CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200460001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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HR 70A.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
; State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
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SOVIET UNION
1. British Foreign Office comments on Malenkov speech (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Japanese set conditions for the renewal of relations with USSR
(page 3).
3. Comment on changes in North Korean leadership (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh reportedly to concentrate on delta during next campaign
season (page 5).
5. Moslem dissident organization in Indonesia allegedly extends its
activities (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
6. Comment on disorders in Ceylon (page 6).
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SOVIET UNION
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1. British Foreign Office comments on Malenkov speech:
The British Foreign Office comments
that, on first analysis, the economic
aspects of Malenkov's speech give an
Impression "of very great power."
The Foreign Office feels that the new
economic program is genuine. It sees no indication of the slack-
ening of industrial development or armament program, but states
that the Soviet Union now appears able to devote more efforts and
resources to consumer goods.
The concessions in the agricultural field
indicate to the Foreign Office an intention to correct the imbalance
between the peasants' contributions and their rewards. The fact
that the army is largely recruited from peasants may be a factor
In these concessions.
Comment: The agricultural concessions
appear to be aimed at improving production through increased in-
centives. It is unlikely that these concessions were intended to
appeal to peasant sentiment in the army.
FAR EAST
2. Japanese set conditions for the renewal of relations with USSR:
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials
believe Malenkov's remarks on Japan
in his recent speech represent no change
in Soviet policy toward Japan, but were
merely further tactics to build up popular pressure to overthrow
the Yoshida government.
They publicly assert that the USSR must
make the first move for a renewal of relations, and set as condi-
tions Soviet acceptance of the substance of the San Francisco treaty,
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return of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands, abrogation of the
part of the Sino-Soviet treaty directed against Japan, and return
of Japanese war prisoners.
Comment: The Japanese have main-
tained a cautious attitude toward recent Soviet gestures as they
are aware that no official Soviet commitment has been made.
Popular Japanese pressure for trade and the normalization of
relations with the Soviet bloc probably will make it difficult for
the government to rebuff a bona fide offer for the renewal of
Japanese-Soviet relations.
3. Comment on changes in North Korean leadership:
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Recent changes in North Korean
leadership, as disclosed by Pyongyang broadcasts, indicate
that the Soviet-trained Korean faction has increased its power,
largely at the expense of domestic elements formerly associated
with the South Korean Communist movement.
While the tightening of Soviet control is
not reflected in the government line-up, in which there seemS to be
a balance among the Soviet, Chinese and domestic factions, it does
appear in the more important party apparatus. Soviet-Koreans
have been appointed to four of the five positions in the newly-reorgan-
ized central political committee of the North Korean Labor Party and
to the majority of posts on the central organization committee.
Moscow's decision to allocate one billion
rubles, approximately $250,000,000 at the official exchange rate,
for North Korean economic rehabilitation is another indication of
Soviet efforts to control North Korean affairs.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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4. Viet Minh reportedly to concentrate on delta during next campaign
season:
a high-level Viet Minh conference was
held in mid-Lily to plan operations for
next fall. It was allegedly decided that two divisions would be used
against the southern part of the delta and three divisions against the
northwestern part.
There have been indications that the Viet
Minh offensive in Laos will be renewed this fall, but the two divi-
sions which are unaccounted for in the alleged plan are not well
located for such an operation.
5. Moslem dissident organization in Indonesia allegedly extends its
activities:
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The Darul Islam, Moslem dissident organ-
ization which seeks the establishment of an
Islamic state in Indonesia, has sent repre-
sentatives to other Moslem countries in an
effort to obtain support:
Comment: The new leftist-dominated
government has stated thgif-T?vill give a high priority to military
action against the Darul Islam which has about 10,000 armed men.
In the past the Darul Islam's activities have been limited to Java,
but there are now indications they are being expanded in other areas.
Various individuals in the Masjumi, the
principal opposition party to the new leftist cabinet, reportedly
have connections with the Darul. Islam, but any extensive rallying
to its support would seriously divide the government's opposition.
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SOUTH ASIA
Comment on disorders in Ceylon:
The widespread strikes, disorders, and
sabotage which occurred in Ceylon on 11 and 12 August may be
interpreted as an organizational triumph for Ceylon's leftist par-
ties, including the Communists. These parties have never before
worked in such close cooperation as they apparently did on this
occasion and they have never before successfully capitalized on
popular discontent.
The Ceylonese government may be faced
with a critical problem if the leftists continue to work together to
keep the populace aroused.
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