristics of the Soviet nuclear
weapons?
We should not depend upon arms inspection to give us
directly more than a smattering of information on the types
and characteristics of Soviet nuclear weapons. If, unlikely as
it may seem, the US and the USSR were to agree to put their
atomic weapons on display for each other to examine, the tech-
nical intelligence analysts, rushing to confirm their evaluation
of the weapons, would certainly gain new and significant infor-
mation on the capabilities and limitations of the weapons they
have the privilege to examine. However, there is no way known
to assure that all of the types and models the Soviet Union has
produced will be displayed. On the basis of debris collected
from experimental bursts, the technical experts might suspect
that weapons are being withheld; but how can they counter
claims that no weapons using that type of construction or
reaction are stockpiled?
If a complete ground inspection operation is developed, the
inspectors of the nuclear materials industry would know the
types and quantities of materials produced. The inspectors of
nuclear weapons plants would probably not have the oppor-
tunity to observe those parts of the operation which would
reveal technological advantage. Their inspection undoubt-
edly would be limited to a check on inputs and outputs.
Knowledge of raw materials and the observable characteristics
of the finished weapons would enable the technical analyst to
develop firm ideas about the characteristics of the weapons
produced. Certainly such information would be considerably
better than our present knowledge.
Aerial inspection of nuclear materials and weapons plants
would probably not be able to collect any information that the
ground observers would not be able to obtain under conditions
just described. If ground observers were not allowed into or
near these facilities, aerial reconnaissance units might be able
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to use such techniques as air sampling to obtain some con-
firming or new information about the activities in the plants.
Either aerial or ground photographs of the nuclear energy in-
dustry and associated power facilities would be of great value
in improving our knowledge of nuclear material production.
Pictures of industrial reactors would also be valuable.
If the Soviets were to detonate atomic weapons while arms
inspection agreements are in force, considerable information
on the weapons types and characteristics could be gathered by
immediate aerial reconnaissance of the test site. Samples of
the debris taken near the point of burst and photographs of
the test site would reveal a great deal about the effectiveness
of weapons and the purpose of the tests. Photographs would
also furnish better information than we now have on the types
of weapons, methods of delivery, and release techniques.
Where are the nuclear materials prepared and where are the
weapons assembled?
Presently available information is believed insufficient to fur-
nish a good answer to the question of where nuclear weapons
are prepared and assembled. Aerial photography would be
highly desirable for the purpose of confirming information be-
lieved to be true and furnishing more accurate details about
locations and plant configurations. Ground inspection teams
could be similarly used, but they would be less capable in the
particular tasks mentioned.
Where are the nuclear weapons storage sites?
Inspection systems ? aerial or ground ? are unlikely to in-
dicate where nuclear weapons are stored. Suspect areas may
be put under heavy aerial reconnaissance. Ground observers
may be able, with luck, to trace materials from manufacturing
locations through transportation centers to storage sites. In-
spection certainly will increase the chances of finding storage
sites, but a great deal of initiative and good fortune would have
to be tapped. Of course, it is impossible to know whether or
not all weapons storage sites have been found.
What is the system for deploying the weapons to the military
forces?
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The ground inspectors stationed at principal military air-
fields and possibly near major air defense (missile) installa-
tions would have the only opportunity to discover elements of
the system for deploying nuclear weapons to the military
forces. The answer to this question could not be obtained
through straightforward inspection procedures. Observation
of military procedures and battle exercises might clue the alert
observer to elements of the weapons distribution system, to the
proximity of the weapons to the delivery vehicles, and to the
length of time required to put them into use.
What employment of nuclear energy is being developed other
than for weapons?
Inspection can be of considerable help in determining the
status of Soviet atomic reactor developments for military pur-
poses. The Soviet Union has already given considerable pub-
licity to its nuclear reactor program for nonmilitary purposes.
Several foreigners have visited reactors near Moscow and are
able to furnish considerable information about them. In the
atmosphere of reduced international tension that would prob-
ably accompany arms inspection agreements, it is reasonable
to believe that the Soviets would release information which
would give us some measure of the status of the nuclear-
reactor capability of their nuclear-reactor power plants.
Aerial inspection would determine the location and size of
nuclear reactors.
Judging from the facilities required for the US programs to
develop atomic-powered aircraft and submarines, such develop-
ments cannot be completed in ordinary laboratories and indus-
trial facilities. To test aircraft shielding, four 324-foot steel
towers were constructed at Oak Ridge.5 The Atomic Energy
Commission investigated 100 possible sites for development of
the nuclear submarine's power plant before it settled on 439,-
000 acres in the Valley of Lost Rivers, Idaho.6 Four giant
" "Major Activities of the US Atomic Energy Program, I: The Reactor
Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. X, No. 9, November
1954.
Ronald Schiller, "Submarine in the Desert," Colliers, 5 February
1954.
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buildings with walls 10 feet thick were scattered in the area.
The nearest town, Arco, is 20 miles distant ? out of range of
radiation gases. Special heat-removing devices, which would
be easily identified from the air, were installed.
Facilities such as those described would be easy to find
through aerial reconnaissance. Low-level reconnaissance with
aircraft equipped for detecting radioactive material might be
used to identify suspect activities of this type. Ground observ-
ers could make subsequent investigations.
The hulls of the atomic submarines are radically different in
shape from those of other submarines. Although detection of
new-type submarine construction would not prove that the
Soviets were developing atomic submarines, it would certainly
arouse suspicion.
Global warfare in the near future will be fought primarily
with manned aircraft, and it is of great importance that we
know the forces that oppose us. What are the range capabili-
ties of enemy bombers? What are the Soviet capabilities to
spoof, jam, or saturate US air defense facilities? What are
the range and altitude capabilities of Soviet radars and how
are they deployed? What proportion of the interceptor forces
are equipped with airborne intercept radar? These are but a
few of the questions about offensive and defensive air capa-
bilities to which intelligence has not been able to provide satis-
factory answers.
Aerial reconnaissance can obviously give us a complete pic-
ture of the Soviet airfield complex. Upon the completion of
the initial aerial survey we would have compiled the informa-
tion necessary to prepare the following information about air-
fields:
a. Coordinates of all airfields.
b. Radar landmarks, either direct or offset, for bombing fixes.
c. Details on runway construction, fuel storage, and mainte-
nance and repair facilities from which the capabilities of the
fields to support bomber or fighter operations can be estimated
accurately. Such information would enable US strike forces
to choose weapons which would match the vulnerability of the
targets.
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Information about airfields on the northern borders of the
Eurasian landmass is particularly important, since it is from
these fields that intercontinental attacks are most likely to be
launched. It is known that the Soviet Union has placed great
emphasis on developing airfields along the Arctic Ocean from
the Kola peninsula to the Chukotsky and Kamchatka penin-
sulas. The exact locations of many of these fields are not
known. The same is true of many other areas. An article 7
on Soviet airfields says:
However, the blank areas shown on the map, such as
the east side of the Caspian Sea, the southwest corner
of the area near Rumania, and the area along the Bal-
tic Sea do not necessarily indicate an absence of air-
field development.
We have inadequate information on the location of many
Soviet targets to meet the needs of manned bombers, let alone
the requirements of long-range missiles. To strike targets
with ballistic missile systems the geodetic latitude and longi-
tude of the launching sites and the targets are required. Since
1940, development of a common European-Russian geodetic
datum has progressed to the point where:
There should be reference points within less than
20 miles of about 70 percent of a typical [Soviet]
target system, for another 15 percent the reference
points will be 40 or 50 miles away or be in the Jap-
anese datum, the remaining 15 percent are far from
known grid systems.8
Aerial photography could be used to furnish such informa-
tion. If a photograph or photomosaic includes a target be-
tween two triangulation check points which are 100 miles
apart, the target can be located to 50 feet. If the check points
are close together and the target is 50 miles away, the error
Director of Intelligence, USAF, "Soviets Develop Airfields in Central-
European USSR" (Secret) , Air Intelligence Digest, September 1955,
p. 27.
" A. Wylly, Strategic Reconnaissance by Means of Missiles, The RAND
Corporation, Study RM-800, 7 April 1952, p. 20.
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will be less than 500 feet.? It is evident that aerial photog-
raphy of the USSR will enable the US to develop the geodetic
coordinates of potential targets entirely suitable for atomic-
missile operations.
About the capacities of the fields, levels of operations on
them, or Soviet methods of using the fields to stage attacks
there is insufficient information available to enable US plan-
ners to predict the size of a Soviet intercontinental attack.
Aerial reconnaissance will be of great value in fulfilling these
intelligence requirements. Regular photographic and visual
reconnaissance of the Arctic region will be difficult to accom-
plish because of cloud coverage.
Concerning the future, intelligence requirements for evi-
dence of the qualitative aspects of enemy capability will take
precedence over those for quantitative ones. The replacement
of conventional high explosive weapons has reduced the num-
ber of delivery vehicles required to accomplish a fixed amount
of damage against the enemy. In intelligence collection,
quantity must take the backseat to determination of opera-
tional characteristics of the new aircraft. If the West and the
Bloc come to blows in the near future, the decisive advantage
will in all probability rest with the side which has qualitative
superiority in its offensive-defensive air system.
Present intelligence operations are unable to penetrate So-
viet security sufficiently to furnish that information on Soviet
aircraft development and testing required for Department of
Defense research and development.
Prior to practice for the 1954 May Day show in Moscow, not
enough was known about the Bison bomber to estimate any
of its flight characteristics. An Air Ministry (RAF) Secret
Intelligence Summary reads:
A large unidentified aircraft was sighted at Ram-
skoye airfield in July 1953. The distance from it was
so great that the wings could not be identified . . . .
Nothing more was heard about this aircraft until
Ibid., p. 20.
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April 1954 whilst participating in the May Day fly past
rehearsals."
A year later the Director of Intelligence, USAF, wrote:
. . . on the strength of the recent sighting [April
and May, 1955] and after a close check with US in-
dustry, the USAF is forced to conclude that much
earlier flights have been made and that the produc-
tion program was already well advanced last year.
Thus the Soviet heavy jet bomber program is roughly
two years' in advance of previous US estimates.11
It wasn't until the Soviet Union had deliberately flown the
Bison where Western observers could take photographs that
technical intelligence experts of the United Kingdom and the
US were able to calculate the characteristics of the aircraft.
Although some information has subsequently been obtained to
substantiate the estimates of characteristics, such significant
factors as maximum range, altitude, and speed capabilities
still have not been verified.
It is unpleasantly true that the situation described in the
preceding paragraph has to a large extent been duplicated
with regard to all of the newer Soviet aircraft.
Aerial reconnaissance will be a particularly valuable means
with which to get earlier knowledge of aircraft development
than is presently available. An aerial inspection plan would
increase manyfold the chances that we will identify new air-
craft while they are still in the testing stages. With modern
techniques, the skilled interpreter can calculate from photo-
graphs the over-all dimensions, the weight, and the flight char-
acteristics of an aircraft.
Ground observers, who would be stationed at major military
air bases, may not have the opportunity to observe aircraft
research, development, or testing. If the ground observers are
fortunate enough to observe aircraft in flight, they could fur-
'? Air Ministry Secret Intelligence Summary, Assistant Chief of the
Air Staff (Intelligence) Air Ministry, September 1954, p. 9.
'' Director of Intelligence, USAF, "Fly-By Highlights," Air Intelligence
Digest (Secret) , June 1955, p. 4.
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ntsh information which would be used to improve estimates
made on the basis of aerial photography. Ground observers
might be able to gather information on aircraft at earlier
stages in the development, for they may see planes under con-
struction which, being under cover, are not visible from the air.
Although it is improbable that the inspection team will get
significant information on research, it is likely that it will have
access to all aircraft factories and would see new aircraft in
early stages of production.
Although the US has been aware for several years of Soviet
missile batteries being completed on the perimeter of Moscow
and although numerous sites have been observed, there is still
very little information available about the missiles employed
in the batteries. Most of the known information tends to indi-
cate that an improved Wasserfall-type missile, about 30 feet
long and 4 feet in diameter, is employed. In 1955 the Air In-
telligence Digest reported:
Fifteen [missile] complexes now appear to be
*rational, but it is possible that this figure could be
as high as 25 . . . . It is estimated the Soviets would
require a stock of about 6,000 missiles. This suggests
a present ?production rate of 3,000 to 4,000 per
year . . . . It is possible that the assembly of these
missiles is taking place at Kimki.12
Later information has verified that there are more batteries
than estimated.
This example suggests that it is perfectly clear that the
Soviet Union is developing a large guided missile capability.
The US, however, has been unable to establish either the quan-
tity of missiles being produced or the types of missiles being
developed in the Soviet Union. , The current standard formula
for determination is to add a cup of analysis to a pinch of
intelligence, leavening the whole by comparison with the US
missile program.
Can arms inspection provide the answer?
uDirector of Intelligence, USAF, "Missiles Around Moscow" (Secret),
Air Intelligence Digest, October 1955, p. 28.
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A single high-altitude photograph of Moscow and its envi-
ronment would enable us to spot the missile defense pattern of
the city. To date, our knowledge indicates that there are two
concentric circles of emplacements of radii 25 and 45 miles
with batteries spaced at 8-mile intervals around the circles.
If this is so, the Moscow defense has approximately 50 emplace-
ments. Aerial photography would establish the exact location
of each element of the Moscow missile defense.
The type of missiles used would probably be determined in
short order, either by ground observation or by low-altitude
photography of missiles being moved into the batteries. A
single good photograph would provide enough information to
enable technical analysts to make approximations of the char-
acteristics of the missile.
Aerial or ground photography should be able to provide val-
uable information on the electronic equipment used in the
control of the net. It is probable that electronic noise emanat-
ing from the control gear can be recorded and analyzed to
provide characteristics of the control system.
To this point, only the missile defense of Moscow has been
discussed. Aerial reconnaissance of other Soviet cities would
reveal the status of their missile defenses. Identification of
missile emplacements similar to those in the Moscow area at
unanticipated locations may even reveal hitherto unknown
critical industrial or military facilities.
The status of development of Soviet long-range missiles, par-
ticularly the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), is a
matter of grave concern to the US. Unfortunately, little is
known about the Soviet program. Estimates of the earliest
date when the Soviet Union may have an operational ICBM
vary too widely to be used effectively in determining US policy.
A combination of aerial and ground inspection can do much
to furnish required information on the Soviet missile develop-
ment. The intelligence specialists have firm ideas about the
location of missile research, development, and testing. The
inspection units would be able to tackle the missile problem
immediately. Aerial missions can be mounted to survey Soviet
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testing sites, such as that near Kapustin Yar, on a schedule
sufficiently frequent that it may be possible to observe missile-
test preparations. Although ground observers may be pre-
vented from entering test areas, they can take positions where,
with the aid of scientific instruments, it would be possible to
collect valuable data on the missiles being tested.
Because of the size of ground-based missiles, ground observ-
ers would not have a great deal of difficulty observing the
movement of missiles from factories to test sites. The associ-
ated equipment required for a missile battery is so extensive
that it would be extremely difficult to prevent observation of
movement of missile units.
The problem of obtaining photographs of the missiles them-
selves is a difficult one. The natural habitat of ground-based
missiles may be in underground storage. The missiles them-
selves probably will be assembled under cover just before
launching. Therefore, they would be exposed to aerial recon-
naissance for a relatively short period of time. The best
opportunities for photographs are likely to come at the test
sites. When missiles are assigned to operational units, it is
quite possible that they will not be directly exposed to aerial
observation before actual firing preparation. Infrared photog-
raphy may help in locating underground bases.
When intermediate and long-range missiles begin to become
operational, high priority will be placed upon obtaining fixes
on the launching sites. Opinion about the ease with which
such sites can be located is divided. Leo Szilard writes:
"[Intercontinental ballistic] missiles, once they have been
manufactured and placed in position, can be easily hid-
den . . . ." 13 Although he speaks only of the missile itself,
his article seems to imply that he thinks the launching pad is
easy to hide. Another noted writer, William F. Frye, writes:
Obviously, the ICBM ? or at the very least its
launching platforms would have to be outlawed.
If such platforms existed at the time the treaty took
" Leo Szilard, "Disarmament and the Problem of Peace," Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, vol. XI, No. 8, October 1955.
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effect, they would have to be destroyed; whether or not
this has been done could be verified by aerial photog-
raphy with something approaching certainty. At
least, no large group of platforms, such as would be
necessary for a massive attack, could be concealed.
Thereafter, aerial photographs would expose any move
to build new platforms. . . . There would, of course,
have to be provision for follow-up inspection on the
? ground in case something suspicious were discovered
on the photographic plates
It is probable that Frye is closer to the truth than Szilard.
Electronic intercept operations may be very valuable in col-
lecting indications of possible attack by noting widespread
electronic checkouts of missile electronics systems.
In summary, arms inspection by aerial and ground inspec-
tion should be able:
a. To determine the types of missiles being manufactured in
the Soviet Union.
b. To furnish information from which reasonably accurate
estimates of the characteristics of Soviet missiles can be made.
c. To locate the launching platforms for the missiles.
In a recent Air War College thesis on aerial reconnaissance,
Colonel Richard R. Stewart wrote:
It is predicted that the reconnaissance pay-off possi-
ble on the Soviet defense force would be considerably
less than on their attack capability. Some of the fac-
tors that would tend to make this reconnaissance less
remunerative are (1) the importance of the human
element and (2) the greater reliance on "black box"
type equipment.15
Although little information about the human element can be
obtained through arms inspection plans, it is possible to im-
" Williarn F. Frye, "Possession and Use of Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, vol. XI, No. 10, December 1955.
US Stewart, Colonel Richard R., "The Value of Intelligence Data Ob-
tainable by Air Reconnaissance" (Secret), Air War College Thesis,
No. 1036, May 1955, p. 40.
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prove our knowledge of Soviet utilization of "black boxes."
Fortunately it is not vital to know the exact content of the
"black boxes." The Beacon Hill Report on Air Force intelli-
gence and reconnaissance says that "an elaborate and precise
analysis of each radar signal is not needed and, in fact, not
desirable. We want many independent pieces of information,
each of limited content." The report would have intelli-
gence effort concentrated on the specifics, rather than attempt
to gather everything.
Every active radar within range of the reconnaissance ve-
hicle should generate automatically a record of:
(1) The detection of a pulsed signal and the posi-
tion of the reconnaissance vehicle at the time of de-
tection.
(2) The approximate frequency of the signal
(within 10 or 20 percent), for identification of the
class of equipment involved.
(3) Approximate true bearing of transmitter. .
Other things, such as pulse repetition rate and scanning cycle,
can be easily obtained. In keeping with the concept of con-
centrating on the essential items, however, it would be best to
neglect the latter in normal reconnaissance activities.
It is obvious that a reconnaissance unit can not accomplish
electronic intercept unless the electronic units of the enemy
are active. Ferret flights have found that the Soviet early
warning (EW) and ground control intercept (GCI) radars
have continued to operate against the ferret aircraft as long
as the aircraft remained in range, enabling the ferret mission
to calibrate the radar completely. If arms inspection agree-
ments are implemented, it is reasonable to expect the USSR
to use its radar net to monitor the inspection aircraft. Al-
though there is no assurance that the inspection units will be
able to identify all radar installations in the air defense net,
"Beacon Hill Report, Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Recon-
naissance (Secret), Project Lincoln, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 15 June 1952, p. 44.
"Beacon Hill Report, p. 50.
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there are checks which can be applied. The US, through its
present ELINT operations, has located and identified many
early warning and ground control intercept stations in the
western and southern USSR, the European Satellite nations,
and along the Pacific coast of the USSR and China. Using
these previously identified stations as a check would enable
the analysts to determine the probability that the Soviets are
deliberately silencing some of their radars when inspection
aircraft are in the air. Such activity on the part of the Soviets
would materially diminish their opportunity for gaining pro-
ficiency on the equipment.
Good closeup photographs of the various types of the Soviet
radar and communications equipment would be even more
valuable in determining the technical characteristics of the
equipment.
Aerial photography will reveal many of the installations
whether or not the equipment is in use. Even active radar
reconnaissance can be used to pinpoint the location of enemy
electronics equipment. The Beacon Hill Report considers the
ultimate limit of radar resolution:
Low-level reconnaissance of the strip 10 miles wide
(5-miles range) should be possible under all conditions
except moderate to heavy rain. . . . With an appro-
priately short pulse, which presents no serious (tech-
nical) problem, this would enable a 10-mile-wide map
to be recorded in 20-foot by 20-foot elements. A 10-
mile square would contain as much detail as a 70 mm
film resolving 20 miles per millimeter.18
When ELINT methods are used in conjunction with photog-
raphy or with radar mapping as described, there should be no
major problem in determining the location and significant
characteristics of Soviet air defense radar.
Although it is probable that our ability in ELINT is as good
as, or better than, that in other fields of technical intelligence,
there continues to be difficulty in obtaining information on
new radar equipment being developed and installed in the So-
"Beacon Hill Report, p. 135.
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viet Bloc. Only recently, one of the first indications that the
Soviet Union was re-equipping some of its air defense system
with new radar was observation of a great increase of TOKEN
radar on the China coast, indicating that the Soviets may have
developed something better for their own use. Electronic
reconnaissance from ground stations near known Soviet elec-
tronics research and development activities and with airborne
equipment can easily furnish the US with information about
Soviet radar equipment under development.
The opportunities that arms inspection provide for study of
Soviet aircraft, missiles, and related bases and facilities have
been discussed earlier in this article. The only major element
of the air defense system not considered so far is the most
difficult the command and communications system of air
defense. Even here the inspection teams can be of assist-
ance ? both from the air and from the ground.
Radio communications activities of the enemy units
is the most important electromagnetic source of infor-
mation needed to put together a picture of the imme-
diate strength, deployment, and inventories of the
opposing military force. This is true even if we ex-
clude message content."
Radio-wave interception, in general, is a way of
guarding against technological surprise. We need
only recall the antisubmarine campaign of 1942 and
1943, in which we were able to contain the threat
solely because the German submarine force was un-
aware that microwaves were being used against it.20
Photographs of the three groups of equipment in the MOON
system of aerial navigation would enable the technical analysts
to develop much more accurate estimates of the Soviet capa-
bility to navigate over Western Europe, North Africa, and the
Middle East.
Arms inspection plans may never become realities, but while
they are being considered it is important that attention be
"Beacon Hill Report, p. 43.
"Beacon Hill Report, p. 44.
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given to the indirect results of such plans as well as to the
immediate relation of the plans to disarmament and to the
machinery which would be required to implement such inspec-
tion systems.
It is popularly believed that the military departments have
little knowledge about the Soviet forces, but the true gravity
of the situation is only apparent to those who are charged with
the development of US forces to counter the Soviet power.
Colonel William A. Adams, USAF, reported in 1948 that "It is
impossible for us at Strategic Air Command, or at any other
level, to plan a comprehensive air campaign without a photo-
graphic exploitation of the territory to the east of the Ural
Mountains." 21
In his presentation to the 1955 Reconnaissance Symposium,
Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everest, USAF, insisted "We cannot meet our
responsibilities, cannot accomplish our tasks in defense of our
national security without critical information. Much of this
can be obtained only through aerial reconnaissance." 22
With such a pressing need for information which can be
obtained, at least in part, under the arms inspection plans, it
is highly desirable that those who are negotiating be aware of
the intelligence implications of these proposals. If such plans
become reality, then the US should be prepared to make the
most of the opportunity for intelligence collection that is so
presented.
Aerial and ground inspection systems present an excellent
opportunity for gathering technical intelligence. The ex-
change of "military blueprints" would be of material assistance
in determining the intent of the enemy and the location of his
forces but would not provide the type of information required
to determine the characteristics and capabilities of weapons
and weapons systems. Although exchange of "blueprints" may
provide accurate target information, aerial reconnaissance
would be required for verification.
"US Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Reconnaissance Symposium
(Secret) , November 1948.
22 US Air Force, Air University, Reconnaissance Symposium (Secret) ,
April 1955.
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The proposal for military budget reduction and inspection
would be of no value for technical purposes, for it would not
reveal scientific or technical developments nor the state of
military research and development.
Aerial inspection, making use of all types of reconnaissance
equipment, would provide vital information on:
a. Target locations sufficiently accurate for guided missiles,
either ballistic or winged, and manned bombers.
b. Major developments in manufacture of nuclear material,
aircraft, and possibly missiles.
c. Guided missile development and deployment.
d. Characteristics of aircraft, at least as they begin to be-
come operational.
e. Air defense radar in particular, and all types of radar in
general.
Aerial photography would not always be able to provide the
precise photography necessary for technical intelligence pur-
poses. In April 1955 the Day Reconnaissance Seminar Group
reported that there is a requirement for a photographic system
"for recording highly specific information on relatively few
areas to provide detailed information on the development of
enemy scientific warfare equipment and techniques." The
equipment should "record low contrast objects 1 foot on a side
on the ground, these objects to be measured with an accuracy
within 5 percent . . . over 90 percent of the total format
area." 23
Ground observers will have the opportunity to meet this re-
quirement, at least in part. If a closeup photograph of a radar
installation or a missile battery at a known location is desired,
the observer will be able to visit and photograph the facility
under the proposed plan for freedom of movement of observer
teams. The eyes and camera of the ground observer will be
his primary means of intelligence collection. However, he can
perform operations which the aerial reconnaissance teams
would find difficult or impossible. He can observe a fixed loca-
tion for long periods. He can collect air, stream, or vegetation
" US Air Force, Air University, Reconnaissance Symposium (Secret) ,
April 1955.
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samples from the vicinity of laboratories or factories suspected
of being engaged in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
development or manufacture.
Now consider what the arms inspection operations under
consideration would not reveal. The number and deployment
of nuclear weapons could not be determined. It is unlikely
that the Soviet system of "bombing-up" would be revealed, and
consequently it would be impossible to determine the time re-
quired to get an attack force airborne. Bombing and naviga-
tion capabilities of the Soviet Long Range Air Force are likely
to remain largely unknown. Although much information
about the military equipment used in the air defense system
would be forthcoming, the inspection would not enable us to
determine the control system or the speed and efficiency of the
air defense communications. Many guided missile launching
sites may be determined, and an estimate of the quantity and
types of missiles produced may become known to the West.
However, it is improbable that the characteristics and the qual-
ity of Soviet missiles will be determined.
All of these factors are elements required to assess the
present Soviet military capabilities. But what about our abil-
ity to determine the scientific and military research and devel-
opment of the Soviet Union? Can the arms inspection meth-
ods under study be expected to furnish the ten- to fifteen-year
look into the future that is required for the development of our
own military equipment? It is apparent that arms inspection
will not satisfy this requirement. Although the very act of a
carrying out of arms inspection will reveal some aspect of So-
viet research and development, little hope should exist that a
thorough understanding of the future of Soviet air-atomic
capability can be developed. The US must continue to develop
its various intelligence efforts against the Soviet Bloc. Fur-
thermore, if arms inspections are established, the US must
make use of the opportunities that the operations will provide
to develop close liaison between Soviet and Western scientific
and technical personnel. Only by developing every oppor-
tunity can the US hope to become sufficiently informed on
Soviet technical development.
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In conclusion, there is a great quantity of intelligence of a
military and technical nature, not presently available, which
the US could obtain in the event that an arms inspection plan,
using aerial and/or ground inspection teams, were to be im-
plemented. To wait for such developments, however, is fool-
hardy. In the face of the fact of supersonic aircraft and long-
range missiles carrying thermonuclear weapons, the intelli-
gence community must redouble its effort to develop new tech-
niques for collecting technical intelligence, whether or not arms
inspection proposals become international agreements.
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INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
SOME SUGGESTED APPROACHES
Bernard Drell
Research may be divided into two general activities, to col-
lect information or extend knowledge, and to answer particular
questions. Intelligence research properly consists of the latter
kind. Because the problems of the intelligence community are
many, research activity must be focused not only on intelli-
gence problems but also must be directed at targets of highest
priority, in order to make the most efficient use of the com-
munity's limited manpower and money.
Intelligence questions may range from such narrowly defined
topics as how many man-hours it takes to produce a Soviet
tank to broad inquiries about the industrial capacity of a satel-
lite nation. Intelligence research may be undertaken for im-
mediate, or current, use; the depth of an obscure harbor, for
example, must be ascertained before an invasion, or a study of
the economy of a country is called for because it will serve as
a guide for answering more specific questions that may arise
on short notice.
Even in such broad projects, however, the object of the intel-
ligence research is not encyclopedic information; it must be
limited to information that answers questions of intelligence
interest. It is essential, therefore, both in planning and con-
ducting intelligence research, that its urgency and its purpose
be constantly borne in mind. From these imperatives will
stem the interest, incentive, accuracy, and imagination re-
quired for creative work in intelligence.
Although intelligence research has much in common with
other purposeful research, there is no single, simple technique
which will solve all research problems. It may be said with
equal truth that no one method is appropriate to all kinds of
intelligence research. Techniques and methods must be
adapted to the problem, its scope, its urgency, and to the
nature of the evidence. It should not be forgotten that the
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researcher, himself, is a variable quantity. No two analysts
are likely to use the same methods in solving a given problem.
Within limits, therefore, research methods must be gauged to
the training, background, and interest ? the personality of
the intelligence analyst.
Although the intelligence research process is varied, it may
be suggested that it has much in common with other research
in the social sciences. Any intelligence research project may
be broken down into basic operations, according to their role
in the project as a whole. These operations may be termed
(1) Project planning, (2) Collection of data, (3) Analysis of
data (a general term, here) , and (4) Presentation: Writing the
report. Although these operations are not performed entirely
in sequence, usually they take place in the order named, allow-
ing, of course, for considerable overlap and a human tendency
to back and fill.
These are arbitrary divisions. There is nothing natural or
inherent about them, nor for that matter, about dividing the
whole process into four parts. Other names might do as well,
and undoubtedly more than four skills are used in any given
project. The four stages chosen here are merely suggested as
convenient divisions for discussion.
Because an intelligence project seeks to find an answer to an
intelligence question, it is of prime importance to secure an
early understanding of the problem to be investigated.
If the problem is a question from the National Security
Council, it probably will be clearly stated in the Terms of Ref-
erence put out by the Office of National Estimates. Another
kind of problem will have to be formulated internally in terms
of projects initiated at or below the divisional levels. In either
instance the object is to overcome ignorance in a matter of
intelligence importance. To plan the project, then, it is essen-
tial to know just what it is that must be learned about the
subject in the time available. When the question is under-
stood, it becomes possible to define the scope of the project in
terms of a) what is relevant and irrelevant, b) what is known
and what must be investigated, and c) the number of man-
hours to be allotted to the work.
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In order to achieve full understanding of the question at this
stage, it is also essential that the analyst think the problem
through, going beyond a mere statement of the question. Al-
though such an analysis may appear premature, it is impera-
tive that the problem be mulled over thoroughly for disclosure
of its implications and ramifications and that these be formu-
lated in the shape of a preliminary outline of what is desired
to be known about the subject.
At first thought, it may seem impossible to outline a project
until the research has been completed and the threshold of the
writing stage has been reached. When a project is conducted
in this manner, however, it tends to veer away from purposeful,
sharply focused research to fuzzy shotgun collection charac-
terized by uneven coverage and inefficient allocation of time.
Nevertheless, outlining a project when it is still in its plan-
ning stage and before any research has been undertaken on the
subject admittedly raises difficulties.
This initial outline presents not all that is known about the
subject, but rather all that we wish to know. The analyst can
infer, from the mission of his component, the kind of informa-
tion that will be sought.
This is not to suggest that initial ignorance of a subject is
an advantage, but merely that it is not as great a handicap as
appears at first glance. An analyst with a technical knowl-
edge of automotive construction, of aircraft factories, or tank
factories in the US, in a sense already partially knows what to
look for when undertaking a study of the Soviet ability to sat-
isfy requirements for these items.
Naturally the analyst will want to brief himself on what is
known about these industries in the USSR. Where, in a new
research project, a scholar would turn to a short, general ac-
count for a quick survey of the kind that might be found in an
encyclopedia, textbook, or technical monograph, so an intelli-
gence analyst has recourse to similar summaries in the intelli-
gence field, such as the appropriate chapter of the National
Intelligence Survey, one of the National Intelligence Estimates,
or completed intelligence reports on the subject. Occasion-
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ally, however, the analyst finds no background reports avail-
able, so he must begin his research without the benefit of
organized information.
From his background experience, his scanning of general
reports on related subjects, and his initial analysis of the prob-
lem, the analyst should be able not only to prepare a prelim-
inary outline of questions about the subject, but also to begin
to think about the precise kind of data to look for as well as
ways of processing the information in order to find answers to
the problem.
Having made preliminary plans for a project, the analyst is
justifiably eager to begin accumulating data. This impa-
tience is understandable, but it is also an urge that should be
restrained until a survey can be made of the amount and kind
of information available. In a well-organized research project,
the analyst first makes an inventory of accessible information
and sets this up in the form of a bibliography or list through
which he can then work systematically. The completeness of
the inventory depends in turn on whether the project is a basic
study or whether it is merely a quick answer to a simple ques-
tion. If the study is to be exhaustive, then the search for ma-
terial should be systematic and intensive.
Unlike the academic research worker, the intelligence
analyst may draw on a world-wide collection organization. In
a sense, he has at his command all the collection resources of
the US government as well as of certain other nations. He
can also draw upon information possessed by private organiza-
tions and independent specialists. Much of the discussion of
this article has reference to the CIA facilities, which are avail-
able to analysts throughout the intelligence community.
Because the data collected by CIA are great in quantity and
growing rapidly, machine methods have been devised to help
get information from the mass of data in the CIA Library (a
part of the Office of Central Reference ? OCR). IBM ma-
chines are used to sort the punched cards upon which most
documents are coded and books are catalogued.
The Dewey decimal system is embodied in a book entitled
Intelligence Subject Code, a volume with which all intelligence
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analysts are vitally concerned and with which all should be
familiar. This book is used in the reference services of CIA,
the Air Force, the Signal Corps, and other components of the
government. In order to request documents from the Library,
the analyst first selects the appropriate numbers from the
Intelligence Subject Code and requests a tape run on these
numbers. The Machine Division of OCR will mechanically
sort out the cards that fall within the requested number limits,
place the selected cards in an intellofax machine, and send the
resultant tape run to the analyst, via the Library. From the
tape run the analyst selects those items that pertain specifically
to his problem and orders the documents from the Library.
This process seems deceptively simple because it is a mech-
anistic description; what has been left out is the analyst's
ingenuity in selecting the numbers from the code and his
ability to identify a likely looking document on the basis of the
title alone. In the use of the code, he can rely on expert help
from a librarian; but in calling for the documents proper he
must either rely on his own perception or order all documents
of any possible use.
This, then, is the first step in preparing a bibliography of
the information in CIA bearing on the project. This sort of
information will often be mostly classified, as opposed to open
literature. In some instances, however, it will be found that
more valuable information is to be found in the open or un-
classified sources than in the classified ones. After checking
the CIA Library card run for such open sources, the analyst
should then visit the various appropriate departmental
libraries and the Library of Congress. A complete list of all
the libraries in the area of the District of Columbia, with a
description of what they contain, who can use them, where
they are, and whether or not they are members of the inter-
library loan system ? entitled Library and Reference Facilities
in the Area of the District of Columbia, is available in the CIA
Library.
Although the library facilities in the Washington area are
extensive, on certain subjects the best specialized libraries are
elsewhere in the country. The locations of such special col-
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lections can be found by checking the index of the useful list
entitled Special Library Resources (New York, 4 vols. 1941-
47) published by the Special Libraries Association.
This initial effort to locate materials may or may not turn
up much pertinent information. In any event, the scanning
of card catalogues is only part of the search for sources. On
the whole, one will find in these card catalogues references only
to books and pamphlets and not to articles in periodicals. The
card catalogues generally will be strongest in information
about domestic affairs, and the analyst will have only an inci-
dental interest in the US data. It is necessary, therefore, to
secure better coverage on pertinent foreign printed sources
than exists in library card catalogues. For this the analyst
should consult the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature.
Those delving into subjects in the areas of economics or poli-
tics should check the issues of the Public Affairs Information
Service. For technical and engineering references, the place
to look is in the Engineering Index, the Industrial Arts Index,
or other appropriate guides to books and articles. These guides
appear currently and are bound annually. By a patient and
ingenious search through such works the analyst can be rea-
sonably certain of learning what unclassified information on
his subject published in the US is available.
The New York Times Index is an excellent example of a
newspaper research source, and other standard sources include
the International Political Science Abstracts and the Interna-
tional Bibliography of Economics. These are just a few of the
research aids available in a standard library. Thd CIA
Library includes the Intelligence Publications Index (Secret,
Noforn) , Selected Reference Aids to Cyrillic Alphabet Mate-
rials CIA/CD (sic) 1952 (Secret) , the Monthly List of Russian
Accessions, and the East European Accessions List.
In addition to the CIA Library, OCR includes the Biographic
Register (BR) , which contains information on foreign scien-
tists, industrialists, and social scientists; the Graphics Register
(GR) , which maintains files of photographs of intelligence
significance and will provide assistance in the use of photo-
graphs for intelligence purposes; the Industrial Register (IR) ,
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which contains information on foreign industries, industrial
resources, individual plants, companies, and related research
and commercial activities, plus information on ports, power
plants, pipe lines, inland waterways, communications, and
storage and other facilities; and the Machine Division (MD),
which supports the operations of the other divisions.
As a result of this inventory of available materials, the
analyst ? although he will have collected very little substan-
tive information ? will have a valuable checklist of where to
go for what. This inventory should also reveal which parts of
the project outline can be thoroughly answered and which
parts represent gaps in immediately available (that is, in the
Washington area) information. At this point he can begin to
initiate new requirements and request any needed translations
of foreign language material.
Now the analyst can start digging into the information
itself, recording it, and placing it in his planned file, where it
can be retrieved easily. A part of this recording and filing
procedure should be a consideration of the significance of each
piece of information and an assignment of a priority to each,
so that as the parts are used, the most important information
will be retrieved first. (The same consideration should be
applied in considering which references to consult first.) Such
priority assignment should be a standard practice in intelli-
gence research and analysis, as most projects are scheduled
against deadlines.
In building a file of information for a project, it is usually
best to work from the general to the specific, to read first the
previous reports on the subject as a whole and then to work
on into more detailed aspects of the subject, in as logical a
sequence as possible. Thus the analyst should seek first to
master the history, technology, organization, output, and other
pertinent characteristics of an activity, industry, or science
from comprehensive, over-all, evaluated intelligence reports
before attempting to cope with the mass of unevaluated intel-
ligence reports that will be encountered.
Unfortunately, the intelligence process ? which requires
specialization and compartmentation and which balances
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security and efficiency ? is not conducive to accuracy. At
each step in the process of transmitting information, in trans-
lating it from one language to another, and in editing it, errors
are likely to creep in and distort the original meaning. For
this reason, accuracy is best served when the original document
can be incorporated directly into the working file. This also
saves the time of the analyst. Of course, this policy must be
balanced with the need for filing information by units. Sup-
pose, for example, that the analyst received from FDD a special
hundred-page report on the nomenclature of his subject,
breaking it down systematically and providing detail on each
aspect of it. For the analyst to reduce all of this detailed
information to cards for inclusion in a card file would be not
only a dubious allocation of scarce time, but also a violation of
the principle of accuracy. Even if his files, as set up, provide
for incorporation of data, topic by topic, it would be a good idea
to preface such a section with a category into which material
such as this translation ? which cuts across more specific
entries ? could be placed.
This example, however, is exceptional. More often the
analyst may note in a source, a single paragraph dealing with
a unified subject. When the item is very short and stated
clearly, and when it could not be misconstrued even out of
context, it may be appropriate to make a handwritten or type-
written note for the file. Even here it is preferable to quote
rather than to paraphrase.
If the item is slightly longer and still deals with one subject,
however, accuracy and efficiency both can be achieved by
obtaining a copy of the document for clipping. When clipped,
the information can then be marked for reference and incor-
porated in the file without anxiety over whether or not accu-
racy has been sacrificed in the process.
Clearly there are times when a long document must be para-
phrased and condensed into brief notes. The analyst must
then make the conversion from the extended statement to a
brief, usable account without distortion of meaning or loss of
essential information.
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It should not be forgotten that the comprehension and relia-
bility of the analyst are not constant qualities. Skilled as he
is in a general area, his competence at the beginning of a new
project is less than it will be in the later stages of that same
project. Early in a project, therefore, he should be careful
both to extract from the material all of the pertinent data and
to protect himself from unconscious errors in recording data.
A note file is adequate when a balance is achieved between
collecting too little and collecting too much. Lest this be con-
strued to mean, "if it is adequate, it is adequate," note that
"too little" or "too much" are relative terms and acquire mean-
ing only when applied to the project or measured against the
amount of information necessary to answer the intelligence
question.
The analyst who makes too few notes will be prone to con-
clude erroneously, later in the project, that gaps of information
exist which preclude a satisfactory completion of the report.
And the one who makes too many notes will have difficulty
meeting his deadline, will have to condense his material fur-
ther by making notes on his notes, or may find himself so
overwhelmed by information that he loses sight of his mission
and writes a disorganized report.
It is equally embarrassing to make notes that later prove to
be incomplete because some essential point of fact, such as
quantity, place, date, evaluation, or classification, has been
omitted. Each note should be scanned for this type of com-
pleteness. The time to do this is when making the note, not
when the document has passed on for further routing or when
an extensive file has been returned to its cabinet.
It should be emphasized that notes should be documented
when i they are made. Although it may seem onerous, the doc-
umenting of notes is an essential step in the intelligence re-
search process. An undocumented note may contain an al-
most priceless gem of intelligence information. Unless, how-
ever, the note can be related to its source, it is useless to the
analyst, and of no value in a report. If a note is completely
documented, the analyst can assign the proper importance to
it based on its source, date, evaluation, and other facts. ?Such
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a note thus contains more meaning than one that is only par-
tially referenced. It permits comparison of information with
that contained on other notes and facilitates decisions as to
whether to use the information, where to use it, and what
weight to assign to it. Finally, it makes possible the use and
citation of the information in a report without having to go
back to the actual document.
With these principles and methods well in hand, the analyst
proceeds with the gathering and filing of his data. He will
find that from time to time it is desirable, in the midst of a
research project, to pause long enough to survey the status of
things. This operation may take the form of skimming
through the files to determine the areas in which coverage is
complete and those in which information has been coming in
slowly. (It will be facilitated if notes are filed when made, or
shortly thereafter.)
The prompt filing of material and the periodic review of the
files makes one aware, also, of the organization into which the
material is falling. This review encourages continuous critical
assessment of the organization (and hence of the outline) and
makes possible a more logical and finished report structure
than would result if notes were filed serially and not organized
until the writing stage.
The review should consider both the detailed level, as just
indicated, and the project as a whole. Incoming information
should be tested against the criterion ? given an appropriate
methodology ? of its utility in answering the intelligence
question upon which the project is focused.
Too often the organization of a paper is deferred until after
material has been collected and when the pressure to begin
writing has mounted to a considerable degree. Countless
papers have been organized as they were written. To do this
reduces not only the quality of the writing, but also the clarity
of the answer to the problem. To avoid this, projects should
be thoroughly planned and tentatively outlined during the
planning stage and, as it comes in, data should be incorporated
into a working file. In a well executed project data is not col-
lected at random; it is sought because the analyst has in his
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mind at least the glimmering of an idea that this data can be
worked over in such a way that it will contribute to the solu-
tion of the problem.
It is the manipulation and marshaling of the data that con-
stitutes the methodology of the paper. No one method can be
recommended as being suitable for all situations; a method
must be adapted to the question and to the available informa-
tion. In terms of these factors, the method appropriate to any
particular project may range from a simple, direct approach
to a complicated statistical manipulation. A few possible ap-
proaches are suggested.
In terms of efficiency of operation, the natural place to look
for the answer to an intelligence question is in the open litera-
ture of a country ? official census reports, the results of other
national surveys, the reports of trade and technical associa-
tions, the reports of nationalized institutes and industries, and
the various professional journals published. In recent years
the Soviet Bloc has resumed the publication of detailed statis-
tical handbooks and yearbooks. In many areas, these publi-
cations greatly ease the collection problem of the analyst.
They do not, however, include military information, such as
tank, aircraft, or artillery production. Analysis has shown
that official statistics from the Soviet Bloc are not to be dis-
missed lightly as Communist propaganda. On the other hand,
they should not be accepted uncritically without being checked
for internal consistency, consistency with other official data
previously released, and agreement with related sources, open
and, covert.
Care must also be exercised in arriving at a precise under-
standing of definitions upon which official statistics are based.
What, for example, do the data on East German figures on
crude steel production include? Close examination and com-
parison with plant production have revealed that the published
figure of crude steel output fails to include a considerable
quantity of steel for casting produced from scrap in large ma-
chine building plants. Likewise, students of Soviet Bloc na-
tional income have pointed out that economic aggregates,
such as national income and gross national product, are de-
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fined differently in Communist countries than in the Free
World and hence must not be compared with official data from
the Free World without appropriate adjustments. Thus un-
critical and uninformed use of official data is subject to
hazards.
Suppose, for example, that the analyst wants to know the
answer to a question which is a classified matter in the target
country ? the production of a military end item, for example.
By surpassingly clever use of bibliographic techniques, an
analyst may be able to determine precisely what he wants to
know. If the USSR is the target country and the information
is not overtly published, getting the answer may require a
fairly high level of covert penetration. To corroborate the
facts, the covert effort would have to be duplicated by a second
and independent substantiating report ? another operational
project.
Where national statistics, either overt or covert, are difficult
to come by, attention must often be shifted to the other end
of the scale, and directed at the collection of production figures
for an institute, product, or region. Finding this type of in-
formation requires a painstaking search through technical
publications, press, and radio accounts, as well as careful eval-
uation of covert reports. Even then it is unlikely that the
entire picture will be exposed; information may be available on
some aspects and not on others. For this reason it is usually
necessary to combine over-all approaches with calculations
based on less direct indicators of activity.
When total effort in a field is known and the target consists
of a segment of that total, then the unknown segment can be
computed simply by subtracting production of known items
from the total. Again, this method is often applicable in con-
junction with other techniques.
When progress in a field has been established on a firm base
for a series of years, it is then in order to project, or extrapolate,
that trend to ascertain future developments. The reliability
of this projection will depend in part on the accuracy of the
knowledge of the field and upon whatever variables may come
into play in the future.
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If the analyst knows generally the technology of the field
within which the project falls, he may be able to make valuable
estimates of requirements, schedules, and capabilities. Thus
with a sample of Soviet penicillin on hand for laboratory assay,
with a knowledge of the growth curves of the strain of peni-
cillin used by the USSR and of the composition of the culture
medium, a well-grounded analyst may be able to give a good
estimate of Soviet penicillin production.
In economic intelligence numerous correlations exist be-
tween inputs and outputs. To a considerable extent coeffi-
cients for these correlations are still being established. Where
they are known they can be of great help in solving intelli-
gence problems. They may consist of such diverse relation-
ships as kilowatt hours of energy consumed per ton of output,
floor space in square feet per employee, or number of motors
of subassemblies of a given type per unit of product.
At times a knowledge of one nation's technology helps the
analyst to understand the operation and requirements of an-
other's. It is important, of course, that corrections be made
for variations in efficiency, when that is possible. At other
times such variations may be negligible and will not affect the
reliability of the over-all estimate. Because the USSR and the
US employ different methods of coal mining, it would not be
appropriate to estimate Soviet needs for coal cutters on the
basis of US data. Once Soviet production of coal cutters has
been estimated, however, the input data for US coal cutters can
supply a basis from which calculations can be made, with
various adjustments for inputs into equivalent Soviet coal cut-
ters. When reasoning by analogy, as in this output calcu-
lation, the starting base can be national estimates, industry-
wide figures, plant data, or information on particular models.
Such data can be secured from War Production Board files,
Munitions Board data, industry consultants, and various in-
telligence sources.
Whichever method is used, there is great opportunity for an
imaginative approach to the problem. The methods discussed
are examples of the many research approaches. In any project
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many combinations of method are in order. Indeed, it is high-
ly desirable to check any given method by another and inde-
pendent procedure.
An intelligence report should be thought of as the answer to
an intelligence problem. In this sense it should raise the
question, present the answer, indicate the gaps as a guide to
collection, explain the method used in achieving the answer,
and document the discussion so that any reader may conduct
an independent check of the results.
Although some sections (such as organizational or installa-
tion summaries) are best written as the research on that por-
tion of the total problem is completed so that the information
will be fresh in the mind of the writer, it may be argued that
it is preferable on the whole to defer the bulk of the writing
until most of the material has been collected and digested.
The analyst gains in comprehension of the subject as he collects
and organizes his material. He is therefore more likely to do
a better job if he defers writing until he finds that the incom-
ing material is beginning to be repetitious and unrewarding.
By writing during the latter part of the period he also has the
advantage of having organized and reorganized his files and of
having gone over them several times.
If the files are well organized they will correspond fairly
closely to the revised project outline. When the files are well
organized it should also be possible for the analyst to place at
his finger tips most of the information he needs to write any
given section of his report. Although he will also need to have
recourse to certain general information, it will not be necessary
for him to attempt to assimilate during the writing stage
numerous undigested reports covering a number of different
subjects. If he has used the unit note system and has organ-
ized his material well, his files will be in logical sequence and
he can arrange his individual notes on any particular part of
the subject in the order in which that information is to appear
in the text of his paper.
When reports include quantitative information, such as re-
quirements, production, and input figures, it is good policy to
work up all tables and graphs before writing the text, rather
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than during the writing. If the tables are prepared in advance
and if each table is carefully documented at that time, the
writer will have the advantage of greater perspective; he will
be able to simplify his text by references to the tables, and in
addition he can greatly reduce the amount of long and repeti-
tive documentation, again by referring to the tables. From
every point of view it is wise to prepare the tables and graphs
in advance of writing the text.
The writer should make clear to the reader the nature of the
problem to which the report is addressed, and he should indi-
cate what is included and what is excluded. The analyst must
define terms the first time that each is used, then use the terms
consistently. He should not introduce technical synonyms
without indicating with what they are synonymous. Table
headings should be consistent with one another and with the
text.
It is important to anticipate, insofar as is possible, the char-
acter of the group to which the paper is addressed. Readers
may be various kinds of specialists. At the same time that a
report must prove instructive to fellow specialists it must also
be understandable by persons whose interests are more
general.
Because it is the practice of most members of the intelligence
community to place citations in an appendix at the end of a
report, footnotes are reserved for parenthetic and explanatory
remarks that could interrupt the flow of thought of the body
of the text.
The purpose of documentation is utility rather than an exhi-
bition of scholarship. A good working rule to follow is that
citations must permit the reader to make an independent
check of factual statements. Therefore, each separate fact
that is not a matter of common knowledge presented should
ordinarily be buttressed by a documentary citation. Books
should be cited by author, title, date, and page (publisher
optional, a matter for the production staff of the analyst's
? component). Articles in periodicals should show in addition
the name of the journal. Intelligence documents should be
identified by the symbols assigned by the issuing office, which
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will therefore bear meaning throughout the intelligence com-
munity, rather than merely by the accession number of the
component library. In general, documentation should dis-
close to the reader the same types of information as suggested
in the section on data gathering and should include date of
source, date of information, classification, and evaluation;
these should be presented in the form required by the produc-
tion (editorial or publications) staff.
In addition to the standard list of references in each report,
it is sometimes useful to provide the reader with a critical
bibliography. In this section each of the major sources used
in answering the intelligence question should be evaluated in
a few words.
The method used in the body of the text to solve the intelli-
gence problem should be made explicit enough so that the
reader may follow the logic as he proceeds through the paper.
If this is done in the text, then the appendix section on
methodology may consist of a brief resume of the methods
employed.
It is vitally important to attach to the report the analyst's
assessment of the gaps in intelligence. These gaps will serve
as a basis for levying additional requirements. The gaps also
will indicate to field recipients of the report where collection
effort should be concentrated.
Whereas it is important that the research analyst develop a
high degree of interest in his project, in order both to motivate
himself and to be able to prepare a good report, it is equally
important that he maintain an attitude of detachment. Al-
though the information contained in the report may contribute
to the making of policy, it is neither the analyst's responsi-
bility nor his mission to make policy.
It is equally important to retain a sense of objectivity toward
the problem. The analyst should explore the various hypoth-
eses he develops in the course of his work. He should follow
the evidence where it leads him. If necessary he must make
choices, evaluations, and judgments about which data are fac-
tual and which are false. He must not become enamored of
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any theory or position to the extent of losing his sense of judg-
ment. He should regard himself as a scientist who has worked
with a problem, considered the evidence, drawn a conclusion,
and presented both the evidence and the conclusion.
Then he should circulate his report for revision and criti-
cism by his fellow analysts. He is not expected to be infallible,
and his answer can be no more than the best possible at that
time.
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TO AN ELUSIVE MUSE
by
Had we but world enough and time,
To meditate would be no crime.
We could write essays, to endure,
For an Intelligence Literature.
But at my back I always hear
The roar of deadlines drawing near.
And yonder all before us lie
Targets of great priority.
So let us assemble all our zest,
And all our thoughts ? at least the best.
The contribution, however small,
Is better than no thoughts at all.
* With appropriate apologies to Andrew Marvell.
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THE ROLE OF INTERINDUSTRY STUDIES
IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Robert Loring Allen
Interindustry economics, or, as it has sometimes been called,
input-output analysis, is an organizational framework and tool
of analysis for studying an economic system quantitatively,
rigorously, and systematically. The techniques permit analy-
sis of an economy as a whole and of individual products and
industries simultaneously. Interindustry research must nec-
essarily be regarded as long-run cumulative research. The re-
quirements for data are large. In many cases intelligence
sources cannot provide much of the information needed. Only
a slow and painstaking process of continuous research can fill
the gaps. In the short run, interindustry studies contribute
mainly a system or framework in which many types of quanti-
tative economic information can be related to one another.
In the long run, as the data improve and accumulate, it will be
possible to undertake the solution of complicated problems, as,
for example, to estimate the economic consequences of given
sets of wartime demands on an economy.
The beginning of analysis with interindustry techniques is a
detailed description of the economic system for an annual
period. The goods and services produced in the economy are
aggregated into sectors. The description indicates the trans-
actions (purchases and sales) among these sectors. Any given
sector is described both in terms of its purchases from each of
the other sectors ? the input, or cost, structure ? and its sales
to each of the other sectors ? the use, or consumption, pattern.
For the whole economy, all the transactions which took place
in the given year are shown in a double-entry accounting tab-
ulation organized so that along the rows the use patterns of
the sectors are arrayed and in the columns the input struc-
tures of the sectors are listed. The interindustry tabulation is
the basic information with which analysis is performed.
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Analysis can be conducted either by regarding the economy
as a closed circular system in which the output of all sectors is
consumed by other sectors or by distinguishing between two
types of sectors in order to determine the impact of changes in
one group of sectors on the other sectors and on total output.
The open interindustry system has been the most useful both
because the assumptions it is necessary to make more nearly
approach the facts than is the case with the closed system
and because open interindustry system analysis offers the pos-
sibility of examining a wide range of problems concerning
changes in demand and technical structure.
The open interindustry system distinguishes between inter-
industry sectors and final demand sectors. The interindustry
sectors are engaged primarily in buying from other sectors and
selling to other sectors. The food-processing, chemicals, and
transportation sectors are examples. These sectors buy raw
materials, electric power, fuel, and other inputs and in turn
sell their output to many other industries and to households.
The final demand sectors consume the output of other sectors
but do not produce a processed output which is sold to any
other sector. Sectors usually considered to be final demand
sectors are household consumption, foreign trade, government
(including military) expenditures, and capital formation.
The amount of research effort, the quality and quantity of
data, the objective of research, and the technological and
decision-making processes of the sectors condition the decision
to place a sector in final demand. For the interindustry sec-
tors, rigorous analysis assumes fixed technical interrelation-
ships between inputs and outputs. The fact that such assump-
tions are not made for final demand sectors, in which con-
stancy of technical interrelationships is seldom characteristic,
implies that an open interindustry system is most suitable for
analytical purposes.
The breakdown of transactions within the economy and the
nature of the interrelationships may be of varying degrees of
complexity. The three major transactions categories are (1)
current account, (2) capital account, and (3) interregional
transactions. Technical interrelationships are frequently as-
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sumed to be constant. If data are available, however, linear,
discontinuous, or curvilinear functions can be used.
Any given transaction between one sector and another may
be divided into its components and tabulated along with the
total. A purchase designed to meet the current operating
needs of the buyer is usually the largest proportion of the total
purchase by a sector. In much of interindustry analysis this
transaction is the only one taken into account as a part of
the interindustry system. Another segment of a purchase by
a sector is that which is on capital account ? purchases de-
signed to add to capacity or to increase inventory. When
analysis is performed using the relatively simple current trans-
action interindustry system, capital transactions for all sectors
are aggregated into separate capital formation and inventory
sectors, which are usually placed in final demand. When capi-
tal transactions are identified for each purchaser from each
seller, then a double interindustry system results. The double
system is called the dynamic interindustry system.
Another breakdown of transactions is to specify the region
originating and the region receiving for every purchase and
sale. Such an interregional interindustry system amounts to
splitting the national interindustry tabulations into regional
components and indicating not only the interindustry trans-
actions but also the interspatial transactions.
The more complicated the interindustry systems become, the
more rigorous become the assumptions which it is necessary
to make to perform analysis. In the simple current trans-
actions system it is usually assumed only that the relationships
between inputs and outputs for all interindustry sectors are
known technical functions. With a dynamic system it is
assumed, in addition, that the relationships between capital
inputs and outputs at capacity are known technical functions.
An interregional system involves the assumption that there is
a known technical relationship between inputs and outputs
region by region.
The technical interrelationships are usually assumed to be
fixed and constant. It is not analytically or computationally
necessary that technical coefficients be constant. The func-
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tions may be linear, discontinuous, or curvilinear. The use of
such functions, however, implies that data exist to support the
described relationship. It is seldom that such data are avail-
able. Most analysis, therefore, has been driven back upon the
constant coefficient asumption.
Despite the possibility of undertaking quite intricate analysis
with dynamic and interregional systems and notwithstanding
the analytical feasibility of flexible assumptions about tech-
nical interrelationships, the work which has been done in inter-
industry analysis has in fact been largely confined to the more
simple current transactions system, in which the final demand
sectors correspond roughly to gross national product, which
includes household consumption, government expenditures,
and capital formation.
The type of analysis which can be performed with an open
interindustry system is called the analysis of parametric
change. Parameter is a mathematical term denoting in this
case a set of values derived from a hypothetical situation. It
is the purpose of analysis with an open interindustry system
to trace through the economy the consequences corresponding
to a given set of values. The parameters in interindustry
analysis are (1) sales to final demand and (2) interrelation-
ships among interindustry sectors embodied in the description
of the structure of the economy. Changes in these elements
have economic impact far beyond the immediate change.
The interdependence of modern economies, as depicted in
interindustry tabulations, is such that any change in the
structure or in final demand initiates a complicated round of
indirect effects. Interindustry technique is oriented toward
determining quantitatively the magnitude of indirect effects
on the output of all sectors.
An increase of $1 million in final demand for aluminum
products, for instance, results in an increased demand for all
inputs feeding into that sector. Aside from labor and taxes,
which are charges against final demand, these inputs are
bauxite, alumina, electric power, chemicals, metals, and trans-
portation. Since demand for aluminum is up, the supply
sectors must expand operations and hence demand more in-
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puts from their suppliers, and so on. These reciprocal and
indirect effects are frequently small after the first round, but
the cumulation of the second, third, and fourth rounds, and so
on, amounts to a significant proportion of the total indirect
effects. From an initial increase in final demand of $1 million
worth of aluminum products there results an industrial expan-
sion of $2.5 million, or indirect effects of $1.5 million. The
total expansion is divided as follows:
The Impact of $1 Million Worth of Aluminum Product
Deliveries to Final Demand
In Thousands of Dollars
Steel Works and Rolling Mills
10
Primary Metals
16
Copper Rolling and Drawing
20
Nonferrous Metal Rolling
22
Primary Copper
25
Metal Mining
27
Coal and Coke
30
Wholesale Trade
37
Railroads
39
Primary Lead and Zinc
43
Petroleum Products and Crude Petroleum
47
Electric Light and Power
64
Industrial Chemicals
111
Secondary Nonferrous Metals
252
Primary Aluminum
479
Aluminum Rolling and Drawing
1,097
Other
181
Like changes in final demand, changes in technical relation-
ships start a round of indirect effects, resulting in a different
level of output for all sectors. A comparison of sector output
under the two situations indicates what effect the structural
change has had.
It also is possible to interpose side conditions and determine
the consequences of the economy's operations under these con-
ditions. Assume that the outputs of all sectors have been com-
puted under given conditions. Then it may be postulated that
a given sector's output is a specific amount. With the new
schedule of outputs, the same as before except for the one sec-
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tor, a new final demand may be determined. In addition,
different magnitudes and mixes for final demand may be postu-
lated, all consistent with a specific output for the given sector
but with other sector outputs free to change.
Within the framework of analysis of parametric change
(and side conditions) , it is possible to deal not only with the
structure on current account but also on capital account and
to take into consideration other more complicated phenomena.
To do so multiplies the data requirements, requires new
assumptions, and introduces time explicitly into the analysis.
While more complex in data, analysis, and interpretation, the
results are in finer detail and are more precise and reveal
aspects not discernible in simpler analysis.
Underlying all the analysis, indeed all analysis, is a logical
system. In interindustry analysis the logical system can be
framed in mathematical terms. The mechanism of analysis
follows this mathematical structure closely. The precise form
of analytical process is not uniform, and there is no "grand
solution" which solves all problems. It is true that when the
assumptions are decided upon, when all the data are in, and
when no changes are foreseen, the data can be manipulated
mathematically and the solution to the system (or systems)
of equations implied by the interindustry structure can be
obtained. This is a particularly costly procedure, and it
freezes the data, classification system, and assumptions, so
that even a small change involves a repetition of the expensive
solution. The usual process makes possible more flexibility in
data changes (including estimates of temporal and scale
changes in structure) and in the application of limiting
assumptions, and it allows for detailed examination of specific
groups of sectors without much attention to other sectors. The
process is called iteration, but the procedure cannot be spelled
out in detail, since it changes from problem to problem. In
general, iteration involves tracing a given impact through the
economy by hand rather than mechanically, starting with the
initial change in a sector's output, determining its impact on
the sector's suppliers, then the impact on the sectors supplying
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these suppliers and the sectors supplying the second-round
suppliers until the indirect effects are negligible.
It must be remembered that the technique is not in itself a
predictive device. The predictive element enters through the
parametric changes or side conditions which are imposed on
the economy. The analysis performs the function of taking
these predictions and converting them into predictions of a
different type. It is a vehicle for completing conditional state-
ments of the form: "If X, then Y." The "X" is a prediction
about a change in final demand, a structural change, on a side
condition. "Then" is the analytical framework by which it is
possible to derive conclusion "Y," which is also a prediction.
"Y" is a schedule of sector outputs, to be compared with pre-
vious outputs determined before "X" was specified. The tech-
nique simply carries the prediction along and reveals implica-
tions that are not clearly obvious. Since the analysis em-
bodies information about the economy, it influences the derived
prediction "Y." In any event, however, if "X" is an inaccurate
forecast, then "Y" will inevitably be wrong.
Grist for the interindustry analysis mill is information as to
(1) the magnitude of transactions (purchases or sales) among
the sectors of the economy and (2) the technical interrela-
tionships (input coefficients) among the sectors of the econ-
omy. Transactions data can be viewed as coming from two
sets of books. One set of books records all of the purchases of
each sector from each of the other sectors. The other set of
books indicates all of the sales of each sector to each other
sector. The two sets duplicate each other. A complete record
of sales is also a complete record of purchases. The technical
data, showing intersector relationships, consist of scattered
information derived from engineering analysis. In practice,
however, sectors of the economy do not keep books, data are
scarce, and the information needed for interindustry analysis
is limited and difficult to obtain.
Generally, there are three sources which form the empirical
basis for interindustry analysis: (1) statistical records, (2)
engineering and technical data, and (3) information derived
from samples.
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Statistical record information is the most important. In
the US and many other countries, such data are based ulti-
mately upon records kept by individual firms. The data are
compiled and made available through census and survey re-
reports (Census of Manufactures, Mineral Yearbook, and
others in the US) , publications of trade and industrial associ-
ations, and directly from the production and accounting state-
ments of the firm.
Engineering and technical data are available in many pub-
lished engineering analyses to be found in textbooks, manuals,
and specialized periodicals. It is possible in many cases to
undertake research investigations making use of engineering
methods to develop information on industrial interrela-
tionships.
Techniques of sampling make it possible, by interviews and
questionnaires, to obtain information about the whole from
limited data about its parts. Samples of recorded information,
where the whole body of data is large, have also proved useful.
The three principal empirical sources provide the underlying
data required to piece together a complete quantitative descrip-
tion of the structure of the economy. The sources of data are
not independent, and none by itself is adequate. They com-
bine to form the description of economic structure on which
subsequent analysis is based.
The data required for interindustry studies are more detailed
than the data needed for most economic analysis. The minute
detail of data for interindustry purposes gives rise to a greater
chance for error. Much economic analysis makes use of more
highly aggregated data, in which small errors are canceled out,
whereas in interindustry analysis every error is fully reflected
in the results. In other economic analysis, greater reliability
also can be achieved because more attention can be given to
each part of aggregated data.
The data used in interindustry work have not been notably
accurate. Census information, sampling, and some engineer-
ing coefficients have gone into the construction of existing
interindustry tabulations. Despite the fact that a great
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amount of data has been accumulated and that competent
analysts have been working with the data over a period of
years, there is still much to be desired. Weaknesses in data
and lack of data have been the major stumbling blocks to suc-
cessful analysis.
One of the most important analytical uses of interindustry
studies is as a study of the implications of changes in external
demands on the economy. These changes are based ultimately
on peace or war strategy and tactics, technological innovations,
weapons systems and defense measures, and decisions of in-
vestors and consumers. These considerations must be reduced
to quantitative economic terms which are consistent with the
description of economic and industrial structure. The data
involved in hypothetical changes are no less important than
the data on economic structure, although the former are fre-
quently neglected. Estimates and, often, guesses substitute
for a careful derivation of the economic quantities implied in a
change in strategy. If the data specifying the change are not
accurate, the conclusions will be amiss.
The uses of interindustry analysis have already been implied
in the types of analysis which can be undertaken. The great
single analytical use is the determination of indirect effects of
a change in final demand, sector output, or the structure of
the economy, or in some combination of these. A knowledge
of these facts is useful not only in itself but also as an aid in
the analysis of the operation of the economy.
Several broad classes of uses may be enumerated: (1) na-
tional security, (2) national welfare, (3) technological inno-
vation, (4) market and sales research, and (5) economic in-
telligence. In all of the uses, variations and combinations of
types of analysis can be used.
In addition to the analytical uses mentioned above, inter-
industry studies provide a valuable consistency check and con-
firmation for estimates derived from national accounts (such
as industrial production indexes and gross national product)
and are a starting point for analysis along other lines or of
separate sectors. These auxiliary analytical uses are in some
cases as valuable as the analysis of parametric change. For
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instance, analysis of the relationship between the construction
industry and other industries in the US has revealed serious
errors in data on construction activity.
The organizational system implied in interindustry analysis
is one of its most significant contributions. The use of a de-
tailed coded classification system in which each sector is rig-
orously defined makes it possible to_ organize the data, docu-
mentation, and methods of estimation in an orderly manner
and provides a means both for continual accretion to data and
for checking their consistency on a continuing basis.
The limitations of any technique of analysis result from (1)
failure of assumptions to approximate actual conditions, (2)
inadequate or improper formulation of the hypothesis,
(3) weakness in and lack of data, (4) errors in inference, and
(5) inaccurate and inadequate interpretation of the results.
Economic analysis has advanced to the point where logical
flaws in inference are rare. The basic formulation of the hy-
pothesis in interindustry analysis is sound. Granting its
assumptions, interindustry analysis has been demonstrated to
be logically accurate. Even so, however, it can be misused,
and care must be exercised to see that the formulation is cor-
rect and the inferences are carefully drawn.
The other limitations, those arising from assumptions, data,
and interpretation, impose a heavy obligation on those under-
taking the analysis. The limitations are such that no precise
statement can be made as to the magnitude of error introduced
by any of them separately or by the three combined. Gener-
alization as to direction and magnitude of error cannot be
made. If a datum is wrong, it is reflected in the results. If
an assumption is inaccurate, the conclusions will be biased.
If an interpretation is not appropriate, the purpose of the
analysis is defeated. Precisely the same conditions obtain for
any other form of analysis. If there is a difference between
interindustry and any other kind of analysis in this respect, it
results from the facts (1) that the assumptions are more spe-
cific and comprehensive, (2) that more detailed data are in-
volved, and (3) that interpretation is more complex. Each of
these may allow error to intrude.
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Two particular considerations are especially troublesome.
One is the frequent assumption that the input per unit output
is fixed for all ranges of output. The other is the possibility
that the errors in data are so large that they are as large as,
or larger than, the indirect effects which are the major reason
for undertaking the analysis in the first place. These limita-
tions cannot be dismissed and must be constantly kept in mind.
Extreme care must be maintained to see that the limiting
assumptions, especially those involving fixed coefficients, are
handled so that conclusions are not impaired. The process of
iteration mitigates in some degree the fixed coefficient assump-
tions, since by means of this process the coefficients may be
changed to reflect temporal, scalar, and structural changes.
Even so, analysis necessarily proceeds on the basis of assumed
technological rigidities which are frequently at odds with
actual events, and the limitation must always be considered.
Data weaknesses are often so great that one has no confidence
that a particular indirect effect may be twice as much or only
half that resulting from analysis. The errors may be greater
than the indirect effects. The hazard is increased by the fact
that it is not possible to determine where weaknesses in data
have vitiated the results. The data are intermingled to such
an extent that it is almost impossible to untangle them and
find where a poor datum has influenced the results adversely.
Nothing can substitute for data. Where data are weak or are
lacking, the results of any analysis based upon them are corre-
spondingly weakened. There are no "tricks" to get around
this limitation. Only data improvement through arduous and
assiduous research can raise the level of analysis.
It is still too early to offer a definitive evaluation of inter-
industry techniques. No one questions that interindustry
analysis has some capabilities not possessed by other forms of
analysis; that it is a flexible and powerful tool of economic
analysis, and that, used judiciously, it is a valuable analytic
framework for many quantitative economic problems. So far,
however, interindustry analysis cannot be said to have been
tested and proved as an accurate predictive device in the com-
prehensive detail which it implies.
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In a literal sense, interindustry analysis cannot be "tested."
It can be compared, and its consistency can be checked in-
ternally. Prediction resulting from analysis can be compared
with realized results, but this operation tests the techniques
only in part, since the real predictive element is apart ? that
is, independent of the analytical technique.
The basis for judgment of analytical results is the corre-
spondence of the data with the facts and the correspondence
of the assumptions with the operational procedures. When
these conditions hold, analytical results can be counted upon
as reliable. "Good" and "bad" are misnomers when applied to
Internally consistent theoretical frameworks. Such frame-
works may be useful or not useful for purposes of solving par-
ticular research problems. A tentative favorable evaluation
can be given interindustry analysis.
Economic intelligence data having a bearing on the opera-
tions of the economy of foreign powers are of three general
kinds: direct intelligence, derived intelligence, and analogous
data.
Direct economic intelligence data are relatively scarce. Two
kinds of direct intelligence are available. The first consists of
official statements, and the second is classified information
obtained from observation, documents, and other sources.
Both of these kinds of data are spotty and inadequate. In
addition, the data are of uneven quality and reliability.
Derived intelligence is that information which can be in-
ferred from what is known directly. The basis of the deriva-
tion may be the complementarity of industrial products,
technology, or many other situations in which an unknown
quantity may be deduced from known quantities.
Analogous information is that body of data known and avail-
able for some country other than the foreign power under
study which can be used to fill gaps in direct and derived
intelligence. Information concerning the US economy, be-
cause of its abundance and ease of acquisition, has become the
standard analogy.
Any research effort, including interindustry research, must
necessarily make use of all three kinds of data and data from
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all sources. The combination cannot be known in advance.
Ideally, direct intelligence should be the empirical backbone
of any research, with derived intelligence providing the pri-
mary support data. Analogous information, if used at all,
should be used sparingly and only to fill gaps which must
necessarily be filled.
In interindustry research, because of the detail required,
the weighting of various kinds of data is often quite the op-
posite of the ideal. In order to complete a systematic study
of the economic structure of the USSR, it is necessary to borrow
extensively from US information on technological interrela-
tionships. Direct intelligence and derived intelligence are im-
portant in establishing the control totals and for some of the
estimates of inputs and allocations.
At the very best the data used in interindustry research are
of questionable reliability. In some cases it is possible to
assign error limits for individual figures, such as the produc-
tion of a single product. But when this estimate is aggregated
with other such figures having differing reliability and with
some data on US industry, it becomes difficult to assess the
reliability of the final figure.
Weaknesses in data and lack of data are the most serious
problems in interindustry analysis of foreign powers. Accu-
rate data are mixed with the less accurate, and the final tabu-
lation, because of aggregation and forcing to fit the control
totals, has a mixed quality without any way to identify the
more from the less reliable.
Since the technique is oriented to revealing indirect effects,
the data weaknesses may result in a situation in which the
error limits are as much as, or greater than, the indicated
effect. In this case the actual indirect effect may be half or
twice as much as that indicated. There is no way out of the
dilemma. The deleterious effects of inadequate data can be
mitigated in some measure. The only satisfactory remedy is
to raise the level of confidence in the data by continuous
research.
Interindustry research serves several important uses in eco-
nomic intelligence. Not the least among these uses is the
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direct use of the data in industry and product description.
The cost structure and use pattern of an individual product are
an integral part of interindustry analysis, and they are also of
considerable intelligence value in and of themselves. Alone or
in combination with other data, interindustry tabulations can
form the frame of reference for analysis of products, product
groups, and large sectors of the economy.
Nearly all sector and product studies have as a part of their
research effort the estimate of output, of some critical inputs,
of major end uses of the item, and of possible substitutes.
These data are substantially the same as those needed in inter-
industry analysis. Hence a double purpose is served in work-
ing up these data: direct use in sector studies and use as a part
of interindustry studies.
The most significant area of analysis is that of determining
the implications of changes in the economy which affect the
sector outputs. A parameter is an element in the economy
which is fixed for any postulated situation but which may
change as the postulated situation changes. The parameters
are (a) allocation of sector outputs to final demand, (b) the
input-output coefficient for particular sectors, and, in special
cases, (c) the output of specific sectors. These three elements
are fixed for any given time period under a given set of condi-
tions. Analysis proceeds on the basis of postulating changes
in any one of them and working out the implication of these
postulated changes.
There are innumerable examples of changes in final de-
mand. From the point of view of economic intelligence, the
most important examples are analyses of mobilization and war
demands to determine the capability of a foreign power to
support the demands of such action. Interindustry techniques
are particularly valuable for such an evaluation, since this type
of analysis is explicitly designed to bring out the indirect
requirements of a military program and economic mobilization
for war. For instance, a direct requirement for aluminum
products by the military services might be easily within the
economy's capabilities. But in order to attain the higher level
of demand, 150 percent more aluminum products are required
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and other vital sectors have a heavy expansion burden placed
upon them. Levy of a complete schedule of mobilization and
war requirements resulting from the expansion of supporting
sectors of the economy may make the difference between the
ability of the economy to meet the new demands or the neces-
sity a cutting back important sectors.
The analysis of mobilization and war demands inserts a new
element of uncertainty. The data on direct requirements,
which become a part of final demand, and data on cutbacks
and shifts in consumption and investment are hypothetical.
But these data must reflect accurately the postulated condi-
tions, or the analysis becomes a simple exercise in logic. The
demands of the war machine must be quantified and tabulated
in terms of the sectors of the economy analyzed. This in-
volves a conversion from specific end products, such as tanks
and aircraft, into steel and aluminum products. The con-
sumption sector must be analyzed to determine the extent of
cutbacks which it can endure. The composition of the invest-
ment sector will shift, and it may be reduced. The demands
of these sectors must be quantified. When all of the relevant
data are assembled, they may be analyzed with interindustry
techniques.
The implication of the new final demands may be traced
through by the iteration process, singly and/or collectively.
As a result of the new demands, new direct plus new indirect
requirements must be met sector by sector. These new re-
quired outputs must then be matched with independent intelli-
gence estimates of maximum output and capacity of each sec-
tor. These estimates inject another element of error which
can vitiate the results of the analysis.
A single estimate for mobilization and war demands is not
sufficient. Several sets of hypothetical final demands can be
analyzed and their implications traced. Each set is presumed
to represent different circumstances. In this way an array of
estimates of capabilities can be made.
The elements of strength in interindustry analysis of mobili-
zation and war programs lie in its ability to determine indirect
requirements for each sector of the economy, thus showing the
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total impact of demand. The weakness of interindustry
analysis lies primarily in its requirements for data. The data
which form the basic structure of the economy may well be
subject to considerable error. Military, investment, and con-
sumer demand cannot be determined accurately in many cases.
In the verification procedure, independent estimates of capac-
ity may be in error. Errors introduced by the data may be so
great as to undo the benefits to be derived from the calculation
of indirect effects. No precise assessment of reliability is pos-
sible; only a gradual improvement of the data can be counted
upon to improve reliability and reduce uncertainty.
Within the framework of interindustry analysis it is possible,
given the data, to become much more sophisticated than is in-
dicated above. For instance, a flow interindustry system can
be coupled to a consumption-investment-military final demand.
Using this basic framework, the new final demand allocations
can be fed in by quarters and direct and indirect requirements
can be calculated by quarters. Proper accounting can be made
for lead times by this process. Furthermore, by expanding the
simple flow system into a flow and capital-capacity system it is
possible to bring the capital requirements explicitly into con-
sideration. Interregional transactions can also be considered.
Both require additional data and additional assumptions. At
the present time, refinement of the flow (or current transac-
tion) interindustry system for intelligence purposes is not
practicable.
A second area of analysis is the problem of interdiction.
The foreign trade transactions of the economy are generally
considered a part of final demand. Elimination of imports
and exports in whole or in part constitutes interdiction; but,
since they are in final demand, the implications for the rest of
the economy may be traced out as indicated above. Another
use, perhaps more important for the intelligence community,
is that of determining the effects of air damage on the econ-
omy. An air strike would reduce capacity and hence output
in many sectors. By fixing the output of those sectors which
have been damaged at a specific level and treating the other
sector outputs as fixed at the same level as before the air strike,
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the deliveries to final demand can be determined. This set of
deliveries to final demand can then be matched with a set of
deliveries to final demand required under postulated condi-
tions. Several final demands can be determined. The output
of sectors not damaged in the strike would readjust to the new
conditions. The interdiction problem gives rise to innumer-
able solutions, and no single solution has any more merit than
another, since there are many possible ways to adjust to a
reduction in output for one or more sectors.
Because of the lack of a unique solution, the interpretation
of results of an analysis of interdiction is especially difficult.
The limitations of data are another serious obstacle to this type
of analysis. Even so, the interdependence of the economy
makes it important that interdiction problems be analyzed by
techniques in which this characteristic is explicit. For in-
stance, suppose damage to the aluminum products sector re-
duced output by 50 percent. If the interindustrial require-
ments are 50 percent or more, there will be no deliveries to
final demand unless sector outputs are reshuffled so that
aluminum-demanding interindustry sectors reduce their out-
put and hence their consumption of aluminum products. Only
with a general interdependence schema is it possible to deter-
mine the full impact of interdiction.
The third area of analysis is the consideration of structural
change. Although this problem is conceptually separate, it is
in fact usually coupled with changes in final demand and inter-
diction. The basic descriptive data ? the input per unit out-
put for all sectors ? are usually assumed to be fixed for analyt-
ical purposes. The coefficients are presumed to reflect tech-
nological necessity, and it is on this assumption that most
analysis, including that discussed above, is based. Using the
iterative process, however, it is not necessary to adhere slav-
ishly to this assumption. The coefficients may be changed to
reflect the changed conditions.
The analysis of structural change, whether as a problem in
itself or as a part of the analysis of war or mobilization or
interdiction, implies that there are data concerning such
structural changes. In reality this is seldom the case, for most
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of the structural changes are hypothetical with an empirical
base limited to analogous information about the US economic
structure. Despite this, structural change, however it arises,
is of sufficient magnitude that it must be taken into account.
The three types of analysis collectively would represent the
ideal analysis of capabilities. For instance, in a hypothetical
war situation the economy must bear the demands of mobili-
zation and combat and at the same time sustain foreign trade
interdiction, substantial air damage, and loss (or gain) of ter-
ritory. While adjusting to these severe conditions, the econ-
omy would undergo a series of structural changes. Realistic
postulates for all three circumstances and a reliable structure
of the economy would make possible more detailed estimates of
capabilities than heretofore possible.
A number of ancillary analytical purposes can also be served
by interindustry studies. Analysis by means of national aggre-
gates also suffers from weak and insufficient data, and inter-
industry studies offer an independent method of building up
these national aggregates. The relationship between partic-
ular production estimates and aggregates has been incom-
pletely explored, and interindustry analysis offers some hope
for the integration of indicators with aggregative analysis.
Interindustry analysis, expressed in a numeraire, is an op-
portunity for a systematic study of prices and the relationship
of prices to real costs. Such cost analysis is valuable not only
in that it points to the drain of a given sector on the allocation
of materials to alternative uses but also as a weighting system
for the construction of index numbers for the economy as a
whole and for various components.
No precise outline can be made of all the ancillary analytical
uses of interindustry studies. Many such uses are confirma-
tory in nature, and they tend to buttress analysis of different
kinds by providing both a confirmation of results and data
from a new source. Other analytical uses, such as examina-
tion of prices and costs, break new ground. It is quite possible
that the ancillary analytical uses will prove, at least in the
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short run, much more valuable than the direct analytical ap-
plication for which interindustry studies are specifically
designed.
While the ultimate aim of interindustry studies is analysis,
there are within the process many benefits to be derived by
looking at the economy as a double entry accounting system
and organizing the data in such a manner that economic
interdependence is revealed.
One of the most significant of these organizational uses is
its educational value. In a research effort organized largely
along functional lines it is all too easy to concentrate upon par-
ticular products and industries to the relative neglect of the
over-all economy. The interindustry approach, by putting the
economy and all its components into perspective, enables one
to grasp details simultaneously with the over-all situation. At
a glance the complicated industrial interrelationships are re-
vealed, while at the same time the over-all functioning of the
economy can be comprehended.
Since interindustry analysis depends upon a cross referenc-
ing of costs and shipments of each sector and its components,
the approach naturally leads to a filing system in which all of
the information about the economy can be conveniently and
logically placed. The interindustry tabulation itself is, in fact,
a filing system. Behind the tabulation lies a more compli-
cated set of files which encompasses all relevant data, such as
prices, production (in heterogeneous units) , technical inter-
relationships, cost and shipment data, and other such
information.
The interindustry file is not static; it is a constantly grow-
ing, changing compilation of data. It is arranged in such a
manner that there are continual accretions to the base fund
of knowledge of the structure of the economy. New data can
be added so that they have an immediate impact on the final
tabulation; better data replace the old, and more or less com-
prehensive information fits into the filing system in such a way
that the improvement in results is immediate. This implies
that no interindustry tabulation is final. For a specific pur-
pose, a tabulation can be drawn out of the files, assembled,
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reconciled, and used. At another time, for another purpose,
another tabulation can be developed in the same manner.
Thus the interindustry file, a continuing and gradually im-
proving body of data, stands ready on short notice to support
a capabilities estimate with the latest data available.
The filing system implied in the interindustry approach
makes possible another important organizational use. This is
in the testing of the reliability of data and checking their con-
sistency. When the data have been assembled, it is possible
to evaluate their reliability by comparing them with other data.
Every sale of a product is also a cost to some sector, and every
input is a part of a sector's output. Hence the data can
be checked and cross-checked. Data which are inconsistent
can be weeded out, and the general level of reliability can be
raised. New information can be compared with existing data,
and the relative merits of each can be assessed.
Finally, the interindustry approach provides a guide to fur-
ther research not only along interindustry lines but also in
other methods. Gaps in the data can be spotted readily, and
steps can be taken to remedy them. If price information for
a particular group of products, or production data for some
sector, or any other information is needed, the technique,
backed by its organizational system, makes it possible to detect
the missing elements. It may become clear, because of weak-
ness of data, that some types of analysis cannot be undertaken
but that other kinds of analysis can be profitably expanded
or that other techniques should be exploited.
These applications of interindustry studies ? direct use of
data, analysis, and improved organization ? must be regarded
as a whole and none slighted. They complement one another.
The tendency might be to get on with the analytical uses and
neglect the other uses. This would be dangerous. The tech-
nique is one which improves with age; the analytical stage,
particularly the analysis of parametric change, may well be
several years in the future. This is not only because the pilot
stages of research are expensive and 'inefficient but also be-
cause data exploitation and preparation, both for the interin-
dustry and final demand sectors, are difficult and time-consum-
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ing activities. To ignore the direct use of data by all research-
ers and to neglect other analytical uses and the benefits to be
derived from improved organization would be to fail to use the
framework of interindustry techniques to its fullest extent.
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CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE
THE LABYRINTH THE MEMOIRS OF HITLER'S SECRET
SERVICE CHIEF. By Walter Schellenberg. (New York:
Harper. 1956. Pp. 423.)
A nimble, detached, and cynical mind aided Schellenberg in
avoiding entanglement in the mysticism and ritualistic clap-
trap with which Himmler and Heydrich had indoctrinated the
leadership cadres of their SS Elite Guards, without on the
other hand ? implicating him in conspiracies against the
regime. By no means a blind adherent of the Fuehrer, his
boast to have on occasion registered dissent from some of Hit-
ler's more outlandish "intelligence" schemes, can be believed.
Among the blind, Schellenberg was one-eyed. His special call-
ing as chief of the regime's foreign intelligence service sharp-
ened his critical faculties, enabling him to gain a more timely
and accurate grasp of the obstacles in the way of Germany's
quest for world leadership.
Schellenberg was an avowed protege of Himmler's and of
Heydrich's. The former held a protecting hand over Schellen-
berg until the bitter end, a circumstance aiding Schellenberg's
phenomenal luck in surviving the vagaries of the Third Reich.
It may be said that he paid a debt of gratitude to Himmler by
painting him in The Labyrinth as a weak rather than a vicious
man. It is difficult to visualize in Schellenberg's characteri-
zation of Himmler the protagonist and executor of a carefully
planned program of mass extermination on a scale the modern
world had not heretofore witnessed.
The Labyrinth throws into relief one salient aspect of Schel-
lenberg's personality: his exceptional dexterity in the manipu-
lation of power factions within the leadership of the Nazi Party
without ever becoming too closely identified with any one of
them. As a handy introduction into the techniques for sur-
vival, The Labyrinth can be recommended.
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Only toward the end, when there was little more to lose, did
Schellenberg decide to take calculated risks. The Bernadotte
episode, though abortive, was handled by Schellenberg with
some of the daring and imagination that stemmed from
despair.
While his rank and position doubtlessly afforded Schellen-
berg a vantage point from which to observe Germany's inex-
orable drift toward defeat, he was frequently found wanting in
the intellectual equipment needed to project events, which he
correctly observed, into a framework of global developments.
The outline of peace terms which he presented to Himmler at
Zhitomir reflects a surprising degree of naivete in gauging the
temper of the world powers ranged against Germany ? their
willingness to accept Germany's ascendancy in the European
concert as a permanent arrangement he took blithely for
granted.
On the other hand, some of Schellenberg's more visceral re-
sponses turned out to be sound, for example those reflected in
his assessment of Britain's determination to fight to the end.
He clearly perceived the folly of Hitler's policies in the occupied
parts of the Soviet Union and vainly raised his voice in protest.
Not having read the complete manuscript of Schellenberg's
memoirs, it is difficult for me to pass judgment on whether or
not certain notable omissions should in fairness be blamed on
Schellenberg rather than on its publisher. The translation
from the German is mediocre, and regret must be voiced that
the final editing job, which would have benefited from annota-
tions, was not entrusted to a man of the calibre of Trevor-Roper.
In the circumstances, the reader in search of true enlighten-
ment about the inner workings of the German Secret Service,
should be cautioned to beware, because The Labyrinth is re-
plete with factual inaccuracies and naturally suffers from its
author's bias. What it conveys at best is an episodic study of
human behavior under conditions of strain inflicted by a strug-
gle for supremacy within an oligarchy untrammelled by human
laws of ethical standards and dedicated to the methods of
genocide and terror to maintain its sway.
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Contrasted with most of the Nazi biographies, as well as those
written by leading men of the Third Reich who claimed to have
belonged to the opposition, it lacks the whining self-righteous-
ness, the posture of injured innocence, and frantic endeavor to
blame the next guy, the shameless alacrity in throwing over-
board the ballast of long-standing friendships, the perfunctory
expressions of horror at the crimes committed by the Nazi
regime, which make the perusal of most of them such a repug-
nant chore. In my talks with Schellenberg, which took place
in 1945 in the Military Intelligence (MI) Interrogation Center
at Oberursel, I found him to be personable, adaptable, and yet
not devoid of a certain dignity in facing up to the prospects of
being called to account for some of the activities in which he
had been engaged. He did not go out of his way to pin respon-
sibility on his former associates, nor did he pretend that his
efforts to bring about a negotiated peace were motivated by
considerations other than a clear realization that Germany's
game was up.
Schellenberg makes passing reference to his interrogation by
the British service. As a matter of fact, he had been subjected
to an exceedingly painstaking debriefing, backed up by a for-
midable body of detailed data at the disposal of the so-called
Counter Intelligence War Room, a joint British-American enter-
prise, representing probably the most competently operated
repository of counterespionage data the world had ever seen.
The British report on Schellenberg was up to the customarily
high professional standards of their services, especially in the
field of intelligence reportage. Even today a reading of the
Schellenberg report can be considered a rewarding professional
experience, although most of the incidents it relates are devoid
of contemporary significance. In a way it represented a mile-
stone in the field of counterespionage, inasmuch as never be-
fore in modern history had an opportunity offered to perform
an autopsy on the remains of the intelligence services of a de-
feated world power.
Twelve years have dimmed my recollection of some of the
details of the Schellenberg interrogation report. I do recall
that the British interrogator poked fun at Schellenberg's rather
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romantic concepts of the British Secret Service and at the
inaccuracies of some of the factual data with which he tried to
back up his views. However, I am somewhat inclined to doubt
British candor on that score. After all, the Venlo incident
must still have rankled with them; the interrogation report on
Schellenberg in the version made available to us was singu-
larly uncommunicative concerning that incident. In talking
to him about the aftermath of the Venlo incident, I found him
reluctant to go into any detail. Since my brief did not call for
coverage along those lines, I abstained from exerting pressure.
(At the time I drew the possibly erroneous inference that the
British had requested him to restrain himself in passing out
information concerning the results of the Stevens-Best debrief-
ing.) I am, incidentally, prepared to believe his protestations
that the abduction of Stevens and Best was contrary to his own
ideas regarding long range exploitation of the link to the Brit-
ish service, and that he acquiesced in participating in the kid-
napping only with great reluctance.
In the chapter on The Reichswehr and the Red Army little is
being added to the already known. The analysis given in John
W. Wheeler-Bennett's Nemesis of Power has a much more
authentic ring. My own opinion, conjectural at best, is that
the purge of the Soviet command had been in the cards for
some time, that the deception practiced by the Germans was
recognized by Stalin as such, but that it came in very handy
to garb the purge of Tukhachevsky and his associates with a
cloak of legality. The rifling of the German General Staff's
archives is unlikely to have yielded more than official data per-
taining to the various transactions which, with the full knowl-
edge of the Kremlin, enabled the Reichswehr to avail itself of
the logistic support of the Red Army in secretly rebuilding its
cadres.
In the chapter on Active Espionage, Schellenberg rehashes
the Sosnovsky espionage case without adding anything new.
(For reasons best known to the publishers, the names of the
principals are not spelled out in full.) After the end of the
war Sosnovsky returned to West Berlin, and it is fair to assume
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that he resumed his erstwhile activities, this time in the employ
of the Polish Communist services.
The investigation of the Beer Cellar Explosion fails to provide
an answer to the pivotal question: who actually engineered it?
It has never been satisfactorily explained why the Nazis fore-
went the opportunity of putting the alleged perpetrator, a man
named Elser, on show trial. In fact Elser was never brought
to trial but put away in the Dachau concentration camp where
he suffered death just before Germany's surrender. The
actual criminal investigation was conducted under the aegis of
Amt V, the Criminal Police Division of the RSHA. I talked
after the war to Kriminalrat Hans Lobbes, who had been in
charge of the investigation and who claimed that Elser's guilt
had been proven beyond peradventure: he too was unable to
shed light on the identity of the actual instigators.
The chapter on A Japanese-Polish Conspiracy does scant jus-
tice to the scope and success of the collaboration between the
Japanese Intelligence Service and elements of the Polish re-
sistance. Onadera, the senior representative of Japanese intel-
ligence in Europe, is referred to as "The Japanese Ambassador
in Stockholm," although the position occupied by him was that
of Military Attach?(The report of his interrogation should
be considered required reading for anyone interested in the
Japanese modus operandi.)
Schellenberg makes passing reference to Colonel Ronge, the
chief of the Austrian Secret Service, in the days of the Austrian
Empire known as the Kaiserlich ? Koenigliche Evidenzbuero.
At the time Schellenberg met him Ronge was a historical relic,
having been the head of the Austrian counterespionage service
since before World War I. His name at that time became asso-
ciated with the uncovery of one of the Okhrana's most brilliant
and successful espionage operations, the recruitment of Col.
Alfred Redl, a high-ranking Austrian staff officer, as a Russian
espionage agent. Ronge broke this case ? too late, however, to
prevent the Russians from getting their hands on Austria's
war plans. Many Austrian, Czechoslovak, and Polish intelli-
gence officers counted themselves among Range's most prized
pupils, and the enlistment of his services by the Germans is
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bound to have yielded a wealth of significant personality infor-
mation. Among ranking Austrian intelligence officers who
switched sides at the time of the Anschluss was Colonel (later
General) Lahousen de Vivremont, who promptly joined the
Abwehr (military intelligence) . It was he who had the fore-
sight to keep a copy of Canaris' diary, produced it before the
Nuremberg Tribunal, and rendered testimony which implicated
Field Marshall Keitel and General Jodl in the perpetration of
war crimes.
Schellenberg devotes one paragraph to Operation North pole,
which contains nothing new. Northpole undoubtedly ranks
among the best counterespionage operations undertaken by the
German services and it brought in its wake one of the most
serious setbacks suffered by the Allied side in the silent war.
Schellenberg's account of Aktion Bernhard, the RSHA's
counterfeit enterprise, sheds significant light on his accuracy
as a reporter of facts and the extent of his truthfulness in relat-
ing facts that might conceivably implicate him in the very
practices for which he castigates Kaltenbrunner, Mueller, and
Meisinger. The true story underlying "Aktion Bernhard" has
been told in a carefully documented article in the July 1957
issue of Harper's Magazine, entitled "The World's Greatest
Counterfeiters," by Murray Teigh Bloom. The reader is in-
vited to study that article and in its light assess Schellenberg's
veracity in stating that "the most skilled engravers in Germany
were drafted (sic) , sworn to secrecy, and set to work in three
shifts." No doubt Schellenberg knew better.
How much did Schellenberg's organization effectively ac-
complish in its operations targeted against the USSR? In go-
ing down the list of Amt VI's major exploits, the reader will be
arrested by the claim that through one of its centers direct con-
nection had been established with two of Marshall Rokosovsky's
General Staff officers. I have seen no mention of this alleged
penetration in any other pertinent debriefing. I doubt its
authenticity. I venture the guess that this alleged operation,
if it in effect existed except in the imagination of a fabricator,
was controlled on the other end.
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Operation Zeppelin, the massive drop of parachute agents
behind Soviet lines, constituted the main effort of Amt VI
directed against the territories of the USSR still under Kremlin
control, particularly the Caucasus. After the German sur-
render, the British service undertook what looked to me like a
carefully planned roundup of VI C (USSR and Far East divi-
sion) key personnel headed by SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hengel-
haupt, which made it rather difficult for us in the field to form
a first-hand assessment of the efficacy of "Zeppelin" in terms
of its intelligence productivity. (Needless to stress, I am not
suggesting that this information was purposely being withheld
from us.) Conceptually, the operation depended on the suc-
cess of illegal entry into territory in which the organs of the
NKVD reigned supreme: it is fair to assume that the Soviets
countered "Zeppelin" with an equally massive defense taking
full advantage of the enormous manpower reserves of their in-
ternal security service. Schellenberg in his description of
"Zeppelin" concedes that the NKVD succeeded in inflicting
sizeable losses and in undermining it from within, aided and
abetted by the treatment the Germans were meting out to Rus-
sian minorities. The defection of Colonel Rodionov, if true,
would testify to the high quality of the NKVD's countermeas-
ures. More likely than not Rodionov was a Russian Intelli-
gence Service (RIS) infiltree rather than a disaffected collab-
orator of the Germans, as Schellenberg wants his readers to
believe.
The next operation mentioned by Schellenberg, the very
important center taken over from the Abwehr, is in fact one
of the legendary operations of World War II. Its principals
were a White Russian General named Turkul, a White Rus-
sian intelligence operator named Ira Longin with a long record
of intelligence work under the aegis of a heavily penetrated
White Russian emigre organization in Yugoslavia, and a Jew
named Kauder, alias Klatt. The operation had been master-
minded by the chief of Abwehrstelle Sofia, Colonel Wagner,
alias Dehlius. It eventually moved to Vienna and thence to
Salzburg just one step ahead of the advancing Soviet armies.
During the war the Allies had effectively monitored and de-
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coded the traffic of two transmitters (Max and Moritz) under
Klatt's control. It had never been possible, however, to moni-
tor the traffic allegedly, being transmitted from the USSR by
Klatt's well-placed sources, and consequently the Allied services
entertained serious doubt as to the authenticity of the ma-
terial, although its outstanding quality appeared to argue
against outright fabrication. After the war, the British serv-
ice, operating on the hypothesis that Ira Longin, and pre-
sumably Klatt also, were in fact high-level Soviet agents, made
a determined attempt to break the case but failed to extract
confessions from Ira Longin or his associates. This notwith-
standing the fact that the British have never been shaken
in their conviction that the intercepted material was in fact
Soviet deception and that, toward the end of the war, the
RIS used the Klatt channel to launch items of major strategic
deception. The British cited the operation as a classical ex-
ample of RIS deception and as an illustration of Soviet will-
ingness to sacrifice whole divisions for the purpose of estab-
lishing the validity of a controlled channel. The German
General Staff and especially its chief, Generaloberst Guderian,
placed unreserved trust in the reliability of the material pro-
duced by the Klatt combine; Guderian in person, at a confer-
ence specifically called to decide the fate of Klatt and his asso-
ciates, stated in emphatic terms that the General Staff would
not want to be held accountable for the consequences should it
be decided to liquidate the net.
In the chapter on Operations of the Secret Service, Schel-
lenberg claims that Germany was exceptionally successful in
"her wireless defense organization," boasting that "at one
time we had at least sixty-four turned-round' stations trans-
mitting to Moscow for us." I consider it next to impossible
to arrive at a reliable estimate of the relative successes of
Germany's W/T defense system without an equally depend-
able estimate of the total strength of active Soviet W/T trans-
mitters operating from soil under German control. Also, the
unknown factor of the incidence of Soviet triples among the 64
doubles, renders a purely statistical approach as a gauge of
German successes quite meaningless. Suffice it to say tha t
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the German services were able to develop a cadre of experts
in the field of countering Soviet W/T operations, who were
able to attain a number of outstanding successes. Amt IV,
(Gestapo) rather than Schellenberg's organization, scored
heavily in this field. Source material on this subject is con-
tained in the debriefing of Kopkow, who was in charge of the
responsible branch in Amt IV. One of the best Amt IV oper-
atives in the field was an Austrian named Sanitz, whom the
Soviets abducted from a Vienna hospital only to return him
to freedom a few years later.
The Case of Richard Sorge, as related by Schellenberg, mere-
ly proves that Schellenberg has since joined the ranks of those
who suspected all along that Sorge was a Soviet spy. Schellen-
berg refers to him as an associate of "the IVth Division of
the MVD" although it is pretty well agreed by now that he
was an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (RV).
In the chapter captioned At War with Russia, Schellenberg
commends Fremde Heere Ost, a department of the Oberkom-
mando des Heeres (Army High Command) serving as repos-
itory and evaluation center for all military intelligence ob-
tained on the Soviet Union, which was headed by. General
Gehlen, as "doing excellent work in the correlation and objec-
tive evaluation of information." This accolade appears of
more than historical interest in the light of subsequent devel-
opments, since historically speaking, Fremde Heere Ost formed
the nucleus of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelli-
gence Service), with General Gehlen as its first head.
Of some interest is Schellenberg's description of his rela-
tions with SS Sturmbannfuehrer Meisinger, one of the stal-
warts of Amt IV, who at the time of Germany's surrender
served as Police Attach?ith the German Embassy in Tokyo,
a cover designation designed to conceal the identity of his?
parent organization, the Gestapo. Like SS Gruppenfuehrer
Heinrich Mueller, the chief of Amt IV, Meisinger had come
up through the ranks of the old Bayrische Staatspolizei. I
can bear out Schellenberg's rather graphic description of the
man, having seen him in Oberursel. He was eventually turned
over to the Poles, who strung him up. In this context it may
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be well to comment on the fact that the worst elements in
the RSHA were for the most part Bavarians and Austrians.
The backbone of Amt IV consisted of Bavarians of the stripe
of Mueller and Meisinger. Kaltenbrunner, the last head of
the RSHA, was an Austrian from Linz. Prussians of the cali-
bre of Diehls, Gisevius, and Kriminalrat Heller in the end
wielded little influence.
I found the discussion of Mueller particularly interesting
because it dwells on the existence of left-wing tendencies
among the SS leadership. In this context Schellenberg pur-
ports to quote remarks made by the chief of Amt IV which
Schellenberg construed as suggesting a decided change in
Mueller's outlook toward possibility of a separate peace with
Russia. I am unable to place my hands on the source ma-
terial, but it has been seriously contended that the RIS, through
the device of the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) was able to
disaffect a significant segment of the Gestapo.
The French end of the doubling operation, involving the
Grand Chef Trepper himself, had been placed in the care of
a Kriminalrat Pannwitz, a representative of Amt IV B, the
counterespionage branch of the Gestapo. From all accounts
he and his associates handled the operation with great skill and
imagination ? according to some with too much of the latter
because, so the allegation runs, the build-up material passed
to the Moscow Center in the end provided the Soviets with
a pretty accurate reading of German capabilities and inten-
tions in France. The school of thought which in effect sus-
pected a Soviet triple operation found sustenance in the dis-
appearance of Pannwitz and his rumored apprehension by
the Soviets. (Pannwitz has in the meanwhile returned from
Soviet imprisonment, and a competent interrogation will no
doubt serve to shed light upon some of the hidden recesses
of the Red Orchestra compromise.) Mueller himself, who
spent the last days of the Battle of Berlin in Hitler's bunker
in the Reich's Chancellery, likewise disappeared from sight,
participating in the sortie of Bormann's group. Schellenberg's
belief that Mueller joined the Communists merely repeats the
essence of a spate of completely unsubstantiated rumors to that
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effect. The Allies made several vain attempts at enlisting
Soviet help in locating Mueller's whereabouts if he was still
alive. The only official reaction came from the Soviet Military
Attach?n London who, obviously in order to stave off further
Allied importuning, queried them with a straight face as to
the correct spelling of Mueller's first name. That effectively
ended the Allied search.
The chapter on the Assassination of Heydrich was obviously
written without the benefit of hindsight. As it turned out,
Himmler, who "had made up his mind that the whole affair
was staged by the British Secret Service, and that the three
assassins had been dropped by parachute near Prague for
this special purpose" was on the right track. Schellenberg,
who suspected Himmler and Bormann, was wrong. No men-
tion is made of the frightful revenge wreaked by Heydrich's
successor, Reichs Protektor Hermann Frank, on the village
of Lydice.
The personal relationship between Schellenberg and Admiral
Canaris was a curiously ambivalent one. It would have been
interesting to hear Canaris' side of the story. There can be
few doubts that Canaris felt personally attracted to a young
SS officer, not cast in the common mold of an SS thug and
quite obviously treating the older and more experienced man
with considerable deference. Had Canaris been alive to tell
his story, he would undoubtedly have dwelled on the many
patent advantages to be derived from staying close to a
ranking official of Hitler's secret service, a man known to be
in the confidence of both Heydrich and Himmler. Schellen-
berg, on the other hand, is bound to have derived considerable
professional benefit from his talks with Canaris and aid in
sorting out his own untested ideas on the future complexion
of a unified German intelligence system. In his biography,
Schellenberg stays just short of admitting that it was he him-
self who engineered Canaris' downfall. His description of the
events leading up to the Admiral's arrest and his own role
in the actual detention are a masterpiece of double entendre.
Without ever frontally attacking the former chief of Germany's
military intelligence service, Schellenberg manages to convey
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to the reader the impression that Canaris was in fact an un-
principled toady (tears at Heydrich's funeral "After all, he
was a great man. I have lost a friend in him"), a traitor to
Germany, and a tottering old fool (the tearful embraces in
Fuerstenwald) . Schellenberg's surmise that Himmler was in-
strumental in staving off Canaris' execution is unsupported
by any other facts available to me. Some light has in the
meanwhile been shed on the circumstances surrounding Ca-
naris' execution in the trial against SS Standartenfuehrer Hup-
penkoten, the last head of Amt IV B, who implemented the
order. Kaltenbrunner, the chief of the RSHA, whom I ques-
tioned on this matter in May 1945, disavowed all direct re-
sponsibility in the execution, but referred to the contents of
the famous diary kept by the Admiral as irrefutable evidence
of his treasonous activities. There can be no doubt that Ca-
naris was privy to the plot of the 20th of July, without lending
it much active support, and that the activities of General Oster
had deeply implicated him. Since the end of the war an
attempt has been made to vindicate Canaris, casting him in
the role of the actual mainspring of the German resistance.
This, in my estimation, is a patently incorrect assessment of
a man who, in spite of many decent impulses and an excep-
tionally clear perception of Germany's ultimate doom at a time
when Hitler's power seemed to have reached its zenith, failed
to measure up to the exigencies of true greatness.
In passing, Schellenberg offers a fairly accurate appraisal of
prevailing conditions in the Abwehr, pointing to Canaris' pen-
chant for "over-inflating his organization, indiscriminately
enrolling serious workers and dubious riffraff," feebly attempt-
ing reforms and then allowing them to peter out. He fails to
mention that in those very respects his own organization, the
foreign intelligence branch of the RSHA, Amt VI, could hardly
be set up as a shining example, and that the subsequent
merger of the two organizations brought no tangible improve-
ments.
There was no love lost between Schellenberg and Dr. Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, the new chief of the RSHA who in 1943 was
appointed by Hitler personally to step into the position made
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vacant by Heydrich's untimely death. Schellenberg confines
himself to discussing the professional rivalries between him-
self and his nominal superior in essentially personal terms,
making no bones of the fact that he would have liked to bring
about a secession of Amt VI from the main body of the RSHA.
Kaltenbrunner clearly perceived that Schellenberg posed a
serious threat to his position and was not about to allow the
foreign intelligence service to be wrested from his control.
Schellenberg merely hints at this by complaining that Kalten-
brunner "sought to surround himself entirely with Austrians,"
actually a carefully conceived strategem which confronted
Schellenberg in his own organization with a sizeable bloc of
"Austrian" officials whose first loyalty belonged to Kalten-
brunner himself. They consisted for the most part of mem-
bers of the old Austrian Nazi underground who, like Kalten-
brunner, came out of hiding at the time of the Anschluss.
Their intellectual leader was the redoubtable Dr. Wilhelm
Hoettl who has publicized in a book entitled "The Secret Front"
what might be referred to as the Austrian contribution to
the German intelligence effort. The division of Amt VI
which dealt with operations in Southeastern Europe bore the
designation VI E. Under the powerful aegis of Kaltenbrunner
it soon became one of the most favored elements of the RSHA,
being used by him also as Hauskapelle, a German euphemism
for an espionage apparatus within an intelligence organization.
In listing the professional exploits of his organization, Schel-
lenberg makes no mention whatsoever of VI E which, for ex-
ample, played an important part in the overthrow of the
Horthy regime in Hungary, replacing it with the Arrow Cross
movement and its leader Szalazy. Schellenberg may be for-
given for not mentioning a staybehind operation in the Bal-
kans, organized by VI E personnel, which never came to frui-
tion, because of the supervening collapse of Germany. Among
the more prominent RSHA officials representing the Austrian
clique could be found Skorzeny, who headed a special depart-
ment concerned with action-type operations, and the notorious
Eichmann, in command of a special task force gathering up
Jews in occupied countries and channeling them into extermi-
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nation camps. Through Dr. Hoettl, Kaltenbrunner made a be-
lated attempt at establishing his own channel to the Allies
by means of contacting the office of Allen Dulles, representative
of the Office of Strategic Services in Bern. Kaltenbrunner,
from the moment of his capture by American troops in May
1945 until his demise at the end of a rope, insisted that his
classification as war criminal was the result of a terrible
misunderstanding; while it was true that in his capacity as
chief of the RSHA he was also in charge of Amt IV, the
executive arm of Germany's genocidal program, in actual fact
the chain of command had completely bypassed him, with
Mueller directly taking his orders from Himmler. During
several sessions I had with him shortly after his capture he
plead with considerable eloquence that his overriding concern
had been intelligence, more specifically the conduct of opera-
tions in Southeastern Europe. This story he repeated so per-
sistently that in the end he may have come to believe it him-
self. Schellenberg's account certainly fails to support it.
The merger of Amt VI and the Military Intelligence Service,
the Abwehr, came about in the fall of 1943. The affair was
solemnized at a meeting in Salzburg over which Kaltenbrun-
ner presided. During an interim period the basic structure
of the Abwehr had been left intact, affiliating it as a quasi
self-contained operating branch named Mil Amt to the main
body of the RSHA and placing it in the charge of a career
General Staff Officer, Colonel Hansen, who ? it soon appeared
? was not equal to the task. Hansen was arrested after the
20 July attempt, and as Canaris correctly surmised ? a
wealth of incriminating material was found in his files. The
arrest was likewise carried out by Schellenberg, a fact which
he fails to mention. Hansen was found guilty of treason and
hanged. In the summer of 1944 the amalgamation of the
Abwehr was completed, and its various tasks were divided
between Amt VI and Amt IV B. Schellenberg's account is
incorrect in stating that the following took place: "From
the middle of 1944 I took over Canaris' Military Intelligence
Department, incorporating its various tasks in departments
IV and VI of the Counterespionage organization." In actual
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fact the counterespionage branch of the Abwehr, which bore
the designation of III F, was integrated with the counter-
espionage service of the RSHA, Amt IV B, and was thus not
placed under Schellenberg. After the surrender of Germany,
this fact became a source of unpleasantness to the old III F
crowd, who found themselves lumped together with the de-
tested Gestapo and exposed to its odium.
Out of the blue, the name Dr. Langbehn is thrown into
the debate. First, Dr. Kersten inquires whether Schellen-
berg had frequent conversations with him, and subsequently
Himmler begs Schellenberg "to improve his relationship with
Langbehn as well." In the chapter on Peace Feelers, the
reader is told that Dr. Langbehn had been negotiating with
Allied representatives in Switzerland and that he had done so
(or was alleged to have done so) with Schellenberg's blessing.
In the chapter on The Downfall of Admiral Canaris Schellen-
berg complains that Mueller and Kaltenbrunner had tried in
1943 to denounce Schellenberg as a British agent in connection
with the Langbehn affair. To the uninitiated reader the story
as it stands is meaningless. Actually the Langbehn incident
deserves less cursory treatment. The relationship between
Langbehn and Himmler in fact represented Himmler's first sub
rosa contact with the German resistance movement which in
1944 led to the abortive July attempt. Himmler eventually
withdrew his support from Langbehn and permitted him to be
executed. It has been alleged that the growth of the anti-Nazi
resistance movement and the surprisingly ramified strength it
displayed during the critical days of July 1944 cannot conceiv-
ably have escaped the vigilance of the Gestapo. At least so
the argument runs both Mueller and Himmler must have
been cognizant of its scope and of the nature of its plans.
Some such thought may have crossed Hitler's mind when he
entrusted the investigation of the 20 July plot to Kaltenbrun-
ner rather than to Himmler. It would have been interesting
to learn the full story, if we can assume that Schellenberg was
in possession of all the facts. There are in Schellenberg's book
some oblique references to the fact that Himmler was loath to
have Schellenberg concern himself with Canaris' oppositional
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activities and Schellenberg confessed himself to being some-
what puzzled by Himmler's solicitude for the Admiral's fate.
Quite conceivably there may have been a side to Himniler's
extra-curricular plans and activities completely unknown to
Schellenberg.
Schellenberg's persistent attempts to win over his protector,
Himmler, to an active exploration of possibilities to negotiate
peace with the Allies, culminating in a talk with Himmler in
Zhitomir which Schellenberg describes, naturally colored his
quest for intelligence. Operation "Cicero" and the intelligence
it yielded, in the sight of Schellenberg, served their principal
purpose by demonstrating the turn of the tide to Germany's
detriment. Schellenberg makes no mention in this context
that, in order to derive maximum benefit from the total of the
German intelligence product, he co-opted into Amt VI Dr.
Giselher Wirsing, a historian of vast experience, whom he com-
missioned to prepare intelligence summaries. These sum-
maries, put out at irregular intervals, were known as Egmont
Berichte. They were given the highest classification with a
distribution confined to six officials of the Third Reich, among
them Hitler, Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, and Ribbentrop. Their
underlying purpose, as clearly understood by Wirsing, was to
buttress the Schellenberg thesis of the necessity of a negotiated
peace. In reconstructing some of the reports as originally sub-
mitted by him (no originals have been located), it was clearly
revealed that the "Cicero" material formed the backbone of the
Egmont Berichte.
A few comments regarding Schellenberg's personal record
may be in order. He came up through the ranks of the old
Gestapo. Beyond reasonable doubt, he acquired first-hand
knowledge of the methods applied by that organization in ex-
torting confessions. Those methods were quite prevalent and
by no means spontaneous. As a matter of fact, the orderly
German mind had in fact conceived a bureaucratic term for
the practice of torture which can be found in numerous official
documents: "verschaerite Vernehmung." I am inclined to
give credence to Schellenberg's aversion to such practices, and
the incident described as evidence of this may have occurred.
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However, the fact that his record is a relatively unblemished
one should be attributed to luck rather than to predisposition.
Had Schellenberg been ordered by Himmler to take over the
command of an SS Einsatzkommando, I strongly doubt that
he would have staked his career and possibly his life on a re-
fusal. (The Chief of Amt V, Kriminalrat Nebe, a professional
criminologist with no Nazi background, was assigned to the
command of an Einsatzkommando and is alleged to have super-
intended large-scale liquidation of Russian civilians behind the
German frontlines. Schellenberg presumably would have done
the same, if ordered.) Schellenberg's role in bringing about
the release and exchange of Jews in German captivity is not in
contradiction to this analysis of his character. His errands of
mercy were part and parcel of a cold-blooded deal in which the
imprisoned Jews were mere pawns. He must have had a clear
appreciation of the fact that any further large-scale atrocities
would merely lead to an intensification of Allied punitive meas-
ures and that by means of serving as an "honest broker" in
putting across those transactions, he stood a good chance of
extricating himself from a share in the collective responsibility
which his associates, especially his great protector Himmler,
had incurred. I have a clear recollection of discussing with
Schellenberg the odious role played by Himmler in the perpe-
tration of what may go down as world history's most colossal
crime, without evoking more than an expression of polite doubt
whether or not those crimes were politically sound. The reader
is bound to carry away the same impression after reading the
chapter on Operation Zeppelin.
Summing up my impressions of The Labyrinth, I fail to dis-
cern in its narrative any significant contributions to our under-
standing of the principles of intelligence tradecraft, let alone
their application. Amt VI never developed a coherent and
practicable system of intelligence planning. The merger with
the more experienced Abwehr came too late to redound to the
benefit of Amt VI. Especially in the leadership bracket, the
absence of experienced personnel was calamitous. Also, the
leading men of Amt VI, and this particularly applies in the case
of Schellenberg, were forced to spend an unconscionable
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amount of time in protecting their rear. Special missions,
such as the grotesque plan to abduct the Duke of Windsor,
monopolized time and effort which could more usefully have
been deployed against truly important targets. The fact that
Amt VI was unable to shed its close kinship with Amt IV, the
dreaded Gestapo, militated against its effectiveness in enlisting
the support of elements in disaccord with the excesses of the
Nazi system and limited the circle of its operatives to party
zealots and SS fanatics whose radius of understanding of world
affairs was circumscribed by Nazi doctrine. Germany's col-
lapse brought about the complete obliteration of what has apt-
ly been described as the "SS-Staat" and of its coercive organs.
Its practices and concepts have not been bequeathed upon the
intelligence service of the Federal Republic. A fitting epitaph
for the organization and the men who operated it would thus
be: "Spurlos versenkt."
CLINTON GALLAGHER
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS.
By Roger Hilsman. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1956.
Pp. 183.)
Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions has many
shortcomings. It suffers (inevitably, under circumstances of
secrecy) from an overbalance of theory as against practice; it
confuses departmental with central intelligence; it shows little
awareness of the special problems of Sino-Soviet Bloc intelli-
gence which dominate the business. Its radical proposals for
a total reorganization of the effort are debatable. Nor is it an
easy book to read. But it has the great virtue of reviving and
placing in the center of the stage the fundamental question of
the relation of intelligence to policy. Or, put more simply,
what are we here for?
Hilsman's argument starts with a declaration that the only
justification for intelligence is the assistance which it gives to
the making of policy. The core of his analysis lies in the
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eighth chapter, which deals with the relationship in foreign
policy between knowledge and action. He breaks down the
decision-making process into its parts ? examination of US
values; recognition of a problem involving these values; select-
ing an objective; appraising alternative means of pursuing it;
calculating the subsidiary effects upon other goals; making the
choice itself; and, finally, modifying the decision in response to
the reactions which accumulate as the decision is implemented.
The aim of intelligence is to make this process as rational as
possible. Thus, according to Hilsman, the only knowledge
worth acquiring is knowledge which informs action, which can
be used to judge how probable developments will affect US
values, to weigh alternative means, and to appraise the sub-
sidiary effects of pursuing a given objective. In the ideal case,
?the requirements for knowledge spring directly from the de-
mands of action at each stage. "Knowledge and action should
Interact, should condition and control each other at every
point . . . . Knowledge for these purposes must be adapted
to the uses of action, shaped to the task of best utilizing the
means for action that are at hand . . . . It should be recipient
as well as provider ? cast in the framework which action pre-
sents, nurtured by the information uncovered as action is car-
ried out, and tested in the laboratory that action provides.
Action in turn should not only be planned by knowledge, but
guided by it at every step ? in the pause, perhaps, between
question and reply in some vital negotiation."
Although this theory seems so sound as to appear unexcep-
tionable, a little reflection will convince most intelligence offi-
cers that the present organization of intelligence is constructed
on quite different, even contrary, assumptions. The basic con-
cept, as Hilsman discovered in a series of interviews with intel-
ligence producers and consumers, concerns facts. Facts are
held to be the only true and dependable things in an otherwise
tricky and deceptive world. Not only are they hard to find,
but Hilsman's informants all felt that the commitment of policy
people to the line of thought embodied in existing policy tends
to blind them to any disturbing fact which conflicts with that
line. Thus a special type of person, with a nose for facts and
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uncommitted to policy, is needed to search them out and put
them together, and this type of person requires, in turn, a spe-
cial organization called an intelligence unit.
In his interviews and his reading of intelligence doctrine,
Hilsman uncovered a widely shared set of beliefs about the
function of intelligence. Intelligence was held by his sources
to be completely separate from the policy-making function,
and therefore it was proper that intelligence and policy making
should be assigned to different organizations and separated
geographically. Fearful of bias in the assembling of informa-
tion and respectful of the truth contained in the facts them-
selves, the holders of this doctrine also insisted that with only
a minimum of guidance the research intelligence function
should be performed before, rather than during or after, the
formulation of policy or the taking of action. Thus the two
should also be separated in time and in outlook.
It is easy to see how such a set of beliefs could arise, and
Hilsman gives some of the reasons in an historical chapter
which is useful and interesting reading for any practitioner.
The first great impetus for organizing a postwar intelligence
organization was the attack on Pearl Harbor, which became a
notorious example of the costs of failing to assemble and put
together information. The conduct of war required great
masses of facts about areas with which Americans had been
little concerned before, and the possibility of another war sug-
gested that next time we should be forearmed with these facts.
Policy people were naturally suspicious of the ambitions of
intelligence, and collecting and assembling facts seemed to
offer a satisfactory compromise. The policy people felt that
this was a harmless activity which might even on occasion do
them some good, and the infinite world of facts offered virgin
land for the devotees of intelligence.
The immense faith in facts which underlies prevailing doc-
trine and structure is nowhere illustrated more clearly than in
the analogy of the jigsaw puzzle ? probably the most harmful
concept ever applied to intelligence. Whereas everyone is con-
scious of its limitations, it remains the standard thumbnail
guide to the intelligence process; no one has offered a better
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analogy, and intelligence organization in fact follows it with
remarkable faithfulness. First there are the collectors, to
whom every fact is a piece in some jigsaw puzzle; and because
there are so many facts, the hapless collector has, to assume
that all are of equal value, and he gathers them indiscrim-
inately. Then there are the processors and storers, who need a
large staff simply to determine what puzzle each piece belongs
to. Then the analysts, so swamped with facts that they must
be divided up into specialists in edge pieces, sky pieces, cloud
pieces, and faces. Atop them all, then, are the "big picture"
men, who integrate the sub-puzzles, joining the fence to the
house, the tree to the sky, until the puzzle is complete. The
implication is obvious that, if everybody does his job, life will
turn out to be fully consistent, entirely knowable, and perfectly
rectangular.
It is hard to argue against the need for facts, against the
claim that you can never have too many facts. But there is
reason to believe that intelligence already has far too many
facts in the numerical sense, although obviously some ex-
tremely important ones are always missing. But large num-
bers of facts, precisely because they require so many people to
handle them, take their toll in over-specialization, in loss of the
ability to make judgments, in increasingly attenuated com-
munication, in remoteness from policy problems.
The last point, that of the distance between intelligence and
policy, is Hilsman's most penetrating concern. And, indeed,
who of the veterans in intelligence has not had the disconcert-
ing experience of being asked by a six-month neophyte whether
he knows of any cases where intelligence has actually been
related to policy. To most analysts, any such relation is rarely
discernible. In some cases, this destroys incentive; most of
those who remain in intelligence overcome their frustrations
(Hilsman found many indications of frustration on this point
in his interviews with intelligence officials) by turning scholar.
They simply get interested in their subject for its own sake,
derive their satisfaction from knowledge itself, and work main-
ly for the sake of convincing their colleagues. On this level,
research and internal debate are the main driving forces, and
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the question of justifying all this activity as a government pro-
gram, which can be done only through reference to policy,
recedes into oblivion.
Of course, this may be a wrong view. It may be that, in
personal contacts, the Director and his chief assistants regu-
larly transmit to the appropriate persons the distilled product
of the Agency in a form and on a schedule useful to policy
formulation and execution. But this is not evident to the
rank-and-file analyst, and his morale suffers for it because he
finds it hard, as does Hilsman, to see any policy-related func-
tion being performed in the stream of current intelligence re-
porting, the esoteric research papers, and the grand estimates.
These defects were illustrated several times in the recent
case of the Polish loan. First, as soon as the early hints ap-
peared of Gomulka's desire for an American loan, any outsider
familiar with the size and competence of CIA's staff in this field
would automatically have assumed that a study was immedi-
ately initiated to determine the probable effects of various types
and sizes of loans on the Polish economy, not to speak of the
effects on Polish internal and external politics. No such reac-
tion occurred, however, because everyone was busy with some-
thing else and no one was sufficiently attuned to policy either
to order such a project from above or undertake it on his own
from below. Later, when a Soviet-Satellite estimate was being
drafted, mention was made of the probable effects of such a
loan, but only in the most general way, and some participants
were rather disquieted by touching so closely on a policy mat-
ter. Finally there came a request from the State Department
for an analysis of probable effects of the loan actually under
consideration by the US Government. Here, it would seem,
intelligence was actually to be used in making a decision. But
alas, in reading the resulting memorandum, the State official,
coming across the statement that grain in the proposed amount
would not permit the cessation of compulsory deliveries from
the Polish peasants, took his pencil and crossed out the word
"not." When remonstrated with, he answered that, just that
morning, the US had quintupled the amount of grain to be
loaned. Perhaps the intelligence memo was needed to explain
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to someone why the loan had been made; perhaps it was an
attempt to spread responsibility for a dangerous policy. At
any rate, the request for an intelligence analysis certainly had
nothing to do with the policy choice, which had already been
made.
Readers should be forewarned that Hilsman's book is heavy
going. But it would be unfortunate if, merely on this account,
intelligence professionals were to ignore this thoroughgoing
treatment of the theory of intelligence. It is interesting par-
ticularly because of its provocative and persuasive conclusion
that much, in fact most, of today's intelligence production is
wasted effort.
JOHN WHITMAN
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION; BASIC PRINCI-
PLES. By Washington Platt. . (New York: F. A. Praeger.
1957. Pp. 302.)
Brigadier General Washington Platt has been an intelli-
gence officer for some ten years, and he clearly loves his work.
It would be pleasant to record, therefore, that General Platt's
book, Strategic Intelligence Production; Basic Principles makes
a really significant contribution to the literature of intelligence.
However, although much of the book is rewarding and thought
provoking, it is as a whole disappointing when viewed both
against the gaps in the present literature and against the
objectives which the author apparently sets out for himself.
The word "apparently" in the last sentence is used deliber-
ately, for the objective of the book is not entirely clear. The
preface contains the statement that the book is intended "as
one step toward the development of first principles in the field
of Strategic Intelligence Production." The first chapter makes
a similar statement, adding that the primary purpose of the
book is to present concepts pertaining to strategic intelligence
production. One might expect, therefore, that the book would
devote considerable attention to the theory and philosophy of
strategic intelligence, to the broad first principles which make
it what it is and which distinguish it from other kinds of intel-
ligence and from other fields of learning. Aside from scattered
statements, however, often in the nature of obiter dicta, one
looks in vain for a discussion along these lines.
Consider, for example, the term "strategic intelligence."
Strategic intelligence is defined formally in a single paragraph,
and its components are listed in another. Although the term
is used frequently thereafter and although methods and tech-
niques for strategic intelligence production are given, very little
else is said about its nature. What is strategic about strategic
intelligence? How does strategic intelligence differ from com-
bat intelligence and from other forms of intelligence, if any?
What is the relationship between strategic intelligence and
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policy? What is strategic intelligence supposed to provide for
the formulation of policy, and where does one end and the
other begin? Any systematic discussion of these and other
important first principles is conspicuously absent.
To be fair to the author, it may not have been his purpose
to consider these broader aspects. The stated aim of the book
is to develop the principles of strategic intelligence production
(as opposed to strategic intelligence, period) , and the emphasis
is put explicitly on the working level. Hence, when the author
speaks of principles, he may be thinking of bread-and-butter
principles designed to provide the reader with a "how to" book
or (perhaps unfairly) a sort of intelligence do-it-yourself kit.
To make a crude analogy, the author may not have intended to
talk about transportation but merely about how to assemble an
automobile. In any case, the result has been to divorce the
working principles of strategic intelligence production from the
broader theoretical and philosophical principles to which they
relate. In doing so, the author has omitted the kind of mate-
rial which probably most needs development in the literature
and has rendered the principles which he gives us less meaning-
ful and helpful than they otherwise would have been.
General Platt's book is essentially a presentation of certain
basic principles of strategic intelligence production and of
methods of the social sciences and the assistance they can give
the intelligence officer, to probability and certainty, and to fore-
casting. The author also gives us discussions of the differ-
ences between information and intelligence, of the scientific
method and its application to strategic intelligence production,
and of intelligence production as an act of creative thinking.
The last chapter covers the characteristics of the intelligence
profession.
The book presents nine principles of intelligence production
said to be similar in their field to Clausewitz's principles of
war: namely, purpose, definitions, exploitation of sources, sig-
nificance, cause and effect, spirit of the people, trends, degrees
of certainty, and conclusions. One can scarcely quarrel with
the relevance and importance of these principles to the pro-
duction of strategic intelligence. Agreeing with these princi-
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pies, however, is much like agreeing, Coolidge-like, that sin is
bad and motherhood admirable. Although each of the prin-
ciples is elaborated elsewhere in the book, one is left with the
feeling that he has been given a skeleton without very much
flesh on it. The reason, I think, is fairly clear: here as else-
where the book concentrates on working principles and meth-
ods to the virtual exclusion of broader theoretical consider-
ations. As a result, we are given many fine hats, but no hat
rack on which to hang them. The fact that. the author may
not have intended to give us a hat rack makes the hats no
easier to handle.
It is interesting that the author compares his nine principles
not only with Clausewitz's principles of war but also with the
Ten Commandments. It may be remarked that during New
Testament times the Pharisees, among others, were criticized,
not because they disobeyed the Ten Commandments, but be-
cause they obeyed them rigidly, literally, and pridefully, and
without spirit, compassion, or understanding. The user of
General Platt's nine principles faces a similar risk, for although
adherence to these principles is a necessary condition to the
production of good strategic intelligence, it is not a sufficient
condition.
The author states that the book is "purposely discursive"
because such discursiveness is necessary in a field with "so little
unity of background, or systematic development of general
principles." However much this may be true, the book is not
well organized or put together and frequently does not develop
its themes systematically or comprehensively. Moreover, the
presentation is often not as clear or as convincing as it should
be and is sometimes downright irritating or dangerously incom-
plete. The book discusses at some length whether or not there
is a group or a national character and, if so, whether or not
information can be gained about it. It gives a yes answer to
both of these questions. A closely related question how
foreign are foreigners? ? is not given a yes or no answer, but
it is clear that the author believes there is some "foreignness"
in foreigners. I wish that the author had gone one step further
(and incidentally, in so doing, better pulled his' discussion to-
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gether) by warning the intelligence officer that he is fatally and
irrevocably lost if he does not put himself in the context of
thought and/or action of the people or events which he is
studying. Elsewhere the author attempts to quantify the de-
preciation of the "inherent value" of various kinds of intelli-
gence with time by stating, for example, that strategic
intelligence depreciates 10 percent per month in wartime,
so that at the end of 6 months it has lost half its value and at
the end of 9 months nearly three-fourths. These rates of de-
preciation are presented out of hand, and despite a qualifying
footnote, not as orders of magnitude, but as more or less fixed
and immutable laws. It is difficult to decide whether to be
horrified, or amused. As a final example, the author discusses
the normal curve of frequency distribution and suggests that
a bimodal curve makes it practically certain that the group
studied was in fact two groups of diverse origin. The reader
is left with the impression that the normal curve is the most
common kind of curve encountered in the social sciences and
that deviations from it merely reflect the mixture of two uni-
verses or inadequate sampling. Actually the analyst in many
of the social sciences will only rarely encounter a normal curve,
not because he has mixed universes or developed bad samples,
but simply because the universe with which he deals does not
group itself in the manner described by the so-called normal
curve.
On the positive side, many of the principles and methods
developed in the book are decidedly well worth stating and
ought to be part of the mental makeup and box of tools of
every producer of strategic intelligence. None of these prin-
ciples is strikingly new, but each is at least useful and often
more than that, and together they constitute a helpful collec-
tion of tools and techniques. For example, the author dis-
cusses two important differences between the usual kind of
creative scholarship and the kind required for the production
of strategic intelligence. The importance of these differ-
ences ? usefulness and timeliness can scarcely be overem-
phasized, not only to those newly entering intelligence work,
but also to its current practitioners. The author makes a
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quite useful distinction between information and intelligence,
which is discussed at some length. Another chapter attempts,
although not entirely successfully, to develop the relationship
between the social sciences and strategic intelligence. This
portion of the book points up the similarity between the sub-
ject matter and methods of the social sciences and intelligence
and suggests that a thorough grounding in one or more of the
social sciences is a most useful background for the strategic
intelligence officer. The book also contains in one chapter,
entitled "Probability and Certainty," and in another, entitled
"Forecasting," a number of specific tools of analysis which can
be of considerable use to the intelligence analyst.
The author first touches upon another important issue al-
most casually. Early in the book he states that "In part I . . .
we recognize intelligence as one of the social sciences." Far
from explicitly providing and justifying this recognition, how-
ever, Part I does not even consider this question. The last
chapter of the book discusses at some length the character-
istics of the intelligence profession compared with other pro-
fessions. Here the 'author states that "perhaps it would be
more correct to say that as at present practiced intelligence
has the makings of a profession, rather that it is a profession"
(emphasis in the original). A discussion then follows in which
the author states that intelligence now lacks most of the char-
acteristics of a learned profession, the key elements of which
he lists and discusses. In short, the author asserts that intelli-
gence is at once a social science and not a profession.
Although the author asserts early in the book that intelli-
gence is one of the social sciences, he seems to write subse-
quently as though it were not. Intelligence is conspicuously
missing from his list of the social sciences. The author invari-
ably refers to the social sciences and never to the other social
sciences, even when, if intelligence is a separate social science,
the context calls for the latter expression. Finally, the author
discusses what he believes to be a desirable undergraduate cur-
riculum as preparation for an intelligence career and pleads
for professional schools of intelligence at the graduate level.
It is notable that his list of undergraduate fields includes only
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courses provided by the conventional social sciences such as
modern history, geography, and economics. His graduate
school, which is to provide advanced studies "specifically in
[the intelligence] profession," is to teach "the underlying
philosophy and improved [sic] methodology of intelligence,"
and "to do systematic research into intelligence production
methods or to explore the basic principles of this great field of
human activity" (emphasis in the original) . Nowhere, how-
ever, is a particular course or field of study laid out, nor does
the author describe exactly what is to be taught.
In the first issue of Studies in Intelligence, Sherman Kent
wrote a lucid and stimulating article on the need for intelli-
gence literature.1 Dr. Kent argued that "intelligence has be-
come, in our own recent memory, an exacting, highly skilled
profession and an honorable one . . . . Intelligence today is
not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken
on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized
methodology; it has developed a vocabulary; it has developed
a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined
techniques. It now has a large professional following. What
it lacks is a literature." Kent says, then, that intelligence is
definitely a learned profession and close to being a discipline.
General Platt, in contrast, concedes to intelligence that higher
order of development to a discipline but does not believe it yet
to be a profession.
Dr. Kent's article has stimulated considerable discussion of
whether intelligence in fact has the attributes of a separate
discipline and, if so, what these attributes are. General Platt's
belief that intelligence falls short of being a learned profession
should stimulate even more. The issues are much too complex
to be considered here, even if the reviewer felt competent to
do so. The reviewer believes, however, more or less intuitively,
that intelligence is without question a separate profession, and
a learned profession at that, because in Kent's terms it requires
native intelligence, rigorous training, and both general compe-
' "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," Studies in Intelligence,
September 1955, pp. 1-11.
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tence and intensive specialization. With respect to whether or
not intelligence is a separate discipline, it may be noted that
the recognized disciplines, in addition to possessing a body of
theory and a methodology and vocabulary, also deal with a
particular subject matter which is more or less distinct from
the subject matter of the other disciplines. Strategic intelli-
gence, however, deals with a variety of events and circum-
stances encompassing almost every form of human activity,
which are also the concern of the conventional natural and
social sciences. Most of us believe, however, intuitively at
least, that intelligence is more than the parroting of any one
of these disciplines and more than their simple sum. Must
we not then discover what this "more" is, and, just as im-
portant, record it for all to see, before we can know who we are
and where we belong?
To some, all this may seem a mere jousting with windmills
or a playing with words, particularly since the job to be done
seems so clear and the time it allows for speculation so dis-
couragingly small. Surely, however, this is not the case.
Issues such as these must be faced as part and parcel of that
looking at ourselves which marks our growing up. Until we
face them, make up our minds about them, and write down our
thoughts and our conclusions, we cannot really know about
ourselves. General Platt has attempted to do this, although
only partially successfully, and he is to be commended for
trying.
LOUIS MARENGO
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CONFIDENTIAL 151
WE SPIED . . .
Walter L. Pforzheimer
In looking over the books recently published in the field of
intelligence, we spied a few which we thought looked interest-
ing enough to call to the attention of the readers of these
Studies in Intelligence. We will not make any attempt in this
column to give you a definitive review of these books; rather,
we would like periodically to call your attention to books pub-
lished in the preceeding months which might make valuable
reading or at least pleasant browsing.
On the subject of intelligence production, the only book pub-
lished here so far this year is Strategic Intelligence Production
by Brigadier General Washington Platt, which is the subject
of a longer article in this issue. General Platt served as a
Corps G-2 during World War II in Europe and worked in CIA
for several years. This book represents Platt's individual
views on intelligence production, a subject on which very few
books have been written.
Three books concerning World War II have been very well
reviewed in the press and are well worth reading. The first of
these is The Labyrinth by Walter Schellenberg (British title,
The Schellenberg Memoirs). These memoirs of the former
Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Section of the Sicherheits-
dienst, who became the head of the combined SS and Wehr-
macht Military Intelligence Service, are discussed in separate
articles elsewhere in this issue. A broader study of the SS has
been written by Gerald Reitlinger and is entitled, The SS: Alibi
of a Nation, 1922-1945. It too has been well reviewed and in-
cludes material on some aspects of the German intelligence
system. The third book recently published of general interest
on World War II is Peter Fleming's Operation Sea Lion (British
title, Invasion 1940). This is a very readable account of the
German preparations and the British countermeasures for the
proposed German invasion of Great Britain in 1940. The book
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includes a chapter on British intelligence about the Germans
and a chapter on German intelligence about the British, which
make good reading.
Closer to home, one should note, The OSS and I by William
J. Morgan, who formerly served as a psychologist in OSS and
CIA. The British version of this book, entitled Spies and Sabo-
teurs, is somewhat shorter than the American text and does
not include the chapters on Morgan's adventures in France
during the war.
Ian Colvin, who already has written two very readable books
in the intelligence field, has turned out another entertaining
work entitled Flight 777. This is an account of the purported
intelligence activities of the great British actor, Leslie Howard,
and of the events leading up to his death in an aircraft shot
down by the Germans over the Bay of Biscay in 1943. A highly
readable, recently published work is Ronald Seth's Secret
Servants, a history of Japanese espionage from 1870 to Pearl
Harbor. Seth has written several books on intelligence and
resistance in which he played a small role in World War II.
In addition to Secret Servants, he has also published this year
a book entitled How Spies Work, a sort of primer of the spy
business. Seth is now turning out books so rapidly that they
do not represent very deep scholarship, but rather a broad
brush approach. Nevertheless, they make rapid and interesting
reading. Also worthy of passing note are Jacques Bergier's
Secret Weapons, Secret Agents which concerns itself largely
with the efforts to steal the secrets of the German rocket
installation at Peenemande, and Gordon Young's Cat with Two
Faces, the story of a double agent in France.
In the field of escape and evasion, one should note The One
That Got Away by Burt and Leasor, the story of a German pilot
who was shot down and developed an amazing proclivity to
escape; and Terence Robertson's The Ship with Two Captains,
which is the story, of the submarine which landed General
Mark Clark on the shores of North Africa prior to the invasion
and then participated in the escape of General Giraud from
France.
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On the scholarly side, a rather useful book entitled The
Soviet Secret Police, edited by Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser,
has recently been published for the Research Program on the
USSR. This book deals with the evolution of the Soviet Secret
Police from the establishment of the Cheka in 1917 to the post-
Stalin era, and also contains some chapters on the secret police
and their methods by former Soviet citizens. The first of a
series of books on Communism in American life hs also
appeared this year with favorable reviews. It is The Roots of
American Communism by Theodore Draper and goes back to
study the radical movement in America in the 19th century
before coming up to more current times.
On a more specialized subject, attention is called to Battle
for the Mind by William Sargant, which studies in part Pavlov's
techniques as applied to religious and political conversion.
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