CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200060009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 9, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 3225/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 December 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America
1. To Fidel Castro and his lieutenants, the fu-
-ture of the Cuban revolution is indissolubly linked
to the "anti-imperialist struggle" in the rest of
Latin America. The Cuban revolution, in their view,
is simply the first victory in the wider revolution
that is "inevitably" to sweep the hemisphere. More-
over, Cuban influence and assistance, they believe,
can speed up the Latin American revolutionary proc-
ess. And it is one of the basic policies of the
regime to do everything that can be done without un-
due risk to speed up this process. It has also be-
come apparent in recent months that the greater the
external and internal pressures on the Castro regime,
the higher the degree of urgency that is assigned to
this Cuban effort in Latin America. Castro, in short,
appears convinced of the undesirability of attempt-
ing to build "socialism in one country" of the hemi-
sphere; in his view, revolutionary outbreaks else-
where in the hemisphere are needed in order to re-
duce "imperialist" pressures on him and to restore
the lagging momentum of his revolution at home. He
probably also hopes that ultimately this course will
serve to lessen his dependence on the Sov.et Union.
2. These convictions of the Cuban leaders are
clearly stated in a number of public pronouncements
by Castro,
his speech on 28 September, for instance, Castro re-
ferred to the US-Cuban relationship as "a battle be-
tween the past and the future ...a battle against time,"
because while the "imperialists" believe they can
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destroy the Cuban revolution, the Cuban revolution-
aries believe that before that could take place
"many other revolutions like ours will appear on
the continent," In the most recent of a number of
similar statements, Che Guevara, speaking on 24 No-
vember, stated that "our victory" in consolidating
and defending the Cuban revolution will be the vic-
tory of all Latin America; the Latin American rev-
olutionary struggle, he said, "is also our reponsi-
bility and it is part of our daily preoccupation,"
3. After the failure of the Cuba-mounted in-
vasions of several Middle American countries during
Castro's first months in power in 1959, Castro turned
to more subtle and less risky methods of achieving
his aims. Many hundreds of Latin Americans have been
brought to Cuba for ideological indoctrination and
training in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare.
It is estimated that in 1962 alone at least 1,000
and perhaps as many as 1,500 Latin Americans received
such training in Cuba. More than th
t
a
have robabl
come to Cuba for such training this Year,
and tactical p ere. Cuban political
guidance has been transmitted to them
and Cuban propaganda has offered them incessant sup-
port. Until recently, however, the Cubans have
avoided actions that risked, implicating the Castro
regime in direct support for Latin American rev-
olutionaries. Leftist extremists were told that
they would be expected to buy or steal their own
weapons and not to expect outside assistance. The
recent confirmed exception to this policy, involv-
ing the shipment of a large quantity of weapons to
Venezuela, appears to demonstrate the increased
sense of urgency that has in recent months pervaded
the Cuban subversive dki.ve in Latin America.
--v AA 1&LaLi[l(71eQ to various leftist_ex
tremist groups in the hem's h
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4. The incontrovertible{evidence that the large
cache of arms found buried on a Venezuelan beach early
last month had come from Cuba
constitutes the most
solid proof since 1959 of major Cuban complicity in
Latin American subversive activities The approxi-
mately three tons of weapons include light automatic
rifles and ;submachine,:Kr
un;?defi
i
,
n
tly identified as
among those shipped to Cuhn
There were also inorz
rs9 oa as
Coilless rifles
and a
g
mmunition of US manufacture.
Communist documents seized by Venezuelan authorities
shortly after the discovery of the weapons indicate
that the equipment was intended for the Venezuelan
Communists' paramilitary arms the Armed Forces,of Na-
tional Liberation (FALN), The weapons were:found in
Falcon State
scene al zham ive FALN
efforts guerrilla
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9. Castro's subversive assets in Latin America
vary greatly from country to country in organization
strength, and effectiveness. Only in Venezuela does
he seem to have the capability to call on significant
elements within an active revolutionary movement to
step up terrorist activity when he so chooses. In
addition., there are serious divisions among extreme
leftist and Communist groups in many Latin American
countries, The Cubans have thus fat met with little
apparent success in their attempts to bring about
the unity of the leftist extremists in "national libera=
tion fronts" under their control or strong influence.
Their failure to accomplish this in such strategic
countries as'Argentina and Colombia is a serious weak-
ness in Cuban subversive capabilities. Nevertheless,
the alumni of Cuban training schools are a growing
band in many countries and a significant proportion
of these people can probably be considered under Cuban
control.
10. In view of the apparent weakness in Castro's
subversive assets in many Latin American countries, it
would seem that Castro's insistence that they be com-
mitted to action in the near future risks the loss of
many of these assets. This appears to be recognized by
the Cuban leaders. Che Guevara has explained publicly
that many "good revolutionaries" will be lost in the
initial stages of the struggle. But that, in his view,
is not important. What is important is that the struggle
--which he grants will be lengthy--be initiated soon.
In an article in the regime's major ideological journal,
Cuba Socialista, in September, Guevara explained that
his no_F_-"a ways necessary to wait for all the condi-
tions for revolution to exist,-the insurrectionary focal
point,can itself create the necessary conditions,"
Here Guevara seems to be saying that even if the condi-
tions in a particular country are not ripe for revolu-
tion, these conditions can be created by a determined
revolutionary leadership. Guevara also stressed the
importance of forcing a "bourgeois government" toward
progressively more oppressive actions and violence against
the people. Then, he said, the masses of the people
will side with the revolutionaries and "the struggle
will deepen so there can be no turning back,"
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